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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Recent steps to limit access to YouTube are seen as somewhat risky due to the video sharing platform’s status as the most popular social media site in Russia. Indeed, it came as no surprise when the apparent shutdown of YouTube sparked significant alarm and anger on Russian social media. Notably, no genuine alternative currently exists in Russia. The Kremlin has promoted similar domestic platforms such as VK Video and RuTube, but these options have not been able to rival the popularity or audience reach of YouTube itself.

There are additional indications that the Kremlin may now be seeking to strengthen its control over the information space and further cut Russia off from the outside world. On August 9, Roskomnadzor blocked access to Signal, a messaging app that allows for end-to-end encrypted communications. Reports also continue to circulate that the Kremlin is preparing to take similar steps against messenger platform WhatsApp.

Recent measures to prevent Russians from accessing YouTube represent the latest escalation in the Kremlin’s campaign to dominate the domestic information space and eliminate all independent media in today’s Russia. Over the past twenty-four years, Vladimir Putin has created a powerful propaganda machine that has proved instrumental in legitimizing his own increasingly dictatorial rule and mobilizing public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Popular social media platforms like YouTube remain outside of Moscow’s control and therefore pose a significant threat to the Kremlin censors. With Ukrainian troops now advancing inside Russia itself, it would seem that this threat can no longer be tolerated.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s dramatic change in tactics comes after almost a year of slow but steady Russian gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since 2023, Russian commanders have been deploying their country’s overwhelming manpower and firepower advantages to gradually pummel Ukrainian forces into submission. The Kremlin’s reliance on brute force has proved costly but effective, leaving the Ukrainian military with little choice but to think outside the box.

It has long been obvious that fighting a war of attrition is a losing strategy for Ukraine. The country’s military leaders cannot hope to compete with Russia’s far larger resources and have no desire to match the Kremlin’s disregard for casualties. The Kursk offensive is an attempt to break out of this suffocating situation by returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that favors the more agile and innovative Ukrainian military. So far, it seems to be working.

While bringing Vladimir Putin’s invasion home to Russia has undeniable strategic and emotional appeal, many commentators have questioned why Ukraine would want to occupy Russian territory. The most obvious explanation is that Kyiv seeks bargaining chips to exchange for Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands during future negotiations.

The significant quantity of Russian POWs captured during the offensive also opens up possibilities to bring more imprisoned Ukrainian soldiers home. Meanwhile, control over swathes of Kursk Oblast could make it possible to disrupt the logistical chains supplying the Russian army in Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

The case for the United States and China working together in space

Dan Hart — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 14:55:11 +0000

In the fall of 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent then Senator Lyndon B Johnson to the United Nations (UN) with the proposal that “the exploration of outer space be undertaken for peaceful purposes, as an enterprise of international cooperation among all member nations.” The resolution reflected a growing aspiration that nations would join together in exploring the cosmos and in doing so find a common purpose.

The vision was amplified by Johnson when he became president. In a letter to the Senate in 1967, he emphasized that cooperation in space would provide a basis by which to avoid confrontational national tendencies, thereby leading to substantial contributions toward peace. The historic US Apollo and Soviet Union Soyuz (Apollo-Soyuz) docking in July 1975 was heralded as a first step toward meaningful space cooperation between otherwise adversarial nations. The image of astronauts and cosmonauts welcoming each other across their open spacecraft hatchways sparked an optimism and a sense of unity that inspired the world community. NASA astronaut Tom Stafford said that opening the hatch in space opened a “new era” back on Earth.

The current state of space diplomacy

Today, the International Space Station is a testament to multinational cooperation, persisting despite seismic geopolitical shifts. The partnership between the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia has required a myriad of joint engineering projects and mutual reliance on resources despite monumental earthly tensions—a striking step forward in space diplomacy.

In recent years, however, hostility between the United States on one hand and Russia and China on the other has overshadowed the core tenets of space cooperation. The realization that space is not only an arena for scientific exploration and economic competition, but of future military conflict, has come to the fore. Although the United States and forty-two other nations have recently agreed to a set of principles for the peaceful exploration of space, known as the Artemis Accords, there exists no such agreement with other key space-faring nations, most notably China and Russia.

Parallel lunar ambitions

The United States and its allies are developing a major space program to return to the moon and establish a permanent presence with a lunar base and an orbiting lunar space station. The project has ignited public excitement and forged new agreements between the United States and partner nations. At the same time, China is leading a very similar project called the International Lunar Research Station to establish a permanent lunar presence, working with Russia and several other countries, including Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, and South Africa.

Two groups of nations separately working on the same goal, establishing separate lunar bases with no cooperation between them is a disappointing setback from earlier achievements. One might ask: What happened to the spirit that drove the handshake on Apollo-Soyuz?

There are of course challenges and barriers to sparking and sustaining cooperation. The growing conflicts on Earth and the threats posed by anti-satellite weapons provide arguments against initiating a dialogue. However, similar dynamics were present in the past, when leaders decided to work together to embrace the common objectives of exploring the cosmos and harvesting space for the betterment of life on Earth. Despite major tensions and conflicts, the two sides gained a measure of mutual understanding and respect for each other’s humanity through the efforts of scientists, engineers, and astronauts, as they joined in a common purpose.

Starting points for US-China space cooperation

The logical question is: Given substantial concerns regarding military hostility in space, where should the United States and China start? How can they find common ground in an environment of such intense mistrust?

Washington and Beijing can begin with a principle that has already been agreed upon and that touches a core human value. The UN Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement came into effect in 1968. It commits nations to come to the assistance of astronauts in distress, no matter what country they launched from. It was a noble step forward, and a theme largely taken from the finest of maritime traditions. The agreement, however, is hollow without plans, procedures, and systems in place to enable meaningful action. Spaceships and space suits are complex and unique, and without forethought and the right equipment it is highly unlikely that astronauts from separate nations could possibly provide any meaningful aid. For instance, how would a Chinese astronaut connect and supply the right pressure to provide oxygen to an American astronaut in distress without first having the right connecting gear and knowing the pressure settings? How can countries make their ships compatible to dock if medical support is needed? What would be the communication protocols to use when determining whether assistance is necessary?

A bilateral working group between NASA and China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) should be established to prepare for joint rescue operations. This interaction would lead to improved communication between the respective space communities. The collaboration would also establish readiness for potential rescue missions, which would have profound benefits in the event that an astronaut rescue was needed.

Once the rescue working group is formed, further bilateral agreements should be pursued. These could include mutual use of lunar communication and navigation services, as well as agreements on providing consumables, power, habitats, and transport.

What steps does the United States need to take? The United States should repeal the Wolf Amendment, which was put in place in 2011 due to concerns about space technology transfer to China. The establishment of this barrier has not slowed China’s space technology development. Instead, it has only hindered useful interchange between NASA and the CNSA.

And China? Beijing should foster more open communication with the United States regarding norms of behavior in space exploration and the preservation of the space environment. It should take a leading role in space sustainability, including being transparent about its plans to remedy issues with the Long March 6A rocket that broke apart earlier this month and left significant space debris. China should also initiate discussions to join moratoria on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing, which it has so far opposed.

Eisenhower and Johnson advocated for cooperation to prevent misunderstandings and mistrust from growing into armed conflict in space. They saw the need to take firm steps to avoid such a tragic result. To that end, the United States and China must now take swift steps to initiate space cooperation and lead a more unified world into the final frontier.

Dan Hart is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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NATO must recognize the potential of open-source intelligence

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.), Robert Bassett Cross MC — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 19:02:28 +0000

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a former UK military representative to NATO and served as director general of the NATO International Military Staff from 2013 to 2016. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an adviser to companies, including Accenture and Adarga, which provide AI tools for processing open-source information, including for public-sector clients.

Robert Bassett Cross is a former British Army officer and the founder and CEO of the UK-headquartered AI software developer Adarga. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an honorary research fellow at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute.

Writing in 1946, just a few years before NATO was founded, Director of the US Office of Strategic Services Bill Donovan knew precisely how valuable publicly available information could be.

“[E]ven a regimented press,” he wrote, “will again and again betray the national interest to a painstaking observer . . . Pamphlets, periodicals, scientific journals are mines of intelligence.”

Today, seventy-five years after the Alliance was formed, such open-source intelligence (OSINT) is more important—and more powerful—than ever. However, underinvestment in OSINT capabilities and a culture favoring classified data currently hold back member states’ intelligence-collection potential. To fully utilize the available technology to detect threats from adversaries, NATO member states must overcome these barriers to embrace open-source intelligence enabled by artificial intelligence (AI).

Understanding the threat landscape

OSINT can help leaders get a fast, up-to-date understanding of their operating environment. If you want to know who’s doing what, where, and when, then an open-source specialist can quickly tell you.

If, for example, you want to find out who’s jamming GPS systems in the Baltic region, the relevant data isn’t hard to come by. Similarly, OSINT analysts can provide insights into issues ranging from the effectiveness of Iran’s attack on Israel (and the Israeli response) to China’s current role in fueling the Russian war machine.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that, in addition to insight into current and recent events, OSINT can help leaders forecast what an adversary might be planning to do weeks, months, or even years from now.

By exploiting OSINT more fully and by integrating it into the wider intelligence cycle, NATO can preempt, deter, and defeat its adversaries’ efforts to expand their influence and undermine the security of member states. Here are several ways that OSINT can be used:

Across the physical domains of land, air, sea, and space, NATO can exploit publicly and commercially available data to explore an adversary’s order of battle and—more importantly—monitor changes in the strength and disposition of its military units and formations to infer its intent.
In the cyber domain, NATO can leverage commercially available information to detect and counter the penetration of networks governing critical infrastructure, as well as those related to research organizations, academic institutions, and technology developers.
In the information space, OSINT can help NATO identify, understand, and counter influence campaigns, specifically when it comes to the detection and attribution of disinformation and misinformation.
NATO can draw on vast swaths of open-source data to infer long-term strategic intent. Every subtle change to a government’s policies, every adjustment to its economic positioning and investment strategy, every new law and regulation it enacts, every new treaty and trade agreement—all of these can help the Alliance reverse engineer an adversary’s confidential playbooks.

Given the vast quantity, complexity, and diversity of the data, it is vital that NATO employs AI to extract the maximum value from it—to enhance analysts’ abilities, accelerate the analysis cycle, and build a reliable, contextual understanding of what Donovan called “the strategy developing silently behind the mask.”

The barriers to OSINT adoption

While AI is, of course, an emerging technology, its utility is already being realized across industries and sectors outside defense. From corporate intelligence and advisory services to finance and media, more and more private-sector organizations are using AI to make sense of the information environment, drawing on an ever-expanding range of sources to manage risk, identify opportunities, and adapt to geopolitical volatility.

However, the barriers to its widespread adoption and effective exploitation in political and military circles remain considerable. A paper published in 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in collaboration with the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute, identified three in particular.

First, there are tradecraft barriers relating to the methodologies governing everything from the analysis of publicly available information to the evaluation and dissemination of the resulting intelligence. Second, there are resourcing barriers stemming from underinvestment in the requisite tools, technologies, data sets, and training.

The third barrier identified by the RUSI authors—and the most daunting one—is cultural. Presented with so much open-source data, analysts and decision makers tend to favor classified information and internal data sets. These sources and insights are easier to trust and are imbued with what the authors call “the perceived power of the ‘secret’ label.”

Speaking at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris in June, US Major General Matthew Van Wagenen, deputy chief of staff for operations at NATO, confirmed how great this cultural barrier is. Up to 90 percent of “what Western militaries are looking for,” he said, can be derived from open sources:

This is a revolution in how we look at information. The ways of discerning information through classical means and techniques, tactics, and procedures that militaries have been adapted to—that’s really an old model of doing business. The new open source that’s out there right now, and the speed of information and relevance of information is coming, this is how things need to be looked at.

It is reasonable to believe that the tradecraft and resourcing barriers can be overcome. Methodologies are evolving swiftly, as are the requisite technologies. In fact, many of the tools NATO needs to capitalize on OSINT already exist. New AI applications are coming online almost every week. But if NATO fails to overcome the cultural barrier, it risks going into the next conflict underinformed and ill-prepared.

How AI-enabled OSINT can earn NATO leaders’ confidence

The cultural barrier to AI-enabled OSINT cannot be surmounted simply by decree or directive. Nor can it be overcome by intelligence professionals alone. The technology—and the discipline—must earn the justified confidence of civilian leaders and military commanders across the international staff, the military committee, and the supporting agencies. This could happen if AI-enabled OSINT were applied first to the simplest intelligence-gathering tasks before being applied to the most complex. To borrow the terminology made famous by former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, NATO should apply the discipline to corroborating “known knowns,” resolving “known unknowns,” and surfacing “unknown unknowns.”

Corroborating “known knowns”: NATO should start by recognizing where the skills of the human analyst currently outperform even the most sophisticated models, and where AI can best be applied to elevate these skills. This means asking the right kind of questions, and employing OSINT to corroborate what is already known and to triangulate insights gathered from well-established secret sources. In this way, NATO can begin to overcome the skepticism that’s too often associated with publicly available information and OSINT.

Resolving “known unknowns”: With so much data to draw on, it is essential that NATO uses AI to help collate, process, and (where necessary) translate that data so it is ready for analysts to interpret. If AI-enabled OSINT can prove useful to intelligence professionals in this capacity, those professionals may be more willing to apply it to the most complex and valuable intelligence tasks of all—surfacing risks and opportunities that civilian and military leaders would otherwise struggle to identify.

Surfacing “unknown unknowns”: Perhaps the greatest contribution that AI can make to the intelligence-gathering discipline is identifying patterns and connections that are invisible to the human eye. Dedicated, AI-powered information-intelligence applications that synthesize publicly available information with proprietary data can help analysts and decision makers tease out insights they would otherwise miss.

This combination of publicly available information with classified data will enable NATO analysts to give military and political leaders a uniquely rich, nuanced, and highly contextualized understanding of the operating environment. Decision makers at every level will be able to examine intelligence from every angle, and apply their experience and imagination to infer an adversary’s intentions based on the interplay of evidence.

The critical need for human-machine teaming

The necessary tools and methodologies exist. What’s missing is the determination to get these tools into users’ hands, to supply the requisite training, and to capitalize on the integrated output derived from all sources of intelligence, open-source and otherwise.

OSINT is becoming known among some intelligence professionals as “the intelligence of first resort.” Compared with clandestine methods of information gathering and analysis, OSINT is fast, low-cost, and low-risk. But if it can be combined with those same methods then NATO’s analysts and leadership will have an enduring competitive edge, with access to the kind of strategic information that would likely be, in Bill Donovan’s words, “of determining influence in modern war.”

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 15:19:36 +0000

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is now in its second week and the sense of shock is still tangible. The Ukrainian military was able to achieve almost total surprise when it crossed the border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6. While the ultimate goals of the operation remain subject to much debate, Ukraine’s success in catching the Russians completely off-guard is a considerable accomplishment in its own right.

The Ukrainian military’s ability to maintain a veil of secrecy around preparations for the current operation is all the more remarkable given the evidence from the first two-and-a-half years of Russia’s invasion. The war in Ukraine has been marked by the growing importance of drone and electromagnetic surveillance, creating what most analysts agree is a remarkably transparent battlefield. This is making it more and more difficult for either army to benefit from the element of surprise.

Given the increased visibility on both sides of the front lines, how did Ukraine manage to spring such a surprise? At this stage there is very little detailed information available about Ukraine’s preparations, but initial reports indicate that unprecedented levels of operational silence and the innovative deployment of Ukraine’s electronic warfare capabilities played important roles.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Tech regulation requires balancing security, privacy, and usability

Karen Sowon, Giulia Fanti, JP Schnapper-Casteras — Mon, 12 Aug 2024 14:44:33 +0000

In the United States and across the globe, governments continue to grapple with how to regulate new and increasingly complex technologies, including in the realm of financial services. While they might be tempted to clamp down or impose strict centralized security requirements, recent history suggests that policymakers should jointly consider and balance usability and privacy—and approach their goals as if they were a product designer.

Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations.

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s.

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card.

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together.

Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy.

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback.

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.

Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.

Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 12 Aug 2024 02:15:22 +0000

In the early hours of August 6, units of the Ukrainian army crossed the border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in a surprise move that ended a two-and-a-half year taboo over military operations on Russian soil. The goals of this ambitious Kursk incursion are still shrouded in mystery and subject to much debate, but it is already clear that Ukraine’s decision to invade Russia has succeeded in making a complete mockery of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and the West’s fears of escalation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive is a watershed moment in the current war and an historic milestone in its own right. For the first time since World War II, Russia has been invaded by a foreign army. Initial reports indicate that this ambitious operation was prepared amid great secrecy over a period of months. Ukraine managed to catch the Russians completely off-guard, with Ukrainian forces advancing tens of kilometers into Kursk Oblast during the first days of the campaign.

Ukraine’s political and military leaders have so far remained remarkably tight-lipped about the invasion, saying very little publicly and providing few details. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of likely objectives.

Ukraine’s most obvious intention is probably to ease the military pressure in the south and east of the country, where Russia has been slowly but steadily advancing in recent months. By attacking across the lightly defended border and seizing Russian territory, Ukrainian commanders believe they can force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from the front lines of the war in Ukraine in order to redeploy them for the defense of Russia itself.

The offensive also creates opportunities for Ukraine to regain the military initiative after a year of costly and demoralizing defensive operations. It has long been obvious that Ukraine cannot realistically hope to win a war of attrition against the far larger and wealthier Russian Federation. Kyiv’s best chance of military success lies in returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that allows Ukrainian commanders to take advantage of their relative agility while exploiting the Russian army’s far more cumbersome decision-making processes. This is exactly what the invasion of Kursk Oblast has achieved.

In psychological terms, bringing the war home to Russia has allowed Ukraine to strike a powerful blow against enemy morale. The Ukrainian army’s advances in Kursk Oblast are spreading panic throughout the surrounding region and undermining Putin’s efforts to prevent the invasion of Ukraine from disrupting the daily lives of ordinary Russians. On the home front, Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive has provided Ukrainian society with a desperately needed morale boost, reviving hopes that the war-weary nation can still achieve meaningful military success.

The Kursk offensive may ultimately be part of Ukraine’s preparations for a future peace process, with Kyiv looking to occupy as much Russian territory as possible to use as a bargaining chip in any negotiations with the Kremlin. Indeed, during the initial days of the invasion, there was widespread speculation that Ukraine’s primary target may be the Kursk nuclear power plant, with a view to trading it for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine. An eventual land swap on a far larger scale may be part of Kyiv’s calculations.

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The Ukrainian army’s advance into Russia has profound implications for perceptions of the war. It directly challenges the widespread belief that Russia’s invasion has reached a stalemate and can no longer be decided on the battlefield. Crucially, it also exposes the emptiness of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and the folly of the West’s emphasis on escalation management.

Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, the international response has been hindered by fear of escalation. Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin, who has used thinly veiled nuclear threats and frequent talk of Russian red lines to restrict the flow of military aid and convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia. As a result, Ukraine has effectively been forced to wage war with one hand tied behind its back.

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What we are currently witnessing is entirely in line with a well-established pattern of Russian threats being exposed as bluffs by Ukrainian boldness. During the first year of the war as Putin prepared to announce the annexation of occupied Ukrainian city Kherson, he warned that any attempt to reclaim this “Russian land” would result in a nuclear reply. “I’m not bluffing,” he famously declared. But when Ukraine liberated Kherson just weeks later, Putin did not reach for the nuclear button. Instead, he ordered his beaten troops to quietly retreat.

Russia’s reaction to wartime setbacks in Crimea has been similarly underwhelming. The 2014 seizure of the Ukrainian peninsula remains Putin’s crowning glory and serves as the basis for his claim to a place in Russian history alongside the country’s greatest rulers. Nevertheless, when Ukraine deployed missiles and marine drones to sink or disable around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, there was no apocalyptic response from the Kremlin. On the contrary, Putin instructed his remaining warships to withdraw from Crimea and seek safety in Russian ports.

This record of inglorious Russian retreats makes the West’s frequently voiced fear of escalation all the more difficult to justify. Ukrainians will now be hoping Putin’s characteristically weak response to the Kursk offensive can persuade Western leaders to belatedly abandon their failed policies of escalation management and acknowledge that the quickest way to end the war is by arming Ukraine for victory.

There are some indications that attitudes among Ukraine’s Western allies may finally be changing. The EU has led the way, with European Commission spokesperson Peter Thano responding to the Ukrainian cross-border push into Kursk Oblast by saying Ukraine has the “legitimate right” to defend itself, including inside Russia. Berlin has reacted in the same manner, with the German Foreign Ministry issuing a statement confirming that Ukraine’s right to self defense “is not limited to its own territory.” Meanwhile, US officials have also signaled their approval. “Ukraine is doing what it needs to do to be successful on the battlefield,” commented a Pentagon official.

This broadly supportive international reaction is welcome news for Ukraine, but officials in Kyiv are also well aware that further steps are required in order to set the stage for Putin’s eventual defeat. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underlined this point in his August 11 evening address, when he once again called for the lifting of all Western restrictions on long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. Until that happens, Moscow will retain the ability to pummel Ukrainian cities at will and Putin will have little reason to end his invasion.

The West has spent more than two years slow-walking military aid to Ukraine for fear of provoking Putin. And yet time after time, Ukraine has proved that whenever the Russian dictator is confronted with the prospect of defeat, he is far more likely to retreat than escalate. Now that the Ukrainian military has crossed the last of Putin’s red lines and invaded Russia without sparking World War III, there are no more excuses for restricting Kyiv’s ability to defend itself or denying Ukraine the weapons it needs to win the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Long-range attack drones are a good fit for Ukraine’s limited offensive capabilities. Kyiv needs to be able to strike military targets inside Russia, but is prevented from doing do with Western-supplied missiles due to restrictions imposed by the country’s partners. While Ukraine has some capacity to produce its own missiles domestically, this is insufficient for a sustained bombing campaign.

Drones are enabling Ukraine to overcome these obstacles. Ukrainian drone production has expanded dramatically over the past two-and-a-half years. The low cost of manufacturing a long-range drone relative to the damage it can cause to Russian military and industrial facilities makes it in many ways the ideal weapon for a cash-strapped but innovative nation like Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drone industry is a diverse ecosystem featuring hundreds of participating companies producing different models. The Ukrainian military has used a variety of drones with different characteristics for attacks inside Russia, making the campaign even more challenging for Russia’s air defenses.

The decentralized nature of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing sector also makes it difficult for Russia to target. Even if the Kremlin is able to identify and hit individual production sites located across Ukraine, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s overall output.

Since 2022, Ukraine has taken a number of steps to reduce bureaucracy and streamline cooperation between drone makers and the military. The result is a sector capable of adapting to changing battlefield conditions and able to implement innovations quickly and effectively. This includes efforts to create AI-enabled drones capable of functioning without an operator, making it far more difficult for Russia to jam.

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As it expands, Ukraine’s drone bombing campaign is exposing the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Defending a territory as vast as Russia against air strikes would be problematic even in peacetime. With much of Russia’s existing air defense systems currently deployed along the front lines in Ukraine, there are now far fewer systems available to protect industrial and military targets inside Russia.

During the initial stages of the war, this shortage of air defense coverage was not a major issue. However, Ukraine’s broadening bombing offensive is now forcing Russia to make tough decisions regarding the distribution of its limited air defenses.

In addition to strategically important sites such as airbases, the Kremlin must also defend prestige targets from possible attack. In July, CNN reported that air defenses had been significantly strengthened around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summer residence. Protecting Putin’s palace from attack is necessary to avoid embarrassment, but it means leaving other potential targets exposed.

Ukraine’s drone program is the biggest success story to emerge from the country’s vibrant defense tech sector, and is helping Ukraine to even out the odds against its far larger and wealthier adversary. The country’s partners clearly recognize the importance of drones for the Ukrainian military, and have formed a drone coalition to increase the supply of drones from abroad. This combination of international support and Ukrainian ingenuity spells trouble for Russia. It will likely lead to increasingly powerful and plentiful long-range strikes in the months ahead.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Isabel Chiriboga, Maite Gonzalez Latorre, Diego Area — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

The sixth of a six-part series following up on the Ninth Summit of the Americas commitments.

An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

Leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda.

Establish formal partnerships between governments and local and international universities to broaden affordable student access to exchange programs, internships, and capacity-building sessions in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Programs should be tailored to country-specific economic interests and sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Tailoring these programs can also help enhance students’ access to the labor market upon graduation.
Ensure existing and new digital capacity-building programs leverage diaspora professionals. Implement virtual workshops, webinars, and collaborative projects that transfer knowledge and skills from technologically advanced regions to local communities. Leveraging these connections will help ensure programs are contextually relevant and effective.
Build on existing intraregional cooperation mechanisms and alliances to incorporate commitments of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation. Incorporating summit commitments to mechanisms such as the Alliance for Development in Democracy, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, and other subregional partnerships can result in greater sustainability of commitments as these alliances tend to transcend finite political agendas.
Propose regional policies to standardize the recognition of digital nomads and remote workers, including visa programs, tax incentives, and employment regulations. This harmonization will facilitate job creation for young professionals and enhance regional connectivity.

Prioritize workforce development for traditionally marginalized groups by strengthening public-private partnerships and multisectoral collaboration.

Establish periodic and open dialogues between the public and private sectors to facilitate the implementation of targeted digital transformation for key sectors of a country’s economy that can enhance and modernize productivity. For instance, provide farmers with digital tools for precision agriculture, train health care workers in telemedicine technologies, and support tourism operators in developing online marketing strategies.
Foster direct lines of communication with multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Engaging in periodic dialogues with these actors will minimize duplication of efforts and maximize the impact of existing strategies and lines of work devoted to creating digital societies that are more resilient and inclusive. Existing and new programs should be paired with employment opportunities and competitive salaries for marginalized groups based on the acquired skills, thereby creating strong incentives to pursue education in digital skills.
Collaborate with telecommunications companies to offer subsidized internet packages for low-income households and small businesses and simplify regulatory frameworks to attract investment in rural and underserved areas, expanding internet coverage and accessibility.
Enhance coordination with private sector and multilateral partners to create a joint road map for sustained financing of digital infrastructure and workforce development to improve investment conditions in marginalized and traditionally excluded regions and cities.

Increase engagement with local youth groups and civil society organizations to help ensure digital transformation agendas are viable and in line with local contexts.

Facilitate periodic dialogues with civil society organizations, the private sector , and government officials and ensure that consultative meetings are taking place at remote locations to ensure participation from disadvantaged populations in the digital space. Include women, children, and persons with disabilities to ensure capacity programs are generating desired impact and being realigned to address challenges faced by key, targeted communities.
Work with local actors such as youth groups and civil society organizations to conduct widespread awareness campaigns to help communities visualize the benefits of digital skills and technology use. Utilize success stories and case studies to show how individuals and businesses can thrive in a digital economy, fostering a culture of innovation and adaptation.
Invest in local innovation ecosystems by providing grants and incentives for start-ups and small businesses working on digital solutions. Create business incubators and accelerators to support the growth of digital enterprises, particularly those addressing local challenges.
Offer partnership opportunities with governments to provide seed capital, contests, digital boot camps, and mentorship sessions specifically designed for girls and women in school or college to help bridge the gender digital divide.

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F-16 jets will help defend Ukrainian cities from Russian bombardment

Olena Tregub — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 12:44:30 +0000

The recent appearance of F-16 fighter jets in the skies above Ukraine is a victory for all Ukrainians, and particularly for the relatively small group of people who worked tirelessly to promote the idea of delivering the planes. The push to secure F-16s began as a grassroots effort initiated by Ukrainian civil society and the military, before being taken on by the country’s political leadership. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was then able to convince Ukraine’s allies to create an F-16 coalition. In many ways, the process was a great example of teamwork involving different segments of Ukrainian society.

Ukraine’s efforts to persuade partner countries focused on the US, which had to grant permission as the manufacturer of F-16s. Ukrainian pilot Andriy Pilschikov deserves a special mention for the key role he played in the campaign to win American backing. A fluent English speaker and experienced air force pilot known to many by his callsign “Juice,” Pilschikov became the unofficial public face of Ukraine’s appeal for F-16s. Crucially, he was able to articulate why the F-16 was the best choice for Ukraine, arguing that it was the most widely available modern jet and relatively easy to use.

In the initial months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there was no consensus over which aircraft Ukraine should request from the country’s allies. Various Ukrainian government officials mentioned a range of different models, leading to some confusion. Pilschikov provided much-needed clarity and managed to convince everyone to focus their efforts specifically on the F-16. With support from Ukrainian civil society, he personally travelled to the US and established productive relationships with a number of US officials and members of Congress.

US President Joe Biden finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with F-16s in summer 2023. However, it would take another year before the the Ukrainian Air Force received the first batch of jets. Sadly, Pilschikov did not live to see this historic day. The pilot who did so much to secure F-16s for his country was killed in a mid-air collision during a training exercise in August 2023.

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Despite achieving a breakthrough in summer 2023, the process of preparing for the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine proved frustratingly slow. Ukrainian pilots spent many months training, with only a limited number of slots made available. As a result, Ukraine still has very few pilots able to fly F-16s. Identifying and upgrading Ukrainian airfields capable of accommodating F-16s also created challenges.

The planes that Ukraine has received from the country’s European partners are from the older generation, which is being phased out elsewhere as air forces transition to more modern models. This imposes some limitations on the functions Ukraine’s F-16 fleet can perform. Limited radar reach means that deployment of F-16s on the front lines of the war is seen as too risky, as they could be shot down by both Russian aircraft and Russian air defenses.

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With a combat role unlikely at this stage, Ukrainian F-16s will primarily be used to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The planes Kyiv has received are ideally suited to the task of shooting down the Russian missiles and drones that are regularly fired at Ukrainian cities and vital infrastructure.

Their effectiveness in this role will depend on the kinds of missiles they are armed with. F-16s can carry a range of armaments that are more advanced that the types of weapons used by the majority of planes in service with the Russian Air Force. Initial indications are encouraging, with the first F-16s arriving in Ukraine complete with weapons ideally suited to air defense. It is now vital for Ukrainian officials and members of civil society to focus their advocacy efforts on securing sufficient numbers of missiles from partner countries.

Ukraine should also prioritize the supply of long-range radar detection aircraft, such as the planes recently promised by Sweden. In May 2024, the Swedes announced plans to deliver two surveillance aircraft as part of the Scandinavian nation’s largest support package to date. These “eyes in the sky” can monitor airspace for hundreds of kilometers. Together with Ukraine’s growing F-16 fleet, they will significantly enhance the country’s air defenses.

As Ukraine acquires more F-16s in the coming months, and as the country’s limited pool of pilots grows in size and experience, we will likely see these jets used in more adventurous ways. This may include targeting Russian planes and helicopters operating close to the front lines with long-range strikes. For now, though, the main task of Ukraine’s F-16s will be to improve the country’s air defenses and protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment.

Olena Tregub is Executive Director of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), a member of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Sailing through the spyglass: The strategic advantages of blue OSINT, ubiquitous sensor networks, and deception

Guido L. Torres and Austin Gray — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 10:43:41 +0000

In today’s technologically enabled world, the movements of every vessel—from nimble fishing boats to colossal aircraft carriers—can be meticulously tracked by a massive network of satellites and sensors. With every ripple on the ocean’s surface under scrutiny, surprise naval maneuvers will soon be relics of the past. The vast expanse of the world’s oceans will no longer be shrouded in mystery, but illuminated by data streams flowing from millions of eyes and ears aware of every movement from space to seabed.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) refers to intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. OSINT encompasses a wide range of sources, including public records, news media, libraries, social media platforms, images, videos, websites, and even the dark web. Commercial technical collection and imagery satellites also provide valuable open-source data. The power of OSINT lies in its ability to provide meaningful, actionable intelligence from diverse and readily available sources.

Thanks to technological advances, OSINT can provide early warning signs of a conflict to come long before it actually breaks out. On land, the proliferation of inexpensive and ubiquitous sensor networks has rendered battlefields almost transparent, making surprise maneuvers more difficult. Through open-source data from smartphones and satellites, persistent OSINT provides early warning of mobilization and other key indicators of military maneuvers. This capability is further augmented by artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced reconnaissance and real-time data analysis, which have proven remarkably effective in modern conflicts including in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Gaza and Israel, and Sudan. As this paradigm extends to maritime operations, it brings unique challenges and characteristics compared to land operations.

As technology races forward, Blue OSINT stands out as a key tool in the arsenal of contemporary naval warfare during global great-power competition. Blue OSINT harnesses data from commercial satellites, social media, and other publicly available sources to specifically enhance maritime domain awareness, identify emerging threats, and inform strategic decisions.

The current state of Blue OSINT across the spectrum of conflict points to an accelerating technology-driven evolution enabling maritime security and sea-control missions. The US Navy (USN) can enhance Blue OSINT collection with its own commercially procured sensor networks and bespoke uncrewed systems to shape operational environments, prevent and resolve conflicts, and ensure accessibility of sea lines of communications.

Commercially procured sensors span a wide array of technologies, including sonar and acoustic sensors, as well as video and seismic devices that are utilized to detect activities in strategic locations. These sensors can function independently or operate from uncrewed systems, providing flexibility and adaptability in various maritime operations. For instance, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) equipped with high-resolution cameras and radar can deliver persistent surveillance over expansive oceanic areas, while uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) with sonar capabilities can monitor subsea activities, such as submarine movements and underwater installations. These uncrewed platforms enable the continuous collection of critical data, enhancing the Navy’s situational awareness and operational readiness without putting sailors at risk.

For the US Navy to best support the joint force and maintain its strategic edge, it must integrate ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT into naval strategies adapted for tomorrow’s increasingly complex maritime environment. The Navy’s multiyear Project Overmatch is a good start to developing its “network of networks” and contributing to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program.

With escalating tensions in the South China Sea, conventional forces are stretched thin and face asymmetric threats such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s undersea sensing arrays and China’s maritime militia forces. Integrating Blue OSINT and sensor networks into the Navy’s strategies complements traditional naval power, while allowing intelligence missions to be conducted at lower risk and cost. Moreover, the open-source nature of this information enhances the Navy’s ability to share information and collaborate with allies and partners while bypassing cumbersome security classification issues. By relying on easily shareable information, the Navy can better synchronize efforts with partner navies, making command of the sea a more coordinated and viable endeavor.

The impact of evolving open-source intelligence on warfare

Feature	OSINT	Traditional Intelligence
Source of data	Commercial satellites, social media, public sources	HUMINT, SIGINT, classified sources
Coverage	Global, real-time updates, highly accessible	Selective, based on specific operational requirements
Cost	Low cost, leveraging existing commercial infrastructure	High cost, involving extensive human and technical resources
Risk	Low risk, minimal direct exposure	Higher risk, involves clandestine operations
Data volume	Extremely high, necessitates AI and advanced analytics	Moderate to high, manageable with traditional methods
Ease of sharing	High, fewer classification issues	Low, often restricted by security classifications
Data warning	Effective, provides pre-conflict indicators	Effective, but often limited by operational scope
Deception tactics	Requires advanced techniques to counteract	Relies on traditional counterintelligence and technical methods
Collaboration	Enhances collaboration with allies using open data	Limited, restricted sharing due to classification
Operational impact	Supports continuous monitoring and quick response	Supports deep, targeted insights into adversaries

The table above provides a comparison between OSINT and traditional intelligence methods, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. OSINT offers global, real-time updates at a lower cost by leveraging existing commercial infrastructure. This approach presents a lower risk, as it involves minimal direct exposure and facilitates easier information sharing due to fewer classification issues.

On the other hand, traditional intelligence methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) provide selective, targeted insights based on specific operational requirements. These methods often involve higher costs and risks due to the need for extensive human and technical resources, as well as the nature of clandestine operations. While traditional intelligence can offer deep, targeted insights, it is often limited by operational scope and security classification issues, making information sharing more challenging.

In the maritime domain, these distinctions are particularly significant. The concept of Blue OSINT integrates these principles specifically for naval operations, emphasizing the need for continuous monitoring and rapid-response capabilities.

Blue OSINT and persistent maritime monitoring

In the pre-conflict stage, global satellite coverage and social media provide a wealth of data that can map maritime activity with unprecedented detail. Nonprofit organizations like Global Fishing Watch use commercial satellite constellations to track ships and monitor maritime activity. Increased affordability and accessibility of satellite technology have enabled nongovernmental and commercial entities to contribute to maritime domain awareness in new ways. For instance, maritime radar emissions—once the exclusive domain of military and intelligence satellites—are now easily observable and “tweetable,” allowing for vessel identification to be accomplished more easily when actors execute deceptive techniques. Similarly, platforms like X (formerly Twitter) host numerous “ship spotting” accounts, where enthusiasts post photos and updates of vessels passing through strategic chokepoints and major straits, further enriching the available data.

Through persistent monitoring and large-scale data analysis, Blue OSINT can be used to significantly mitigate the challenge of monitoring large exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It offers a cost-effective alternative to traditional patrols, allowing these navies to adopt a more targeted approach when deploying their limited resources. By embracing Blue OSINT, naval forces can enhance their surveillance and response capabilities without a heavy financial burden, ensuring that these forces remain agile and effective in their maritime operations. Additionally, data streams from ubiquitous sensor networks can be coupled with Blue OSINT collection to give naval intelligence experts near-endless amounts of data in support of complex reconnaissance operations, without placing sailors and special operators at increased risk to collect it.

In addition to myriad opportunities for intelligence collection, using Blue OSINT presents technological challenges for the US Navy. The sheer volume of data generated by ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT tools necessitate substantial investments in software and analytic tools to manage and interpret this information effectively. Intelligence professionals must sift through endless amounts of data to identify actionable insights. Even the most skilled analysts need software and computer processing that can help organize and parse raw data.

To address these challenges, the US Navy and other maritime forces are ramping up investments in commercially procured sensor networks and cutting-edge analytic tools. In June 2024, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency issued its first-ever commercial solicitation for unclassified technology to help track illicit fishing in the Pacific. Such investments aim to access, exploit, and process the massive amounts of data generated, a key step to achieving comprehensive maritime domain awareness. Better software and analytic tools can help maximize the potential of Blue OSINT and sensor networks, ensuring that intelligence analysts can better inform decision-makers at the speed of relevance.

Strategic deployment of distributed sensors

While Blue OSINT provides valuable insights into chokepoints and shipping lanes, it does not yet offer comprehensive coverage of the open ocean. Its effectiveness is greater in populated and coastal areas, where the density of electronic devices and human activity is significantly higher than on the high seas. Moreover, OSINT data can often be easily manipulated, presenting challenges in ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the information gathered. For example, although ships emitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals can be tracked on the web, navies are aware that bad actors often tamper with their transponders in order to disguise their locations, ultimately limiting the signals’ reliability.

To bypass these limitations of open-source data, navies and intelligence agencies can enhance their Blue OSINT capabilities by augmenting them with strategically deployed clandestine sensor networks in key locations, such as harbors, straits, and other critical chokepoints. This combination of data flows allows for effective monitoring and data collection on vessel movements, communications, and adversary intentions. Additionally, other covert sensors can be hidden on the seabed or disguised on civilian vessels, like fishing boats, in regions such as the South China Sea. Using distributed sensors along with Blue OSINT data ensures continuous and comprehensive maritime situational awareness, even in areas less frequented by military assets.

However, fixed sensor networks alone are insufficient to cover the dynamic maritime environment. Deploying a mobile network of distributed sensors necessitates a diverse array of platforms and technologies. While military satellites, ships, and aircraft equipped with advanced sensors can offer intermittent coverage, they are costly and limited in number, and their findings are less easily shareable with partners and allies. To bridge these gaps, allied navies should invest in affordable and scalable solutions such as uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), UUVs, and UASs. Outfitted with various sensors, these platforms can effectively detect and track adversary movements, ensuring that navies maintain situational awareness across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and other critical regions.

Small UASs launched from naval ships can be used to rapidly surveil large swaths of sea, providing real-time data on both surface and subsurface activities. Recognizing the strategic advantage of uncrewed systems, China has taken a bold step to outpace the US Navy by developing an aircraft carrier specifically designed to launch and recover UASs, rather than sophisticated manned platforms like the J-20 fighter jet. This significant investment in a carrier solely for uncrewed vehicles by the PLAN should prompt the United States to reconsider, and potentially adjust, its future resourcing strategy. Similarly, USVs can conduct long-duration patrols at a fraction of the cost of manned ship operations, exemplified by Saildrone vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean, providing the USN a robust sensor network. UUVs, deployed from submarines or surface ships, can monitor subsea activities, such as the movement of submarines and other submersible assets.

By monitoring the air, sea, and underwater environments, uncrewed vehicles and their sensors can significantly enhance overall maritime situational awareness. However, these tools are only effective if they are integrated into a cohesive architecture that combines traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with Blue OSINT data and affordable long-term leave-behind sensors. Project Overmatch exemplifies how to achieve this integration by developing a network that links sensors, shooters, and command nodes across all domains. For instance, Project Overmatch aims to leverage advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and secure communications to create a unified maritime operational picture, enabling faster and more informed decision-making. By incorporating these elements, the US Navy can ensure that uncrewed vehicles and their sensors are effectively utilized to maintain operational superiority in the maritime domain.

Moreover, the low-signature nature of some of these sensors increases the odds that they can operate undetected by adversaries, providing a strategic advantage. By deploying sensors in unexpected locations, and disguising them as civilian assets in some cases, navies can gather intelligence without alerting potential threats to their presence.

Blue OSINT and sensor networks in conflict

While Blue OSINT collection and distributed sensor networks can easily collect data in uncontested waters, they have immediate applications to modern maritime conflict as well. For instance, in the event of a cross-strait invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the transparency provided by Blue OSINT would make it difficult for navies to maneuver undetected. Satellites and social media continuously monitor naval piers, strategic chokepoints, and even some open ocean areas, making it increasingly difficult to achieve tactical surprise. Historical instances—such as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the D-Day invasion, or the successful surprise dash to transit the English Channel by the German fleet during World War II—would be much harder to achieve in the modern era due to the pervasive nature of Blue OSINT.

In the context of a potential Taiwan invasion, Blue OSINT would likely be used to detect and closely follow Chinese naval activities, including the movement of amphibious assault ships and submarines. OSINT analysts frequently examine satellite imagery of Chinese shipyards and military installations, which could provide early indications of mobilization.

However, relying solely on satellite imagery and AIS for Blue OSINT is insufficient. Multi-intelligence capabilities are essential to provide a comprehensive assessment. For instance, in 2020, two commercial firms collaborated to use radio frequency and synthetic aperture radar collection to detect Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing near the Galapagos EEZ. This open-source technique revealed the ability to identify fishing vessels that turned off their AIS to cross into the EEZ. In a future conflict with China, the same methodology of combining multiple Blue OSINT sources could be used to identify and track vessels of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This would bypass the AIS vulnerabilities that the PAFMM traditionally exploits to avoid detection, while also revealing its intentions as directed by the PLAN.

The Russo-Ukraine conflict revealed how OSINT can thwart surprise maneuvers and provide crucial targeting data deep behind enemy lines. However, it also underscores the limitations of OSINT in sparsely populated environments, such as the open ocean. For example, in December 2023, as missiles flew over the Red Sea, 18 percent of global container-ship capacity was rerouted. While civilian mariners and commercial shipping significantly contribute to Blue OSINT during peacetime, their absence in a high-risk conflict scenario would shift the burden more heavily onto satellite and uncrewed systems.

Deception and stealth

While the US Navy can take advantage of these technologies, its adversaries can, and almost certainly will, do the same. The US Navy and its allies must develop countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by sensor networks while also leveraging its benefits. One approach is to invest in advanced deception tactics designed to mislead adversaries. These include the use of decoys, electronic warfare, and signal spoofing to create false targets and confuse enemy sensors. The Navy has been quietly developing these tools to obscure its true movements and intentions, ultimately confounding adversaries and making it harder for them to accurately target US forces.

In addition to deception, the United States and its allies need to enhance their naval stealth capabilities to evade adversaries’ distributed sensor networks. This involves not only minimizing the electromagnetic signatures of their vessels, but also employing innovative designs and operational tactics to reduce their radar cross-sections and avoid detection.

Distributed sensors in conflict

The ability to complement Blue OSINT with distributed sensors will be a decisive factor in near-term conflict dynamics. Just as frontline units in Ukraine are detected and targeted by cheap drones and stationary sensors, naval forces can be identified and pinpointed by similar systems at sea. Distributed sensors can provide continuous monitoring and data collection, ensuring that navies can maintain situational awareness and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Three pillars are necessary to distribute sensors effectively across the ocean.

First, large conventional fleets play a critical role in maritime strategy. These fleets must be capable of extended operations and diverse missions, providing the backbone of naval presence, power projection, sea lines of communication, and, ultimately, sea control. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Navy demonstrated its endurance with record-length deployments, showcasing an advantage that could be significant in future maritime campaigns.

Second, organic reconnaissance drones are essential. Each destroyer and aircraft carrier should be equipped with its own fleet of multi-domain drones to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence. Currently, US carrier strike groups rely on land-launched surveillance drones, which are vulnerable and limited in number. Integrating organic drones into each vessel would enhance situational awareness and operational flexibility, allowing for more effective and autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Third, large fleets of affordable USVs and UUVs can deploy sensors across the ocean, increasing sensor hours at sea and improving maritime domain awareness. The first Replicator tranche is equipping forces with thousands of attritable systems to turn the Taiwan Strait into “an unmanned hellscape,” demonstrating the strategic value of uncrewed systems in contested waters. Moreover, the Navy is experimenting with diverse types of uncrewed platforms, aiming to create a distributed fleet architecture that is even more lethal than today’s carrier-centric fleet. These unmanned systems provide a cost-effective means to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across vast oceanic areas, ensuring that the Navy can maintain a strategic advantage in both peacetime and conflict scenarios.

Recommendations

To maximize the efficacy of maritime domain awareness, it is crucial to integrate data from both Blue OSINT and ubiquitous sensor networks. While these two systems of data collection are largely distinct, their combined use can significantly enhance the accuracy and comprehensiveness of intelligence assessments and naval warfare.

Leverage Blue OSINT. Significant investment in artificial intelligence and advanced analytics is necessary to manage and interpret the endless amounts of data generated by open-source intelligence. By fostering a coordinated approach to maritime security, Blue OSINT can facilitate easier information sharing with allies and partners, but only if its utilization is preplanned. Collaborative pathways for Blue OSINT data collection, processing, and analysis must take shape early in the concept and planning phases. This collaborative effort will significantly enhance collective situational awareness and operational effectiveness, making it easier for navies to synchronize their efforts. Additionally, complementing Blue OSINT with traditional intelligence collection such as HUMINT and SIGINT provides a comprehensive threat assessment. By integrating these capabilities, navies can more easily attain a well-rounded understanding of adversary actions.
Commercially procure distributed sensing capabilities and networks. The US Navy must invest in Replicator-style unmanned platforms that can affordably deploy sensors across maritime battlefields, similar to the use of small UAS for land reconnaissance. These commercially procured distributed sensing platforms will significantly enhance the Navy’s ability to continuously and comprehensively monitor vast areas, improving overall maritime domain awareness.
Recognize a new maritime operating environment. The US Navy must prepare for protracted missions away from easily monitored ports and chokepoints while penetrating adversary-controlled, denied waters. This mission set requires a robust logistical framework capable of supporting extended deployments in remote and contested waters. By developing sophisticated tactics to deceive and confuse distributed sensor networks, the Navy can minimize its visibility to adversaries and maintain strategic surprise. This necessitates investing in advanced deception technologies such as electronic warfare, signal spoofing, and decoys to create false targets and obscure true movements. Additionally, enhancing the stealth capabilities of vessels through innovative designs and operational practices will further ensure that naval forces can evade detection and operate effectively in a sensor-saturated environment. By embracing these realities, the Navy can sustain its operational effectiveness and strategic advantage across the competition continuum.

Conclusion

In an era of distributed sensing networks and Blue OSINT, adaptation is not just about leveraging technology but also about evolving operational doctrines to meet the challenges of contemporary maritime conflicts. By integrating Blue OSINT capabilities, deploying distributed sensors, and countering (and employing) deception, naval forces can maintain an asymmetric advantage in the increasingly visible and contested maritime domain.

The success of modern naval operations hinges on the ability to swiftly adapt to technological advancements and evolving threats. Navies must transcend beyond traditional methods and embrace innovative strategies to remain agile and effective. This demands a concerted effort from all levels of naval leadership, from policymakers to forward operators, to implement these changes.

On the unforgiving sea, only those who rapidly transform to the era of Blue OSINT will avoid the abyss, with the rest risk sinking into obsolescence as adversaries gain decisional advantage. Navies that fail to adjust to the realities of Blue OSINT and sensor networks risk ending up like the Russian Black Sea Fleet: at the bottom of the ocean.

Authors

Guido L. Torres is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program and the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

Austin Gray is co-founder and chief strategy officer of Blue Water Autonomy. He previously worked in a Ukrainian drone factory and served in US naval intelligence.

Russia is destroying monuments as part of war on Ukrainian identity

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi, John Vsetecka — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 20:14:30 +0000

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, efforts continue to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian national memory. This campaign against monuments and memorials is chilling proof that Russia’s invasion goes far beyond mere border revisions and ultimately aims to wipe Ukraine off the map entirely.

The modern history of a single park in east Ukrainian city Luhansk offers insights into the memory war currently being waged by the Kremlin. In 1972, the Communist authorities in Soviet Luhansk decided to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR by transforming a local cemetery into a Friendship of Peoples Park. Once construction got underway, workers soon began uncovering mass graves of people murdered during the Stalin era. This news was suppressed until 1989, when it was belatedly reported in the local newspaper. One year later, a memorial to the victims of Stalinist mass killings was erected at the site.

This initial monument was part of a broader movement for historical justice that emerged in the twilight years of the USSR as local historians, journalists, and officials sought to document the crimes of the Communist authorities in the Luhansk region. Following Ukrainian independence, the opening of national archives made it possible to identify and honor victims of the Communist regime and end decades of censorship that had suppressed knowledge of Soviet crimes against humanity including the Holodomor, an artificially engineered famine in 1930s Ukraine that killed millions of Ukrainians.

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During the early years of Ukrainian independence, Luhansk’s Friendship of Peoples Park remained a space of contested memory. While retaining its old Soviet era name, it gradually acquired a range of new memorials including a monument to Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, a cross marking the grave of the city’s former mayor, and a memorial to the victims of the Holodomor.

In 2009, following decades of public pressure, the park was renamed as the Garden of Remembrance. At this point, it seemed as though the long task of restoring historical memory in Luhansk was finally complete. However, the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 transformed the memory politics of the region once again and revived many of the darkest chapters of the Soviet years.

When Kremlin forces occupied Luhansk in the spring of 2014, they soon began attempting to transform remembrance of the Soviet era. While monuments to Lenin were being dismantled elsewhere in Ukraine, the Russian authorities in Luhansk were erecting new monuments glorifying the Soviet past and celebrating the “liberation” of the city from Ukrainian rule. This mirrored similar processes that were underway in other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including nearby Donetsk and the Crimean peninsula.

Curiously, many memorials in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Soviet era initially remained untouched. This changed with the full-scale invasion of February 2022, which led to a more aggressive approach to the eradication of Ukrainian historical memory. In the second half of 2022, the Holodomor memorial in Mariupol was demolished. By summer 2024, the Russian occupation authorities had also dismantled monuments in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Holodomor and the Stalinist Terror.

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The occupation authorities in Luhansk have attempted to justify these measures by framing the Holodomor as a Ukrainian propaganda myth and positioning memorials to the victims of Soviet crimes as “pilgrimage sites for Ukrainian nationalists.” They have also argued that the dismantling of monuments is in response to grassroots demands from the local population.

Russia’s selective monument removals are part of a deliberate strategy to rehabilitate favorable aspects of the Soviet past while whitewashing the crimes of the Communist era. A similarly partisan approach has been adopted toward the historical role of Tsarist Russia. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to craft a narrative glorifying Russian imperialism that legitimizes Moscow’s land grab while suppressing any traces of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In this manner, Putin is weaponizing the past to serve his own present-day geopolitical ambitions.

The demolition of memorials is only one aspect of Russia’s war on Ukrainian national identity. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of being detained or simply disappearing. Speaking Ukrainian is considered a serious offense. Ukrainians are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship, while thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and sent to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination in camps designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Unlike earlier attempts to erase entire nations, today’s Kremlin campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is taking place in full view of international audiences in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. This poses fundamental challenges to the entire notion of a rules-based international order and represents a major obstacle to any future peace process. As long as Russia remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine, a truly sustainable settlement to today’s war will remain elusive.

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi is a PhD student of history at Harvard University and a lecturer at Kyiv School of Economics. John Vsetecka is an assistant professor of history at Nova Southeastern University.

The Great IT Outage of 2024 is a wake-up call about digital public infrastructure

Saba Weatherspoon and Zhenwei Gao — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 17:24:12 +0000

On July 19, the world experienced its largest global IT outage to date, affecting 8.5 million Microsoft Windows devices. Thousands of flights were grounded. Surgeries were canceled. Users of certain online banks could not access their accounts. Even operators of 911 lines could not respond to emergencies.

The cause? One mere faulty section of code in a software update.

The update came from CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm whose Falcon Sensor software many Windows users employ against cyber breaches. Instead of providing improvements, the update caused devices to shut down and enter an endless reboot cycle, driving a global outage. Reports suggest that insufficient testing at CrowdStrike was likely the cause.

However, this outage is not just a technology error. It also reveals a hidden world of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that deserves more attention from policymakers.

What is digital public infrastructure?

DPI, while an evolving concept, is broadly defined by the United Nations (UN) as a combination of “networked open technology standards built for public interest, [which] enables governance and [serves] a community of innovative and competitive market players working to drive innovation, especially across public programmes.” This definition refers to DPI as essential digital systems that support critical societal functions, like how physical infrastructure—including roads, bridges, and power grids—are essential for everyday activities.

Microsoft Windows, which runs CrowdStrike’s Falcon Sensor software, is a form of DPI. And other examples of DPI within the UN definition include digital health systems, payment systems, and e-governance portals.

As the world scrambles to fix their Windows systems, policymakers need to pay particular attention to the core DPI issues that underpin the outage.

The problem of invisibility

DPI, such as Microsoft Windows, is ubiquitous but also largely invisible, which is a significant challenge when it comes to managing risks associated with it. Unlike physical infrastructure, which is tangible and visible, DPI powers essential digital services without drawing public awareness. Consequently, the potential risks posed by DPI failures—whether stemming from software bugs or cybersecurity breaches—tend to be underappreciated and underestimated by the public.

The lack of a clear definition of DPI exacerbates the issue of its invisibility. Not all digital technologies are public infrastructure: Companies build technology to generate revenue, but many of them do not directly offer critical services for the public. For instance, Fitbit, a tech company that creates fitness and health tracking devices, is not a provider of DPI. Though it utilizes technology and data services to enhance user experience, it does not provide essential infrastructure such as internet services, cloud computing platforms, or large-scale data centers that support public and business digital needs. That said, Fitbit’s new owner, Google, known for its widely used browser, popular cloud computing services, and efforts to expand digital connectivity, can be considered a provider of DPI.

