An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

Report

May 31, 2024

PACC 2030 objectives: The road to implementation

By Wazim Mowla, Charlene Aguilera

The Atlantic Council organized a PACC 2030 Working Group and worked closely with governments, the business community, and civil society organizations to support the implementation of PACC 2030’s objectives.

Caribbean Climate Change & Climate Action

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Apr 16, 2024

Advancing health and resilience policies in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Isabel Chiriboga, Martin Cassinelli, Diego Area

During an off-the-record private roundtable, thought leaders and practitioners from across the Americas discussed how to further enhance access to and finance for health services and products in the region.

Coronavirus Latin America

Summit of the Americas

Amid global uncertainties and new challenges, the ninth Summit of the Americas is a renewed opportunity to bring about hemispheric cooperation and consensus to reach regional prosperity and security.

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Isabel Chiriboga

Assistant Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Colombia Corruption

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Maite Gonzalez Latorre

Program Assistant

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Education

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Diego Area

Deputy Director, Strategic Development

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Crisis Management Democratic Transitions

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

I. Addressing the Soviet legacy

II. Pre-war policies

III. The ethnic variable

IV. Wartime policies undermine population growth

V. Conclusion

About the author

Russia’s future will be characterized by a smaller population. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has virtually guaranteed that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be not only smaller, but also older, more fragile, and less well-educated. It will almost certainly be ethnically less Russian and more religiously diverse. While some might view diversity as a strength, many Russians do not see it this way. In a world with hordes of people on the move to escape war, persecution, poverty, and the increasing impact of climate change, xenophobic political rhetoric sells well.

Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems, beginning in his first months as president. Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades. However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.

The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations. Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.

United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.

While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging. Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.

There have been four important inflection points in demography policy since Putin became president. The first came in 2006, when Putin’s rhetoric about demography finally resulted in specific policies: demography was one of the first four national projects he launched at that time. The second significant change came following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The reaction to that aggression in Ukraine, Moldova, and other former Soviet republics narrowed the number of countries providing labor to Russia.

A third key moment was the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack near Moscow in March 2024. Tajiks made up half of the immigrants to Russia in 2023, but that has become politically problematic in the aftermath of the Crocus attack. The most recent policy shifts accompanied the formation of a new government in May 2024. Initial reports promise a long-term approach that perhaps begins to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality. It comes too late, and the measures proposed fail to offer new solutions.

The paper begins with a summary of the demographic problems the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union and its ineffective initial response. The second section reviews the deteriorating situation after 2013. The third section focuses on ways Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is exacerbating all of these challenges. The conclusion suggests what impact population decline will have on Russia’s future.

Addressing the Soviet legacy

The Soviet Union experienced multiple demographic shocks in the twentieth century. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, recovery appeared possible. Yet by the 1960s, Russia’s high infant mortality and low adult life expectancy were outliers compared with most highly industrialized countries.

The population shock from World War II echoed for decades. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign in 1986–1987 generated a brief improvement in life expectancy, but this was hardly enough to change the dynamic.

Economic disruptions, beginning with Gorbachev’s perestroika and continuing into the 1990s, resulted in fewer births, higher mortality, and significant emigration. The dissolution of the Soviet Union spurred massive population relocation, as millions of Russians and non-Russians returned to their titular homelands. Every former Soviet republic became more ethnically homogeneous. This trend has continued within the Russian Federation, as some non-Russian republics continue to become less Russian. Russians relocating within the Russian Federation have reduced the population in the Far East.

Russia’s immigration-emigration balance involves several population flows. Russians have moved back to Russia from newly independent former Soviet republics. As Russia’s economy improved, labor migrants, primarily from former Soviet republics, have found formal and informal work in Russia. Prior to the war, the immigrants compensated for the multiple waves of (mostly Russian) people emigrating from Russia.

The breakdown of the Warsaw Pact —and then the Soviet Union itself—disrupted economic linkages and supply chains that had existed for decades. Economic insecurity reduced already-declining birth rates across much of the post-Soviet space. Russia’s total fertility rate (TFR)—the number of births per woman—dropped from just below replacement level in 1988 to 1.3 in 2004. Maintaining a population level requires a TFR of at least 2.1 without positive net immigration; Russia’s high adult mortality rate requires one even higher.

In his initial inaugural address in August 2000, Putin warned that Russia could become “an enfeebled nation” due to population decline. Despite the warnings, little was done. Russia’s TFR increased from 1.25 in 2000 to 1.39 in 2007. This slight improvement reflected better economic conditions due to rising oil prices, and a (temporarily) larger number of women in the 18–35 age cohort.

One reason for persistent difficulty in achieving higher birth rates or TFR numbers has been the legacy of Soviet polices. Lack of access to effective birth control and male resistance to condom use resulted in abortion being the widely used solution for unwanted pregnancies. Murray Feshbach calculated that the Soviet-era abortion rate averaged seven per woman. Far less attention has been devoted to male infertility. Alcohol and substance abuse have resulted in unusually high infertility rates among Russian men.

Low birth rates are only one part of the population problem. Unhealthy diet and lifestyle, binge alcohol consumption, and accidents contribute to the high adult mortality numbers. When Putin was first elected president in 2000, Russian men aged 18–64 were dying at four times the rate of European men. Russian women were perishing at about the same rate as European men.
Until early 2005, Putin’s public position was that Russia could offset its population decline by attracting more Russians living in former Soviet republics to return to Russia, bringing with them needed skills while augmenting the ethnic Russian population. This immigration offset much of the population loss in the 1990s but has increasingly declined since Putin became president. Significantly, non-Russians became the dominant labor migrants.

Data from the Russian state statistics service Goskomstat indicate legal immigration peaked at 1.147 million in 1994 and declined each year thereafter, shrinking to 350,900 in 2000 and 70,000 in 2004.

Despite the declining numbers, the Russian government adopted a highly restrictive law in 2002 limiting legal immigration. When the Security Council discussed immigration again in 2005, Putin called for a more “humane approach,” dropping the racial and religious criteria. Yet he followed this with a “clarification” prioritizing Russian speakers. It is possible that Putin understood the situation but adjusted his rhetoric in accord with public opinion.

Russian media reports of a massive influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s were wildly exaggerated. By 2000, as oil prices rose, workers from Central Asia, Ukraine, and Moldova found formal or informal work in Russia. Russia incorporated the populations of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and additional territories since 2022, which accounts for official claims of a larger “Russian” population.

Immigrants to Russia have come overwhelmingly from former Soviet republics, which account for 95–96 percent of the total. Just five countries that were part of the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) had population growth between 1989 and 2004. Migrants from two former Soviet republics with declining populations, Ukraine and Moldova, continued to provide labor until 2014. Putin reiterated the importance of demography in his inaugural addresses in 2012, 2018, and 2024, and in many of his annual call-in programs. Several times he has acknowledged the failure to achieve promised increases in births. Yet there appears to be no learning curve regarding policies. Putin’s 2024 address promised more of the same: paying Russians to have larger families, accompanied by invoking the need for more soldiers to defend the motherland.

Pre-war policies

As the price of oil increased in the 2000s, Putin’s government debated how to use the windfall to address persistent demographic challenges. As in many countries, immigration remains politically fraught. Russian nationalist groups adopted “Russia for the Russians” as a campaign slogan. Improving life expectancy is an ideal solution, but it is slow and expensive, depending on adults taking care of their health. Putin’s government opted for pro-natal policies. In his presidential address in 2006, Putin cited demography as “the most serious problem in Russia today.” Rather than listening to advisers familiar with the basket of diverse policies that improved birth rates in France and Sweden—prenatal and postnatal care, parental leave, daycare, preschool programs, housing support, and other incentives—Russia’s government emphasized “maternity capital.”

The initial maternity capital program offered incentives to women for the birth or adoption of a second or additional child. The funds, paid when a child turned three, could be used for housing, the child’s education at an accredited institution, the mother’s pension, or assistance for children with disabilities. Over time, changes have included payment for a first child and improved housing. The annually indexed funding was enough to encourage additional births in rural areas and smaller towns but had little impact in higher-priced urban areas that are home to 70 percent of the population. Moreover, many women who experienced giving birth in a Russian maternity hospital decided once was sufficient.

The pro-natal policy coincided with slightly higher Russian birth rates, raising the TFR from 1.3 when the maternity-capital program was launched in 2007 to nearly 1.8 in 2015. Most demographers, however, attribute the higher numbers to a (temporarily) larger cohort of women in prime child-bearing years, economic growth due to higher oil prices during Putin’s first two terms, and hopes that nationwide protests over the 2011–2012 elections augured real change. After 2012, the reduced number of returning compatriots offset the gains in births.

Despite the augmented maternity-capital program, Russia’s TFR dropped back to 1.5 by 2019, prior to COVID-19 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian official sources continued to report the rate as 1.8. Without immigration, even a TFR of 1.8 would result in Russia’s population decreasing by about 20–25 percent in each generation.

The other endogenous factor in natural population change is life expectancy. Russia is hardly an outlier in experiencing lower birth rates. Most countries outside of Africa are projected to have smaller populations in the coming decades. Yet Russia continues to be exceptional among developed countries in the rate of mortality among adults aged 18–64. Russia’s economic recovery during Putin’s first two terms as President did lead to some improvement. While Russian men died at four times the rate of European men in 1990, by 2022 the rate was merely double the European rate.

The modest improvements during Putin’s first two terms were due to the economic recovery, greater stability, and efforts to improve healthcare. Yet the major focus of the healthcare program was not the badly needed primary and preventive care. Instead, most of the funds were used to purchase expensive new equipment, creating opportunities for graft.

The improvements in life expectancy began to reverse by 2019. Russia’s COVID-19 response was deeply flawed, resulting in the highest per-capita death rate among industrialized countries, though official statistics have consistently concealed the impact.

Economic benefits from people living longer are double edged. The impact depends on individuals’ capacity to work and the related dependency ratio for the population. Societies need enough able-bodied workers to support the young, the old, and the disabled.

Russia’s demographic issues involve quality as well as quantity. Even before Putin opted to invade Ukraine, Russia was experiencing another significant brain drain. Just before the war, Valerii Fal’kov, Russia’s Minister of Science and Higher Education, told Putin that the number of scientists in Russia was declining. Outside of atomic energy and the defense industry, Russia’s best specialists preferred to work in the US, Europe, and “even China.” Nikolai Dolgushkin, Academy of Sciences Chief Scientific Secretary, reported that emigration by scientists had increased from 14,000 in 2012 to 70,000 in 2021. Russia was the only developed nation where the number of scientific personnel was shrinking.

The challenges have become more serious, as the war on Ukraine has resulted in as many as half a million young men killed or wounded, women choosing to forego having children, women being sent to fight in Ukraine, and more than one million mostly young and highly educated people choosing to leave Russia.

Replacing them has been increasingly undermined by shortsighted government policies. In a country with a history of claiming to be multinational while viewing Russians as the system-forming ethnicity, recent government policies are creating additional difficulties. One of the great ironies of the situation Putin has created is that, in addition to poor rural villagers, the demographic groups best matching his August 2022 decree advocating “preservation and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” are Russia’s non-Russian and non-Russian Orthodox populations.

The ethnic variable

Russia’s birth rates vary across regions and ethnic and religious populations. The rates in major urban centers resemble those of Central Europe, with later marriages, widespread use of birth control, and a large number of single-child families. Rural regions and small towns tend to retain more traditional values around child-rearing. People in these venues marry and begin having children earlier and are far more likely to have two or more children. Yet 70 percent of Russians live in the urban centers. The citizens most likely to have large families live in villages, small towns, and Russia’s non-Russian regions and Republics. In 2023, the non-Russian share of the population was about 30%.

Putin-era policies have persistently undermined the principles of federalism enshrined in Russia’s 1993 constitution. Some non-Russians believe the assault on their special status stems, in part, from Russians fearing their higher birth rates.

Significant differences in birth rates among ethnic and religious groups within Russia pose serious policy challenges. Some groups have been more resistant to the “demographic transition” than others. The predominantly non-Russian and Muslim republics of the North Caucasus are experiencing the “demographic transition” more slowly than most Russian regions. The Chechens in particular have responded to their deportation to Central Asia during World War II with a strong pro-natal ethos.

Comparative studies find relationships between high birth rates and traditional religious beliefs in multiple places. Some accounts emphasize higher birth rates among Muslims, despite wide variation across communities. Religious conservatives in many faiths record higher birth rates: evangelical Christians, Mormons, Hindus, Orthodox Jews, and others. Some groups have historically been known for large families. In Russia, some non-Russian ethnic groups have higher birth rates than Russians. The birth rates in the largely Muslim North Caucasus have been a particular concern for Moscow. Despite birth rates among many ethnic populations declining, births in many non-Russian communities continue to remain higher than those of ethnic Russians.

Several analysts call attention to a phenomenon of ethnic groups that feel threatened responding with high fertility rates. Russia’s “punished peoples”—those accused of sympathizing with the Germans during World War II and deported from their homelands—have received particular attention. Marat Ilyasov, a scholar from Chechnya who now teaches in the US, makes a strong case for the Chechens, one of the groups that managed to return to their ancestral territory, striving for high birth rates to guarantee the nation’s survival. They have the highest birth rates in the country.

Chechens are hardly the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus with birth rates higher than the Russian average. Some official sources intentionally downplay the numbers of Chechens and other non-Russian groups in an attempt to emphasize “Russianness” and downplay the significance of non-Russian populations.

Some Russian demographers suggest that non-Russians are increasingly experiencing the “demographic revolution,” but at a slower pace. While this is plausible, complaints about changing definitions and undercounting in recent Russian censuses provide ample grounds for skepticism regarding the official numbers.

Even the official data show that birth rates continue to be higher among many of the non-Russian groups in Russia. Many leaders of non-Russian peoples claim that these populations are being sent to fight in Ukraine in far larger numbers than ethnic Russians. Russian officials try to emphasize that it is the rural population that provides most of the soldiers, due to the high wages the military offers.

Data show that individuals from ethnic republics in Russia’s far east and south have a far higher chance of being mobilized for combat. While proving intent is complicated, the numbers are shocking. Men living in Buryatia have a 50- to 100-percent greater chance of being sent to fight in Ukraine than a resident of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

It is too early to gauge whether the high numbers of deaths and injuries will stimulate a response by some groups to try increasing birth rates. It does appear that the war is resulting in a more serious decline in births among ethnic Russians in urban centers than in both Russian and non-Russian rural communities. Russia’s non-ethnic-Russian citizens increasingly perceive their populations as being singled out as cannon fodder in Ukraine.

Immigrants have also been pressed into military service, causing a precipitous drop in immigration.

Wartime policies undermine population growth

Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova. After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.

Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan. The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.

Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential. Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).

The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead. This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.

The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.

Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control. However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.

The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.

One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians. After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country. No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.

The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat. These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.

In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons. Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.

Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.

Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty. Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.

Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home. In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19. The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:

Legislation designed to prohibit Russians—especially mobile IT workers—from working while abroad has provoked sharp battles between security services and Russian companies that depend on these employees in a tight labor market.

Treatment of Central Asian and other foreign labor migrants has increasingly shifted to forced labor and sometimes outright slavery. Central Asians working in Russia have been rounded up and sent to join the war on Ukraine. A study of the Uzbek community reports that many Uzbeks have been arrested for minor or contrived offenses and sentenced to terms of fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five years. Once in prison, they are offered the Wagner option of “volunteering” to fight in Ukraine.

Predatory practices have extended beyond Russia’s usual sources of migrant workers. Individuals from Nepal, Syria, and India have been recruited to work in factories or as guards at various venues in Russia. After they arrive, their passports are confiscated and they are sent to fight in Ukraine. As during World War II, punishment squads are deployed to prevent soldiers from retreating. These predatory tactics differ from the treatment of Cuban and African mercenaries who are attracted by the money.

In addition to money, another inducement to attract foreign fighters is the offer of Russian citizenship. If these commitments are honored, the result will be to add more non-Russians to the country’s population. The disastrous long-term impact of the predatory recruitment policies is clear. As information (and bodies) reach families, word spreads. Russian programs to increase labor recruitment in Southeast Asia are being undermined as word of these tactics spreads.

Conclusion

Why would a leader who has proclaimed demography to be one of the most serious threats to a nation’s future launch an unprovoked war against a neighboring country that was a significant source of labor before 2014? We may never be able to answer this. We can conclude that Putin has turned a daunting crisis into a cataclysm.

Putin’s policies cannot solve these demographic problems. He has been reiterating the importance of Russia’s dire demographic situation for a quarter-century. Manipulating demographic data, adding people in occupied Ukrainian regions to Russia’s population, and omitting war casualties from the census do not generate sustainable population growth. These tactics cannot meet the needs of employers who report serious labor shortages in nearly every sector of the economy. Russia’s defense industry is operating “three shifts” by requiring workers to work sixty to seventy hours per week. The sustainability of these measures and the impact on quality raise significant questions. Financial incentives are undermined when workers are compelled to make “voluntary” contributions to fund the war effort.

In 2022–2023, the most serious labor shortages were reported in agriculture and construction, sectors that rely heavily on Central Asian migrants. Now Russia’s government is endeavoring to attract labor from India, Pakistan, and North Korea to replace the war casualties and émigrés. Firms involved in production, retail, logistics, and e-commerce face labor shortages. While manufacturers continue to prefer Russian workers, one company told journalists that bringing workers from India required paying salaries at the same level as those for Russian staff, plus the cost of transporting and registering the workers. Yet the company was looking for a contractor to arrange providing five hundred workers from India. The reasoning was that workers who lack Russian language are less likely to be recruited by competitors, while foreign workers who know Russian are more mobile.

A Russian entrepreneur noted that labor brokers in Kazakhstan smuggle thousands of workers from Bangladesh into that country in containers each year. They are now offering their services to Russian employers, suggesting that the same tactics can be used to bring workers from India. Others point out that labor from India remains crucial in several Middle Eastern countries where wages are higher, making Russia the option for the least skilled and least desirable migrants.

Sources of labor globally are increasing due to population growth in developing countries that face serious impacts from climate change. Demographers project that the major growth in global population during the rest of the twenty-first century will be in Africa. Yet the six African countries with the largest populations also appear on most lists of the places likely to face the greatest threats from climate change. As in Latin America, this will result in “green migration.” These are not traditional sources of labor for Russia, and the regime may choose to rely on these countries for mercenaries.

Putin’s government has not evinced visible concern that Russia’s population might be cut in half by century’s end. Unless Russia’s leaders can develop and finance a more effective set of policies, the only solutions to population decline will be a combination of incorporating non-Russian territory and/or immigration from Asia and Africa.

If Putin truly believed that demography is an existential problem for Russia, he might have calculated how many Ukrainians lived or worked in Russia before annexing Crimea and launching an invasion.

Putin’s regime is both seeking and discouraging repatriation by compatriots. On February 1, 2024, Russian media reported new legislation allowing the government to seize property belonging to Russians outside the country who criticize the war on Ukraine. Multiple instances have been reported of Russian diplomats and security personnel demanding that other countries detain and repatriate Russians who speak freely. Threats to seize their property in Russia are a logical extension of policies threatening family members still living in Russia.

At the same time, Russia’s policy does encourage compatriots to return, even as other citizens continue to depart.

One possible solution to the problems compounding Russia’s labor shortage would be to decentralize policy, allowing Russian regions to make their own decisions about attracting foreign labor. The resulting competition could go a long way toward improving conditions for foreign workers. Regional development was the prime mover in China’s massive urbanization and industrialization after 1978. While this involved horizontal mobility within the country, the model would resemble the significant influx of immigrants that, at least thus far, has kept the US population at well above replacement level. As Russia’s population continues to decline, immigrants will be increasingly vital to economic recovery.

Invading Ukraine while facing a catastrophic demographic challenge appears to have been a massive folly for the Kremlin. Hubris based on an astonishing intelligence failure might account for the miscalculation. Another possible explanation is that Putin understood that Russia’s economic and demographic challenges mean the country would not be in a more favorable condition any time in the coming decades.

Every corner of Russia’s economy is experiencing personnel shortages, while war casualties continue to shrink the able-bodied population. Russians and their leaders must learn to value diversity, or Russia will have an increasingly smaller and older population. Either way, there will be fewer ethnic Russians.

Harley Balzer retired in July 2016 after 33 years in the Department of Government, School of Foreign Service, and associated faculty member of the History Department at Georgetown University. He was founding director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies from 1987-2001. Prior to Georgetown he taught at Grinnell College and Boston University, and held post-doctoral fellowships at Harvard’s Russian Research Center and the MIT Program in Science, Technology and Society. In 1982-83 he was a congressional fellow in the office of Congressman Lee Hamilton, where he helped secure passage of the Soviet-East-European Research and Training Act (Title VIII).

In 1992-93 Balzer served as executive director and chairman of the board of the International Science Foundation, George Soros’s largest program to aid the former Soviet Union. From 1998 to 2009, he was a member of the Governing Council of the Basic Research and Higher Education (BRHE) Program, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and Russian Ministry of Education. BRHE established 20 Research and Education Centers at Russian Universities, and was significantly expanded by the Russian government using their own resources.