Other companies that do not start out as DPI may become integral to public infrastructure by dint of becoming indispensable. Facebook, for example, started out as a social network, but it and other social media platforms have become a crucial aspect of civil discourse surrounding many elections. Regulating social media platforms as a simple technology product could potentially ignore their role as public infrastructure, which often deserve extra scrutiny to mitigate potential detrimental effects on the public.

The recent Microsoft outage, from which airlines, hospitals, and other companies are still recovering, should now sharpen the focus on the company as a provider of DPI. However, the invisibility of DPI and the absence of appropriate policy guidelines for measuring and managing its risks result in two complications. First, most users who interact with DPI often do not recognize it as a form of DPI. Second, this invisibility leads to a misplaced trust in major technology companies, as users fail to recognize how high the collective stakes of a failure in this DPI might be. Market dominance and effective advertising have helped major technology companies publicize their systems as benchmarks of reliability and resiliency. As a result, the public often perceives these systems as infallible, assuming they are more secure than they are—until a failure occurs. At the same time, an overabundance of public trust and comfort with familiar systems can foster complacency within organizations, which can lead to inadequate internal scrutiny and security audits.

How to prevent future disruptions

The Great IT Outage of 2024 revealed just how essential DPI is to societies across the globe. In many ways, the outage serves as a symbolic outcry for solution-oriented policies and accountability to stave off future disruptions.

To address DPI invisibility and misplaced trust in technology companies, US policymakers should first define DPI clearly and holistically while accounting for its status as an evolving concept. It is equally crucial to distinguish which companies are currently providers of DPI, and to educate leaders, policymakers, and the public about what that means. Such an initiative should provide a clear definition of DPI, its technical characteristics, and its various forms, while highlighting how commonly used software such as Microsoft Windows is a form of DPI. A silver lining of the recent Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage is that it offers a practical, recent case study to present to the public as real-world context for understanding the risks when DPI fails.

Finally, Microsoft has outlined technical next steps to prevent another outage, including extensive testing frameworks and backup systems to prevent the same kind of outage from happening again. However, while industry-driven self-regulation is crucial, regulation that enforces and standardizes backup systems, not just with Microsoft, but also for other technology companies that may also become providers of DPI, is also necessary. Doing so will help prevent future outages, ensuring the reliability of infrastructure which, just like roads and bridges, props up the world.

Saba Weatherspoon is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Geotech Center.

Zhenwei Gao is a young global professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

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Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 13:51:05 +0000

There was much pomp and pageantry on display recently in former Russian imperial capital Saint Petersburg as Vladimir Putin presided over the country’s annual Navy Day festivities. In truth, however, Putin and his assembled admirals had very little to celebrate. Over the past year, Russia’s once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian drones and missiles in what must rank as the most remarkable series of naval defeats in modern military history.

Despite barely having a navy of its own, Ukraine has managed to sink or severely damage approximately one-third of Putin’s fleet, forcing the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from occupied Crimea. The war at sea has gone so badly for Russia that by spring 2024, Britain’s Ministry of Defense was already declaring the Black Sea Fleet “functionally inactive.”

The details of this year’s Russian Navy Day program provided some hints of the inglorious reality behind Moscow’s efforts to project naval strength. Tellingly, the traditional parade of Russian warships along the Neva River to the Kronstadt naval base, which usually serves as the centerpiece of the entire holiday, was canceled due to security concerns. In its place, a reduced flotilla took part in a significantly scaled down event that featured around half as many vessels as in previous years.

Despite being by far the smallest Russian Navy Day since the holiday was reinstated in 2017, this year’s event nevertheless represented an excellent opportunity for Putin to honor Russia’s fallen sailors and vow retribution for the country’s unprecedented losses in the Black Sea. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. Throughout his official address, Putin barely mentioned the casualties suffered or the sacrifices made by the Russian Navy during the invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin dictator preferred to flush Russia’s Black Sea defeats down the memory hole. He was aided by the loyal Russian media, which carefully avoided any awkward references to the disaster that has befallen the country’s Black Sea Fleet.

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All this brings to mind an old Soviet joke that begins with Napoleon, Julius Caesar, and Alexander the Great looking down from heaven at a Red Army parade on Red Square. Caesar indicates the endless rows of Soviet troops and says, “with so many men, I could have held Germania.” Alexander points to the tanks and missiles and declares, “with such weapons of war, I could have conquered all India.” Napoleon, meanwhile, completely ignores the parade and is instead engrossed in a copy of Pravda. “If I had such a newspaper,” he proclaims, “nobody would have heard of Waterloo.”

Many Soviet jokes have not aged well, but this particular punchline remains as relevant as ever in modern Russia, where Putin has succeeded in creating a propaganda machine every bit as potent as its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Kremlin-controlled multimedia ecosystem is far more sophisticated than its Communist forerunner, but it serves the same basic function of bending reality to suit the whims of Russia’s ruling elite.

For the past decade, Putin has used this unrivaled information weapon to fuel the biggest European invasion since World War II. Kremlin propagandists have managed to convince millions of ordinary Russians that democratic Ukraine is actually a “Nazi state” whose very existence poses an intolerable threat to Russia. Ukrainians have been demonized and dehumanized to such an extent that genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now a routine feature on prime time Russian TV.

The success of these efforts is all too apparent, with a wide range of opinion polls, research, and anecdotal evidence pointing to consistently high levels of Russian public support for the invasion. Meanwhile, there is no meaningful anti-war movement in the country, despite widespread knowledge of the horrors taking place in neighboring Ukraine. This is not surprising. After all, as Voltaire once warned, those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.

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Putin’s ability to distort Russian reality is genuinely terrifying, but the sheer scale of his propaganda operation could also inadvertently offer hope for the future. Many commentators have argued that failure in Ukraine would lead to the fall of the Putin regime and quite possibly the breakup of Russia itself, but these concerns may be exaggerated. While a third Russian collapse in a little over a century cannot be ruled out, the experience of the past two-and-a-half years gives good cause to believe that Moscow’s disinformation industry is more than capable of rebranding any future retreat from Ukraine in a favorable light, or of burying it completely. In other words, if the Russian media can manufacture a major war, it can also fabricate a suitably plausible peace.

Anyone who still doubts the Kremlin’s capacity to whitewash military defeat in Ukraine hasn’t been paying attention. We have recently witnessed Putin hosting the biggest naval event of the year while studiously ignoring the historic humbling of his southern fleet. It was the same story in 2022, when he ceremoniously announced that Kherson had joined Russia “forever,” only to order his beaten troops to abandon the city just weeks later. Likewise, when Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv during the initial phase of the invasion, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge defeat and absurdly insisted that the retreat from northern Ukraine was a mere “goodwill gesture.” If Putin is eventually forced to end his invasion, it seems safe to assume he will downplay this humiliation in similar fashion.

Since February 2022, Western leaders have found numerous reasons to limit their support for Ukraine. Some are restricted by modest defense budgets and competing domestic priorities. Most are afraid of possible escalation and have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s talk of Russian red lines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says many of his country’s Western partners are also reluctant to arm Ukraine because they fear the unpredictable geopolitical consequences of a Russian defeat. This Western alarm over a possible Russian collapse is exaggerated and fails to account for the power of Putin’s propaganda.

If Russia suffers a decisive defeat in Ukraine, past experience indicates that the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to move the goalposts, change the narrative, or devise some other way of rewriting history and claiming victory. Any embarrassing evidence of failure would simply be flushed down the memory hole, along with all the sunken Russian warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Europe can do more to help Ukraine counter Russia’s energy attacks

Aura Sabadus — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 20:54:59 +0000

Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has forced millions of Ukrainians to spend the summer months adjusting to rolling power blackouts, with record high temperatures adding to the practical challenges of living without electricity. The Ukrainian response to this latest episode of wartime adversity has been marked by typical grit, resourcefulness, and good humor. Nevertheless, there is now widespread awareness that the country is facing what may be the toughest winter in modern Ukrainian history.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has destroyed, damaged, or occupied approximately eighty percent of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. The situation has deteriorated sharply since March 2024 following a wave of Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants that have devastated the country’s thermal capacity.

Ukrainian energy sector officials believe that during the coming winter season, peak demand could be above eighteen gigawatts, with average consumption likely to hover around fifteen gigawatts. However, remaining capacity is just over ten gigawatts. Unless significant new sources can be secured, Ukrainians will have to deal with extended blackouts amid subzero temperatures. This could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and create new waves of refugees fleeing to the EU.

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Looking ahead, there is no substitute for much needed air defenses to protect Ukraine’s remaining energy production capacity. However, additional steps from the Ukrainian authorities and Kyiv’s partners could help prepare the country for the coming winter season.

A July 2024 report funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Education and Research has identified a number of short-term measures that could be adopted swiftly to at least partially plug current shortfalls. Fast repairs of thermal and hydro plants together with the deployment of small-scale gas-fired turbines and solar panels could bring approximately 3.4GW of additional capacity online before temperatures start to drop. Donations of spare equipment are also absolutely vital, while Ukraine should intensify work with partners to establish stockpiles of components to rebuild generation capacity.

One of the most promising initiatives would involve increasing cross-border capacity with neighboring EU countries operating under the umbrella of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Ukraine synchronized with the ENTSO-E grid in March 2022. Since then, Kyiv has increased cross-border capacity significantly, but there is still scope for a further expansion of interconnection capacity by approximately 0.3GW ahead of the coming winter season. This may be easier said than done, however.

Hungary and Slovakia are key exporters of electricity to Ukraine but are currently threatening to cut flows after Kyiv introduced a partial ban on the transit of Russian oil to refineries in the two EU countries. Budapest and Bratislava have long benefitted from cheap Russian energy imports and have faced accusations of acting in the Kremlin’s interests by blocking EU financial and military support to Ukraine. Both countries could now undermine efforts to boost energy exports to Ukraine.

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While there has not yet been any disruption to electricity flows from the EU into Ukraine, it is clearly in Kyiv’s interests to avoid disagreements where possible and to seek enhanced energy partnership with the country’s European neighbors. Closer cooperation with Slovakia and Romania in particular could pay major dividends. Indeed, recent research has found that transmission capacity could be more than doubled to five gigawatts. This could provide greater energy security, create jobs, and attract significant investments.

If completed, one existing power line project linking Slovakia and Ukraine could bring additional capacity of one gigawatt, enough to supply a million consumers. Work on this line began in 2013 and is seventy percent complete on the Ukrainian side, but nothing has yet been done on the Slovak side. Similarly, a proposed electricity power line linking Ukraine’s Pivdennoukrainska nuclear power plant to Romania would not only bring an additional one gigawatt of transfer capacity, but could also potentially end nearby Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the Kremlin-controlled Transnistria enclave.

Despite the numerous benefits offered by these projects, the Romanian and Slovakian governments remain unwilling to commit. This lack of political cooperation may contribute to a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months that could spill over into neighboring countries. With the countdown to the cold season now already underway, there is no time to lose. Helping Ukraine to keep the lights on should be a priority for the whole of Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms.

This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence.

As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order.

The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded.

To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit.

This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale.

The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity.

In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world.

That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos.

This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such.

The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces.

The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.

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Kenton Thibaut

Digital Forensic Research Lab

China Disinformation

A policymaker’s guide to ensuring that AI-powered health tech operates ethically

Coley Felt — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 20:00:57 +0000

The healthcare landscape is undergoing a profound transformation thanks to artificial intelligence (AI) and big data. However, with this transformation come complex challenges surrounding data collection, algorithmic decision-making, transparency, and workforce readiness.

That was a topic of a recent roundtable hosted by the GeoTech Center and Syntropy, a platform that works with healthcare, government, and other groups to collaborate on data in a single ecosystem geared toward informing healthcare research.

At the roundtable, experts from the public and private sectors discussed the complex challenges that arise with the transformation of the healthcare sector, arguing that these challenges lie not only in the development of the technology but also in the implementation and use of it.

As AI becomes more and more integrated with healthcare, policymakers must lay the groundwork for a future in which AI augments, rather than replaces, human expertise in the pursuit of better health outcomes for all. Below are the roundtable participants’ recommendations for policymakers, focusing on building strong data foundations, setting guidelines for algorithm testing and maintenance, fostering trust and transparency, and supporting a strong workforce.

1. Building strong data foundations

Data sets in the healthcare sector can be messy, small in scale, and lacking in diversity, leading to inherent biases that can skew the outcomes of AI-driven analyses—and decisions made following such analyses. Moreover, these biases are not always apparent and often require extensive work to identify. Thus, it is important at the outset to ensure the integrity, quality, and diversity of the data with which AI systems are trained.

The ability to do so will in part depend on the strength of the workforce and the infrastructure that collects and manages data. For example, hospitals—from large, well-funded facilities to smaller community-based hospitals with fewer resources—play an important role in collecting data.

A strong foundation for data is one that protects data. In an ideal world, all individuals (regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location) can benefit from AI-driven healthcare technologies. With that come concerns about the protection of health data, particularly in countries with fragile democracies and low regulatory standards. The potential misuse of health data by governments around the world poses significant risks to individual privacy and autonomy, highlighting the need for robust legal and ethical frameworks to safeguard against such abuses.

To address such challenges with data collection and management, policymakers can begin by implementing the following:

Establishing a foundational data strategy for healthcare data that will improve patient equity by setting standards for inclusive data sets.
Allocating more resources and support for community hospitals to ensure that the data collected in such facilities is high quality and diverse.
Encouraging the development of robust data systems that allow for better data sharing, collaboration, and interoperability.
Optimizing patient benefits by providing transparency about not only the healthcare providers but also about anyone else participating in data sharing.

2. Establishing guidelines for algorithm testing and maintenance by healthcare-technology companies

While building an algorithm may be a complex process, understanding and testing its performance over time is even more challenging. The dynamic nature of the healthcare industry demands ongoing adaptation and refinement of algorithms to account for evolving patient needs, technological advancements, and regulatory requirements.

In addition to continuous testing, it’s important to recognize that the same algorithms may exhibit different risk profiles when deployed in different contexts. Factors such as patient demographics, disease prevalence, and healthcare infrastructure can all influence the performance and safety of AI algorithms. A one-size-fits-all approach to AI deployment in healthcare is neither practical nor advisable.

To ensure that algorithms are constantly tested and maintained, policymakers should consider the following:

Developing guidelines that inform developers, testers, data scientists, regulators, and clinicians about their shared responsibility of maintaining algorithms.
Instituting an oversight authority to continuously monitor the risks associated with decisions that have been made based on AI to ensure the algorithms remain accurate, reliable, and safe for clinical settings.

3. Fostering patient trust and transparency

As technology continues to impact the healthcare industry, and as patients often find themselves unaware of the integration of AI technologies into their care processes, it becomes more difficult for those patients to give informed consent. This lack of transparency undermines patient autonomy and raises profound ethical questions about patients’ right to be informed and participate in health-related decisions. A lack of awareness about the integration of AI technologies is just one layer to the problem; even if a patient knows that AI is playing a role in their care, they may not know about who sponsors such technologies. Sponsors pay for the testing and maintenance of these systems, and they may also have access to the patient’s data.

When AI technologies are involved in care processes, it is still important to achieve the right balance between human interaction and AI-driven solutions. While AI technologies hold great promise for improving efficiency and accuracy in clinical decision-making, they must be integrated seamlessly into existing workflows and complement (rather than replace) human expertise and judgment.

The willingness to accept AI in healthcare varies significantly among patients and healthcare professionals. To bridge this gap in acceptance and address other challenges with trust and transparency, policymakers should consider the following:

Providing transparent information about the capabilities, limitations, and ethical considerations of AI technologies.
Encouraging companies to use particular design methods that ensure that tools and practices align with privacy values and protect patient autonomy.
Producing guiding principles for hospitals to promote a deep understanding of the implications of AI and proactively addressing concerns related to workforce dynamics and patient care.
Developing strategies to strengthen institutional trust to encourage patients to share data, avoiding algorithms that develop in silos.
Awarding organizations with an integrity badge for transparency, responsible use, and testing.

4. Supporting a strong workforce

The integration of AI tools into healthcare workflows is challenging, particularly because of the changes in processes, job roles, patient-provider interactions, and organizational culture such implementation creates. It will be necessary to support the hospital workforce with strategies to manage this change and also with comprehensive education and training initiatives. While the focus here is on humans rather than technology, such support is just as integral to realizing the full potential of these innovations in improving patient outcomes and healthcare delivery.

Many hospitals lack the necessary capabilities to effectively leverage AI technologies to their fullest potential, but supporting technical assistance training and infrastructure could help in the successful deployment of AI technologies.

To navigate the changes that AI tools would bring to the workplace, policymakers should consider the following:

Releasing guidance to healthcare companies to anticipate change management, education, training, and governance.
Incentivizing private-sector technical assistance training and infrastructure to provide services to communities with fewer resources.
Creating training programs tailored to the specific needs of healthcare organizations so that stakeholders can ensure AI implementations are both effective and sustainable in the long run.

The private sector is moving quickly with the development of AI tools. The public sector will need to keep up with new strategies, standards, and regulations around the deployment and use of such tools in the healthcare sector.

Coley Felt is a program assistant at the GeoTech Center.

The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

The post A policymaker’s guide to ensuring that AI-powered health tech operates ethically appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The sovereignty trap

Fri, 26 Jul 2024 19:11:47 +0000

This piece was originally published on DFRLab.org.

On February 28, 2024, a blog post entitled “What is Sovereign AI?” appeared on the website of NVIDIA, a chip designer and one of the world’s most valuable companies. The post defined the term as a country’s ability to produce artificial intelligence (AI) using its own “infrastructure, data, workforce and business networks.” Later, in its May 2024 earnings report, NVIDIA outlined how sovereign AI has become one of its “multibillion dollar” verticals, as it seeks to deliver AI chips and software to countries around the world.

On its face, “sovereign AI” as a concept is focused on enabling states to mitigate potential downsides of relying on foreign-made large AI models. Sovereign AI is NVIDIA’s attempt to turn this growing demand from governments into a new market, as the company seeks to offer governments computational resources that can aid them in ensuring that AI systems are tailored to local conditions. By invoking sovereignty, however, NVIDIA is weighing into a complex existing geopolitical context. The broader push from governments for AI sovereignty will have important consequences for the digital ecosystem on the whole and could undermine internet freedom. NVIDIA is seeking to respond to demand from countries that are eager for more indigenous options for developing compute capacity and AI systems. However, sovereign AI can create “sovereignty traps” that unintentionally grant momentum to authoritarian governments’ efforts to undermine multistakeholder governance of digital technologies. This piece outlines the broader geopolitical context behind digital sovereignty and identifies several potential sovereignty traps associated with sovereign AI.¹

Background

Since its inception, the internet has been managed through a multistakeholder system that, while not without its flaws, sought to uphold a global, open, and interoperable internet. Maintaining this inherent interconnectedness is the foundation by which the multistakeholder community of technical experts, civil society organizations, and industry representatives have operated for years.

One of the early instantiations of digital sovereignty was introduced by China in its 2010 White Paper called “The State of China’s Internet.” In it, Beijing defined the internet as “key national infrastructure,” and as such it fell under the scope of the country’s sovereign jurisdiction. In the same breath, Chinese authorities also made explicit the centrality of internet security to digital sovereignty. In China’s case, the government aimed to address internet security risks related to the dissemination of information and data—including public opinion—that could pose a risk to the political security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a result, foreign social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook have been banned in China since around 2009. It is no coincidence that the remit of China’s main internet regulator, the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, has evolved from developing and enforcing censorship standards for online content to becoming a key policy body for regulating privacy, data security, and cybersecurity.

This emphasis on state control over the internet—now commonly referred to by China as “network sovereignty” or “cyber sovereignty” (网络主权), also characterizes China’s approach to the global digital ecosystem. Following the publication of its White Paper in 2010, in September of the following year, China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly submitted an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” to the United Nations General Assembly, which held that control over policies related to the governance of the internet is “the sovereign right of states”—and thus should reside squarely under the jurisdiction of the host country.

In line with this view, China has undertaken great efforts in recent years to move the center of gravity of internet governance from multistakeholder to multilateral fora. For example, Beijing has sought to leverage the platform of the Global Digital Compact under the United Nations to engage G-77 countries to support its vision. China has proposed language that would make the internet a more centralized, top-down network over which governments have sole authority, excluding the technical community and expert organizations that have helped shape community governance from the internet’s early days.

Adding to the confusion is the seeming interchangeability of the terms “cyber sovereignty,” used more frequently by China, and “digital sovereignty,” a term used most often by the European Union and its member states. While semantically similar, these terms have vastly different implications for digital policy due to the disparate social contexts in which they are embedded. For example, while the origin of the “cyber sovereignty” concept in China speaks to the CCP’s desire for internet security, some countries view cyber sovereignty as a potential pathway by which to gain more power over the development of their digital economies, thus enabling them to more efficiently deliver public goods to their citizens. There is real demand for this kind of autonomy, especially among Global Majority countries.

Democracies are now trying to find alternative concepts to capture the spirit of self-sufficiency in tech governance without lending credence to the more problematic implications of digital sovereignty. For example, in Denmark’s strategy for tech diplomacy, the government avoids reference to digital sovereignty, instead highlighting the importance of technology in promoting and preserving democratic values and human rights, while assisting in addressing global challenges. The United States’ analogous strategy invokes the concept of “digital solidarity” as a counterpoint, alluding to the importance of respecting fundamental rights in the digital world.

Thus, ideas of sovereignty, as applied to the digital, can have both a positive, rights-affirming connotation, as well as a negative one that leaves the definition of digital rights and duties to the state alone. This can lead to confusion and often obscures the legitimate concerns that Global Majority countries have about technological capacity-building and autonomy in digital governance.

NVIDIA’s addition of the concept of “sovereign AI” further complicates this terrain and may amplify the problems presented by authoritarian pushes for sovereignty in the digital domain. For example, national-level AI governance initiatives that emphasize sovereignty may undermine efforts for collective and collaborative governance of AI, reducing the efficacy of risk mitigations. Over-indexing on sovereignty in the context of technology often cedes important ground in ensuring that transformative technologies like AI are governed in an open, transparent, and rights-respecting manner. Without global governance, the full, uncritical embrace of sovereign AI may make the world less safe, prosperous, and democratic. Below we outline some of the “traps” that can be triggered when sovereignty is invoked in digital contexts without an understanding of the broader political contexts within which such terms are embedded.

Sovereignty trap 1: Sovereign systems are not collaborative

If there is one thing we have learned from the governance of the internet in the past twenty years, it is that collaboration sits at the core of how we should address the complexity and fast-paced nature of technology. AI is no different. It is an ecosystem that is both diverse and complex, which means that no single entity or person should be responsible for allocating its benefits and risks. Just like the internet, AI is full of “wicked problems,” whether regarding the ethics of autonomy or the effects that large language models could have on the climate, given the energy required to build large models. Wicked problems can only be solved through successful collaboration, not with each actor sticking its head in the sand.

Collaboration leads to more transparent governance, and transparency in how AI is governed is essential given the potential for AI systems to be weaponized and cause real-world harm. For example, many of the drones that are being used in the war in Ukraine have AI-enabled guidance or targeting systems, which has had a major impact on the war. Just as closed systems on the internet can be harmful for innovation and competition, as with operating systems or app stores built as “walled gardens,” AI systems that are created in silos and are not subject to a collaborative international governance framework will produce fewer benefits for society.

Legitimate concerns about the misappropriation of AI systems will only worsen if sovereign AI is achieved by imposing harsh restrictions on cross-border data flows. Just like in the case of the internet, data flows are crucial because they ensure access to information that is important for AI development. True collaboration can help level the playing field between stakeholders and address existing gaps, especially in regard to the need for human rights to unde r lie the creation, deployment, and use of AI systems.

Sovereignty trap 2: Sovereign systems make governments the sole guarantors of rights

Sovereign AI, like its antecedent “digital sovereignty,” means different things to different audiences. On one hand, it denotes reclaiming control of the future from dominant tech companies, usually based in the United States. It is important to note that rallying cries for digital sovereignty stem from real concerns about critical digital infrastructure, including AI infrastructure, being disrupted or shut down unilaterally by the United States. AI researchers have long said that actors in the Global Majority must avoid being relegated to the status of data suppliers and consumers of models, as AI systems that are built and tested in the contexts where they will actually be deployed will generate better outcomes for Global Majority users.

The other connotation of sovereign AI, however, is that the state has the sole authority to define, guarantee, or deny rights. This is particularly worrying in the context of generative AI, which is an inherently centralizing technology due to its lack of interpretability and the immense resources required to build large AI models. If governments choose to pursue sovereign AI by nationalizing data resources, such as by blocking cross-border transfer of datasets that could be used to train large AI models, this could have significant implications for human rights. For instance, governments might increase surveillance to better collect such data or to monitor cross-border transfers. At a more basic level, governments have a more essentialist understanding of national identity than civil society organizations, sociotechnical researchers, or other stakeholders who might curate national datasets, meaning government-backed data initiatives for sovereign AI are still likely to hurt marginalized populations.

Sovereignty trap 3: Sovereign systems can be weaponized

Assessing the risks of sovereign AI systems is critical, but governments lack the capacity and the incentives to do so. The bedrock of any AI system lies in the quality and quantity of the data used to build it. If the data is biased or incomplete, or if the values encoded in the data are nondemocratic or toxic, an AI system’s output will reflect these characteristics. This is akin to the old adage in computer science, “garbage in, garbage out,” emphasizing that the quality of output is determined by the quality of the input.

As countries increasingly rely on AI for digital sovereignty and national security, new challenges and potential risks emerge. Sovereign AI systems, designed to operate within a nation’s own infrastructure and data networks, might inadvertently or intentionally weaponize or exaggerate certain information based on their training data.

For instance, if a national AI system is trained on data that overwhelmingly endorses nondemocratic values or autocratic perspectives, the system may identify certain actions or entities as threats that would not be considered as such in a democratic context. These could include political opposition, civil society activism, or free press. This scenario echoes the concerns about China’s approach to “cyber sovereignty,” where the state exerts control over digital space in several ways to suppress information sources that may present views or information contradicting the official narrative of the Chinese government. This includes blocking access to foreign websites and social media platforms, filtering online content, and monitoring digital communications to prevent the dissemination of dissenting views or information deemed sensitive by the government. Such measures could potentially be reinforced through the use of sovereign AI systems.

Moreover, the legitimacy that comes with sovereign AI projects could be exploited by governments to ensure that state-backed language models endorse a specific ideology or narrative. This is already taking place in China, where the government has succeeded in censoring the outputs of homegrown large language models. This also aligns with China’s push to leverage the Global Digital Compact to reshape internet governance in favor of a more centralized approach. If sovereign AI is used to bolster the position of authoritarian governments, it could further undermine the multistakeholder model of internet and digital governance.

Conclusion

The history of digital sovereignty shows that sovereign AI comes with a number of pitfalls, even as its benefits remain largely untested. The push to wall off the development of AI and other emerging technologies with diminished external involvement and oversight is risky: lack of collaboration, governments as the sole guarantors of rights, and potential weaponization of AI systems are all major potential drawbacks of sovereign AI. The global community should focus on ensuring AI governance is open, collaborative, transparent, and aligned with core values of human rights and democracy. While sovereign AI will undoubtedly boost NVIDIA’s earnings, its impact on democracy is more ambiguous.

Addressing these potential threats is crucial for global stability and security. As AI’s impact on national security grows, it is essential to establish international norms and standards for the development and deployment of state-backed AI systems. This includes ensuring transparency in how these systems are built, maintained, released, and applied, as well as implementing measures to prevent misuse of AI applications. AI governance should seek to ensure that AI enhances security, fosters innovation, and promotes economic growth, rather than exacerbating national security threats or strengthening authoritarian governments. Our goal should be to advance the well-being of ordinary people, not sovereignty for sovereignty’s sake.

Konstantinos Komaitis is a nonresident fellow with the Democracy + Tech Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Esteban Ponce de León is a research associate at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab based in Colombia.

Kenton Thibaut is a resident China fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Trisha Ray is an associate director and resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Kevin Klyman is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Pelayo quoted in TRT World on Houthis’ attacks against Israel ships

Atlantic Council — Fri, 26 Jul 2024 15:34:05 +0000

original source

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Deutsche Welle on Japan’s efforts in the Pacific Islands

ylee — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 15:40:23 +0000

On July 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in Deutsche Welle regarding Japan’s strategic competition with China in the Pacific Islands. He emphasized that Japan aims to be a reliable partner to Pacific nations through infrastructure development and climate change efforts, in contrast to China’s significant investments and security agreements.

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Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Why the United States needs a robust strategy for space cooperation with Africa

Temidayo Oniosun — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 20:37:45 +0000

At the US-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022, leaders gathered at the US-Africa Space Forum, eliciting mixed reactions. For some, there was excitement about growing US interest in cooperation with Africa on space. That excitement was solidified when, at the forum, Nigeria and Rwanda became the first and second African countries to sign the Artemis Accords, a set of principles on best practices to use in exploring space outlined by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). By December 2023, Angola had also signed the NASA Artemis Accords. But despite these developments, the United States still has no clear space policy towards Africa.

If the United States does not collaborate more with Africa on space-related activities, it risks not only losing strategic and geopolitical influence to China and Russia and missing out on a growing market but also hindering scientific and technological advancements. That would limit the contribution of space-based solutions to solving challenges, for example ones related to sustainability, climate change, and disaster management. A lack of collaboration would also leave behind an opportunity to shape space security and strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries.

Collaboration as it stands today

Following the US-Africa Leaders Summit in October last year, the US Departments of Commerce and State and the African Union organized the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, to build multilateral space partnerships and foster space commerce. At the meeting, the African Union representatives highlighted the African Outer Space Programme—which looks to strengthen the African Union’s use of space—and the role it plays in realizing Africa’s Agenda 2063 and powering development. Meanwhile, the US Office of Space Commerce, tasked with protecting conditions for economic growth and technological innovation in space, outlined how African institutions can reach US space institutions to explore collaborations on capacity building, Earth observation, positioning and navigation, satellite communications, and more—although no clear plans for such collaboration were finalized.

Currently, the United States’ main space-related projects with Africa are SERVIR and Harvest. SERVIR, an initiative by NASA and the US Agency for International Development, helps countries use Earth observation data and geospatial technologies to improve environmental management and climate resilience. SERVIR West Africa, launched in 2016, gathers several science and research institutions in promoting the use of satellite imagery and geospatial tools to help stakeholders and decision makers across the Sahel make informed decisions about agriculture, water resources, the weather, the climate, and ecosystems. SERVIR Eastern and Southern Africa ran from 2008 to 2023 and developed geospatial services using Earth observations and NASA data to support resilient development.

NASA Harvest, led by researchers at the University of Maryland, aims to advance the use of satellite Earth observations to benefit food security, agriculture, and environmental resilience. The Harvest Africa initiative applies Earth observation-based data to agricultural monitoring and assessments conducted across East and Southern Africa. National and regional agencies work together to ensure a smooth transition to respective government agencies or partners. Projects include enhancing Tanzania’s agrometeorological services, developing Earth observation-based agricultural monitoring systems, and improving food security and resilience.

Skyrocketing opportunity

Out of approximately $4.7 billion in satellite contracts from Africa between 1998 and 2023, $1.396 billion went to China and Russia, while only $250 million went to US companies, according to a report by my analytics company, Space in Africa (based in Nigeria and Estonia). Furthermore, out of 187 space collaboration agreements with African institutions from 2001 to 2023, fifty-eight were with Chinese and Russian entities and only twenty-seven with US institutions. Additionally, Egypt and South Africa have joined the International Lunar Research Station mission led by Russia and China, with Ethiopia and Kenya recently signing memorandums of understanding to join as well.

Significant satellite communications infrastructures—such as NigComSat-1R for Nigeria, AngoSat-2 for Angola, and AlComSat-1 for Algeria—were developed by China or Russia. For instance, in addressing national security, Nigeria’s Defence Space Administration launched the DelSat-1 satellite, contracted and launched by China, with plans for five additional satellites.

But while many US foreign policies towards Africa aim to counter China and Russia’s influence, this approach should not extend to the space sector. Space cooperation offers the opportunity to achieve broader US foreign-policy goals independently.

Africa’s space industry presents the United States with economic opportunity. For example, according to the Space in Africa report, Africa’s space industry currently generates about $19 billion annually, with projections indicating growth to over $22.64 billion by 2026. US satellite communications companies such as ViaSat and Starlink—along with Earth observation data providers such as Maxar Technologies, Tomorrow.io, and Planet Labs, and geographic-information-system (GIS) software companies such as Esri—have found a robust market in Africa.

Africa offers significant opportunities for space diplomacy as well. For instance, Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group signed an agreement with Djibouti to build a launch site there, and Turkey announced a space program that would build a launch site in Somalia. The United States can similarly leverage these opportunities to foster mutual benefits including capacity development, technology transfer, and ecosystem development. African space programs, at both national and continental levels, often embrace nonaligned diplomacy, allowing them to cooperate with a variety of countries based on mutual interests. While the United States is taking some steps in the right direction and showing its willingness to collaborate with Africa on space issues—as US stakeholders did at the NewSpace Africa Conference, which my company and the African Union co-hosted—it is time for the United States to identify mutual interests with Africa to develop a robust space partnership.

The United States, as a global leader in the space sector, has an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries and the African Union (through the African Union’s African Space Agency). African countries have demonstrated their capability to contribute to critical technology development, supporting ambitious space missions and building satellite components for global markets. For example, South Africa provides tracking support for the Artemis mission, and Rwandan students have developed artificial-intelligence algorithms for onboard satellite image processing. The United States can capitalize on these developments to foster a mutually beneficial space partnership with Africa.

The United States can, for example, support African policies aligned with US best practices that promote space sustainability at the grassroots level, which can enhance US space diplomacy in select African countries. This support can help African nations establish standards for safe and responsible space activities, thereby promoting stability, security, and long-term sustainability in alignment with several US policies and strategies. Additionally, fostering US participation in African space innovation can build strategic partnerships, increase trade opportunities, facilitate technology transfer, and encourage US investments in the African space market, boosting its global competitiveness. Facilitating market and trade exposure for small to medium US businesses to engage with Africa, along with providing networking opportunities, can deepen relationships between US and African space enterprises—much in alignment with the broader US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the White House’s previous efforts to expand the US-Africa partnership.

While recent US engagements have advanced discussions on collaboration with Africa in space development, it is now time to implement clear actions backed by strong strategies.

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

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How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism

Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 11:00:00 +0000

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Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

Ukraine’s drone success offers a blueprint for cybersecurity strategy

Anatoly Motkin — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 20:28:12 +0000

In December 2023, Ukraine’s largest telecom operator, Kyivstar, experienced a massive outage. Mobile and internet services went down for approximately twenty four million subscribers across the country. Company president Alexander Komarov called it “the largest hacker attack on telecom infrastructure in the world.” The Russian hacker group Solntsepyok claimed responsibility for the attack.

This and similar incidents have highlighted the importance of the cyber front in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine has invested significant funds in cybersecurity and can call upon an impressive array of international partners. However, the country currently lacks sufficient domestic cybersecurity system manufacturers.

Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone manufacturing sector may offer the solution. The growth of Ukrainian domestic drone production over the past two and a half years is arguably the country’s most significant defense tech success story since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. If correctly implemented, it could serve as a model for the creation of a more robust domestic cybersecurity industry.

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Speaking in summer 2023, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov outlined the country’s drone strategy of bringing together drone manufacturers and military officials to address problems, approve designs, secure funding, and streamline collaboration. Thanks to this approach, he predicted a one hundred fold increase in output by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian drone production industry began as a volunteer project in the early days of the Russian invasion, and quickly became a nationwide movement. The initial goal was to provide the Ukrainian military with 10,000 FPV (first person view) drones along with ammunition. This was soon replaced by far more ambitious objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more the one billion US dollars has been collected by Ukrainians via fundraising efforts for the purchase of drones. According to online polls, Ukrainians are more inclined to donate money for drones than any other cause.

Today, Ukrainian drone production has evolved from volunteer effort to national strategic priority. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country will produce more than one million drones in 2024. This includes various types of drone models, not just small FPV drones for targeting personnel and armored vehicles on the battlefield. By early 2024, Ukraine had reportedly caught up with Russia in the production of kamikaze drones similar in characteristics to the large Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This progress owes much to cooperation between state bodies and private manufacturers.

Marine drones are a separate Ukrainian success story. Since February 2022, Ukraine has used domestically developed marine drones to damage or sink around one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, forcing Putin to withdraw most of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. New Russian defensive measures are consistently met with upgraded Ukrainian marine drones.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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In May 2024, Ukraine became the first country in the world to create an entire branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare. The commander of this new drone branch, Vadym Sukharevsky, has since identified the diversity of country’s drone production as a major asset. As end users, the Ukrainian military is interested in as wide a selection of manufacturers and products as possible. To date, contracts have been signed with more than 125 manufacturers.

The lessons learned from the successful development of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem should now be applied to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. “Ukraine has the talent to develop cutting-edge cyber products, but lacks investment. Government support is crucial, as can be seen in the drone industry. Allocating budgets to buy local cybersecurity products will create a thriving market and attract investors. Importing technologies strengthens capabilities but this approach doesn’t build a robust national industry,” commented Oleh Derevianko, co-founder and chairman of Information Systems Security Partners.

The development of Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities has been so striking because local manufacturers are able to test and refine their products in authentic combat conditions. This allows them to respond on a daily basis to new defensive measures employed by the Russians. The same principle is necessary in cybersecurity. Ukraine regularly faces fresh challenges from Russian cyber forces and hacker groups; the most effective approach would involve developing solutions on-site. Among other things, this would make it possible to conduct immediate tests in genuine wartime conditions, as is done with drones.

At present, Ukraine’s primary cybersecurity funding comes from the Ukrainian defense budget and international donors. These investments would be more effective if one of the conditions was the procurement of some solutions from local Ukrainian companies. Today, only a handful of Ukrainian IT companies supply the Ukrainian authorities with cybersecurity solutions. Increasing this number to at least dozens of companies would create a local industry capable of producing world-class products. As we have seen with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian drone industry, this strategy would likely strengthen Ukraine’s own cyber defenses while also boosting the cybersecurity of the wider Western world.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region.

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Russia’s retreat from Crimea makes a mockery of the West’s escalation fears

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 20:52:12 +0000

This week marked another milestone in the Battle of the Black Sea as the Russian Navy reportedly withdrew its last remaining patrol ship from occupied Crimea. The news was announced by Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, who signaled the historic nature of the Russian retreat with the words: “Remember this day.”

The withdrawal of Russian warships from Crimea is the latest indication that against all odds, Ukraine is actually winning the war at sea. When Russia first began the blockade of Ukraine’s ports on the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, few believed the ramshackle Ukrainian Navy could seriously challenge the dominance of the mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet. Once hostilities were underway, however, it soon became apparent that Ukraine had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to Putin without a fight.

Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones.

The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had seventy four warships, most of which were based at ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. In a little over two years, Ukraine managed to sink or damage around one third of these ships. In the second half of 2023, reports were already emerging of Russian warships being hurriedly moved across the Black Sea from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia. By March 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive,” according to the British Ministry of Defense.

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea has had significant practical implications for the wider war. It has disrupted Russian logistics and hindered the resupply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine, while limiting Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian targets from warships armed with cruise missiles. Crucially, it has also enabled Ukraine to break the blockade the country’s Black Sea ports and resume commercial shipping via a new maritime corridor. As a result, Ukrainian agricultural exports are now close to prewar levels, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

The Russian reaction to mounting setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea has also been extremely revealing, and offers valuable lessons for the future conduct of the war. It has often been suggested that a cornered and beaten Vladimir Putin could potentially resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, he has responded to the humiliating defeat of the Black Sea Fleet by quietly ordering his remaining warships to retreat.

This underwhelming response is all the more telling given the symbolic significance of Crimea to the Putin regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, which occupies an almost mystical position in Russian national folklore as the home of the country’s Black Sea Fleet. Throughout the past decade, the occupied Ukrainian peninsula has featured heavily in Kremlin propaganda trumpeting Russia’s return to Great Power status, and has come to symbolize Putin’s personal claim to a place in Russian history.

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Crimea’s elevated status was initially enough to make some of Ukraine’s international partners wary of sanctioning strikes on the occupied peninsula. However, the Ukrainians themselves had no such concerns. Instead, they simply disregarded the Kremlin’s talk of dire consequences and began attacking Russian military targets across Crimea and throughout the Black Sea. More than two years later, these attacks have now become a routine feature of the war and are taken for granted by all sides. Indeed, the Kremlin media plays down attacks on Crimea and largely ignores the frequent sinking of Russian warships, no doubt to save Putin’s blushes.

The Russian Navy’s readiness to retreat from its supposedly sacred home ports in Crimea has made a mockery of Moscow’s so-called red lines and exposed the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear threats. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s international allies remain reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead, Western support for Ukraine continues to be defined by self-defeating fears of escalation.

For almost two and a half years, Ukraine’s partners have allowed themselves to be intimidated into denying Ukraine certain categories of weapons and restricting attacks inside Russia. This is usually done while piously citing the need to prevent the current conflict from spreading any further. Western policymakers apparently prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence from the Battle of the Black Sea, which confirms that when confronted by resolute opposition, Putin is far more likely to back down than escalate.

The West’s fear of escalation is Putin’s most effective weapon. It allows him to limit the military aid reaching Kyiv, while also preventing Ukraine from striking back against Russia. This is slowly but surely setting the stage for inevitable Russian victory in a long war of attrition. Western leaders claim to be motivated by a desire to avoid provoking a wider war, but that is exactly what will happen if they continue to pursue misguided policies of escalation management and fail to stop Putin in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Africa’s television and film industry is also reaching new global audiences. Showmax, a streaming platform headquartered in South Africa, is ramping up production on twenty-one new and original African shows. Since 2016, Netflix has invested more than $175 million in African films, including a multi-title deal with a Nigerian production company. The Nigerian movie The Black Book was watched by over twenty million people in its first weeks, becoming at one point the third most-streamed movie worldwide. African film companies have inked deals with the likes of Walt Disney Animation Studios for original productions released globally on services such as Disney+, including the animated Iwájú series, for which Disney collaborated with London-based African storytelling company Kugali Media. Nollywood, the world’s second-largest film industry by production volume, generates $1.2 billion in annual revenues.

With Africa’s population projected to nearly double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, the continent will host one-third of the planet’s young people and the fastest-growing consumer markets for the entertainment industry. Music streaming revenues in Africa are expected to rise from $92.9 million in 2021 to $314.6 million by 2026. Platforms like Spotify, Paramount+, and Netflix are vying for a share of this expanding market with compelling, locally produced content. Nigeria, poised to become one of the ten biggest economies in the world by 2050, generated $45.2 million in revenues from music, television, and film streaming in 2022—a 55 percent increase compared to the year before.

Other creative industries, like gaming, have significant growth potential in Africa but haven’t yet seen breakthrough moments comparable to music, television, and film. The continent is the fastest-growing global market for the gaming industry, expected to generate more than one billion dollars in 2024 for the first time ever, with the number of African gamers doubling over the past five years—mostly driven by youth gaming on their phones. But local game developers have yet to gain a strong foothold on the continent or beyond, despite the clear potential for new and culturally rich gaming experiences rooted in the African context. Innovators like Guzo Technologies (which has participated in programs backed by Meta, where one of the authors works) are developing innovative gaming and learning experiences harnessing virtual reality, but there remain significant barriers to access and use for many Africans.

Some African governments, international partners, and investors are striving to boost their creative industries to stimulate growth, attract investment, and create jobs. In April 2024, Côte d’Ivoire partnered with a venture capital firm and bank to create a fund for entertainment startups. In October 2023, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Sony collaborated to invest in Africa’s creative industries. In announcing the initiative, the IFC highlighted the African creative economy’s “significant, untapped potential . . . for boosting economic growth and improving employment opportunities for young people and women.” Zambia announced a $100-million investment plan to transform its film industry. Actor Idris Elba is backing new film studios in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Ghana, while Senegalese Director Mati Diop is opening a new film production house.

But African governments, their international partners, and investors can do more to ignite Africa’s creative industries. Artists have too often succeeded in spite of, not thanks to, the state—where regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and exacting tax regimes may inhibit the creative economy. Development finance institutions can follow the IFC’s lead by offering blended finance options to de-risk similar investments in other countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo—historically considered a regional cultural superpower, especially in music—shows significant growth potential, for example. Contemporary Congolese stars are yet to experience success akin to that of their Nigerian and South African peers; even Congolese icon Fally Ipupa has less than 7 percent of Nigerian artist Burna Boy’s monthly listeners on Spotify.

Beyond their remarkable economic impacts, Africa’s cultural entrepreneurs are reshaping global perceptions of the continent. As one African analyst noted, “historically, when we talk about global soft power, Africa has never really been top of mind.” But through television series and films set in Africa and written by Africans, artists are rewriting the infamous “single story” that has shaped international perceptions of a continent ravaged by war, poverty, and disease. One African-British journalist wrote about how “Afrobeats artists were the best [public relations] team we could ever have asked for—talented, arrogant, and unapologetically African.” The World Economic Forum has heralded a “rising Afro Wave inspired by the arts and cultural leaders of African and Afro diaspora . . . [empowering] nations to participate more actively in global conversations, enhancing their diplomatic influence, and forging connections that extend beyond geopolitical boundaries on key themes, issues, and business opportunities.”

Some caution that there are challenges presented by the rapid rise and commercialization of African cultural industries. Nollywood’s roots in the Yoruba people’s traveling theater tradition, with rapid recording and distribution networks, may become consigned to history as the local film industry transforms. Some African artists have also rejected the ubiquitous term “Afrobeats”—they argue it is a catchall term for an incredibly broad and diverse set of musical genres. Burna Boy, the first African artist to sell out a US stadium, said, “it’s not fair to just join everybody . . . It’s almost like joining hip-hop, R&B, and dancehall into one thing and [calling] it ‘Ameribeats.’ It doesn’t do justice to what’s really going on.”

African governments, international partners, and investors can all play a critical role in further unlocking the potential and impact of the continent’s creative industries. However, they must ensure that African artists and entrepreneurs retain ownership and creative control amid increasing international engagement and investment. Whether that is successfully done will determine whether Africa’s cultural economies benefit from the hard work of the artists and whether creative industries across the continent can build a new, better-informed international appreciation for Africa’s economic and cultural power.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a 2023 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

Josefina Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a Women in Africa laureate, La Caixa Foundation fellow, and lawyer at Withersworldwide.

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Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare

Olha Fokaf — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:58:08 +0000

The bombing of Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital in Kyiv on July 8 has sparked a wave of global condemnation, with US President Joe Biden calling the attack a “horrific reminder of Russia’s brutality.” Meanwhile, others have noted that this latest airstrike was not an isolated incident. “Once again, Russia has deliberately targeted residential areas and healthcare infrastructure,” commented France’s representative at the UN.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

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The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

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According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s prayer breakfast challenges Kremlin claims of religious persecution

Steven Moore — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:50:38 +0000

On June 29, more than eight hundred participants from fifteen countries representing a dozen different religious denominations gathered in the historic heart of Kyiv for Ukraine’s annual National Prayer Breakfast. The day before the breakfast, two Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Father Ivan Levytsky and Father Bohdan Geleta, had been released from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange brokered by the Vatican Diplomatic Corps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the priests back to Ukraine in a speech that drew tears.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

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Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in NK News on Russia-North Korea relationship

ylee — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 20:27:20 +0000

Original source

On July 9, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in an NK News article regarding a Russian military jet’s visit to North Korea, the first since the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty. Hinata-Yamaguchi noted that Russia appears open about its military cooperation with North Korea, predicting more overt military engagements and the potential for North Korea to gain advanced military technologies.

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Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

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State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 14:37:58 +0000

In June, much of the world saw not only rising temperatures, but also multiplying stresses on the world order. Israel and Hamas still did not agree on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his military leadership over war aims magnified, as the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies ramped up support for Ukraine, with new measures that allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia and a new Group of Seven (G7) plan to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets for a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. European Union (EU) elections saw the far right make gains, especially in France, but the center largely held.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term.

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s centrist alliance placed second, and Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

“The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.“
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

Niva Yau, in an Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Rudder featured in Intelligence Online on Taiwan’s military advancements

ylee — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 20:24:08 +0000

Original source

On July 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Steven Rudder was featured in Intelligence Online discussing Taiwan’s military advancements. The article highlighted his crucial role in facilitating Taiwan’s acquisition of American drones.

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Advancing AI safety requires international collaboration. Here’s what should happen next.

Courtney Lang — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 11:14:01 +0000

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is advancing. So, too, is international collaboration to ensure that advances are made in a safe and responsible way. In May, ten countries and the European Union (EU) met in South Korea and signed the “Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science,” which establishes an international network of AI safety institutes. This agreement builds on measures that several of its signatories have taken on AI safety since the Bletchley Park summit in November 2023. Since November, for example, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Singapore have established AI safety institutes, and the EU has set up an AI office with a unit dedicated to safety.

The Statement of Intent also builds on existing bilateral agreements. At the EU-US Trade and Technology Council meeting held in April 2024, the EU and the United States announced that the AI Office and the US AI Safety Institute would work together to develop the tools needed to evaluate AI models. Additionally, ahead of the Seoul Summit, the US AI Safety Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom’s AI Institute, also aimed at building out a shared approach to AI safety, with an emphasis on developing testing and evaluation metrics.

The Statement of Intent signed at the Seoul Summit represents an important step forward in the AI safety conversation. It demonstrates both increasing international interest in and commitment to advancing the science needed to promote AI safety. To be successful in its implementation, however, the signatory countries will need to prioritize the most pressing areas of need for scientific practices, deepen their engagement with international standards-setting bodies, and collaborate with stakeholders across the AI ecosystem.

Why the Seoul Summit statement matters

The Statement of Intent matters for several reasons. First, it will help foster not only a common understanding of key AI safety concepts but also help advance common approaches to testing models (or otherwise ensure that approaches are interoperable). Indeed, there remains a lack of consensus around terms and taxonomy specific to AI safety—for example, the specific difference between a “frontier” AI model, an “advanced” AI model, and a “general purpose” AI model. There is also a lack of consensus on what constitutes red-teaming for AI, which is typically understood in cybersecurity as a process by which a team within an organization (a “red team”) attacks a system to expose vulnerabilities or weaknesses. There is also, in the context of AI, a lack of consensus about whether additional testing, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV) techniques beyond red-teaming are required to appropriately evaluate a system’s capabilities and risk. The Seoul Summit statement enables cross-border information sharing, allowing the institutes to learn from each other, share empirical findings, and identify best practices.

Second, the statement helps lay the groundwork for the institutes to share resources, such as expertise, datasets, and infrastructure. Indeed, beyond questions around red-teaming and testing and evaluation, there remains an important need to develop consistent metrics and criteria for risk evaluation, guidance related to transparency, and benchmarks for safety, reliability, and performance. Setting out a collaborative vision for how institutes intend to leverage joint resources can help to progress the research needed to advance work on these critical topics.

Finally, such an agreement can potentially contribute to technical capacity building and talent development. While the primary objective of these institutes is to advance the science of AI safety, they could play an important role in developing specific training curricula for practitioners, ensuring that guidance is practical and can be implemented.

How the AI safety institutes can turn intent into action

It’s early days for the network of AI safety institutes, and it remains to be seen exactly how collaboration will unfold. But to make meaningful progress on their stated objectives, there are three important objectives that will be vital for the institutes to focus on.

The AI safety institutes should:

Prioritize collaborating to develop metrics for testing and evaluation of advanced AI models and ways to quantify emerging risks. While there are many areas worth exploring in the field of AI safety, the institutes should focus their immediate efforts on establishing collective practices that are most necessary to advance the development of trustworthy AI systems. One area the institutes should focus on is the testing and evaluation of advanced AI models. This is unsurprising given the ongoing focus on the role of red-teaming in AI risk management, but it is important that the institutes also seek to make progress on TEVV more broadly, including pre-deployment TEVV to assess and manage known and emerging risks associated with advanced AI systems. Indeed, stakeholders have agreed that assessing and understanding risks presented by such models is important to mitigating them, but there remain challenges in consistently measuring and evaluating those risks, particularly in cases where those risks are still emerging. The institutes should also seek to develop consistent ways to measure and report on model and system performance.

Prioritize engagement in standards bodies that are undertaking standards development activities. International technical standards, and the work of bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission’s Subcommittee 42 on AI, will be critical to consistently implementing AI safety best practices. For example, bringing the institutes’ work on testing and evaluation of advanced AI models to international standards bodies will help promote international alignment and adoption. Conversely, engaging with international standards bodies may also help inform the safety practices and guidance that the institutes are seeking to develop.

Seek to collaborate with stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem. Announcing a network of publicly backed institutions is important. But it is equally important that the AI safety institutes prioritize engagement with stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem. This includes the private sector, civil society, and government officials and policymakers. In particular, the institutes should consider how to enable cooperation between affiliated consortiums. For example, the AI Safety Institute Consortium within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is comprised of stakeholders from multiple parts of the ecosystem, and NIST has sought to engage the Consortium on initial AI trust and safety work under the Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI. To the extent that other institutes pull together similar groups, it will be imperative that there is understanding of exactly how the expertise of those groups will feed into the wider network.

The Statement of Intent is a necessary first step in fostering international collaboration on AI safety. By focusing on making concrete progress on metrics for AI safety, engaging with standards-setting bodies, and ensuring that stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem are involved, countries can build on the Statement to make concrete advances in AI safety.

Courtney Lang is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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Putin is using Belarus to escalate his nuclear threats

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 20:09:39 +0000

Belarus engaged in a bout of nuclear saber-rattling on June 30, with Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Pavel Muraveiko declaring that his country would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if provoked. “We’ve learned how to handle these weapons. We know how to apply them confidently. And you can be sure that we will do it if the sovereignty and independence of our country is threatened,” Muraveiko stated.

The Belarusian army commander’s hawkish comments came just weeks after Belarus and Russia conducted joint nuclear drills that were widely interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the West. This followed on from Vladimir Putin’s spring 2023 announcement of plans to store Russian tactical nukes on Belarusian territory. By the end of the year, the weapons had reportedly arrived in Belarus.

Muraveiko’s recent statement illustrates how the Kremlin is using Belarus to escalate its campaign of nuclear blackmail against the West. Clearly, any Russian nuclear weapons deployed across the border in Belarus remain firmly under Moscow’s control. If Belarusian officials are now issuing nuclear threats of their own, they are doing so on behalf of Putin.

This is very much in line with the supporting role played by Belarus throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When hostilities first began in February 2022, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka allowed the Russian military to use his country as a base for the invasion of northern Ukraine. Following Russia’s spring 2022 defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, Putin’s army then retreated back into Belarus to regroup.

While Lukashenka has so far been able to resist Kremlin pressure to enter the war directly, he has allowed Russia to conduct air strikes on targets across Ukraine from Belarusian territory. He has also been one of the few international leaders prepared to publicly align himself with Putin, meeting with the Russian dictator on multiple occasions.

Lukashenka’s slavish loyalty to his Russian patron comes as no surprise. The Belarusian ruler has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin since 2020, when Putin intervened to prevent the Lukashenka regime from collapse amid nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election. For the past four years, Russia has been steadily strengthening its grip on Belarus, a process some have likened to the creeping annexation of the country.