His publications have focused on Russian and Soviet history, Russian politics, Russian education, science and technology, and comparative work on Russia and China.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

The post Dispatch from the Paris Olympics: The African sports movement is about to take off, if leaders help fuel it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five cases of youths committing suicide were recorded in just the first two weeks of June in Wasit alone, according to a recent communiqué issued by the Iraqi National Security Services, which condemned the “deviant” movement and arrested thirty-one of its members. This wasn’t the first incident linked to the sect, which is affiliated with a mysterious leader based in Iran’s holy city of Mashhad claiming to worship Imam Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Mohammad, as a deity—an unorthodox belief condemned by mainstream Shia clergy. The movement claimed the lives of several young men in Dhi Qar governorate last year, and some reports suggest that it has already spread to other countries including Lebanon, where a young man took his own life in a similar ceremonial ritual in July 2023. Because its epicenter is in Dhi Qar governorate, it is hard not to associate Jamaat al-Qurban with the human sacrifices that took place only twenty miles away in the Sumerian city of Ur some 4,500 years ago.

Collective trauma and messianic creed

Iraq remains a fertile ground for messianic doctrines and often irrational eschatological dogmas due to a mixture of deeply engrained Mesopotamian mythological legacy, pronounced esoteric beliefs associated with the dominant Twelver Shiism creed, and the many minority religious beliefs in the country linked to Gnosticism, such as Mandaeans, Kakais, Shabak, and Kasnazani Sufi order—communities that all still practice ancestral hermetic and mystic rituals.

These peculiar incidents—along with the flourishing of tens of other doomsday sects led by self-claimed prophets, charlatans, and characters with a Messiah complex—should be understood as a social phenomenon in the context of a collectively traumatized post-invasion Iraqi society. Repetitive conflicts since 2003 have caused political unrest, sectarian unrest, fragmented state structures, and a suppressed Tishreen social movement—a youth-led protest movement between 2019 and 2021 condemning corruption and asking for less foreign interference—and might offer explanations for why so many Iraqis are plunging into the abyss of obscure metaphysical beliefs after seemingly losing hope in the physical realm.

Despite its apparent resilience and openness to a future with ambitious economic reforms and infrastructure projects, Iraq still suffers from invisible fractures affecting the core of its society. A 2007 national survey revealed that nearly 60 percent of the population experienced traumatic events with next to no access to psychological support—these numbers don’t even take into consideration the ordeal caused by conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Additionally, the World Health Organization warned about the soaring number of suicide attempts among young Iraqis in 2020.

A savior in a beanie and an Atlantis for the Shia

The United Kingdom, which hosts an important community of Arab refugees and expatriates, is the site of the hours-long live broadcasts by Sheikh Yasser al-Habib. From his headquarters in southern London, the exiled Kuwaiti cleric has been collecting live donations for the purchase of three islands amounting to $3 million, which he will allegedly transform into a sovereign homeland for all Twelver Shia individuals willing to relocate to the promised idyllic Atlantis. The project, announced earlier this year, will be designed in accordance with the sheikh’s religious preachings, and will aim to prepare for the savior’s return from his millennium-long occultation.

Another Iraqi-born doomsday sect, the Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light—a syncretic faith mixing psychedelic consumption, New Age beliefs, soul reincarnation, ancient Egyptian gods, and space aliens—also calls the United Kingdom home. The movement, formally known as the Black Banners, is currently based in Manchester, where an old orphanage converted into a temple is adorned with a marble statue of a man from Basra called Ahmed al-Hassan al-Yamani, who had proclaimed himself the vizier of the Mahdi amid the chaos that followed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

This religion took a new turn when an Egyptian associate of Hassan, Abdullah Hashem, appeared in a black beanie during the pandemic, claiming in a hall full of devotees to be the final Mahdi, prophesizing the political demise of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, and condemning the persecution of the movement’s activists across the world. It remains unclear how these movements fund their large-scale events and media presence.

This is but the tip of the iceberg. In recent years, many baffling figures have risen to fame, like Abu Ali Shaibani—a former Iraqi secret services officer and herbalist based in Lebanon, who accurately predicted the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces—who claims to be the equivalent of a trumpet of Armageddon in the Bible. Other famed charlatans include Diaa Abdu Zahrae al-Garaoui, killed on a farm in Zargha with hundreds of his followers by US coalition forces in 2007 after conspiring to assassinate top Hawza clergy in Najaf. The leader of Jund al-Samaa (“the Soldiers of Heaven”)—Iraq’s own Jim Jones—claimed to be a 1,400-year-old dormant embryo from Imam Ali and his spouse Fatima Zahra, who rose to become the Mahdi.

A larger MENA phenomenon

It is important to note that this phenomenon is part of a larger messianic resurgence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the past two decades. Cases of self-proclaimed end-of-day prophets emerge every other day on social media, such as an amusing Lebanese fortuneteller “sent from the heavens to save humankind,” who appeared two years ago. However, only a few become full-fledged religious leaders, such as the controversial Yemeni Naser Mohamed, a tribal leader from Marib, or his compatriot Hassan al-Tuhami, who was arrested and tortured by the Houthis with his followers.

This tendency created an entire ecosystem of social media content creators and famed prime-time television clairvoyants like the Egyptian-Lebanese Leila Abdelatif. This new army of influencers interprets the holy scriptures, tracks the signs of the end of days against current regional conflicts like the Gaza war, and projects apocalyptic Islamic protagonists on modern-day political leaders like Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, or Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Interestingly, similar trends are observed regarding Israel and the Gaza war, fueled by certain Haredi Jewish groups and their US Christian right allies, and by the dichotomous biblical rhetoric promulgated by members of the Israeli government, a coalition that more secular analysts describe as “messianic.” Following the terror generated by the October 7, 2023, attacks, several Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, described the conflict as a holy war between “the sons of lights, and the sons of darkness.” (Though it’s unclear if these statements are mere allegories or discursive tactics used to appeal to an increasingly religious Israeli society.) Another internet and media sensation to follow is the Texas red heifers associated in the scriptures with the building of the Third Temple in Jerusalem and the advent of the Jewish Messiah. As certain far-right Jewish and Christian activists call for conducting a purification ritual using the ashes of the Angus cows on the Temple Mount, where al-Aqsa Mosque stands today, Hamas leadership made a salient declaration associating the ritual with the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks.

Historically, messianic movements in the MENA region are symptomatic of profound social and economic malaise and are a form of subaltern resistance by frustrated citizens opposing the existing tyrannic political and theological structures. Many messianic leaders even brought immense change and shifted the course of entire empires—like Mahdi ibn Tumart, the founder of the Moroccan Almohad dynasty, or the early Ismaili Fatimid rulers in Tunisia and Egypt. Others were less fortunate, like Juhayman al-Otaybi and his failed 1979 coup d’état in Mecca. Nonetheless, in a region where the borders between the natural and supernatural remain blurred, it is extremely worrisome and premonitory of greater regional upheaval to observe an unprecedented doomsday fever and a high concentration of messianic groups—probably the most important since Prophet Mohammad and Jesus of Nazareth. 

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

The post What’s behind the Middle East’s doomsday fever? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

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According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the Russian offensive began last Friday, harrowing footage of burning villages and fleeing civilians has flooded social media, adding to the sense of mounting danger. Evacuation efforts are still underway in the border region, with around eight thousand people so far brought from nearby communities to Kharkiv.

So far, Russian troops have made modest progress, advancing up to eight kilometers into Ukraine and capturing a number of Ukrainian villages. While the incursion is currently regarded as too small in scale to threaten Kharkiv itself, the reappearance of Russian soldiers in the region for the first time since 2022 has sparked considerable alarm and dismay.

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Russia’s new offensive did not come as a complete surprise, of course. On the contrary, the build-up of Russian troops across the border had been common knowledge for weeks. Kharkiv Regional Council member and political sciences professor Halyna Kuts says she has been preparing for some time, and has a bag of emergency items packed and ready.

Kuts is one of many people in Kharkiv to express anger at restrictions preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Due to fears of possible Russian retaliation, most of Kyiv’s partners insist the military aid they supply only be used within Ukraine’s borders. These restrictions prevented Ukraine from attacking concentrations of Russian troops as they prepared for the current offensive. “We could have destroyed them, but we were not allowed to,” says Kuts.

With Russian troops now gradually moving toward the city, Kuts believes the only option is to “dig in” and prepare to defend Kharkiv. “This is no longer a center of culture and science; this is a military fortress. Everyone should be carrying a gas mask, bandages, and water with them at all times,” she says.

In recent days, it has become much rarer to encounter children on the streets of the city. Some families have now left Kharkiv due to the deteriorating security situation, heading west for the relative safety of Poltava, Kyiv, or beyond. Youngsters who remain are obliged to attend classes underground or online.

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Olha Kashyrina, the co-founder of a Kharkiv publishing house specializing in children’s books, has spent recent evenings watching the glow of artillery fire on the horizon as fighting edges closer and closer to her home in Kharkiv’s Saltivka residential district. She estimates that there is now less than twenty kilometers separating her from the Russian army. For the time being, Kashyrina continues working in her publishing business and volunteering to help evacuees find temporary accommodation. However, if Russian troops advance further and the city comes within artillery range, she plans to leave.

Others insist they will not leave Kharkiv under any circumstances. Kashyrina’s publishing house colleague Svitlana Feldman has spent recent days stockpiling power banks, generators, and headlights for employees. “Adaptability is the key skill now,” she explains. One of the most dangerous aspects of daily life in Kharkiv is commuting to the office, so the company now encourages working from home.

Some Kharkiv residents have already fled from the Russian invasion once and do not intend to do so again. Liudmila, who came to Kharkiv from Donetsk when it was first occupied by Russia ten years ago, says she will not evacuate and is instead placing her faith in the Ukrainian army to defend the city, much as it did in 2022. This is a common refrain in today’s Kharkiv. While almost everyone is watching anxiously for signs of an escalation in the current offensive, there is also a mood of defiance and plenty of confidence in the city’s ability to defend itself.

Defiance can be expressed in different ways. For Halyna Kuts, this means proceeding with Kharkiv’s annual Vyshyvanka Day parade on May 16 in one of the city’s underground metro stations. This colorful annual event, which features people sporting Ukraine’s traditional embroidered shirts, is widely seen as a celebration of Ukrainian patriotism and national identity. With Russian troops advancing toward the city, Kuts says it is now more important than ever to host this year’s parade as planned.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 7, 2024

Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing

By Maria Avdeeva

Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, is struggling to survive amid a campaign of relentless Russian bombing that aims to make the city unlivable, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 9, 2024

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

By Peter Dickinson

Putin’s one tank victory parade reflects the catastrophic scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and is a reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, the Russian army is far from invincible, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 14, 2024

Putin expands invasion as outgunned Ukraine waits for Western weapons

By Mykola Bielieskov

Russia has opened a new front in the invasion of Ukraine with a cross-border offensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region as Putin seeks to capitalize on a window of opportunity before fresh Western aid reaches Ukrainian front line troops, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Members of the US House of Representatives recently demonstrated that they understand what is at stake and are well aware of the crimes being committed by Russia in Ukraine. On March 19, the US House overwhelmingly passed a resolution “condemning the illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation” by a 390-9 margin.

Russia’s systematic and coordinated abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine has attracted global condemnation, and has led to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Russian government official Maria Lvova-Belova. Following in the footsteps of American allies in Europe, the recently adopted US House resolution signals a major bipartisan US policy shift in labeling and shaming Russian perpetrators.

Although nonbinding, the House’s condemnation officially formalizes individual remarks made by Congressional Representatives indicating that Russia is conducting a campaign of genocide in Ukraine. Specifically, this super-majority of Representatives, including key leaders like Speaker Mike Johnson, affirmed that Russia’s abduction, transfer, and forcible adoption of Ukrainian children is “contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and amounts to genocide.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

By invoking the UN Genocide Convention, the House’s resolution stresses the severity of Russian crimes in Ukraine. Critically, it also denotes the resulting legal obligations to prevent and punish further genocidal acts against Ukrainians. In other words, Congress has finally recognized what countless experts and advocates have been asking them to acknowledge for much of the past two years.

As a principal author and a key contributor on two independent legal inquiries into the question of Russian genocide in Ukraine published by the New Lines Institute (Washington, DC) and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (Montreal, Canada), we applaud the House’s unequivocal language regarding these crimes and resulting legal obligations.

Our investigations have detailed the Kremlin’s escalating violence against the Ukrainian population over the past two years. Russia’s most recent actions targeting the civilian population fit into a broader pattern of genocidal objectives evident throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, prominent Russian media personalities closely tied to the Kremlin continue to advocate for the eradication of Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Amid mounting international efforts to hold Russian perpetrators to account for crimes taking place in Ukraine, it is important to stress that the central duty of the UN Genocide Convention is prevention rather than punishment. This implies active steps from signatories to ensure that further crimes are not committed and to keep Ukrainian children safe from abduction.

At the same time, the stark reality remains that no genocide has even been stopped in a courtroom. While accountability is vital for surviving victims, international legal processes often take decades and lack the enforcement mechanisms required to decisively end genocides in real-time. Instead, the duty to stop a genocide in motion falls squarely on every country that has ratified the Genocide Convention.

Human rights advocates are currently racing against the clock to locate Ukraine’s missing children and end the daily deportations that continue in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Once Ukrainian children are seized, experts have traced the Kremlin’s efforts to hide these young victims, while subjecting them to frightening surveillance and camps designed to eradicate their Ukrainian identity. The resolution adopted by the US House of Representatives in March confronted this issue squarely, declaring that “the Russian Federation is attempting to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children.”

Numerous survivor testimonies confirm that the best genocide prevention mechanism in Ukraine today is a fully-equipped Ukrainian army with staunch Western backing. Ukrainian officials know this all too well. With their troops now forced to ration ammunition amid growing supply shortages, they are urgently appealing for the international military aid they need to save their nation.

While the recent US House of Representatives resolution’s clear articulation of Russia’s genocidal crimes in Ukraine is a step in the right direction, Western leaders must follow such statements with the necessary actions. It is vital for Congress, along with the rest of the US government and governments around the world, to act without further delay and enact policies worthy of Ukraine’s courage and sacrifice. History is watching, and so is Vladimir Putin.

Kristina Hook is Assistant Professor of Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Christopher Atwood is a specialist on Eastern Europe and the Head of the Advisory Board at the Souspilnist Foundation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 11, 2024

Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid

By Peter Dickinson

Officials in Kyiv are calling on partners to urgently supply Patriot systems as Russia capitalizes on Ukraine’s weakening air defenses to methodically destroy the country’s power grid, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Russia’s new air offensive leaves Ukraine facing humanitarian disaster

By Aura Sabadus

Unless Ukraine’s Western partners urgently enhance the country’s air defenses, Russia’s new air offensive will leave millions of Ukrainians without access to electricity, water, and heating, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare delayed this election, initially scheduled for last year, under the justification that the administrative burden of hosting the 2023 Pacific Games was too great to carry out the election in the same year. But many saw the delay for what it was—Sogavare buying more time to consolidate power and boost his chances for reelection.

The contest is a competitive one, and the results will determine whether the country continues growing its relationship with the PRC or changes course in favor of a different approach.

Sogavare’s warm embrace of the PRC

Since withdrawing his country’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of establishing formal ties with the PRC in 2019, Sogavare has aligned himself with Beijing on matters of foreign policy. This shift has drawn concern from countries such as Australia and the United States, which are competing with the PRC for influence in the country and the wider region.

Whether Sogavare’s embrace of the PRC is driven by transactionalism or ideology depends on who you ask. Some see him as playing larger powers off each other to extract maximum benefit, while others see him as driven by an anti-Australian worldview informed by his own nationalism and long-standing criticism of the Australian-led peacekeeping mission that extricated the country from state failure.

Others have astutely observed that these are not mutually exclusive motivations and that his motive may ultimately boil down to something that drives politicians the world over: securing, consolidating, and maintaining power. As Patricia O’Brien wrote, “Sogavare will continue to act in ways that serve his ultimate purpose, to remain in power. This unfortunately also serves China’s sweeping regional ambitions.”

Domestic backlash and electoral politics

Sogavare’s “look north” policy has drawn criticism domestically from prominent politicians such as opposition leader Matthew Wale, as well as former Malaita Province Premier Daniel Suidani, whose critiques of the PRC contributed to his removal from office last year by the provincial assembly. But this seemingly clear-cut divide is an “oversimplified understanding” of critics’ positions, which are intertwined with complex ethnic and social divisions rooted in the country’s colonial history.

On the campaign trail, Sogavare has touted his “look north” policy as bringing much-needed development aid and, on the heels of hosting a successful Pacific Games—for which the PRC provided much of the infrastructure—boosting his country’s prestige in the region. He has also praised the PRC’s political system while criticizing Western democracy.

Sogavare’s opponents have actively contested the issue, with Wale accusing the prime minister of “selling out the country to foreign interests” and slamming him for having “prioritized the Pacific Games over medicines.” If elected, Wale has floated holding a nationwide referendum on the country’s relationship with the PRC, but he has also left the door open to maintaining some degree of relations with Beijing.

Thus, the election presents an inflection point for the Solomon Islands’ relations with the PRC. As Sogavare seeks a fifth cumulative term in office, will voters award this gruff and wily political survivor for his embrace of Beijing or remove him in favor of politicians who are promising a different approach?

The political landscape and electoral system

Candidates from thirteen political parties are contesting the parliamentary election, and 120 of 334 eligible candidates are standing as independents. The country has a weak party system; as the Development Policy Centre’s Terence Wood explained, “voters rarely vote along party lines in Solomon Islands: they vote based on individual candidate attributes.” Candidates’ loyalty to their parties is fickle, with their allegiance often up for grabs after election day.

Any one party is unlikely to win an outright majority, so the victor will need to secure coalition partners to form a government. Thus, Sogavare and Wale aren’t the only players who merit observation; other figures, such as Peter Kenilorea Jr., will certainly factor into the formation of the government.

Voter motivations and key issues

While personality politics predominate, policy issues do register with voters. Domestic issues—reducing poverty, increasing physical and digital connectivity, creating employment opportunities, improving health and education systems, and more—are front of mind for voters. Foreign policy is typically discussed through the lens of domestic matters, and voters are unlikely to base their vote choice on foreign policy.

Public opinion and young voters

It is challenging to speculate about ground-level public opinion from afar due to the lack of publicly available polling. Seventy-four percent of the population lives in rural areas flung across the country’s 147 inhabited islands, making it a difficult place to poll. This is compounded by wide variations in turnout from election to election, a key data point to nail down in any survey seeking to gauge voter sentiment.

One wild card is young voters who have reached voting age since the 2019 election. Candidates and parties are seeking to capitalize on this by appealing to a seeming desire for change; for example, Kenilorea and his party have embraced a youth-centric campaign. But at this stage it is unknown whether young voters’ collective behavior will meaningfully differ from that of other age groups, or if they will fall into more traditional voting patterns.

Election day and the uncertain aftermath

All eyes are on Sogavare as April 17 approaches. At this stage, he seems to be favored to return for a fifth term, but this outcome is not certain. Moreover, his fate is unlikely to be known immediately; in 2019, it took three days for official results to be announced after the election. The “election after the election,” which lasted for three weeks in 2019, will quickly come to the fore as candidates and parties jockey for power.

During this opaque period, pre-election alliances and loyalties tend to be discarded in favor of fresh inducements that make it difficult to predict outcomes. As Wood wrote, “there will also be the post-election horse-trading amongst MPs hopping between Honiara hotels that leads to the selection of the prime minister, and the public reaction to this opaque and unaccountable process.”

Post-election civil unrest, which was seen after the 2019 elections, could transpire and potentially influence the formation of a government. Since gaining independence in 1978, the country has been bedeviled by ethnic and social tensions that have often resulted in violence, most recently in 2021 when riots rocked Honiara, particularly impacting its Chinatown district.

Geopolitics comes into play here, as quelling violence has often required the deployment of foreign security forces. Police from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea will be utilized to provide security around election day, and the 2021 riots were only extinguished upon the deployment of police from Australia, who may be called upon again if tensions flare.

The deployment of PRC police is also possible under a policing agreement signed in 2023, which was justified by Sogavare in the name of diversifying partnerships and “plugging security gaps” made evident by the 2021 riots. Apprehensions also linger about underhanded PRC efforts to influence post-election negotiations, and Beijing’s track record lends credence to these worries.

Cumulatively, these factors portend a tense and uncertain post-election period, but one in which Sogavare seems poised to have the upper hand. The “coconut wireless” of social media will surely be abuzz, and the results will reverberate well beyond the borders of the Happy Isles.

Parker Novak is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, where he specializes in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and US foreign policy.

The post As Sogavare seeks reelection in the Solomon Islands, China’s influence is on the ballot appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are stuck in economic and political transitions toward more open economic and political markets. The lack of economic freedom has long echoed the lack of political freedom in the region. To maintain the status quo, political elites have for many years sought to cultivate an enduring social contract wherein economic and political elites capture economic rents—including from oil revenues—and citizens receiving patronage spending have tended to look the other way.

That is evident from the overall freedom score for the region, which has remained considerably lower than the global average. Indeed, the MENA region’s freedom score in 2022 is the same as two decades before (around 46.9), 15.4 points below the global average. That said, an increase in the freedom score is evident at the beginning of the period of analysis (from 1995 to 2002) which coincided with a wave of both economic and political reforms.

While there are important cultural and legal similarities among MENA countries, the region is also heterogeneous in many ways. Three distinct groups have progressed at different speeds in their economic transitions: the high-speed group, mostly composed of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries; moderate-speed, mostly composed of North African countries plus countries like Jordan and Lebanon; and the low-speed group, which includes conflict or post-conflict countries. Indeed, the GCC countries, which are mostly nonpopulous economies with vast wealth, have outperformed the other two groups, increasing their average freedom score by 6.7 points over the sample (1995–2022). The “moderate-speed” group of countries in North Africa, plus Jordan and Lebanon, includes both oil-importing and oil-exporting states, with a mixed record of economic reforms. Most of these countries are populous, with Egypt home to the largest population in the region. The conflict and post-conflict group includes Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, each with a complex history of civil wars coupled with foreign invasions.

The diversity of circumstances is evident when considering the evolution of the economic freedom score. The regional score has increased by 5 points throughout the period, driven by improvements in women’s economic freedom and, recently, investment freedom. This increase is mainly driven by progress in the GCC group of countries, where economic freedom went up by 14.5 points. The GCC is now led by Saudi Arabia, which has embarked on an important economic and social transformation agenda. In the “low-speed” group, we see an overall decline over the period (−3.7 points). Across the region, trade freedom presents a significant negative trend since 2011, losing almost 15 points.

On the political freedom front, the region is home to the world’s last absolute monarchies, whose transition to constitutional monarchies has been slow, and at times reversed. Military involvement in politics is all too common and has been on the rise. The wave of protests that spread through almost the entire region and which came to be known as the Arab Spring is apparent in the data. The Arab Spring erupted in the early 2010s from the frustration of a young and educated population aspiring to more political and economic freedom and prosperity. The hope raised by the Arab Spring proved, however, to be temporary. Indeed, protests ended up either tamed by autocrats or resulted in internal conflicts, with foreign interventions supporting opposing sides. The political freedom score shows an increase starting in 2010, which has vanished by 2014. All indicators of the political freedom subindex have been affected. This shows that countries in the region are stuck in political transitions toward democracy. 

Legal freedom is relatively low in the region, with all its indicators except informality scoring below 50 in 2022. Most indicators of legal freedom have had a flat trend in the last decade, showing no signs of improvement. Here as well, the GCC countries score higher than the other two groups, with a stable score over the sample. In the other two groups, legal freedom is declining. Just as on the political front, legal reforms toward more fair and inclusive systems have stalled. 

From freedom to prosperity

The prosperity score of the MENA region has clearly diverged from the global average during the period 1995–2022. Overall scores mask important differences between countries in MENA, especially along economic lines. Indeed, the MENA region has the largest reserves of oil and other hydrocarbons in the world.¹ But not all countries in the region are rich in oil. The region is host to both oil importers and oil exporters, and the impacts of oil shocks far outweigh any policy intervention. Evidently, persistently high oil prices—albeit remaining volatile—have been good news for oil exporters and somewhat bad news for oil importers in the region. However, the reality is not always so straightforward, as high oil prices result in large and positive spillover effects from oil exporters to oil importers, especially in terms of remittances and foreign aid, and these have tended to mitigate the differences between the two groups.

While the consequences of oil market fluctuations continue to play a dominant role in driving prosperity in the region, that situation is clearly not sustainable as the world economy is firmly embarking on a transition away from fossil fuels. The MENA region scores higher than the global average in income, health, and environment, but the gap in the last two decades has been narrowing. Countries in the region should not be complacent and should transform their economies by supporting more (genuine) private sector development. The success of the economic and social transformation agenda led by Saudi Arabia is vital for the region. Yet the ultimate test of that transformation is whether it would be sustained and financed through (domestic and foreign) private investment instead of state funds, which will eventually run out.

Education is the best performing indicator for the region, with a score that has doubled in the period of analysis. Nonetheless, there is still room for improvement, as the level is still low (close to 45 points), relative to the global average. Educated but unemployed youth have been the drivers of the Arab Spring. That situation is a source of worry for leaders who want to keep the status quo, and has led them to place limits on political freedom and civil liberties.

The region scores significantly below the global average in inequality and minority rights, and the gaps have not been reduced in the last twenty-five years. Persistently high inequality is a source of further tensions. The need to promote equality of opportunity in the region—through free enterprise and curbing cronyism—has never been greater. Failure to address deficiencies in economic but also political freedom will hamper prosperity in the region and lead to further instability.

The future ahead

Over the next decade, countries in the MENA region will have to grapple with economic and political transitions in a world in mutation. To achieve freedom and prosperity, countries in the region will have to face up to risks linked to geopolitics, climate change, and the transformation of energy markets, as well as social polarization.

The region is at a tipping point when it comes to conflict escalation. Indeed, the alarming intensity and casualties resulting from the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian territories risk engulfing the whole region. This new phase of escalation of violence brings not only tragic loss of lives but also physical destruction, fear, and uncertainty. That new spread of violence will have far-reaching economic and social consequences. What is more, the Palestinian issue is an important fault line between the Global North and the Global South that could have global repercussions and tear the region further apart.

The region is also extremely exposed to the existential threat posed by climate change. Climate change is simply making the Middle East and North Africa unlivable at a faster rate than any other region. Specifically, temperatures have reached record highs and a water crisis is looming in the region, which could lead to heightened domestic tensions and interstate conflicts. The crisis is made worse by the inadequate governance of the water sector and other utilities, which has exacerbated the frustration of the citizenry over poor public services.

The region also needs to transition away from fossil fuels. Oil prices have been persistently high and this has provided some respite to the many oil-exporting countries in the region. Yet, as the world moves away from fossil fuels, the vast reserves of oil and natural gas with which MENA is endowed will eventually become stranded—and so will the capital investment in the sector. With these considerations in mind, several MENA countries have embarked on ambitious diversification programs to move away from oil, although success has, so far, been elusive. As we have said, Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic and social transformation agenda could be a game changer for the region and perhaps offer a model for other countries to emulate.

A credible economic and social transformation agenda is long overdue, to meet the aspirations of an educated youth and to absorb millions of young people—females and males alike—into the labor market. The aborted political transitions have, however, polarized societies in the region: the people on the streets who continue to protest on the one side, and the political elites and crony capitalists on the other. The political and economic transitions are interlinked and failure to address both could result in further social tensions and instability.²

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region, and a former chief of commodities at the the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. He is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development and at Harvard Kennedy School.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

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Popular anger about sky-high inflation and growing repression, combined with more younger voters entering the fray, did play a key role in the results. But one cannot ignore PTI’s use of technology—much of it not cutting-edge—that not only disrupted the traditional political status quo but also set a new benchmark for electoral campaigns around the world.

Here are five ways in which PTI’s technology and digital media strategy helped the party outmaneuver its rivals in Pakistan’s general elections:

1. Cultivating a culture of bottom-up innovation

Business leaders who have tried to push the adoption of technology in legacy organizations know full well that innovation requires bottom-up support, especially in larger organizations. While PTI’s approach to political engagement has always been fundamentally different from its predecessors, it set itself further apart in this electoral cycle. 

The party’s energized base of young supporters have fostered a culture of bottom-up innovation, in which volunteers and supporters feel empowered to take initiative and contribute ideas. This grassroots movement was fueled by digital platforms that allowed for the dissemination of information at an unprecedented scale. When the party’s leaders could not find space on mainstream television, they used Twitter Spaces; when physical rallies were not permitted, they organized virtual jalsas; and when experts with a leaning toward PTI found no space on mainstream talk shows, they took to YouTube.

While some observers rightfully point to how PTI and its affiliated accounts engage in online trolling, harassment, and misinformation, this is only one part of the story. On the other end, this army of volunteers allowed PTI to tap into the collective intelligence of tech-savvy young people eager for change. As a result, despite all sorts of headwinds, the party managed to get the word out ahead of, during, and after the elections.

Examples of this innovation include launching a portal listing its candidates on the online software platform GitHub when the party’s websites were blocked in Pakistan and creating a chatbot linked to Khan’s Facebook Page. PTI also created an open-source repository of electoral data to reinforce its claim that election results had been manipulated.

2. Strategically using artificial intelligence

With Khan in jail and many of its leaders on the run, PTI faced a unique challenge in terms of engaging with constituents across Pakistan. While a traditional media approach would have involved using the written word to get the leadership’s message out, PTI realized that nothing could beat getting Khan’s words out to the masses in his own voice. As a result, PTI embraced the power of artificial intelligence. 

Through messages conveyed to his lawyers during meetings, Khan was able to get information out to his party, which then used technology to generate content in his own voice. This ensured that Khan managed to speak virtually to millions of Pakistanis ahead of and after polls. This kept the base energized and ensured that Khan remained in the news cycle, even though he was physically in jail and unable to engage with audiences in a way that other leaders could in the run-up to the elections.

3. Developing peer-to-peer communication networks

With almost 130 million mobile broadband subscribers, Pakistan is undergoing a major digital transformation. Gone are the days in which centralized media skewed citizens’ worldviews. What has emerged in its place are decentralized media and peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, which are changing the way in which citizens consume information and engage with one another. 

PTI has historically been a first-mover in this space, but the party took things to the next level during this electoral cycle. Bolstered by a bottom-up media ecosystem leveraging platforms such as YouTube and TikTok, PTI engaged with constituents even though the party was virtually blacked out from mainstream television media. 

The party’s cadre of volunteers also harnessed the power of direct messaging apps and platforms to create a network of interconnected supporters. Just days before the elections, a Supreme Court decision banned PTI’s traditional electoral symbol, the cricket bat. Symbols, which appear next to names on ballot papers, are important in a country in which 40 percent of the population is illiterate. In response, the PTI and its volunteers used this network to make sure that voters at each constituency knew who the PTI-aligned candidate was and what their electoral symbol was. This P2P network bypassed traditional media gatekeepers, allowing PTI to control its narrative and engage with voters on a more personal level. A key enabler was WhatsApp, which was leveraged to disseminate campaign materials, information about rallies, and voting instructions directly to the electorate, fostering a sense of community and shared purpose.

4. Dominating the news cycle to earn media

PTI’s technological prowess was not only limited to the digital realm; it also had a profound impact on traditional media. By mastering the art of social media, PTI consistently generated content that was newsworthy, ensuring that the party and its leaders remained at the forefront of the news cycle, even when the party and its leaders could not get direct coverage. 

In addition, PTI got stories out into international media, including a piece Khan wrote for the Economist ahead of the elections. In doing so, PTI forced the governing status quo to respond to what the party and its leaders were claiming internationally. This created a whole news cycle in the traditional media, meaning that PTI was being discussed during talk shows, even though the government reportedly banned some news channels from mentioning either the party or Khan. This strategy not only kept PTI in the public eye but also allowed it to shape public sentiment around the fact that the party was being repressed and that there was a risk that the will of the people would not be respected on election day.

5. Opponents failing to innovate

The success of PTI’s technological initiatives was further underscored by the failure of its political opponents to innovate and get a grip on Pakistan’s digital transformation. While PTI was pioneering the use of digital tools for political engagement, other parties remained entrenched in conventional campaign tactics. This reluctance to adapt to the digital age left PTI’s rivals struggling to keep up with the rapid pace of change, rendering their campaign efforts less effective and less resonant with a population increasingly reliant on technology for information and social interaction. In addition, the status quo relied on the traditional tool of blocking access to the internet, which was both ineffective—people could use virtual private networks, or VPNs, to get around the block—and created further conversation about why the state was blocking access to the internet. These tactics only reinforced PTI’s messaging, meaning that it was PTI, not the status quo, shaping the narrative and dominating the headlines.

The result of PTI’s technological campaign strategy was a more engaged and informed electorate, which translated into significant electoral gains. Khan’s PTI managed to galvanize a significant part of the electorate, and the party’s success demonstrates the potential of digital tools to democratize political participation and challenge entrenched power structures.

It is no surprise that some of the most powerful men in Pakistan want to find ways to control the internet. Over the last few years, for example, the government has tried to control the internet by proposing new laws and regulations, some of which have been struck down by the courts. By and large, these efforts have failed to stem the tide. What comes next remains to be seen, and the threat to internet freedoms remains high in Pakistan. PTI, however, has shown that despite all sorts of headwinds and repression, it is possible to engage in guerrilla tactics on the internet to mobilize an electorate and challenge the status quo.

Uzair Younus is a nonresident fellow and the former director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The post Five ways Imran Khan’s party used technology to outperform in Pakistan’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Issued on January 4, 2024, the citizenship decree is officially designed to ease the process of granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals and stateless persons. Officials in Kyiv highlighted one particularly contentious section indicating that orphaned Ukrainian children or those deprived of parental guardianship can be fast-tracked to Russian citizenship via presidential decision or following a request from a hosting institution.

Ukraine’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets, has accused Moscow of implementing the new citizenship regulations so children abducted from Ukraine to Russia would no longer be regarded as Ukrainians. In an official appeal to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry claimed the decree served as further proof of Russia’s crimes against Ukraine, including “the forcible assimilation of Ukrainian children.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The International Criminal Court has already issued a warrant for the arrest of Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges in connection with the mass deportation of Ukrainian children since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin has yet to be detained in line with the warrant, but the Russian dictator is now obliged to tailor his travel plans to avoid possible arrest. In August 2023, he cancelled plans to attend a BRICS summit in South Africa after the host country was unable to guarantee he would not face legal challenges.

Russia’s January 2024 citizenship decree is the latest evidence of a systematic Kremlin campaign to rob children abducted in Ukraine of their Ukrainian identity and forcibly turn them into Russians. The Ukrainian authorities have so far managed to identify almost 20,000 Ukrainian children who have been subjected to Russian abduction. Many fear the true number of victims may be far higher.

International investigations into the mass abduction of Ukrainian children have found that once taken to Russia, victims are subjected to indoctrination that aims to erase their Ukrainian identity and impose a Russian national identity. This process is undertaken at a network of camps across Russia. Research published by The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) in February 2023 identified 43 Russian facilities for the indoctrination of abducted Ukrainian children, with all levels of the Russian government involved in a large-scale, state-sanctioned initiative.

The mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children by Russia has been branded as an act of genocide. In an April 2023 resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said the abductions matched the international definition of genocide and stated that the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia had the aim of “annihilating every link to and feature of their Ukrainian identity.” The UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five acts that qualify as genocide.

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Evidence continues to emerge that in addition to exposing Ukrainian children to a wide range of patriotic propaganda, Russia is also militarizing them by involving them in various paramilitary structures aimed at teenagers. This includes the Yunarmiya (“Young Army”) youth organization, which was established in 2015 and is funded by the Kremlin. Deported Ukrainian children have reportedly been obliged to undergo military training and coerced into writing supportive letters to Russian military personnel engaged in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

In the first weeks of 2024, details emerged of abducted Ukrainian children being forced to undergo training with the Belarusian military. Belarusian state TV reported on January 10 that 35 children from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine had been sent to Mogilev in eastern Belarus to take part in exercises with the Belarusian military. Belarus is accused of participating in Russia’s abduction operations.

Efforts are ongoing to rescue abducted Ukrainian children and bring those responsible for the abductions to justice. The Ukrainian state and civil society are currently focused on bringing every single victim home. These efforts are benefiting from significant international support. For example, in December 2023, six abducted Ukrainian children were released by Russia thanks to mediation from Qatar.

Further international support is needed if the thousands of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia are to be saved. The clock is ticking and every moment counts. Indoctrination efforts continue in camps across Russia, while the Kremlin is clearly seeking to speed up the process of granting Russian citizenship.

The international community appears to recognize the importance of holding Russia accountable for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. “We cannot allow children to be treated as if they are the spoils of war,” ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan commented in 2023.

This year, it is vital to maintain the pressure on Russia and demonstrate that such behavior has no place in the modern world. The deliberate targeting of vulnerable Ukrainian children has been one of the most shocking features of an invasion that has stunned the world. The abductions are also arguably the most striking evidence that the Kremlin’s ultimate goal is to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely in areas under its control.

Vladyslav Havrylov is a research fellow with the Collaborative on Global Children’s Issues at Georgetown University and lead researcher at the “Where Are Our People?” initiative.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 22, 2024

Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s remarkable success during 2023 in the Battle of the Black Sea can serve as a blueprint for victory over Putin’s Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

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No European security without Ukrainian victory

By Pavlo Zhovnirenko

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the two-year mark, Western leaders increasingly acknowledge that there can be no European security without Ukrainian victory, writes Pavlo Zhovnirenko.

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Russia faces fresh accusations of targeting journalists in Ukraine

By Mercedes Sapuppo

A series of Russian attacks on hotels used by international journalists has sparked fresh accusations that Moscow is deliberately targeting the media in Ukraine, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

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On September 28, 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Program hosted a hybrid event on “Addressing the captagon Crisis in MENA: Strategies & Challenges” with an array of experts to discuss the evolving captagon trade in the MENA region and beyond. The panel focused on the current captagon landscape in Syria, captagon’s place within the global illicit supply chain, the importance of captagon for the United States (US), the Syrian American advocacy efforts against captagon, and the available tools to press for accountability.  

The event featured opening remarks by Nour Dabboussi, Program Assistant for the Rafik Harris & Middle East programs, keynotes remarks by Ethan Goldrich, US Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Near Eastern Affairs, and was moderated by Qutaiba Idibi, Project Manager of the Syria Program at the Atlantic Council. The panelist are Caroline Rose, Director of the Strategic Blind Spots Portfolio at New Lines Institute; Annette Idler, Director of the Minerva Global Security Program, and Associate Professor in Global Security at University of Oxford; Betsy Dribben, Head of Advocacy for Multifaith Alliance; Yasser Tabbara is an international human rights attorney who, as Co-founder and Chief Strategist at the Syrian Forum and Chairman of the American Relief Coalition for Syria, and Dylan Frost, Deputy Chief of Staff and Legislative Director for Representative James French Hill.

Opening remarks 

In its pursuit of sustaining financial stability after years of enduring years of diplomatic and economic isolation, the Assad regime has transformed many war-torn areas into the world’s cardinal captagon laboratories. Nour highlighted how this psychoactive drug, estimated as a multibillion-dollar chain, has, on one hand, empowered the Assad regime to maintain access over foreign current assets amidst international sanctions, and on the other, bolster its smuggling network which operates across 17 countries to guarantee the drugs’ export throughout Europe and the Gulf. Moreover, the Iran-backed Hezbollah has proved as a successful partner for the Assad regime, as it oversees both local production and packaging of captagon. Notably, unchecked corruption facilitates the exploitation of public infrastructure, such as the port of Beirut, for exporting captagon without government surveillance. 

Furthermore, the Assad regime’s narcotic distribution infrastructure has become a top health and security threat to neighboring Arab states but also a growing concern to the United States. In an attempt to curtail this threat, Arab states have resorted to diplomatic reproachment by readmitting the Assad regime into the Arab League earlier in May. However, the United States is pursuing a distinct approach through an inter-agency strategy that aims to disrupt and dismantle narcotics production and trafficking, along with affiliated networks connected to the Assad regime. 

Keynote remarks

In June, the US unveiled its interagency strategy for combating captagon trafficking. In his speech, Goldrich emphasized this strategy’s overarching lines of efforts:

• i. To support law enforcement agencies involved in investigating captagon-related activities 
• ii. To utilize economic sanctions and other tools to disrupt and dismantle captagon networks.
• iii. To aid regional partners in combating drug trafficking and consumption. The United States is providing security assistance to Jordan and Lebanon 
• iv. To build coordinated approaches with multilateral institutions in order to strengthen the global response against captagon 

Although captagon is neither produced nor widely available in the US, Goldrich highlighted the deep concern about its impact on the health, economy, and social welfare of communities in the Middle East. In July, Secretary Blinken initiated a global coalition aimed at combating the rising threat of synthetic drugs, which pose a critical threat, not only as a leading cause of mortality among Americans aged 18 to 49, but also a significant concern in regions like Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 

Regional impact, challenges, and trends 

The captagon trade should not be considered in isolation when assessing its ramifications on local security, public health, and the economic landscape in Syria. Rather, Rose emphasized the transnational and transregional threat of the drug. The captagon trade targets established markets in the Gulf, while concurrently attempting to create novel consumption and destination markets. Rose mentioned that there has been credible evidence of captagon trafficking and production that extends beyond Syria into countries such as Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Netherlands, and Germany.  

Rose highlighted two challenges in addressing the captagon crisis. The first consists of the lack of a precise definition of captagon’s composition. The latter has evolved over time, departing from its original formula prevalent in illicit markets during the 1960s to 1980s. Presently, it is comprised of a mélange of interpretations of a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant, sometimes devoid of any amphetamine. In April 2022, the New Lines Institute reported that captagon typically contains amphetamine, sometimes in minuscule quantities, and occasionally comprising a substantial portion of up to 45-47% in the form of amphetamine metabolites per pill.  Also, captagon may encompass caffeine, quinine, and sometimes toxic levels of metals such as copper and zinc. 