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With Russian influence in Belarus now at unprecedented levels, Lukashenka has had little choice but to back the invasion of Ukraine. Naturally, this support includes playing along with Putin’s nuclear intimidation tactics. Perhaps more surprising is Putin’s readiness to involve Russia’s small western neighbor in his incredibly reckless game of nuclear brinkmanship.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost two and a half years ago, Putin has become notorious for frequently issuing thinly-veiled nuclear threats. This trend was first evident during his initial address announcing the decision to invade, with Putin warning Western leaders that any attempts to intervene would lead to consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Four days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.

Perhaps the most infamous example of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling came six months later. With the Russian army retreating in disarray in eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin ruler referenced his country’s nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

With Western support for Ukraine regaining momentum in recent months, Putin has once again made regular references to a possible nuclear war. Western leaders “should keep in mind that theirs are small and densely populated countries,” he commented chillingly in late May.

Other Kremlin leaders have gone even further. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, recently stated that it would be a “fatal mistake” for Western leaders to believe Russia was not ready to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO member states. “This is, alas, not an attempt at intimidation or a nuclear bluff,” he declared.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While Ukraine has refused to be cowed by Russia’s repeated nuclear threats, many in the West have allowed themselves to be intimidated. Indeed, widespread alarm over the potential use of nuclear weapons is believed to be a key factor fueling the fear of escalation that has consistently hampered the international response to Russia’s invasion.

Putin is well aware of the low risk tolerance in many Western capitals and has used it to his advantage. He has skillfully exploited the West’s escalation phobia to reduce the flow of military aid to Kyiv, and has even managed to convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on how the embattled country can defend itself.

Russia’s readiness to employ nuclear threats could have grave implications for international security that would be felt far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. If nuclear blackmail enables Putin to succeed in Ukraine, he will inevitably use the same tactics again elsewhere. Other countries will then draw the logical conclusion and decide that they, too, must also possess nuclear weapons, sparking a scramble for nukes that will undo decades of nonproliferation efforts. The entire world will be plunged into an era of insecurity marked by a dramatically heightened risk of nuclear war.

If Western leaders wish to avoid this bleak future, they must finally stand up to Russia’s nuclear bullying. At this point, Putin evidently regards his nuclear bluster as an effective foreign policy tool. Far from being deterred, he appears determined to raise the stakes further by involving Belarus.

Putin will continue to pursue policies of nuclear intimidation until the costs outweigh the benefits. This can be achieved by increasing Western military support for Ukraine and lifting all remaining restrictions on Kyiv’s ability to strike back against Russia. Unless that happens, there is a very real danger that the international security climate of the coming decades will be defined by nuclear-backed expansionism and further wars of imperial aggression.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Bombing Europe’s breadbasket: Russia targets Ukrainian farmers

Hanna Hopko — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 19:07:28 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has identified Ukraine’s vast and strategically vital agriculture industry as a priority target. This offensive against Ukrainian farmers has included everything from the blockade of the country’s seaports to the systematic destruction of agricultural produce and infrastructure.

On the eve of the invasion in February 2022, the Russian Navy began blocking Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, cutting off long-established trade routes taking Ukrainian grain and other agricultural goods to international markets. This represented a devastating blow to the Ukrainian economy, while also increasing the threat of famine in countries throughout the Global South dependent on Ukrainian food supplies.

For more than two years, this attack on the Ukrainian agricultural sector has continued to accelerate. From Odesa to the Danube Delta, the southern Ukrainian port facilities that are so crucial to the export of agricultural produce have been subjected to relentless bombardment. According to Odesa Military Administration head Oleh Kiper, this has made it impossible to accumulate large quantities of grain in warehouse facilities, and is forcing the country’s agricultural exporters to operate under constant threat of attack.

Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is also being systematically targeted across the country, with regular Russian attacks on equipment, storage facilities, and transport hubs. According to recent research, the total value of destroyed agricultural assets amounts to more than ten billion US dollars. Meanwhile, approximately two billion dollars worth of Ukrainian agricultural products have been destroyed or stolen and shipped to Kremlin allies such as Syria and Iran.

The scale of the damage done to Ukraine’s farmlands is staggering. More than one-third of the Ukrainian agricultural land dedicated to cereal production has been directly affected by the war, with about four million hectares currently unusable due to mining, munitions, or ongoing hostilities. A further eight million hectares of Ukrainian farmland is currently under Russian occupation. Beyond the front lines, Russia is also accused of deliberately setting fire to Ukrainian grain fields.

The Kremlin’s goal is clear: Russia aims to inflict irreparable damage on Ukraine’s agricultural industry, leading to economic collapse and depopulation. Ukraine has historically been known as Europe’s breadbasket, with the country’s agricultural sector serving as a key engine of the national economy. By blocking agricultural exports, destroying agricultural infrastructure, and preventing farmers from growing crops, Moscow hopes to undermine the economic foundations of Ukrainian statehood and pave the way for the country’s subjugation.

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Russia’s campaign against the Ukrainian agricultural industry also has a broader international dimension. The Kremlin is using food as a weapon to expand its influence throughout the Global South while employing a combination of blackmail and bribery. Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from exporting foodstuffs to countries in Africa and Asia, while at the same time looking to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian supplies.

In summer 2022, there were hopes of some relieve for the Ukrainian agricultural sector when Russia signed up to a UN-brokered grain deal. This apparent breakthrough sparked initial optimism, but ultimately highlighted the Kremlin’s readiness to exploit global food security concerns. The UN-backed grain agreement allowed for limited exports of grain from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, but it soon became apparent that Moscow saw the deal primarily as an opportunity to secure further concessions. The Kremlin consistently sabotaged implementation of the grain agreement, before unilaterally withdrawing one year later when its escalating demands were not met.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine has achieved some notable successes in defense of the country’s farming industry. Beginning in August 2023, Ukraine has managed to partially unblock the country’s Black Sea ports and resume grain deliveries through the creation of a new corridor for merchant shipping. Maritime agricultural export volumes are now close to prewar levels, underlining the remarkable resilience of wartime Ukraine.

The resumption of agricultural exports via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports represents one of the country’s most significant victories since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This was made possible by the innovative use of Ukrainian drone technologies and the effective deployment of missiles provided by the country’s international partners, allowing Ukraine to significantly reduce the Russian Navy’s effectiveness in the Black Sea.

Despite this progress, much more still needs to be done in order to safeguard shipping lanes and allow for the free passage of agricultural produce across the Black Sea to global markets. As the trade routes that Russia is targeting lie in international waters, this is not an issue for Ukraine alone. Instead, there are implications for the wider international community, especially for other Black Sea region countries. It is important to hold Russia accountable for jeopardizing the security of vital maritime trade routes and for engaging in conduct that could be classified as piracy.

Ukraine has proven that it can fight back effectively against Russia with even limited resources. The Ukrainian military has damaged or destroyed around one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and has forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Ukraine now urgently needs to receive fighter jets, long-range missiles, and air defenses from the country’s international partners. With the right tools, Ukraine will be able to protect its ports and agricultural infrastructure, enforce international law in the Black Sea, and safeguard the breadbasket of Europe from further Russian attack.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. She was a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from 2014 to 2019 and served as head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency

Franklin D. Kramer, Philip W. Yu, Joseph Webster, Elizabeth Sizeland — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

Introduction
Establish a comprehensive security strategy
Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience
Energy
Food and water resiliency
Enhancing defense resilience
Conclusion
About the authors
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

This report recommends actions for the new leadership of Taiwan to take to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks. The report focuses on establishing a comprehensive security strategy and analyzes three key areas particularly important for effective resilience: enhancing cybersecurity for critical infrastructures; improving energy security; and accelerating defense transformation.

The new administration of Lai Ching-te faces both existing resilience challenges and the potential for significantly greater problems if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues expanded gray zone activities or if actual conflict occurs.¹ The ongoing challenges include substantial disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, military incursions, and periodic economic coercion. Potential future challenges could involve expansion of one or more of these ongoing Chinese activities. In the context of a more contested environment such as a quarantine,² blockade, or a kinetic conflict, Chinese actions could seek to cause leadership failures and loss of social cohesion; undertake cyberattacks to target critical infrastructures; generate energy shortages; and seek to defeat Taiwan militarily before the United States could provide effective support. The potential for such harms substantially increases the importance of resilient responses by Taiwan.

The report recommends four major sets of actions to enhance Taiwan’s resilience:

Establish a comprehensive security strategy that engages government, the private sector, and individuals in cooperative efforts to ensure all facets of resilience including:
1. Risk analyses and priority requirements.
2. Organization of data relevant to responding to challenges from the PRC.
3. Development of expertise in key areas required for response.
4. Provision of governmental leadership and activation of the whole nation as part of a comprehensive approach.
Enhance cybersecurity by establishing:
1. Off-island, cloud-based capabilities to duplicate governmental and other critical functions.
2. Working arrangements with high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers.
3. A surge capability of cybersecurity experts.
4. Regular engagement with US Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward program.
5. Alternatives to undersea cables through low-earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites.
Bolster energy security resilience by:
1. Rationalizing—that is, increasing—energy prices, especially for electricity.
2. Supporting indigenous supply, including nuclear energy.
3. Prioritizing energy needs.
4. Dispersing and hardening energy storage facilities.
5. Preparing comprehensive rationing plans for energy.
Enhance defense resilience by:
1. Continuing the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
2. Leveraging Taiwan’s strength in high tech manufacturing and shipbuilding to accelerate the development of a Ukraine-style, public-private “capability accelerator”³ for emerging technologies.
3. Fielding low-cost, high-effectiveness capabilities including unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines.
4. Incorporating training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
5. Investing in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
6. Raising the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to the national level and implementing a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Establish a comprehensive security strategy

Resilience is not a new theme in Taiwan. Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who completed two terms in office on May 20, entitled her 2022 National Day Address “Island of Resilience,”⁴ and similarly identified resilience as a key factor for Taiwan in her two subsequent National Day addresses.⁵ “The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority,” she stated in that 2022 speech, in which she articulated four key areas of resilience: economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense. What is left undone, however, is aligning these and other resilience elements into a comprehensive security strategy similar to those undertaken by Finland⁶ and Sweden,⁷ which utilize a whole-of society approach to enhance resilience.

Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy.⁸ Comparable comprehensive national security approaches, such as the Finnish model, aim to foster and enable an engaged national ecosystem of partners, each with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Finland’s model is instructive, underscoring the importance of engagement by the entire society:

The Security Strategy for Society lays out the general principles governing preparedness in Finnish society. The preparedness is based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens.⁹

Comprehensive security thus is far more than just government activities:

Comprehensive security has evolved into a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities. The cooperation is based on statutory tasks, cooperation agreements and the Security Strategy for Society.¹⁰

The Finnish strategy identifies seven “vital functions” as key areas: leadership; international and European Union activities; defense capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.¹¹

Taiwan has taken a variety of actions to enhance resilience including the establishment in 2022 of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.¹² That agency has a useful but limited scope with its mandate of “comprehensive management of ‘planning for mobilization, management, service, civil defense, [and] building reserve capacity.’ ”¹³ But while defense is important (and further discussed below), as the Finnish and Swedish strategies underscore, Taiwan should expand its approach to resilience to include the full spectrum of governmental, private sector, and individual tasks—and the necessary cooperative efforts to make them most effective.

President Lai’s recent election ushered in an unprecedented third consecutive term for the Democratic Progressive Party.¹⁴ This outcome not only provides continuity in the agenda set by the island’s duly elected leader, but also presents an opportunity to sharpen the focus areas for resilience. As Taiwan transitions to a Lai presidency, the challenge of shoring up the island’s resilience should be at the forefront.

As a valuable starting point for establishing such an expanded resilience strategy, the Lai government should undertake extensive consultations with both Finland and Sweden—which could be facilitated as necessary by the United States. Taiwan should also seek to engage with the Hybrid Center of Excellence, based in Finland, which is an “autonomous, network-based international organization countering hybrid threats.”¹⁵

The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, and it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach. Resilience is a team game with the whole of society playing a role. But only Taiwan’s central government can act as the team captain, setting expectations, establishing priorities, formulating and communicating national strategy, and coordinating activities. Only leaders in national-level government can oversee the critical work of developing institutional effectiveness in key areas of risk management and resilience.

As a starting point, Taiwan should undertake a comprehensive audit now to uncover any gaps in the country’s ability to understand, respond to, and recover from both the chronic risks it currently faces and any more acute manifestations of PRC aggression in the future. Taiwan’s government should examine the following areas to pursue greater resilience:

Activating the whole nation: Working with the private sector and local government, and communicating to households are essential to develop a truly comprehensive approach to Taiwan’s resilience.
Understanding risk: Developing a set of scenarios that will help prioritize activities across government and beyond. Prioritizing is critical where resources are limited—as is identifying areas of cross-cutting work that can help to reduce risk in multiple scenarios.
Building data capacity: Laying a foundation for data exploitation needs will be critical for Taiwan, which will need this capacity both ahead of and during any crisis response. Preparing for and providing this capacity is not just the preserve of government, as commercially available and industry data sources will provide critical insights. Planning to access, receive, store, and process this data needs to start early, as the foundations for technical infrastructure, capabilities, data-sharing policies, and data expertise in government all require time and cannot just be activated on the cusp of crisis. Part of this work entails developing scenarios to help analysts map out gaps in information sources (intelligence, open source, commercial, and from allies) that Taiwan will likely need in each circumstance to build situational awareness. Ahead of and during crisis, risk assessment and effective decision-making will be highly dependent on the availability, quality, and usability of intelligence, information, and data.
Expanding its network of professional skills and resources: Assessing the range of skills and the levels of resourcing needed in government to manage a long-term crisis posture should start well ahead of any crisis. It would be helpful to look now at the gaps in key areas of professional expertise: analysts, data experts, crisis-response professionals, and operational planners will all be needed in larger numbers to sustain an effective response. Taiwan will also need professionally administered and well-exercised crisis facilities, resilient technical infrastructure, and business continuity approaches in place.
Preparedness and planning: Thinking through potential impacts of crisis scenarios in advance and working up potential policy and operational responses will bolster the quality of adaptability, which is an essential component of resilience. The process of exercising and refining plans is also helpful to build the professional connections and networks that will be activated during a live response.

Working with countries that are already developing vanguard resilience capabilities could help Taiwan quickly establish a workable model. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Situation Centre¹⁶—built in less than a year during the COVID-19 pandemic—is a model of developing access to critical data in peacetime and lessons learned from previous crisis scenarios about the practical challenges a nation could face in a variety of scenarios. Many commercial providers offer competent ways of displaying data insights on dashboards, and while this is helpful, it is only part of what can be achieved.

As a model for its broader resilience requirements, Taiwan will have the benefit of its existing efforts including in the counterdisinformation arena, where it has programs as effective as any in the world, despite the fact that Taiwan consistently faces the world’s highest volume of targeted disinformation campaigns.¹⁷ The saturation of PRC information manipulation across Taiwan’s traditional and social media platforms is strategically designed to undermine social cohesion, erode trust in government institutions, and soften resistance to Beijing’s forced unification agenda, while sowing doubts about America’s commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Taiwan has developed a multifaceted strategy to combat this onslaught, eschewing heavy-handed censorship in favor of promoting free speech and empowering civil society. This approach serves as a beacon for other democracies, demonstrating how to effectively counter disinformation through rapid-response mechanisms, independent fact-checking, along with widespread media literacy initiatives. Collaborative efforts such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, and MyGoPen have proven instrumental in swiftly identifying and debunking false rumors, notably during the closely watched presidential election on January 13.¹⁸

Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs (MoDA) attributes the island’s success in combating this “infodemic” to its sophisticated civil-sector efforts, which avoids reliance on reactive takedowns of malicious content akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Much like its handling of the pandemic—where Taiwan achieved one of the world’s lowest COVID-19 fatality rates without resorting to draconian lockdowns—it has demonstrated resilience and innovation in the digital sphere.¹⁹

Taiwan’s response to disinformation demonstrates that it is well-positioned to establish a comprehensive approach to societal resilience. The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, but it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach.

Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience

Cyber risks to critical infrastructures

Like all advanced economies, Taiwan depends on its critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have been described as “sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital . . . that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”²⁰ Since several critical infrastructures are interlinked, it is important in evaluating resilience to “capture cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impacts within and across sectors.”²¹ Among those interlinked critical infrastructures are energy, communications, transportation, and water. Each of these are critical to society as a whole and each are dependent on digital technology for their operations.

In Taiwan, the Administration for Cyber Security has identified critical infrastructures “by their feature types into the following eight fields: energy, water resource, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, emergency aid and hospitals, central and local governments, and high-tech parks.”²² It is worth underscoring that several of Taiwan’s critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid²³ and the water system,²⁴ are significantly centralized or have other notable vulnerabilities such as the dependency on undersea cables for international communications²⁵ that increase the potential consequences from a successful cyberattack.

The Taiwan government has fully recognized the significant risks from cyberattacks. As described by Taiwan’s Administration for Cyber Security, “Due to Taiwan’s unique political and economic situation, the country faces not only a complex global cyber security environment but also severe cyber security threats, making the continuous implementation and improvement of cyber security measures a necessity.”²⁶

The number of cyberattacks against Taiwan is notable.²⁷ Published estimates range from five million cyberattacks per day against Taiwanese government agencies²⁸ to the detection of 15,000 cyberattacks per second, including attempted intrusions, in Taiwan during the first half of 2023.²⁹

The attacks often focus on key societal infrastructures. A recent Voice of America report noted that just prior to the January 2024 elections:

Most of the attacks appeared to focus on government offices, police departments, and financial institutions, with the attackers focused on internal communications, police reports, bank statements and insurance information.³⁰

Google researchers have likewise described the cyber threat to key critical infrastructures, revealing that it is “tracking close to 100 hacking groups out of China [and that these] malicious groups are attacking a wide spectrum of organizations, including the government, private industry players and defense organizations.”³¹

The attacks themselves are often relatively sophisticated. Trellix, a cybersecurity firm, described multiple techniques utilized by attackers that “focused on defense evasion, discovery, and command and control . . . to subvert system defenses to gather information about accounts, systems, and networks.” Among them are “living-off-the-land” techniques, which allow attackers to maintain their intrusions over time with smaller chances of detection.³²

While no one can say with certainty what actions the PRC would take in the context of a blockade of or outright conflict with Taiwan, the United States is clear-eyed about the potential for attacks on its own critical infrastructures if engaged in conflict with China. The February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community notes the likelihood of such PRC cyberattacks in that context:

If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide . . . China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.³³

The ongoing Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore the reality of critical infrastructures as a target in a conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that comparable actions (and perhaps even more) would be undertaken against Taiwan in the event of a blockade or kinetic conflict. “Probable targets,” according to James A. Lewis, would include critical infrastructures such as electrical power facilities, information and communications systems, and pipelines.³⁴

Actions to enhance Taiwan’s cyber resilience

Taiwan can enhance its cyber resilience through its own actions and in collaborative activities with private-sector companies and with the United States. While cyberattacks can be highly disruptive, one of the important lessons of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is that the effects on operations can be mitigated, as described in a CyberScoop analysis that underscores a shift in expectations:

The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.³⁵

According to the analysis, the critical element for such success has been significant multinational and public-private collaboration:

This high level of defense capability is a consequence of a combination of Ukraine’s own effectiveness, significant support from other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, and a key role for private sector companies.
The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.³⁶

Actions by Taiwan

Taiwan should utilize the Ukraine model of cyber resilience—backed in part by private-sector companies—and take comparable actions to enhance its cybersecurity. Taiwan has a substantial existing cybersecurity framework on which to build such mitigating actions. Since 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, through its Administration for Cyber Security, is responsible for “implementing cyber security management and defense mechanisms for national critical infrastructures” including “evaluating and auditing cyber security works at government agencies and public entities.”³⁷ Utilizing that framework, Taiwan should undertake the following four actions that would significantly enhance the island’s cybersecurity resilience.

First, Taiwan should utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan. Ukraine undertook such actions, thereby rendering Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine unable to disrupt ongoing governmental activities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has been evaluating the use of public clouds including the possibility of “digital embassies” abroad to hold data.³⁸ Taiwan should organize such actions with key cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provided support to Ukraine.³⁹ The United States should work with Taiwan and appropriate cloud providers to help effectuate such a result.

Second, Taiwan should establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks in the context of a blockade or kinetic conflict. As noted above, such private-sector actions have been instrumental to Ukraine, and would similarly be invaluable for Taiwan. The United States should also help facilitate such private-sector defensive cyber operations for Taiwan.

Third, Taiwan should organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources. Both Estonia and the United Kingdom have very effective cyber-reserve approaches, and Taiwan should engage with each country, seeking lessons learned as part of establishing its own reserve corps.

Fourth, Taiwan needs to accelerate its low-earth orbit satellite communications program. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ two-year, US$18 million plan to strengthen the resilience of government communications entails building more than 700 satellite receiver stations. The impetus: ships from mainland China have repeatedly severed submarine internet cables in what Taiwan perceived as “a trial of methods” that the PRC could use to prepare for a military invasion.⁴⁰

The existing program involves satellites as well as ground-based receivers. The Taiwan Space Agency disclosed its plan for a “dedicated” LEO satellite communications project in late 2022,⁴¹ as a public-private partnership:

Distinct from traditional government programs, this groundbreaking project is structured as a privately operated venture, wherein the Taiwanese government would retain a substantial minority ownership. . . . This project intends to enhance the Taiwan Space Agency’s initial proposal for two government-built LEO satellites by evolving it into a “2+4” configuration. This will involve constructing four additional satellites through collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors.⁴²

Actions with the United States

In accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,⁴³ and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s defensive capabilities including for cybersecurity. The Integrated Country Strategy of the American Institute in Taiwan (essentially the unofficial US embassy) specifically provides that “bolster[ing] Taiwan’s cybersecurity resilience” is one of the United States’ strategic priorities for the island.⁴⁴ To support that objective, the United States can enhance Taiwan cybersecurity through cooperative defensive activities.

First, US Cyber Command regularly supports the network resilience of allied countries and partners through its “Hunt Forward” operations, which are “strictly defensive” joint ventures, undertaken following an invitation from the ally or partner, to “observe and detect malicious cyber activity” on these networks, together searching out “vulnerabilities, malware, and adversary presence.”⁴⁵

While Taiwan has not been specifically identified as a Hunt Forward participant, Anne Neuberger, who is the US deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, said at a Politico Tech Summit in 2023 that in the event of a major cyberattack on Taiwan, the United States would “send its best teams to help hunt down the attackers, the same approach typically used to help global allies in cyberspace.”⁴⁶ She described the typical approach as:

Putting our best teams to hunt on their most sensitive networks to help identify any current intrusions and to help remediate and make those networks as strong as possible.”⁴⁷

Neuberger also highlighted US work with Taiwan to carry out military tabletop games and exercises to prepare for potential cyberattack.⁴⁸

More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 explicitly authorized the Defense Department to cooperate on:

Defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan to (1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and (4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.⁴⁹

Going forward, those authorities authorize not only Hunt Forward actions but also actions to leverage commercial and military technology to harden such networks (which would seem to resolve any export control issues) and to conduct combined training and exercises, all of which underscores clear congressional approval for enhanced cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.⁵⁰

Second, the United States should undertake to enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks. The important role of the commercial provider Starlink in assuring communications in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war is well-known.⁵¹ Starlink’s parent company, SpaceX, is, however, controlled by Elon Musk, whose Tesla company has major investments in China. That linkage has raised the question of whether Taiwan could rely on any commercial arrangements it might make on its own with Starlink—particularly since Starlink did impose some limitations on Ukraine’s use of the network.⁵² However, as previously described by one of the authors of this report, the US government has sway on such matters:

The Defense Production Act authorizes the [US] government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.⁵³

Accordingly, the US should rely on this authority to organize appropriate arrangements with Starlink—and other space companies that provide like capabilities—to ensure access that would support Taiwan communications. One way to do this would be to incorporate appropriate terms into the commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program arrangements that US Space Force is currently negotiating with civil space providers,⁵⁴ as part of the Department of Defense’s overall commercial space strategy.⁵⁵

Additionally, the DOD is developing its own LEO capability through a variety of constellations being put in place by Space Force.⁵⁶ Pursuant to the recent NDAA authorization noted above, DOD should work with the Taiwan military to ensure that those constellations will be available to support Taiwan as necessary.

Longer term, the United States should also undertake to enhance the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables. As previously proposed by one of the authors, the United States should lead in establishing an international undersea infrastructure protection corps. It should:

Combine governmental and private activities to support the resilience of undersea cables and pipelines. Membership should include the United States, allied nations with undersea maritime capabilities, and key private-sector cable and pipeline companies.⁵⁷

Such an activity would include focus on cybersecurity for undersea cable networks, hardening and other protection for cable landing points, and capabilities and resources to ensure expeditious repair of cables as needed.⁵⁸ To be sure, getting such an activity up and running will necessarily be a multiyear effort. However, Taiwan’s vulnerability underscores the importance of beginning promptly and working as expeditiously as possible.

Cybersecurity recommendations for Taiwan

Utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan.
Establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks.
Organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources.
Accelerate the low-earth orbit satellite communications program.
Actively engage with Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward activities.
Enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks.
Undertake on a longer-term basis enhanced resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables.

Energy

As part of its efforts to enhance resilience, Taiwan must mitigate its energy vulnerabilities, as its reliance on maritime imports for about 97 percent⁵⁹ of its energy needs creates acute risks. To lessen its dependency on maritime imports and strengthen its resiliency in the face of potential PRC coercion, Taiwan should curb energy and electricity demand, bolster indigenous supply, overhaul its inventory management, and prepare rationing plans. A resilient energy security approach would credibly signal to the PRC that Taiwan could hold out for long durations without maritime resupply.

Curbing demand by rationalizing prices

Taiwan’s ultra-low electricity prices are a security risk (and a black eye for its climate targets). Reliance on seaborne energy shipments presents straightforward security problems, and Taiwan’s low electricity prices subsidize consumption that is being met by imports of hydrocarbons, especially coal. The new Lai administration should make haste prudently, increasing electricity prices more frequently and significantly, without exceeding the limits of the politically possible.

Taiwan’s electricity price quandary is illustrated by Taipower, the state-owned monopoly utility. In 2022 and 2023, Taipower lost 227.2 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) and 198.5 billion NTD, respectively, as its per kilowatt hour cost of electricity sold substantially exceeded per unit prices.⁶⁰ Taipower’s prices failed to offset the steep rise in electricity input costs amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the post-COVID-19 unsnarling of supply chains.

Taiwan’s electricity costs remain too low, diminishing the island’s resiliency, although policymakers have now taken some steps in light of the problem. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ latest electricity price review, in March 2024, raised average prices by about 11 percent, with the new tariff reaching about 3.4518 NTD, or approximately $0.11 USD/kWh.⁶¹ This rationalization of prices, while welcome, is insufficient. In the United States, the rolling twelve-month ending price in January 2024 for all sectors totaled $0.127/kWh.⁶² Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity consumers therefore enjoy a discount in excess of 13 percent compared to their US counterparts, despite US access to low-cost, abundant, and indigenously produced energy.

Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity prices incentivize maritime imports, especially coal. Astonishingly, Taiwan was the world’s largest per capita user of coal generation for electricity in 2022, higher than even Australia, a major coal exporter.

Taiwan’s low electricity prices and use of coal expose the island to PRC economic coercion. Taiwan’s dependency on imported coal heightens its vulnerability in the summer, when the island’s electricity-generation needs peak. Concerningly, Taiwan has already experienced electricity shortfalls in summer peacetime conditions, including a wave of outages⁶³ between July and August 2022. With the island’s future summer cooling needs set to rise even further due to climate change and hotter temperatures, Taiwan’s electricity needs pose a vulnerability that the PRC may attempt to exploit.

Curbing Taiwan’s electricity demand during summer months is critical, necessitating a rise in prices. While this reduction is a principal energy security challenge, the island must also do more to secure supply, especially for nuclear energy.

Supply: Support indigenous production

Taiwan’s resiliency will be strengthened by producing as much indigenous energy as possible, especially during the critical summer months. Taiwan, which has virtually no hydrocarbon resources, can therefore indigenously produce only four different forms of energy at scale: nuclear energy, offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar. Taiwan should pursue each of these indigenous energy sources. Taiwan should apply “carrots” by strengthening incentives and payments for indigenous production. At the same time, applying the “stick” of higher prices to energy consumption, especially for energy imports, would bolster the island’s resiliency.

Taiwan’s renewable resources are significant and often economically viable, but they cannot secure adequate levels of resiliency by themselves. Taiwan’s wind speeds slow in the summer,⁶⁴ limiting onshore and offshore wind’s effectiveness in bolstering energy security. Additionally, Taiwan’s stringent localization requirements for offshore appropriately minimize PRC components and sensors in Taiwan’s offshore wind turbines, but also raise the costs of this technology. Taiwan’s solar potential⁶⁵ is also limited⁶⁶ by cloudy skies, frequent rainfall, and land scarcity.

Accordingly, nuclear energy is the most viable way for Taiwan to address its summer electricity needs without turning to maritime imports. While Taiwan’s nuclear reactors must acquire fuel from abroad, this fuel can be used for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.⁶⁷ Taiwan should maintain its existing nuclear energy capacity; restart retired capacity as soon as politically and technically feasible; and seek new, incremental capacity over time.⁶⁸

Unpacking Taiwan’s storage complexities: Dispersal and hardening is critical

To cope with various contingencies, including the possibility of a prolonged summertime blockade, Taiwan should increase its stockpiles of energy, disperse inventory around the island, and harden facilities.

While Taiwan’s ability to hold out against a blockade involves by many factors, energy inventories are a critical element. Taiwan’s electricity reserves are limited: it reported fifty-six days of supply of coal inventories in February 2023,⁶⁹ and aims to raise its natural gas inventories from eleven days to more than twenty days by 2030.⁷⁰ These inventory levels should be expanded, in part because “days of supply” fail to encapsulate uncertainty. Demand fluctuates depending on temperature and other variables, while Taiwan’s access to energy storage inventories faces the risk of sabotage and, in certain scenarios, kinetic strikes.

Taiwan’s management of petroleum reserves is a matter of great importance, given the use of these fuels, especially diesel, for military matters. Taiwan’s Energy Administration, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, reported in April 2024 that its total oil inventories stood at 167 days of supply.⁷¹ This topline figure presents an overly optimistic portrait of Taiwan’s petroleum security, however. For instance, Taiwan’s government-controlled inventories in April 2024⁷² included 2.6 million kiloliters of crude oil and refined products; private stocks added another 6.5 million kiloliters. Accordingly, Taiwan reports forty-seven days of supply from government stockpiles, with an additional 120 days from private inventories.⁷³ Given that domestic sales and consumption equated to about 54,200 kiloliters per day from prior comparable periods,⁷⁴ Taiwan calculated it had about 167 days of supply.

There may, however, be insufficient monitoring of private inventories. Marek Jestrab observed:

A concerning—and possibly significant—loophole exists in these laws, where the criteria and computation formulas for the actual on-hand security stockpiles will be determined by the central competent authority, and are not required to be disclosed. This presents the opportunity for energy that is loaded onboard merchant shipping while in transit to Taiwan to count toward these figures.⁷⁵

While Taiwan should ensure that stockpiles are actually on the island, and not at sea, it also needs to carefully examine the inventory split between crude oil and crude products, such as diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc. Additionally, Taiwan’s policymakers should not expect to rely on its crude inventories, which only have a latent potential: crude oil cannot be used until it is refined into a crude product. Therefore, if the PRC disrupted Taiwan’s refineries via cyber or even kinetic means, Taiwan would not be able to access the totality of its crude oil reserves.

Taiwan’s military requirements for fuel would likely surge during a confrontation or conflict with the PRC, reducing the “days of supply.” Since Taiwan’s military vehicles largely run on diesel, the island should pay careful attention to this product.

Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy assets, especially diesel storage, as concentrated objects would present inviting targets for the PRC. Beijing is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely and will not fail to notice that Moscow attacked about 30 percent of Ukrainian infrastructure in a single day.⁷⁶ As one author witnessed during his recent visit to Kyiv, Ukraine’s dispersal of electricity assets is achieving a reasonable degree of success. Indeed, Russia’s more recent campaign⁷⁷ attacking large-scale thermal and hydroelectric power plants illustrates the utility of dispersed energy infrastructure. Like Ukraine, Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy storage inventories to the maximal feasible extent.

Rationing plans

While both Taiwan’s electricity supply and demand will be very hard to predict in a state of emergency, rationing plans must be considered—especially for the island’s manufacturing and semiconductor industries.

Taiwan’s economy is uniquely⁷⁸ tied to electricity-intensive manufacturing, as industrial consumers accounted for more than 55 percent of Taiwan’s electricity consumption in 2023.⁷⁹ Most of these industrial producers (such as chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) service export markets—not Taiwan. While the PRC might attempt to disrupt the island’s energy and electricity supply via cyber and kinetic means, Taiwan’s electricity consumption would fall dramatically during a crisis if Taiwan’s industries were forced to shut down. Although the closure of Taiwan’s industry would prove economically ruinous, it would also make the island’s electricity and energy issues much more manageable. Adding an additional layer of complication, many of Taiwan’s most valuable exports – such as chips – are shipped via civilian airliners, not on seaborne vessels, and would consequently be more difficult to interdict in circumstances short of war.⁸⁰ Taiwan should prepare rationing plans for a variety of contingencies, adapting to a range of scenarios, including a quarantine, siege, or even kinetic conflict. Taiwan must be ready.

Energy recommendations for Taiwan

Gradually raise electricity and energy prices, communicating that price hikes will persist and require significant adjustments over the medium term.
Expand the frequency of electricity price reviews from twice a year to a quarterly basis. More frequent price adjustments will allow smaller incremental increases while also enabling Taiwan to respond more quickly to potential contingencies.
Expand fiscal support for indigenous forms of energy. Demand-side management programs could include virtual power plants, building efficiency measures, two-way air conditioning units, and more. On the supply side, Taiwan should incentivize indigenous energy production, including nuclear energy, onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar.
Extend the life of Taiwan’s nuclear energy power plants and consider expanding capacity. Nuclear energy is not only Taiwan’s best option for meeting its summer generation needs but also extremely safe and reliable. In the event of a conflict, the PRC is extremely unlikely to launch highly escalatory and provocative attacks against nuclear facilities on territory it seeks to occupy.
Bolster domestic energy supplies and decarbonization objectives including by considering easing localization requirements for offshore wind projects—while ensuring that PRC components and sensors are not incorporated.
Disperse and, where possible, harden energy and electricity assets and volumes across the island for both military and civil defense needs.
Examine potential alternatives to diesel, as diesel inventories can begin to degrade after several weeks, including “long-duration diesel” solutions that, while more polluting, could extend the shelf life of its inventories, enhancing the durability of Taiwan’s military and civil defense efforts.
Deepen liquified natural gas (LNG) ties with the United States. Contracting with US LNG producers would moderately bolster Taiwan’s energy security, as the PRC would be more reluctant to interdict US cargoes than vessels from other nations.
Conduct comprehensive studies into energy contingency planning, examining how energy and electricity would be prioritized and rationed during various scenarios.

Food and water resiliency

Taiwan’s food supply needs will be significant in the event of a contingency, but pale in comparison to its energy and water requirements. Taiwan’s water security is a serious concern, as it is already suffering from water access issues in noncrisis periods. Taiwan should prioritize scarce land for electricity generation, especially onshore wind and solar, which are much less water-intensive than coal and natural gas generation. Repurposing farmland for renewables would ease Taiwan’s electricity and water needs in peacetime and during any crisis.

Taiwan’s food security challenges are serious, but manageable. The island’s self-sufficiency ratio for food stands at about 40 percent, after rising somewhat in recent years. Unlike energy, however, Taiwan can both store food, especially rice, and replenish these inventories. Meals ready to eat (MREs) can store for more than eighteen months.

Additionally, the island would likely be able to resupply itself aerially in all situations short of conflict. The PRC might well be extremely reluctant to shoot down a civilian aircraft resupplying Taiwan with food. The PRC’s shootdown of a civilian aircraft would damage external perceptions of the PRC, and strengthen global support for sanctions. While there can be no certainty, the PRC’s self-interest in managing perceptions of a confrontation would increase the likelihood of the safe transit of aerial and perhaps even maritime food deliveries to the island.

Taiwan’s water access problems are serious. Water shortages have manifested even in peacetime, as Taiwan experienced a severe drought in 2021. During a contingency with the PRC, Beijing might attempt to exploit this vulnerability.

Luckily, Taiwan’s water resiliency can be strengthened by tackling agricultural consumption and, wherever politically and technically feasible, repurposing farmland for energy generation. From 2013 to 2022, 71 percent of Taiwan’s water consumption was attributable to agriculture. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s industries comprised only 10 percent of demand during that period, with domestic (i.e., residential and commercial) consumption accounting for the remainder. Taiwan’s water needs are growing, due to “thirsty” industrial customers, but the agricultural sector is primarily responsible for the majority of the island’s consumption, although consumption and supply sources vary across the island.

Taiwan’s policymakers recognize its water problems and have begun raising water prices, especially for heavy users. Taiwan should continue to encourage efficiency by gradually but perceptibly increasing water prices. Concomitantly, it should further reduce demand by repurposing water-intensive farmland for electricity generation, when feasible. Repurposing farmland will undoubtedly prove politically difficult, but it will also improve Taiwan’s water and electricity resiliency.

Food and water security recommendations

Prioritize energy and water security needs over food production.
Secure and disperse inventories of foodstuffs, such as MREs, medicines, and water, along with water purification tablets.
Bolster the island’s cold storage supply chains and overall foodstuff inventories.
Plan and work with partners to stage food supply if a Berlin airlift-style operation becomes necessary.
Continue to encourage water conservation by increasing water prices gradually but steadily.
Ensure redundancy of water supplies and systems, especially in the more populous northern part of the island.
Ensure that drinking water and sanitation systems can operate continuously, after accounting for any electricity needs.

SOURCES

Gustavo F. Ferreira and J. A. Critelli, “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China,” US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 2 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3222; Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council blog, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-massive-reliance-on-energy-imports-put-its-security-at-risk/; Amy Chang Chien, Mike Ives, and Billy H. C. Kwok, “Taiwan Prays for Rain and Scrambles to Save Water,” New York Times, May 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/asia/taiwan-drought.html; “Water Resources Utilization,” Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Water Resources Agency, 2022, https://eng.wra.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=5154&dn=5155; Meng-hsuan Yang, “Why Did Formosa Plastics Build Its Own Desalination Facility?,” CommonWealth Magazine, May 31, 2023, https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3440; and Chao Li-yen and Ko Lin, “Taiwan State-Owned Utility Evaluates Water Price Adjustments,” Focus Taiwan, January 26, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202401260017#:~:text=As%20of%20Aug.

NOTE

The Berlin airlift of 1948 and 1949 demonstrates the power of aerial food replenishment logistics in an uncontested environment. From June 26, 1948, to September 30, 1949, Allied forces delivered more than 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and supplies to West Berlin in over 278,000 airdrops. While Taiwan’s population of more than twenty-three million is significantly larger than West Berlin’s population of 2.5 million, the world civilian air cargo fleet has expanded dramatically over the past seventy-five years. In all situations short of conflict, Taiwan would be able to restock food from the air. For more on the Berlin airlift, see Katie Lange, “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War,” DOD News, June 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3072635/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-in-the-cold-war/.

Enhancing defense resilience

Ever since Beijing leveraged then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as an excuse to launch large-scale joint blockade military exercises, pundits have labeled the residual military situation around Taiwan as a “new normal.” Yet there is really nothing normal about a permanent presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships menacingly surrounding the island along its twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, and nothing usual about increasing numbers of manned and unmanned military aircraft crossing the tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait—a line that held significance for seven decades as a symbol of cross-strait stability. Nor should it be viewed as normal that a steady stream of high-altitude surveillance balloons—which are suspected of collecting military intelligence—violate Taiwan’s airspace.⁸¹ Some have better described this “new normal” as a strategy akin to an anaconda noticeably tightening its grip around the island, drawing close enough to reduce warning time and provocative enough to raise the risk of inadvertent clashes. In other words, the PRC has unilaterally dialed up a military cost-imposition campaign meant to chip away at peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, wear down Taiwan’s military, and erode confidence and social cohesion in Taiwan society.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an additional wake-up call for the citizens of Taiwan, following mainland China’s 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong freedoms, heightening recognition of the risks presented by the PRC and, in particular, that the long-standing status quo in cross-strait relations is no longer acceptable to Beijing. Taiwan thus finds itself in the unenviable position of simultaneously countering PLA gray zone intrusions and cognitive warfare—what NATO calls affecting attitudes and behaviors to gain advantage⁸²—while beefing itself up militarily to deter the growing threat of a blockade or assault.

With this backdrop, Taipei authorities have since embarked on long-overdue reforms in defense affairs, marked by several developments aimed at bolstering the island democracy’s military capabilities and readiness in the face of growing threats from Beijing.

First, Taiwan’s overall defense spending has undergone seven consecutive year-on-year increases, reaching 2.5 percent of gross domestic product.⁸³ While this is commendable, Taiwan’s defense requirements are very substantial, and its budget in US dollars is only $19.1 billion.⁸⁴ Accordingly, it will be important for Taiwan to continue the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP both to bolster Taiwan’s military capabilities and as a deterrent signal to Beijing—and also to garner international community recognition that Taiwan is serious about its own defense. A key element will be to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient stocks of ammunition and other weapons capabilities to fight effectively until the United States could fully engage and in the event of a longer war. One area that deserves a high degree of attention is defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Especially in light of the recent coalition success in defeating such Iranian attacks against Israel, planning should be undertaken to assure comparable success for Taiwan against PRC attacks. Adding mobile, short-range air defenses to the high-priority list of military investments for Taiwan—such as the highly mobile National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)⁸⁵—will make it harder for the PLA to find and destroy Taiwan defenses, especially if combined with passive means for target detection and missile guidance.

Second, the new president can kick-start an enhanced approach to defense by embracing full integration of public-private innovation and adopting Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation for defense, which has served it well through a decade of war against a much larger Russia. Recognizing that innovation is itself a form of resilience, Taiwan can draw valuable lessons from Ukraine, particularly in leveraging private-sector expertise. By implementing what some Ukrainian defense experts term a “capability accelerator” to integrate emerging technologies into mission-focused capabilities, Taiwan can enhance its resilience and swiftly adapt to evolving security challenges, including rapidly fielding a high volume of unmanned systems to achieve distributed surveillance, redundant command and control, and higher survivability.⁸⁶ This comprehensive approach, which recognizes the private sector as the greatest source of innovation in today’s complex security environment, holds significant potential for enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities through the utilization of disruptive technologies. The island’s overall resilience would significantly benefit by drawing the private sector in as a direct stakeholder in national defense matters.

Ukraine’s grass-roots model of defense innovation, spearheaded by volunteers, nongovernment organizations, and international partners, is a worthy and timely model for Taiwan. Ukraine’s approach has yielded significant advancements in drone warfare, as well as sophisticated capabilities like the Delta battlefield management system—a user-friendly cloud-based situational awareness tool that provides real-time information on enemy and friendly forces through the integration of data from sources such as drones, satellites, and even civilian reports.⁸⁷ This collaborative model, reliant on cooperation between civilian developers and military end users, has propelled Ukraine’s military technological revolution by integrating intelligence and surveillance tasks, while enhancing decision-making and kill-chain target acquisition. Taiwan will benefit from a comparable approach.

Third, as suggested above, Taiwan should focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems. In terms of force structure, it appears that Taiwan has settled on a design that blends large legacy platforms of a twentieth-century military with the introduction of more survivable and distributable low-end asymmetric capabilities. The latter are best exemplified by Taiwan’s indigenously produced Ta Chiang-class of high-speed, guided-missile corvettes (PGG) and Min Jiang-class fast mine laying boats (FMLB).⁸⁸ But much more must be done to bolster Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by focusing on less expensive, but nonetheless highly effective systems.

In Ukraine’s battle against Russian Federation invaders, drones have provided Ukrainian forces with important tactical capabilities by enabling them to gather intelligence, monitor enemy movements, and conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. Taiwan can comparably utilize low-cost UAVs to establish mesh networks that connect devices for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and for targeting that would be invaluable in countering a PRC amphibious assault. Lessons from Ukraine further highlight the importance of having the right mix of drone types and capabilities in substantial stockpiles, capable of a variety of missions. Notably, Ukrainian officials have called for the production of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.⁸⁹ Then-President Tsai’s formation of a civilian-led “drone national team” program is a commendable step in this direction and underscores the power of collaborative innovation in joint efforts between users.⁹⁰ Encouraging cooperation between Taiwan drone makers and US private industry will accelerate the development of a combat-ready unmanned systems fleet with sufficient range, endurance, and payload to enhance situational awareness and battlefield effects.

Concurrent with those efforts utilizing unmanned systems, Taiwan should bolster its naval mining capabilities as a strategic measure against PRC aggression. Naval mines represent one of the most cost-effective and immediately impactful layers of defense.⁹¹ In this regard, Taiwan’s new Min Jiang class of FMLB represents the right type of investments in capabilities which could prove pivotal in thwarting potential invasion attempts.

Even more significantly for a Taiwan audience, Ukraine broke a blockade of its Black Sea ports using a combination of naval drones and coastal defense missiles—and repelled the once-mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet—all without a traditional navy of its own.⁹² Faced with clear intent by a PLA Navy practicing daily to isolate the island, the time is past due for Taiwanese authorities to hone their own counterblockade skills including a heavy reliance on unmanned surface vehicles.

Taiwan should also make rapid investments in port infrastructure and defenses along Taiwan’s eastern seaboard in places such as Su’ao and Hualien harbors, which can serve as deepwater ports that are accessible, strategic, antiblockade strongpoints, and where any conceivable PLA blockade would be at its weakest and most vulnerable point logistically. Su’ao harbor, as a potential future homeport for Taiwan’s new indigenous Hai Kun-class diesel submarines, could also serve a dual purpose as an experimentation and development zone for public-private collaboration on unmanned-systems employment and operations. Infrastructure investments in East Coast ports could enhance the island’s ability to attain emergency resupply of energy, food, humanitarian supplies, and munitions under all conditions, broadening options for international community aid and complicating PLA efforts.

Fourth, every new capability needs trained operators who are empowered to employ and engage. This year Taiwan began implementation of a new, one-year conscript training system for male adults born after January 1, 2005 (up from a wholly inadequate four months of conscription in the past decade).⁹³ Taiwan’s “all-out defense” plan realigns into a frontline main battle force consisting of all-volunteer career military personnel, backed up by a standing garrison force composed mainly of conscripted military personnel guarding infrastructure, along with a civil defense system integrated with local governments and private-sector resources. Upon mobilization, there would also be a reserve force to supplement the main battle and garrison forces.

According to details laid out in its 2023 National Defense Report, Taiwan’s revamped one-year conscript system and reorganized reserve mobilization system place significant emphasis on traditional military combat skills, such as rifle marksmanship and operation of mortars.⁹⁴ However, in response to evolving security challenges and the changing nature of warfare, Taiwan’s military should incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics, along with decentralized command and control, especially in the areas of drone warfare, where unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vessels play a crucial role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes. By integrating drone warfare training into the conscript system as well as in annual reserve call-up training, Taiwan can better prepare its military personnel to adapt to modern battlefield environments and effectively counter emerging threats.

Integrating drone operations into military operations down to the conscript and reservist level offers a cost-effective means to enhance battlefield situational awareness and operational capabilities, and also has the added benefit of enhancing the attractiveness and value of a mandatory conscription system emerging from years of low morale and characterized by Taiwan’s outgoing president as “insufficient” and “full of outmoded training.”⁹⁵ Recognizing the imperative to modernize military training to face up to a rapidly expanding PLA threat, Taiwan’s military force realignment plan came with a promise to “include training in the use of Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, Kestrel rockets, drones, and other new types of weapons . . . in accordance with mission requirements to meet the needs of modern warfare.”⁹⁶ Looking at the example of Ukraine, where drones have been utilized, underscores the importance of incorporating drone warfare training into its asymmetric strategy.

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act “prioritize[d] realistic training” by the United States, with Taiwan authorizing “an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness.”⁹⁷ There have been numerous reports of US special forces in Taiwan,⁹⁸ and those forces could provide training in tactical air control, dynamic targeting, urban warfare, and comparable capabilities.⁹⁹ Likewise, parts of an Army Security Force Assistance Brigade could do similar work on a rotational basis, on- or off-island.

To facilitate a comprehensive and integrated approach to defense planning and preparedness between the military, government agencies, and civilian organizations, Taiwan has also established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which (as noted above) is a centralized body subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense that is tasked with coordinating efforts across various sectors, down to the local level, to enhance national defense readiness. That agency would be significantly more effective if raised to the national level with a broadened mandate as part of a comprehensive approach.

The Taiwanese leadership also should consider elevating their efforts to create a large-scale civil defense force, offering practical skills training which would appeal to Taiwanese willing to dedicate time and effort toward defense of their communities and localities. These skills could include emergency medical training, casualty evacuation, additive manufacturing, drone flying, and open-source intelligence. Private, nonprofit civil defense organizations such as Taiwan’s Kuma Academy hold widespread appeal to citizens seeking to enhance basic preparedness skills.¹⁰⁰ With a curriculum that covers topics ranging from basic first aid to cognitive warfare, Kuma Academy’s popular classes typically sell out within minutes of going online. According to a recent survey of domestic Taiwan opinions sponsored by Spirit of America, “When facing external threats, 75.3% of the people agree that Taiwanese citizens have an obligation to defend Taiwan.”¹⁰¹ A well-trained civil defense force and other whole-of-society resilience measures provide an additional layer of defense and enhance social cohesion to better deny Beijing’s ultimate political objective of subjugating the will of the people.

Defense resilience recommendations for Taiwan

Raise defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP.
Adopt Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation in defense.
Focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems including unmanned vehicles and naval mines.
Incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
Invest in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
Elevate the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to the national level and implement a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Conclusion

On April 3, 2024, Taiwan was struck by the strongest earthquake in twenty-five years. In the face of this magnitude 7.4 quake, Taiwan’s response highlights the effectiveness of robust investment in stricter building codes, earthquake alert systems, and resilience policies, resulting in minimal casualties and low infrastructure damage.¹⁰² Taiwan’s precarious position on the seismically vulnerable Ring of Fire, a belt of volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean, mirrors its vulnerability under constant threat of military and gray zone aggression from a mainland China seeking seismic changes in geopolitical power. Drawing from its success in preparing for and mitigating the impact of natural disasters, Taiwan can apply a similarly proactive approach in its defense preparedness. Safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and security requires investments in a comprehensive security strategy for resilience across society—including cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, bolstering energy security, and enhanced defense resilience. Such an approach would provide Taiwan the greatest likelihood of deterring or, if necessary, defeating PRC aggression including through blockade or kinetic conflict.

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of its board. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Philip Yu is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a retired US Navy rear admiral.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Elizabeth “Beth” Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Earlier, she served in the United Kingdom’s government including as deputy national security adviser and as adviser to the UK prime minister on intelligence, security, and resilience issues.

This analysis reflects the personal opinions of the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and feedback: Amber Lin, Elsie Hung, Kwangyin Liu, and Alison O’Neil.

Production diplomacy for deterrence, readiness, and resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Andrew Brown, John T. Watts, Markus Garlauskas — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 16:42:13 +0000

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Executive summary

Production diplomacy integrates the defense industrial bases (DIB) of allies and partners by protecting supply chains, strengthening alliances and partnerships, enhancing deterrence, and building defense readiness, though it is not without risks and challenges. In order to meet growing challenges of an evolving geostrategic environment including facing multiple adversaries simultaneously, the United States should rapidly develop and implement new production diplomacy initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.

The term production diplomacy was coined by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William A. LaPlante, and subsequently defined in the National Defense Industrial Strategy as a strategy to protect DIB supply chain. It can additionally support national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic environment.

Production diplomacy plays a key role in deepening and broadening integration among allies and partners, while enhancing resilience and building stockpiles and surge capacity. The application of production diplomacy also comes with risks and challenges, including difficulties creating sustainable industry environments, unintended technology transfer to adversaries, and domestic political environments.

While production diplomacy will not apply in every case, when applied creatively under the right circumstances, it has the potential to enhance US, allied, and partner national security. This creativity can include both coproducing and assembling forward, as well as multilateral coproduction to create win-win-win outcomes.

Maximizing effectiveness of production diplomacy initiatives to support US, allied, and partner national security objectives will require executive branch and congressional action. The full issue brief includes recommendations that think creatively; craft programs to support multiple national security objectives; assess and manage risks; overcome gaps and seams; and apply historical lessons.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

The EU’s new tariffs are just the start of the EV trade saga with China

Jacopo Pastorelli, James Batchik — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 15:26:42 +0000

In May, the Biden administration took a big step forward in its trade saga with China by imposing large tariff increases on, among other goods, Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs). Now Europe has joined the fray. Earlier this month, the European Commission announced that tariffs on some Chinese-made EVs from certain Chinese companies would rise up to 38.1 percent in the European Union (EU).

These new tariffs on both sides of the Atlantic signal greater alignment between Washington and Brussels on China. That is good news for the transatlantic partnership. But the technical differences in the latest salvos by the United States and Europe point to important differences in where Washington and Brussels are starting from and where they each might move next.

The Biden administration’s tariffs, announced on May 14, cover a wide range of strategic industries deemed critical to national security. These industries include steel, aluminum, microchips, EVs, and batteries. The most eye-grabbing figure was US tariffs on Chinese EVs quadrupling to 100 percent. The news from Brussels on June 12 delivered a similar but smaller effort, and one based less on a national-security framing. Moreover, Europe’s new tariffs are part of an ongoing investigation into Chinese practices, and therefore they are provisional.

Chinese-made EVs account for around 25 percent of the European market, with Beijing exporting 430,000 such vehicles to the continent in 2023.

The European Commission began its probe into Beijing’s massive subsidies of key sectors in October 2023. It has focused on the threat of cheap Chinese imports flooding the European market, driving down prices, and hurting Europe’s automotive sector. The investigation reflects a calculated approach, aligning with the EU’s new de-risking approach, but still, as is typical for the bloc, centering on adherence to World Trade Organization-complying trade defense regulations.

Unlike Washington’s tariffs, which apply to the entire sector, the new European tariffs target specific Chinese companies. They do not, in the words of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, amount to “punitive tariffs.” Europe’s tariffs on battery EVs will cover a wide umbrella of companies, including Western brands with production facilities and joint ventures in China. This leaves open the option for carmakers to relocate their production to Europe, thereby avoiding the tariffs.

Much of the difference between Washington and Brussels is due to the different immediate market threats posed by Chinese EVs. The United States imported fewer than three thousand EVs from China last year, and the tariffs are in part intended to prevent Chinese market share from growing. In Europe, in contrast, China is already a major player. Chinese-made EVs account for around 25 percent of the European market, with Beijing exporting 430,000 such vehicles to the continent in 2023, a number that has quadrupled in the past five years. The EU decision therefore must be seen as an attempt to strike a balance between protecting Europe’s internal automobile industry and avoiding escalation into a trade war with Beijing.