Notably, there is a burgeoning trend of pseudoephedrine potentially being used in captagon production. Rose noted Syria’s consistent demand for pseudoephedrine since the onset of the Syrian war, underlining the paramount role this precursor material plays in the context of captagon production. She also acknowledged that there may be other various reasons to account for this, yet Syria remains one of the largest importers of pseudoephedrine, despite the pharmaceutical industry’s collapse. Although this does not definitively establish pseudoephedrine as the primary input of captagon production, the mounting evidence does lend credence to the notion that it plays a significant role. This confluence of factors strongly indicates a substantial and intricate link between pseudoephedrine and the mass production of captagon by the Assad regime. 

Secondly, the participation of the Syrian regime in discussions regarding the containment and prevention of captagon production and trafficking, particularly in the context of Interpol’s efforts, warrants scrutiny. Interpol plays a pivotal role in combating illicit trade including captagon. Operation Lionfish, as highlighted by Rose, focuses on regular seizures of captagon, meth, crystal, and cocaine. Interpol also actively fosters the exchange of regional information and intelligence among stakeholders. However, as of June 2021, Interpol’s persistent attempts to incorporate the Syrian regime within regional discussions – despite evidence of the regime’s involvement in captagon production and trafficking — has compromised Interpol’s creditability and ability to address interdiction. As Rose succinctly phrased it, “It’s like giving the cartel a seat at the table.” 

A global supply chain network 

Idler outlined five key points through which captagon is intricately embedded within the global illicit supply chain networks. First, captagon does not exist within a vacuum; it intricately intersects with a diverse array of illicit flows, including the trafficking of weapons, humans, and various narcotics. This interconnection is exemplified by the case of precursor chemicals vital for captagon production, as previously noted by Rose. Second, the management of these supply chains is multifaceted. At each stage, from material sourcing to production, transportation, trafficking, and the final market distribution is overseen by distinct actors that are globally connected. The third aspect reveals the instrumental role played by intermediaries or brokers, who operate at the local, regional, and global levels. They facilitate the coordination and unification of all the different phases of the supply chain. Fourth, the routes utilized for captagon trafficking are not confined to physical locations; they also encompass the requisite expertise and knowledge needed to execute these operations. Also, these trafficking nodes are not limited to one commodity. Lastly, illicit markets are interconnected, irrespective of the varying priorities given to different substances in different countries. Meaning, that a shock to one market can reverberate globally across other markets, prompting shifts in production strategies. For instance, while the United States places greater emphasis on fentanyl, a shock in the fentanyl market can lead consumers to seek alternatives, thereby increasing the demand for other markets, including captagon. Idler anticipates that captagon could be the next substance to be exploited by organizations like the Mexican cartels, furthering their endeavors to consolidate power and exacerbating the security risks already present.

A Global Health Crisis

For her part, Dribben explained an often under-researched and under-reported perspective: global health. Captagon should be an American priority because it can easily become a prominent drug in America causing major health implications. Like Fentanyl and Oxycontin, of which America already has a serious addiction problem, captagon is a synthetic drug that requires little knowledge and equipment to produce. She noted that even if captagon trade was halted and addicts were cut off, there is no protocol for dealing with the addiction. In Saudi Arabia, an estimated 40% of youth are addicted to captagon but the region’s medical treatment facilities are not well-equipped to treat drug addiction due to the way it is stigmatized as a criminal problem and not a health one. The American medical community is beginning to take note of captagon, and this attention will hopefully drive greater constituent interest in Congress. There is also increased global engagement, especially from the United Kingdom and the European Union, which is a promising step forward.

Finding Accountability

Tabbara focused on accountability methods for the Syrian Assad Regime. He explained that the captagon crisis is just one piece in the larger puzzle of the Assad Regime’s human and legal rights abuses, but that it can perhaps offer an entry way into taking accountability measures for other crimes. Trials over the illegality of captagon production and export in the International Criminal Court are one possible avenue for accountability. The Syrian Forum’s legal team has also researched existing legislative frameworks that can hold individuals and companies with associations and dealings with the captagon trade accountable here in the United States. The research found that the existing legal frameworks fall short of providing the opportunity for criminal prosecution of those who are involved in the captagon criminal networks. This type of accountability is also greatly important for US national security. Research has shown that both Hezbollah and Iran are directly involved in the captagon trade. A major faciliatory player in captagon trade is the 4th division, an Iran sponsored division of Syria’s military led by Bashar Al Assad’s brother, Maher Al Assad. Tabbara also explained that the Arab world already lost one avenue for accountability when they decided to pursue normalization with the Assad regime and re-admit it into the Arab League. This was a very important negotiating card that was given away for empty promises. The Arab world is now realizing that it is not a question of willingness for Assad to stop captagon and other illicit activities, but that Assad is unable to deliver and to keep order in his country.

The Role of Congress and the Executive Branch

Frost explained that Hill has been at the forefront of the United States’ legislative fight against captagon as he has introduced two important Acts on the topic: the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act to sanction those involved in the production and trafficking of the drug, and the Countering Assad’s Proliferation Trafficking And Garnering of Narcotics (CAPTAGON) Act. The latter will allow the State Department and Treasury to sanction other actors in this trade, and it also grants power to the administration to designate political organizations, militias, and state/non-state actors involved in drug trafficking. Frost explained that these important bills were only possible because of the grass–roots support Representative French Hill receives from his district on this issue. The current administration is also supportive of fighting captagon trade as evident by Secretary Blinken’s recent speech in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on captagon and normalization with Assad.

Takeaways and Recommendations 

• 1. Goldrich recommends seeking innovative strategies to address drug demand and consumption, emphasizing that Global Reduction Programs could also benefit US partners in the region.  
• 2. Moving forward, Betsy urges educating and fostering support from the medical community at a grassroots level. Their involvement is integral to developing medical protocols for captagon addiction that can be used throughout the world, but especially in the region. The United States must also designate and recognize the actors involved in captagon trade as those are not always obvious. 
• 3. Goldrich urges sustained coordination on sanctions with the United Kingdom and European partners to exert pressure for accountability regarding the Assad regime’s abuses, and to constrain the regime’s ability to profit from the conflict in Syria. 
• 4. Rose underscores the critical importance of understanding the composition of captagon for law enforcement, intelligence, and the healthcare sector.
• 5. Idler proposes that the United States proactively takes measures to prevent the exploitation of captagon by organizations like the Mexican cartel. Therefore, it is imperative to channel international efforts toward disrupting the captagon trade network and the associated power dynamics to safeguard global security interests.
• 6. Yasser recommends filling the research gaps that could allow for the creation of stronger legal frameworks under which US based companies and individuals can be held accountable for their involvement in illicit captagon trade and networks.  Before any legislation is written, there needs to be an analysis of the jurisdictional limitations of the United States on captagon including money laundering operations, supply chain operations, the use of the US dollar in captagon trade, and extradition of foreign nationals. Research on the role and extent of involvement of Hezbollah, Iran, and Iranian militias in captagon trade also must be greatly expanded upon. In order for this research to be effective, there must be open communication between the United States and its allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. When those make arrests related to captagon, it is extremely important for them to hold public prosecutions, so that the public is aware of the risk and consequences of involving themselves with captagon.
• 7. Dylan suggests that the next step for Congress should focus on passing an anti-normalization act with the Assad regime, which would help hold corporations accountable for illicit interactions with the Syrian government – noting the exemptions provided for humanitarian aid. Congress can also find ways to hold individuals involved with captagon who are outside of Syria accountable through existing laws and extradition treaties.

The post Addressing the captagon crisis in MENA: Strategies & Challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Former Ukrainian national team captain and coach Shevchenko has been particularly prominent in efforts to raise international awareness about Russia’s ongoing invasion. As an ambassador for Ukraine’s UNITED24 platform since spring 2022, he has done much to highlight the wartime experience of Ukraine’s civilian population and the humanitarian cost of the war.

Shevchenko was instrumental in organizing the Game4Ukraine initiative, an all-star charity match that took place in August 2023 at Stamford Bridge, the home ground of English Premier League side Chelsea, where Shevchenko spent three seasons as a player during the twilight years of his career. The Game4Ukraine charity match raised funds to rebuild a Ukrainian school destroyed during the Russian invasion. Crucially, the event also attracted considerable media attention and helped keep Ukraine in the headlines.

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As a former Ballon d’Or winner and AC Milan hero who is widely regarded as one of the greatest strikers of his generation, Shevchenko is a natural ambassador. However, he is far from the only Ukrainian soccer player to speak out on behalf of their country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion nineteen months ago. Many Ukrainian footballers currently playing for teams in Europe’s top leagues have been active since February 2022 in efforts to promote awareness of their country’s plight.

In England, Arsenal’s Oleksandr Zinchenko has been particularly vocal, while Everton’s Vitaliy Mykolenko has been outspoken in his criticism of the conflict and the failure of Russian sports stars to condemn the invasion. Other Ukrainian footballers including Ruslan Malinovskyi, who plays for Italian side Genoa, and national team captain Andriy Yarmolenko have been similarly supportive of their country. In Ukraine itself, famous footballers have also been involved in numerous fundraising initiatives.

Recently appointed Ukrainian national team coach Serhiy Rebrov is another prominent figure from Ukraine’s footballing fraternity who has championed the country’s struggle against Russia’s invasion. Rebrov was one of the driving forces behind the creation of the Ukrainian Army Support Fund, and has spoken publicly about his family’s decision to switch from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their daily lives. Rebrov has stated that he has received numerous offers to take on lucrative coaching roles in Russia since 2014 but has rejected them all. “My position is unequivocal,” he stated in summer 2022. “No contact with the country that attacked my people.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The prominent role being played by Ukraine’s footballers in the information space reflects the country’s rich footballing tradition. During the Cold War, Ukrainian clubs dominated the domestic soccer scene inside the Soviet Union, with standout team Dynamo Kyiv twice winning UEFA’s European Cup Winners Cup. Meanwhile, the Soviet national team relied heavily on Ukrainian talent, with more than half of the squad that reached the European Championship Final in 1988 hailing from Ukraine. The most celebrated football trainer in Soviet history, Valeriy Lobanovskiy, was also Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian national team has struggled to build on this remarkable legacy during the post-Soviet era, but Ukrainian club teams remain among the strongest in Eastern Europe. A swashbuckling Dynamo Kyiv side featuring a young Andriy Shevchenko famously reached the semi-finals of the Champions League in 1999, while bitter domestic rivals Shakhtar Donetsk won the UEFA Cup in 2009 and regularly feature in the knockout stages of European competition. Since the start of the war, both Dynamo Kyiv and Shakhtar Donetsk have played multiple charity games against teams throughout Europe to help raise money for the victims of Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s primary footballing ambassadors remain the country’s national team. After narrowly failing to reach the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, Ukraine is now hoping to qualify for the 2024 European Championship, with the last matches of the qualifying stage scheduled for October and November 2023. The decisive tie is likely to be Ukraine’s match against Italy on November 20.

The security challenges created by the ongoing war with Russia mean that Ukraine’s national team must play its home ties in nearby Poland, where the presence of a large Ukrainian community guarantees packed stadiums and strong support. Each qualification match also provides millions of Ukrainians back home with a welcome distraction from the horrors of Russia’s invasion, while also serving as a reminder to global audiences of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience.

Renat Zihanshyn is a digital marketing strategist, author, and content manager of the R/Z FOOTBALL YouTube channel. Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 27, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is making real progress on the Crimean front

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s escalating attacks in Crimea are steadily undermining Russia’s invasion and are a reminder that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is not limited to the relatively static front lines of the war, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s soccer stars help to keep Russia’s invasion in global spotlight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The recent publication of a new history textbook for Russian schoolchildren highlights the continued dominance of unapologetically imperialistic thinking within the Russian establishment. “This isn’t a historical textbook, but a narrative of excuses for Russian and Soviet crimes, as well as an exhortation to young readers to accept these crimes, past and present, as their own,” commented Jade McGlynn, the British author of a new study of Russian memory politics.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The launch of this new textbook is worthy of particular attention. As an officially sanctioned guide to Russian history that is clearly designed to shape the world view of young Russians, it highlights many of the key messages at the heart of modern Russian imperialism and lays bare the Kremlin’s efforts to weaponize history in order to justify its own wars of aggression.

Unsurprisingly, the textbook glorifies centuries of Russian imperial expansion and whitewashes the crimes of the Soviet era, while dehumanizing Ukrainians as Nazis and portraying the West as implacably hostile to Russia. It defends the Russian invasion of Ukraine and places Putin alongside other leading Russian imperialists such as Peter the Great and Stalin as a “gatherer of Russian lands.” Meanwhile, setbacks such as the collapse of the USSR and the loss of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space are portrayed as part of a long-term Western anti-Russian conspiracy.

One of the key threads running through the new textbook is the notion of Russian victimhood. Russia is consistently portrayed as a victim of Western intrigues and is never the aggressor. Needless to say, there is no thought for the entire nations subjugated or destroyed by Russian imperial aggression. In this highly distorted and hopelessly partisan reading of history, the largest nation on the planet is also the world’s biggest victim.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The messianic view of Russian history outlined in this newly published textbook is part of a long tradition of Russian exceptionalism dating back to Czarist times that portrays Russia as a nation on a sacred civilizing mission. With Russia depicted as an unquestionably positive force for good in the world, the use of force in pursuit of this role becomes easily justified. Such twisted logic remains prevalent today and helps to explain the popularity of otherwise absurd arguments framing the invasion of Ukraine as an attempt to rescue Ukrainians from themselves.

This embrace of exceptionalism encourages Russians to romanticize the violence that has defined much of their country’s history. It also reinforces a sense of continuity linking the Czarist and Soviet past with the Putinist present. For millions of Russians, post-Soviet military campaigns including the frozen conflict in Moldova, two Chechen wars, the invasion of Georgia, the seizure of Crimea, and the intervention in Syria are all part of a expansionist tradition stretching back centuries.

Putin himself has spoken of the USSR as “historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.” He has directly compared his Ukraine invasion with the imperial conquests of Peter the Great, and has made clear that the goal of today’s war is to reclaim “historically Russian lands.” No doubt Putin’s Czarist predecessors would find these imperial ambitions immediately recognizable.

In line with Putin’s claims to be restoring historical justice in Ukraine, the new textbook rejects the idea of Russia as a colonial power and instead speaks of “reuniting” territories or liberating neighboring nations from oppression. Meanwhile, those who have dared to condemn or fight against Russian expansionism are depicted as agents of the West or nationalist extremists. The incorporation of new territories by Russia is portrayed as beneficial for the people being incorporated, regardless of whether they themselves agree.

The recent publication of Russia’s new history textbook is a comparatively minor event at a time when the Kremlin is waging a genocidal war of imperial conquest in the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, it should serve as a wake-up call for anyone still laboring under the delusion that Putin is a rational leader pursuing limited geopolitical objectives. On the contrary, he presides over a regime and a society that openly embraces a brand of imperialism which most Europeans assumed had been consigned to the ash heap of history generations ago.

This imperialistic mindset represents perhaps the greatest single obstacle to a sustainable peace in Europe. Even if the invasion of Ukraine ends in military failure, the underlying problem of Russian imperialism will remain until Russians are forced to confront their country’s long history of imperial aggression. This will likely be a painful process, but it is unavoidable if Russia is to eventually emerge as a modern state and reintegrate into the wider community of nations.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the recently published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 17, 2023

Putin must not be allowed to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake

By Melinda Haring

Western countries must take urgent action to prevent Vladimir Putin from turning the Black Sea into a Russian lake, warns Melinda Haring.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin weaponizes history with new textbook justifying Ukraine invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the majority of Afghanistan’s new generation—those who worked, fought, and aspired for a free, democratic, and prosperous country—it has been a harrowing two years. It has been two long years of processing grief and overcoming the anguish of abandonment and collapse, but also two years of engaging in self-reflection, reorganization, and resistance.

The country is in a deep crisis; the status quo is not sustainable. The challenges ahead are enormous and multidimensional, but all is not lost. Afghanistan’s most precious asset, developed over the past two decades, is its professional and well-connected youth. More than 60 percent of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of twenty-five. The burden of resolving this crisis by spotting and exploiting opportunities amid this calamity falls on this generation. They are slowly but surely rising to the task.

The challenges ahead are indeed colossal. Afghanistan faces a deeply divided society, a demoralized elite, a broken economy, an exhausted civil society, and an extremist ethnoreligious group in control of the country. The Taliban reneged on the promises they made during the Doha negotiation process to form an inclusive government and provide women and girls with access to education. Instating exclusively male and essentially Pashtun mullahs, they failed to gain domestic and international legitimacy. They continue to impose draconian and regressive laws, which are pushing the country into a downward spiral in every socioeconomic, human-rights, and fundamental-freedoms index. After systematically erasing women and girls from public life, the Taliban administration is on the brink of being designated as a gender apartheid regime by United Nations–appointed rights experts. Its symbiotic relations with foreign terrorist groups, drug production and trafficking, and systematic promotion of violent extremist ideology pose imminent threats to the immediate region and beyond.

The international community, weary and incoherent in its approach to the crises, has retreated to the background, only to engage in narrow humanitarian diplomacy. With each new edict from the Taliban’s reclusive leader, the bar on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms lowers further. International demands for an inclusive and representative government are confined to written reports. International leaders have dropped democratization from their talking points on the Taliban regime altogether.

Yet members of Afghanistan’s new generation—inside the country and in exile—have not given up, neither on their country nor on their hope and aspiration for the creation of a free, rights-based, and prosperous state that can serve as a home to all its citizens. Only two days after the Taliban’s military takeover, women and girls took to the streets of Kabul and other major cities to demand their fundamental rights. The call by women for “food, work, and freedom” ignited the first sparks of a civil resistance movement in the cities. Similarly, despite the chaotic disintegration of Afghanistan’s national security forces, some soldiers and officers have laid the foundations of a national resistance front in the rural mountains of Afghanistan. Afghan diaspora communities have organized protests and launched advocacy campaigns for the restoration of rights and dignity around the world.

The most excruciating challenge of all is the spread of a self-deprecating narrative among certain circles outside Afghanistan that there is no alternative to the Taliban government and that it is the “reality” that Afghans have to live with. This narrative is wrong and lazy. The Taliban are not and never were an acceptable alternative to a democratic state in a pluralistic society such as Afghanistan. While they are a part of the country’s “reality,” this does not mean that the people of Afghanistan shouldn’t rise above and aspire for better. Hence Afghans’ struggle for a better Afghanistan entails standing against the brutality of a formidable foe but also enduring the selective amnesia of retreating friends.

More serious than often-cited tribal or regional rifts—Durrani versus Ghilzai or east versus south—are the inherent internal contradictions in the Taliban attitude toward contemporary governance, education, economics, and foreign affairs. The concept of equality of treatment and opportunities for citizens and long-term peaceful coexistence with the outside world, the two prerequisites of enduring stability in Afghanistan, are not ingrained in the movement’s DNA. Their dogmatic, anti-Enlightenment, and misogynist ideas and practices are not only a nuisance for the developed world, but also a threat to the new wave of modernization in Muslim-majority nations. 

History has shown that dogmatic regimes defy the normative principle of diplomatic engagement. Concessions don’t lead to counter-concessions but to the strengthening of power. The Taliban’s behavior during the peace talks and after their assumption of power vindicates this argument. They are running in the opposite direction of the caravan of human progress. International engagement should prioritize containment and damage control rather than offering more concessions. 

The international community’s nonrecognition of the Taliban regime has created an enabling environment for Afghanistan’s civil and political forces to coalesce around common values and principles and demand the restoration of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and an inclusive and representative government. International civil society, parliamentarians, academic institutions, women’s rights groups, associations of veterans, and friends of Afghanistan are actively supporting these endeavors. Taking note of the Taliban’s intransigence and regressive policies, their failure to gain international legitimacy, and the emergence of a civil resistance movement, many Afghans inside the country have not settled with the Taliban and do not perceive them as a legitimate and permanent government.

A realistic assessment of the above challenges points to opportunities to positively engage all relevant stakeholders. Afghanistan’s professional and emerging political forces, journalists, and academics are rapidly establishing themselves as units of a mass resistance and reform movement. It is these Afghans, particularly among the youth, who must unite to save the country.

Nasir Andisha is the ambassador and permanent representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations in Geneva. He is a former vice president of the Human Rights Council (2020) and deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan (2015-2019).

The post Afghanistan’s next generation must rise above the Taliban’s ‘reality’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

AlDhabi is the youngest Emirati entrepreneur and youngest publisher. She also holds a Guinness World Record for being the youngest person to publish a bilingual book. Our MENASource editor, Holly Dagres, talked to her on August 9 to discuss her remarkable entrepreneurial journey and explore her achievements.

MENASOURCE: How old were you when you started reading?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: So, to be honest, my mom started to read me books when I was still in her tummy. When I was about six to seven months, I started to sound out the words and read along with the story. My mom used to say, maybe a sentence like, “A rabbit went for a walk,” and I would sound out the letters. When I was two or three years old, I started to read by myself.

One of the best things is that every time I open a book, I always know there’s a meaning, and that’s why I enjoy books so much because they have a message. So, I feel that books are really interesting, to be honest. And they’re also really fun since there are nonfiction and fiction books.

MENASOURCE: You reportedly read 1,200 books by the time you were six. What were some of your favorites?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: Well, to be honest, when I was six years old I had read 1,200 books, and when I was, I think, seven to eight years old, I had read about 3,000 books and above.

Some of my favorites were Mary Poppins, Rich Dad Poor Dad, Alice in Wonderland, The Gruffalo, Goodnight Moon, and DK Children’s Encyclopedia.

MENASOURCE: Tell us about your online platform Rainbow Chimney. What inspired you?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: Rainbow Chimney didn’t start as a business. Whenever I went to my grandma’s house, I would do activities. And every time I went there, my cousins were on their electronics. They take them wherever they go, whenever they want to. “Why,” I used to ask my mother. I would say, “Mom, why don’t they play with me? Why are they on their electronics so much?” She told me that they like to use electronics more than having fun, which is kind of weird because, as children, we love to play. And when I say we love, we love to play.

So, when I went home, I thought to myself, “What could I do to fix this?” I took a box, filled it up with activities, books, some crafts, art, and these kinds of things. And when I put books, I didn’t put a little. I put a lot. I closed the box and colored it with lines, stripes, and on top of it, I wrote Rainbow Chimney, which is now my business’s name. So, you might be thinking, “What did you do next?”

When I took [Rainbow Chimney] to my grandmother’s house the next time I visited, I put it on the floor. My cousins all started to look at the box, but they were still on their electronics. So, I told them about the box, and they were curious. They asked, “Is it a puppy? What’s inside the box? We want to see what’s inside the box.” And I said, “If you want to open the box, you need to put all the electronics aside, including my whole family.” My grandmother even put it away. My grandfather put it away. They all put it away. So, we opened the box together. They took a book, toy, or activity. And, when I got home, I asked my mother, “Can we have a business?” So, she agreed and we established Rainbow Chimney to make educational aids, and now my business has a bookshop. It also has special books for people with autism and those who are blind.

MENASOURCE: What inspired you to write your bilingual book, which was recorded in the Guinness World Records?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: When I was six years old, I thought to myself, “If I have a bookshop, why don’t I have a publishing house?” So, I published a bilingual book. It’s called I Had an Idea. It’s actually my first book. It’s both in English and Arabic so that everybody in the world can understand it.

Then, I thought to myself again, “What if my book became a Guinness World Record?” So, we applied for the Guinness World Records, and I got the Guinness World Record for the youngest female author to publish a bilingual book. So, that was only for my first book. Then, my second book, which is called Here Was the Beginning, got a world record again for the youngest author to write a bilingual book series.

MENASOURCE: How many books have you published right now?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: So far, two. We’re working on my third book. I have an initiative called Books from Children to Children, and this initiative is to encourage children from four to ten years old to write—either in Arabic or English. The objective is to raise a new generation of writers and to encourage children to think and become whatever they want to be in the future.

MENASOURCE: Have you considered what you’d like to be when you grow up?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: When I grow up, I want to encourage children to become whatever they want to be in the future. And not only that. But I also want to go to space and discover more things. But not only to be an astronaut but to be an astronaut and scientist at the same time.

I want to go to space because I want to learn. I have wanted to learn about space since I was three years old. I’ve loved space so much, and I still have lots of books about space. I even have a space encyclopedia.

When I go to space, I not only want to discover more things but [experience] everything I have learned. I want to show children through publishing that they can know more about space and also learn more facts. I also want them to feel the joy and happiness that I feel when I write books and how interesting it is. 

MENASOURCE: What do you like to do for fun when you’re not reading books?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: So, actually, I love to read books. I don’t think I would do anything else. But, like, of course, we need to move around. I like to draw, color, or even sometimes paint. And those things are actually really interesting to me because I love how if you’re stressed out, you can paint, and you calm down. Painting is soothing and relaxing. And you can just think of whatever you want at that time.

And, of course, I love to play with my brother and sister. Mostly I would like to play with my youngest brother. So, yeah, I really love to play with my siblings.

One of the things I love the most is going to school. It’s because I feel like school is my second home. It gives you the learning that you need. It’s always interesting. Maybe people sometimes think it’s boring. But that boringness, it becomes interesting, especially Math and English. I really enjoy them very much. Math challenges you and makes you think about something new—something you have never tried before. And, English, I really like to write a lot. Write what you need to, read what you need to write.

MENASOURCE: What has your experience been with the WIN fellowship so far?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: It’s been a great experience, and I’m truly honored to be part of this program. I’m really excited about the new connections I’ll gain and the new things that I’ll learn about businesses. I can be more knowledgeable about what I need to do to support my business, Rainbow Chimney. I’m really excited about the next thing that I’ll learn.

MENASOURCE: What is your message to other aspiring young entrepreneurs from the Middle East and North Africa?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: My message to them is that, no matter what, never give up. And to those children out there who don’t read books, maybe the cover’s nice, but the cover’s not the book. So, I really want them to believe in themselves. I want them to be confident. I want them to be brave, and I want them to be confident about what they’re seeing and about their knowledge and to care about their knowledge. And sometimes maybe they will want to read a few more books in their home.

MENASOURCE: As the youngest WIn fellow, what message do you have on International Youth Day?

ALDHABI ALMHERI: I would like to say there’s a key within you that unlocks a door, and this door is waiting to be opened by you. So, I hope to everybody who’s hearing me right now that they can inspire themselves and become whatever they want to be in the future—if they try hard.

Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

The post AlDhabi AlMheiri: Meet the nine-year-old driving change in the UAE, one book at a time appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russian oil tanker struck as Ukrainian general alleges chemical weapons use

Satellite imagery supports report of depleted armored vehicles in Russian military storage facility

Tracking narratives

Yandex co-founder condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russian independent outlet ties Investigative Committee of Russia to forced deportations of Ukrainian children

Russian oil tanker struck as Ukrainian general alleges chemical weapons use

Russia accused Ukraine of striking a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone. The vessel was identified by the Moscow Times as the chemical tanker SIG, currently under US sanctions for supplying jet fuel to Russian forces in Syria. Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne, citing unnamed Ukrainian security officials, reported that the Ukrainian navy struck the ship near the Kerch Strait Bridge using a naval drone. Ukrainian forces have long targeted the Kerch Bridge in an attempt to cut off Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. On the night of August 3, Ukrainian troops conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and seaside infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia’s Krasnodar region, reportedly striking the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak.

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on August 7 that it conducted offensive operations in the direction of the Russian-occupied cities of Berdyansk and Melitopol. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said that fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army is making progress on this front, albeit slowly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged in an interview published on August 6 with Argentine newspaper La Nacion that counteroffensive operations are progressing slower than expected and mentioned the need for patience.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi alleged on August 6 that Russian forces used chemical weapons in Ukraine, violating international conventions. According to a post on Tarnavskyi’s Telegram channel, Russian troops fired two artillery barrages with munitions containing the toxic compound chloropicrin in Novodanylivka. Tarnavskyi did not include evidence to back up his claim, nor has it been independently verified.

On the evening of August 7, Russian forces reportedly dropped four guided aerial bombs on the village of Kruhliakivka, located twenty-five kilometers southeast of Kupiansk. According to Governor Oleh Syniehubov, the attack killed two civilians; and Russia struck the village again when first responders arrived on the scene.  That same day, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak said that Russia struck a house in the town of Kucherivka, Kharkiv Oblast, killing two people. In addition, a man was reportedly killed during a Russian attack in Nikopol, located across the Dnipro River from Russian-controlled Enerhodar in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. 

On August 6, Zelenskyy said that over the past week, Russian forces had launched sixty-five missiles against Ukraine and 178 combat drones, including eighty-seven Iranian-made Shahed drones. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force reported that Russian troops used Kinzhal ballistic missiles against Ukraine on August 5, targeting central and western regions.

According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, Russia has damaged at least 763 cultural heritage sites in unoccupied regions of Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The most damage has been recorded in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, and Odesa. At least 255 architectural landmarks, 185 historical sites, nineteen monumental art sites, and eighteen sites of archeological significance are reportedly among the damaged locations. 

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Satellite imagery supports report of depleted armored vehicles in Russian military storage facility

In an August 8 article, the Moscow Times claimed that a Russian open-air storage facility dedicated to tanks and armored vehicles in the Vagzhanova district of Buryatia’s capital city, Ulan-Ude, had been depleted of almost 40 percent of its units since June 2022. The outlet based its claims on Google Earth imagery, with the May 2023 update showing empty spots where tanks used to be located. The DFRLab compared the Google imagery to Capella Space satellite aperture radar (SAR) imagery, which also appears to show that many armored vehicles and tanks in storage at the Vagzhanova facility had been relocated. The SAR imagery only covers the area from June to November 2022.

According to the Moscow Times’ estimates, in September 2021, the storage facility stored 3,840 armored vehicles. The figure shrank to around 2,600 units in November 2022, and the latest Google Earth imagery points to around 2,270 remaining units. The Moscow Times also indicated that around 1,570 units were missing from the storage facility, with the most significant departures observed after the enforcement of the partial mobilization in late May 2022.

Using measurement tools on satellite imagery, the DFRLab can infer that based on the length and width of the vehicles in the imagery, the tanks could be identified as the BTR-RD, BMD-4M or BMD-3, and BTR-MD (codename: “Rakushka”). The Moscow Times reported that military units 4428 and 46108 are deployed to the Vagzhanova military facility. 

The armored vehicles cited above also appear consistent with losses reported by open-source researcher Oryx during the February 2023 battle of Vuhledar, which saw heavy Russian losses. According to Oryx’s estimates, twenty-one BTR-MD tanks were destroyed or captured during the failed offensive. The DFRLab also monitored the failed Russian push on Vuhledar, which highlighted the presence of Russian soldiers from Russia’s far-east regions, including Primorsky Krai and Buryatia. Both regions have suffered heavy fatalities since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

At the time of writing, the DFRLab cannot confirm that these units were equipped with the vehicles presented in the satellite imagery dating back to November 2022.

Citing Russian defense ministry instructions, the Moscow Times also reported that armored vehicles stored in open-air facilities are typically part of the least valuable units, as more modern vehicles are stored in protected facilities or under tents.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Yandex co-founder condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine

After independent Russian news outlet Agenstvo reported that Arkady Volozh, co-founder of the search engine and tech company Yandex, did not describe himself as Russian in his official website bio, Volozh reportedly issued a statement voicing opposition to the war in Ukraine and acknowledged his “share of responsibility.” 

“I am categorically against Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, where I, like many, have friends and relatives,” the statement noted. “I am horrified by the fact that every day bombs fly into the homes of Ukrainians. Despite the fact that I have not lived in Russia since 2014, I understand that I also have a share of responsibility for the actions of the country.”

Independent outlets, including Meduza and Proekt, have previously published articles critical of Volozh and Yandex, alleging that both have been complicit in Russia’s crackdowns on internet freedoms. “Over time, it became clear that Russia was in no hurry to become part of the global world,” the statement added. “At the same time, the pressure on the company grew. But we did not give up, we did our best despite the external conditions. Has it always been possible to find the right balance? Now, looking back, it is clear that something could have been done differently.”

On August 7, Agenstvo raised questions about how Volozh presented himself to the world, noting that his official bio describes him as a “Kazakhstan-born, Israeli tech entrepreneur, computer scientist, investor, and philanthropist.” Agenstvo also noted a back-and-forth series of edits on his Wikipedia page in which an IP address located in Israel had removed the phrase “Russian billionaire.” 

“There were many reasons why I had to remain silent,” the statement concluded. “You can argue about the timeliness of my statement, but not about its substance. I am against war.”

—Andy Carvin, DFRLab managing edtior, Washington, DC

Russian independent outlet ties Investigative Committee of Russia to forced deportations of Ukrainian children

Russian independent media outlet Verstka reported that the Investigative Committee of Russia and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are allegedly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a special report published on August 6, Verstka claimed that the Investigative Committee of Russia took patronage over the Ukrainian children living in Russia and sent its employees to homes with toys, clothes, and school materials. 

Verstka also claimed that the Investigative Committee previously advertised the cadet corps to Ukrainian children from eastern Ukraine. According to data published in an Investigative Committee magazine, at least seventy-eight Ukrainian children entered Russian educational institutions, including the cadet corps and academies affiliated with the Investigative Committee, between February 2022 and March 2023.

Bastrykin does not appear to have commented on the allegation; the Russian War Report will continue to keep an eye on this story in case he issues a statement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Co-founder of Russia’s most popular search engine condemns war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But for all the similarities between the current and previous surge in migratory pressures from North Africa, much has also changed. Going through these changes can help illuminate recent evolutions in regional migratory patterns, in the causes that push African migrants to attempt perilous journeys across the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, and in the effectiveness of policy responses from countries on both shores of the Mediterranean.

For one, today’s points of departure have become much more scattered along the North African coast. In 2014-2017, close to 90 percent of those who managed to reach Italy did so departing from Libya, and as time went on increasingly from its western shores—namely, from the sixty-mile strip that stretches in an east-west direction from Tripoli, Libya’s capital, to Zwara, a town near the border with Tunisia. However, since 2019, Tunisia and Libya have been competing for the top spot as point of departure, so much so that in the first five months of 2023, 52 percent of migrants disembarking in Italy had departed from Tunisia, while just 44 percent had done so from Libya. Even within Libya, UNHCR, the United Nations (UN) refugee agency, estimates that the majority of those who made it to Italy this year had embarked from Cyrenaica—the country’s eastern half, controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Tobruk’s High Council of State—rather than from Tripolitania.

The second difference, tightly linked to the first, relates to the speed of the current surge. During the previous “migrant crisis,” the surge took just a few months between 2013 and 2014. This time around, the increase in migrant departures from northern African shores has been several years in the making, slowly and steadily building up from April 2020 to today. As to the economic causes of the current increase in arrivals, it is not surprising that the surge started just a few months after the pandemic wiped out any hope for tourism receipts in 2020. This was especially important for a country such as Tunisia, which draws around 10 percent of its gross domestic product from tourism and related activities, with around 12 percent of its active population employed in the sector.

Another difference can be found in the composition of nationalities making up the current surge. In 2014-2017, close to 80 percent of all irregular migrant arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route included citizens of sub-Saharan African countries, mainly from western Africa. In contrast, between 2020 and the first half of 2022, migration patterns had “regionalized,” including a large share of Tunisians and Egyptians. It was clear, then, that irregular migration was being driven first by the “twin crises” of the pandemic, and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These forces acted as an economic double whammy for African economies, first (as seen) by hitting the tourism sector, and then through the Ukraine war by making energy and food prices skyrocket. The effects rippled across the continent like waves, and people living in closer proximity to points of departure in northern African countries were the first to arrive in Europe. As time passed, people living further away from the Mediterranean shores had time to reach them. This is why, from the second half of 2022 to today, the trend has reversed, so much so that in the first five months of 2023, more than half of the migrants that reached Italy having departed from Tunisia were citizens of the Ivory Coast (28 percent) or Guinea (another 23 percent), while Tunisians made up just 13 percent of the total.

In a way it seems like, in terms of nationalities, the last year is almost “back to square one.” But there is another difference compared with the period 2014-2017, and that is the existence of active entities that police the shores where most migrant crossings occur. During the previous migration crisis, when most migrants departed from Libya and the so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) had not been set up yet or had insufficient vessels, resources, or political commitment to carry out rescues/interceptions at sea, the Central Mediterranean Sea was predominantly populated by European actors and ships—be they merchant vessels, coast guard ships, or components of the civil fleet like nongovernmental organization (NGO) vessels. Since 2017, however, the Italian and European Union (EU) authorities have funded, trained, and empowered the LCG while assisting Libyan authorities in declaring the existence of their own Libyan search and rescue region, as well as setting up a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 2018. Accordingly, the proportion of migrants that has been stopped while trying to leave Libya and brought back to shore has risen from none in 2016, to 12 percent in 2017, and to 68 percent in 2019, reaching the highest level of thirty-two thousand irregular migrants brought back to Libya in 2021 (51 percent of total departures). At the same time, the Tunisian Coast Guard has continued to carry out rescue/interceptions itself, with a steady rise from thirty-five hundred interceptions in 2017 to twenty-three thousand in 2021 (more recently, the Tunisian Coast Guard reported over twenty-four thousand interceptions in just the first five months of 2023).

This trend, together with the sudden drop in irregular migrant departures from Libya in July 2017, lasting over three years before the start of the current surge, shows that enhanced cooperation among EU countries and official and unofficial actors in northern African countries that have a stake in the migrant smuggling business can significantly stem the irregular flow of persons. Of course, this is achieved at the cost of increasing the number of persons who are returned to unsafe countries (as the UN has defined Libya since at least 2016) or end up in brutal illegal detention centers (in Libya, estimates have grown from five thousand detained in January 2019 to close to ten thousand by the end of 2021), and exposing EU countries to a higher likelihood of being blackmailed.

Moreover, enforcement of border controls can ebb and flow. The Libya case shows this perfectly, as the LCG’s activities at sea have dropped consistently over the past year and a half relative to arrivals in Italy. In 2023 so far, the share of irregular migrants that has been rescued/intercepted by the LCG has dropped to 23 percent, less than half the 2018-2021 average. In Tunisia, a sudden drop in irregular departures in May and June compared with expectations (close to 70 percent lower arrivals than an ISPI short-term model for forecasting irregular arrivals had predicted) has been associated not just with worse-than-average weather conditions, but also with an increase in police raids in Sfax and other Tunisian towns along the coast that have been known to be heavily involved in smuggling activity. The fact that this drop in departures from Tunisia was observed just days after visits by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi has generated renewed interest on political agreements among countries from the two shores of the Mediterranean. Since Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Tunis on June 6, departures have risen but have remained subdued compared with the previous trend.

Policy responses: Adequate or insufficient? 

What do recent trends teach us in terms of policy responses? First, they show the precarious nature of political-technical agreements to stem the flow of irregular departures from northern African shores. The sudden drop in departures from Libya in July 2017 held for years, allowing arrivals to Italy to drop from around 155,000 to 11,000 in twenty-four months. But the implicit agreement among Italy and a number of Libyan militias did not do much to reduce the “demand” for smuggling services among migrants who were already living in Libya or travelling to northern African countries. On the contrary, the drop in supply of migrant smuggling services in Libya opened up the possibility that Tunisian smugglers who were already providing a number of limited goods or services (such as sturdier iron boats) to smugglers in Libya could move up the “smuggling value chain” and start offering the full package as well.

It also teaches us about the flexibility of each smuggling route, as well as the need to understand each route’s specificities. For instance, it was only with the pandemic and its impact on tourism that Tunisian migrants started looking for smuggling services in much larger numbers. As soon as demand for smuggling rose, and the industry found its footing in Tunisia, it was only natural that it would start to provide the same services to sub-Saharan African nationals severely hit by the economic effects of the Ukraine crisis. This is exactly what happened in 2022: From the outside, the transition from Tunisian nationals to sub-Saharan Africans appeared to be seamless. Moreover, as the smuggling industry in Tunisia seems to be less led by specific households but rather a much more competitive business, it is less plausible to expect that irregular departures could be stopped by striking just a handful of deals with the right counterparts. Namely, both an increase in police raids and/or paying smugglers to stop providing their services are likely to bring only a respite from the issue, to eventually be replaced by other actors willing to offer the very same services.

Local contexts 

To adequately respond to irregular migration across the Mediterranean, it is crucial to comprehend the ongoing domestic crises that North African countries are facing. Among the five countries comprising the continent’s northern shore (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Libya and Tunisia stand out as the most precarious and unstable. Consequently, there seems to be a clear correlation between instability and heightened migration.

Libya is still rocked by civil strife, split between the east, under Khalifa Haftar’s control, and the west, under the UN-backed interim government led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. The ongoing conflict has made it impossible for economic conditions to improve. With unemployment continuously on the rise (now close to 20 percent) and economic growth low and volatile, locals and non-locals have found other means to make ends meet. Migration is a lucrative business for local militias both to Libya’s east and west, while non-locals (Libya hosts nearly seven hundred thousand international migrants) flock to the shores attempting to reach Europe in search of better economic and humanitarian conditions. The ongoing civil war is bad for locals, but particularly bad for migrants who face discrimination and a lack of employment as a result. 

Meanwhile, Tunisia’s perilous economic conditions and an uptake in anti-migrant sentiment have been important migratory push factors. Democratic backsliding has also been a key concern since President Kais Saïed froze parliament, sacked the prime minister (July 2021), and removed fifty-seven judges from office (June 2022), with more and more political opponents seeking refuge elsewhere and looking at Europe as a safe haven. 