Another factor is European unity—or lack thereof. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has underscored that Europe “will not waver from making tough decisions needed to protect its economy and its security” and she has not shied away from directly confronting China’s leadership on Chinese overcapacity “flooding the European market.” But von der Leyen is well out in front of many of her European counterparts with her economic security agenda. Export-oriented members, such as Germany, Sweden, and Greece, have expressed reservations toward the increased tariffs, and the Commission’s announcement came only after an eleventh-hour push by Germany to lower the tariffs.

This hesitance from certain member states is spurred on by Beijing, which has fought the investigation since its inception and sought to sow division within the bloc. Even though Europe’s countervailing duties are likely insufficient to offset the advantage China holds in production, Beijing has warned that the EU’s moves could lead to a trade war. On June 17, Beijing opened a dumping probe into imports of pork from the EU in response to Brussels’ tariff announcement.

Prior to the news of the EV tariffs, China also threatened retaliatory tariffs targeting German carmakers, French luxury products, and the European aviation and agricultural sectors, highlighting the breadth of China’s appetite to hit back at sectors that will hurt specific EU countries.

Another difference between the US and EU tariffs is the finality of these announcements. The Biden administration can move relatively quickly and decisively, but the European Commission’s tariff announcement is provisional. The investigation is still ongoing, and final tariffs will come four months after the provisional tariffs’ imposition on July 4. The EU’s tariffs could realistically be lowered during this time if China continues to push back and if EU member states get skittish. The EU and China have already begun consultations on the tariffs, which may bring about some revisions to the EU’s actions.

Finally, there is the issue of leadership. The United States will hold an election in November, but Washington is generally united on its approach toward China. As the Biden administration’s extension of many of the Trump administration’s policies toward Beijing signal, tariffs and a hardline approach on China will likely feature in any next US administration. There is far less certainty of consistent support in Europe, however.

Over the summer, the European Commission leadership will turn over. If von der Leyen were to win a second term leading the next Commission, it would solidify the EU’s increasingly tough trade policy approach toward China, signaling continuity and alignment with Washington. But nothing is guaranteed. Von der Leyen has yet to be nominated by the EU’s member states or confirmed by the European Parliament. She will certainly defend her Commission’s decisions on China, but she may be forced to make concessions on future action to secure her post. This trade saga is far from over.

Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post The EU’s new tariffs are just the start of the EV trade saga with China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s innovative drone industry helps counter Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:02:03 +0000

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine’s domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the formidable Russian war machine. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia’s far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia itself.

For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war.

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As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

A global strategy to secure UAS supply chains

Matthew Kroenig, Imran Bayoumi — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 21:09:37 +0000

Foreword: A US strategy for UAVs

The United States has long been one of the world’s leading innovators, allowing it to rapidly adopt emerging technology to strengthen US national defense. This has been especially true in the field of aviation. From the first powered flight at Kitty Hawk to twenty-first-century strategic competition, the United States has made the maintenance of air superiority a major priority.

Today, however, the People’s Republic of China has built a near-insurmountable lead in the development and use of small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Benefiting from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) unfair trading practices, Chinese companies have come to dominate the global UAV market, which was valued at $31 billion in 2023.

Chinese dominance of the global UAV industry poses a number of national security challenges for the United States. On the battlefield, drones play a crucial role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and in conducting strikes. Chinese leadership in UAVs provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with potential battlefield advantages.

At home, these devices provide critical support to law-enforcement agencies and a variety of government departments, in everything from undertaking infrastructure inspections to fulfilling vital roles in scientific research. Chinese commercial drones operating in the United States and allied countries, therefore, provide the PLA with a potential source of intelligence about personal data and critical infrastructure that can be used to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US and allied homelands.

Finally, Chinese UAVs raise human rights concerns, as Chinese drone companies surveil Chinese citizens and assist the CCP in its mistreatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority.

Washington has begun to wake up to the challenges presented by China’s dominance of the global UAV market. Federal agencies and some states have banned the use of Chinese drones. The federal government has enacted tariffs. Recognizing UAVs’ potential benefit to defense and deterrence, the Department of Defense created the Replicator initiative, a flagship effort to promote the development and fielding of autonomous systems. Congress has also introduced legislation with new measures to protect the US market from Chinese drones and to promote the production of US-made drones.

These are good initial steps, but, to date, they have been piecemeal in nature and lack an overarching strategic framework.

This issue brief proposes a comprehensive three-part “protect-promote-align” strategy for the United States and its allies to secure their national security interests in the global UAV market. It argues that the United States and its allies should introduce new restrictions on the use of Chinese drones in their markets. They should promote the development of alternative drone manufacturers in the United States and trusted allies. Finally, they should align their policies to advance a whole-of-free-world approach to the global drone competition.

If adopted, the strategy proposed here will go a long way toward ensuring that the United States and its allies can remain secure at home, deter their adversaries, and benefit from an emerging technology that is likely to play a critical role in twenty-first-century defense.

Deborah Lee James
Atlantic Council Board Director
Former Secretary of the Air Force

Executive summary

The United States has been the world’s innovation leader since the time of Thomas Edison, and this innovation edge has provided the United States and its allies with enormous economic, military, and geopolitical benefits. China, however, aims to usurp the US position as the world’s leader in the most important technologies of the twenty-first century, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly known as drones. Using a variety of unfair trade practices, including massive intellectual-property theft, China has closed the gap, and even maintains the lead, in some of these critical technologies, including UAS.

While the United States has preserved its edge in large military drones, China dominates the market for smaller and commercially available drones with dual-use civilian and military applications. China controls 90 percent of the drone market in the United States and 80 percent globally.

China’s supremacy in the commercial UAS market creates a number of national security threats for the United States and its allies. First, Chinese drones operating in the United States and its democratic allies create an intelligence vulnerability, as these drones scoop up sensitive data that can be transferred back to Beijing for a variety of national security purposes, including aiding the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in targeting critical infrastructure for cyber and kinetic military attacks.

Second, China’s drone-manufacturing prowess provides a military edge. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that inexpensive commercial drones will be critical to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike in twenty-first-century warfare.

Third, and related, the free world has a supply-chain vulnerability problem, as it is dependent on an autocratic adversary for access to UAS for both civilian and military purposes, creating dangerous dependencies that China could exploit in crisis or peacetime. States increasingly utilize “drone diplomacy” to gain influence abroad. The act of selling a drone can be used to “extract concessions, exert influence, counter rivals, and strengthen military ties.” China’s artificially low prices for UAS, achieved through state subsidies, crowd out the development of a homegrown domestic drone industry in the United States and among US allies.

Fourth, Chinese-built drones threaten democratic values and human rights, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other autocracies employ Chinese drones for surveilling their populations, including in the CCP’s genocide of the Uyghur minority.

To address these challenges, the United States and its allies need a new strategy to protect against the threats posed by Chinese drones, strengthen their position in the international UAS market, and assert global leadership in this key twenty-first-century technology. To help the United States and its allies win the new tech race, the Scowcroft Center previously published a three-part “promote, protect, and coordinate” strategy. This paper updates that framework, and applies it to the issue of dual-use drones.

First, the United States and its allies should protect their countries from the national security threat posed by Chinese-made drones by prohibiting their use in sensitive areas, such as by the government and in critical infrastructure.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act and the Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant (DIIG) Act.
The US Congress should pass legislation to make US state-level bans effective and actionable by offering federal-government support for their implementation, including through targeted grant programs accelerating the transition to secure and capable systems.
The US State Department should, in light of increasing global restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones, launch an initiative to educate allies and partners on the risks associated with those systems, and support secure and capable alternatives.
The US State Department should encourage allies and partners to enact tariffs and sanctions on PRC-made UAS to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Second, the United States and its allies should promote domestic drone manufacturing to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US federal government should provide targeted grants to accelerate the transition to secure drones in the government and critical-infrastructure sectors, and should consider funding to expand domestic drone manufacturing.
The US State Department should encourage allied governments to do the same, providing reasonable funding measures to accelerate the transition to secure US and allied solutions.
The US Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) should ensure that the Replicator initiative has the proper funding and support to achieve the ambitious goals laid out in the program.
The US Departments of State and Defense should encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator initiative to ensure the free world has UAS in mass necessary to deter and defeat aggression.
The US Congress should pass legislation, using a public-private partnership framework, to stimulate investment in research and development of autonomous drones, and scale existing UAS-manufacturing capabilities in the United States.

Third, and finally, the United States should align with its allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US State Department should elevate drones in technology and commercial diplomacy, starting by designating an individual to lead allied cooperation on drone policies, manufacturing, and supply-chain security.
The United States and its allies should work with existing multilateral frameworks including the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), Quad, Department of Commerce, and World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of drones and autonomous systems.
The United States should leverage NATO and AUKUS Pillar II to improve defense coordination related to UAS.

Pursuing this strategy now will help the United States and its allies maintain their innovation edge and prevail in a new era of strategic competition against revisionist autocracies.

The threat posed by China’s dominance of the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry

In 2023, the global UAS market was worth more than $30 billion, a number projected to increase to more than $55 billion by 2030. The market is dominated by firms based in China, with DJI controlling 80 percent of the commercial market within the United States and as much as 70 percent of the global market, and Autel, another PRC manufacturer, controlling 7 percent globally. As of 2021, estimates put Autel’s US market share at 15 percent. In comparison, Skydio, perhaps the most prominent US-based company, had only a 3 percent share of the global market, the same as Parrot, a French-based entity.

DroneAnalyst’s 2021 Drone Market Sector Report includes data from a survey of drone industry stakeholders in over 100 countries on the percentage of all new commercial drone purchases. The graph examines the percentage each company has of the global market share and sorts by the headquarter location of each company. DroneAnalyst

In 2020, 90 percent of UAS operated by US public-safety agencies were manufactured by DJI, though this number has since fallen due to a series of state and local bans. In Florida, before a recent ban was enacted, more than 1,800 of 3,000 UAS registered by the government and police departments were manufactured by DJI and Autel. However, in some states, DJI and Autel still hold a disproportionate market share among public-sector entities. In New Jersey, more than 500 of the 550 UAS registered by the state and local police departments were made by DJI or Autel.

US allies continue to rely heavily on PRC-made drones. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, 230 out of the 337 drones operated by police forces across the country are DJI products. In Australia, a report revealed that federal agencies owned several thousand DJI drones, although the Australian military had grounded its systems and other agencies had begun to move away from them as well.

The global-market dominance of DJI and Autel has been supported by two national CCP policies, Made in China 2025 and Military-Civil Fusion, which are supported in part by industrial and corporate theft of foreign technology. The PRC has never been a market economy. Instead, it relies on a noncompetitive system of trade, bolstered by subsidies and other unfair practices.

Made in China 2025 was announced in 2015 and seeks to boost China’s manufacturing competitiveness across a variety of industries. The plan focuses on ten different sectors, including the development of UAS. Across each sector, the PRC aims to increase China’s domestic manufacturing capacity to have 70 percent of the core components and materials produced in China by 2025. To achieve this goal, the PRC uses a variety of tactics, such as creating financial and tax incentives to convince foreign-based firms to shift manufacturing and research and development (R&D) operations to China, intellectual-property theft, predatory procurement policies, and financing state-owned enterprises in their acquisitions of overseas companies.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is central to Xi Jinping’s plan to allow China to modernize its military by 2035 and ensure that the PLA becomes “world-class” by 2049. At its core, MCF is a strategy that aims to break down barriers between commercial R&D and military products, allowing the PLA to rapidly identify, adopt, scale up, and leverage commercial technologies that also have a military application, such as UAS. The MCF system also encourages linkages between the state and dozens of private companies that can contribute to military projects and help meet procurement needs, including companies that develop unmanned systems. To achieve the goals of MCF, the PRC uses both licit and illicit means, including exploiting global academic exchanges, investment in foreign companies, forced military transfer, and, in some cases, blatant theft.

As a result of these strategies, DJI and Autel can sell their UAS at below-market cost to the United States and allied countries, a process known as dumping. A 2017 investigation by the US Department of Homeland Security found that, in 2015, DJI slashed its prices by 70 percent, leading to a problem highlighted in 2019 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord, who said, “We don’t have much of a UAS industrial base because DJI dumped so many low-price quadcopters on the market, and we then became dependent on them.” DJI has even clearer linkages to the CCP than just state support for illegal trade practices. A 2022 Washington Post investigation found four different CCP-owned or operated investment vehicles invested in DJI.

The US government recognizes the threat posed by PRC-made drones. In 2021, the Department of Defense released a statement indicating that DJI systems pose potential threats to national security. In 2022, the department identified DJI as a Chinese military company operating in the United States. Similarly, the Treasury Department added DJI to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) companies list, which prevents US citizens from investing in or trading their stock, should DJI attempt to build a public company.

PRC-made UAS pose four direct national security concerns. The first concern relates to Chinese intelligence collection in the United States. In early 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released an alert that stated, “The use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” These concerns represented by the joint CISA-FBI alert are compounded by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which mandates that private companies work with the PRC’s intelligence services. Article 14 of the law states, “State intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.” In practice, this may include Chinese drone companies sharing sensitive flight data, the personal information of users, geolocation data, images, and video collected in the United States with the CCP. The transfer of such information to the CCP would allow Beijing to identify and exploit US vulnerabilities and facilitate the sabotage, disruption, or destruction of US critical infrastructure in times of crisis or conflict. Indeed, in 2017, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement determined that DJI was likely providing information about critical US infrastructure sites to the PRC, which the PRC then used to target specific assets. At the strategic level, FBI Director Christopher Wray warns that the Chinese security services present a “broad and unrelenting threat” to US critical infrastructure and are prepared to “wreak havoc.” PRC-made UAS have also been located in restricted airspace, including over Washington, DC. This is despite DJI claiming to have geofencing restrictions, which, in theory, limit where its UAS can operate.

The second concern relates to military effectiveness. The war in Ukraine is a testbed for new military technologies, and small commercial UAS have been a game changer in the conflict. They allow troops on the ground to conduct more accurate, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of adversary positions and troop movements, and to facilitate more effective fires. They have also proven to be an effective and economical strike option, as UAS can destroy much more expensive platforms by crashing into them or dropping inexpensive bombs. Indeed, Chinese drones are making Vladimir Putin’s war machine more lethal. As of March 2023, the PRC had sold more than $12 million in UAS and parts to Russia. The consistent supply of UAS has allowed Russia access to a cheap and plentiful way to carry out ISR and targeted attacks. DJI and Autel are the number one and two brands, respectively, that China exports to Russia. To maintain deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies will need the ability to develop trusted drones, at scale, for military purposes and to counter adversaries’ drones. Recent news from China makes that reality more important. Last year, China enacted export controls on small commercial drones for the first time. Those controls threaten to choke Ukraine’s primary source of drones without affecting supplies to Russia. That development highlights the criticality of the United States and its allies developing alternative sources of supply.

An Autel Robotics Dragonfish Pro drone, with an 18-mile range, is displayed during CES 2022 at the Las Vegas Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S. January 5, 2022. REUTERS/Steve Marcus

A third concern relates to secure supply chains. In recent years, the United States and its allies have recognized they are economically vulnerable due to dependence on autocratic rivals—China and Russia—for critical supplies, including semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and much else. As demonstrated by the recent Chinese efforts to strangle Ukraine’s source of supply, the PRC has the ability to restrict US and allied access to UAS, potentially limiting their access in wartime. Similarly, drone customers not subject to federal or state prohibitions on Chinese drones, such as commercial entities, remain vulnerable to the PRC’s ability to restrict their access to UAS for civil purposes in peacetime.

The fourth and final concern relates to human rights. China commits gross human rights violations, including genocide against its Uyghur minority population. Under the Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2020, Washington committed to sanctioning companies that participate in atrocities against the Uyghurs. The US Treasury Department stated, “SZ DJI has provided drones to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, which are used to surveil Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Public Security Bureau was previously designated in July 2020, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for connection to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.” DJI has already been added to the Commerce Department’s entity list, which restricts the ability of US companies to sell technology and component parts to DJI. DJI’s complicity in the human rights violations against the Uyghurs is indicative of the CCP’s support of authoritarianism globally. China and its authoritarian partners increasingly use UAS to suppress democracy and human rights globally. Countering DJI and other PRC UAS companies is critical to limiting the reach of autocrats and supporting democracy globally.

Ongoing efforts to counter PRC-made drones

The United States and its allies have already undertaken some efforts to challenge the dominance of Chinese UAS. At the federal level, the Donald Trump administration banned the sale of US technology to DJI without a license. The Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the Interior stopped using Chinese drones in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. Congress codified the Pentagon’s ban in 2019. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded those restrictions to prohibit DOD from buying UAS or components from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This law was further expanded to ban defense contractors from using UAS and components manufactured in the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in execution of their DOD contracts starting in 2023. The American Security Drone Act, passed in the 2024 NDAA, bans federal government entities from buying and operating UAS from designated adversarial nations, including China, and prohibits the use of federal funds to purchase or operate these drones starting in December 2025.

At the state level, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Tennessee, and Utah have restricted the use of PRC-made UAS by state agencies, local agencies, or both. Those restrictions generally mirror federal laws, protecting government agencies from insecure products connected to adversarial nations. This first phase of state action focused on government end-user restrictions, but a second phase—focused on providing grants to accelerate the transition away from insecure drones—is under way. In 2023 Florida enacted a $25-million grant program to help local agencies reduce their dependency on insecure drones. In 2024, legislators in several states proposed similar grant programs.

There are additional efforts under way in the US Congress. Representatives Elise Stefanik and Mike Gallagher introduced the Countering CCP Drones Act to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Their bill would add DJI to the list of equipment banned from operating on US telecommunications infrastructure, potentially impacting DJI’s ability to place new products on the market. The bill would not affect existing DJI drones.

In an effort to better equip the United States with UAS for military purposes, the DOD recently announced the Replicator initiative, which aims to directly counter PRC dominance in the domain of attritable autonomous systems. Replicator was motivated, in part, by the recognition that the PRC has a scale advantage, which allows Beijing to rapidly manufacture and field weapons systems, including attritable autonomous systems. With Replicator, DOD aims to deploy thousands of autonomous systems. Open questions remain as to what systems will be selected for Replicator, how the initiative will be funded, and how many systems will be procured. To be decisive in a near-peer conflict, Replicator will likely need to purchase tens of thousands of various systems to be used across all domains. For example, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute estimates that Ukraine is losing ten thousand drones per month in its fight against Russia, providing insight into the scale of the total number of UAS. To complement Replicator and make all-domain attritable autonomous systems decisive in near-peer conflict, the DOD should consider stockpiling drones. The stockpiling of these systems would be a hedge against supply-chain interruptions in times of conflict, and would allow for the quick delivery of drones to theaters of conflict as these systems are rapidly expended on the battlefield.

US allies have also started to act. In 2022, Lithuania banned the purchase of technology from countries deemed “untrustworthy” for applications in defense and security, including PRC-made UAS. India has gone further, banning both Chinese-made drones and their component parts. Australia’s military services and border force have grounded DJI drones, and other agencies appear to be transitioning to secure systems. In Japan, the coast guard stopped using DJI drones in 2020 due to cybersecurity concerns.

While the above actions are a good start, the United States and its allies need a whole-of-free-world strategic framework to mitigate the threat posed by PRC-made drones.

A free-world strategy for securing UAV supply chains

The United States and its allies should adopt a comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by Chinese-made drones. The goal should be to reduce or eliminate the national security threats that come from an overreliance on PRC-made drones, and to develop an alternative drone market in trusted countries. To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies should pursue a three-part “protect, promote, and align” strategy.

1. Protect the United States and its allies from the national security threat posed by PRC-made drones.

The first element of a strategy for securing UAV supply chains is to protect US and allied markets from PRC-made drones that threaten national security or that violate international trade laws and norms. This begins by pursuing a hard decoupling from Chinese-made drones in areas of sensitive national security concern. The regulation of UAS can be modeled after the “small yard, high fence” approach that the United States is taking to the regulation of other critical technologies, such as semiconductors.

In the United States, the American Security Drone Act is a good first step, but it is insufficient to fully address the problem. In addition, Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act to prohibit Chinese drones from operating on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) infrastructure, just as the United States did for Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE. As identified by CISA and the FBI, the continued operation of Chinese UAS on US infrastructure raises the risk that the PRC will gain access to sensitive information and could use that information to conduct espionage on vulnerabilities in US critical infrastructure and public-safety response footprint, and to stage potential cyberattacks. Volt Typhoon, a recently disclosed Chinese threat activity discovered penetrating US critical infrastructure to prepare for future attacks, illustrates the stark nature of the threat. Currently, the American Security Drone Act would only ban DJI, but this should be amended to include all PRC-made drones, including those made by Autel.

Reasonable restrictions on PRC-made drones should be extended to state and local governments. Currently, the diverse range of legislation at the state and local levels has created a piecemeal approach that is confusing and leaves loopholes. Furthermore, the ban on Chinese drones operating in the United States should include the US private sector operating in sensitive national security areas, such as inspecting critical-infrastructure sites.

Next, the State Department should work with US allies and partners and encourage them to pass similar legislation restricting Chinese drones in sensitive sectors and to cooperate on common drone policies going forward. US global defense readiness and ability to project power in key regions could be compromised if China is able to gather sensitive intelligence and targeting information through drones operating in key allied countries. The United States and its allies already discuss critical and emerging technology cooperation through various forums, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. The State Department should elevate drone cooperation as a key agenda item for discussion and cooperation in these forums. Additionally, the State Department should designate an individual who has the mandate to lead diplomatic efforts on drone cooperation.

In addition, the United States and its allies should seek coordinated tariffs and other countervailing measures to offset China’s unfair trade practices and level the playing field. The United States should maintain, if not increase, its 25-percent tariff on Chinese-made drones. There will, of course, be a cost to these measures, but they can be partially offset by the recommendations in the following “promote” element of the strategy. Should the United States increase tariffs on Chinese-made drones, the corresponding increased tariff revenue could be used to fund various grant programs to help existing Chinese drone customers—such as law-enforcement agencies—transition to US or allied drones.

When considering tariffs, it is critical to counter tariff evasion. In March 2024, bipartisan members of Congress wrote to the Joe Biden administration raising serious concerns that Chinese drone makers are evading the 25-percent tariffs by transshipping drones through Malaysia. The letter said, “[A]fter exporting virtually zero drones to the United States and being home to no major domestic drone manufacturers prior to 2022, Malaysia’s drone exports to the United States jumped inexplicably to 242,000 units that year.” In “the first eleven months of 2023 the United States imported more than 565,000 drones from Malaysia.” It is critically important to tackle transshipment, and to apply equivalent tariffs to—or categorical bans on—companies and products found to be complicit.

As part of this strategy to secure drone supply chains, the United States must be wary of efforts by DJI and other Chinese drone companies to avoid US sanctions. The New York Times reported earlier this year, for example, about a Texas-based company that licenses its drone designs from DJI and sources much of its parts from China. Legislative initiatives by Congress and other efforts by federal regulators to curb dependence on Chinese drones need to eliminate loopholes that would enable Chinese companies to evade punitive measures by distributing their products through US-based companies.

In preparation for a possible crisis or conflict with China, Washington and its allies should also be prepared to enact wide-reaching sanctions against Chinese companies critical for China’s military and intelligence activities, including DJI and Autel.¹ Washington must also be prepared to sanction companies involved in the overall procurement process for UAS, something that the Treasury Department has done in targeting companies that support Iran’s UAV industry. A response to the PRC in a time of crisis would also include enacting retaliatory export restrictions of US technology to China. To best prepare for these potential impacts, the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, established within the Department of the Treasury, should undertake research to understand the possible “collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.” A quick and easy win in this space would be adding Autel to the Department of Defense’s 1260H list, the Commerce Department’s entity list, and the Treasury Department’s Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, joining DJI. Additionally, the United States must work to develop robust and durable secure supply chains for all components of UAS, including through the development of a domestic industrial base.

To guide engagement with its allies, the United States should leverage the recently established Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (S/TECH). The S/TECH should make secure supply chains for drones a priority, along with other measures such as coordinating restrictions and safeguards against Chinese drones. Additionally, the DOD should elevate UAS as a priority agenda item for all bilateral and multilateral technology engagements carried out by US diplomats with allies and partners.

Taken together, these steps will offer significant protection for the United States and its allies from the threat of Chinese-made UAS.

U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Mary Beth Leonard, walks past a Zipline drone while touring an Innovation Exhibition at Innov8 Hub in Abuja, Nigeria November 19, 2021. Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS

2. Promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

The second major element of the strategy is to promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries. As outlined above, drones are critical for many purposes, and Chinese-made systems dominate all drone markets. As the United States and allied countries successfully de-risk from Chinese-made drones, they will need to replace this supply with drones produced by trusted sources.

Some of the steps identified in the “protect” element of the strategy will also stimulate domestic US and allied production. A selective ban on Chinese drones will naturally increase demand for drones produced elsewhere. Stiffer tariffs on Chinese-made drones will help to level the playing field and make non-PRC-made drones more competitive in the market.

To ensure these bans can be effectively enacted while being minimally disruptive, the federal government should provide funding incentives to facilitate the transition away from PRC-made UAS. As noted earlier, Florida’s ban on PRC-made UAS left local bodies, including fire departments and law-enforcement agencies, scrambling to find funding for alternatives. The provision of federal funds can help overcome the financial burden of buying alternatives to PRC UAS. The DIIG Act, for example, promises to provide funding for state and local agencies to purchase UAS for infrastructure inspections. Federal funding should be conditional, and only available to states that fully ban PRC-made UAS. For example, states that only ban DJI and not Autel, or that fail to ban the use of PRC-made UAS by contractors, would not be eligible for this funding.

The State Department should share these efforts, such as the DIIG Act, with allied countries and encourage the adoption of similar measures by allied governments. Its network of allies is the cornerstone of US national security. Therefore, the United States must encourage its allies to adopt similar policies that promote their own security as well.

In addition, the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative should be harnessed to stimulate a major leap forward in the development and deployment of US autonomous systems. In the short timeframe of 18–24 months, Replicator can help modernize the DOD’s warfighting capabilities and produce thousands of new drones. The US Congress and the DOD should prioritize significant, enduring funding for the Replicator initiative.

The efforts initially achieved through Replicator can be boosted by utilizing the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Established in 2022, OSC identifies critical technologies for the DOD and partners with private capital and other agencies to create investment vehicles. Given Replicator’s priority status for the department, the development of the autonomous UAS industry should be a prioritized area for OSC. However, OSC funding is designed to target small companies that would not be able to produce systems at scale in order to contribute to Replicator. Instead, OSC should consider boosting small, innovative companies that are in the UAS supply chain and help enable the critical domestic industrial base of advanced components for current and future UAS systems. By designating UAS as a priority area for OSC, the Department of Defense can help create a strong domestic manufacturing base for this technology.

There is potential for OSC funding to play an important role in strengthening the domestic UAS industry, with the White House requesting $144 million for the office in 2025. In addition to fully meeting the White House’s request for OSC funding, Congress should continue funding other accelerators and offices that strengthen the development of companies across the DOD’s fourteen critical technology areas.

In order to meet any potential funding gaps, the DOD should be prepared to provide additional funding for investment in small UAV systems outside of OSC, including by increasing related funding to the relevant task forces working inside of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Furthermore, Congress should authorize additional funding for the Defense Production Act that will allow the Department of Defense to further invest in the defense industrial base, including the development of asymmetric capabilities such as the small drones that have played a critical role in Ukraine’s battlefield success.

The US Departments of State and Defense can encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator program to ensure the free world has UAS in mass that will be necessary to deter and defeat aggression in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Department of Defense should consider the potential to invite other allies and partners into the Replicator program, or establish a multinational, allied Replicator initiative. In doing so, the department would scale the allied drone industry, create interoperability among combined allied forces, and strengthen allied deterrence against great-power adversaries.

DOD is already working to integrate UAS and autonomous systems more broadly into its operations. The US Navy’s Task Force 59 aims to better integrate emerging technologies into warfighting, and is currently focused on robotics and autonomous systems. Task Force 59 operates a variety of uncrewed vehicles, including submersible and surface-level ships, alongside UAS.

The Air Force operates Task Force 99.² Based in Qatar, it has developed a 3D-printed UAV, dubbed the “kestrel,” which can be produced for $2,500 and can carry a payload of up to three kilograms.

The efforts of Task Forces 59 and 99 are a solid start, but they have been challenged by institutional hurdles and a lack of funding. Similar concerns have been raised about the ability of the private sector to meet the government’s demand for Replicator. Any successful long-term strategy in this area will require close coordination between the private and public sectors. Replicator offers a good starting point, allowing the DOD to establish trust with the defense-technology industry, break free from the antiquated Cold War procurement process, and establish the new defense industrial base required for twenty-first-century security.

Beyond Replicator, Congress should pass legislation modeled on the CHIPS and Science Act to produce autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Recognizing a similar challenge related to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022. The act provides billions of dollars in incentives for the research, development, and manufacturing of semiconductors. It has already stimulated the construction of new semiconductor-fabrication facilities in the United States. Similarly, the United States should provide a variety of incentives, including tax credits and investments, for the research, development, and manufacturing of autonomous vehicles. Stimulating US manufacture of autonomous vehicles will make drones available for DOD procurement, while also allowing US-made UAS to be sold globally for commercial applications.

Creating an equivalent piece of legislation for the manufacturing of UAS would have one major difference compared to the CHIPS Act—the price would be significantly lower. A manufacturing facility for the production of semiconductor chips costs a minimum of $10 billion while taking at least five years to build. Compare that to the US drone manufacturer Skydio, which raised $230 million in additional funding in 2023, part of which paid for the construction of a new UAV-manufacturing facility within the United States that expanded its production capacity ten times. For a fraction of the $54-billion CHIPS Act, the United States can successfully develop and support a variety of domestic UAV-manufacturing operations.

US allies and partners have taken note of the CHIPS Act and passed their own legislation to advance in this space. For example, the European Union enacted the European Chips Act into law in September 2023. As the US encouraged allies to invest in CHIPS, it can encourage key allies to stimulate domestic drone manufacturing in their countries.

Coordinating these actions will require a whole-of-free-world approach, among the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and US allies and partners. To achieve these ambitious goals, the president should consider designating an individual within the State Department’s S/TECH office. This individual would be responsible for coordinating this slate of policy proposals, similar to how the White House coordinator for CHIPS implementation operates. The special envoy should set a date for achieving the above benchmarks to ensure accountability.

Taken together, these actions can help create an industrial base in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure supply for UAS.

3. Align with allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

The third major element of the strategy is to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS. Among the United States’ greatest strengths in its competition with China is its network of allies and partners. Combined, the United States and its allies possess nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and, when they work together, they retain a preponderance of power to shape global outcomes.

The G7, the G20, and the Quad are all multilateral groupings in which the United States has galvanized allies and partners alike to develop a series of secure supply chains for semiconductors. It should do the same with UAS.

The Scowcroft Center has previously argued that the United States and its allies should establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance to coordinate the free world’s approach on emerging technology, including UAS. Short of this, the United States and its allies should work through existing bilateral and multilateral channels.

The United States should continue to work with its allies to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of new technology, including UAS, through bodies such as the US-EU TTC, NATO, G7, G20, and WTO. The United States would be well served to develop polices in coordination with its allies and partners through these forums. Doing so will help ensure a coordinated approach going forward. The United States should also raise concerns in these bodies about China’s unfair and illegal behavior. Though the WTO lacks teeth when coming after China, raising concerns about its behavior and trade disputes at the WTO can help build evidence of a pattern of unfair actions. The development of clear norms would help to demonstrate that the free world is not taking punitive measures against China or seeking to hold China down. Rather, it is taking prudent actions to protect itself from China’s unfair and threatening practices. If China were to reform its practices and its economic system, it could be welcomed back into US and allied markets.

Concurrently, the Department of Commerce and its International Trade Administration should play a central role in developing a trusted ecosystem—both in the United States and with its allies and partners—to secure critical components to strengthen domestic UAS manufacturing while promoting US-made drones around the world.

In addition, the United States should leverage the new trilateral defense pact, AUKUS. AUKUS Pillar II brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to improve defense coordination across critical-technology areas, including artificial intelligence and autonomy, innovation, and information sharing. The Pentagon should work with AUKUS partners to prioritize the development of advanced UAS.

Moreover, Washington should work with allies and partners to develop a secure supply chain for UAV components and manufacturing. DOD has already cleared two drones produced by Parrot, a French UAV manufacturer, as secure and reliable through its Blue UAS program. This will allow for the manufacturing of component parts through final assembly to take place in trusted countries.

NATO offers other opportunities for Washington to coordinate with allies on emerging technologies. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is a venue for Alliance members to coordinate on the development of emerging technologies, bringing together researchers, industry, and government. In 2023, DIANA announced the first three areas in which it aims to encourage the development of dual-use technologies. One of these domains, sensing and surveillance, is a logical avenue for the allied development of UAS. Indeed, DIANA has already accepted a Czech UAV manufacturer into the program. Here, the United States should utilize DIANA as a means to further cooperation on UAS and enable reciprocal development and manufacturing relationships across Europe, creating the basis of a dual-use drone industry.

In addition, the United States should work with its allies to secure the key UAS component supply chain, including batteries and battery cells. Part of the solution concerns mineral access. Amid a global transition to low-carbon energy sources, China’s strong position in the global lithium market and Russia’s robust nickel-mining capacity present challenges to US efforts to secure access to minerals needed for batteries. As several colleagues in the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center have argued, one option to address these challenges is supporting research, development, and capacity building for alternative battery chemistries. This includes leveraging public capital from US and allied governments and using tax incentives to encourage diversification of battery inputs. In 2021, the Department of Energy announced that innovations related to advanced batteries, which were developed via taxpayer dollars through Department of Energy (DOE) funding, would need to be “substantially” manufactured in the United States. In 2023, as a result of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, DOE announced $3.5 billion “to boost domestic production of advanced batteries and battery materials nationwide.” At the same time, the federal government, as well state and local governments, will need to muster the political will to allow domestic mining and refining of these minerals to ensure truly secure access to batteries. Once regulatory red tape is reduced, private capital necessary for the development of this domestic capability will enter the battery market. This sort of public-private engagement is an important part of shoring up the US battery supply chain and mitigating vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China.

Taken together, these steps will help to ensure a successful and coordinated free-world approach to UAS.

Conclusion

This paper recommended a protect-promote-align strategy to help the United States and its allies secure a trusted UAS industry to compete against China. China’s dominance of the dual-use UAS sector presents an unacceptable national security risk to the United States and its allies. Following this strategy will allow the United States and its allies to counter the unfair CCP practices that have led to China’s ill-begotten dominance of the global UAS market. A dedicated strategy, one that limits the use of PRC-made UAS, creates incentives for domestic UAS production, aligns the United States and its likeminded allies, and will allow the free world to retain its innovation edge over the CCP and better position itself for victory in a new era of strategic competition.

About the authors

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In these roles, he manages the Scowcroft Center’s nonpartisan team of more than thirty resident staff and oversees the Council’s extensive network of nonresident fellows. His own research focuses on US national security strategy, strategic competition with China and Russia, and strategic deterrence and weapons nonproliferation.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He supports the Center’s work on foresight and strategy development, focusing on emerging technologies, conflict, and climate security. In addition, Bayoumi contributes to the development of the Center’s annual “Global Foresight” publication.

Transatlantic Economic Statecraft Report cited in the International Cybersecurity Law Review on semiconductor supply chains

cfalkenek — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 13:57:00 +0000

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Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Defense Journal’s Rich Outzen spoke with T. X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University, on January 26, 2024. The conversation is lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Dr. Hammes, you’ve been tracking and predicting developments in drones, unmanned systems, and the changing nature of combined arms warfare for over a decade now. Looking back, what has surprised you and what has confirmed your early surmises in recent years?

T. X. Hammes: From the beginning I expected that “small, smart, and many” could overcome “few and exquisite” by sheer numbers. The general trend has held, but what has surprised me—especially in Ukraine—has been how quickly users have adapted. For instance, Ukraine has employed carpenters to build drones made out of wood powered by outboard motors. It was undeterred by its lack of manufacturing facilities for advanced synthetic materials. These drones launch from a simple wheeled carriage but can achieve a range of 750 kilometers, and carry a fairly substantial payload. These very cheap systems are being used to attack oil facilities deep in Russia.

I suggested in 2016 that, in many cases, an unmanned aerial system (UAS) doesn’t necessarily have to deliver the explosive; it is enough to bring the detonator. Modern societies provide their own explosives and combustibles. Very small drones can do great damage by impacting with enough of a detonating charge to induce fuel, ammunition, or energy sources to explode. Large warheads are not required.

In 2016, the idea had little traction with senior [officers], but younger, field grade officers got it. Unfortunately, developing a concept and bending the procurement system are two very different things. We have the “iron triangle” of vested interests in procurement—defense contractors, the Pentagon, and Congress. Each is vested in keeping current systems and approaches for as long as possible. This is very difficult to change. Congressional reversal of the US Navy’s attempt to not refuel an aircraft carrier (the Harry S. Truman) in favor of devoting more resources to advanced strike capabilities is an example of this. There are thousands of jobs in congressional districts engaged in military production: the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) involves production in forty-five of the fifty states. Couple these economic incentives with the fact that military officers are inherently conservative as a group, and you see resistance to real or rapid change.

As always, warfare will include the adaption, counteradaption and counter-counteradaption cycle. The Turkish Bayraktar drones were a shock early in the war in Ukraine, but the Russians gradually got an air defense system together and effectively neutralized the Bayraktar. Today, the Turks are developing jet stealth systems like the US Valkyrie XQ58A. I don’t know what the Turkish model will cost, but the Valkyrie is roughly $4 million apiece. The F-35 costs nearly $140 million each. With an expected operational lifespan of 8,000 hours, at $30,000 per flight hour, the lifetime operations and maintenance (O&M) cost can exceed $360 million per F-35. This gets to be real money over time. Further, with the current fleet-wide mission capable rate of just over 50 percent, you effectively need two aircraft (for $720 million) to ensure one mission-capable aircraft. Current full-mission capable rates on the F-35 are 28 percent, so we’re close to needing four to ensure one fully mission-capable aircraft. In essence you are spending $1.4 billion for each full mission-capable F-35. You can have hundreds of XQ58As at that price. And the world will know where the F-35s are (few in number, operating in a world with pervasive surveillance). Keep in mind, these figures cover only O&M costs for F-35s. They do not cover the cost of pilot or maintenance personnel and training pipelines. Nor do they cover the cost of large fixed air bases and air defense for the facilities required to operate F-35s. The Turks will likely develop an export version of their aircraft, and so we can see a world in which small, high-speed, deep-penetrating drones with a variety of onboard armaments and sensors will be available to almost anyone. Drones like these can operate up to 1,500 miles beyond launch points. And they do about the same as some of the advanced munitions fired by F-35s, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, or JASSM, at $3 million a missile.

DJ: Some observers think that Russia is winning the drone war against Ukraine, including Eric Schmidt, whose recent Foreign Affairs article, “Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War,” cited the effective pairing of drones for observation and strike (Orlans and Lancets). Do you agree?

Hammes: Schmidt is right about Russia outproducing Ukraine in drones. But this does not translate directly to winning the conflict. I find it bizarre that some commentators essentially take the Russian side without critical comparison. This goes for commentators and in some cases political leaders. If you look at both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Ukraine continues to inflict three or four times as many casualties on attacking Russian forces: this is typically the case, an advantage to the defender.

With regards to UAS, both sides are training a lot of drone pilots. But as the war drags on, both Ukrainians and Russians are finding difficulty in recruiting for traditional combat arms. For instance, recent warehouse fires in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere in Russia reportedly stem from resistance to the forced roundup of conscripts for the war.

In the case of the Foreign Affairs article, title notwithstanding, the piece was not really about the drone competition—it was about industrial competition and the race to mass produce. The article was right: it’s an industrial competition. Ukraine can win and compete if the United States leans into it. But the Biden administration has been too reticent in providing advanced and long-range strike systems. The Kerch Strait Bridge should be down. And why are we demilitarizing MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] ammunition rather than allowing the Ukrainians to fire it in defense of their country? Domestic politics on both sides of the aisle has been working against us fully leaning into the defense industrial competition. The Russian production goal is two million UAS per year; they are not there yet. The Ukrainian goal is 100,000 per month. They are producing enough to pose a substantial long-range strike capability deep into Russia. Russia has already had to pull air defense systems back from Ukraine into its own territory to defend key sites. In the Ukraine war, we are seeing early forms of largely autonomous UAS and swarm usage. After launch, some of these systems can be fully autonomous. If you launch tens of thousands per month, the requirement for autonomous guidance grows. It is far more complex than UAS usage in counterinsurgency or small wars.

DJ: Turning to the US military, have we adapted doctrine, organization, and employment to shift from drones as a counterterror platform to drones as an integral part of maneuver warfare?

Hammes: The services are trying. The US Navy fielded Task Force 59 in the Persian Gulf as a way to deploy experimental unmanned technologies and designs. The US Fourth Fleet stood up an experimental task force. The Navy also deployed a four-ship squadron of unmanned systems in the Pacific—primarily as a sensor package. Following the Marine Corps FD2030 lead [Force Design 2030], the US Army has a Strategic Mid-range Fires program that includes small-signature trucks launching Tomahawks and other missiles up to and beyond 1,500 miles. In a major war against a near-peer competitor—say China—airfields and fixed installations will be heavily targeted, so distributed fires of this sort will be important. We can conceivably go to country X and buy native-style trucks, which will be very survivable due to blending in, and put these systems on them. The US Air Force is investing in unmanned combat vehicles as wingmen for F-35s or advanced bombers. But again, everyone will know where the advanced bombers live and stay. Containerized missiles based on commercial ships can saturate bomber airfields and kill low-density, high-cost assets on the ground. In sum, we are seeing adaptation beginning across the forces, but procurement and advanced planning remain the big problems. Instead of $360 million for one aircraft we should consider buying 360 $1 million missiles in containers. These systems need a high level of autonomy and small crews. In the current environment, we need to focus resources on the weapons, not the delivery platforms. Low cost and expendable, primarily unmanned weapons will overwhelm the large, exquisite but few platforms of our current forces.

DJ: Defense Journal examines issues of common interest to the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Can I get your views on the Turkish experience with UAS, and how they’ve become a major player in production, export, and operational use of UAS?

Hammes: Unmanned systems allow a country at very low cost to influence a conflict. With automated systems you can intervene regionally with lower human cost, and little risk of blowback. Turkey has done this successfully. What will be interesting is when the other side starts countering with their own UASs. As these systems proliferate, what is to keep cheap launch trucks and boats from approaching striking range of Turkey? When everyone has long-range precision strike capability, and every modern society has highly combustible, energy-dense targets embedded in their society, security concepts have to adapt. Not just medium powers, but insurgent groups have the ability increasingly to conduct this type of operation. The Houthis proved this with the attack on Saudi oil facilities. There are massive geopolitical implications when everyone can strike at long range.

DJ: In most military technological fields there is a sort of dialectic or cat-and-mouse game between developers of offensive and defensive systems. Why the great lag in counter-UAS systems vis-à-vis the platforms themselves?

Hammes: There is a lag. UASs present a very tough challenge. Many are very small and made of polymers, plastics, and wood, so they are very difficult to track and engage. That said, the electronic warfare (EW) systems of Russia and Ukraine have been very effective. But the counter-countermeasure has been more autonomy for the attack systems. We are seeing autonomous drones that carry EW jammers, and rely more on visual/optical IR [i.e., infrared] sensors. In the war in Karabagh, 70 percent of vehicle kills were achieved by drones or drone-fired munitions—and the Armenian side was not prepared. If you look at Reddit and other social media feeds covering the fighting in Ukraine, you can see absolutely terrifying videos of how UASs dominate the battlespace. UASs are hunting individual vehicles and soldiers. They can fly into buildings and turn corners in pursuit.

The game of competitive adaption has been a mixed bag. At one level, UAS have greatly strengthened tactical defense. Yet with increased methods of long-range strike, at the operational level, offensive capabilities are strengthened. Perhaps also strategically, as we see Ukraine going hard against the Russian oil industry.

We are starting to see the advent of counterdrone drones: drones that fly into other drones. It will be interesting to see how this further develops; we are likely to see a cheap version of the identify friend or foe (IFF) sensors carried on manned aircraft to protect drones operating over friendly forces, so you don’t have your own killing your own. The innovation cycle in Ukraine is very short, with each side adapting rapidly, sometimes in a few days, to innovations by the other side. In fact, Ukrainian innovation with naval drones has pushed the Russian Black Sea fleet back significantly. In less than a year, starting from scratch, Ukraine developed unmanned surface vessels that hit several Russia ships and restored export shipping lanes for Ukrainian products.

There is a need now for better command and control nodes to consolidate information from pervasive drone sensors and get it to commanders. We have entered the era of pervasive intelligence for targeting; everyone will be visible and targetable, so everyone will have to keep moving.

My key advice for the United States and its friends is to get away from focusing on platforms and focus on weapons.

T. X. Hammes is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Hammes is also a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University.

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US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

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Foreword

The first half of 2024 has brought new energy and dynamics to US-Turkish bilateral strategic ties, much—though not all—positive. The successful sequential approval of Swedish accession into NATO and Turkish acquisition of upgraded F16V air warfare deterrent restored a level of trust, albeit rooted in transactionalism, after nearly a decade of unarrested divergence and increasing mistrust. New hope in defense industrial cooperation has been embodied by new investments in the field including a significant new munitions collaboration in Texas. Turkish diplomatic reconciliations with a number of US regional allies—Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have removed an additional source of friction while the war in Gaza has led to new tensions, and very divergent policies. This issue of Defense Journal provides a snapshot of several current dynamics in the strategic relationship at a critical time, approaching the NATO Summit in Washington. Enjoy!

Dr. Rich Outzen & Dr. Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

By Rich Outzen

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

By Can Kasapoglu

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

By Gen. (ret.) Yavuz Türkgenci

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

By Andrew Bernard

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Interview with Thomas X. Hammes

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Interview with Gregory Bloom

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International; Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States; Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; & Board Director, Atlantic Council

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Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

Can Kasapoglu — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Turkish defense technological and industrial base has reached a critical mass across certain segments. The successful trajectory of the unfolding projects manifests a new reality in the realm of air power. While the Bayraktar TB-2, aka the “flying Kalashnikov” by Baykar, has made most of the headlines, the Turkish drone program is not merely about that. Turkey has built a reputable edge in designing wide range of high-value assets.

In the drone warfare segment, Baykar’s unmanned combat aircraft Kizilelma and the company’s high-altitude drone equipped with high-end weapons, Akinci, as well as Turkish Aerospace Industries’ flying wing, stealthy unmanned combat aircraft Anka-3 loom large as some examples. Even more importantly, the Anka-3 and Kizilelma are designed to fly within the loyal wingman concept alongside manned aircraft, which is technically a sixth-generation tactical military aviation feature, presaging the future horizons of Turkish defense planning.

In the manned fighter jet segment, Kaan, formerly known as the Milli Muharip Uçak, presents interesting takeaways to grasp the Turkish defense industry’s international dynamics. In February 2024, Turkey’s indigenous, stealth combat aircraft, Kaan, conducted its maiden flight. Besides painting a shiny picture of the future of Turkish air power, Kaan also sheds light on some of the ongoing capability limitations of the nation’s defense technological and industrial base (DTIB). The first problem pertains to the jet’s power configuration. The initial batches, and the prototype of the aircraft, fly with the F-110 engines that power the F-16 fighter jet, illustrating a clear dependency.

With the rising trajectory and still-in-place limitations of the Turkish DTIB’s air power generation capacity, one has to answer two political-military questions pertaining to the nature of defense business: First, what kind of an arms exporter is Turkey to become considering its aerial assets? Will it follow a more reserved model, such as Germany? Or a more business-friendly one like France? Or, will it pursue more of a market disrupter role like China? Second, how will the nation’s foreign collaboration network take shape?

Turkey’s defense cooperation outlook

From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s success in unmanned aerial technologies has positioned it as a burgeoning drone-exporting nation within the transatlantic Alliance.

Indeed, Turkey’s drone warfare success, at least in the headlines, started with the Bayraktar TB-2’s combat record in Syria and Libya. Still, to grasp the Turkish drone warfare’s defense diplomacy dimension, one has to know more about other operators of the drone.

Both in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 has helped the operating countries, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, in the hard turning points of their respective quests. Having proven its combat performance, the TB-2 paved the way for a fruitful strategic collaboration with these nations. A series of cooperative production deals between the Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, and Ukraine and Azerbaijan, respectively, stand out as important examples of such defense industry collaborations. More importantly, having capitalized on the TB-2’s combat performance, Baykar established defense companies in Kyiv and Baku. But these are not one-way journeys. The engine collaboration for the Kizilelma drone with Kyiv, for example, has opened a new chapter in Ukrainian-Turkish military ties. At present, Ukraine also eyes engine deals for Turkey’s manned combat aircraft segment.

In the manned aircraft segment, a careful assessment of Kaan’s export portfolio would explain Turkey’s defense diplomacy outlook for its advanced solutions. To keep the unit costs at manageable levels, Turkey needs to find lucrative deals to market the aircraft. Yet Kaan will enter an international market characterized by fierce competition. Therefore, transforming the Kaan into an attractive platform for clients seeking either enhanced fourth- or the more advanced fifth-generation fighter jets will be a critical priority, especially at a time when the F-35 dominates the Euro-Atlantic market and when other alternatives, such as the Rafale by Dassault Aviation of France and soon the South Korean KF-21 Boramae by Korea Aerospace Industries, are seeking to capture the remainder of the pie globally. SAAB’s Gripen, on the other hand, is losing its market share. All in all, Paris and Seoul are aiming to increase their market share in critical arms industries, indicating that Turkey will also face heavy competition. The Kaan could function as a geopolitical ledger that opens the path for new international partnerships. The combat aircraft will likely offer an effective solution to countries that cannot procure F-35s such as Pakistan or the Gulf Arab nations, due to a series of sensitive political impediments; though the latter may impinge on Seoul’s interest in selling its new Boramae. Another natural target for Turkey’s multirole combat solution would be militaries that want to replace their Soviet era-remnant arsenals with a defense ecosystem that is in line with NATO standards, such as the non-NATO former Soviet space, which has traditionally been Russia’s markets. In this regard, Azerbaijan and Ukraine loom large as two particularly interesting potential operator nations as Kaan’s export market slowly takes shape in the coming years.

The geopolitical showdown ahead

From a defense economics standpoint, Turkey’s serious air power projects, such as high-end drones and advanced manned aircraft, will also help the West to counterbalance its great power competitors in the international arms market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Moscow and Beijing constituted around 16 percent and 5.2 percent of the global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, respectively, although the former’s share decreased following its stumbling invasion in Ukraine. Yet China continues to pose a real risk to the NATO members’ overall weapons market presence in several regions.

China has already snatched up the Middle Eastern drone market amid a long absence of American solutions due to restrictions. Turkey’s drone sales to the Gulf, and recently Egypt, offered a critical comeback to tackle the Chinese share in the unmanned aerial systems segment. In the coming years, China’s potential presence in the Middle Eastern manned aircraft market will be among the highest priorities to track. The Kaan can offer some help in this respect.

Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike popular speculations in the Turkish press, the Kaan will not compete with the F-35 head-on. Instead, it will introduce an alternative, NATO-grade solution in the manned aircraft segment that can be delivered to the nations that cannot purchase the F-35. While it will directly compete with the combat aircraft of Russia and China, both Korea and France will join the contest. The million-dollar question, for now, is about who will dominate the Gulf manned aircraft market in the absence of F-35.

Extending technology transfers in the drone warfare realm

Along with market opportunities, Turkey’s limits in arms transfers and coproduction deals remain key to understanding how the nation’s defense business will play out in the near term.

The Akinci is an interesting example, as it illustrates how the Turkish DTIB is evolving around high-end platforms. Akinci’s weapon systems configuration, featuring Turkey’s first aeroballistic missile, TRG-230-İHA, and a stand-off missile (SOM) baseline of cruise missiles, transforms the platform into a deep strike asset. The high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone can also fly up to 40,000 feet (out of the engagement envelope of short-to-medium air defense systems). Looming large as one of the most capable platforms in the Turkish export portfolio, Akinci has started to leave a footprint in the international weapons market. In the summer of 2023, Baykar signed a historic export and coproduction deal with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries for local production and technology transfer. Roketsan and Aselsan, the primary manufacturers of the platform’s critical weapon systems configuration and sensors, were also included in the deals.

Baykar’s deal with the United Arab Emirates’ Edge Group to arm the Bayraktar TB-2 with Emirati payloads in early 2024 is another notable example. The procurement package marked the first instance of a Turkish drone maker certifying foreign munitions to be integrated into its platforms.

Last, having monitored the Ukrainian military’s successful TB-2 employment at the outset of the conflict, the TB-2 is also expanding its footprint in NATO markets. Following Poland, Romania has purchased the drone in a lucrative deal.

Next up

During the Cold War, Turkey—a NATO nation standing up to more than twenty Soviet Red Army divisions—remained a decades-long net arms importer. Thus, perhaps the country’s transformation into a key arms exporter, especially in advanced technologies such as drone warfare assets, has marked one of the most important developments in the Euro-Atlantic security affairs in the twenty-first century.

The Turkish model comes with successes and limitations. Turkey’s shipyards are now capable of designing principal surface combatants, frigates, and corvettes. In the submarine segment, however, especially in air-independent propulsion systems, Turkey’s needs foreign collaboration. Likewise, the Turkish defense industry can produce most of the land warfare solutions, albeit, the national tank program, Altay, still awaits its entry into the army’s arsenal. The aerial systems segment in not a different one compared to the naval and land warfare segments. In the air, the Turkish aerial drone design and production prowess is one of the best in the international weapons market. The manned aircraft segment, nonetheless, is lagging behind. As to high-end systems, manned or unmanned, engine configuration will continue to be troublesome for years to come. Turkey’s calculus goes well beyond merely becoming an off-the-shelf arms supplier. Ankara aims to establish deep-rooted ties in the market nations while paving the way to bring those nations’ capabilities to Turkey’s DTIB when possible, as is the case with the Ukrainian industries. Drones are still pioneering the Turkish defense outreach in the air. The path of Kaan, as well as the unmanned combat aircraft/loyal wingman projects, Kizilelma and Anka-3, will determine the final trajectory of the nation’s defense business outlook in the air.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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The sustainability questions policymakers should be asking about AI

Fri, 21 Jun 2024 20:16:50 +0000

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) promise to achieve efficiency and progress for a variety of applications, including cutting-edge research, business, and whole industries. However, a major gap has opened: the need for transparency around the sustainability of AI initiatives throughout their whole lifecycle.

“Sustainability” is not just an environmental concern. In a broader sense, such as that employed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), sustainability requires improving human health, prosperity, and economic growth. And in discussing sustainability in AI, following a framing described by the Sustainable AI Lab at University of Bonn, it is important to discuss not only AI applications for sustainability, but also the sustainability of the AI industry itself.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development pointed out in November 2022 that it is important to consider both the direct sustainability impacts of computing as well as the indirect impacts of AI applications. However, the sustainability of computing seems to rarely be mentioned in current conversations about the governance of AI development and deployment or in new legislation or guidance such as the European Union (EU) AI Act, United Nations resolution A/78/L.49, Canada’s C27 bill, the Australian government’s interim response report, the White House executive order on AI and follow-on actions, or requirements in various US states. Instead, these and many other conversations around the world focus primarily on the also-critical topics of trustworthy AI, data privacy, alignment, and ethics.

If policymakers close this gap and focus today on the sustainability of the AI industry, they will have the opportunity to steer entire industries toward contributing to a positive future for both people and the planet.

To develop and leverage AI at the scale imagined by researchers, businesses, and governments, significant physical resources will be required for the design and deployment of the requisite computing hardware and software. While all AI approaches merit attention regarding their sustainability, generative AI is particularly resource-intensive: One such AI-powered chatbot is reportedly consuming the energy equivalent of 33,000 homes. (Note that while it is complicated to estimate such equivalences—given variations in operational timescales and details, home location, user numbers, etc.—various calculations have yielded estimated energy use equivalent to that of tens to hundreds of thousands of US homes.)

In addition, new data centers are being designed and built with high demand and at a fast pace, new AI-critical hardware components are being designed and fabricated, and organizations large and small are experiencing urgency in setting their short-term tactics and long-term strategies for AI. Demands on data centers will only continue to grow as AI-powered applications spread through industries and around the world. For example, a recent International Energy Agency report projected an increase in data center energy consumption in 2026 equivalent to the energy consumption of Japan.

Sustainability-focused regulation of AI, if deployed in a timely manner, can incentivize further improvements in the efficiency of data center operation and even the efficiency of software itself. Unfortunately, in the past, similar opportunities to promote the sustainable development of emerging technologies across industries have been missed. Failure to act during the rise of cryptocurrency mining has led to concerns today about the industry’s electricity and water use and to tension—internationally and domestically—around regulation and resource accessibility. For example, blockchain advocates filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Energy after the agency attempted to conduct an emergency survey of energy use by crypto miners, with the advocates arguing that it forced businesses to divulge sensitive information.

More broadly, global digitization and its associated technologies have spurred crises in e-waste, supply-chain fragility, and human rights, to name a few. Early consideration and prioritization of these issues could have prevented harmful patterns from becoming embedded in today’s systems and processes. Crucially, the projected demands on data centers in the coming years due to the rise of AI—in terms of hardware, power, cooling, land and water use, and access to physical infrastructure and network bandwidth (a particular concern in growing urban areas)—are likely to far outstrip demands associated with other technologies. The potential cumulative impacts of the AI revolution, including resource consumption and byproduct production, underscore the urgency of acting today.

Questions for a sustainable industry

In order for policymakers to introduce measures that encourage AI initiatives (and the entire AI industry) to be more sustainable—and to enable consumers to choose sustainable AI tools—there needs to be more transparency around the sustainability of developing, training (including storing data), and deploying AI models, and into the lifecycle of attendant hardware and other infrastructure. P olicymakers should require that any new AI initiative, early in planning, complete sustainability reporting that helps estimate a proposed AI initiative’s physical impact on the planet and people, both now and in the future. This transparency is not only necessary for guiding future regulation and consumer choice; it is also a crucial part of fostering a culture that prioritizes developing and regulating technology with the future in mind.

The questions that policymakers should require organizations developing and deploying AI initiatives to answer should, to use a metaphor, address the entire “iceberg.” In other words, these questions should inquire about visible sustainability issues (such as the production of carbon dioxide) as well as less-visible issues below the “waterline” (such as whether the land underlying physical infrastructure could have been used for food production). These questions should cover three overarching categories:

The consumption of readily detectable resources,
The production of byproducts, and
The achievement of broader sustainability goals.

In developing the questions for reporting, policymakers should gather insights from regulators, AI technologists, environmental scientists, businesses, communities near AI infrastructure, and end users. The questions should be useful (easily interpretable and insights from them point to potential areas of improvement), be extensible (applicable across current AI models and for future models), and result in reliable answers (roughly repeatable using distinct tools). Framing questions in a way that results in the reporting of concrete and preferably quantitative answers can set the stage for organizations to implement internal, dashboard-style approaches to sustainable AI development and deployment.

Beyond the wording of such questions, the timing of asking organizations matters as well. Answers to these questions should be reported in the earliest stages of an AI initiative’s planning, as they will help organizations conduct cost/benefit analyses and assess their return on investment. Real-time insights gathered during the operational lifetime of an AI initiative would enable not only monitoring of the project’s sustainability, but also execution of in silico experiments that could reveal novel operational, budgetary, and sustainability benefits. The questions should apply equally to all organizations in the public and private sectors using AI. Finally, policymakers should revisit the questions regularly as AI technologies continue to develop and be deployed—and as user needs and geopolitics change.

To capture these broad considerations in a concise set of questions, policymakers should look to the following key sustainability questions as a starting point.

What resources (inputs) are being consumed, directly and indirectly, throughout the lifecycle of an AI initiative?

How much energy is required? What are the sources of this energy? What percentage of this energy is renewable? What is the Power Usage Effectiveness for the initiative?
How much water is required, for example for cooling? What are the sources of this water and, for example, is it recycled water? How much of this water could have been suitable for human consumption or agricultural use? What is the Water Usage Effectiveness for the initiative?
How much land is required, for example for physical infrastructure? How close is each land parcel to human habitation? How much of this land is appropriate for food production or human habitation? How has local biodiversity been impacted by the use of this land for AI initiatives?
What rare metals are used and what are their sources? What are the sources of all metals required for hardware (such as graphics processing units, also known as GPUs)—land, ocean, or recycled? How are local communities and workers, in areas where these metals are procured, engaged or affected?

What byproducts (outputs) are being produced, directly and indirectly, throughout the lifecycle of an AI initiative?

How much greenhouse gas (embodied carbon) is produced, in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent?
What is the projected functional lifetime of each of the top five most abundant hardware components (such as central processing units—also known as CPUs—or GPUs)?
How much hardware waste is generated each year? How much of this waste is recycled effectively? How much of this waste will go to the landfill? How much waste pollutes the air and water? How much of this waste is toxic to human health and to the environment?
How much wastewater is produced, where does it go, and what can it be used for? Does it require further treatment? Can it be released back into the environment, and how would its release impact the environment (e.g., changing the water temperature of an ecosystem)? Is it used as gray water for other applications?

What broader sustainability opportunities are being harnessed through each AI initiative, using the United Nations’ SDGs as a framework?

How resilient is the associated physical infrastructure to earthquakes, floods, droughts, fires, storms, and other disasters? (SDGs 9 and 11)
How much of the broader labor force is local to the land and community being used for an AI initiative? How competitive are wages relative to the industry? (SDGs 1 and 8; broader questions around AI and labor disruption are critical but go beyond the scope of the current discussion)
How safe and healthy are working conditions for all contributing employees and contractors, both local and remote to the physical infrastructure of the initiative? (SDG 3)
How many educational opportunities are being produced by, and contributing to, the AI initiative? (SDG 4)
Regarding gender equality and broader inclusivity, what percentage of the workforce, both full-time and contract, identifies as a member of a marginalized group? Are efforts being made to reduce inequality within and between countries that provide AI workforce? (SDGs 5, 10, and 11)

Sticking the landing

Any organization working with AI—whether the organization is using in-house compute resources or external (cloud) service providers to develop and deploy AI models—should report their answers to the above sustainability questions yearly. Several tools and frameworks for reporting and answering some sustainability questions already exist; adopting new policies such as required reporting will spur the development of further tools.

For the time being, transparency obligations should fall on the organizations that are developing and deploying AI models—not on consumers who are only end users of AI models. That may change if large numbers of end users themselves end up training and developing their own models, causing a rapid expansion in AI-associated resource consumption and byproduct production. However, the question about where transparency obligations fall must be revisited regularly as AI technologies continue to develop rapidly and increasingly resource-intensive queries by users become possible. Crucially, hypothetical future affordances of AI must not be factored into the answers to these sustainability questions. For example, if the goal of an AI initiative is to help an end user reduce their carbon emissions, then that hypothetical future reduction must not be factored into the organization’s assessment of the carbon emissions of this AI initiative this year.

Policymakers should promote the monitoring and reporting of accurate information, rather than define “good” answers to these questions and penalize companies that do not meet those benchmarks. The EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation framework, with its emphasis on the power of transparency to shape and amplify market forces, can serve as a model for such an approach. If reported data were gathered in a single, open-access database (perhaps analogous to the European Single Access Point), then regulators, investors, technology companies, nonprofits, and the general public would be able to reward progress toward sustainability goals, over various time horizons, through a variety of mechanisms. It will be important to have external auditors to ensure the credibility of reported data, as they have done for sustainable finance.

Authority to penalize nonreporting should be assigned to a designated agency. For example, for the United States, while the Securities and Exchange Commission and environmental protection agencies at the federal and state levels could be logical candidates for this authority, this environment-centered approach overlooks the larger definitions of sustainability that could be encompassed by regulation. The Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House may be more appropriate as a centralizing point, given this entity’s mandate to pursue “bold visions” and “unified plans” for US science and technology, as well as its ability to engage with external partners in industry, government, academia, and civil society. The agencies selected to carry out this responsibility should have direct lines of communication with their counterparts in other countries, enabling an agile and coordinated international response to rapid advances in AI.

Critically, international regulators, researchers, businesses, and other developers and users of AI should maintain a collaborative—rather than adversarial—relationship, as doing so could position sustainability as an investment in the future that delivers returns in the near to medium term. Subsidies from federal, state, or local governments could be used to assist small and medium-sized enterprises with the administrative and other financial burdens of this reporting, as mentioned by the EU’s AI Act. To ease the burden on organizations as they comply with potential future reporting and auditing requirements about the sustainability of their AI operations, policymakers should identify metrics and processes that can be used for parallel disclosures. For example, this can be done by requiring data that a single company could use to fulfill their transparency obligations for sustainable AI, sustainable finance, and sustainable corporate reporting such as the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. Policymakers should also strive to maintain consistency internationally, perhaps following the EU’s lead in sustainability policy to date. Ultimately, the International Organization for Standardization should expand its current AI offerings to include standards for the transparency of AI sustainability (such as the questions suggested above), in alignment with its current standards addressing environmental management, energy management, social responsibility, and more.

A unique moment

The sustainability of AI is an urgent and pressing issue with long-lasting, global impacts. Today, the world still dedicates a great deal of attention to AI; the technology has not yet faded into the background or become ubiquitous and invisible, much like electricity has. However, the current moment—of unprecedented demand for the extraction and deployment of AI-enabling physical resources—is a crucial turning point.

Current and future generations depend on policymakers to steward the world’s resources sustainably, especially as a wave of global resource expenditure—with an anticipated long tail—approaches. In light of this impending growth, the opportunity for action is brief and the need is immediate. Although the scale of the challenge is daunting, international responses to ozone depletion and Antarctic geopolitical tension showcase the power of international collaboration for rapid and high-impact action.

With the framing of key sustainability questions, policymakers can gather the insights they need to adequately build a regulatory framework that encourages responsible resource expenditure and adapts to the inevitable shifts in a nascent industry. Transparency can empower consumers and investors to incentivize sustainable AI development. International cooperation on this effort can foster transparency and inspire collaborative action to build a future that is sustainable in many senses of the word.

Tiffany J. Vora is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. She has a PhD in molecular biology from Princeton University.

Kathryn Thomas is the chief operating officer of Blue Lion. She has a PhD in water quality and monitoring from the University of Waterloo.

Anna Ferré-Mateu is a Ramón y Cajal fellow at the Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias and an adjunct fellow at the Center of Astronomy and Supercomputing of the Swinburne University of Technology. She has a PhD in astrophysics from the Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias.

Catherine Lopes is the chief data and AI strategist of Opsdo Analytics. She has a PhD in machine learning from Monash University.

Marissa Giustina is a research scientist and quantum electronics engineer. She has a PhD in physics from the University of Vienna. She conducted the research for this article outside of her employment with Google DeepMind and this article represents her own views and those of her coauthors.

The authors gratefully acknowledge David Rae of EY for fruitful discussions. The authors also acknowledge Homeward Bound Projects, which hosted the initial working session that led to the ideas in this article.

The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

The post The sustainability questions policymakers should be asking about AI appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin just reminded the world why Russia must lose

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 21:26:06 +0000

On the eve of last weekend’s Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, Vladimir Putin unveiled a peace proposal of his own. The presentation of this rival peace plan was an obvious attempt to undermine Ukraine’s Swiss initiative, but it also served as a timely reminder that Putin is waging an old-fashioned war of imperial conquest and will continue to escalate his demands until he is defeated.

Putin’s uncompromising vision for a future peace in Ukraine was widely condemned, with Kyiv officials and world leaders rejecting it as an “ultimatum.” Crucially, the terms outlined by the Kremlin leader would leave around twenty percent of Ukraine under Russian control, including significant portions of the country that Putin’s army has so far been unable to capture.

This new peace proposal is the latest example of the growing territorial demands that have accompanied Russia’s ten-year invasion of Ukraine. Time after time over the past decade, Putin has rejected accusations of an expansionist agenda, only to then escalate his invasion of Ukraine further.

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When Russia first attacked Ukraine in February 2014, Putin insisted Moscow had no territorial ambitions beyond the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. “We do not want to divide Ukraine,” he assured the watching world. Within weeks, however, Kremlin forces posing as locals had sparked a separatist war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

For the following eight years, Putin steadily strengthened his grip on the so-called “separatist republics” of eastern Ukraine, while consistently denying any direct involvement. The failure of the international community to hold Putin accountable for this shameless duplicity fuelled a sense of impunity in Moscow that set the stage for the largest European invasion since World War II.

In his February 2022 address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin once again denied harboring any ambitions to annex additional Ukrainian lands. “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory,” he stated. “We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.” Just six months later, Putin demonstrated the true value of his word by solemnly announcing the annexation of four more Ukrainian provinces.

Significantly, the invading Russian army did not fully control any of the Ukrainian provinces claimed by Putin in September 2022. This created a degree of ambiguity regarding the exact geographical extent of Russia’s goals, with Kremlin officials typically limiting themselves to vague calls for Ukraine to recognize the “new territorial realities” created by the front lines of the invasion.

Putin’s new peace plan has now removed all doubt. Indeed, he took special care to clarify that he expects the Ukrainian military to withdraw completely from the four Ukrainian provinces in question, including unoccupied areas. Among other things, this would mean handing over the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, with a prewar population of more than seven hundred thousand, along with Kherson, which was the only Ukrainian regional capital captured by the Russians before being liberated in November 2022.

Ukraine would also have to voluntarily demilitarize, accept geopolitical neutrality, and submit to “denazification,” Kremlin code for the suppression of Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of a Russian imperial ideology. In other words, Putin is insisting Ukraine admit defeat and surrender.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The terms offered by Putin confirm that he has no intention of reaching a sustainable peace with Ukraine. On the contrary, the Russian dictator evidently remains as committed as ever to his overriding war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing the Ukrainian nation. As if to underline the point, Putin accompanied his latest demands with a chilling warning that “the existence of Ukraine” depends on Kyiv’s readiness to accept his conditions.

In fact, there is even more at stake than the continued existence of the Ukrainian state. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of global security is currently being determined on the battlefields of Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion succeeds, it will signal the dawning of a new era marked by rising international insecurity, ballooning defense budgets, and increasingly frequent wars of aggression.

A victorious Russia would almost certainly remain at the forefront of this descent into lawlessness for many years to come. Throughout the past decade, Putin has steadily escalated his invasion of Ukraine while shifting his entire country onto a war footing. By this point, it should be painfully clear to all objective observers that he will not stop until he is stopped. Indeed, Putin has openly compared today’s war to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great, and frequently speaks in terms of a sacred mission to “return historically Russian lands.”

As anyone with a passing knowledge of Russian history will confirm, there are at least fifteen other countries beyond Ukraine that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All are now potential targets. While it is impossible to know exactly what Putin will do next if he defeats Ukraine, the idea that he will simply choose to stop is perhaps the most far-fetched scenario of all.

Nor will Putin be the only authoritarian ruler looking to embrace a new age of imperial aggression. China, Iran, and North Korea are all already providing the Russian war effort with varying degrees of support, and make no secret of their eagerness to overturn the existing world order. If Moscow achieves an historic victory in Ukraine, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang will also be emboldened, along with a whole host of fellow autocrats throughout the Global South.

The only way to avoid a geopolitical future shaped by rising insecurity and resurgent imperialism is by ensuring Russia loses in Ukraine. Putin’s recent bogus peace proposal is essentially a call for Kyiv’s capitulation and the absorption of Ukraine into a new Russian Empire. This is entirely in line with the policies of escalation he has pursued throughout the past decade, and reflects an imperial agenda that leaves no room for meaningful compromise.

The Russian dictator still clearly believes he can overwhelm Ukraine with brute force while intimidating the wider Western world into inaction. If he succeeds, the consequences for international security will be devastating. Ukraine’s leaders have already responded to Putin’s latest demands with characteristic defiance. Kyiv’s international partners must now go further and provide the military support to secure Ukrainian victory.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

Tomas Milasauskas, Liudvikas Jaškūnas — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 20:27:42 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is often referred to as the world’s first large-scale drone war. But what exactly does “drone war” mean in practical terms, and how is this war being waged?

Media coverage of the drone war often focuses on particular models such as the Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, or the Bayraktar drones that played an eye-catching role in Ukraine’s fight back during the initial stages of the invasion. However, behind these brands lies a much more complex and rapidly expanding drone ecosystem.

By far the most prevalent type of drone on the Ukrainian battlefield is the First Person View (FPV) drone—a type that our company sells in Ukraine and elsewhere. Despite their relatively low cost compared to other aerial platforms, FPV drones possess a number of capabilities that have resulted in a dramatic shift in our understanding of modern warfare. Given their navigation capabilities, these drones have become the preferred platform for mounting explosives and executing targeted strikes.

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Originally emerging from the realm of civilian hobby drone racing, FPV drones have robust motors and frames that are built to withstand the rigors of high-speed races and multiple crashes.

Relative to their fixed-wing cousins, copter-type drones have greater maneuvering capabilities, which, in the hands of skilled pilots, convert into precision targeting unique to FPV drones. It is not uncommon for pilots to fly their drones through the window of a building or into the open hatch of an armored vehicle, unleashing an explosion on exposed personnel inside. FPV drones are also well-suited for targeting specific equipment like optics, radars, and antennas mounted on the exteriors of armored vehicles.

FPV pilots in Ukraine do not normally operate from front-line trenches. Instead, they typically serve in specialized teams located around two to five kilometers away from the front line. This distance provides them with relative security from small arms and larger systems mounted on armored vehicles as well as from the indirect fire of mortars.

The nature of drone piloting equipment offers an additional layer of protection. Since everything is controlled remotely, only the antenna transmitting between the drone and operator needs to be exposed. The remaining equipment and the team can conduct their operations from the safety of a bunker or basement.

While hubs of drone operators are now recognized as high-value targets, in practice most attention is focused on blocking or destroying the drones themselves. This shift of lethal danger from personnel in forward positions to drones has accelerated the proliferation of FPV drone usage. It appeals to soldiers, who naturally seek to minimize the dangers of combat, and also appeals to Ukrainian and Russian commanders as they wage a war of attrition amid growing manpower shortages.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The main feature that has made FPV drones such a key weapon in the Russian war on Ukraine is their relatively low cost, with prices for a single unit sometimes lower than five hundred US dollars. This affordability, coupled with performance and tactical versatility, helps to explain the ubiquity of FPV drones on the front lines of the war. For Ukraine, which has not always had access to predictable weapons supplies from its Western partners, the affordability of FPV drones has helped its military stay in the fight, despite being outgunned by Russia.

In technological terms, FPV drones are currently in the early stages of their development. Most components are still sourced from the civilian market, while many models offer only a relatively limited range of frequencies. This is significant, as jamming is considered the Achilles’ heel of FPV drones. Many skeptics argue that it won’t be long until jammers are employed everywhere, rendering radio controls useless. However, jammers have their own hardware limitations that can be difficult to overcome.

Creating signal interference relies on sending a stronger signal than the one it is aiming to jam. In other words, effective jamming capabilities require considerable electrical power and bulky hardware. This is why most infantry units can only operate with small jamming devices that create a limited protection bubble for short periods of time. Stronger jamming systems can be employed on armored vehicles, but the prevalence of tank “cope cages” and the recent appearance of “turtle tanks” hints that physical armor is still the go-to protection against FPV drone attacks.

Despite efforts to counter them with jamming technology, FPV drones have proven resilient and have managed to adapt effectively to electronic warfare measures. Ongoing innovations in areas such as customized frequencies, frequency-hopping, and automated flight patterns promise to further enhance their effectiveness.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought FPV drones to prominence as a component of modern militaries and it appears that they are here to stay. This can be seen in the way the Ukrainian and Russian armies are both incorporating this technology into existing military structures. Indeed, in early 2024, Ukraine launched a new branch of the country’s armed forces dedicated exclusively to drones.

There are few reasons to believe the role of FPV drones will diminish in the coming years. On the contrary, as technologies advance and military tactics evolve, FPV drones are likely to become even more prominent in the wars of the future. This new reality is already being digested by military planners and commanders around the world. As they look to assess how best to incorporate FPV drones into their own defense doctrines, they will be studying the significant shifts currently taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Tomas Milasauskas is CEO of RSI Europe, a Lithuania-based remotely controlled systems manufacturer for the defense sector. Liudvikas Jaškūnas is head of marketing and communications at RSI Europe.

Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South

Dexter Tiff Roberts — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:07:30 +0000

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The statement released by G7 leaders after their summit last week garnered ample attention for its strong language on China’s unfair economic practices and ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and triggered a predictably sharp Chinese response. The back-and-forth is another reminder of China’s worsened relations with developed democracies over the past few years.

Beijing is by no means abandoning those relationships – Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia and New Zealand this week, not to mention President Xi’s trip to Europe last month, underscore a drive to mend damaged ties. But the incident is another piece of evidence confirming that Beijing’s positions on global and economic issues receive a more welcoming reception in the developing world, where China’s economic and political ties are growing by the day.

China’s strategic shift toward greater focus on the so-called Global South is unmistakable. One need only look at where China is spending diplomatic attention and propaganda dollars.

As colleagues at the Digital Forensics Research Lab explore in a new report on China’s messaging in Africa, China is increasingly promoting pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine in sub-Saharan Africa using its media platforms, commentators, social media, and broadcasting infrastructure. The effort aims to portray China as a force for peace while the United States prolongs the war, in line with Beijing’s drive to enhance its reputation relative to Washington across the developing world.

Source: (Murtala Zhang; CGTN Hausa) Screenshot of a cartoon shared by a China Radio International (CRI) illustrator, depicting the US arms industry as profiting from the war in Ukraine. Also, a screenshot of the Facebook post of the article that written for CRI defending China’s amplification of the biolabs in Ukraine disinformation translated from Hausa.

This effort to shape perceptions of China’s responsible global role in contrast to the United States is now routinely reflected in the content of high-level diplomatic engagements with developing countries.

In his speech just last week at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only underscored China’s leadership of the Global South as the “largest developing country” but also called for the convening of “a true international peace conference” on the Ukraine war that involves Russia – after Beijing pulled out all the stops to try to scuttle the Swiss-organized conference earlier this month – and threw in some choice words on US efforts to “maintain its unipolar hegemony” for good measure.

As I and the Global China Hub team discovered on a trip to Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras earlier this month, China is also ramping up diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement across Latin America, and pairing those efforts with a push to shape understanding of China across the region. Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts dives into that and much more in this issue of Global China – take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

China Spotlight

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Latin American officials flood Beijing revealing China’s global priorities

Want to know one key region of the Global South China is now focusing on? Take a look at who visited Beijing in early June. Before the first week of the month was even over, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil, and special envoy of Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla had all passed through China’s capital (the Brazilian vice president met with Xi Jinping and secured $4.49 billion in credit concessions. Brazil has been a key market for China too, as evidenced by an eighteen-fold surge in Chinese EV sales by value).

Latin America, with its rich resources, is a key target as China expands its global economic and political reach, and that’s a concern for the US. Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field: Trade, Investment, and Technology,” Pepe Zhang of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center called for a development-focused economic partnership with LAC that would make the Western Hemisphere more competitive, resilient, and better integrated with the US.

Economics used to bolster authoritarian power in Global South training

China’s commerce ministry isn’t just fretting about EU tariffs (see below). It has also spearheaded an effort to train officials in countries across the Global South. And perhaps not surprisingly, the instruction is about more than trade and economics: “This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule,” writes the Global China Hub’s Niva Yau in a June 12 report called “A Global South with Chinese Characteristics” (watch the launch event here). The 795 training descriptions reviewed by Yau show “how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.”

The report certainly got the PRC’s attention. The Chinese Embassy responded, saying the report is “full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” with the Foreign Ministry adding that “China has always respected the peoples of all countries in independently choosing their development paths and social systems,” which is very reassuring.

A new, coordinated transatlantic response to China emerges on trade?

In a widely expected move, the European Union announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on June 12, up as much 38.1% on top of existing taxes of 10% before, affecting companies including BYD, SAIC, and NIO. Also to no surprise was the heated response from Beijing: the move by the EU “undermines the legitimate rights and interests of China’s EV industry,” and is “blatant protectionism,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong said in a press briefing. On June 17, Beijing officially launched an anti-dumping probe on imported pork and its by-products from the EU in response.

With the EU action coming just over a month after US President Joe Biden imposed tariffs on EVs of 100%, is a new, more coordinated transatlantic response to the Chinese trade juggernaut emerging? On June 3rd, in an ACFrontPage conversation with United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, she did not mince words on how the US and the EU should adapt the transatlantic trade relationship to reflect the realities of China’s economic system, saying “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics… I haven’t heard that term used in many, many years. At this point, I think it’s less diplomatic than just sort of ahistorical. The China that we’re dealing with now, the PRC, is not a democracy. It’s not a capitalist, market-based economy.”

In an Econographics article exploring a similar theme entitled “Biden’s electric vehicle tariff strategy needs a united front,” the GeoEconomics Center’s Sophia Busch and Josh Lipsky write, “tariffs, working in isolation, can’t fully achieve all the objectives—no matter how high they go. It’s only when tariffs are relatively aligned across countries… that the trajectory could change.”

And it’s not just EVs that pose a threat to global industries. Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the “new three” clean tech exports—lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and, of course, electric cars (along with the action against EVs, the White House also raised tariffs simultaneously on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells to 25%.) “Imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles,” the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster wrote in a piece for EnergySource.

ICYMI

Beginning on June 17, Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and former President of Latvia Egils Levits have co-led the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwanese government. Joined by former Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, they will meet with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
The Global China Hub hosted a public conversation on allied solutions to de-risking tech supply chains from Chinese investment to spur collective action between the United States and government and private sector partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The event was a continuation of the Hub’s work on tech competition and China’s drive to dominate emerging technologies and relevant supply chains.
China’s trade with Russia has risen substantially since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly bolstering Moscow’s war aims, according to new research by the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster.
Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe was in part intended to divide it as the EU increasingly hardens its stance on China. The Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér explores the degree to which Xi was successful in these efforts in a New Atlanticist piece.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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The post Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zaaimi in Leadership Connect: Tribal Spotlight Interview

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Jun 2024 18:57:35 +0000

The post Zaaimi in Leadership Connect: Tribal Spotlight Interview appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Holding Putin’s propagandists accountable for crimes in Ukraine

Kristina Hook, Anna Vyshniakova — Tue, 18 Jun 2024 13:12:25 +0000

At dawn in May 2020, a French police raid on a sleepy village near Paris ended a 26-year manhunt for one of the Rwanda genocide’s most notorious fugitives. By October 2022, 89-year-old Felician Kabuga was standing trial in The Hague for crimes without a statute of limitations: Genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, and conspiracy to commit genocide, among other human rights violations. Prosecutors singled out his role as founder of a notorious Rwanda radio station, calling this dehumanizing media a key cause of the genocide.

In early June, new developments in The Hague served as a reminder to key Russian propagandists, including one of Russia’s former presidents, that they may one day face similar charges. As allowed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, a coalition of non-government organizations jointly submitted a formal Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into six Russian nationals involved in state propaganda. Notably, this coalition included international and Ukrainian groups, as well as one Russian NGO.

The Communication urged the ICC to investigate the Russians for criminal hate speech. The accused include Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current Security Council Deputy Chairman; Vladimir Solovyov, a popular host on Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russia Today; Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the state-owned media consortium Rossiya Segodnya; and Sergey Mardan, a popular television and radio host. The Communication also named Alexey Gromov, First Deputy to the Presidential Executive Office’s Chief of Staff, stating his role in ordering or failing to prevent over 300 examples of criminal incitement to violence from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024.

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, Russian state and state-aligned actors are accused of committing a daily litany of horrific atrocities against Ukrainians. In such a context, it is tempting to overlook the rhetoric behind these actions, but the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates the dangers of ignoring the threats made by powerful Russian media figures. Many in the Russian media have openly telegraphed eliminationist rhetoric against Ukrainians for years, setting the stage for the largest military attack in Europe since World War II. Their continuing threats against the existence of Ukraine, and against other Western countries, pose a direct threat to international security.

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Since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia’s highly sophisticated propaganda machine requires novel legal and policy responses. New dangerous and diffuse platforms for Russia’s inciting language and other disinformation continue to emerge. In addition to the kind of conventional propaganda most are familiar with, Russian actors now spread public incitement and more subtle disinformation through social media, bot farms, video games, movies, and manipulated content (including deepfakes). International law does not yet cover each of these categories, as older legal frameworks concentrate on historical understandings of propaganda in legacy media formats.

These realities pose serious challenges for anyone seeking to protect victimized groups from atrocity crimes. International law, including the United Nations Genocide Convention, prohibits all means of disseminating direct and public incitement. Still, Russia’s sophisticated networks of propaganda platforms make upholding these provisions difficult. As these challenges increase, Russian techniques of shaping subconscious dehumanization continue to evolve. This fostering of cascading radicalization within Russian society may prove even more impactful than one-time calls for violence, while being more difficult to trace and prosecute.

Some Russian efforts to stay ahead of judicial accountability are clear. Even the Russian authorities felt compelled to respond to Russian journalist Anton Kravosky’s call to drown Ukrainian children in a river (he was suspended from RT for these comments, although an investigative committee later stated he had committed no crime). After these events, some Russian propagandists became noticeably more careful, cloaking their rhetoric through allusions and metaphors. Still, even this “hidden rhetoric” often meets legal requirements for incitement and other criminal propaganda.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The gravity of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians compels international urgency to disrupt Moscow’s escalation in direct violence and associated inciting propaganda to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Days after posting a profanity-filled acknowledgement of the NGO-led Communication to the ICC, Dmitry Medvedev followed up with a video showing all of Ukraine as “belonging” to Russia. This complete obliteration of Ukraine from world maps was the first time a top Kremlin official had overtly claimed the entirety of Ukraine as a stated goal, showing a link between words and projected actions.

The international community now faces a critical moment. It also has a unique chance to create a legal framework and enforcement mechanism capable of implementation through international cooperation. Beginning at home, Ukraine’s legal system requires amendments to systematize prosecutions in absentia for genocidal incitement. International partners must support these efforts by surging law enforcement resources to monitor the flood of calls for violence emanating from Russian media and from more shadowy Kremlin-backed propaganda platforms.

For Russian propagandists to face the criminal consequences of their conduct, international arrest warrants are indispensable. Bolstering political will for judicial accountability and opening criminal proceedings should be the two major areas of focus. To ensure accountability, Ukraine and its partners must now plan for realistic enforcement mechanisms that implement trial verdicts and deny safe havens of non-extradition. The words and actions of Kremlin propagandists have combined to fuel unimaginable atrocities in Ukraine. To protect Ukrainians and other victims, and to prevent further armed conflicts fuelled by propaganda, the international community must break the cycle of Russia’s real or imagined impunity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Anna Vyshniakova is a war crimes lawyer and a legal consultant, head of legal NGO LingvaLexa, and author of the book “Incitement to Genocide: How to Bring Propagandists to Justice.”

Unpacking Influence: China’s Impact on US Strategy in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Jun 2024 15:22:08 +0000

SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHINA-MENA PODCAST ON THE APP OF YOUR CHOICE

Key takeaways

US vs. China in Regional Influence
Importance of International Order
US Strategic Partnerships
China’s Regional Impact

Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

03:51 – Navigating Biden’s China Challenge in the Middle East

08:46 – Safeguarding Strategic Partnerships Amidst China’s Rise

11:41 – Exploring China’s Economic Development

15:00 – Contrasting US and China Infrastructure Support

20:19 – Assessing China’s Trade Influence

22:23 – Impact of the International Order on Gulf Economies

24:30 – Insights from the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum

29:18 – China’s Prioritization of its Immediate Periphery

34:04 – Cooperation and Countering Iran’s Influence

38:19 – Iran’s Behavior Changes and China’s Role

39:51 – Evading Sanctions: Iran, Russia, and China

42:22 – Outro

In this episode

Dana Stroul
Director of Research and Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, positions she assumed in February, 2024. She rejoined the Institute after serving from 2021-2023 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, the Pentagon’s top civilian official with responsibility for the region. In that capacity, she led the development and execution of U.S. defense policy in the region during an especially turbulent period that included accelerating integrated air and maritime defense, addressing Iran’s destabilizing activities, formulating the U.S. approach to strategic competition, sustaining the DEFEAT-ISIS coalition, and responding to the Israel-Hamas War. Previously, she served for five years as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where she covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey, and also served in Middle East policy office of the Secretary of Defense.

About

In this episode of China-MENA, titled “Unpacking Influence: China’s Impact on US Strategy in the Middle East,” join our host Jonathan Fulton and guest Dana Stroul, director of research and senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East, as they explore China’s evolving role and its impact on US policy in the Middle East and North Africa. This episode delves into global partnerships like the US-UAE-G42-Microsoft collaboration, the strategic significance of 5G technology and cloud computing, and the role of China on Iran’s behavior changes. Among other themes, Dana also discusses:

• The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
• How to safeguard strategic partnerships amidst China’s rise
• Contrast between China and US infrastructure support
• Evasion of sanctions: Iran, Russia and China

Join us for an insightful discussion on the future of the US and its strategic goals in the region.

Hosted by

Fellow

Jonathan Fulton

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

China Chinese

The importance of the Rules-Based International Order lies in preventing unilateral changes or use of force to alter recognized boundaries

Dana Stroul

About the China-MENA podcast

The China-MENA podcast features conversations with academics, think-tankers, and regional specialists on Chinese Influence in the Middle East and informs US and MENA audiences in the policy and business communities about the nature of China’s outreach to the region.

At a time when China’s global footprint is getting deeper and deeper, it has never been more important to understand its foreign policy and the Middle East is one of the world’s most consequential regions: home to major religions, diverse cultural and social heritage, central to global energy markets, and of course, geopolitics, linking people and markets in Asia, Africa and Europe. This show will help you understand what China is doing in the region, and how the region is engaging with China as an increasingly important external power.

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

Read the full article here.

Designing a blueprint for open, free and trustworthy digital economies

Carole House — Fri, 14 Jun 2024 21:21:25 +0000

More than half a century into the information age, it is clear how policy has shaped the digital world. The internet has enabled world-changing innovation, commercial developments, and economic growth through a global and interoperable infrastructure. However, the internet is also home to rampant fraud, misinformation, and criminal exploitation. To shape policy and technology to address these challenges in the next generation of digital infrastructure, policymakers must confront two complex issues: the difficulty of massively scaling technologies and the growing fragmentation across technological and economic systems.

How today’s policymakers decide to balance freedom and security in the digital landscape will have massive consequences for the future. US digital policy must be aimed at improving national security, defending human freedom, dignity, and economic growth while ensuring necessary accountability for the integrity of the technological bedrock.

Digital economy building blocks and the need for strategic alignment

Digital policymakers face a host of complex issues, such as regulating and securing artificial intelligence, banning or transitioning ownership of TikTok, combating pervasive fraud, addressing malign influence and interference in democratic processes, considering updates to Section 230 and impacts on tech platforms, and implementing zero-trust security architectures. When addressing these issues, policymakers must keep these core building blocks of the digital economy front and center:

Infrastructure: How to provide the structure, rails, processes, standards, and technologies for critical societal functions;
Data: How to protect, manage, own, use, share, and destroy open and sensitive data; and
Identity: How to represent and facilitate trust and interactions across people, entities, data, and devices.

How to approach accountability—who is responsible for what—in each of these pillars sets the stage for how future digital systems will or will not be secure, competitive, and equitable.

Achieving the right balance between openness and security is not easy, and the stakes for both personal liberty and national security amid geostrategic competition are high. The open accessibility of information, infrastructure, and markets enabled by the internet all bring knowledge diffusion, data flows, and higher order economic developments, which are critical for international trade and investment.

However, vulnerabilities in existing digital ecosystems contribute significantly to economic losses, such as the estimated $600 billion per year lost to intellectual property theft and the $8 trillion in global costs last year from cybercrime. Apart from direct economic costs, growing digital authoritarianism threatens undesirable censorship, surveillance, and manipulation of foreign and domestic societies that could not only undermine democracy but also reverse the economic benefits wrought from democratization.

As the United States pursues its commitment with partner nations toward an open, free, secure internet, Washington must operationalize that commitment into specific policy and technological implementations coordinated across the digital economy building blocks. It is critical to shape them to strengthen their integrity while preventing undesired fragmentation, which could hinder objectives for openness and innovation.

Infrastructure

The underlying infrastructure and technologies that define how consumers and businesses get access to and can use information are featured in ongoing debates and policymaking, which has led to heightened bipartisan calls for accountability across platform operators. Further complicating the landscape of accountability in infrastructure are the growing decentralization and aggregation of historically siloed functions and systems. As demonstrated by calls for decentralizing the banking system or blockchain-based decentralized networks underlying cryptocurrencies, there is an increasing interest from policymakers and industry leaders to drive away from concentration risks and inequity that can be at risk in overly centralized systems.

However, increasing decentralization can lead to a lack of clear lines of responsibility and accountability in the system. Accountability and neutrality policy are also impacted by increasing digital interconnectedness and the commingling of functions. The Bank of the International Settlement recently coined a term, “finternet,” to describe the vision of an exciting but complexly interconnected digital financial system that must navigate international authorities, sovereignty, and regulatory applicability in systems that operate around the world.

With this tech and policy landscape in mind, infrastructure policy should focus on two aspects:

Ensuring infrastructure security, integrity, and openness. Policymakers and civil society need to articulate and test a clear vision for stakeholders to coordinate on what openness and security across digital infrastructure for cross-economic purposes should look like based on impacts to national security, economic security, and democratic objectives. This would outline elements such as infrastructure ecosystem participants, the degree of openness, and where points for responsibility of controls should be, whether through voluntary or enforceable means. This vision would build on ongoing Biden administration efforts and provide a north star for strategic coordination with legislators, regulators, industry, civil society, and international partners to move in a common direction.
Addressing decentralization and the commingling of infrastructure. Technologists must come together with policymakers to ensure that features for governance and security are fit for purpose and integrated early in decentralized systems, as well as able to oversee and ensure compliance for any regulated, high-risk activity.

Data

Data has been called the new oil, the new gold, and the new oxygen. Perhaps overstated, each description nonetheless captures what is already the case: Data is incredibly valuable in digital economies. US policymakers should focus on how to surround how to address the privacy, control, and integrity of data, the fundamental assets of value in information economies.

Privacy is a critical area to get right in the collection and management of information. The US privacy framework is fragmented and generally use-specific, framed for high risk sectors like finance and healthcare. In the absence of a federal-government-wide consumer data privacy law, some states are implementing their own approaches. In light of existing international data privacy laws, US policy also has to account for issues surrounding harmonization and potential economic hindrances brought by data localization.

Beyond just control of privacy and disclosure, many tech entrepreneurs, legislators, and federal agencies are aimed at placing greater ownership of data and subsequent use in the hands of consumers. Other efforts supporting privacy and other national and economic security concerns are geared toward protecting against the control and ownership of sensitive data by adversarial nations or anti-competitive actors, including regulations on data brokers and the recent divest-or-ban legislation targeted at TikTok.

There is also significant policy interest surrounding the integrity of information and the systems reliant on it, such as in combating the manipulation of data underlying AI systems and protecting electoral processes that could be vulnerable to disinformation. Standards and research are rising, focused on data provenance and integrity techniques. But there remain barriers to getting the issue of data integrity right in the digital age.

While there is some momentum for combating data integrity compromise, doing so is rife with challenges of implementation and preserving freedom of expression that have to be addressed to achieve the needed balance of security and freedom:

Balancing data security, discoverability, and privacy. Stakeholders across various key functions of law enforcement, regulation, civil society, and industry must together define what type of information should be discoverable by whom and under what conditions, guided by democratic principles, privacy frameworks, the rule of law, and consumer and national security interests. This would shape the technical standards and requirements for privacy tech and governance models that government and industry can put into effect.
Preserving consumer and democratic control and ownership of data. Placing greater control and localization protections around consumer data could bring great benefits to user privacy but must also be done in consideration of the economic impacts and higher order innovations enabled from the free flow and aggregation of data. Policy efforts could pursue research and experimentation for assessing the value of data
Combating manipulation and protecting information integrity. Governments must work hand in hand with civil society and, where appropriate, media organizations to pursue policies and technical developments that could contribute to promoting trust in democratic public institutions and help identify misinformation across platforms, especially in high-risk areas to societies and democracies such as election messaging, financial services and markets, and healthcare.

Identity

Talk about “identity” can trigger concerns of social credit scores and Black Mirror episodes. It may, for example, evoke a sense of state surveillance, criminal anonymity, fraud, voter and political dissident suppression, disenfranchisement of marginalized populations, or even the mundane experience of waiting in line at a department of motor vehicles. As a force for good, identity enables critical access to goods and services for consumers, helps provide recourse for victims of fraud and those seeking public benefits, and protects sensitive information while providing necessary insights to authorities and regulated institutions to hold bad actors accountable. With increasing reliance on digital infrastructure, government and industry will have to partner to create the technical and policy fabric for secure, trustworthy, and interoperable digital identity.

Digital identity is a critical element of digital public infrastructure (DPI). The United States joined the Group of Twenty (G20) leaders in committing to pursue work on secure, interoperable digital identity tools and emphasized its importance in international fora to combat illicit finance. However, while many international efforts have taken root to establish digital identity systems abroad, progress by the United States on holistic domestic or cross-border digital identity frameworks has been limited. Identity security is crucial to establish trust in US systems, including the US financial sector and US public institutions. While the Biden administration has been driving some efforts to strengthen identity, the democratized access to sophisticatedAI tools increased the threat environment significantly by making it easy to create fraudulent credentials and deepfakes that circumvent many current counter-fraud measures.

The government is well-positioned to be the key driver of investments in identity that would create the underlying fabric for trust in digital communications and commerce:

Investing in identity as digital public infrastructure. Digital identity development and expansion can unlock massive societal and economic benefits, including driving value up to 13 percent of a nation’s gross domestic product and providing access to critical goods and services, as well as the ability to vote, engage in the financial sector, and own land. Identity itself can serve as infrastructure for higher-order e-commerce applications that rely on trust. The United States should invest in secure, interoperable digital identity infrastructure domestically and overseas, to include the provision of secure verifiable credentials and privacy-preserving attribute validation services.
Managing security, privacy, and equity in Identity. Policymakers must work with industry to ensure that identity systems, processes, and regulatory requirements implement appropriate controls in full view of all desired outcomes across security, privacy, and equity, consistent with National Institute of Science and Technology standards. Policies should ensure that saving resources by implementing digital identity systems also help to improve services for those not able to use them.

Technology by itself is not inherently good or evil—its benefits and risks are specific to the technological, operational, and governance implementations driven by people and businesses. This outline of emerging policy efforts affecting digital economy building blocks may help policymakers and industry leaders consider efforts needed to drive alignment to preserve the benefits of a global, interoperable, secure and free internet while addressing the key shortfalls present in the current digital landscape.

Carole House is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and the Executive in Residence at Terranet Ventures, Inc. She formerly served as the director for cybersecurity and secure digital innovation for the White House National Security Council, where Carole will soon be returning as the Special Advisor for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Policy. This article reflects views expressed by the author in her personal capacity.

The post Designing a blueprint for open, free and trustworthy digital economies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

House published in Bloomberg Law on US public-private investment in critical technology

rmurphy — Fri, 14 Jun 2024 14:51:07 +0000

The post House published in Bloomberg Law on US public-private investment in critical technology appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

Olivia Yanchik — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 23:17:53 +0000

A combination of Ukrainian ingenuity and Western-supplied long-range missiles is making the Russian occupation of Crimea increasingly untenable. The continued weakening of Russia’s position on the Crimean peninsula is a major blow to Kremlin prestige that also has potentially serious practical implications for the future of the war.

In recent weeks, long-awaited supplies of US missiles have allowed Ukraine to step up a campaign of air strikes against Russian air defense assets and other military targets throughout the occupied peninsula. This follows on from an earlier series of drone and missile attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which forced the bulk of Putin’s warships to retreat from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia (and the Caribbean).

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Reports of fresh Ukrainian air strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea are now an almost daily occurrence. On June 10, for example, Ukraine claimed to have struck three advanced Russian air defense systems. Additional high value targets have included Russian airfields, radars, command posts, and communications centers. The majority of recent attacks have been possible thanks to the delivery of ATACMS missiles from the US as part of the military aid bill that was finally passed by Congress in April following months of delays.

In addition to steadily depleting Russia’s defensive capacities, Ukraine also appears intent on isolating Crimea by targeting the Kremlin’s logistical connections to the occupied peninsula. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian air strikes in late May damaged two rail ferries on the Crimean side of the Kerch Strait, putting them temporarily out of service. This represented a significant blow as Moscow has grown reliant on these ferry services to resupply its army in Crimea following a series of Ukrainian attacks on the Crimean Bridge connecting the peninsula to Russia.

Ukraine’s recent ferry service attack has reportedly forced Russia to resume the transportation of military supplies and fuel over the vulnerable Crimean Bridge. Moscow has sought to protect the bridge from possible attack by deploying a series of barges in addition to extensive existing defenses. However, the apparent ease with which Ukraine has been able to hit Russian air defenses and logistical hubs throughout Crimea has led some to suggest that the destruction of the Crimean Bridge may now only be a matter of time.

The Kremlin appears to be well aware of this vulnerability. For the past year, Russian engineers have been constructing a series of railway lines running from Russia itself through occupied regions of mainland Ukraine along the coast of the Sea of Azov to Crimea. This should help Moscow maintain connection with the peninsula and supply Russian forces in southern Ukraine, but the new railway routes will also serve as key targets for Ukrainian missiles and saboteurs.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is now evident that Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are placing Russian occupation forces in Crimea in a precarious position. By utilizing Western-provided cruise missiles and domestically produced naval drones, Ukraine has already succeeded in forcing most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw from its home port of Sevastopol in Crimea. This has also restricted the ability of Russian warships to operate in the western Black Sea.

The next stage of this effort is now underway, with Ukraine methodically depleting Russian air defenses and exposing the entire peninsula to further attack. Ukraine is expected to receive the first F-16 fighter jets in the coming months, setting the stage for what is likely to be a broader air campaign against Russia’s extensive surviving military infrastructure throughout Crimea. With its air defenses decimated and supply lines under threat, the Russian army in Crimea may soon face the realization that its position is no longer sustainable.

Russia’s declining fortunes in Crimea represent a very personal humiliation for Vladimir Putin. The 2014 seizure of the peninsula marked the start of Russia’s Ukraine invasion and is still widely regarded as the greatest single achievement of Putin’s entire reign. With this in mind, he is likely to resist calls to reduce the Russian military presence in Crimea unless absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, it is already clear that Crimea is no longer the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” it once was. Instead, it is becoming a weak link in Russia’s invasion that Ukraine will continue to exploit.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The size of these tariffs indicate that the French have more influence than the Germans in EU trade policy, at least for now. French carmakers, in contrast to German auto brands, are less dependent on the Chinese market and more willing to use tariff policy to protect local production capacity. Indeed, the tariffs and their political fallout reflect a split between EU member states with deep ties to China’s car industry, such as Germany, Sweden, and Hungary, and member states that view China as more of a threat than an opportunity, such as France and Italy.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow in the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

The European Commission unveiled its higher-than-expected countervailing tariffs on some EVs imported from China. With this move, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security agenda has won out against even a last-minute push by Germany to soften the decision. Concerns and disappointment have already echoed from German industry, criticizing the Commission’s “Trumpian protectionist” decision and denouncing detrimental economic consequences for Germany’s automotive industry. However, apart from the howls of opposition from some large German auto and chemical actors, almost 70 percent of German industries support protective measures against China’s unfair trade practices and market distortion. This fracture between Germany’s Mittelstand and major global players (such as Volkswagen, Siemens, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, BASF, and Bayer) reflects the underlying contrast between the EU’s need to protect its industries against Chinese overcapacity versus certain export-dependent sectors within the European bloc.

With a strong chance of von der Leyen leading the Commission for the next five years and an increasingly protectionist-oriented global economy, it will be interesting to watch who catches up with whom. Will von der Leyen’s ambitious economic security agenda that echoes Washington’s tougher stance on China be reined in by export-dependent member states such as Germany? Or will Berlin come to a realization that the EU has to address key vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Beijing? This is only the opening salvo in a longer-term policy debate.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

—Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

In order to not affect the European Parliament election campaign, the European Commission waited to announce its decision to impose additional tariffs on Chinese EVs. But now that the election is over, it can finally move. It is indeed high time for the EU to react to China’s subsidized industrial overcapacities. The United States and other countries, such as Turkey, had already announced additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, thereby raising the pressure on the EU, because China could further divert its exports to Europe.

But the decision by Brussels is not backed by all EU member states. While France is in favor, auto giant Germany has been wary of these tariffs and made an eleventh-hour bid to dilute and reduce the Commission’s planned tariff hike. In the corridors of the German chancellery and parts of the German economics ministry, there is great concern that the German automotive industry could bear the brunt of Chinese retaliatory action. And this remains a space to watch. So far, this is a provisional predisclosure by the European Commission. It now has four months to adopt definitive measures, which will require an implementing act with an examination procedure, which usually implies a qualified majority vote in a comitology procedure, meaning it is not final and set in stone, yet.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

The EU is undertaking tariffs on China-made EVs due to surging shipments to Europe. Additionally, the US imposition of tariffs on EVs and other products—especially batteries—forced the EU’s hand.

The EU is of at least two minds regarding tariffs on China-produced EVs. Germany, Sweden, and Hungary all oppose the tariffs, which they feel will damage existing commercial ties with China. Germany fears retaliation against its own auto sales to China. Sweden’s Volvo brand is owned by the Chinese firm Geely. And Hungary has received substantial EV investments from Chinese EV and battery companies. Conversely, France, Italy, and several other EU actors advocated for additional tariffs, as these measures could protect EU automakers from subsidized competitors while attracting inward investments from China.

Owing to a lack of internal consensus, as well as the rapidly changing nature of the EV landscape, the EU may well revisit its decision in the coming months. The EU’s decision is caveated at several points and could be reassessed if the European-US alliance weakens over the next year.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security.

2. How does this step compare with the new US tariffs?

Because the United States has very little Chinese EV market penetration as of now, its recent Section 301 tariffs on Chinese EVs are largely preventive. In contrast, the EU’s tariffs are responding to a rapid increase in Chinese EV imports. In this way, the EU tariffs are more in keeping with the manner in which antidumping/countervailing duty investigations are usually undertaken, and the EU announcement makes it clear that it is at least attempting to impose these duties in a World Trade Organization-compliant manner, including by offering to enter negotiations with the Chinese government.

The EU tariffs are both lower than the United States’ and more complicated. By choosing to apply tariffs on a company-by-company basis, the EU is trying to demonstrate that its actions are rooted in factual determinations about Chinese subsidies, which themselves are provided on a company-by-company basis. By ensuring SAIC cars are hit with the highest tariff rate, the EU is also differentiating between state-owned car companies (which SAIC is) and private firms (such as BYD and Geely). This also gives the EU tools to incentivize car companies on an individual basis to transfer more production to the EU in order to gain better market access. The message is clear—site production in the EU or be subject to a tariff designed to eliminate the subsidization benefits of building vehicles in China.

The differences between the US and EU tariffs further highlight how much more dependent major European car manufacturers are on China—as a market, a production site, and as a source of inward investment. US carmakers are much less reliant on China for revenue, largely because as Chinese automakers have grown, US brands have been pushed out. The sense that China is a declining market for US autos has also blunted organized industrial opposition to tariffs on Chinese vehicles. Across the Atlantic, European car manufacturers have been much more vocal and concerned about tariff action against Chinese EVs due to the potential for retaliation, and this shows in both the tariff level—which is much lower than the United States’—and the firm-specific carve-outs.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

The EU’s tariffs are vastly different from the US measures in several key aspects. The EU-announced tariff rates are substantially lower than comparable US measures; are differentiated on a company-by-company basis; and, unlike the United States’, indicate a receptiveness to inward investment.

The European Commission’s investigation determined that Chinese automakers BYD and Geely will receive preferential tariff rates of 17.4 percent and 20 percent, which will be applied on top of the existing 10 percent tariff rate that Chinese EVs face. Other producers would face additional tariffs ranging from 21 percent to 38.1 percent.

While the criteria for determining provisional countervailing duties is not transparent, it appears that the European Commission awarded lower rates to automakers investing into the European ecosystem.

It is not clear how the Commission determined a level of subsidization on a company-by-company basis—or if this exercise is even possible. The Chinese system of subsidies is diverse, complex, and opaque. Chinese firms often receive direct or implicit support via preferential interest rates, directed credit, tax credits, and cross subsidies—such as in the steelmaking and shipbuilding sectors. Moreover, these subsidies take place at the national, provincial, and even local level.

While it’s not clear how the European Union could determine the level of these subsidies, especially on a company-by-company basis, it can calculate which firms have the largest local footprint. Both BYD and Geely have substantial investments in Europe. BYD has already opened an EV plant in Hungary and plans to open another facility. Geely owns the Swedish brand Volvo and has begun to shift production of some vehicles from China to Belgium.

Finally, China’s SAIC group received the maximum tariff rate of 38.1 percent. The automaker has a limited footprint on the continent, and it has yet to select a site for its first European production facility, despite nearly a year of consideration. Accordingly, Europe seems to be warning SAIC to site a facility within Europe or face tariffs.

—Joseph Webster

3. How might China react?

China will likely issue some corresponding tariffs on European-made goods, even if only for symbolic purposes. Yet, it may have no choice other than to accept that Europe will accept its investment, but not its exports. Beijing may also seek to re-engage with Europe on electric vehicles after the US presidential election, which will have significant implications for transatlantic ties.

Beijing will closely watch Europe’s posture toward lithium-ion batteries, which can be used for grid storage or electric vehicles (and also have potential military implications). With US tariffs on lithium-ion batteries beginning in 2026, Europe will be flooded by these products unless it applies its own measures.

—Joseph Webster

China has already indicated it may retaliate with tariffs against internal combustion engine vehicles, aviation equipment, and agriculture. It remains to be seen whether China makes good on that threat, but it did send a letter to the Commission in the aftermath of the tariff announcements, asking for a negotiated settlement and threatening to start retaliatory measures in aviation and agriculture in the absence of a deal. Agriculture and aviation are both politically sensitive sectors, with exports to China representing more than 6 percent of the EU’s agricultural trade. It’s less clear how easily China could absorb the costs of aviation tariffs given that Airbus planes represent more than 50 percent of China’s commercial aviation fleet.