Conclusions 

Europe is negotiating a deal worth almost one billion euros with Tunisia to curb the current migration flow. Yet, conditioning financial aid to a cessation in migration is a risky business that presents long-term challenges as well as ethical concerns. For one, it allows for the recipient country (in this case, Tunisia) to hold significant leverage on European countries and use migration flows as a bargaining chip for further demands. Instead, Europe could condition its aid to a more holistic package of requests, including a return to the rule of law and renewed efforts toward a democratic transition. 

Moreover, it is essential for European countries, particularly coastal states, to abandon the counterproductive approach of consistently blaming nongovernmental actors that seek to improve search and rescue efforts in the Central Mediterranean. In Italy, the current government’s practice of sending NGO ships that have carried out a rescue to faraway ports that take three to five days to reach, and another three to five days to return to the search and rescue zone off the Libyan coast, unnecessarily shortens their operational period and raises their costs. It is crucial to acknowledge that clear and repeated findings have debunked the notion that search and rescue operations serve as incentives for migrants to depart from North Africa’s shores.

Lastly, unless European countries establish safe and lawful avenues for low-skill migrants to reach their intended destinations, the problem of irregular migration will persist, or even worsen, in the coming decades. Even if new legal avenues do not directly decrease irregular crossings, they could legitimately be used to justify negotiations on increasing the return rates of irregular migrants. The current dearth of legal routes instead serves as justification for origin countries not to accept returnees, and serves to only raise political and diplomatic tensions.

Matteo Villa is Senior Research Fellow at ISPI and co-heads the ISPI Data Lab

Alissa Pavia is Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program 

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To Ukrainian tennis player Elina Svitolina, forgoing handshakes with Russian and Belarusian competitors is much more than an individual choice.

It reflects “the position of all Ukrainians… we are here to win this war,” she said, explaining that the fight for sovereignty begins with the media—which reported on Svitolina’s handshake refusals at Wimbledon at length—and finishes with the brave “men and women who are fighting on the front line.”

Just weeks after her Wimbledon appearance—where the unseeded tennis player made it to the semi-finals and became a crowd favorite—Svitolina told the Atlantic Council about how athletes are “doing everything possible” to give Ukrainian fighters support. At the Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday, cohosted by the Women’s Foreign Policy Group and the Council’s Eurasia Center, Svitolina pointed out how Ukrainian fencer Olga Harlan had earlier that day been disqualified from the World Fencing Championships for refusing to shake the hand of her Russian opponent.

For the tennis star, the disqualification brought flashbacks to having been booed over refusing to shake hands with Belarusian player Aryna Sabalenka at the French Open last month.

Svitolina argued that it is not possible to separate sports from politics, especially when the players are from Russia and Belarus. “Their governments are using the athletes fully,” she said. “They really use them as a weapon in the media” and in “propaganda.” She also pointed out that some Russian athletes have had positions in the military—the same military that employs soldiers who have forcibly removed children and killed Ukrainian fighters.

“As a Ukrainian, I cannot be silent,” she said. “I want to scream everywhere I can and use my voice [to] the fullest.”

Below are highlights from the event, which was moderated by CBS News’s Margaret Brennan and touched upon the power of Ukrainian athletes, the Ukrainian fighting spirit, and the next generation of Ukrainian tennis stars.

More support needed from the sports world

• The Women’s Tennis Association stated that it is up to each player to decide whether or not to shake hands. “I think the other sports federations, they should do the same,” Svitolina argued. “They should respect our decision, the decision of our country.” She added that “it’s really terrible what’s happening in the sports world, that we [Ukrainians] don’t get the respect of our decision.”
• On July 26, Ukraine lifted its ban on athletes competing against Russians and Belarusians so long as the opponents compete under neutral banners. “I think this was the right decision,” Svitolina said. With the Paris 2024 Olympics one year away, Svitolina explained that behind the scenes, the Ukrainian sports minister is “doing everything possible” to work with the International Olympic Committee on finding a solution that respects the Ukrainian position on competing and interacting with Russian and Belarusian athletes.
• Svitolina argued that exceptions should only be made if Russian and Belarusian athletes “come out with a clear statement… against their governments,” and remain vocal over time. But over the past year and a half, she explained, “we got nothing—and now it’s too late.”
• Athletes globally can do more to support Ukraine, according to Svitolina. “I think being vocal is really the least you can do… to raise the awareness that the war is still ongoing.” Beyond that, she implored them to not be scared about taking the responsibility to speak out.
• Svitolina explained that fans also have a role to play in supporting Ukrainians; that can include everything from waving flags at tournaments to sending donations to organizations supporting Ukrainians at home. Do “what speaks to you,” she told fans. “It really motivates me to do better, to do more.”

The next generation of sport stars

• Svitolina established a charitable foundation that supports young gifted tennis players in Ukraine. The foundation is planning to host tournaments in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities over the coming months. “I know how much kids love to compete, how much they love to play.”
• However, “safety is the [first] priority,” Svitolina said, recounting how when the war started, the foundation worked to try to relocate the kids and families that the foundation supports. And today, the foundation specifically locates courts that are in safe areas or near bomb shelters.
• The foundation also provides mental health services to the families. Svitolina noted that there’s “generally a lot of pressure” in tennis and other sports. And in addition, the budding athletes have seen immense suffering and hardship over the past year and a half. “It’s really damaging mentally,” she explained. “You need someone who will be there helping you on [a] mental level.”

A fighting spirit

• When it comes to getting in the zone on the court, Svitolina said she draws motivation from “the fighting spirit, the strength that Ukrainians have.” She added that it is an honor for her to have the power and platform of being a global tennis player, “to have [a] voice that I can use at different levels, especially right now during the war.”
• Svitolina hails from Odesa, which has seen a slew of deadly strikes from Russia, especially over the past several weeks. “[Russians] say that there was no attack in Odesa,” Svitolina said, calling Moscow out for its disinformation, “when I [just had] a call with my grandmother, and she said that her building was shaking from the missiles.”
• In addition to being a star tennis player, Svitolina is also a United24 ambassador and a new mom, having given birth to a daughter just nine months ago. She said her mission to bring “light” and “hope for all Ukrainians” motivated her to come back to competition as soon as possible, “not only for myself… but also for the Ukrainian people in this horrible time.”
• “Women are so strong, we don’t even know how strong we are,” Svitolina said. She encouraged other new moms to take time to recover, and then take their post-partum journey one day at a time. “We all have this power in us that we need to discover.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Ukrainian tennis star Elina Svitolina: The sports world must get behind Ukraine’s cause appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia appears to recognize the scale of the damage being done to the country’s international standing by the scandal surrounding the mass abduction of Ukrainian children, and has responded by attempting to portray these deportations as humanitarian measures designed to protect Ukrainian children caught up in the war zone. During a June visit to St. Petersburg by a delegation of African leaders, Putin claimed that Ukrainian children had been transferred to Russia legally in order “to save their lives and health.”

Russian efforts to justify the deportations on humanitarian grounds are undermined by widespread evidence of indoctrination programs designed to pressure children into abandoning their Ukrainian identity and adopting Russian nationality. If Ukrainian children are being taken to Russia purely for their own safety, why is it necessary to brainwash them with Kremlin propaganda and turn them into Russian citizens?

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The available evidence indicates that Russian efforts to indoctrinate abducted Ukrainian children are both systematic and extensive. A February 2023 report published by the Yale School of Public Health identified a large-scale Russian initiative to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” said Yale Humanitarian Research Lab executive director Nathaniel Raymond. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

In mid-July 2023, the UK imposed sanctions on a number of Russians tied to the abduction of Ukrainian children. British officials said the deportations were designed to “erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity” via the relocation of Ukrainian children to a network of re-education camps. “In his chilling program of forced child deportation, and the hate-filled propaganda spewed by his lackeys, we see Putin’s true intention: to wipe Ukraine from the map,” commented British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly.

It is not known how many children are involved in Russia’s abduction program. Ukrainian officials say they have identified almost 20,000 victims, but some fear the true total number may be far higher. Efforts to rescue Ukrainian children taken to Russia are now gaining momentum, but so far only a few hundred have been returned to Ukraine. Many have provided first-hand accounts of indoctrination efforts including daily recitals of the Russian national anthem and punishments for expressions of Ukrainian patriotism.

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The warrant for Putin’s arrest issued by the ICC in March 2023 identifies the “unlawful deportation of children” as a war crime. Some have argued that the methodical nature of the deportations and accompanying “re-education” mean Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children may actually qualify as an act of genocide. Article two of the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as any one of five acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The large-scale deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children appears to be in line with the fifth act, which is defined as “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

There are signs of growing international awareness regarding the potentially genocidal nature of Russia’s mass abductions. In a move welcomed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution in April 2023 officially recognizing the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia as “genocide.” PACE Deputy Paulo Pisco said the mass deportations of Ukrainian children were organized in a systematic way with the aim of “annihilating every link to and feature of their Ukrainian identity.”

More recently, US Congressman Joe Wilson, who chairs the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, told a hearing dedicated to the plight of Ukrainian children that Russia’s mass abductions qualified as an act of genocide. “Russia has been kidnapping Ukrainian children to Russia or Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine and forcibly russifying them,” he noted. “This is a war crime and I believe amounts to genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.”

Many in Ukraine have echoed these accusations. During a March 2023 interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk described the abduction of Ukrainian children as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” One month earlier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Switzerland that Moscow’s policy of forced deportations amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he said. “This is a genocidal crime.”

There currently appears to be little prospect of Vladimir Putin or any other senior Kremlin officials facing justice for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. At the same time, it is also clear that outrage over the deportations has deepened Russia’s isolation and helped consolidate international opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. Putin is no doubt acutely aware that his travel plans now hinge on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes, while members of the Russian establishment must also recognize that they will be tarnished by association for as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin.

Vladyslav Havrylov is a research fellow with the Georgetown University Collaborative on Global Children’s Issues and a researcher at the Ukrainian project “Where Are Our People.”

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Public Event Wed, June 28, 2023 • 3:00 pm ET

USAID Administrator Samantha Power on advancing LGBTQI+ inclusive development

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Samantha Power
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Moderator

Jonathan Capehart
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, the Washington Post and MSNBC

VICENTE GARCIA: Hello. Welcome to this special Pride edition of #ACFrontPage. I’m Vicente Garcia, senior director of engagement and external affairs at the Atlantic Council, and we’re delighted for today’s conversation featuring USAID Administrator Samantha Power on a topic important to me as a member of the LGBTQI+ community, but also to the Atlantic Council in our mission to shape the global future together through US global leadership and global engagement.

Today’s conversation will be led by Pulitzer-winning journalist Jonathan Capehart, who is the host of his own show on MSNBC, serves on the Washington Post Editorial Board, and a frequent commentator on PBS, and the list goes on. We welcome participation by those here joining us today in person during our Q&A session, but also welcome those joining online by using the hashtag #ACFrontPage.

Administrator Power, thank you for joining us here today. We’re very eager to hear from you about the Biden administration’s and USAID’s priorities at addressing global LGBTQI+ human rights. And so now I’ll turn it over to Jonathan to lead our discussion. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Thank you very much, Vicente, for the invitation to be here. Thank you all. One more thing, Vicente. As someone who reads teleprompter for a living, I really felt for you because that print is so small.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yeah, seriously. We’re just old, dude.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I know, it’s true, given the distance. But thank you very much for that introduction. And, Administrator Power, thank you very much for being here and taking the time to be a part of this important conversation.

So, as you well know, within the first month of taking office President Biden issued a memorandum that directed various parts of the US government responsible for foreign policy, such as USAID, to prioritize efforts to advance LGBTQI+ rights around the world. How are those efforts going? And what have been the biggest challenges?

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you so much. And thanks to everybody for turning out. It’s a great energy in the room, great energy this month, and much needed, because we harness this energy to try to do this work in the world.

Well, first to say that USAID is one of fifteen agencies that is being responsive to President Biden’s direction to promote and protect and respect the human rights of LGBTQIA+ people around the world. And I’d say I feel very fortunate every day, no matter what issue I’m working on, to be at USAID, because we have this toolkit. We have programming in public health on maternal and child health. Of course we have PEPFAR, where we work with the State Department and CDC, which has, of course, made a major difference, saving twenty-five million lives and 5.5 million babies is the estimate for the good that it has done over time. And that’s had a particular effect on LGBTQIA+ communities around the world.

But beyond that, we do agriculture. We do economic growth and inclusion, livelihoods work. We’ve helped vaccinate the world. In many parts of the world, if you are LGBTQIA+, coming forward to seek social services may risk something near and dear to you, depending on the legal environment in which you’re working.

When the fallout from COVID occurred and you saw such economic devastation around the world, given the fact that LGBTQIA+ people are often working in the informal sector and may have had, in some instances, less backup, the kinds of crises that have befallen the planet have a disparate impact on marginalized communities and those that have, in a sense, faced preexisting conditions, you might say, including discrimination, stigmatization, violence, et cetera.

So we went forth. We have tripled the size of our staff. We have the great Jay Gilliam, who many of you work with, as our lead LGBTQIA+ coordinator at USAID. That position had been unfilled in the previous administration. This fiscal year we’ve had a dedicated pool of resources of around sixteen million dollars, which does everything from spot emergency assistance to people who need legal defense because they’re being rounded up in some cases or evicted to working really closely with the State Department to help identify people who would be eligible for asylum or to become refugees because of their vulnerability, because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

So, you know, I’d say you see a massive surge in programming, in attention. But for me, I think the—and the thing that Jay has helped us so much with and the team, if you believe in development in 2023—I mean, and actually seeing development outcomes that matter and reversing development setbacks that have occurred—it’s not enough to have, like, a little pot of money, or a big pot of money, even, dedicated to LGBTQIA+. All the programming we do on food security, on education, on health, needs to be—and the list goes on—needs to be attentive and intentional about going out of our way to make sure that we are not just practicing development but inclusive development.

And the biggest challenges—I’m sure we’ll get into them, and I know many in the audience are seized with them—is criminalization, and even in countries that already have criminalized LGBTQIA+ status, you know, new moves, desire to render more salient laws that may be on the books but being ignored by some communities, work in places like Uganda, because of the introduction of the anti-homosexuality act, vigilantes and citizens and others taking what’s happening in the legal space or in the parliament and getting signed into law and viewing it as license to do whatever the hell they want to vulnerable people.

And so it’s not just happening in Uganda. That’s, of course, something that has happened very recently. But we see the instrumentalization of the human-rights agenda that so many in the world aspire to see progress, that being turned on its head. And in places where anti-democratic forces are ascendant or are getting either support or abetted or at least not counteracted by authorities, you see those voices getting louder. And even when there’s not a law and that kind of legal ballast behind those voices, that, in and of itself, is terrifying and exclusionary and a deterrent, again, for these communities to come forward and access these programs at the very time where we’re really seeking to make sure that we’re leaving no one behind.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So since you brought up Uganda and also your point about, you know, USAID has all of these programs. But there are countries where just presenting yourself to make yourself—avail yourself of these programs could put you in danger. So the question is what is the United States government doing or can it do to push back on what’s happening in countries like Uganda?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, to start—and I would start with what I consider a statement of the obvious but, nonetheless, I think does need to be said because it’s not always the way things are done, which is you start from the proposition of nothing about you without you. This question of tactics and how to prevail or how to counteract are super complicated, right.

Imagine, like, being part of the Biden administration and the tactical questions about how we moved the Inflation Reduction Act and, you know, convinced Joe Manchin to be part of the—I mean, when we’re operating in someone else’s country, you know, understanding, you know, the complex ecosystem in which we work, drawing, I should say, at USAID very heavily on the expertise of our local staff, two-thirds of—at least-two thirds of USAID staff abroad are nationals of the countries in which we work so they can be a great resource, but fundamentally it is the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be, how much to signal in a deterrent way in advance of the movement of a piece of legislation, which risks then putting the United States at the center of a national drama and potentially triggering nationalism and other forces or some, you know, historical, you know, dynamics—let’s put it that way.

And so—but even what I’ve just said is kind of simplistic because there is no one view. I mean, even within an organization people are debating at fever pitch, you know, what the right approach is. This is just really, really hard.

But we do come in with humility and really try to be in lockstep with the groups who we may have funded in the past or may be funding currently, and in the case of the anti-homosexuality act in—that Uganda has moved forward with President Biden was very clear that the law should be repealed. Came out with a public statement. Has talked—and this is one of the approaches that we have taken not only in Uganda but in other places that are threatening to put in place similar laws—talking about the effects, Jonathan, on this incredibly successful partnership that we’ve had in combating HIV/AIDS.

There’s one report in Uganda that shows that service utilization is down by more than 60 percent since the law was introduced and that’s people who are afraid of coming forward for vital health services because they’re afraid it could lead to their arrest or it could lead to their eviction or it could lead to vigilante violence.

And so here we are, you know, trying to get this epidemic under control by 2030 and we’re part of this grand global coalition and at the same time these steps are being taken that would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities but the health in this instance of all Ugandans.

And so, in a sense, you know, really looking at what the practical effects are of being seen to license community involvement in discrimination, stigmatization, and even law enforcement as you see citizens, again, taking things into their own hands but trying to find also arguments that have broad appeal in terms of services or programs that a broad swath of the societies in which we work are enthusiastic about, you know, showing the link between those—for example, private sector investment. There’s not one country in which USAID works that isn’t interested in fueling economic growth recovering from COVID, getting young people to work.

Well, what does it mean if the multinational companies that we and the Commerce Department and the State Department have been working with to try to encourage them to invest in these countries? Their own anti-discrimination policies and values are not going to make that an attractive place for investment.

So it’s a combination of, you know, the State Department taking steps now potentially to sanction individuals involved in this measure in Uganda. That’s been something that’s been messaged publicly and, again, these sort of practical effects that are going to extend practical harms, that are going to extend beyond if this law is not repealed.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so let’s talk about another country. I was thinking when you say, in response to my question about Uganda, talking to the groups on the ground, getting their input into what USAID and what the US government should do, let’s talk about Ukraine. There’s a war going on, but hopefully at some point that war will end and reconstruction will begin. Where does the LGBTQI+ community play—come into the conversation about rebuilding? Both from making sure that they are whole in Ukrainian society, but also that their rights are protected and respected?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, this is a complex issue and a complex question, and I could come at it a few different ways. But, first, let me just say that, you know, part of Putin’s motivation, as we well know, for invading Ukraine was watching Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian government, move at really rapid pace to integrate itself into Europe. And, yes, that carries with it a lot of economic benefit for young people in Ukraine, but much of the impetus behind what was, you know, between really 2013 and last year, such a shift, right, in an orientation that went in one direction and then shifted in another direction. Much of it was values-based.

That doesn’t mean everybody was with all aspects of the European agenda, or the European program, or the European Convention on Human Rights immediately. We’ve seen that, of course. But, you know, part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to. Now, again, that’s a kind of general statement.

What we do—then, shall I say, of course, following Russia’s invasion Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human rights protections, although not making headlines in the American or even the European headline, that work has accelerated. Which is, frankly, remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people can walk and chew gum at the same time. But meaning, you know, you see [LGBTQI+] protections progressing not only through legislative measures, and regulation, and as we vet—as the Ukrainians vet and we support programs to vet judges, you know, their human rights credentials being assessed in this much more comprehensive way.

But also, again, as the economy—parts of the economy actually flourish—I know this is hard to believe. But, like, the tech sector grew by, I think, seven or eight percent last year. You know, that itself, young people being out and being integrated in the world, there’s just things happening in the society that I think is going to put Ukraine, you know, and above all [LGBTQI+] communities and individuals, in a much more supportive legal and social ecosystem as the whole rationale for the war is about integrating into Europe. And the criteria by which—that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past.

To your point, I think, if I understood it, about reconstruction, again, that’s incumbent on this intentionality that I was talking about. USAID is a critical partner. I was just meeting with the minister of finance yesterday talking about reconstruction out of the recent conference in the United Kingdom. You know, as we think about procurement and nondiscrimination in procurement, you know, how are those checks and those protections built in? As we think right now about health services and making sure that those are restored every place we can, even places close to the front line or as territory is liberated, how does USAID support flow in a manner where we are constantly vigilant to how inclusive those services are, and whether or not they are provided?

I mean, you know, we’ve actually managed to distribute I think it’s something like sixteen million antiretrovirals in Ukraine, you know, just since the war, you know, has started. So, you know, in terms of the mainstream PEPFAR and HIV/AIDS programs, like, those have continued. We’ve managed to be able to keep those afloat. And that took real intentionality on the part of our health team and our Ukraine team.

But I think, again, the principle that we want to bring to everything we do in terms of inclusive development is just that it’s a design feature of any program that we do that we are looking to make sure we are going out of our way, just as we would for religious minorities and on behalf of religious freedom or for women in countries where women are discriminated against, to make sure that we are reaching the full spectrum of beneficiaries, and that any kind of social deterrent or normative factors are ones that we try to circumvent to make sure that we are being inclusive because that’s going to be in the interests of all—again, all individuals living in a country economically and in terms of their ability to—in this instance, to integrate into Europe.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So what would you—what do you say to people who question why supporting LGBTQI+ rights should be a part of American foreign policy? Because you could see there might be some people around the world, or even in our own country, who think, you know, I’m down with the community, but why make that part of our foreign policy.