At some point, the usefulness of tariffs in changing governments’ behavior displays decreasing returns. This is especially true as rounds of protectionism reduce firms’ market share in each other’s markets. The lack of strong US industrial opposition to tariffs on Chinese EVs is a case in point. The lesson here is that governments are going to eventually have to sit down and work out their differences; trade wars might be on-trend at the moment, but eventually the downsides—including increased costs and reduced consumer choice—will become more apparent to citizens.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

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Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt abuse legal systems to suppress online speech

Dina Sadek, Layla Mashkoor, Iain Robertson, Andy Carvin — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 11:00:00 +0000

Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are weaponizing vaguely written domestic media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws to target and suppress dissent, opposition, and vulnerable groups. Political leaders in Egypt and Saudi Arabia often claim that their countries’ judicial systems enjoy independence and a lack of interference, a narrative intended to distance the states from the real and overzealous targeting and prosecution of critics. Such claims can be debunked and dismissed, as the Egyptian and Saudi governments have had direct involvement in establishing and implementing laws that are utilized to target journalists and human rights defenders.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia were selected as case studies for this report because of their status as among the most frequently documented offenders in the region when it comes to exploiting ambiguously written laws to target and prosecute journalists, critics, activists, human rights defenders, and even apolitical citizens. The two countries have consolidated power domestically, permitting them to utilize and bend their domestic legal systems to exert control over the online information space. Punishments for those targeted can involve draconian prison sentences, travel bans, and fines, which result in a chilling effect that consequently stifles online speech and activities, preventing citizens from discussing political, social, and economic issues.

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia enacted media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws with ambiguous language and unclear definitions of legal terms, allowing for flexible interpretations of phrases such as “false information,” “morality,” or “family values and principles.” The laws in both countries also loosely define critical terms like “terrorism,” thereby facilitating expansive interpretations of what constitutes a terrorist crime. Further, anti-terror laws now include articles that connect the “dissemination of false information” with terrorist acts. This vague and elastic legal language has enabled the Egyptian and Saudi regimes to prosecute peaceful citizens on arbitrary grounds, sometimes handing out long prison sentences or even death sentences, undermining respect for the rule of law in the two countries.

This report explores the development of media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws in both countries, and demonstrates through case studies how Saudi Arabia and Egypt weaponize the laws to prosecute opposition figures and control narratives online. This report examines the relationship between criminal charges tied to one’s professional activities or online speech and how those charges can trigger online smear campaigns and harassment. In cases that involve women, gender-based violence is often used to harm a woman’s reputation. Though a direct correlation between judicial charges and online harassment cannot be ascertained, these case studies suggest that dissidents are likely to face online harm following legal persecution, even after they are released.

Bakir quoted in BreakingDefense on Turkish drones during Raisi crash

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 20:52:53 +0000

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Plitsas quoted in Defense One on US influence operations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 14:19:10 +0000

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Generative AI provides a toolkit for decarbonization

Joseph Webster and Shaheer Hussam — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 16:43:13 +0000

Rapidly improving artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities will help accelerate the energy transition. Both established and emergent AI capabilities—such as large language models (LLMs)—can be applied to an array of strategic, technical, financial, and policy challenges posed by decarbonization. It is critical for energy transition stakeholders to monitor, understand, and carefully apply these capabilities to their unique decarbonization challenges, while also addressing the risks involved.

The most consequential new class of AI, generative AI, is able to analyze and create text, audio, code, and even molecular design—doing so faster and often with higher quality than human-created counterparts. Generative AI uses extraordinary volumes of training data and novel data-processing mechanisms which require unprecedented computational power. Data center load growth, driven by a range of factors, is forcing utilities across the United States and Europe to revisit system planning needs. Indeed, this added demand is—in some regions—delaying the retirement of coal-fired power plants. To ensure that climate targets are met, data center growth must coincide with transmission upgrades, energy efficiency improvements, and new low-carbon generation capacity. More broadly, policymakers must also consider how to harness the potential from generative AI while managing complex uncertainties, from inaccurate outputs and data leakage to AI-enabled cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. The deployment of generative AI will require rigorous human oversight, particularly in the early stages.

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Given the capabilities of generative AI, integration into organizational workflows can help energy stakeholders in multiple ways—for example, lower regulatory compliance costs, consider strategic planning options, and evaluate the financial risk around their low-carbon investments, among others.

1. Strategic planning

Recent demonstrations of generative AI capabilities are impressive. Generative AI can already outline, summarize, and draft documents cheaper and faster than many humans. It can also help humans conduct strategic tasks more effectively. A study by Harvard Business School examined the effects of GPT-4—the model behind ChatGPT—on knowledge workers’ productivity, finding that GPT-4 significantly improved workers’ abilities to generate effective ideas and develop implementation plans. Another study from University College London found that a collection of LLMs could give strategic recommendations at a comparable level to human experts. As strategic planning use cases are systemic and across industries, improvements in productivity would apply across the decarbonization value chain.

2. Regulatory compliance

Some generative AI use cases will directly enhance clean energy project developers’ ability to manage cumbersome regulatory processes. As generative AI capabilities are integrated into institutional workflows, they will assist on tasks ranging from simple emails to complex, costly, and time-consuming regulatory processes. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, as part of its PolicyAI, initiative, recently found that LLMs could streamline the public comment-review process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which is burdensome for many renewables firms.

Importantly, generative AI may aid regulators by accelerating reviews of a variety of environmental impact studies. For instance, after New York State attempted to ease traffic and pollution by passing traffic congestion pricing, an exhaustive environmental review took five years and more than 4,000 pages of analysis. By streamlining portions of these document-intensive regulatory tasks, generative AI can speed up environmental reviews, giving infrastructure projects a quicker go/no-go decision.

3. Decarbonization investment analytics

A range of AI tools, using both existing techniques and generative AI, are being developed to assist with financial and economic modeling, a critical but resource-intensive task for renewable energy projects. While still at the early stages, generative AI tools may be able to partially or even fully build financial models or propose complex scenario plans. In addition, AI is already being used to enhance corporate due diligence by detecting anomalies in financial statements, summarizing earnings call transcripts, or rapidly analyzing trade press. These capabilities will continue to assist both investors and corporate mergers-and-acquisitions teams in their decarbonization investments.

4. Energy asset management

Financial and economic modeling tools overlap with another essential aspect of decarbonization: advanced energy asset management. Currently, communications with energy asset field operators are typically executed via middle management and dashboards with both planned and ad hoc analytics. Generative AI may enable more simplified analytics and communication with the workers physically assessing and repairing assets. At the energy asset management level, generative AI tools could deliver improvements in compiling, summarizing, and communicating asset performance in a customized manner for financial managers.

5. Wildfire risk assessment

In parallel to generative AI, another area of quiet yet significant advancement has been machine-learning (ML) models for weather forecasting, which have produced some extraordinary results. Further advances in weather forecasting could help mitigate the climate change-driven fire season. Wildfires themselves exacerbate the climate crisis—global fires produce emissions of about 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, equal to 4 percent of total global emissions. These fires can also force large populations indoors for weeks due to health risks and poor air quality. Further investment in AI/ML-based modeling could help manage these risks by predicting the probable location and magnitude of potential wildfires and improving real-time surveillance of smoke, enabling firefighters to combat the over 80,000 wildfires that occur in the United States alone every year.

Despite the current AI hype cycle and the early-stage risks around generative AI, improving the broad range of AI models will be integral to developing a low-carbon economy. The magnitude and pace will be difficult to predict, as models are integrated into institutional workflows. Human oversight, particularly around critical infrastructure, must remain comprehensive. If managed appropriately, these emergent capabilities will yield important advances in regulatory analysis, environmental management, strategic planning, and an array of challenges essential to achieving net-zero emissions.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Shaheer Hussam is a partner at Aetlan, an energy advisory and analytics firm.

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Allies stand with Ukraine as Russian threat looms over D-Day anniversary

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 06 Jun 2024 20:27:45 +0000

World leaders gathered in Normandy on June 6 to mark the eightieth anniversary of the Allied landings in France during World War II. Russian President Vladimir Putin was not invited to attend, but the war he unleashed more than two years ago in Ukraine cast a long shadow over commemorations.

In his official address, French President Emmanuel Macron directly referenced the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. “When we look at war coming back to our continent, when we look at people questioning the values for which we fought, when we look at those who want to change borders by force by rewriting history, let us stand with dignity and look at those who landed here. Let us have their courage,” he commented.

US President Joe Biden struck a similar note. In a speech to thousands of dignitaries and around 180 surviving veterans of the 1944 Normandy landings, Biden compared the current challenge of confronting Putin’s Russia with the threat Hitler’s Germany posed to an earlier generation. “We know the dark forces that these heroes fought eighty years ago. They never fade,” he said. “Aggression and greed, the desire to dominate and control, to change borders by force, these are perennial. The struggle between dictatorship and freedom is unending.”

Referring to Putin as a “tyrant bent on domination,” Biden used the anniversary to issue a rallying cry for Western unity in the fight against Russian aggression. This was accompanied by a stark warning of the grave consequences for the future of European security if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine. “We will not walk away,” Biden declared. “Because if we do, Ukraine will be subjugated and it will not end there.”

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The presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at anniversary events in France this week served as a timely reminder that eighty years since Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, Europe is once again at war. Zelenskyy received a very warm welcome, including hearty cheers from the French public and praise from Macron. In one particularly touching exchange, the Ukrainian leader was greeted by a US veteran who told him, “You’re a savior of the people!” “No,” replied Zelenskyy, “You saved Europe. You are our heroes.”

This week’s D-Day anniversary comes as the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters a crucial phase. Russian troops currently hold the battlefield initiative and continue to advance, with a recently launched offensive in the north further stretching Ukraine’s already depleted forces. Meanwhile, a large-scale Russian bombing campaign targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has succeeded in damaging or destroying around half the country’s available power-generating capacity, leaving millions of Ukrainians without access to electricity for extended periods.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Thursday’s gathering in Normandy marked the start of a particularly intensive period of Ukrainian diplomatic activity. A major Ukraine Recovery Conference will take place in Berlin on June 11-12. Zelenskyy is then expected to attend next week’s G7 summit in Italy, before traveling to neighboring Switzerland for a global peace summit that seeks to consolidate international backing for the Ukrainian leader’s peace plan.

Zelenskyy will be looking to use these meetings to underline the gravity of the current situation in Ukraine and push for more military support. Ukraine recently achieved a significant breakthrough in its quest to bring the war home to Russia, securing the green light from Kyiv’s international partners to use Western-supplied weapons for strikes on Russian territory. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military is still outnumbered and outgunned, while a lack of sufficient air defenses means the country’s critical infrastructure remains extremely vulnerable to Russian attack.

The Ukrainian President’s star billing at one of the most important World War II commemorations in recent years will have been particularly galling for Vladimir Putin to witness. Throughout his reign, Putin has sought to position the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of modern Russia’s national identity, transforming it into a quasi-religious cult complete with its own sacred symbols, dogmas, feast days, and the ruthless suppression of heresy.

A key element of this cult is the routine denigration of all opponents as “Nazis.” For years, Kremlin propaganda has portrayed independent Ukraine as a “Nazi state,” despite the inconvenient fact that support for Ukrainian far-right political parties is among the lowest in Europe and the country’s president is Jewish. Predictably, when Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he named “de-Nazification” as his key war aim.

Putin’s relentless attacks on “Nazi Ukraine” have helped strengthen pro-war sentiment inside Russia, but have largely failed to convince international audiences. Instead, as this week’s D-Day events illustrated, it is Putin himself who is widely seen as the greatest single threat to peace in Europe since the days of Adolf Hitler.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

From the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Cooperation Between the Gulf and Asia

Atlantic Council — Thu, 06 Jun 2024 04:30:00 +0000

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Key takeaways

Chinese Involvement in the Gulf
Regional Geopolitical Tensions
Indo-Pacific and Global Power Dynamics

Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

01:53 – Exploring Gulf-Asia Economic Ties.

04:07 – Gulf States’ Quest for Global Indispensability.

07:41 – Saudi Arabia’s Drive for Economic Influence.

11:48 – India’s Leadership in the Global South.

14:49 – Gulf States’ Strategic Engagements with China, India.

18:28 – India’s Naval Strategy and Evacuations.

23:02 – Gulf States’ Distanced Relationship with Asia.

27:11 – Regional Competition and Strategic Shifts.

31:34- India Expands Indo-Pacific Framework.

35:43 – Assessing Indo-Pacific’s Impact on Gulf Security.

40:43 – Geoeconomics and Alliance Dynamics.

43:43 – Gulf States Prefer US AI, Diverse Partnerships.

45:58 – Outro

In this episode

Hasan Alhasan
Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Dr Hasan Alhasan is a Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy at the IISS. He has over a decade of experience as a scholar and practitioner of foreign policy in the Gulf region. He specialises in the Arab Gulf states’ grand strategies, economic statecraft, and relations with the Asian powers. Prior to joining IISS in 2019, Hasan served on HRH the Crown Prince of Bahrain’s staff as a senior analyst on foreign policy and national security for five years. Hasan is regularly consulted by governments, private corporations, and the media on strategic affairs in the Gulf and Middle East region. His latest project at IISS, entitled Gulf Bailout Diplomacy: Aid as Economic Statecraft in a Turbulent Region, is a groundbreaking study on the politics of Gulf rescue lending in the MENA region. He is the co-editor of India and the Gulf: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Shifts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

Harsh V Pant and Hasan T Alhasan (eds), India and the Gulf: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Shifts (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
Hasan Alhasan, India’s Defence Cooperation with the GCC States under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in Sujan Chinoy and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (eds), India’s Approach to West Asia: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2024), pp. 30-55

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In this episode of China-MENA, titled “From the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Cooperation Between the Gulf and Asia,” host Jonathan Fulton engages in a compelling conversation with Dr. Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies to discuss the Gulf States’ views on and expanding ties with the Indo-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance for Gulf security, and the influence of the US, China, and India on Gulf alliances.

Join us to understand how Gulf-Asia cooperation addresses future challenges and opportunities, from the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

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The Gulf States perceive the varied and vibrant Indo-Pacific through the distinct lens of their own interests, seizing each opportunity uniquely

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Ukrainian lawmakers are debating banning Telegram. Here’s what to know.

Ivan Horodyskyy — Tue, 04 Jun 2024 21:41:30 +0000

As social media platforms grow, adapt, and proliferate, governments and the wider public are grappling with a basic question: How do companies guarantee—or compromise—privacy and security?

On April 24, US President Joe Biden signed a law banning TikTok in the United States—unless the Chinese company ByteDance sells its stake in TikTok in the next twelve months. The debate that led up to this law was conducted in public, where arguments were made about how to go about appropriately governing the US information space in a way that prevents foreign interference without jettisoning free expression and an interest in an open internet. The US debate will continue, while around the world many other countries grapple with similar tensions.

In that same spirit of transparency, it is worth looking at a bill proposed on March 25 in Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, that would ban Telegram in Ukraine unless the company implements certain changes to protect against national security threats.

In late April, Ihor Solovey, director of Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, explained in an interview why he believes that using Telegram is risky due to its lack of transparency and potential control by Russia. Using the message app of it for sending personal data and for official purposes, especially in the public sector and military zones, is not recommended, he said. Anonymity on the platform is often used to spread false information, he added, including by Russian special services, which negatively affects public order and security in Ukraine.

Ultimately, decisions to ban or regulate Telegram must weigh Ukraine’s national security against its democratic values.

Telegram is a messaging app that positions itself as one that guarantees maximum privacy for users. Thanks to the combination of different functions (personal messaging, group chats, public information channels), it can also be used as a fully-fledged media outlet, as a tool of political and social influence, and as a business application. According to a recent poll by the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM), Telegram is the most influential online platform in terms of where Ukrainians get their news, far more popular than Facebook, TikTok, or X. Its impact is growing in other countries as well, such as Iran and Brazil. Telegram users are attracted to its variety of options. It is a communication platform, a media source, and a business instrument, all with the promise of anonymity, multifunctionality, and the ability to register even without a mobile number.

According to the CEDEM poll, 71.3 percent of Ukrainians obtain news from Telegram—which is an especially important consideration following the full-scale Russian invasion and ongoing air raid sirens and other warnings. There are at least fifty Ukraine-based Telegram channels that each have more than five hundred thousand subscribers, thirteen of which have more than one million subscribers.

Given Telegram’s widespread popularity in Ukraine, the potential ban is reportedly unpopular among citizens, despite the support of deputies from four of the Rada’s political groups, including some deputies from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Servant of People party. These deputies fear, first, the possibility that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) will access information about Telegram users and, second, the proliferation of Russian propaganda—mirroring a few of the concerns regarding China’s role with TikTok in the United States.

For the information security concern, Ukrainian lawmakers’ fears relate to the personality of Pavel Durov. He was a founder of VKontakte (VK), the Russian analogue of Facebook and the largest social network in the post-Soviet space. Later, he sold or was forced to sell his assets to Mail.Ru Group, which was controlled by US-sanctioned businessman Alisher Usmanov, who the US Treasury Department found to be “close” with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Durov then emigrated to Dubai, where he founded Telegram.

Durov has always been surrounded by a halo of mystery. Even now, after he obtained citizenships from St. Kitts and Nevis, the United Arab Emirates, and France, there are persistent rumors that Telegram has connections with the FSB and that Russian intelligence services have permanent and effective access to Telegram’s servers and users’ data.

However, apart from these rumors about access to Telegram, the Ukrainian government has criticized the messaging app’s internal standards and previous decisions. For example, Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, the head of the Rada’s Freedom of Speech Committee, said earlier this year that Telegram’s administrators refuse to block channels that spread Russian propaganda or contact Ukrainian authorities. Oleksandr Melnychenko, spokesperson of Ukraine’s security service, accused Telegram of cooperation with the FSB and Roskomnadzor, a Russian censoring agency. Durov, in his recent interview with Tucker Carlson, strongly denied any claims about the messenger app’s connections with Russian authorities, asserting that these accusations are propagated and supported by competitors who are displeased with Telegram’s growing audience.

For the propaganda and disinformation concern, Telegram is no less popular in Russia, and the Kremlin uses Telegram to support its war in Ukraine and spread disinformation. This content is also available in Ukraine, which faces the prospect of a long war and the demoralization of Ukrainian society.

Telegram channels are also widely used for illicit activities: drug trading, pornography distribution, and blackmail. For example, the controller of one Telegram channel reportedly demanded as much as two hundred thousand dollars to stop a recent disinformation campaign. Although the Telegram administration blocks such activities, the number of channels, the ease of creating them, and the lack of consistent rules and practices around such blocks leave the problem unsolved.

It is not just a lack of oversight by Telegram that is a concern. At the end of April, Telegram “accidentally” blocked channels being used to help Ukrainian military and security services, only to unblock them later. This decision can be seen either as proof of connections with the Russian government or as a sign of influence in its relationship with the Ukrainian government. Furthermore, Telegram’s promise of confidentiality, anonymity, and free speech make it impossible for the Ukrainian government to enact effective countermeasures against such channels. Telegram’s administration is responsible for decisions on blocking channels and chats that share harmful or dangerous content and is guided by the internal standards it wrote and now interprets.

According to Durov, Telegram prioritizes users’ freedom to access uncensored information and opinions, even if biased, to enable them to make their own decisions. At the same time, he emphasizes that the Telegram administration bans accounts and bots that collect coordinates to target strikes or post direct personal information with calls to violence. Such a broad definition allows for wide discretion from administrators when making decisions on whether to block content. However, as with the potential TikTok ban in the United States, a Telegram ban would likely face criticism for impinging on the freedom of speech. Ukraine’s 2017 decision to block VK, for example, caused public outrage for this very reason. Blocking the main source of information during wartime and in conditions in which freedom of speech has already been restricted could cause accusations of censorship and lead to comparisons with Russia, which blocked Twitter and Instagram at the very beginning of the full-scale invasion.

At the heart of the Ukrainian resistance is its commitment and desire to be a democracy contrary to Russia. Mimicking Russia’s actions in controlling information flows undermines this democratic aspiration.

So, what does this mean for Ukraine’s approach to Telegram?

The draft bill proposed on March 25 would establish special requirements for Telegram. These include the creation of local representative offices in Ukraine, the introduction of certain legal requirements (such as restrictions on certain advertising and requirements to allow responses and refutations to inaccurate information), and the requirement to disclose ownership structures and funding sources upon the request of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting. Another potential regulation, supported by former Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Olesksiy Danilov, would require the official registration of Telegram channels as media, which would de-anonymize them.

These proposals have only a small chance of being supported and implemented, due in part to the lack of support from the current presidential office. In addition to the fear of a negative response by the public, the Zelenskyy administration may also have practical doubts: Telegram is reportedly widely used by the authorities both for official purposes and to share needed information via anonymous channels, though the Office of the President denies this.

The probability that Telegram will voluntarily meet the requirements of the Ukrainian government, by, for example, opening a representative office in Ukraine or changing the blocking rules is minimal. And this is supported by a business argument: Ukraine’s market share among Telegram’s nine hundred million users is only about 2.5 percent.

In the case of digital platforms, market interests are powerful motivations. TikTok’s CEO, Shou Zi Chew, gave testimony to the US Congress in March 2023, and Meta has paid huge fines in the European Union—recognizing the authorities and cooperating with them—in large part because of the fear of losing huge markets for their products.

The debate over Ukraine’s ban on Telegram underscores the growing global struggle to balance national security with free speech and open information in the social media age. The widespread use of Telegram and its critical role in disseminating information during the conflict with Russia make a potential ban a significant challenge for the Ukrainian government.

The Ukrainian government fears the effects of disinformation amid the war, but Telegram’s anonymity and multifunctionality have made it indispensable for many Ukrainians. The most likely legislative proposal aims to impose regulatory requirements on Telegram in an attempt to find a middle ground. However, practical, and political challenges, as well as Telegram’s minimal dependence on the Ukrainian market, make significant changes unlikely.

Ultimately, decisions to ban or regulate Telegram must weigh Ukraine’s national security against its democratic values. As Ukraine navigates its way through war and geopolitical tensions, its lawmakers must be careful in their approach to regulating digital platforms so as not to undermine confidence in the country’s postwar democratic future.

On the other hand, Telegram and other digital platforms should take a more grounded approach to protecting free speech as a value, not just a selling point. Global impact means global responsibility.

Ivan Horodyskyy is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and cofounder of the Dnistryanskyi Center for Politics and Law.

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Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 04 Jun 2024 14:01:50 +0000

Ukraine achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough last week, securing the green light from key allies for strikes inside Russia using Western weapons. The Russian reaction to this landmark news has bordered on the hysterical, with a host of Kremlin officials and propagandists denouncing the West and vowing terrible revenge.

Predictably, Vladimir Putin led the way, issuing yet more of the thinly-veiled nuclear threats that have become his trademark. Speaking in Tashkent, Putin warned European leaders of “serious consequences,” before reminding them of their own vulnerability. “They should keep in mind that theirs are small and densely populated countries, which is a factor to reckon with before they start talking about striking deep into Russian territory,” he commented.

Close Putin ally and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s response featured an even more explicit nuclear threat. Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said it would be a “fatal mistake” for Western leaders to believe Russia was not ready to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or individual NATO member states. “This is, alas, not an attempt at intimidation or a nuclear bluff,” he declared.

Russia’s use of nuclear blackmail is no longer particularly surprising, of course. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion, Putin has engaged in frequent bouts of nuclear saber-rattling as part of a broader Russian effort to establish so-called red lines and undermine Western support for Ukraine. Nevertheless, this latest example of nuclear bluster is worthy of closer attention as it inadvertently provides revealing insights into the political realities behind Putin’s lofty imperial rhetoric of conquest and annexation.

With his chilling references to “small and densely populated countries,” Putin clearly hoped to intimidate his opponents and signal that the use of Western weapons on Russian territory is a major red line for the Kremlin. But according to Russia’s own logic, this particular red line has already been crossed on hundreds of occasions. Since 2022, Ukraine has routinely used Western weapons throughout the occupied Ukrainian regions that Putin says are now part of Russia, without triggering any discernible escalation from Moscow. In Putin’s new Russian Empire, it would seem, some places are more Russian than others.

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Officially, at least, there is no ambiguity in Moscow over the status of the Ukrainian regions claimed by the Kremlin. According to the Russian Constitution, Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson provinces along with the Crimean peninsula are now all part of the Russian Federation. Russia proclaimed the “return” of Crimea in March 2014, just a few weeks after the lightning military takeover of the peninsula that marked the start of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. More recently, Putin announced the “annexation” of four more Ukrainian provinces in a lavish September 2022 Kremlin ceremony.

Technically speaking, the five Ukrainian provinces subject to unilateral Russian “annexation” should all now enjoy the same protections as the rest of Putin’s realm. In practice, however, it has long been apparent that Moscow has no intention of expanding its nuclear umbrella to cover these regions, or of even attempting to impose its red lines regarding the use of Western weapons.

The Battle of Kherson provides a particularly vivid demonstration of the credibility gap between Russian rhetoric and Russian reality. The only regional capital captured during the entire Russian invasion, Kherson was liberated in November 2022, less than two months after Putin had declared it to be “Russian forever.” Rather than reach for his nuclear button, Putin responded to this embarrassing setback by ordering his defeated troops to quietly withdraw across the Dnipro River.

The evolving Battle of Crimea is perhaps even more revealing. For over ten years, Putin has insisted the occupied Ukrainian peninsula is now part of Russia, and has rejected all attempts to discuss its status. During this period, the seizure of Crimea has emerged as arguably the most important single element in modern Russia’s national narrative; it has come to be seen as the greatest achievement of Putin’s entire reign, and is widely regarded as a symbol of the country’s return to the top table of international affairs. This official Russian reverence for Crimea initially persuaded many in the West to view the peninsula as off-limits, but failed to deter Ukraine.

Since the early months of the war, Ukraine has been attacking Russian forces in Crimea with every available weapon, including those provided by the country’s Western allies. Western-supplied missiles have played a central role in the Battle of Crimea, enabling Ukraine to methodically deplete Russian air defenses throughout the peninsula and sink numerous Russian warships. The most eye-catching attack of all came in September 2023, when Ukraine used Western cruise missiles to bomb and partially destroy the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. If Kherson was an embarrassment for Putin, this was a very personal humiliation. Crucially, it did not lead to World War III. Instead, Putin withdrew most of his remaining warships from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The obvious inconsistency in the Kremlin’s public position regarding attacks on Russian soil has a number of practical implications for the further conduct of the war. It highlights the flexibility of Russia’s red lines, and strengthens perceptions that Moscow is primarily seeking to exploit the West’s own fear of escalation rather than establish any genuine boundaries.

Clearly, no responsible Western leader can afford to completely disregard the threat of nuclear war. At the same time, it is increasingly apparent that Russia’s relentless nuclear saber-rattling is losing its potency. By engaging in regular nuclear threats that never lead to action, the Kremlin has weakened the entire concept of nuclear deterrence and left Russia looking toothless. Based on the experience of the past two years, it now seems safe to conclude that while carpet-bombing the Kremlin might force Putin into some kind of drastic response, targeted attacks on Russian military bases and firing positions across the border from Ukraine are highly unlikely to fuel any kind of major escalation.

The Kremlin’s obvious reluctance to treat “annexed” regions of Ukraine as fully Russian directly contradicts Moscow’s own efforts to portray the occupation of Ukrainian lands as irreversible. While Putin likes to compare himself to Peter the Great and boast of “returning historically Russian lands,” he is evidently in no hurry to grant his Ukrainian “conquests” the kind of unequivocal security commitments that are the ultimate marker of sovereignty. Indeed, after more than a decade, the hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens who have been shipped to occupied Crimea since 2014 will no doubt be wondering how much longer they must wait before the Kremlin finally considers them worthy of protection.

Far from being set in stone, Russia’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine are largely opportunist and will expand or contract based on the military situation. Putin and his colleagues often call on Ukraine to accept the “new territorial realities” created by the current front lines of the war, but their actions send an unmistakable signal that the future of the “annexed” Ukrainian regions is still very much up for debate. Meanwhile, the multiple retreats from “historically Russian land” conducted by Putin’s invading army since 2022 suggest the chances of a nuclear apocalypse have been wildly exaggerated. This should help Kyiv’s Western partners overcome their self-defeating fear of escalation, and encourage them to finally provide Ukraine with the tools, along with the free hand, to finish the job of defeating Russia.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:20:23 +0000

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If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius — Thu, 30 May 2024 21:01:22 +0000

In the coming weeks, the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, the G7 Summit in Italy, the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, and the jubilee NATO Summit in Washington DC will all offer opportunities for the international community to reinforce its support for Ukraine. These high-profile events should also serve as a chance to take stock. With no end in sight to Russia’s genocidal invasion, Kyiv’s Western partners must define the endgame of their support for Ukraine. Is it Ukrainian victory or merely Ukrainian survival?

Why does the West not have a coherent victory plan? How long can Ukraine be expected to sustain the current war effort if the country only receives sufficient military aid to survive? Is the latest US aid package enough to secure Ukrainian victory? Is Europe doing enough to enforce sanctions, confiscate Russian assets, and supply advanced weapons systems like Taurus missiles? These are just some of the key questions Ukraine’s partners should be asking themselves in the coming weeks.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Putin’s Russia poses a direct threat to the global security system and to a sustainable peace in Europe. The outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine will define the future security framework on the European continent for decades to come. If the West provides Ukraine with the support it needs to win the war, this victory will secure peace not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe. Russian defeat could also spark a political transformation inside Russia and help undermine the country’s aggressive imperial ambitions.

The consequences of Russian success in Ukraine would be equally far-reaching. If the West continues to demonstrate weakness in Ukraine and supports calls for some kind of ceasefire or negotiated settlement, Russia will claim an historic victory and will become even more internationally aggressive. This aggression will not be limited to Ukraine, and will be targeted against the whole Western world.

Nor will the Kremlin be acting alone. On the contrary, Russian victory over the West in Ukraine would embolden the Alliance of Autocracies that has emerged in recent years, bringing together Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. While further Russian aggression is likely to focus on Europe, Putin’s fellow autocrats will be encouraged to embrace their own expansionist agendas elsewhere.

This is why the international community needs to accept that only Ukrainian victory can open the door to a sustainable peace, both for Ukraine and the wider world. Any attempt to reach a compromise peace agreement with Putin would not only hand Russia victory and allow Moscow to continue occupying entire regions of Ukraine; it would also be a dangerous repetition of the 1938 Munich Conference, which had such tragic consequences for the entire international community. The British and French leaders who agreed to hand Hitler part of Czechoslovakia in Munich also hoped they were securing peace. Instead, they were setting the stage for World War II. Europe cannot afford to make the same mistake again.

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At present, the West appears to be split into two main camps over the issue of how to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One camp recognizes the importance of Ukrainian victory for European security, and sees Russian defeat as its clear goal. These countries are committed to supporting the Ukrainian war effort and refuse to rule out sending troops to defend Ukraine if necessary.

The other camp favors a negotiated settlement and typically frames this readiness to compromise with the Kremlin as a desire for peace. Such posturing is intellectually dishonest. After all, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. However, Ukrainians understand that peace cannot be secured by offering territorial concessions to the Putin regime that would abandon millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation. They know that accepting a ceasefire without victory would make it impossible to hold Russia accountable for war crimes.

Crucially, Ukrainians also recognize that unless Putin is defeated, he will inevitably go further. Encouraged by the impunity of a ceasefire agreement, Russia would use any pause in hostilities to rearm and prepare for the next phase of its war against Ukraine and the West. This would create dangers similar to the threat faced by the Allies during World War II, when Churchill and Roosevelt warned against a premature peace and instead declared the goal of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. Today’s Western leaders must now recognize that offering Putin a ceasefire will not bring about a lasting peace. Instead, it will pave the way for more war.

Future Western support for Ukraine must be built around a clear and unambiguous commitment to Ukrainian victory. This is currently missing. When Western leaders and policymakers gather in the coming weeks, the need to work toward a Ukrainian victory should be at the very top of the agenda. Meanwhile, Ukrainians must continue to explain the difference between a temporary ceasefire and a lasting peace. In 2023, Ukrainian civil society experts did their part by developing their own vision, which was outlined in the Sustainable Peace Manifesto, describing the importance of bringing Russia to justice and providing Ukraine with unambiguous security guarantees.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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After more than ten years of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, it is time for Kyiv’s partners to learn the lessons of this war and avoid falling into further Russian traps. When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, it did so under a veil of deniability using so-called “little green men,” or Russian soldiers without insignia. A decade later, Russia is now openly waging the largest European invasion since World War II, and is supported by an alliance of fellow tyrannies who share the Kremlin’s goal of destroying the rules-based international order. Russia is now attacking Ukraine with Iranian drones and North Korean missiles, while receiving military supplies and vital economic support from China. If the West is unable to counter this growing threat, it will forfeit its position at the heart of the international security architecture and be replaced by the rising authoritarian powers.

In 2014, Western leaders were naive enough to expect a diplomatic solution to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It should now be painfully obvious that such hopes were unrealistic. Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine engaged in more than 200 rounds of negotiations with Russia, but this failed to prevent the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Even while talks continued, Russia made its genocidal intentions clear with relentless propaganda denying the existence of the Ukrainian nation and dehumanizing Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric has since been implemented in practice by Putin’s invading army, with well-documented massacres in places like Bucha and Izium, mass abductions and forced deportations, and the eradication of all symbols of Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russian occupation. While the international community sees what is happening in Ukraine, most remain reluctant to accuse Russia of genocide as this would oblige them to act. But turning a blind eye cannot change the fact that we are witnessing a genocide in the center of twenty-first century Europe.

Everybody understands what is needed for Ukraine victory. They know how much Western military assistance is required, and exactly which weapons should be delivered. Everybody knows what sanctions, tribunals, and security agreements are necessary in order to establish a sustainable peace. At the same time, the leaders of the democratic world have yet to address why they have so far shied away from policies that could facilitate Ukrainian victory. The answer is very simple: Western leaders are still heavily influenced by the twin fears of a possible Russian escalation and a potential Russian collapse. In other words, they are unable to commit fully to Ukrainian victory because they are afraid of Russian defeat. This is now the greatest single obstacle to a sustainable peace in Europe.

Perhaps the best advice for Ukraine’s Western partners comes from Pope John Paul II, who said “be not afraid” as he led the fight for freedom and democracy in Central Europe during the 1980s. Europe must now overcome its fears once again if it is to safeguard the freedoms that define the continent. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved at the expense of justice. European security will remain elusive if Putin is allowed to gain from his aggression and consolidate his genocidal occupation of Ukrainian lands.

With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Ukraine’s partners must finally acknowledge that European security depends on Ukrainian victory. The sooner they develop and implement a strategy to achieve this victory, the more lives will be saved. Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. Andrius Kubilius is a member of the European Parliament, former Prime Minister of Lithuania, and chair of the United for Ukraine global parliamentary network.

The geopolitics of transatlantic data transfers have been unvarying for the past decade. European governments criticize the US National Security Agency (NSA) for exploiting personal data moving from Europe to the United States for commercial reasons. The US government responds, through a series of arrangements with the European Union, by providing assurances that NSA collection is not disproportionate, and that Europeans have legal avenues if they believe their data has been illegally used. Although the arrangements have not proven legally stable, on the whole they have sufficed to keep data flowing via subsea cables under the Atlantic Ocean.

Now the locus of national security concerns about international data transfers has shifted from Brussels to Washington. The Biden administration and the US Congress, in a series of bold measures, are moving aggressively to interrupt certain cross-border data flows, notably to China and Russia.

The geopolitics of international data flows remain largely unchanged in Europe, however. European data protection authorities have been mostly noncommittal about the prospect of Russian state surveillance collecting Europeans’ personal data. Decisions on whether to transfer European data to Russia and China remain in the hands of individual companies.

Will Washington’s new focus on data transfers to authoritarian states have an impact in Europe? Will Europe continue to pay more attention to the surveillance activities of its liberal democratic allies, especially the United States? Is there a prospect of Europe and the United States aligning on the national security risks of transfers to authoritarian countries?

Data transfer politics come to America

The US government long considered the movement of personal data across borders as primarily a matter of facilitating international trade.¹ US national security authorities’ surveillance of foreigners’ personal data in the course of commercial transfers was regarded as an entirely separate matter.

For example, the 2001 EU-US Safe Harbor Framework,² the first transatlantic data transfer agreement, simply allowed the United States to assert the primacy of national security over data protection requirements, without further discussion. Similarly, the 2020 US-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement³ and the US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement⁴ contain both free flow of data guarantees and traditional national security carve-outs from those obligations.

Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations of expansive US NSA surveillance in Europe put the Safe Harbor Framework’s national security derogation into the political spotlight. Privacy activist Max Schrems then challenged its legality under EU fundamental rights law, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled it unacceptable.⁵

The 2023 EU-US Data Privacy Framework⁶ (DPF) is the latest response to this jurisprudence. In it, the United States commits to hold national security electronic surveillance of EU-origin personal data to a more constrained standard, as the European Commission has noted.⁷ The United States’ defensive goal has been to reassure Europe that it conducts foreign surveillance in a fashion that can be reconciled with EU fundamental rights law.

Now, however, the US government has begun expressly integrating its own national security considerations into decisions on the foreign destinations to which US-origin personal data may flow. It is a major philosophical shift from the prior free data flows philosophy, in which national security limits played a theoretical and marginal role.

One notable development is a February 28, 2024, executive order, Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern.⁸ The EO empowers the Department of Justice (DOJ), in consultation with other relevant departments, to identify countries “of concern” and to prohibit or otherwise regulate bulk data transfers to them, based on a belief that these countries could be collecting such data for purposes of spying on or extorting Americans. A week later DOJ issued a proposed rule describing the envisaged regulatory regime, and proposing China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela as the countries “of concern.”⁹

The White House, in issuing the bulk data EO, was at pains to insist that it was limited in scope and not inconsistent with the historic US commitment to the free flow of data, because it applies only to certain categories of data and certain countries.¹⁰ Nonetheless, as has been observed by scholars Peter Swire and Samm Sacks, the EO and proposed rule are, for the United States, part of “a new chapter in how it regulates data flows” in that they would create an elaborate new national security regulatory regime applying to legal commercial data activity.¹¹

Hard on the heels of the bulk data EO came congressional passage in April of the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act, which the president signed into law.¹² It prohibits data brokers from selling or otherwise making available Americans’ sensitive information to four specified countries: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The new law has a significantly broader scope than the EO. It cuts off certain data transfers to any entity controlled by one of these adversary countries, apparently including corporate affiliates and subsidiaries. It extends to any sensitive data, not just data in bulk. It remains to be seen how the administration will address the overlaps between the new law and the EO.

Another part of the same omnibus legislation ordered the ban or forced sale of TikTok, the Chinese social media platform widely used in this country.¹³ Advocates of the law point to the government of China’s ability under its own national security law to demand that companies operating there turn over personal data, including, potentially, TikTok users’ data transferred from the United States. Critics have cast the measure as a targeted punishment of a particular company, done without public evidence being offered of national security damage. TikTok has challenged the law as a violation of the First Amendment.¹⁴

Finally, the data transfer restrictions in these measures are thematically similar to a January 29 proposed rule from the Commerce Department obliging cloud service providers to verify the identity of their customers, on whose behalf they transfer data.¹⁵ The rule would impose know your customer (KYC) requirements—similar to those that apply in the international banking context—for cloud sales to non-US customers, wherever located.

This extraordinary burst of legislative and executive action focused on the national security risks of certain types of data transfers from the United States to certain authoritarian states is indicative of how far and fast political attitudes have shifted in this country. But what of Europe, which faces similar national security data challenges from authoritarian states? Is it moving in a similar direction as the United States?

Data transfer politics in Europe

The EU, unlike the United States, has long had a systematic set of controls on personal data flows from EU territory abroad, articulated in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).¹⁶ The GDPR conditions transfers to a foreign jurisdiction on the “adequacy” of its data protection safeguards—or, as the CJEU has refined the concept, their “essential equivalence” to the GDPR regime.

The task of assessing foreign legal systems falls to the European Commission, the EU’s quasi-executive arm. Article 45 of the GDPR instructs it to consider, among other things, “the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation . . . including concerning . . . the access of public authorities to personal data.”

For much of the past decade, the central drama in the European Commission’s adequacy process has been whether the United States meets this standard. As previously noted, the CJEU invalidated first the Safe Harbor Framework,¹⁷ in 2015, and then the Privacy Shield Framework,¹⁸ in 2020. The DPF is the third try by the US government and the European Commission to address the CJEU’s fundamental rights concerns. Last year, the European Commission issued yet another adequacy decision that found the DPF adequate.¹⁹ The EU understandably has focused its energies on the United States, since vast amounts of Europeans’ personal data travels to cloud service providers’ data centers in the United States and, as Snowden revealed, offered an inviting target for the NSA.

Separately, the European Commission has gradually expanded the range of other countries benefiting from adequacy findings, conferring this status on Japan,²⁰ Korea,²¹ and the United Kingdom.²² However, the 2019 adequacy decision for the UK continues to be criticized in Brussels. On April 22, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament wrote to the UK House of Lords complaining about UK national security bulk data collection practices and the prospect of onward transfer of data from UK territory to jurisdictions not deemed adequate by the EU.²³ Next year, the European Commission will formally review the UK’s adequacy status.

This past January, the European Commission renewed the adequacy decisions for eleven jurisdictions which had long enjoyed them, including, notably, Israel.²⁴ On April 22, a coalition of civil society groups published an open letter to the European Commission questioning the renewal of Israel’s adequacy decision.²⁵ The letter expressed doubts about the rule of law in Israel itself, the specific activities of Israeli intelligence agencies in Gaza during the current hostilities there, and the surveillance powers exercised by those agencies more generally.

Also delicate is the continuing flow of personal data from the European Union to Russia and China. Although neither country has been—or is likely to be—accorded adequacy status, data nonetheless can continue to flow to their territories, as to other third countries, if accompanied by contractual data protection safeguards. The CJEU established in its Schrems jurisprudence that such standard contractual clauses (SCCs) must uphold the same fundamental rights standards as an adequacy decision. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) subsequently issued detailed guidance on the essential guarantees against national security surveillance that must be in place in order for personal data to be sent to a nonadequate jurisdiction.²⁶

In 2021, the EDPB received an outside expert report²⁷ on several foreign governments’ data access regimes. Its findings were clear. “Chinese law legitimises broad and unrestricted access to personal data by the government,” it concluded. Similarly, with respect to Russia, “The right to privacy is strongly limited when interests of national security are at stake.” The board did not take any further steps to follow up on the report, however.

Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe and ceased to be a party to that body’s European Convention on Human Rights.²⁸ The European Data Protection Board issued a statement confirming that data transfers to Russia pursuant to standard contract clauses remained possible, but stressed that safeguards to guard against Russian law enforcement or national security access to data were vital.²⁹

Over two thousand multinational companies continue to do business in Russia, despite the Ukraine war, although a smaller number have shut down, according to a Kyiv academic research institute.³⁰ Data flows between Europe and Russia thus remain substantial, if less than previously. Companies engaged in commerce in Russia also are subject to requirements that data on Russian persons be localized in that country.³¹ Nonetheless, data flows from Europe to Russia are not subject to categorical exclusions, unlike the new US approach.

The sole reported case of a European data protection authority questioning data flows to Russia involves Yango, a taxi-booking mobile app developed by Yandex, a Russian internet search and information technology company. Yango’s European services are based in the Netherlands and are available in other countries including Finland and Norway. In August 2023, Finland’s data protection authority (DPA) issued an interim decision to suspend use of Yango in its territory because Russia had just adopted a decree giving its state security service (FSB) unrestricted access to commercial taxi databases.³²

The interim suspension decision was short-lived. A month later, the Finnish authority, acting in concert with Norwegian and Dutch counterparts, lifted it, on the basis of a clarification that the Russian decree in fact did not apply to use of the Yango app in Finland.³³ The Finnish authority further announced that the Dutch authority, in coordination with it and Norway, would issue a final decision in the matter. The Dutch investigation reportedly remains open, but it does not appear to be a high priority matter.

The day after lifting the Yango suspension, the Finnish data protection authority rushed out yet another press release advising that its decision “does not address the legality of data transfers to Russia,” or “mean that Yango data transfers to Russia would be in compliance with the GDPR or that Russia has an adequate level of data protection.”³⁴

One can interpret this final Finnish statement as at least indirectly acknowledging that continued commercial data transfers from an EU jurisdiction to Russia may raise rule of law questions bigger than a single decree allowing its primary security agency, known as the FSB, to access certain taxi databases. Otherwise, the Finnish decision could be criticized for ignoring the forest for the birch trees.

Equally striking is the limited extent of DPA attention to data transfers between EU countries and China. China maintains an extensive national security surveillance regime, and lately has implemented a series of legal measures that can limit outbound data transfers for national security reasons.³⁵ In 2023, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner³⁶ imposed a substantial fine on TikTok for violating the GDPR with respect to children’s privacy, following a decision by the EDPB.³⁷ This inquiry did not examine the question of whether Chinese government surveillance authorities had access to European users’ data, however.

Personal data actively flows between Europe and China in the commercial context, pursuant to SCCs. China reportedly may issue additional guidance to companies on how to respond to requests for data from foreign law enforcement authorities. To date there is no public evidence of European DPAs questioning companies about their safeguard measures for transfers to China.

Indeed, signs recently have emerged from China of greater openness to transfers abroad of data generated in the automotive sector, including from connected cars. Data from connected cars is a mix of nonpersonal and personal data. China recently approved Tesla’s data security safeguards, enabling the company’s previously localized data to leave the country.³⁸ In addition, the government of Germany is trying to ease the passage of data to and from China on behalf of German carmakers. On April 16, several German government ministers, part of a delegation visiting China led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, issued a joint political statement with Chinese counterparts promising “concrete progress on the topic of reciprocal data transfer—and this in respect of national and EU data law,” with data from connected cars and automated driving in mind.³⁹

Conclusions

The United States and the European Union are, in some respects, converging in their international data transfer laws and policies. In Washington, free data transfers are no longer sacrosanct. In Europe, they never have been. Viewed from Brussels, it appears that the United States is, finally, joining the EU by creating a formal international data transfers regime—albeit constructed in a piecemeal manner and focused on particular countries, rather than through a comprehensive and general data privacy law.

Yet the rationales for limiting data transfers vary considerably from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Washington now focuses on the national security dangers to US citizens and to the US government from certain categories of personal data moving to the territories of “foreign adversaries.” Brussels instead applies more abstract criteria relating to foreign governments’ commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and especially their access to personal data.

A second important difference is that the United States has effectively created a blacklist of countries to which certain categories of data should not flow, whereas the EU’s adequacy process serves as a means of “white listing” countries with comparable data protection frameworks to its own. Concretely, this structural difference means that the United States concentrates on prohibiting certain data transfers to China and Russia, while the EU institutionally has withheld judgment about transfers to those authoritarian jurisdictions. Critics of the EU’s adequacy practice instead have tended to concentrate on the perceived risks of data transfers to liberal democracies with active foreign surveillance establishments: Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The transatlantic—as well as global—geopolitics of data transfers are in flux. The sudden US shift to viewing certain transfers through a national security lens is unlikely to be strictly mirrored in Europe. In light of the emerging differences in approach, the United States and European governments should consider incorporating the topic of international data transfers into existing political-level conversations. Although data transfer topics have thus far not figured into the formal work of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC),⁴⁰ which has met six times since 2022 including most recently in April,⁴¹ there is no evident reason why that could not change. If the TTC resumes activity after the US elections, it could become a useful bilateral forum for candid discussion of perceived national security risks in data flows.

Utilizing a broader grouping, such as the data protection and privacy authorities of the Group of Seven (G7), which as a group has been increasingly active in the last few years,⁴² also could be considered. The deliberations of this G7 group already have touched generally on the matter of government access, and they could readily expand to how its democratic members assess risks from authoritarians in particular. Eventually, such discussions could be expanded beyond the G7 frame into broader multilateral fora. The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Declaration on Government Access⁴³ is a good building block.

The days when international data transfers were a topic safely left to privacy lawyers are long gone. It’s time for Washington and Brussels to acknowledge that the geopolitics of data flows has moved from the esoteric to the mainstream, and to grapple with the consequences.

About the author

Fellow

Kenneth Propp

Europe Center

European Union Digital Policy

Generational AI: Digital inclusion for aging populations

Caroline Thompson — Wed, 29 May 2024 14:00:00 +0000

As artificial intelligence (AI) applications become ubiquitous in products and services, it is more important than ever to ensure that they are appropriately aligned for positive use and avoid exacerbating social exclusions for an aging population. Based on discussions with leaders in equity, AI, and aging, and additional research, Generational AI: Digital inclusion for aging populations outlines the unique considerations for older adults within the AI lifecycle, barriers to digital inclusion that older adults experience regarding AI and suggested near- and long-term solutions to advance digital inclusion and mitigate biases against older adults, while supporting practical AI innovation, AI policy, and healthy aging.

Age and its intersection with other dimensions of access—including income, race, language, and gender—dramatically influence an individual’s ability to fully access, benefit from, and contribute to the digital world. With current trends, the population of adults aged sixty and older is expected to surpass 1.4 billion by 2030. Guidance and policies that include and engage older adults in AI development and deployment can foster broader inclusion, as the demographic cuts across various protected statuses and minority identities. Empowering the inclusion of older adults supports them in acting as agents of enhancing more comprehensive inclusion across AI. This change is necessary to ensure responsible and equitable AI for all, especially as the global population rapidly ages.

Digital inclusion for aging populations is possible, with various solutions across the AI lifecycle. Generational AI: Digital inclusion for aging populations identifies the varied use cases of artificial intelligence and older adults, breaking down the main considerations within the design, development, and deployment of AI to support healthy aging and advance equitable AI. These considerations reveal four significant barriers to the digital inclusion of older adults in AI, including:

incomplete or biased data on older adults;
lack of inclusion of older adults in AI design, development, and post-deployment feedback;
limited digital literacy and algorithmic awareness of older adults; and
adaptive monitoring and evaluation.

To address each gap, priorities suggested for the multistakeholder field of AI development, deployment, and governance are:

forging data-inclusion and transparency standards;
empowering user education and literacy for older adults, while ensuring proportional and appropriate modes of consent; and
establishing a standard of care through monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessments.

Interoperability, connectivity, literacy, transparency, and inclusion emerge as key themes to help identify the existing gaps within the intersection of AI and aging. These themes are visible across recent policy efforts, and can be made even more impactful by recognizing their intersection with specific communities, like older adults. The recent developments in guidelines, frameworks, and agreements signify a positive shift toward enabling digital inclusion for older populations. These developments are crucial to safeguard against biases inherent in AI-enabled technologies, biases that can significantly impact older adults throughout the various stages of the AI lifecycle. The path forward demands not just the inclusion of older adults in AI, but also their empowerment. As AI products and services become intertwined with daily life, advocating for the rights and needs of the aging population becomes more critical. This approach will pave the way for an equitable landscape where older citizens are not merely passive recipients, but active contributors and beneficiaries of the AI revolution.

About the author

Staff

Caroline Thompson

Assistant Director

GeoTech Center

Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity

‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 May 2024 21:04:23 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, most of Ukraine’s international allies have insisted that any weapons they provide be used exclusively within Ukrainian territory. These restrictions were initially imposed to prevent a broadening of the conflict, but a growing chorus of critics now say this approach is preventing Ukraine from defending itself and risks enabling Russian victory.

The debate over the use of Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia has rumbled on throughout the war, and has recently been thrust to the top of the agenda by the Russian army’s latest offensive. In early May, Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s northern border and began advancing toward the country’s second city, Kharkiv. This attack was no surprise; on the contrary, Ukrainian military officials had been monitoring preparations on the other side of the border for weeks, but were powerless to act.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive has highlighted the military absurdity of current restrictions on the use of the Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. Russian commanders are well aware of Ukraine’s inability to strike back, and are actively exploiting the border zone as a safe haven to concentrate forces and launch bombardments. Understandably, this is fueling calls among Ukraine’s allies for a major rethink.

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The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the latest international organization to voice its support for an end to restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. Lawmakers from all 32 NATO states adopted a declaration on May 27 urging alliance members to allow strikes on military targets inside Russia. “Ukraine can only defend itself if it can attack Russia’s supply lines and Russian bases of operation. It is time to recognize this reality and let Ukraine do what it must,” stated NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Michal Szczerba.

This declaration echoed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenburg’s May 24 interview with Britain’s The Economist calling on NATO allies to end their prohibition on the use of Western weapons against Russian targets. “The time has come for allies to consider whether they should lift some of the restrictions they have put on the use of weapons they have donated to Ukraine,” commented Stoltenberg. “Especially now when a lot of the fighting is going on in Kharkiv, close to the border, to deny Ukraine the possibility of using these weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory makes it very hard for them to defend themselves.”

A number of senior Western officials have also recently backed an end to restrictions. During an early May visit to Kyiv, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron announced that Ukraine had the “right” to use British-supplied weapons for attacks inside Russia. Speaking in Germany on May 27, French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Ukraine was being attacked from Russia. “We must allow them to take out the military sites the missiles are fired from,” he commented. The following day, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said the present ban was forcing Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back” and argued that lifting restrictions “should not be subject to debate.”

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Not everyone is convinced. For now, the Biden administration remains unwilling to revise its position limiting the use of US weapons. Meanwhile, a number of European countries including Germany and Italy have also called for caution. This reluctance to escalate the existing confrontation with Russia was on display in Brussels on Tuesday, when Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced plans to provide Ukraine with thirty F-16 fighter jets, but informed visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the planes were not to be used inside Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to mounting talk of an end to Western restrictions on attacks inside Russia by warning of “serious consequences” and hinting at a possible nuclear response. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons,” he commented in Tashkent this week. “Do they want a global conflict?”

Putin’s nuclear threats are nothing new, of course. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, he has made numerous thinly-veiled references to nuclear escalation as part of efforts to intimidate the West and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. These nuclear blackmail tactics have proved highly effective, encouraging Western leaders to embrace policies of escalation management that have significantly undermined the international response to Russia’s invasion.

The Kremlin dictator is now clearly hoping the same approach can deter the US and other key allies from giving Ukraine the green light to strike Russia using Western weapons. If he succeeds in this latest act of nuclear intimidation, it will bring Russian victory in Ukraine closer and set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As Russia has escalated its air war against Kharkiv since the beginning of 2024, the publishing industry has been repeatedly hit. In a single March attack, Russian missiles destroyed another of Kharkiv’s largest print facilities and a publishing house, killing five. Mykhailo Khrypak, who serves as commercial director at one of Ukraine’s biggest printing plants, says Russia is systematically attempting to destroy the country’s book publishing industry, and warns that production capacity will be difficult to restore.

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With Kharkiv desperately short of air defenses and located dangerously close to advancing Russian troops, the city’s remaining publishers are taking steps to ensure the safety of staff. Oleksandr Popovych, director of the Unisoft printing plant, has established a bomb shelter for his more than three hundred employees. Despite the recent escalation in attacks, he says he currently has no plans to relocate, pointing to the extreme difficulty of moving bulky printing equipment and relocating his highly skilled staff along with their families.