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I think one way to take that question, which we do hear a lot and you might even say increasingly in certain quarters, but—is to imagine the counterfactual. You know, imagine a world in which US taxpayer resources are expended in a manner that, you know, in a sense perpetuates or deepens exclusion of individuals who are really vulnerable. I mean, that would be bad. And not only that, it would have the flavor, I think, in many of the countries we work, for a country that for all of our imperfections has long stood for human rights, it would have—it would have the effect, I believe, of being seen to kind of legitimate some of the rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward.

So, you know, there’s not, like, some place of neutrality here, right? We are the United States. We, you know, for many, many years in a very bipartisan way have stood for human rights. We have stood behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which doesn’t have exceptions or footnotes excluding particular communities. We stand for implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which explicitly say that no person should be left behind—again, without footnotes or caveats. So I think there are really hard questions about tactics, about in some places how vocal to be to not, again, put ourselves at the center of a narrative, because that in some sense is just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen. So, again, it’s very, very difficult on the ground to find the right balance of tools.

You know, if you look at the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda, the—you know, we spoke out with thirty-one countries. We spoke out with the United Nations independent expert that US diplomacy, when I was the UN as ambassador, was absolutely critical in securing the creation of that position. And the fact that that position has been renewed three times now, including most recently last year, speaks to, again, changing norms. The fact that international instruments more and more are including—sometimes explicitly, sometimes less so—[LGBTQI+] rights as human rights, the fact that we see same-sex marriage legalized this last year in Estonia and Slovenia, but also decriminalization in places as varied as Barbados and Singapore means that these principles are getting traction.

And these international instruments—and this is a critical part of President Biden’s agenda—are really important, Jonathan, because it gives citizens in a country, you know, where on the books there’s lots of happy talk about human rights, but it gives [LGBTQI+] organizations and individuals, you know, something to hang their arguments on; something to say, look, but the United Nations Human Rights Council just appointed this individual, this individual says this. And so when we can act in company, in a coalition, I think that’s always advantageous, and that is something we seek to do.

When the norms themselves—I was part of getting the Security Council for the first time in what at that time was the seventy-five-year history of the UN to condemn the targeting of individuals on their—on the basis of their sexual orientation—that had never happened before—and hearing from around the world what it meant for the United Nations Security Council to have done that. I mean, this was something that was a consensus document; you know, the Russian Federation, a number of African governments that had laws that were not respectful of these human rights on the books went along with that.

And so, again, thinking tactically about how to do it and how these norms become more salient in international law, I think, is very important. But it is in our interest to have maximum economic inclusion that’s consistent with our economic objectives as a country and our foreign-policy interests. It is in our interest to fight repression against whomever it is being carried out. And it is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.

President Biden’s polling, I think, reflects broad approval, surging poll numbers; I think a tripling in global polls about—when the question is posed, do you think Joe Biden will do the right thing, a tripling from his predecessor. And if you talk to people around the world and sort of get a sense of why, the fact that human rights are so central to President Biden’s argument and democracy and the importance of democracy delivering, that’s a major distinguishing feature not only of this administration but really of US foreign policy from some of the big geopolitical actors who are more and more active.

So if we go quiet, just in the same way that if we were to go quiet on the rights of Christians in societies in which they are being persecuted, and just defer to prevailing, you know, what is taken as prevailing popular sentiment, I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: One more question from me before we open it up to Q&A, and that’s this. Everything you say is, you know, terrific and wonderful in terms of what the administration is doing, American values. But I just wonder, when you travel around the world or talk to your counterparts, particularly those in, say, Uganda and elsewhere, how do you respond to what they might say, such as, you know, well, your own country’s, you know, no—you know, no garden party. You’ve got book bans and drag-queen story hours being banned and don’t-say-gay laws. And we’re awaiting a Supreme Court decision, possibly tomorrow, definitely by Friday, on whether a cake decorator can say, no, I’m not going to decorate your cake because your same-sex marriage, you know, goes against my beliefs.

How do you deal with that when that is thrown back in your face from foreign leaders?

SAMANTHA POWER: You know, we have a policy that Jay has helped shepherd through USAID which will be the first-of-its-kind LGBTQIA+ policy that’ll be out soon. And one of its many, I think, important features is it speaks of the importance of going forth in a spirit of humility and ally-ship. And I’ve already spoken, I think, a little bit about the ally-ship point.

But in general—you know, you didn’t mention the insurrection. You know, like—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Well, I mean, it wasn’t—

SAMANTHA POWER: There’s plenty—there’s—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: It wasn’t an LGBTQIA+ insurrection. So I figured I’d just leave—

SAMANTHA POWER: No, that’s a good point.

JONATHAN CAPEHART:—leave that out. But go on.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, but what I mean is in general we are standing up for democracy and human rights as we are facing domestically very, very significant challenges. And I’ve broadened the aperture a little bit from your question, though your question is very valid, you know, as focused on our discussion, our topic for today.

But I don’t even think we can think about LGBTQIA+ rights outside of the broader context of the anti-democratic movements that exist all over the world, including—you know, which include not recognizing results of elections, including resorting to violence, including, you know, some cases partnering with, you know, outside repressive actors who would seek to widen divisions within democracies.

So, you know, the statistics, it’s—you know, I think it’s sixteen years of freedom in decline around the world. And what we see is attacks on minorities generally—sometimes religious minorities; sometimes LGBTQI+ communities—are often the canary in the coal mine about a broader set of measures and a broader kind of consolidation of power away from the people and in the center. And certainly, a diminishment of checks and balances. I think that’s the abiding feature. And minority rights and the rights of marginalized communities fundamentally are checks on majoritarianism in our country and globally.

So, you know, I think if you go—and I’m not saying that we don’t have, you know, as you put it, kind of thrown back at us things that are happening in this country. But I think really since President Obama, and very much carried through with President Biden, we tend to kind of preempt that moment by situating the dialogue about [LGBTQI+] rights in our own struggles, and not leaving the elephant in the room, you know, over here. But to say, look, we’re—this is—we’re in the midst of, you know, many of these same challenges. There are forces in our countries—in our country that would also wish to go back to what is remembered as a simpler time.

And, you know, often I think that actually sets the stage for a more productive conversation, because it’s not a finger-wagging—you know, you may condemn something that has happened and use the leverage of the United States to demand, you know, a repeal. But it is not from a glass house that we are having conversations like this. And I was just in Africa, and I’ll be traveling again. I mean, the dialogue that we have is a humble dialogue. But it is one that has a North Star that I think can animate us both and that is rooted, fundamentally, not only in American values, at their core, but in international instruments and in universal values.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so we’re going to open it up to questions. There is a microphone, oh, I thought it was on a stand. It’s an actual person. Thank you. Thank you very much. We’re going to go until about—if I can find my thing—until about quarter to four. So the microphone is there. Short questions, so we can get more answers in. Go ahead.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Ryan Arick. I’m an assistant director here at the Atlantic Council. I’m really thrilled to have you here today.

I wanted to ask a question related to US development assistance to Ukraine, and specifically how we’re looking at the LGBTQI+ angle as far as our assistance during the ongoing war. I would appreciate your thoughts. Thank you.

SAMANTHA POWER: You want to go one by one, or?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yeah.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. So in brief, one of the things you’ll see, again, in the forthcoming policy, is a broad emphasis on thinking within USAID and within our humanitarian emergency programing about inclusion and about proactive outreach and services. I think there’s been—we’ve always, of course, been for an inclusive process to find and to serve beneficiaries. But to think—you know, to think that all beneficiaries will come forward equally in all communities is not accurate. And so, you know, how this plays out in any specific crisis area, you know, that’s going to be fundamentally up to our engagement with our implementing partners, like the World Food Program, like the ICRC and others. But there is a broad embrace of inclusive response and a broad recognition that gravity alone is not going to get you there.

Again, we’re quite far along in Ukraine because I think the government has every incentive—you know, not saying that there isn’t discrimination that occurs in Ukraine, or that some of those fears don’t still exist. But there are a lot of incentives pulling policy and enforcement in a constructive direction, given the European journey that they are very committed to. But imagine, you know, in other parts of the world where there isn’t that, you know, legal framework or that political will at high levels and so that’s why crisis is going to be very important.

The other thing I’d say is, of course, just continuing our HIV/AIDS work full speed ahead, any work we do in human rights, thinking—so, again, there’s the dedicated LGBTQI+ work and then there’s making sure that all of our programming in these other areas is inclusive of that.

So just—and, finally, just we’ve done a lot with hotlines. There’s so much trauma, so much need for psychosocial service and care. We work very closely with Mrs. Zelensky as well, who has really pushed mental health and so forth. So you will see both in our development programming and in our emergency humanitarian programming, provided the resources are there, which we have to work with Congress to continue to mobilize, but a very significant allocation as well to recognizing the trauma and then the unique traumas that may apply to different communities, including this one.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. We’ve got six questions, ten minutes. So what I want to really try to do is two questions at a time. And, Madam Administrator, if you could—a little more brief—to the first two, ask the questions and then we’ll have the administrator answer. Quick questions.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Katie. I’m a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS right in Dupont Circle.

And my question for you kind of revolves around the other countries we haven’t talked about. We’ve talked a lot about Ukraine, Uganda. But what should the USAID and other people in the United States what other countries should we focus on for human rights violations, especially in the community?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Great.

I’m going to get one more.

Q: Hi, Administrator. My name is Divya. I’m an undergraduate at Stanford University and I’m currently an intern at the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency.

My question for you is how and if you have handled and talked about tech governance in regards to LGBTQI+ rights and misinformation, perhaps, regarding HIV/AIDS, vaccines, and more.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Two simple questions—in nine minutes. I’m going to—I’m keeping us on time.

SAMANTHA POWER: So on the first question, I would say that there is a spate now of laws, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but not only, that are at various stages of legislative movement. Let’s put it that way.

Now, what focus entails, again, you know, I think filtering it through what do our partners on the ground think would be most advantageous for any particular individual or entity or institution to do, as we’ve discussed, it’s—you know, figuring that out is no easy proposition. But I think the New York Times recently did a study that did a lay down of how many country—what stage of passage, you know, these laws were.

I mean, it’s kind of—it’s kicked up what’s happened in Uganda and even our response to it has kicked up, you know, more vocal leadership to push through further exacerbating criminalization measures as, by the way, have really important positive decisions that have been made in Africa.

That, in turn, has generated a backlash and we’ve seen something very similar here, of course, over many, many decades where anti-discrimination ordinances, for example, in Florida—you know, I mean, decades ago—then kicked off major—you know, very, very pronounced counter reactions, massive fundraising, et cetera. That’s happening, too, where for a step forward it then, you know, ignites, you know, certain forces and antibodies and then you see, you know, proactive moves that really can set back those rights.

So, again, the tactics I think we’d have to be very, very case specific. But, you know, where I would—especially for those of you who are in civil society or not in the government per se, the actual support for the organizations. And you’ll have the chance, as well, in this country—those of you who are active in the LGBTQI+ community—through the Welcome Corps at the State Department—this is—I’m sorry I’m going on, but this is a very exciting development that we will actually have the chance—in addition to processing people who are being persecuted on the grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity, we will have the chance as community members to welcome these individuals. Now, that infrastructure is being built and it’s not, you know—you know, yet where there’s a number for you to call, but all of us will have a—well, there’s a number to call for Welcome Corps, but I’m saying very specifically—

SAMANTHA POWER: For—from this—OK. I was told that we were—we were still some weeks away from that. Well, what is the number that people should call, then, if they want—

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s a link on—

SAMANTHA POWER: What is the link?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: RainbowRailroad.org.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. That’s the State Department program?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, no, no, OK. So I’m—sorry, I was talking—

AUDIENCE MEMBER:—to Welcome Corps.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK, great. OK. So RainbowRailroad.org will refer you. I think the State Department piece we are still moving out to make sure that these partnerships can be ignited in rapid fire.

And then the second question, Jonathan, was?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I wrote in my notes tech governance.

SAMANTHA POWER: Tech governance.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes is the short answer. I’ve engaged them—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: We have—we have five minutes and five questions to go.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes. I have—I have engaged them on disinformation generally, and this is a very important subcomponent. Discrimination isn’t new. Persecution isn’t new. The amount of disinformation, including deepfakes showing President Biden vilifying LGBTQI+—I mean, you know, these things are really exacerbating an already very challenging situation.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. And so we have one, two, three, four, five questions, five minutes. Lord Jesus. All right.

Here’s what I want to do. I want you each to ask your very brief question so your question at least gets articulated, and then Administrator Power will answer. Real quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: All five.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: All five. All five. Because now we have four minutes.

Q: Thank you very much.

Very quickly, what would you say to other countries that stand on principle of noninterference, we don’t get to tell other governments how to treat their people? Very briefly. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Thank you.

Q: Yes. My name is Bishop Joseph Tolton.

Domestically in our country, White supremacy one can argue is cradled by the far religious right in our country. These actors are also responsible for the racialization of homophobia across Africa. Are there whole-of-government conversations about how to hold these actors accountable for their racialized efforts?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Great question.

Q: Hi. David Stacy, Human Rights Campaign.

As you know, nondiscrimination is a touchstone of equality, and the administration right now is reviewing the requirements for grantees and cooperative agreements and across the foreign assistance agencies. Can you speak to the need to do that and USAID’s role in helping the other agencies do something where we’re applying it across the board with all of the agencies on an equal basis?

Q: Hi. Mark Bromley with Council for Global Equality.

You spoke about the value of both dedicated LGBTQI+ funding and integrated funding, and we’re excited that that fifteen million is increased to twenty-five million this year. But on the integration point, how are you thinking about measuring integration for LGBTQI+ persons, particularly in places where, you know, being [LGBTQI+] may be criminalized, it’s difficult/dangerous to measure? How do we make sure that’s more than lip service and that that integration is really happening? Because that is where the true value lies.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Last question.

Q: Hi there. My name is Bryce Dawson from Counterpart International.

You mentioned the difficulties of minimizing intrusion and tactically advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in other nations, as well as mentioned potential procurement policies to ensure [LGBTQI+] protections. Do you have any in the pipeline that you’re working on or anything in the future?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I want to thank everyone for their—for their questions, all five of you or seven altogether. Madam Administrator, you have two minutes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thirty seconds.

Well, you know, I think that in general we—in our engagements on human rights issues, we hear a lot about noninterference. I mean, there’s no question. I heard about it a lot at the UN. We hear it often from, you know, countries like the Russian Federation that have invaded another country and tried to take over the other country. We hear it from countries that are providing surveillance technology, you know, to other countries, or fueling disinformation in the countries in which we are working.

So, you know, it is a shield. It is an important one to take seriously, because we also, of course, respect sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and so forth. So USAID is active across sectors and involved in these countries. And this agenda, I think, is—and, by that, it’s the human rights agenda more broadly—is central to how we believe as well that we will get the most out of the programs that we are doing across sectors.

And that brings me—and that’s the kind of conversation we have. Is, like, I was using Uganda as an example about making sure that we are also making the pragmatic case for people who are very skeptical because, again, they—there is a kind of seamlessness to the way our work across governance and human rights in citizen security and in the broad sweep of development sectors—from agriculture, to education, to health, et cetera—they do come together in service of development objectives. And that’s what the SDG’s also enshrine.

And then I’m not going to be able to do justice to the other questions in full, beyond I think the point about measuring integration is very important. You know, for those who are not making their identity known to us, that’s not going to be something that, you know, we will be able to measure in that sense. But I think these are the kinds of things that we are working through, through this policy, to make sure that this isn’t just, yes, here’s our standalone programming, and then by everything else we do, you know, operates in the way that we’ve always done it.

And so it’s not going to be, you know, instant, where everything is happening all at once. But all of our missions have to have inclusive development advisors or somebody—and this will be evident out of the policy—but somebody who is a focal point for working on LGBTQI+ rights and programming. So we’re hopeful that that, plus our new office of chief economist, will help us develop a kind of methodology that will be responsive to this concern that somehow it’s going to be invisible and not done, which is certainly our objective is for it to be done and, when appropriate, visible. And certainly, at least visible to us so we know whether we’re achieving what we’re setting out to achieve.

And then, lastly, I would just say, because it’s coming, the point about nondiscrimination among beneficiaries is just really important. And that guidance will be forthcoming, we hope, soon.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Do you have any thoughts on the other question about—I wrote it down real fast, but I know I got it wrong—about the racialized religious efforts on LGBTQI+ rights that have been happening?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I guess all I would say on that—because there are others in our government, I think, who are working on the kind of conversation that was asked about—is just this is another part of the response to the noninterference charge, is—that we do hear from people who don’t want to be engaged on human rights issues. And that is that there are a lot of actors from outside who are very active actually in pushing certain forms of legislation that would have these discriminatory, and these exclusionary, and these dangerous effects. And so, again, the noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And with that, and just two minutes overtime, Samantha Power, nineteenth administrator of USAID. Thank you very, very much for being here.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you.

Watch the event

The post USAID’s Samantha Power: LGBTQI+ crackdowns are ‘the canary in the coal mine’ for declining freedoms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One of the most glaring examples of governments’ poor performance is the egregiously low number of victims governments identify—a problem I routinely faced over the last two decades working on this issue as a federal prosecutor, nongovernmental organization leader, and US ambassador. The United Nations (UN) Protocol to Combat Trafficking in Persons is one of the most widely subscribed instruments of international law, under which governments commit to identifying the people whom traffickers exploit. According to the latest TIP report, however, governments around the world reported identifying only 115,324 human trafficking victims in the last year. This number comes from data governments provide to the US State Department about the number of victims whom law enforcement or nongovernmental organizations identify and who receive protection services. Although this number is higher than last year’s number, it is slightly lower than the high of 118,932 victims identified in 2019.

Meanwhile, the estimated number of human trafficking victims is increasing. Compare the number of victims that governments reported identifying with the UN estimate based on surveys and data modeling. The UN estimates that traffickers are compelling 27.6 million people into forced labor or sex trafficking.

If 27.6 million victims exist and governments are only identifying 115,324 victims, then the world only identifies less than half of 1 percent of the estimated victims (0.4 percent). This means that 99.6 percent of victims remain trapped by their traffickers, unable to decide where they work or who touches their bodies.

Sex trafficking dominates the discussion of governments’ lackluster victim identification efforts. Forced labor has received less attention, but in this year’s TIP report governments identified a higher number of forced labor victims than in any prior year: 24,340. This improvement, along with governments prosecuting the largest number of labor traffickers, is encouraging. However, when the victim identification statistics are isolated for just forced labor, governments are only identifying 0.1 percent of the total estimated forced labor victims.

Victim identification is made even more difficult due to state-sanctioned human trafficking. The TIP report found that in eleven countries, the governments themselves trafficked people. These offenders include Cuba, North Korea, Eritrea, and China, where millions of Uyghurs are forced to work in Xinjiang reeducation camps. It is especially odious when the government charged with identifying victims is, in fact, the perpetrator.

Without effective victim identification, governments cannot hold traffickers accountable, and people of goodwill cannot offer tailored, trauma-informed services to trafficking survivors. Society cannot address what it cannot identify. Victim identification is the prerequisite to successful prosecution and prevention of this crime. Yet, governments’ rate of victim identification is appallingly low.

It is time for governments to match their rhetoric with their resources and dramatically increase funding for prevention efforts, investigators, prosecutors, service providers, and trauma-informed care. Specialized investigative units should no longer be paper tigers. Survivor leadership should no longer be an ornamental add-on. Holding companies and individuals accountable for committing human trafficking crimes should no longer be elective. Human trafficking victims should no longer be prosecuted for the unlawful acts their traffickers compel them to commit.

Improvement and success must begin with increased victim identification. There are several practical steps that concerned citizens should ask their governments to take:

• Mandate that educators and health care providers become mandatory reporters.
• Invest in specialized investigative units and prosecutors focused on stopping traffickers. 
• Create pathways for survivors to rid themselves of criminal records caused by their traffickers. 
• Ensure companies are not using forced laborers to produce solar panels, electric vehicles, apparel, tomatoes, and batteries. 
• Fund trauma-informed services for survivors. 
• Elevate and center survivors in the fight to put traffickers out of business.

Traffickers thrive in an ecosystem where mere intentions and underfunded public justice systems are their only challenges. It is time for leaders to arise and become champions for freedom. Millions of victims count on governments, civil society, and faith communities to do more than merely care about their plight, designate awareness days, and think good thoughts. Survivors need the world to accelerate its strategic investment and meaningful action to increase victim identification.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, chief impact officer at Atlas Free, president of the Libertas Council, and former US ambassador-at-large to monitor and combat trafficking in persons.

The post Less than half of 1 percent of human trafficking victims are identified. That needs to change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In line with other surveys of public opinion in wartime Ukraine, the KIIS poll identified strikingly similar attitudes across the country, with 75% of respondents in eastern Ukraine ruling out any territorial concessions compared to 84% in central Ukraine and 86% in both the south and west. This illustrates the unifying impact the Russian invasion has had on Ukrainian public opinion, and underlines the significance of the ongoing war as a major milestone in modern Ukraine’s nation-building journey.