Ukraine’s domestic publishing industry has flourished over the past decade following the onset of Russian military aggression against the country in 2014. With the Kremlin openly weaponizing the Russian language to justify the invasion of Ukraine, demand for Ukrainian-language literature has risen to unprecedented levels. A new generation of Ukrainian authors has emerged, becoming part of a broader cultural renaissance that has also had a profound impact on the country’s music, fashion, and art scenes.

This trend has not proved popular in Russia, to say the least. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has made no secret of the fact that he bitterly opposes the consolidation of an independent Ukrainian national identity, which he views as a direct threat to Russia’s own imperial identity.

Putin is notorious for insisting Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). He published an entire essay in July 2021 denying Ukraine’s right to an independent existence. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” More recently, he declared that “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of the world.” According to Putin, occupied regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian lands.”

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Many believe Russia’s recent attacks on the Ukrainian book publishing industry are part of a coordinated Kremlin campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity that qualifies as genocide. Responding to the latest bombing, Yale historian Timothy Snyder said the targeted missile strikes were “an example of a larger genocidal policy.”

The evidence of Russia’s intention to extinguish Ukrainian national identity is overwhelming. In virtually every area of Ukraine occupied by Russia since February 2022, strikingly similar reports have emerged of efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian nationality. The Ukrainian language has been outlawed in schools and public spaces, with all symbols of Ukrainian statehood dismantled and removed.

Meanwhile, Russian occupation forces work with local collaborators to detain community leaders and anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian, including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, military veterans, and cultural figures. Thousands of people detained in this manner are unaccounted for. Those who remain are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship and threatened with the loss of access to essential services such as healthcare.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Kremlin is going to great lengths to indoctrinate Ukrainian children and rob them of their Ukrainian heritage. Large numbers of Russian teachers have been brought to occupied regions to manage the indoctrination process in Ukrainian schools, while tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and sent to reeducation camps. This is a textbook act of genocide, according to the UN’s own 1948 Genocide Convention.

The actions of Putin’s army in Ukraine are very much in line with Russian imperial tradition. For centuries, generation after generation of Russian rulers sought to suppress Ukraine’s statehood aspirations and prevent the emergence of a separate Ukrainian nation. This insistence that Ukrainians be made to accept an imperial Russian identity was perhaps best expressed in a notorious mid-nineteenth century tsarist decree stating that the Ukrainian language “never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

Kharkiv’s Slovo Building is a particularly striking symbol of these efforts to eradicate Ukrainian culture. Designed and constructed in the 1920s to host prominent Ukrainian writers, it was home to many of the country’s leading authors and poets who were later killed by the Soviet authorities. Today, they are known as the “Executed Renaissance.”

The efforts of successive Russian tsars and Soviet commissars failed to extinguish the Ukrainian desire for a country and an identity of their own. Putin’s own war on Ukrainian national identity is now proving similarly counter-productive. From poetry to pop music, contemporary Ukrainian culture is experiencing a golden age amid the horror and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Indeed, as news of Russia’s recent air strikes spread, it was no surprise to see various fundraising initiatives quickly emerge in support of the country’s beleaguered publishing industry. Putin may be able to burn Ukrainian books and bomb Ukraine’s printing presses, but his imperial crusade to erase Ukrainian identity is destined to fail.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

With the 2024 Mexican election looming, here are two major recommendations for the next president

Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:00 +0000

Online Event Thu, May 23, 2024 • 2:30 pm ET

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Foreword

Countries representing half the world’s population are voting in 2024. On June 2, just over five months before Election Day in the United States, Mexican voters will set a historic milestone with the election of the country’s first female president. Over the course of her six-year term, Mexico’s new president will face enormous challenges—internally and in the country’s relationship with the United States. But, like never before, there is also a unique opportunity to strengthen the commercial and economic ties that bind the two countries and reimagine how our shared border could better serve our shared interests.

Although the United States and Mexico have long been economically intertwined, in 2023, Mexico became the United States’ most important trading partner. Now more than ever, with great geopolitical headwinds, the commercial ties that bind our two countries will be increasingly critical to advancing US economic interests globally. Here, greater border efficiency will yield economic gains alongside improvements in our shared security.

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, in partnership with internal and external colleagues and partners, sought to envision the future of two key aspects of the US-Mexico relationship: commercial flows and investment. With extensive feedback and numerous consultations with border stakeholders, including business owners, truck drivers, port operators, civilians, and local and federal elected officials, we sought out fresh perspectives and actionable recommendations. Our goal with this report is to spark dialogue among policymakers, business leaders, and civil society in both countries on the urgent need to address the immediate challenges of border efficiency and investment attraction over the next Mexican president’s term while paving the way for a more prosperous and secure future in our countries.

The Rio Grande and its surrounding towns are more than a physical barrier separating the United States and Mexico. Rather, they are a vibrant artery of commerce, migration, and cultural exchange. Livelihoods depend on our border, but inefficiencies prevent us from maximizing the possible economic opportunities and achieving the necessary security gains. The pages that follow build on previous center findings and emphasize the need for a nuanced approach to foreign investment, infrastructure development, and security measures that prioritize efficiency and our national interests.

This publication also seeks to bring the human dimension to the forefront. Public policy, after all, should reflect how to improve everyday lives. We consolidate the stories of real people affected by the US-Mexico border daily. The combined stories we have gathered over the last two years remind us of the impact of policy decisions. That reminder is particularly poignant with the 2024 elections on both sides of the border. Indeed, we stand on the cusp of a new chapter in our shared history.

This report is a call to action for visionary leadership and bold, pragmatic solutions to the complex issues facing the United States and Mexico. We urge policymakers to embrace policies and strategies that address immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for both an even more inclusive and prosperous future. Let’s seize this unique moment in time.

Jason Marczak
Vice President and Senior Director
Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

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Mexico’s path forward: A conversation with Ildefonso Guajardo

Ildefonso Guajardo discusses Xóchitl Gálvez’s view on a more efficient US-Mexico border and increased opportunities of economic investment.

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Mexico’s path forward: A conversation with Diana Alarcón

Diana Alarcón discusses Claudia Sheinbaum’s view on a more efficient US-Mexico border and increased opportunities of economic investment.

Economy & Business Elections Inclusive Growth Latin America

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President Zelenskyy’s term is over but he’s still a legitimate wartime leader

Elena Davlikanova — Thu, 23 May 2024 08:43:10 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s five-year term in office ended on May 20, but he will remain in his post until security conditions allow for elections to be held. Predictably, the Kremlin is already exploiting this technicality to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy, but Russia’s claims ignore the many obvious obstacles to holding a credible democratic vote in wartime Ukraine.

In the years following the start of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian authorities were able to conduct multiple presidential and parliamentary elections that were consistently rated as free and fair by international democracy watchdogs. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, this is no longer possible.

The key issue is security. In order for any election to take place in Ukraine, the authorities must be able to ensure the safety of millions of voters and thousands of election officials at polling stations and election commissions across the country. That is clearly out of the question at present, particularly in light of Russia’s record for repeatedly targeting civilians. This also rules out the presence of international election observers.

It is even more difficult to imagine how the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men and women currently serving in the armed forces could participate in a wartime ballot, both as voters and as candidates. Russia would certainly view any gatherings of voting soldiers as priority targets. “It would be unfair if those defending our land were denied the opportunity to vote,” commented President Zelenskyy in March.

Security concerns are also one of the key factors that make it impossible to stage anything resembling a normal election campaign. With election rallies and public meetings of any kind at high risk of being bombed by Russia, the campaign would largely have to take place online. This would fall well short of Ukraine’s established democratic standards, while also creating an inviting environment for Russian interference.

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It is hard to see how Ukraine could hope to overcome the huge administrative challenges created by the displacement of millions of Ukrainian citizens following the Russian invasion. There are currently believed to be approximately six million internally displaced people in Ukraine. Enabling them to vote would require a huge effort to update voter registers. This would likely raise all manner of additional questions regarding issues such as official and temporary addresses.

Meanwhile, at least five million Ukrainians are currently residing outside Ukraine as refugees, half of whom are eligible to vote. Existing voter registration procedures for Ukrainians living abroad are not designed to accommodate such large numbers, while Ukraine’s embassies and consulates would be unable to cope with so many voters. Without the participation of Ukrainian refugees, any wartime election would fail to meet basic democratic standards.

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Recent research indicates that Ukrainian society recognizes the impracticality of wartime elections and is broadly supportive of the government’s decision to postpone any national votes until the security situation improves. A February 2024 poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the International Republican Institute found that 67 percent of Ukrainians opposed holding presidential elections amid Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There is also a consensus among Ukraine’s rival political parties that elections should wait until after the war. In November 2023, all parliamentary factions endorsed a memorandum backing the postponement of presidential and parliamentary votes until the end of hostilities. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society agrees, with more than 100 organizations releasing a joint statement in September 2023 rejecting the idea of wartime elections.

While there is virtually no indication of any appetite for wartime elections inside Ukraine itself, Russia and its allies are expected to continue pushing the notion of Zelenskyy’s alleged illegitimacy in the coming months. Indeed, some of the most prominent Kremlin-friendly figures in Congress have already begun promoting this narrative as part of ongoing efforts to argue against further US support for Ukraine.

Ukraine is not the first country to delay elections due to wartime conditions, of course. For example, During World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill repeatedly postponed the country’s scheduled general election, but nobody accused him of undermining the democratic legitimacy of the British parliament.

Ukrainians have impeccable democratic instincts, having staged two separate pro-democracy revolutions in the past twenty years. Indeed, the current war is in part a struggle to defend the country’s democratic identity against Putin’s authoritarian imperialism. At the same time, Ukrainians are sufficiently sensible to understand that the idea of holding elections amid the largest European invasion since World War II is absurd.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

Don’t let the US become the only country to ban CBDCs

Josh Lipsky, Ananya Kumar — Tue, 21 May 2024 20:55:42 +0000

This week, as part of a trifecta of digital assets legislation, the US House of Representatives is set to take up HR 5403, also known as the “CBDC Anti-Surveillance State Act.” While the bill has received far less attention than the cryptocurrency regulation efforts being moved alongside it, its passage could do significant damage to the future of the dollar and curb innovation across both the public and private sector.

Central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, are a digital form of a country’s fiat currency—like an electronic version of cash. The difference between a CBDC and the money one uses on, for example, the payment service Venmo or the Bank of America app is that a CBDC is a liability of a country’s central bank, not a commercial bank.

Over the past five years, most central banks in the world have started exploring the possibility of issuing a CBDC. The reasons vary from country to country. For example, in some small island nations, such as the Bahamas, improving financial inclusion because of limited access to banks and vulnerability to natural disasters is a major motivation. In other countries, such as the United Kingdom, there is a push to “future-proof” money as citizens use less paper cash. While the reasons might vary based on the unique requirements of each country, the trend line is clear. According to Atlantic Council research, as of March 2024, there is a new record high of 134 countries exploring a CBDC, with thirty-eight ongoing CBDC pilot projects, including ones in Europe and Japan.

The United States trails all of its Group of Seven (G7) peers when it comes to researching and developing a CBDC. Outside the G7, the gap is even wider. Eleven Group of Twenty (G20) countries are in the pilot stage, including Brazil, India, Australia, South Korea, and Turkey. China, too, is on the list and already has 250 million users.

It would be a self-defeating move in the race for the future of money.

In the absence of US-led models and regulatory roadmaps, there is a growing risk of a fragmented payment system emerging in which different models proliferate and make the international financial architecture more expensive and less efficient. This is the exact opposite of what banks are trying to achieve with these new technologies.

Critics of CBDCs rightly raise concerns about citizens’ privacy. If the Federal Reserve issues a digital form of cash, couldn’t the government then “surveil” the population and see how citizens spend their money? The solution, however, is not to remove the United States from the playing field, which would allow countries such as China, which will not prioritize privacy, to set standards for the rest of the world. Instead, the United States should work with partners and allies to develop digital assets with democratic values—ones that protect privacy, ensure cybersecurity, and foster a healthier global financial system.

In fact, if this bill ever became law, the United States would be the only country in the world to have banned CBDCs. It would be a self-defeating move in the race for the future of money. It would undercut the national security role of the dollar as the decision would only accelerate other countries’ development of alternative payment systems that look to bypass the dollar in cross-border transactions. This would make US sanctions less effective.

It is one thing to decide not to issue a CBDC—and several countries are debating that precise issue right now. But it is an unnecessary and harmful step to preemptively ban the Federal Reserve from even exploring the idea.

In many ways, the bill before the House is a solution in search of a problem. Over the past year, the Federal Reserve has been crystal clear that it would not proceed with a CBDC without congressional approval. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell repeated this stance in March in testimony to Congress. This gives both the House and the Senate ample opportunity to voice their legitimate concerns if and when the time comes to debate a US CBDC. But even that point is a long way off. The Federal Reserve is only researching a retail CBDC—meaning one used by the general public for commercial and peer-to-peer transactions—at this point, and as the experience of other countries shows, these projects can take years to turn into actual prototypes.

The bill does create real risks for the future of the dollar, however. Because the bill is so broadly worded, it could potentially ban a range of the Federal Reserve’s existing functions and its work with commercial banks on faster settlement of deposits, as research by the Congressional Budget Office shows. Such sweeping language could impact a range of ongoing projects between the Federal Reserve, major US banks, and even US allies overseas. In fact, the New York Federal Reserve is currently working with the private sector and a number of countries, including Singapore, Germany, and France, on developing faster ways to exchange money between commercial banks across borders.

It is very likely that several countries will look at the House bill and conclude that it’s not worth their time, energy, and money to engage with a partner that may, in the near future, not be able to see a project to its conclusion. Even if the Senate never takes up the legislation, a signal will have been sent. With this single vote, the House could create a chilling effect that will undercut US influence in being able to set critical standards around this emerging technology.

Financial innovation in the United States is and always should be a collaboration between the public and private sector. The Federal Reserve should be allowed to continue its exploration and work with US commercial banks and countries around the world to build safe global standards and faster payments. To stop this research in its tracks and make the United States the one country in the world to ban a CBDC would be a disservice to innovation and jeopardize US leadership in the global economy.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He previously worked at the International Monetary Fund and US State Department.

Ananya Kumar is the associate director for digital currencies at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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Torres coauthored for CSIS about Chinese hypersonic missiles in South American space ground control sites

gmatchett — Tue, 21 May 2024 15:01:13 +0000

On May 21, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Guido Torres coauthored an article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies titled “Space, Speed, and Sovereignty: Hypersonic Tensions in the Southern Hemisphere.” The piece underscores that Chinese hypersonic missile connection to ground control sites in South America poses a threat for the United States and southern hemisphere. Combatting the risks with these dual-use facilities and the threats posed by hypersonic weapons requires stronger bilateral and regional cooperation and understanding the vulnerabilities of space-enabling infrastructure.

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Guido Torres

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Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

Maria Avdeeva — Thu, 16 May 2024 11:03:17 +0000

Residents of Kharkiv have been monitoring reports with increasing urgency for the past five days as a new Russian offensive edges closer to the city. The stresses of war are nothing new to the Kharkiv population, which has been under daily bombardment since the start of the current year. Nevertheless, the opening of a new front less than half an hour’s drive from the city’s northern suburbs has raised the stakes dramatically.

Since the Russian offensive began last Friday, harrowing footage of burning villages and fleeing civilians has flooded social media, adding to the sense of mounting danger. Evacuation efforts are still underway in the border region, with around eight thousand people so far brought from nearby communities to Kharkiv.

So far, Russian troops have made modest progress, advancing up to eight kilometers into Ukraine and capturing a number of Ukrainian villages. While the incursion is currently regarded as too small in scale to threaten Kharkiv itself, the reappearance of Russian soldiers in the region for the first time since 2022 has sparked considerable alarm and dismay.

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Russia’s new offensive did not come as a complete surprise, of course. On the contrary, the build-up of Russian troops across the border had been common knowledge for weeks. Kharkiv Regional Council member and political sciences professor Halyna Kuts says she has been preparing for some time, and has a bag of emergency items packed and ready.

Kuts is one of many people in Kharkiv to express anger at restrictions preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Due to fears of possible Russian retaliation, most of Kyiv’s partners insist the military aid they supply only be used within Ukraine’s borders. These restrictions prevented Ukraine from attacking concentrations of Russian troops as they prepared for the current offensive. “We could have destroyed them, but we were not allowed to,” says Kuts.

With Russian troops now gradually moving toward the city, Kuts believes the only option is to “dig in” and prepare to defend Kharkiv. “This is no longer a center of culture and science; this is a military fortress. Everyone should be carrying a gas mask, bandages, and water with them at all times,” she says.

In recent days, it has become much rarer to encounter children on the streets of the city. Some families have now left Kharkiv due to the deteriorating security situation, heading west for the relative safety of Poltava, Kyiv, or beyond. Youngsters who remain are obliged to attend classes underground or online.

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Olha Kashyrina, the co-founder of a Kharkiv publishing house specializing in children’s books, has spent recent evenings watching the glow of artillery fire on the horizon as fighting edges closer and closer to her home in Kharkiv’s Saltivka residential district. She estimates that there is now less than twenty kilometers separating her from the Russian army. For the time being, Kashyrina continues working in her publishing business and volunteering to help evacuees find temporary accommodation. However, if Russian troops advance further and the city comes within artillery range, she plans to leave.

Others insist they will not leave Kharkiv under any circumstances. Kashyrina’s publishing house colleague Svitlana Feldman has spent recent days stockpiling power banks, generators, and headlights for employees. “Adaptability is the key skill now,” she explains. One of the most dangerous aspects of daily life in Kharkiv is commuting to the office, so the company now encourages working from home.

Some Kharkiv residents have already fled from the Russian invasion once and do not intend to do so again. Liudmila, who came to Kharkiv from Donetsk when it was first occupied by Russia ten years ago, says she will not evacuate and is instead placing her faith in the Ukrainian army to defend the city, much as it did in 2022. This is a common refrain in today’s Kharkiv. While almost everyone is watching anxiously for signs of an escalation in the current offensive, there is also a mood of defiance and plenty of confidence in the city’s ability to defend itself.

Defiance can be expressed in different ways. For Halyna Kuts, this means proceeding with Kharkiv’s annual Vyshyvanka Day parade on May 16 in one of the city’s underground metro stations. This colorful annual event, which features people sporting Ukraine’s traditional embroidered shirts, is widely seen as a celebration of Ukrainian patriotism and national identity. With Russian troops advancing toward the city, Kuts says it is now more important than ever to host this year’s parade as planned.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

Fico is a skilled politician and controversial political figure. He is skilled because he had managed a political comeback from a seemingly impossible position. In 2018, he resigned as prime minister in a bid to rein in a political crisis sparked by the murder of an investigative journalist.

Since then, multiple members of his cabinet and other affiliates have been investigated for (or charged with) serious criminal offenses, including organized crime. Several were prosecuted for corruption.

He is skilled because he has managed to erase Slovaks’ memories of these events with pro-Russian rhetoric, which has appealed to many, with pleas for peace (at the expense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity) and various disinformation campaigns that Slovaks are quite prone to. These tactics have helped him garner new support in addition to his base of disillusioned rural voters.

Since taking the helm last October, his cabinet has been working relentlessly to concentrate power and take control of public media and the judiciary, often in fast-track legislative proceedings.

—Soňa Muzikárová is a political economist focused on Central and Eastern Europe and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. What’s most important to know about the political context in which this assassination attempt took place?

Slovak politics is polarized and heated, as is the case in a number of European countries and the United States. Slovakia’s liberal opposition has long regarded Fico as authoritarian and tolerant of corruption; he lost power in 2018 after the suspicious murder of a Slovak journalist. While both outgoing Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová and incoming President Peter Pellegrini have condemned the shooting and called for calm, the attempted assassination could inflame Slovak politics.

—Daniel Fried

Slovakia’s politics and society are unprecedentedly polarized, which to some extent is the result of a pervasively uncivil political culture, amplified by social media, as well as citizens’ digital and civic illiteracy. What happened is a testament to the worrisome state of Slovakia’s democracy.

—Soňa Muzikárová

3. Who is in charge if Fico is incapacitated, and what should we watch out for from the Slovak government?

Whoever serves as acting prime minister, the person to watch is Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák, a long-time ally of Fico and a former interior minister. As defense minister, he implemented Fico’s decision to terminate Slovak military donations to Ukraine but did not stand in the way of Slovak military sales or deliveries to Ukraine. Capable and comfortable with the United States (an avid biker, he used to lead motorcycle trips through the American West with Slovak fire and police chiefs), Kaliňák could emerge as a leader in future Slovak governments should Fico’s Smer-SD Party remain in power.

—Daniel Fried

4. Based on what we know so far, what consequences could the shooting have for Slovakia’s politics?

Several members of Fico’s cabinet, including Deputy Prime Minister Tomáš Taraba and the minister of culture, Martina Šimkovičová, were quick to allege that the attack is a result of “the hate politics” spurred “by the opposition.”

Deputy Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Andrej Danko, in the initial hours after the attack, stated that the governing coalition would take a tougher stance on journalists, although he was not clear on how the media had—directly or indirectly—contributed to the attack.

These are signs that the attack might be weaponized by Fico’s cabinet against the opposition, painting liberals as the villain. The cabinet is likely to use this tragedy to further its political agenda by, for example, curbing media freedom. I expect the incident to help Fico and his affiliates capture more electoral support in the future.

—Soňa Muzikárová

5. Is there any disinformation or misinformation spreading following the shooting?

Even before news of the assassination attempt had broken in the West, Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russian state-controlled propaganda outlet RT, had already taken to Telegram to declare that Fico had been targeted for his pro-Russian sympathies. Within hours, tens of thousands of social media users were blaming the violence on some combination of EU and Ukrainian operatives. By early evening Slovak time, the Slovak Police issued a statement on their official Facebook page urging that both media institutions and the general public refrain from using comment systems, in order to stem the tide of dangerous speculation and hate speech.

The disinformation will get worse before it gets better. There has not been an act of violence in Europe of this sort in more than twenty years, and early reporting has linked the alleged assassin to both pro-EU and hardline Russian interests. In less than a month, citizens of twenty-seven EU member states will cast their votes to decide the future of Europe. Whatever the EU elections may have been about before, this is now part of the debate.

—Emerson T. Brooking is a resident senior fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab of the Atlantic Council and coauthor of LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media.

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Georgia’s government uses Kremlin playbook to consolidate grip on power

Lucy Minicozzi-Wheeland — Wed, 15 May 2024 23:13:15 +0000

Georgia is currently at the crossroads as the government pushes through contentious Kremlin-style legislation that opponents say will stifle civil society and prevent the country’s further European integration. At stake is the future trajectory of this small but strategically significant nation that plays an important role in the broader geopolitics of the post-Soviet space.

On May 14, the ruling Georgian Dream party passed the controversial “foreign agents” bill, which will oblige organizations that receive more than 20 percent of funding from abroad to register with the government or face fines. Despite claims to the contrary, this law resembles Russia’s own foreign agents legislation far more than the US Foreign Agents Registration Act.

EU officials responded to the news from Tbilisi by suggesting adoption of the legislation could hamper Georgia’s bid to join the European Union. “The EU stands with the Georgian people and their choice in favor of democracy and of Georgia’s European future,” commented the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell. US officials have also voiced concern over the issue.

Georgian Dream officials appear unmoved by these appeals. Indeed, critics say the passage of the foreign agents law is part of intentional efforts to derail the country’s Western integration and bring Georgia back into the Kremlin orbit. They claim the legislation is intended to suppress civil society in the lead-up to parliamentary elections in October, and note that Georgian authorities are now adopting tactics that closely mirror Russia’s own efforts to stamp out domestic dissent and silence opponents.

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As unprecedented numbers have taken to the streets of Tbilisi to protest the country’s turn toward Moscow, the Georgian authorities have sought to crush protests with heavy-handed policing, including beatings, tear gas, and water cannons. Journalists and elected officials have been among those on the receiving end of violence.

In a further echo of tactics widely employed in Putin’s Russia, individual members of Georgia’s political opposition and activists have been assaulted in apparently targeted attacks that have taken place far from the protests. Others have been subjected to threatening phone calls and additional forms of harassment.

Meanwhile, the Georgian authorities are accused of copying the longstanding Russian practice of stage-managing pro-government rallies designed to distract attention from protests and create the illusion of popular support. One rally in late April featured thousands of public sector workers who had apparently been bussed into the Georgian capital from around the country and instructed to attend.

The rhetoric coming from Georgian Dream officials in recent weeks has increasingly resembled the anti-Western narratives and conspiracy theories favored by the Putin regime. In thinly veiled attacks on Georgia’s Western partners, Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the unofficial leader of Georgian Dream, has decried civil society organizations as “pseudo-elites” controlled by patrons abroad, and has accused them of attempting to instigate revolution in Georgia. These allegations are virtually indistinguishable from Vladimir Putin’s complaints regarding so-called “color revolutions.”

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Officially, the Georgian authorities deny they are seeking to turn the country away from the path of European integration and reject claims of a pro-Kremlin agenda. Indeed, Ivanishvili continues to insist Georgia is currently closer than ever to joining the EU. The ruling party’s careful rhetoric around Georgia’s European choice is understandable given that 81% of Georgians support EU membership. However, the fact that Georgian Dream moved forward with the foreign agents law despite condemnation from the EU and large-scale public protests has severely undermined the credibility of the government’s claims.

Georgian Dream officials say the foreign agents law is intended to ensure transparency and prevent undue foreign influence in the country, but critics remain unconvinced. They argue that the legislation will be used as a tool to suppress civil society, and point to the chilling role similar legislation has played in Russia. If it comes into force, many fear the law will strengthen the ruling party’s grip on power ahead of Georgia’s coming elections and set the stage for a more authoritarian form of government.

If Georgian Dream is able to secure a convincing result in the October ballot, Ivanishvili has already outlined plans for a strict “political and legal condemnation” of his party’s domestic opponents. In light of the mounting violence against opposition figures and pro-democracy protesters in Tbilisi in recent days, such statements must be taken seriously.

Hundreds of thousands of Georgians have joined protests this spring in an emphatic display of support for the country’s European future, but the struggle looks likely to continue throughout the coming months. The Georgian government has already demonstrated its readiness to employ Kremlin tactics. The question now is how far they are willing to go.

Lucy Minicozzi-Wheeland is a master’s student in Regional Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia at Harvard and a Research Assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School.

What to do about ransomware payments

Carole House — Tue, 14 May 2024 16:57:36 +0000

Ransomware is a destabilizing form of cybercrime with over a million attacks targeting businesses and critical infrastructure every day. Its status as a national security threat, even above that of other pervasive cybercrime, is driven by a variety of factors like its scale, disruptive nature, and potential destabilizing impact on critical infrastructure and services—as well as the sophistication and innovation in ransomware ecosystems and cybercriminals, who are often Russian actors or proxies.

The ransomware problem is multi-dimensional. Ransomware is both a cyber and a financial crime, exploiting vulnerabilities not only in the security of digital infrastructure but also in the financial system that have enabled the rise of sophisticated Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) economies. It is also inherently international, involving transnational crime groups operating in highly distributed networks that are targeting victims, leveraging infrastructure, and laundering proceeds without regard for borders. As with other asymmetric threats, non-state actors can achieve state-level consequences in disruption of critical infrastructure.

With at least $1 billion reported in ransomware payments in 2021 and with incidents targeting critical infrastructure like hospitals, it is not surprising that the debate on ransomware payments is rising again. Ransomware payments themselves are problematic—they are the primary motive for these criminal acts, serving to fuel and incentivize this ecosystem. Many are also inherently already banned in that payments to sanctioned actors are prohibited. However, taking a hardline position on ransomware payments is also challenging because of its potential impact on victims, visibility and cooperation, and limited resources.

Cryptocurrency’s role in enabling ransomware’s rise

While ransomware has existed in some form since 1989, the emergence of cryptocurrencies as an easy means for nearly-instantaneous, peer-to-peer, cross-border value transfer contributed to the rise of sophisticated RaaS economies. Cryptocurrencies use largely public, traceable ledgers which can certainly benefit investigations and disruption efforts. However, in practice those disruption efforts are hindered by weaknesses in cryptocurrency ecosystems like lagging international and industry compliance with anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards; growth of increasingly sophisticated methods of obfuscation leveraging mixers, anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies, chain-hopping, and intermixing with off-chain and traditional finance methods; and insufficient steps taken to enable real-time, scaled detection and timely interdictionof illicit cryptocurrency proceeds.

Despite remarks by some industry and policymaker advocates, RaaS economies would not work at the same level of scale and success without cryptocurrency, at least in its current state of compliance and exploitable features. Massively scaled ransomware campaigns targeting thousands of devices could not work by asking victims to pay using wire transfers and gift cards pointing to common accounts at regulated banks or widely publishing a physical address. Reliance on traditional finance methods would require major, and likely significantly less profitable, evolution in ransomware models.

The attraction of banning ransomware payments

Any strategy to deal with ransomware needs to have multiple elements, and one key aspect is the approach to ransomware payments. The Biden Administration’s multi-pronged counter-ransomware efforts have driven unprecedented coordination of actions combating ransomware, seen in actions like disrupting the ransomware variant infrastructure and actors, OFAC and FinCEN designations of actors and financial institutions facilitating ransomware, pre-ransomware notifications to affected companies by CISA, and a fifty-member International Counter-Ransomware Initiative.

However, ransomware remains a significant threat and is still affecting critical infrastructure. As policymakers in the administration and in Congress consider every tool available, they will have to consider the effectiveness of the existing policy approach to ransomware payments. Some view payment bans as a necessary action to address the risks ransomware presents to Americans and to critical infrastructure. Set against the backdrop of the moral, national security, and economic imperatives to end this destabilizing activity, bans could be the quickest way to diminish incentives for targeting Americans and the significant amounts of money making it into the hands of criminals.

Additionally, banning ransomware payments promotes other Administration policy objectives like driving a greater focus on cybersecurity and resilience. Poor cyber hygiene, and especially often poor identity and access management, are frequently exploited in ransomware. Removing payments as a potential “escape hatch” is seen by some as a way to leverage market forces to incentivize better cyber hygiene, especially in a space where the government has limited and fragmented regulatory authority.

Those who promote bans typically do not come to that position lightly but instead see them as a last resort to try to deter ransomware. The reality is that we have not yet been able to sufficiently scale disruption to the extent needed to diminish this threat below a national security concern—driven by insufficient resourcing, limits on information sharing and collaboration, timeliness issues for use of certain authorities, and insufficient international capacity and coordination on combating cyber and crypto crime. When policymakers are in search of high-impact initiatives to reduce the high-impact threat of ransomware, many understandably view bans as attractive.

Challenges with banning ransomware payments

However, taking a hardline position on ransomware payments can also present practical and political challenges:

Messaging and optics of punishing victims:A ban inherently places the focus of the policy burden and messaging on the victims, potentially not stopping them from using this tool but instead raising the costs for them to do so. Blaming victims that decide to pay in order to keep their company intact presents moral and political challenges.

Limited resources that need to be prioritized against the Bad Guys: For a ban to be meaningful, it would have to be enforced. Spending enforcement resources against victims to enforce a ban—resources which could have been spent on scaling disruption of the actual perpetrators—could divert critically limited resources from efforts against the ransomware actors.

Likelihood that payments will still happen as companies weigh the costs against the benefits: Many feel that companies, if faced between certain demise and the costs of likely discovery and legal or regulatory action by the government, will still end up making ransomware payments.

Disincentivizing reporting and visibility: A ban would also make companies less likely to report that they have been hit with ransomware, as they will aim to keep all options open as they decide how to proceed. This disincentivizes transparency and cooperation from companies needed to drive effective implementation of the cyber incident and ransomware payment reporting requirements under the Cybersecurity Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) regulations to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Diminished cooperation and transparency could have a devastating effect on investigations and disruption efforts that rely on timely visibility.

Asking for permission means the government deciding which companies survive: Some advocates for bans propose exceptions, such as supplementing a presumptive ban with a licensing or waiver authority, where the government is the arbiter of deciding which companies get to pay or not. This could enable certain entities like hospitals to use the payment “escape hatch.” However, placing the government in a position to decide which companies live and die is extremely complicated and presents uncomfortable questions. It is unclear what government body could be capable, or should be endowed with the authority of making that call at all, especially in as timely a fashion as would be required. Granting approval could also place the government in the uncomfortable position of essentially approving payments to criminals.

Additional policy options that can strike a balance for practical implementation

In light of the large-scale, disruptive threat to critical infrastructure from ransomware, policymakers will have to consider other initiatives along with its ransomware payment approach to strike a balance on enhancing disruption and incentivizing security measures:

Resource agencies and prioritize counter-ransomware efforts: Government leadership must properly resource through appropriations and prioritize disruption efforts domestically and internationally as part of a sustained pressure campaign against prioritized ransomware networks.

International cyber and cryptocurrency capacity building and pressure campaign: Agencies should prioritize targeted international engagement, such as capacity building where capability lags and diplomatic pressure where political will lags, toward defined priority jurisdictions. Capacity building and pressure should drive both cybersecurity and cryptocurrency capacity, such as critical infrastructure controls, regulatory, and law enforcement capabilities. Jurisdictional prioritization could account for elements like top nations where RaaS actors and infrastructure operate and where funds are primarily laundered and cashed out.

Enhance targeting authorities for use against ransomware actors: Congress should address limitations in existing authorities to enable greater disruptive action against the cyber and financial elements of ransomware networks. For example, Congress could consider fixes to AML/CFT authorities (e.g., 311 and 9714 Bank Secrecy Act designations) for better use against ransomware financial enablers, as well as potential fixes that the defense, national security, and law enforcement communities may need.

Ensure government and industry visibility for timely interdiction and disruption of ransomware flows: Congressional, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies should work with industry to ensure critical visibility across key ecosystem participants to enable disruption efforts, such as through: Enforcing reporting requirements of ransomware payments under CIRCIA and US Treasury suspicious activity reporting (SAR) requirements; Mandating through law that entities (such as digital forensic and incident response [DFIR] firms) that negotiate or make payments to ransomware criminals on behalf of victims, including in providing decryption services for victims, must be regulated as financial institutions with SAR reporting requirements; Driving the evolution of standards, like those for cyber indicators, to enable real-time information sharing and ingestion of cryptocurrency illicit finance indicators for responsible ecosystem participants to disrupt illicit finance flows.

Prioritize and scale outcome-driven public-private partnerships (PPPs): Policymakers should prioritize, fund, and scale timely efforts for PPPs across key infrastructure and threat analysis actors (e.g., internet service providers [ISPs], managed service providers [MSPs], cyber threat firms, digital forensic and incident response [DFIR] and negotiation firms, cryptocurrency threat firms, cryptocurrency exchanges, and major crypto administrators and network-layer players [e.g., mining pools and validators]) focused on disruption of key ransomware activities and networks.

Incentivize and promote better security while making it less attractive to pay ransoms: Policymakers could leverage market and regulatory incentives to drive better security measures adoption to deter ransomware and make it less attractive to pay. For example, legislation could prohibit cyber insurance reimbursement of ransomware payments. Regulatory action and legislative authority expansion could also drive implementation of high-impact defensive measures against ransomware across critical infrastructure and coordination of international standards on cyber defense.

While attractive for many reasons, banning ransomware payments presents challenges for limiting attacks that demand a broader strategy to address. Only this kind of multi-pronged, whole-of-nation approach will be sufficient to reduce the systemic threats presented by disruptive cybercrime that often targets our most vulnerable.

Carole House is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and the Executive in Residence at Terranet Ventures, Inc. She formerly served as the director for cybersecurity and secure digital innovation for the White House National Security Council.

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Russia’s growing kamikaze drone fleet tests Ukraine’s limited air defenses

Marcel Plichta — Tue, 14 May 2024 15:59:46 +0000

The past few months have been a particularly challenging period for Ukraine’s overstretched air defense units. With the country suffering from mounting shortages of interceptor missiles, Russia has exploited growing gaps in Ukraine’s defenses to bomb cities and vital civilian infrastructure with deadly frequency. These escalating attacks have led to renewed calls from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for Kyiv’s partners to provide the country with more air defense systems in order to safeguard lives and prevent the collapse of basic municipal services.

While most attention has focused on the many Russian ballistic and cruise missiles that have reached their targets, Ukraine has actually managed to shoot down a strikingly high number of Russian kamikaze drones. On May 13, the Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine had intercepted 82 percent of kamikaze drones over the past six months, just one percentage point lower than the total for the previous half-year period. This figure is even more remarkable given that Russia typically launches waves of drones as part of complex attacks that also feature a range of different missiles.

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Many in the Ukrainian media and beyond have been quick to publicize the numerous improvised and ingenious measures adopted by Ukraine to counter Russia’s drone attacks. These steps have included the establishment of mobile teams using older anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to shoot down drones at a fraction of the cost of more sophisticated air defense systems. In spring 2024, US General James Hecker, head of US Air Forces in Europe, described how Ukrainians had set up a detection network using cheap cell phones on poles to warn of incoming drones. German-supplied Gepard systems have also proved extremely cost-effective drone destroyers, as have newer systems such as the US-made VAMPIRE.

While Ukraine’s high interception rates are impressive, the threat posed by this form of aerial warfare remains grave and continues to evolve. Even when the majority of drones are shot down, those that do reach their targets often cause significant damage and loss of life. Indeed, when it comes to air defenses, even a 99 percent success rate is not good enough. While it is better to shoot down drones than allow them to hit their targets, interceptions can also be costly, with debris from falling drones frequently causing death and destruction in a terrifyingly random manner.

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Russia’s fleet of kamikaze drones is growing. During the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin organized regular deliveries of Shahed kamikadze drones from Iran. Moscow has since set up domestic production facilities and is now far less dependent on Tehran. This is allowing Russia to scale up its own output, making it possible to increase the frequency of attacks. As production continues to expand, more and more drones will be launched against targets across Ukraine. These increasing quantities of drones will deplete Ukraine’s anti-drone ammunition and could potentially overwhelm the country’s limited defenses.

In addition to producing a domestic version of Iran’s Shahed drone, Russia is also experimenting with a range of modifications. These efforts have included spraying drones to reduce detection and adding cameras to stream video footage of drone flights back to Russian operators. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly continues to receive new drone models from the country’s Iranian partners.

While these upgraded models and modifications have so far failed to make a big difference to Russia’s air offensive, they do serve as a reminder that this is a war of innovation and underline the need for Ukraine to maintain the highest degree of vigilance. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military has demonstrated its ability to learn from earlier mistakes and incorporate new technologies. Ukrainians cannot afford to assume that today’s defenses will necessarily be sufficient to stop tomorrow’s drones.

An additional drone-related headache for Ukrainian military planners is the need to spread air defenses across as wide an area as possible. While mobile anti-drone teams have proved relatively effective, they are only one part of a much wider network of air defenses centered around Ukraine’s major cities and key infrastructure sites. Given that air defenses are desperately needed to support military operations on the battlefield, guarding against frequent kamikaze drone attacks far away from the front lines weakens the Ukrainian war effort.

As long as Russia continues to build and deploy kamikaze drones, they will remain a significant problem for Ukraine. The country’s partners can help address this problem in two ways. They can supply more air defense systems, especially models that are designed to intercept slow-moving but plentiful drones rather than far faster missiles. They can also support Ukraine’s efforts to strike targets such as air bases, production facilities, and drone storage sites inside Russia. Destroying Russian drones before they are launched is the most effective way to protect Ukraine from further bombardment.

The View from New Delhi: Can IMEC Rival China’s Belt and Road?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:58:21 +0000

SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHINA-MENA PODCAST ON THE APP OF YOUR CHOICE

Key takeaways

India, Middle East, Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
India’s Strategic Interests in the Middle East
Regional Dynamics and Diplomatic Engagements

Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

01:39 – Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Considerations

03:16 – Challenges and Ongoing Interest

07:17 – IMEC’s Focus on Technology in Transportation

11:28 – Economic Growth in the Gulf Linked to India

14:11 – Growing Strategic Relationships in UAE, Saudi Arabia

17:55 – Exploring Potential Funding Sources

19:11 – Positive Momentum in the Region

25:12 – India’s Role in Global Supply Chains

29:51 – Risk Distribution and US-China Contest

31:11 – Outro

In this episode

Ambassador Navdeep Suri
Visiting Fellow
Observer Research Foundation

Ambassador Suri has had a 36-year career in the Indian Foreign Service. He served in India’s diplomatic missions in Cairo, Damascus, Washington, Dar es Salaam, and London. He was India’s Consul General in Johannesburg, High Commissioner to Australia, and Ambassador to Egypt and the UAE. He also headed the West Africa and Public Diplomacy departments in India’s Ministry of External Affairs.

Kabir Taneja
Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme
Observer Research Foundation

Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with West Asia, specifically on the domestic political dynamics, terrorism, non-state militant actors, and the general security paradigm of the region.

About

In this episode of the China-MENA podcast titled “The View from New Delhi: Can IMEC rival China’s Belt and Road?”, our host Jonathan Fulton and guests Ambassador Navdeep Suri and expert Kabir Taneja explore the India, Middle East, Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and how it may rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We unravel India’s significant strategic interests in the Middle East and how the region perceives India’s expanded role in driving economic prosperity and enhancing regional security. Dive deeper into:

Beyond Ports: IMEC aims to establish an economic corridor focused on the future, not just connecting ports but also integrating renewable energy grids, green hydrogen, and secure data connectivity.
India’s Strategic Interests in the Middle East: India seeks to reinvigorate its historical ties with the region, capitalizing on its rapid economic growth and the perception of India as a future economic powerhouse. Additionally, India is increasingly seen as a security contributor in the region.
Regional Dynamics and Diplomatic Engagements: Despite challenges like the recent conflict in Gaza, there is continued interest from key players in IMEC. The project is seen as a way to move beyond regional tensions and promote prosperity through better connectivity.

Join us for an enlightening conversation that bridges continents and cultures on the China MENA podcast.

Hosted by

Fellow

Jonathan Fulton

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

China Chinese

IMEC propels us towards future-proof economies, blending technology and energy integration

Navdeep Suri

The geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East offer both a landscape of opportunities and a complex set of challenges for India

Kabir Taneja

About the China-MENA podcast

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:54:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin has appointed technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister in a shake-up that underlines his determination to wage a long war of attrition against Ukraine.

The relatively unknown Belousov replaces long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who will now take up a new post as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council. Shoigu had led the Defense Ministry since 2012. Known as both a Putin loyalist and a personal friend of the Russian dictator who accompanied him on hunting holidays, he is the most senior figure to be dismissed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Shoigu’s tenure in office coincided with Russian military success stories such as the 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, his reputation had been severely tarnished in recent years by the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. The many battlefield setbacks suffered in Ukraine have been particularly embarrassing for Putin, who has long pointed to the revival of Russia’s military strength as one his greatest achievements.

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Shoigu’s removal took many by surprise but was not entirely unexpected. The announcement came just weeks after his deputy defense minister, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on corruption charges. At the time of Ivanov’s removal in late April, many speculated that Shoigu’s days as defense minister may also be numbered.

Shoigu’s replacement, Andrei Belousov, is a former deputy prime minister and minister of economic development who also served for a number of years as an economic advisor to Putin. The appointment of a civilian technocrat suggests that Putin aims to control military spending and improve efficiency at the ministry of defense as he looks to outproduce Ukraine and the country’s Western partners in a protracted confrontation.

Unlike his predecessor, Belousov has played no significant role in the invasion of Ukraine and is not tainted by the military defeats of the past two years. His long record of government service and relative anonymity make him in many ways a typical pick for Putin, who is notoriously reluctant to raise ambitious new faces to senior positions within the Kremlin leadership.

Speculation over Shoigu’s future has been mounting ever since the failure of Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive in the spring of 2022 during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has frequently been singled out for criticism by Russia’s military blogger community, and was repeatedly accused of corruption by former Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in a series of explosive video addresses on the eve of the short-lived June 2023 Wagner mutiny.

Unsurprisingly, Shoigu’s departure was widely cheered within Russia’s so-called “Z-patriot” pro-war community. Media tycoon and prominent Russian nationalist Konstantin Malofeyev toasted the news, while suggesting Belousov’s appointment would now make defense “the absolute priority” of Russian state policy. “We’ll have both guns and butter,” he commented.

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Putin’s decision to finally remove Shoigu and replace him with a veteran economist comes as he begins a fifth presidential term while bogged down in the largest European invasion since World War II. His new defense minister is now expected to focus on boosting domestic Russian arms production while channeling resources toward the development of the country’s defense tech sector. “Today on the battlefield, the winner is the one who is more open to innovation,” commented Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on the recent ministerial changes in Moscow.

Belousov appears well qualified to meet the twin challenges of improving armament output and aiding Russia’s efforts to regain the technological advantage in the war against Ukraine. His long career in government gives him detailed knowledge of the Russian economy and the intricacies of state budgets, while he has a record of supporting the development of Russia’s drone capabilities. Belousov will now join a number of other senior government officials with similarly strong defense tech credentials including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, and Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadayev.

Despite being removed from his defense post, Shoigu has not been kicked to the curb. His appointment as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, replacing longtime Putin confidant Nikolai Patrushev, should allow him to retain significant influence within the Kremlin. At the same time, it is not clear whether Shoigu will be able to exercise the same kind of power as his predecessor, who now takes on a new role as an aide to Putin. While this has the appearance of a slight demotion for Patrushev, the parallel promotion of his son Dmitry to the position of deputy prime minister would suggest that he will remain an influential figure.

The recent changes in the leadership of Russia’s Defense Ministry do not signal any fundamental shift in Putin’s war aims. On the contrary, this week’s appointment confirms Putin’s continued commitment to the invasion of Ukraine and his readiness to prioritize the war effort over all other considerations. Putin clearly intends to place Russia on an indefinite wartime footing, and hopes Belousov is capable of managing the process with maximum efficiency.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin expands invasion as outgunned Ukraine waits for Western weapons

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 14 May 2024 13:08:20 +0000

Russia launched a cross-border offensive into northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region on May 10, opening a new front in its ongoing invasion. The attack had been widely anticipated, but the apparent ease with which Russian forces were able to penetrate the Ukrainian border sparked considerable alarm and allegations of security blunders.

The debate over Ukraine’s apparent failure to secure the border overlooks the fact that fortifications are typically located some 15 to 20 kilometers behind forward positions. Nevertheless, the renewed presence of Russian troops in northern Ukraine marks a significant escalation in the war.

During the first five days of the offensive, Russia has been able to establish two separate bridgeheads on Ukrainian territory and advance between five and seven kilometers into the country. These modest gains reflect the relatively small numbers of Russian troops involved in the initial incursion. However, that may change in the coming days as the Kremlin has concentrated approximately 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers across the border and continues to reinforce the ongoing offensive.

Ukrainian officials had earlier predicted the start of Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv region toward the end of May or in early June. The recent US decision to grant Ukraine a major new aid package may have convinced the Kremlin to attack earlier than planned in order to exploit the remaining window of opportunity before fresh deliveries of US weapons reach the front lines.

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At this point, Russia’s immediate military goals look to be rather limited, as can be seen from the numbers of troops involved. The initial objective may be the establishment of a buffer zone along the Ukrainian border in the Kharkiv region. This is something Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin leaders have spoken about repeatedly in recent months. If Russian forces do manage to advance further and establish a foothold around 15 kilometers inside northern Ukraine, this would place Kharkiv itself within range of Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s former capital and second-largest city with a prewar population of more than one and a half million, Kharkiv has been subjected to intensive Russian bombing since the beginning of 2024. The city’s power plants were destroyed in March, while residential districts are frequently subjected to missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. There are now fears that Russian artillery could take this campaign of destruction to the next level. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov has repeatedly warned that his city risks becoming a “second Aleppo,” a reference to the Syrian city reduced to rubble almost a decade ago following relentless bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces.

Russia’s end goal appears to be the depopulation of Kharkiv. Moscow aims to make the city unlivable and force the vast majority of its over one million residents to flee. By emptying Kharkiv of its civilian population, the Kremlin hopes to create the conditions for the city’s capture. However, this would require far more troops than Russia currently has available in the region.

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While many observers assume Kharkiv remains Russia’s primary objective, the new offensive may actually be an attempt to destabilize Ukraine’s broader defenses. By opening up a new front in the north of the country, Russia creates dilemmas for Ukrainian commanders and forces them to divert key units that are currently holding the front line in the east of the country.

The present military situation is rapidly evolving and extremely challenging for Ukraine, but it is not yet critical. Indeed, given the clear battlefield advantages enjoyed by defensive forces since the start of the war more than two years ago, the Ukrainian military theoretically has every chance of preventing any major breakthroughs and should also be able to inflict significant losses on advancing Russian forces. However, Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself are currently being severely hampered by an inability to strike Russian targets across the border.

Throughout the war, most of Ukraine’s international partners have insisted that the weapons they provide only be used on Ukrainian territory. These restrictions contradict all military logic and have created uniquely favorable conditions for Russia, which is able to concentrate troops close to the Ukrainian border and prepare to attack without fear of being targeted. Unless Ukraine is granted the right to hit military targets inside Russia, it will be extremely difficult to defeat the current offensive or prevent more cross-border attacks similar the recently opened front in the Kharkiv region.

Russia’s new Kharkiv offensive is an attempt by the Kremlin to capitalize on considerable advantages in both manpower and firepower. Despite suffering staggering losses over the past two years, Putin has succeeded in creating a force far larger than the army that first invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been seriously weakened by more than half a year without major arms deliveries, and is unable to strike back effectively due to restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners. None of this means Russia is guaranteed to succeed, but it does make it far more difficult for Ukraine to prevail.

How AI is reshaping the global business arena

JP Reppeto — Mon, 13 May 2024 15:37:07 +0000

On April 25^th, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship held a panel discussion exploring the projected impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the global business landscape, highlighting how AI-driven strategies are revolutionizing industries worldwide.

The panel, which was moderated by Stefanie Falconi, Emerging Technologies Advisor at USAID, featured four experts working at the forefront of artificial intelligence integration in their respective fields. Speakers included Xiuzhu Lin, Director of Global Business Advisory, AI, at Marriott International; Geoffrey Schaefer, Head of Responsible AI, Chief AI Ethics Advisor at Booz Allen Hamilton; Wafa Ben-Hassine, Principal, Responsible Technology at Omidyar Network; and Aisha Saaka, Data & AI Manager at Accenture Federal Services.

The conversation ranged widely, with the speakers leveraging their expertise on the technology across sectors to touch on best practices for AI integration in companies, AI’s role in addressing social challenges, and responsible development and deployment.

Main Takeaways

Wafa Ben-Hassine kicked off the panel by explaining that society should guide the development and deployment of AI in order to harness its transformative power for good. Generative AI is one of the most promising technologies to emerge since the industrial revolution, and humanity should adopt a holistic approach for managing its growth. She proposed the implementation of guardrails developed by both civil society and technical experts to help mitigate AI’s risks.

Building on this theme, Xiuzhu Lin shifted the focus to the practical aspects of AI in business, discussing the conditions necessary for companies to effectively utilize AI. She pointed out that a business’s maturity often facilitates successful AI integration, exemplified by banks like Chase that have long employed machine learning and data science experts. Businesses adopting AI must often complete necessary pre-work, such as cleaning up their datasets. Lin advised those hoping to embrace AI to consider whether the technology aligns with their industry and if their companies have reached the maturity needed to take full advantage of it.

Geoffrey Schaefer then critiqued the top-down approach to managing generative AI, suggesting it hinders its transformative potential. He advocated for a more decentralized approach, allowing employees to tailor AI tools to their specific needs, which he argued could significantly boost productivity. Centralized dictums and protocol on how to use the technology could be less effective than simply putting it in as many hands as possible and allowing employees to adapt it to the idiosyncrasies of their individual work. The thinking goes that employees will find the most efficient ways to integrate AI tools into their own workflows, supercharging productivity from the bottom up. However, Schaefer also acknowledged the necessity of implementing strict guardrails to prevent issues such as the leakage of proprietary information.

Echoing the importance of a mature approach to AI, Aisha Saaka agreed with her co-panelists on the need for decentralization. Speaking on the public sector, she noted that end users want both trust and accountability to be integral to AI. One challenge that could arise when working with public sector partners is the inability to train their models through exposure to the wider internet. Saaka underscored the public’s desire for trust and accountability in AI applications, particularly in sensitive areas.

Further exploring AI’s broader implications, Xiuzhu Lin responded affirmatively to the role of AI in addressing significant policy issues, like sustainability modeling. Sustainability modeling, for instance, is an area where AI’s strengths in passing through large data sets, finding patterns, and modeling scenarios could be well leveraged. She nonetheless wondered whether humans will adequately utilize the capabilities and insights that AI will deliver. Schaefer added that AI is the greatest public policy tool ever invented. Counterintuitively, biased data may have useful implications for improving policy; he pointed to the discovery of the link between zip codes and race in America as a revealed bias that could be positively utilized. Thinkers should grapple with how AI can make society more perfect without expecting perfection from AI.

Towards the conclusion of the discussion, Wafa Ben-Hassine revisited the theme of AI’s speed and connectivity, suggesting it could revolutionize public policy engagement. She projected an opportunity to leverage its connective abilities in public policy spaces by helping citizens engage more efficiently with their governments, improving upon inefficient bureaucracies. However, she warned against deploying AI in high-stake areas without adequate safeguards. Governments such as France (which recently declared it would use AI to improve its public services) against deploying AI in contexts where failure creates measurable harm, such as on issues of criminal justice or social security.

Aisha Saaka shared her positive outlook, reflecting on how AI facilitated syndromic surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic. She caveated her excitement by noting the prevailing need for local context to identify social and public health interventions.

Ben-Hassine argued for diverse participation within tech companies and public bodies and provided three frameworks for promoting inclusion: inclusivity from the outside-in, wherein communities are brought to developers and share their experience; inside-out, wherein a diverse staff of employees can understands possible harms, issues, and needs; and the feedback loop between the two previous frameworks, given that the evolution of technology changes the scope of impact on different communities.

Meanwhile, Geoffrey Schaefer posited that AI could mend national social cohesion by improving interactions between Americans and their government. The rise in populism, anger, and dissatisfaction in the United States should be not surprising given that the touchpoint between many Americans and their government are frustrations like potholes, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the Internal Revenue Service. Schaefer pointed out that by using AI to meet people’s needs more efficiently on the national level, trust can be restored in government and the degradation of the American social fabric can be halted.

In closing, Aisha Saaka highlighted a gap in technology education in the U.S., advocating for an educational campaign to better inform the public about AI. The average person probably does not fully understand how AI works, and an education campaign around the technology would be valuable. Xiuzhu Lin wrapped up by pointing to the practices of Anthropic, a company focused on ethically aligning AI with human values, underscoring the ongoing discourse on AI’s role in society.

The Way Forward

AI’s rapid evolution is a game-changer for businesses, altering operational frameworks and setting new benchmarks for efficiency and innovation. By automating routine tasks and analyzing vast datasets for actionable insights, AI is proving to be a crucial driver for growth, decision-making enhancement, and competitive edge in a dynamic market environment. However, the widespread adoption of the technology also brings both known and unknown risks and raises questions over ethical governance and implementation of AI.

Recent studies indicate that sectors like manufacturing, information technology, and healthcare are at the forefront of AI adoption, seamlessly integrating AI solutions into their core operations. Companies experienced in machine learning and data management are particularly well-equipped to capitalize on AI’s potential. Nevertheless, any business can advance by decentralizing AI usage and empowering employees to determine how best to implement AI in their specific roles. To navigate these changes, multi-stakeholder guardrails involving civil society, technical experts, and policymakers are essential to ensure that AI development aligns with societal values and needs. Businesses should assess their readiness for AI, customizing tools to meet operational demands and boost productivity, while the public sector should focus on AI applications that enhance efficiency without compromising safety. Moreover, continuous education across all societal levels is vital, coupled with public awareness campaigns that elucidate AI’s capabilities and limitations.

In terms of policy and social impact, AI should be utilized to analyze data for informed policymaking. Proactively addressing and leveraging biases in data can lead to societal improvements. Inclusion of diverse groups in the AI design and development process is critical to avoid marginalizing vulnerable communities, and regular evaluations are necessary to ensure AI technologies evolve in response to societal needs. By adopting this comprehensive approach, we can leverage AI’s advantages responsibly and ethically, fostering societal well-being and stimulating economic growth through proactive governance and inclusive practices.

JP Reppeto is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

Explore the WIn Fellowship

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

May 3, 2024

2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Developing an actionable framework to guide promotion and protection policies for emerging technologies

Hanna Dohmen — Mon, 13 May 2024 13:00:00 +0000

TO: Policymakers and technology policy strategists

FROM: Hanna Dohmen

DATE: May 13, 2024

SUBJECT: Developing an actionable framework to guide policies that protect and promote US leadership in emerging technologies

In February 2024, the Atlantic Council Global China Hub (AC GCH) and the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) convened experts and policymakers in a private workshop to test an actionable framework designed to guide policymakers in identifying emerging technology priorities. Using SCSP’s Strategic Evaluation Framework, participants discussed five technology case studies (commercial drones, electric vehicles, genomic sequencers, Internet of Things, and mobile applications) based on technological, rival, and domestic factors. This memo summarizes insights gathered during the workshop.

Strategic context

The ongoing technology competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is at the forefront of policy debates in the United States and globally. It is widely understood in policy circles that technology competition involves both protecting US leadership and promoting US innovation in emerging technologies. Protecting US technological strengths entails limiting or cutting off adversaries’ access to, and slowing adversaries’ progress in, certain technologies that could undermine or threaten US national security and technological as well as economic competitiveness through tools like inbound and outbound investment screening, export controls, and sanctions. Promoting US innovation entails incentivizing and advancing US technological progress by fostering research and innovation through tools such as federal research and development (R&D) funding, patents, and grants.

While the protect and promote policy levers are well understood, there is less consensus on how those policy tools should be used to address risks posed by rapidly evolving and emerging technologies. Amid this policy debate, there is a clear gap in the decision-making process: a strategic framework to guide decisions on prioritizing emerging technologies using promotion and protection policies.

The Joe Biden administration has already taken significant policy actions to address a number of technologies, including semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI). However, the policy debate in Washington continues to expand beyond the “force multiplier” technologies—computing-related technologies, biotechnologies, and clean-energy technologies—identified by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in September 2022. For example, in late February the Biden administration announced its first Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) investigation into the cybersecurity and data security risks posed by connected vehicles. Additionally, President Biden signed a law in April 2024 that would force ByteDance—the beneficial owner of TikTok—to either sell TikTok or face a ban in the United States.

These technology policy discussions range from national security-critical applications to a broader set of dual-use systems that play a strategic role in a nation’s economic competitiveness. However, not all technological advancements threaten national and economic security to the same extent. Due to this broad range of applications and limited government capacity to address all risks effectively, it is critical to take an evidence-based approach to prioritizing technology policies.

Purpose and approach

To help policymakers prioritize the growing risks and opportunities posed by new technologies, the workshop convened by AC GCH and SCSP aimed to develop and test an actionable framework that assesses risks and ranks technology priorities. Participants structured their discussion around SCSP’s Strategic Evaluation Framework, which poses twenty-one questions along three categories: technology, rival, and domestic factors.

Technology: Questions in the technology category are intended to help determine to what extent a technology could impact US national competitiveness and whether it is strategically important enough to warrant policy actions to strengthen U.S. leadership. These questions focus on the potential impact the technology may have on national security interests and economic development.
Rival: Questions in the rival category are designed to assess to what extent a rival’s strength in a technology could impact US national competitiveness. These questions consider a rival’s current state and potential developments in a technology, how a competitor’s leadership in a technology may undermine US leadership and power, and the competitor’s motivations and intentions.
Domestic: Questions in the domestic category assess to what extent domestic innovation capacity and capabilities in a technology impact US national competitiveness. These questions focus on the US strengths and weaknesses in a technology, the role that allies and partners play in a technology’s development, and political, policy, and societal motivations to consider.

Five technologies—commercial drones, electric vehicles, genomic sequencers, Internet of Things, and mobile applications—identified by AC GCH and SCSP served as case studies to test this framework. AC GCH and SCSP selected technologies at varying levels of specificity in order to emulate real policy discussions and to represent a broad range of risks to US national competitiveness. In groups, participants assessed each technology’s strategic importance by assigning a score from one to ten (one being the lowest level of importance, ten being the highest level of importance) to the technology, rival, and domestic factors. Participants subsequently ranked the five technologies based on a comparative analysis combining all three factors’ scores.

The intent behind force ranking the technologies during the exercise was to encourage participants to grapple with the tradeoffs policymakers face when confronted with limited resources and policy attention, rather than the actual rankings themselves. The outcome showed that every group, despite discussing the same five technologies, ranked the technologies in a different order, demonstrating the difficulty of reaching a consensus on technology policy priorities.

Key takeaways

Varying interpretations of US national competitiveness

Determining which technologies require protection or promotion in today’s policy debates is complicated by the ambiguity of what constitutes ‘US national competitiveness.’ The workshop discussion reflected this reality, where stakeholders’ interpretations diverged significantly. The lines between national security and economic competitiveness are frequently blurred, highlighting the urgent need for a more methodical approach to technology risk assessment and policy prioritization.

Cross-cutting technology risks

Applying the Strategic Evaluation Framework to this set of five technologies highlighted the cross-cutting technology risks that warrant consideration in their own right, such as cybersecurity, data security, and supply-chain risks. For example, both commercial drones and gene sequencers could give foreign adversaries access to sensitive data that can be used against the United States and its people. The recurrence of such cross-cutting risks suggests an additional variable that policymakers should systematically consider. By focusing on the cross-cutting risks, policies can effectively target a more comprehensive set of priorities.

Four core risks

Four core risks could be layered on top of the Strategic Evaluation Framework to drill deeper into the questions at the heart of policymakers’ technology promotion and protection decisions. Using semiconductors as an example, we provide a brief, non-exhaustive snapshot of how this additional layer of analysis could be used to identify the types of risks a technology poses.

Access: What are the risks to US security and innovation if US stakeholders do not have access to the same quality of technology that competitors or adversaries do?

Insufficient access to advanced-node semiconductors creates the risk of falling behind competitors in innovation, particularly in AI, as advanced-node semiconductors provide the critical computational power that is needed to both develop and deploy AI systems.

Manufacturing capability and capacity: What are the risks to US security and innovation if the United States lacks the capabilities or capacity to manufacture a technology?

Lack of capability or insufficient capacity in semiconductor manufacturing presents supply-chain risks that have significant implications for the US economy, which is heavily dependent on chips, as well as US military efforts. Relying on competitors or adversaries to supply critical technologies could present detrimental disruptions to the economy and US innovation efforts. Additionally, Chinese subsidies may distort market dynamics, especially in the mature-node market, and could disadvantage US and other foreign companies in the market.

US adoption: What are the risks to US security and innovation of US persons and industry adopting a competitor or adversary’s technology?

The risks of US persons or industry using semiconductors supplied by adversaries, such as Chinese manufacturers could implement backdoors into the hardware that poses cybersecurity risks to users.

Third-country adoption: What are the risks to US security and innovation if third countries adopt a competitor or adversary’s technology?

Similar to the risks that Chinese manufactured chips may pose to US persons or industry, backdoors installed on chips may pose cybersecurity risks to users in third-party countries as well.

Challenges in prioritizing technologies

Another goal of the workshop was to simulate the tradeoffs policymakers encounter when confronted by imperfect comparisons, short deadlines, and competing interests.

The approach used in the workshop raised a few key questions about how to consistently apply the framework across technologies. For example, should technology factors weigh more heavily than rival and domestic factors? Should rival factors weigh more heavily than domestic factors? How can a quantitative scoring system be clearly defined so it may be applied consistently across technologies? An additional challenge that came to light is the varying levels of specificity of technologies. For example, during the workshop, participants compared commercial drones, which are a relatively specific technology, to mobile applications, which spans a broad category of technologies. This variation in specificity made comparing and ranking technologies relative to one another difficult, emphasizing the need to address these challenges in order to establish a successful framework for policymakers.

An additional layer of a risk-based framework would also require comparing risks and making decisions about which risks to prioritize. Nonetheless, it may be easier to make decisions about policy priorities if technologies are being considered based on categorical risks. By focusing on one risk, policymakers could, for example, choose to implement data security regulations that address the data security risks posed by various technologies. In fact, the Biden administration is already implementing such an approach to address a narrow set of data security risks.

Diverse range of perspectives and expertise

The benefit of bringing together a workshop of researchers, policymakers, and industry experts ensures that there is a diverse range of perspectives and expertise, allowing for a robust conversation that challenges assumptions. Proactive conversations about risks posed by technologies and potential policy options that could be used to address those risks require a balanced group of experts who understand both the technologies and the policy landscape.

About the author

Hanna Dohmen is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a research analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

Acknowledgement

This strategic insights memo was written and prepared with the support of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Special Competitive Studies Project.

The Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit initiative with a clear mission: to make recommendations to strengthen America’s long-term competitiveness as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies are reshaping our national security, economy, and society.

Global China Hub

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Russia’s Georgia strategy offers hints of Kremlin vision for Ukraine

Nicholas Chkhaidze — Thu, 09 May 2024 21:19:57 +0000

Recent efforts by the Georgian government to adopt a Kremlin-style law imposing restrictions on civil society have laid bare the geopolitical struggle currently underway to define the country’s future. The escalating crisis in the southern Caucasus nation also offers some indications of the end game Russia may have in mind if it succeeds in defeating Ukraine.

Georgia’s contentious Foreign Agents Law, which was proposed but shelved in 2023 following an initial round of protests, was revived in spring 2024 by the ruling Georgian Dream party. Unsurprisingly, these efforts have sparked renewed protests on an even larger scale.

Critics say the bill is an attempt to crack down on the country’s political opposition and civil society, and have dubbed it “the Russian law” due to its striking similarity to legislation used by the Kremlin to muzzle domestic opponents of the Putin regime. The bill is also notable for positioning Georgia’s traditional Western allies as adversaries while refraining from mentioning Russia, which currently occupies around twenty percent of the country.

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The Georgian government’s bid to adopt legislation reminiscent of Putin’s Russia is all the more remarkable as polls show that around eighty percent of Georgians favor integration with NATO and the EU. This has provoked a major public backlash within Georgia and has led to harsh criticism from the country’s Western partners. In a recent statement, the US State Department warned that the contentious legislation along with accompanying anti-Western rhetoric from Georgian Dream representatives placed the country on a “precarious trajectory” that could “jeopardize Georgia’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration.”

None of these appears to have deterred the Georgian authorities. As the crisis escalated in late April, the founder and unofficial leader of the Georgian Dream party, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, doubled down on his party’s increasingly conspiratorial, anti-Western posturing in a rare public address that was reminiscent of Kremlin propaganda. Ivanishvili’s speech was widely viewed as a major milestone in his party’s attempts to turn Georgia away from the West and toward Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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With Georgian society at a geopolitical crossroads and engulfed in increasing violence amid a draconian crackdown on mass protests, many observers are drawing parallels with Ukraine’s 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution. Some are even asking whether the country is now experiencing its own “Yanukovych moment,” a reference to the pro-Kremlin Ukrainian president who fled to Russia following months of unrest.

The two situations certainly appear to have much in common. On both occasions, the country’s pro-Western political forces and civil society protested against an increasingly authoritarian and Kremlin-friendly government in order to defend their basic democratic rights. On both occasions, the brutality of the regime’s response fueled a surge in public support for the protests.

Georgia’s broader political trajectory may also provide some insights into Russia’s plans if its invasion of Ukraine proves successful. The Georgian Dream party first came to power in 2012 at a time when the wounds of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia were still raw. Over the past 12 years, the party has been able to gradually consolidate its grip on power, becoming steadily bolder in its promotion of pro-Kremlin and anti-Western positions. This has been achieved despite the overwhelmingly pro-Western mood in the country.

This kind of scenario appears to be what Russia had in mind for Ukraine at the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Moscow’s initial plan was to decapitate the government in Kyiv and install a puppet regime that would end Ukraine’s Western integration and anchor the country firmly in the Kremlin orbit, despite strong Ukrainian public support for a European future.

While Russia’s initial blitzkrieg failed, the war continues and Moscow has clearly not abandoned its efforts to subjugate Ukraine. Indeed, recent reports of a foiled Russian plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other senior Ukrainian officials suggest the Kremlin still hopes to install a friendlier regime in Kyiv. As they look to address the realities of fierce public opposition to Russia throughout Ukrainian society, Russian policymakers will surely draw on their experience in Georgia over the past decade or so.

The current protests in Georgia are taking place as the country prepares for parliamentary elections in October. The fate of the Foreign Agents Law is expected to significantly impact the course of the coming vote, with Georgian Dream officials accused of planning to use the legislation to silence opponents. The outcome of the October election will tell us much about Georgia’s likely future geopolitical direction. It will also serve as a verdict of sorts on Moscow’s efforts to regain influence in the country despite the painful legacy of the 2008 invasion and the ongoing occupation of Georgian land. This will have huge implications for the wider southern Caucasus region, and may also help shape Russia’s approach to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a Research Fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

In addition to exposing the Kremlin’s dwindling supply of tanks, this year’s strikingly modest Victory Day festivities have also drawn attention to other negative consequences of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion. During the buildup to the holiday, a number of major Russian cities including Pskov, Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod announced they would not be staging traditional Victory Day parades this year. These cancellations were justified on security grounds, highlighting the growing threat posed by Ukraine to targets inside Russia.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has brought the war home to Russia with a highly successful long-range drone campaign against the country’s oil and gas industry, including air strikes against refineries located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. While Kyiv has largely refrained from attacks on civilian targets, Ukraine’s proven ability to strike deep inside Russia is a major blow to the Kremlin, which has vowed to shield the Russian public from the war and prevent any disruption to everyday life.

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The downgrading of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations is a personal blow for Putin, who has sought to place the holiday at the heart of efforts to revive Russian nationalism following the loss of status and perceived humiliations of the early post-Soviet period. This approach marked a departure from the Soviet years, when Victory Day was overshadowed by a number of more ideologically driven holidays such as May Day and the annual anniversary of the October Revolution. Indeed, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades in Moscow.

It was Putin who masterminded the rise of Victory Day to its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Since the early 2000s, he has transformed Victory Day into the propaganda centerpiece of a pseudo-religious cult, complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. Anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s heavily distorted and highly sanitized version of the Soviet role in World War II is treated with the kind of ruthless severity once reserved for medieval heretics. Meanwhile, in a further nod to the continued potency of the World War II narrative in Putin’s Russia, opponents of the Kremlin are routinely branded as “fascists” and “Nazis.”

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The mythology surrounding Putin’s Victory Day cult is not just a matter of repairing battered Russian national pride. It has also helped strengthen perceptions of the Russian army as unbeatable. Both inside Russia and among international audiences, the pomp and propaganda surrounding the holiday have encouraged people to view the Russian army as simply too big and powerful to be defeated. This is complete nonsense. The past few centuries of Russian history are littered with resounding military defeats including the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Russia even managed to lose World War I, despite starting the war on the winning side.

The historically unjustified but widespread belief that Russian victory is somehow inevitable has helped shape the West’s weak response to the invasion of Ukraine. When the war began, most Western observers were convinced Ukraine would fall in a matter of days. Even after the Ukrainian military shocked the world by winning battle after battle and liberating half the land occupied by Russia, many have clung to the assumption that eventual Russian victory remains assured. This defeatist thinking has been an important factor hampering efforts to arm Ukraine adequately. It may yet become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The sight of a lone tank on Red Square this week is a timely reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, Putin’s Russia is far from invincible. For years, the Kremlin has sought to intimidate the outside world with carefully choreographed displays of military muscle-flexing. However, the invasion of Ukraine has revealed a very different reality. Since February 2022, Putin’s once vaunted army has seen its reputation plummet and has suffered a series of stinging battlefield defeats while failing to achieve a decisive breakthrough against its much smaller neighbor. The Russian military remains a formidable force and should not be underestimated, but the events of the past two years have demonstrated that it is also very much beatable. If Ukraine is finally given the necessary tools by the country’s partners, it will finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Fontenrose quoted in the Guardian on Saudi deal with the United States excluding Israel

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:18:39 +0000

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One hundred years of energy transitions

Mahmoud Abouelnaga — Wed, 08 May 2024 12:09:08 +0000

Thousands of energy leaders, technology developers, and climate advocates gathered in Rotterdam, Netherlands from April 22-25 along the 26th World Energy Congress. Looking back at the first Congress, then called the World Power Congress, in London in 1924, global energy systems looked very different. In 1924, global oil production was around 2.8 million barrels per day, compared to almost 102 million barrels per day last year. In other words, a country like South Korea or Canada consumes today the same amount of oil that the whole world needed one hundred years ago.

In 1924, there was no nuclear energy in the global energy mix and renewables were probably beyond the imagination of policy makers. By 1975, there were 200 nuclear power reactors in 19 different countries, but solar and wind power were still practically nonexistent. It was not until the early 2000s that solar and wind began to gain traction and break records year after year, contributing 18 percent of the world’s total energy consumption.

Unlike previous energy transitions, the current energy transition is not mainly driven by a more superior technology in terms of energy density and efficiency alone. The current energy transition is mainly responding to the climate impacts related to energy generation and consumption over the last century, or what economists call “externalities”. However, this transition towards more sustainable sources of energy is constrained by the increasing energy demand globally, especially in emerging and less developed economies. This makes the global energy transition measured against three main criteria, commonly referred to as the “energy trilemma”: energy security, energy affordability, and environmental sustainability.

To address the energy trilemma, four critical discussion themes emerged during the centenary World Energy Congress in Rotterdam: 1. Accelerating the deployment of existing solutions, 2. Scaling innovative technologies, 3. The interaction of energy and artificial intelligence (AI), and 4. Humanizing the energy transition.

Accelerating the deployment of existing solutions

There has been great progress on deployment of clean energy technologies over the last 20 years that made most of these technologies cost-competitive with fossil fuels in today’s market even without financial support. However, these technologies are not deployed fast enough to get us on track to meet our climate targets. For example, utility-scale wind and solar projects in the United States can take 4.5 years on average to obtain the necessary permits and navigate necessary environmental reviews for siting and construction.

There is a need for regulatory reforms that can strike the right balance between timely decisions on clean energy and infrastructure projects while preserving thorough environmental reviews. This balance would not leave project developers concerned about fluctuations in equipment costs while they are waiting on permits. The recent delays in offshore wind projects along US coastlines show how the combination of uncertainty, public acceptance, and affordability can impact the pace of the energy transition.

Scaling innovative technologies

In their 2023 World Energy Transitions Outlook, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) estimated that accelerating the deployment of renewables, energy efficiency, and electrification could achieve 69 percent of global emissions reductions needed to reach net zero by 2050. This would leave almost a third of the needed abatement to innovative, disruptive technologies (e.g., long-duration energy storage, hydrogen, e-fuels, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS), carbon dioxide removal) that have not been deployed at a scale large enough to meet our climate targets.

Renewables need long-duration energy storage at scale to ensure that this clean power is available anytime, day or night. Hydrogen and e-fuels will also be needed to support transportation and industrial applications that require liquid fuels, especially when their high heat demands can’t be met with renewables. Although there has been some progress on production of these cleaner fuels with major hydrogen production and infrastructure projects in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, there are still gaps around how policies can create large demand signals to scale this market.

After all these mitigation efforts are exhausted, there will still be carbon emissions in the air that need to be subtracted from our limited carbon budget, a clear and direct role for carbon management technologies. CCUS can capture emissions from unabated industrial resources or remaining fossil-based power generation units. Some industries, even if they were completely powered by clean energy, would still emit carbon. For example, almost 60 percent of the emissions from cement production are unavoidable process emissions from the calcination process (i.e., the decomposition of calcium carbonate into calcium oxide and carbon dioxide) rather than energy-related emissions. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicated, climate mitigation efforts to date have been insufficient and there is a need for scaling carbon dioxide removal technologies to reduce the risks of climate overshoot and complement emissions reduction efforts, especially from hard-to-abate sectors.

The interaction of energy and artificial intelligence (AI)

Over the last few years, AI has emerged as an enabler for the energy transition. Generative AI can play an important role in modernization of the electric grid by enabling grid operators to make better, faster decisions and optimize loads. Also, AI can be one of the most effective abatement tools for fugitive methane emissions by using satellite and aerial measurements to quantify, map, and predict methane leaks. This approach can revolutionize fugitive emissions abatement by moving from preventive measures to predictive and even descriptive measures.

A successful emissions abatement strategy relies heavily on accurate measurements which can be challenging for companies with complex operations and supply chains. However, the automation capabilities of AI can drastically reduce the margin of error from manual inputs and provide accurate, real-time data to help companies identify where to focus their emissions reduction activities.

Additionally, AI can be used to improve the performance and increase the output of solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) systems by predicting solar output, reducing corrective maintenance costs, and providing a more accurate forecast of the capacity available to the grid from electric loads that can be turned on or off depending on the balance between electric demand and generation.

With the increase in electric vehicles (EV) adoption, AI-enabled energy demand forecasts will be critical in avoiding peak charges and reducing the burden on the grid. Although AI has many advantages to enable the energy transition, its huge energy footprint remains a challenge as countries plan for future energy needs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that electricity consumption from data centers could double by 2026 to be roughly equivalent to the electricity consumption in Japan.

Humanizing the energy transition

Since this is the first energy transition in history that is not driven solely by technology metrics, it is critical to ensure that local communities are involved in climate action plans. With disproportionate impacts of climate change around the world, especially in the global South where most countries have historically contributed far less to global emissions, energy equity and climate justice should be at the center of the energy transition. There is a dire need for bridging the climate finance gap and facilitating the flow of funds to the Global South by de-risking investments and regulatory reforms in developing economies. This would also require institutional reforms in the finance sector to move towards new financing mechanisms (e.g., concessional finance, credit guarantee, grants) rather than the unfair, high-interest loans from multilateral banks that have been the main vehicle for energy infrastructure and development projects for decades.

The world has gone through many energy transitions before, but what probably differentiates the current energy transition is that it encompasses multiple energy transitions happening at the same time. There are transformations across the globe in energy generation processes, infrastructure development, energy policy frameworks, environmental laws, and financing mechanisms. While these transformations do not need to happen at the same pace in every region, countries should ensure that the collective energy transition efforts are sufficient to meet our global climate targets. We have enough tools today to shape the next hundred years of energy.

A hundred years ago, participants at the World Energy Congress were probably not as concerned about energy-related climate impacts. However, we know better today about these impacts and how we can meet global energy needs without compromising environmental integrity. In his masterpiece, One Hundred Years of Solitude, Gabriel Garcia Marquez showed us how it took five generations to decipher the prophecy of the Buendia family and their town of Macondo. We have deciphered the energy trilemma, but global action is imperative to navigate the storm and tackle the climate crisis. If we learned anything from Marquez’s magical realism and the fate of the city of Macondo, we should work together to accelerate the deployment of energy and climate solutions that can shape a brighter future for people and planet.

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Mahmoud Abouelnaga

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Championing positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing

Maria Avdeeva — Tue, 07 May 2024 14:50:36 +0000

Everywhere you look in Kharkiv today, there is evidence of Russian bombing. After four months of relentless aerial attacks, Ukraine’s second city is dotted with ruined buildings, while boarded-up windows have become a ubiquitous feature of the urban landscape. A little over two years ago, this had been a vibrant city known for its many universities and robust industrial economy. It is now becoming the latest symbol of the human suffering inflicted by Russia’s invasion.

There are still plenty of reminders that Kharkiv remains home to over a million people. Freshly planted flowerbeds bloom in bright spring colors. Downtown traffic is still sometimes congested, with delivery boys on bikes and scooters weaving their way through jams of taxi drivers, private cars, and public transport. Supermarkets and many small businesses remain defiantly open, while municipal workers emerge to diligently clear up the mess after each new explosion. But there is no mistaking the menace of sudden death and destruction that now hangs over the city.

Located just thirty kilometers from the Russian border, Kharkiv is Ukraine’s most vulnerable major city and has been on the front lines of the war for more than two years. Russia’s initial blitzkrieg attack on Kharkiv in early 2022 was repelled, with Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive then pushing Putin’s invading army further away from the city. However, since the beginning of 2024, Kharkiv has become the principle target in a new Russian offensive which aims to take advantage of Ukraine’s mounting ammunition shortages and lack of air defenses.

Bombings are now a daily occurrence. Russia employs a mix of weapons including everything from ballistic missiles and drones to vast quantities of long-range glide bombs that are steadily destroying the city from a safe distance. These attacks target residential neighborhoods and critical civilian infrastructure in what appears to be a calculated campaign to make the entire city unlivable.

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Amid the constant threat of bombing, Kharkiv residents continue to display the kind of remarkable resilience that is now synonymous with Ukraine. The city’s Makers coffee chain is a good example of this dogged determination. The chain has actually expanded since the start of the war, doubling its presence in Kharkiv from two outlets to four, while also opening a new branch in the front line city of Kupyansk. Dmytro Kabanets, the twenty nine year old owner of the chain, believes it is vital for local residents to have a sense of community. “The feeling of not being alone is invaluable. People need to know there are others ready to lend a hand, both emotionally and practically,” he says.

Despite this upbeat attitude, he admits staying in business in today’s Kharkiv is becoming more and more difficult. The windows of the chain’s flagship coffee shop are boarded up as a precaution against further bomb damage. Due to Russian attacks on the city’s energy infrastructure, electricity supplies are a major challenge for all local businesses. After both of Kharkiv’s biggest power plants were destroyed in March, the city has experienced rolling blackouts. The rumble of generators has become a background feature of everyday life, with restaurants offering “generator-friendly’ menu items that require minimal power to prepare.

Many analysts believe Russia’s objective is to depopulate Kharkiv ahead of a summer offensive that will aim to seize the city and deliver a decisive blow to Ukrainian resistance. Rumors of looming encirclement and evacuations swirl around on social media, often fueled by Russian disinformation. For now, there is no indication of a mass exodus from Kharkiv, but the strain and trauma of recent months are forcing residents to make hard decisions.

Yevhen Streltsov, who runs the city’s Radio Nakypilo, says everyone approaches the issue of whether to stay or go in a highly personal manner. Some residents are bracing themselves for a repeat of the artillery barrages that rocked Kharkiv in the first months of the war. Others say they will only leave if the city is under direct threat of Russian occupation. “The situation is tense, but there is no panic,” he says, noting that he and his team are determined to continue their mission of broadcasting to the local population.

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For some Kharkiv residents, the stress has already become too much. Exhausted and emotionally drained by months of Russian bombardment, they are heading westward to Kyiv or beyond. Many are leaving their homes for the second time, having returned to Kharkiv after initially fleeing the city in the first days of the invasion.

Inevitably, the outflow of people is having an impact on the local economy. Revenues at the Makers coffee chain have dropped by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Across Kharkiv, companies are reluctantly shutting down as people move their families to safety, with some businesses being put up for sale. Many of the city’s public spaces now feel eerily empty, especially once evening arrives.

It is still far too early to write Kharkiv off. While more and more residents are understandably seeking to escape the horrors of daily bombing, many remain determined to stay put. The population is clearly declining, but it remains nowhere near the lows witnessed during the early months of the invasion, when only around 300,000 people remained in the city.

If Russia does launch a serious campaign to capture or encircle Kharkiv in the coming months, this would represent by far the Kremlin’s most ambitious undertaking since losing the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. The Ukrainian army will fight hard to defend the country’s second city, and they will be supported by a still sizable local population. Given the considerable difficulties Russia has encountered in seizing much smaller towns such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, it is far from certain that Putin’s invading army currently has the offensive capabilities to take Kharkiv.

As the summer campaigning season approaches, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine is rising and requires urgent international attention. Kharkiv is now the focal point of Russia’s entire invasion and is in desperate need of increased air defenses. This is the only way to prevent it from becoming the largest in a long line of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by the Russian military.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Cole spoke at the 2024 AI Expo in Washington DC

gmatchett — Tue, 07 May 2024 14:33:12 +0000

On May 7-8, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow August Cole spoke at the 2024 artificial intelligence for national competitiveness expo in Washington DC. He spoke on a “Venture Capital Perspectives on the Technologies That Will Drive the 21st Century” panel and did a meet and greet for his books Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution & Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War.

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UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 03 May 2024 21:23:35 +0000

Ukraine can use British-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russia, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated during a May 2 visit to Kyiv. “Ukraine has that right,” Cameron told Reuters. “Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it’s defending itself.”

The British Foreign Secretary’s comments represent a departure from the cautious position adopted by most of Ukraine’s Western partners over the past two years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the majority of countries backing Ukraine have insisted that Western weapons can only be used within Ukraine’s international borders and must not be deployed against targets inside the Russian Federation.

These restrictions reflect widespread concerns in Western capitals over a possible escalation of the current war into a far broader European conflict. Moscow has skillfully exploited the West’s fear of escalation, with Kremlin officials regularly warning of Russian red lines and Vladimir Putin making frequent thinly-veiled nuclear threats.

So far, Russia’s intimidation tactics have proved highly effective. By threatening to escalate the war, Moscow has been able to slow down the flow of military aid to Ukraine, while also deterring the delivery of certain weapons categories and limiting Kyiv’s ability to strike back against otherwise legitimate targets inside Russia.

This has placed Ukraine at a significant military disadvantage. Already massively outgunned and outnumbered by its much larger and wealthier Russian adversary, Ukraine has had to defend itself without the ability to deploy Western weapons against Russia’s military infrastructure. Critics of this approach claim the West is effectively making Ukraine fight against a far larger opponent with one hand tied behind its back.

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With the existence of their country under threat, Ukrainians have bristled at Western restrictions and are using their own limited range of weapons to strike back. These attacks include a recent campaign of long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries that have hurt the Russian energy sector and divided opinion among Ukraine’s partners. While US officials have voiced their disapproval and urged Kyiv to focus on military targets, France has indicated its support.

The situation regarding the use of Western weapons on Russian territory has been further complicated by the Kremlin’s territorial claims inside Ukraine. In September 2022, Moscow declared the “annexation” of four Ukrainian regions and officially incorporated them into the Russian Constitution. Fighting has continued in all four of these partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, with the Ukrainian military free to deploy Western weapons despite the Kremlin’s insistence that these regions are now part of Russia.

In contrast to the caution displayed by Western leaders, Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff and exposed the emptiness of Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Weeks after the Kremlin dictator ceremoniously announced the entry of Kherson into the Russian Federation, Ukrainian troops liberated the city. Rather than retaliating by deploying the might of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin simply accepted this humiliating defeat and withdrew his beleaguered army across the Dnipro River.

The Kremlin’s reaction to mounting Ukrainian attacks on the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula has been similarly underwhelming. Since first occupying Crimea in 2014, Putin has portrayed the peninsula in almost mystical terms as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status. However, when Ukraine used a combination of locally developed naval drones and Western-supplied cruise missiles to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Putin quietly ordered the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from Crimea and head for Russian ports. Despite the crucial role played by Western weapons in this Ukrainian success, there has been no sign of any escalation from Russia.

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With the Russian invasion now in its third year, there are indications that Western leaders may now finally be overcoming their self-defeating fear of escalation. In addition to David Cameron’s landmark comments regarding the use of British weapons inside Russia, the US has recently begun providing Ukraine with large quantities of long-range ATACMS missile systems capable of striking targets throughout occupied Ukrainian territory. Moscow had consistently warned against such deliveries, but has yet to provide any meaningful response to this highly conspicuous crossing of yet another Russian red line.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron is actively attempting to reclaim the escalation initiative from Moscow by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. This development has clearly riled the Kremlin. Putin has reacted to Macron’s newfound boldness by engaging in more nuclear blackmail, while the nuclear saber-rattling continued last weekend on Russia’s flagship current affairs TV show. None of this seems to have put Macron off. On the contrary, he remains adamant that direct Western military involvement in the defense of Ukraine must remain on the table.

This apparent strengthening of Western resolve comes at a pivotal moment in the war. With Ukrainian forces suffering from shortages in both ammunition and manpower, Russia has recently been able to regain the battlefield initiative and make significant advances for the first time in two years. Preparations are now underway for a major Russian summer offensive that could potentially break through Ukraine’s weakened front lines and deliver a knockout blow to the war weary country.

Removing restrictions on attacks inside Russia would enable Ukraine to disrupt preparations for the coming offensive. It would also limit Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian cities and destroy the country’s civilian infrastructure with impunity. This will not be enough to transform the course of the war, but it will go some way to evening out the odds.

By giving Kyiv the green light to use Western weapons in Russia, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron has established an important new precedent. This is in many ways fitting. After all, Britain has consistently set the tone for international aid since the eve of the Russian invasion, providing Ukrainians with anti-tank weapons, tanks, and cruise missiles in advance of other allies. Ukrainians will now be hoping the country’s other partners follow suit soon.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Officials in Kyiv hope this new wave of weapons deliveries will arrive in time to help stabilize the front lines of the war and prevent further Russian advances. In recent months, Russia has taken advantage of the Ukrainian military’s mounting supply problems to edge forward at various points along the one thousand kilometer front line, often overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with sheer numbers and relentless bombardments.

During Stoltenberg’s Kyiv visit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to send additional military aid as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian leader said the battlefield situation “directly depended” on the timely delivery of ammunition supplies to Ukraine. “Today, I don’t see any positive developments on this point yet. Some supplies have begun to arrive, but this process needs to speed up.”

The sense of urgency in Kyiv reflects widespread expectations that Vladimir Putin will launch a major summer offensive in late May or early June. Having already succeeded in regaining the battlefield initiative, Russian commanders now hope to smash through Ukraine’s weakened defensive lines and achieve major territorial gains for the first time since the initial stages of the invasion in spring 2022. Ukraine’s international partners currently find themselves in a race against the clock to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities before Russia’s anticipated offensive can get fully underway.

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Ukraine’s recent supply issues and battlefield setbacks have highlighted the need for a more reliable long-term approach to arming the country against Russia. At present, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself depends heavily on the changing political winds in a number of Western capitals. This makes it difficult for Ukraine’s military and political leaders to plan future campaigns, while also encouraging the Kremlin to believe it can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to address this problem, Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a $100 billion, five-year fund backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 32 members. While in the Ukrainian capital, he reiterated his support for this initiative. “I believe we need a major, multi-year financial commitment to sustain our support. To demonstrate that our support to Ukraine is not short term and ad hoc, but long-term and predictable.”

Crucially, Stoltenberg believes a five-year fund would help convince the Kremlin that Ukraine’s NATO partners have the requisite resolve to maintain their support until Russia’s invasion is defeated. “Moscow must understand: They cannot win. And they cannot wait us out,” the NATO chief commented in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg’s message has never been more relevant. With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Putin is widely believed to be counting on a decline in Western support for Ukraine. Following the failure of his initial blitzkrieg attack in 2022, the Russian dictator has changed tactics and is now attempting to break Ukraine’s resistance in a long war of attrition. Given Russia’s vastly superior human and material resources, this approach has a good chance of succeeding, unless Ukraine’s Western partners remain committed to arming the country.

The issue of a long term military fund for Ukraine will likely be high on the agenda at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC in July. With little hope of any meaningful progress on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, a commitment to provide reliable long-term support may be the most realistic summit outcome for Kyiv. This would not solve the existential challenges posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, but it would bolster the Ukrainian war effort and dent morale in Moscow while sending a message to Putin that time is not on his side.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

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Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

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Since late 2023, the negative impact of delaying military aid to Ukraine has been all too apparent. With Ukrainian troops often at a ten-to-one disadvantage in terms of artillery firepower, Russia has been able to advance at various points along the approximately 1000 kilometer front line of the war, capturing the town of Avdiivka in February and pushing further forward in recent weeks. Russian commanders have also taken advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses to launch a new bombing campaign targeting the country’s cities and civilian energy infrastructure. This has led to the destruction of multiple power plants, sparking fears of a looming humanitarian catastrophe.

As soon as it begins to arrive in the coming days, US aid will go some way to addressing the most immediate challenges facing Ukraine. The package approved this week in Washington DC includes air defense systems and interceptor ammunition that will help protect residential areas and vital infrastructure from further Russian bombardment. Likewise, the delivery of artillery shells and long-range missiles should make it far more difficult for the Russian army to advance and occupy additional Ukrainian territory. Russian dominance of the skies above the battlefields of eastern and southern Ukraine will also soon become increasingly contested.

At the same time, this new US military aid package will not provide Ukraine with anything like the quantities it needs to defeat Russia. This has been a problem ever since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022. While the West has provided significant amounts of military aid, weapons have consistently been delivered to Ukraine after extended delays and in insufficient quantities. The first meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which brings together more than 50 countries in support of Ukraine, did not take place until more than two months after the onset of Russia’s invasion. It would be almost a year before NATO member countries agreed to supply Ukraine with a modest number of modern tanks. With the invasion now in its third year, Ukraine is still waiting for the arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets.

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The underwhelming international response to Russia’s invasion has led to accusations that Ukraine’s partners seek to provide Kyiv with sufficient weapons to avoid defeat but not enough to actually win. This cautious approach is primarily due to the West’s well-documented fear of escalation. It also reflects widespread concerns over the potentially destabilizing geopolitical consequences of a Ukrainian victory.

Many in the West seem to sincerely believe that if confronted by the prospect of imminent battlefield defeat, a desperate Vladimir Putin may be prepared to use nuclear weapons. Putin himself has skillfully exploited these fears, intimidating Western leaders into self-deterrence with his frequent and thinly-veiled nuclear threats. Meanwhile, if Russia does lose the war, there is considerable anxiety that this could lead to the collapse of the Putin regime and the breakup of the Russian Federation into a series of smaller successor states. Faced with these nightmare scenarios, Kyiv’s Western backers have repeatedly shied away from bold decisions that could have turned the tide of the war decisively in Ukraine’s favor.

Russia’s war effort suffers from no such uncertainty or indecision. On the contrary, Putin has succeeded in mobilizing the entire country in support of his invasion. He has moved the Russian economy onto a war footing, and is now comfortably outproducing the far wealthier West in key categories such as artillery shells. The Kremlin-controlled Russian media and the Russian Orthodox Church have led efforts to consolidate popular backing for the invasion of Ukraine, which has been presented to the Russian public as a “holy war” and an existential struggle against the West. With no sign of domestic opposition and ample supplies of both men and equipment, Russia is clearly preparing for a long war.

There are growing indications that Europe now recognizes the scale of the threat posed by Russia. This week, Britain confirmed its largest Ukrainian military aid package to date. In recent months, French President Emmanuel Macron has acknowledged that Ukrainian victory is vital for European security, and has refused to rule out sending French troops. Across Europe, initiatives to boost armament manufacturing are gradually gaining momentum and will lead to far greater production volumes by the end of the current year. This is encouraging but it is not enough.

The recent scare over US aid has underlined the fragility of the current Western approach to arming Ukraine. With the future of US support for Ukraine still uncertain, European leaders must accept a far greater share of the burden. This means taking the necessary steps to move toward a wartime economy capable of supplying the Ukrainian military for years to come. Such a shift is likely to prove politically unpopular with domestic European audiences, but the alternative is even more unpalatable. Unless Putin is stopped in Ukraine, he will go further. Europe can either support Ukraine today or face a resurgent Russia tomorrow, with all the additional costs this would involve.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Navigating dominant narratives and data accuracy: Implications for energy security

Sara Vakhshouri — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 15:48:09 +0000

Top lines

Energy market forecasts create data-driven narratives that economists and lawmakers use to inform consequential policy and investment decisions.
Projections by influential international energy organizations, including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), vary widely. This discrepancy not only creates uncertainty within the market but also has the potential to impact market decisions and, ultimately, undermine energy security.
Moving forward, organizations must improve data accuracy and transparency, so that stakeholders can navigate energy market uncertainties with confidence, ensuring a resilient, sustainable, and inclusive energy future.

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THE DIAGNOSIS

Energy market shocks and uncertainties, from the COVID-19 pandemic to geopolitical tensions, highlight the importance of understanding the nuanced interplay between data-driven narratives and market expectations within the energy sector. These narratives, which are shaped by reputable energy organizations, wield significant influence over market dynamics, impacting commodity pricing and investment trends.

Delving into these narratives and discerning underlying sentiments are crucial for unlocking insights vital for ensuring energy security. By scrutinizing data-driven narratives, policymakers, analysts, and investors can adeptly navigate the intricacies of the energy market, anticipating trends, and making informed policy and investment decisions.

However, discrepancies between how major energy organizations like OPEC and the IEA approach forecasting complicate navigating energy market uncertainties both in the short and medium terms.

The IEA and OPEC offer distinct scenarios to forecast future energy trends and inform policy decisions. Comparing the organizations’ 2023 outlook reports, the IEA’s World Energy Outlook scenarios focus on specific policy targets like net-zero emissions and aligning with the goals of the Paris Agreement. In contrast, OPEC’s World Oil Outlook scenarios incorporate policies more broadly, reflecting a range of possible policy outcomes and market conditions. This distinction is crucial, as it results in significantly varied projections.

IEA’s reliance on a policy-based methodology, evident in its outlook report and the influential Net Zero Roadmap, is susceptible to inaccuracies due to policy shifts driven by changing geopolitical, economic, environmental, and, ultimately, national security priorities. While this methodology provides insights into potential future scenarios based on existing policies, it should not be the sole determinant for policy and investment decisions, given the fluid nature of policies. These inaccuracies between policies and market realities in the future can lead to decisions that are not aligned with market realities, posing a threat to energy security.

BOTTOM LINES

Moving forward, improving data accuracy, and enhancing data-driven modeling are vital for crafting effective policies and shaping investment decisions in the face of energy market uncertainties. Access to accurate data and transparent modeling assumptions is crucial for informed decision-making, particularly during the energy transition. By embracing data-driven narratives rooted in classical forecasting models alongside with polices, stakeholders can navigate energy market uncertainties with confidence, ensuring a resilient, sustainable, and inclusive energy future.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sara Vakhshouri is founder and president of SVB Energy International & SVB Green Access, Senior Energy Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, and chair of the Center for Energy Security and Energy Diplomacy at the Institute of World Politics, a graduate school focusing on national security and statecraft.

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UAE tech minister: AI will be ‘the new lifeblood’ for governments and the private sector

Nick Fouriezos — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 00:51:59 +0000

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UAE AI Minister Omar Al Olama on the era of artificial intelligence

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Omar Sultan Al Olama provides insights into the UAE’s strategy to position itself as a leader in AI readiness, while also highlighting the UAE’s contributions to the global AI landscape.

Artificial Intelligence Middle East Technology & Innovation

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) hasn’t been shy about its ambition to become a global leader on artificial intelligence (AI). The Gulf nation became the first in the world to appoint an AI minister back in 2017, and has hosted a number of top tech emissaries, from Microsoft’s Satya Nadella to Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, in recent months.

Naming its landmark 2022 AI model “Falcon LLM” after its national bird, leaders in the country of ten million have aimed to position themselves as players in the AI arms race dominated by the United States and China—while trying to diversify their historically oil-dominated economy.

Speaking at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Friday, Omar Sultan Al Olama, the UAE minister of state for artificial intelligence, digital economy, and remote work applications, said we should expect a lot more AI ministers around the world in the coming years.

“AI is going to be the new lifeblood, the new foundation for most governments—and for the private sector as well—and we need to have more focused government positions that are able to really look at the impact of the technology and are able to steer it.”

Here are some of the most telling takeaways from Al Olama’s conversation with Steven Overly, host of the POLITICO Tech podcast.

A ‘marriage’ with Microsoft

On Monday, Microsoft announced that it would be investing $1.5 billion in G42, an Abu Dhabi-based AI firm. The collaboration aims to pair Microsoft’s LLM research and other technologies with the UAE’s burgeoning AI workforce, which has already quadrupled from 2001 to 2023 to include 120,000 workers, according to Al Olama.

Comparing the deal to a “marriage,” Al Olama said it doesn’t just represent a technological match, but a cultural one. “I don’t think a company the size of Microsoft, with the letter and backing of the US government, is going to go into business and actually invest in a company if there weren’t reassurances that they see eye-to-eye and operate with a similar culture, similar mentality, and similar moral, strategic grounds.”

Is aligning with Microsoft a sign that the UAE is siding with the United States over China? Al Olama didn’t embrace the idea, emphasizing instead that the future of AI technology can’t be a zero-sum game and must include all international stakeholders. “Any party being excluded from a global conversation is negative, and the reason for that is this technology can go sideways,” Al Olama said.

Al Olama went on to compare the increasingly heated AI conversation to the way competing nations had to navigate the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. “There were conversations that were taking place between the adversaries at the time to actually understand what should or should not be done, and how they could maneuver this very delicate environment.”

Addressing the second-order impacts of AI

With the UAE making global news in recent days after a shock storm dumped a decade’s worth of rain on the streets of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, Al Olama emphasized that AI and other technologies will inform their future responses. “It’s something we couldn’t have prepared for, but what you’re going to see next time is that we will be better prepared to leverage technology to help forecast better and ensure that people have less of an inconvenience when these events occur.”

When asked about training AI while protecting privacy and copyright laws, Al Olama said that as the public becomes more attuned to safeguarding their data (and not giving it away for free), the technology will shift accordingly. “We were at one point a wild, wild West,” he said. “As we go forward, it’s going to become much more difficult for you to crawl the Internet and collect everything that’s available.”

Such questions should be answered by a consortium of international experts, both from technology and public policy backgrounds, Al Olama said, which is why he also predicted a growing trend of governments appointing AI-focused officials like himself to navigate such thorny challenges. “There is an element here that is really very subjective . . . So we need to really engage the public and try to understand where they feel like the pain points are higher.”

However, even as governments pursue thoughtful regulation, Al Olama was careful to point out that there was no placing this genie back in the bottle. “Most governments that have just gone and banned technologies because they didn’t understand them, or because they felt like a trade-off was too large, have backtracked. I don’t think it’s healthy to do that, especially if the decision was based on ignorance.”

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

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EU AI Act sets the stage for global AI governance: Implications for US companies and policymakers

Mohamed Elbashir — Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:51:29 +0000

The European Union (EU) has made a significant step forward in shaping the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI) with the recent approval of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) by the European Parliament. This historic legislation, passed by an overwhelming margin of 523-46 on March 13, 2024, creates the world’s first comprehensive framework for AI regulation. The EU will now roll out the new regulation in a phased approach through 2027. The bloc took a risk-based approach to AI governance, strictly prohibiting AI practices that are considered unacceptable, with some AI systems classified as high-risk, while encouraging responsible innovation.

The law is expected to enter into force between May and June after approval from the European Council; its impact is expected to extend far beyond the EU’s borders, reshaping the global AI landscape and establishing a new standard for AI governance around the world.

While reviewing the EU AI Act’s requirements for tech companies, it is critical to distinguish between core obligations that will have the greatest impact on AI development and deployment and those that are more peripheral.

Tech companies should prioritize transparency obligations such as disclosing AI system use, clearly indicating AI-generated content, maintaining detailed technical documentation, and reporting serious incidents or malfunctions. These transparency measures are critical for ensuring AI systems’ trustworthiness, accountability, and explainability, which are the Act’s primary goals.

More peripheral requirements exist, such as registering the classified high-risk AI systems in a public EU database or establishing specific compliance assessment procedures. Prioritizing these key obligations allows tech companies to demonstrate their commitment to responsible AI development while also ensuring compliance with the most important aspects of the EU AI Act.

The Act strictly prohibits certain high-risk AI practices that have been deemed unacceptable. These prohibited practices include using subliminal techniques or exploiting vulnerabilities to materially distort human behavior, which has the potential to cause physical or psychological harm, particularly to vulnerable groups such as children or the elderly. The Act prohibits social scoring systems, which rate individuals or groups based on social behavior and interactions. These systems can be harmful, discriminatory, and racially biased.

Certain AI systems are classified as high-risk under the EU AI Act due to their potential to have a significant or severe impact on people and society. These high-risk AI systems include those used in critical infrastructure like transportation, energy, and water supply, where failures endanger citizens’ lives and health. AI systems used in educational or vocational training that affect access to learning and professional development, such as those used to score exams or evaluate candidates, are also considered high-risk. The Act also classifies AI systems used as safety components in products, such as robot-assisted surgery or autonomous vehicles, as high-risk, as well as those used in employment, worker management, and access to self-employment, such as resume-sorting software for recruitment or employee performance monitoring and evaluation systems.

Furthermore, AI systems used in critical private and public services, such as credit scoring or determining access to public benefits, as well as those used in law enforcement, migration, asylum, border control management, and the administration of justice and democratic processes, are classified as high-risk under the EU AI Act.

The Act set stringent requirements for these systems include thorough risk assessments, high-quality datasets, traceability measures, detailed documentation, human oversight, and robustness standards. Companies running afoul of the new rules could face fines of up to 7 percent of global revenue or $38 million, whichever is higher.

The Act classifies all remote biometric identification systems as high-risk and generally prohibits their use in publicly accessible areas for law enforcement purposes, with only a few exceptions. The national security exemption in the Act has raised concerns among civil society and human rights groups because it creates a double standard between private tech companies and government agencies when it comes to AI systems used for national security, potentially allowing government agencies to use these same technologies without the same oversight and accountability.

The EU AI Act has far-reaching implications for US AI companies and policymakers. Companies developing or deploying AI systems in or for the EU market will have to navigate the Act’s strict requirements, which requires significant changes to their AI development and governance practices. This likely would involve investments to improve risk assessment and mitigation processes, ensure the quality and representativeness of training data, implement comprehensive policies and documentation procedures, and establish strong human oversight mechanisms. Besides significant penalties, noncompliance with the Act’s provisions may result in reputational damage which can be significant and long-lasting, resulting in a severe loss of trust and credibility, as well as widespread public backlash, negative media coverage, customer loss, partnerships, investment opportunities, and boycott calls.

The AI Act’s extraterritorial reach means that US companies will be impacted if their AI systems are used by EU customers. This emphasizes the importance for US AI companies to closely monitor and adapt to the changing regulatory landscape in the EU, regardless of their primary market focus.

As Thierry Breton, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, said on X (formerly Twitter), “Europe is NOW a global standard-setter in AI”. The EU AI Act will likely shape AI legislation in other countries by setting a high-risk-based regulation standard for AI governance. Many countries are already considering the EU AI Act as they formulate their AI policies. François-Philippe Champagne, Canada’s Minister of Innovation, Science, and Industry, has stated that the country is closely following the development of the EU AI Act as it works on its own AI legislation. A partnership that is already strong with the boost of their joint strategic digital partnership to address AI challenges by implementing the EU-Canada Digital Partnership.

Similarly, the Japanese government has expressed an interest in aligning its AI governance framework with the EU’s approach as Japan’s ruling party is expected to push for AI legislation within 2024. As more countries find inspiration in the EU AI Act, similar AI penal provisions are likely to become the de facto global standard for AI regulation.

The impact of the EU AI Act on the technology industry is expected to be significant, as companies developing and deploying AI systems will need to devote resources to compliance measures, which raise costs and slow innovation in the short term, especially for startups. However, the Act’s emphasis on responsible AI development and protecting fundamental rights is the region’s first attempt to set up guardrails and increase public trust in AI technologies, with the overall goal of promoting long-term growth and adoption.

Tech giants, like Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, and Sam Altman have repeatedly asked governments to regulate AI. Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google and Alphabet, stated last year that “AI is too important not to regulate”, and the EU AI Act is an important step toward ensuring that AI is developed and used in a way that benefits society at large.

As other countries look to the EU AI Act as a model for their own legislation, US policymakers should continue engaging in international dialogues to ensure consistent approaches to AI governance globally, helping to ease regulatory fragmentation.

The EU AI Act is a watershed moment in the global AI governance and regulatory landscape, with far-reaching implications for US AI companies and policymakers. As the Act approaches implementation, it is critical for US stakeholders to proactively engage with the changing regulatory environment, adapt their practices to ensure compliance and contribute to the development of responsible AI governance frameworks that balance innovation, competitiveness, and fundamental rights.

Fellow

Mohamed Elbashir

GeoTech Center

Arabic Digital Policy

GeoTech Center

Championing positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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Konaev cited in Taipei Times about drone warfare, deterring China, and global conflict

gmatchett — Sat, 20 Apr 2024 15:08:38 +0000

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

On April 20, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in the Taipei Times about drone warfare as a deterrent against China and its implications on increasing global conflict.

Former fellow

Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

The post Konaev cited in Taipei Times about drone warfare, deterring China, and global conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems

gmatchett — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:01:32 +0000

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

The post Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems appeared first on Atlantic Council.

China vs. IMEC: The Minilateral Movement in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:26:13 +0000

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Key takeaways

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Current Geopolitical Context
France’s Strategic Involvement in IMEC
Uncertainties Surrounding IMEC
Changing Landscape post-Gaza War

Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

00:23 – Exploring Middle East Mini Laterals

05:41 – Analyzing the US-led I2U2 Initiative

06:58 – Middle Eastern Caution Towards a New Quad

11:28 – Research Challenges in a Changing Middle East

15:04 – Jordan’s Vital Role in Regional Stability

18:37 – Unpacking China’s Regional Influence

23:35 – Shifting Foreign Policies Amid US-China Competition

26:31 – Innovations in Security via Mini Laterals

30:08 – Insights on Middle Eastern Politics and China’s Responses

35:28 – UAE and India: Infrastructural Investments and Rebranding

38:27 – Issues with IMEC Format and Financing Concerns

40:24 – Uncertainties Surrounding Israel’s Role

43:12 – Outro

In this episode

Fellow

Jean-Loup Samaan

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Arabic Defense Policy

About

In this episode, Jean-Loup Samaan, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute, joins us to dissect the rise of the new minilateral movement in the Middle East, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the groundbreaking corridor, and its impact on the region compared to Chinese initiatives. Explore the ongoing significance of IMEC and its uncertainties, including financial concerns. Dive deeper into:

Shifting Alliances: How is the post-Gaza war landscape impacting Israel’s role in minilateral movements, especially US-led, potentially boosting China’s influence?
The Abraham Accords Ripple Effect: How did the Accords kickstart and pave the way for a new era of cooperation in the Middle East?
IMEC’s Impact and France’s Role: Will it become a game-changer for India-MENA trade, and what is France’s strategic engagement in the grouping?

This episode offers a deep dive into the evolving power dynamics of the Middle East, with China, India, and the US vying for influence. Tune in to understand how these minilateral groupings, like IMEC, might reshape the region’s future!

Hosted by

Fellow

Jonathan Fulton

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

China Chinese

The benefit of minilaterals is creating new discussion mechanisms among countries, crucial in regions like the Middle East lacking strong security frameworks

Jean-Loup Samaan

About the China-MENA podcast

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.