Until very recently, international media coverage of Ukraine often depicted the country as deeply divided between pro-Russian east and pro-European west. This was always an oversimplification and is now clearly no longer the case. Instead, attitudes toward key issues such as the war with Russia and membership of NATO have converged, with strong support for Euro-Atlantic integration evident in every region of Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Russian sentiment has plummeted to record lows, especially in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have witnessed the worst of the fighting.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.  

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.     

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service. 

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 11, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

By Lesia Dubenko

If Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is successful, Kyiv will be faced with the significant challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived under Russian occupation for extended periods, writes Lesia Dubenko.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 7, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

By Peter Dickinson

Speculation is mounting that Ukraine’s hotly anticipated summer counteroffensive may be underway but initial stages are likely to feature probes and diversionary attacks rather than a big push, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

By Tennyson Dearing

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is an important moment in the war with Russia but it is critical to maintain a sense of perspective and underline the need for long-term Western backing, writes Tennyson Dearing.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As he pondered the course of the war, Henri-Lévy came to the conclusion that the best way to combat the West’s mounting impatience with the 15-month war and counter the push for preliminary negotiations was to show rather than tell. Instead of writing an essay, the 74-year-old French filmmaker and philosopher took to the road to illuminate the bravery of ordinary Ukrainians against what he calls the “master terrorist” in the Kremlin.

The film, which carefully traces Henri-Lévy’s journey across Ukraine, is about far more than jerky shots of the Frenchman and his crew dodging bullets and drone attacks. It is about Ukraine’s defiance of Putin’s attempt not simply to wage a war of territorial conquest, but to efface the idea of Ukrainian nationhood itself. “If I dare to give a certain logic to this crazy war, it is in the logic of the denial of Ukrainian identity,” he says. “This barbarity matches the logic of denying the very existence of Ukraine.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As he journeys from Ukraine’s capital to the east, Henri-Lévy captures the dignity of the Ukrainian people through short vignettes that remain with you long after the credits roll. The Frenchman focuses on ordinary Ukrainians like the elderly woman who appears in the documentary engaged in the quotidian task of stirring a steaming pot of borscht and pleads for an end to the constant violence that has upended her life. She hopes to make it to her seventieth birthday, she says.

In Kyiv, after another Russian air strike hits a woman’s apartment, she apologizes profusely to Henri-Lévy for wearing a dirty black coat. Her kitchen is unusable after the bombing and her crockery is battered, but she’s more focused on the state of her appearance. She takes the French filmmaker to her makeshift bed, a chair inside a bathroom tub where she waited out the aerial assault, and smiles with pride at her ability to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Another scene captures everyday life for those who couldn’t leave cities and towns that Russia has pounded relentlessly in the east. A man who appears to be approaching pension age tries to chop wood with an axe, complaining that it’s warmer outside than inside.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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In Pavlograd, the French filmmaker dons a hard helmet and overalls to cover his black designer suit and spotless white shirt as he descends below ground to watch Ukrainian miners drill iron ore. The precious ore is eventually made into bullet-proof vests for soldiers at the front. After the steel miners are done for the day, they carry on packing care boxes of food and medicine for displaced families.

Henri-Lévy observes that every steelworker is a hero, just like the brave men and women on the front lines. In one of his characteristic meditative asides, he observes that the Greeks and Romans admired heroes in part because they were so rare. “In Ukraine, heroes are everywhere,” he says. The Frenchman confesses that he keeps coming back to Ukraine because it is rare in history to see so many people embody heroism in one place.

The documentary also features moments of exhilaration. Henri-Lévy captures joyous scenes from recently liberated Kherson, where hundreds mill in the main square, some searching for power to recharge their phones and tell their loved ones they are still alive. Perhaps the hardest and most powerful scene comes when Henri-Lévy visits a torture cell that still has fresh blood on the floor. The Russians never actually appear on film, but their depraved conduct casts a dark shadow over the documentary.

This film is anything but neutral and Henri-Lévy makes no attempt to disguise his sympathies. “I am partisan. I don’t give five minutes to the Jews and five minutes to the Nazis,” he says.

The Frenchman has consistently refused to engage in bogus moral hand-wringing when it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, he is clear about which side he’s on, as viewers of “Slava Ukraini” will no doubt recognize. “I want the Ukrainians to win,” he commented on May 11 at a screening of the documentary at the E Street Cinema in Washington, DC.

Melinda Haring is director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center. Jacob Heilbrunn is Editor of the National Interest. Haring and Heilbrunn are both non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “Slava Ukraini” was shown at a series of screenings in May organized with the Ukrainian American charity Razom. It can be viewed on Apple TV and YouTube.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 12, 2023

Andriy Yermak: Italy is defending common European values in Ukraine

By Andriy Yermak

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is right to say that helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian invasion is about freedom, justice, and common values, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

Conflict Economy & Business

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post New Bernard Henri-Lévy documentary challenges Ukraine fatigue appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Thu, May 11, 2023 • 11:00 am ET

Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – An in-depth conversation examining the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran following the murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, and the decades-long fight for gender equality and social justice in the country.

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Azam Jangravi
Iranian women’s rights advocate and a Girl of Revolution Street

Mehrangiz Kar
Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer

Nazanin Nour
Iranian-American actor, writer, and activist

Moderator

Ali Rogin
Correspondent, PBS NewsHour

Introductory remarks

Holly Dagres
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs;
Editor, MENASource and IranSource

HOLLY DAGRES: Good morning, everyone. My name is Holly Dagres, and I am a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and I’m honored here to give remarks for today’s Atlantic Council Front Page event.

Zan, zendegi, azadi—“women, life, freedom”—the slogan heard across the globe. Contrary to the lack of media coverage, this month marks eight months of ongoing protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic. Protests that are taking place in various ways, from street gatherings, rooftop chants, graffiti, to public displays of not wearing mandatory hijab. This continuity is unprecedented. The clerical establishment is in a tinderbox situation, and it’s only a matter of time before the protesters pour into the streets en masse because the people of Iran have had enough. They want the regime gone.

As I speak over thirteen thousand schoolgirls have been poisoned at schools across the country. Many believe this is a punishment for their participation in anti-establishment protests. Additionally, in the past two weeks there have been an alarming rise in executions, with over fifty-seven executed. Human rights organizations widely believe that these wave of executions are an effort to instill fear and silence dissent. Every day, women remain defiant against mandatory hijab, by appearing in the streets without the veil. And even in some cases, dresses and shorts, items of clothing only seen at home, behind closed doors, ordinary freedoms we here take for granted.

The world admires and applauds the bravery of the people of Iran, but especially their women and girls. As an American of Iranian heritage, I’m absolutely thrilled to introduce this incredible cohort of Iranian women who will be accepting the 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran at tonight’s Annual Distinguished Leadership Awards… which I should note will be livestreamed.

Dr. Mehrangiz Kar is a human rights lawyer and an activist. She was one of the first women attorneys to oppose the Islamization of gender relations following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Kar has been an active public defender in Iran’s civil and criminal courts, and has lectured extensively both in Iran and abroad.

Azam Jangravi is an Iranian paralegal, human rights advocate, and former political prisoner, residing in Canada. She is primarily known for being one of the girls of revolution street during the protests against compulsory hijab in 2017. Jangravi was taken into custody in 2018 after removing her headscarf in protest on Enghelab Street, standing atop an electricity transformer box, and waving it above her head. She was later released temporarily on bail and fled from Iran to Turkey, before relocating to Canada.

Nazanin Nour is an Iranian-American actress, writer, and activist. She has appeared on shows such as Netflix’s “Big Mouth,” “Madam Secretary,” and “Persia’s Got Talent,” and can currently be seen in the film “A Thousand Little Cuts” on Showtime. Nour could most recently be seen on stage in Washington starring in the studio theatre production of “English.” She is one of several Iranian Americans in the public eye speaking out on the ongoing situation in Iran.

I’d like to also note that Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami is sick with COVID-19 and was unable to attend, but she is recovering.

Finally, I’m delighted to introduce our brilliant moderator, Ali Rogin, of PBS NewsHour. Ali, over to you.

ALI ROGIN: Holly, thank you so much, and welcome to everybody in the room today and to all our viewers tuning in online, and I’m honored to be joined by these three incredible women.

As Holly mentioned, we are here today to discuss the state of women’s rights and human rights in Iran from prerevolution all the way to the current zan, zendegi, azadi movement and we can do all that in forty-five minutes. That is a very steep task but I know that this is a very well-equipped group to do just that. So let’s get right into it.

The first question I’m going to ask and, parenthetically, before I do I want to note I’m going to ask a few questions and then we’re going to open it up to questions from the audience here and online. So please submit your questions in the format that’s already been presented to the group, and for this panel each of the questions I’m going to ask, the first one will be open-ended, and then each one will be directed to one of you specifically. But I invite anybody to weigh in as well.

So the first question—as Holly mentioned, the Islamic Republic is doubling down on its repressive tactics. It’s increased. There have been thirteen thousand schoolgirls that have been poisoned. Hangings are at a historic high. So what do these oppressive measures tell you about the state of the regime and whether or not it is under pressure from these protests? Whoever would like to begin. Maybe we go down the line.

Dr. Kar?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: OK. As you know, in this movement regular women, students of university, students of high school, all labor and they are involved with that, and in zan, zendegi, azadi all Iranian women from all layers of the society, they are—they were working and now they are working in some other style.

And something that you asked about that, like poisoning, poisoning daughters in high schools, we think the—you know, the reason is because they were working a lot in the movement. And one of their activity was—because probably you don’t know that in schoolbooks, the first page is a picture of Khomeini and the second page is a picture of Khamenei, and the students of high school, sometimes they—you know, they taking out these pictures from their schoolbooks and simply removing—removing—

ALI ROGIN: And they’re removing [them] from the—from the walls?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yeah, removing, in front of the camera—in front of the camera. And these, you know, film and video posted to some media outside the country, and that’s the reason.

I think they are very against the against daughters in high school. And we think that now this is some kind of revenge sometimes… and the government doesn’t care about that and doesn’t say anything and doesn’t investigate—very serious investigate in that, and they don’t say what is this. Sometimes, they say something that is not true… They say that this is not true. This is something that, you know, they pretend that there is nothing, there is no poison.

And this is something that the people in Iran, now they are very angry with that because the students of—women students, daughters and students of high schools, they don’t have any safety, any security. And the parents now, they are very angry. And they go around the high schools, and they say: If the government cannot guarantee our daughter’s life and our daughter’s security, we will go around the high school and we will, you know, find something that they poison them, and this is our duty if the government doesn’t do their duty.

ALI ROGIN: So that’s going to be a big test.

But I’m curious to get all your thoughts—and I apologize; we didn’t discuss this in advance—but who do you think is behind these poisonings?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: The government.

ALI ROGIN: Is it the government?

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, everybody believes it’s regime—the regime is complicit, because this is also a regime that has eyes and ears everywhere. They’re able to—they kidnap dissidents abroad, and bring them back to—for execution. They have intelligence on dissidents abroad. There was the, you know, kidnapping that was—that the FBI foiled the plot against a leading voice, Masih Alinejad. So, it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly, cannot find out who’s behind these poisonings. So, everybody believes that the regime is actually behind this.

And it’s been going on since November of 2022, so that’s months now that this has been happening. And there’s countless videos on the internet from activist groups within Iran that are showing girls in hospitals, you know, with oxygen masks. They can’t breathe, they smell tangerine in the air, or rotten fish in the air. So, it’s very real.

And I know that the regime tries to downplay it, but, you know, it’s also very difficult to kind of loiter around a girls’ school in Iran. And so, again, it’s—again, that’s why it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that the regime is not complicit in this. Parents that have gone to ask questions are met with brute force by regime forces. So, not only are no answers being given, this is still continuing as of just a few days ago, we saw videos from other poisonings. And it’s across all cities and provinces in Iran, too. So—

ALI ROGIN: So, what I’m—what I’m curious about is—Azam, is this an example of the regime really feeling the pressure, that they are taking these steps of poisoning young girls?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Actually, I don’t know. It’s really complicated. But it might be the regime is behind of this situation.

Mehrangiz and Nazanin mentioned about poisoning, and I want to talk about executions. Well, the government is now trying to create fear among people by increasing executions. In the past ten days, over fifty-five people have been executed in—from in which twenty-six Baloch citizens executed. And I think—this by the suppression of Islamic Republic of Iran.

But the protest is ongoing in Balochistan, and every Friday they shut down the internet. And I think we have to talk about Balochistan and Kurdistan and—because the suppression in that areas every time increased by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: That’s a very, very important point.

Azam, I want to stay with you and ask, let’s take a step back and let’s talk about the factors that led to this round of protests.

AZAM JANGRAVI: The protests that begin in mid-September were unprecedented in their scale and duration. People from all level of society, including women of various cities and social classes, came together to demand change.

A key point of contention was the mandatory hijab laws, which require all Iranian women to cover their hair. And although the protests were initially led by women, they soon expand to include men as well. The government attempt to suppress the protest with violence and repression, but the movement continued to grow and gained momentum. People from different backgrounds joined in—driven by a shared sense of frustration with the current government. While there have been some reports of misinformation circulating about the government’s intention, most people understand that the issue of mandatory hijab is just one of the many issue that need to be addressed.

It is clear that until there is real change in Iran, people will continue to demand change and speak out against the injustices in Iran. As I said, the government is now trying to create really fear among people by execution. Two men were executed in the past week, Yousef Mehrdad and Sadrollah Fazeil Zare were executed for just running online group criticizing Islam. Dual Swedish-Iranian citizen also executed last week. Additionally, more than eleven individuals are currently on deaths way—on death row in connection with the now recent protests. The world has been outraged by these killings and has called on Iran to stop them. We need to act now and raise our voices and call on the Islamic Republic to stop their executions.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin, to Azam’s point about the need to raise your voice, we’ve seen some really interesting subversive ways that protesters, especially the young women and girls in Iran, are using social media. They’re using just formats that the regime is not familiar with to register their dissent. So does that add a new dimension that we haven’t seen before in previous iterations of these protests? And how is that affecting how this message is being communicated to the regime?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Yeah, absolutely. Social media’s been a huge help actually in this movement. It’s the first time that we’ve seen it. Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral. An example of that is the video of the girls of Ekbatan. I don’t know if everybody saw that video, but there’s a song by Rema, a popular Afrobeats artist, with Selena Gomez. And they have a song called “Calm Down.” So these young girls made this dance video, and then they were detained afterward, of course, and had to give a forced apology video.

But that went viral. And that caused everybody around the world, from various countries—I mean, this—it was, like, trending billions in hashtags on TikTok. And it raised awareness for people to understand what’s actually happening in Iran. It gives people outside of Iran a connection to those inside showing, hey, we’re actually more similar than you might think, because a lot of people don’t have information on what Iran was like prior to 1979 either. And so social media’s been a really huge tool in pushing this forward.

And this is also—the Gen Zers are the ones who were at the forefront of all of this. And as Dr. Kar and Azzi said, this is—these poisonings seem to be a retaliation for the fact that they have been ripping up pieces of the supreme leader, they’ve been setting fire, there’s countless photos now that are iconic, that Time replicated, with the girls with their backs to the camera with the middle finger. So all of these things that they’re doing, they’re very smart. They know exactly how to get the attention of people across the world, and it’s—we have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran.

ALI ROGIN: And it’s fascinating because it really does seem to be techniques using forums that are just completely unfamiliar to especially the conservative clerics.

So Dr. Kar, for you, you have—for a long time, part of your scholarship has been about tracking the divisions between the moderates, the reformers within the government, and the hardliners, looking from the 1990s to now. So can you get us up to date on what is the balance, what is the tension currently in the regime between moderates and conservatives? Is there any tension there, or is it just completely overrun by conservatives? How do you see those tensions playing out now, versus in previous decades where there was a bit of a reformist element?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: At the beginning I would like say that I practiced as a lawyer twenty-two years in Islamic Republic of Iran, so when I started to practice as a lawyer in Iran I was very young, and immediately we had Islamic—the revolution, Islamic Revolution and victory of Khomeini in this revolution. So I had been in a very complicated situation, not because I was a lawyer but because I was a woman and lawyer. I think two criminal in their eyes, because they—immediately they said that women cannot be judge, so they removed all female judge from judiciary system. And we were not sure that they give us permission to continue work as a lawyer, but they did, and they said because everybody is able to choose a lawyer, probably a mad lawyer, a crazy lawyer, and this is—and Islam—Islam doesn’t care about that. This is something that the people—

ALI ROGIN: If you want to choose a female lawyer, that’s your choice.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, is your choice; if you want to choose a mad, you know, lawyer, that is your choice. And that’s why we could survive. This was the reason, the base of our job.

So I can say that since Khomeini ordered for mandatory hijab, this movement started in Iran and continued. But sometimes it was very slow, it was very hard; sometimes it was getting clear and obvious. I can say that in first decade we were very, very active for mandatory hijab. And for something that is full of, you know, our penal code and family law after they came on power are full of discriminations against women, gender discrimination, and we can say this is some kind of gender apartheid. But we cannot have demonstration. Just somebody like me started talking and writing about these legal discriminations.

After that, the second we had involved with a very bad war between Iran and Iraq, and eight years we had been involved with that. And that’s why everything was closed about women’s rights and human rights, and nobody could talk about that in any other country that is involved with war. So we can say that during the time everything was slow or nothing. Nothing was active in that.

After war, after eight years that the war was over, Hashemi Rafsanjani was on power as president and he ordered open very small, very small opportunity for writing and talking about something, but under control—under very heavy control.

ALI ROGIN: And remind us, this is in the 1990s?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: 1990s, yes. And because I should make short everything, this is history and it is not easy—

ALI ROGIN: No, it—you’re doing a great job.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: After 1990, we reached 1996. And 1996 is very important period of revolution history started because the name is reformism movement. And the president, Khatami, and the people—most people of Iran, for the first time they voted to a president of this system, this political system. After that, because the slogan was different like rule of law and like we should—we should have civil society, it was very important because he ordered and the reformists ordered that women can have independent NGO. And it was very helpful for women. It was the first time that something like that happened in Iran.

But either during this time they didn’t give me permission because it—

ALI ROGIN: How interesting, during the reformist era.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: No, yeah, everything was under control. And they said: No, no, you cannot. You cannot have any NGO. And I do have all documents of that.

But some of young Iranian women, they could register and they could be active as NGO. This was something that started, you know, another kind of—

ALI ROGIN: Activism, or another kind of activism, or—

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, yes, yes, as NGO.

ALI ROGIN: Yeah.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: And it—and they could be very active.

And then, after that, we had some campaign like one million signature and no to stoning and something like that. And Iranians—some part of Iranian women, they came to streets and it was very important. They came to public area, and they were talking and they were giving a slogan against discriminations, not against political system.

But after that, step by step, Ahmadinejad came and stopped everything and suppressed all women activists. And you know, they—most of them, they left Iran, and now they are all over the world. And after that, everybody thought that everything is stopped and never—you know, never be active about women’s rights. But as you know and as you see now, everything is full of energy and started a movement: Mahsa; and zan, zendegi, azadi. This is full of energy. This is full of anger. And this is different with some other that we had been before that.

ALI ROGIN: And to—Dr. Kar, to your point about how many activists left Iran, so now the diaspora is very rich, very, very vocal. And so, Nazanin, I’m curious to get your sense of what is the state of the diaspora now? Are they united around these protests, any more so than perhaps the cohesion was in previous years?

NAZANIN NOUR: Yeah. I want to say, just to that point too that you brought up of differences in the government, reforms, et cetera, that the people—the information coming out of Iran and people I talk to on the ground, most people don’t see any difference between any—they all think it’s the—you know, they’re all cut from the same cloth. So it’s a regime that’s irreformable and irredeemable in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.

To the diaspora, yes, I remember in 2009 I was actually in Iran. I got there two days before the election, the Green Movement elections. And I witnessed what happened afterward, which was the violent suppression and oppression by the state to quash those protests. And I remember that it must have been like a blip in the American media. Maybe it was in a forty-eight-hour news cycle, and then it was gone. And so—and we’ve had protests that have built up in Iran since—you know, for the last twelve to thirteen years. But if you just want to go back, 2017, 2018, 2019. There was bloody November in 2019, fifteen thousand protesters got killed within a few days and it wasn’t on the news at all.

And now we saw that actually, yeah, the diaspora rallied around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity in the entire time that I’ve lived in this country, as far as, you know, giving a spotlight and attention to Iran. There’s protests and rallies that have been held in—major protests and rallies held in cities and countries all over the world ever since September. Most of them are happening in cities every weekend.

And while we would love more media coverage, and attention, and a spotlight kept on Iran and all the atrocities—the poisonings, the executions, the fact that the people want this regime gone—the unity that I’ve seen and the level of attention is something that I’ve never seen before. And it’s absolutely necessary and vital to keep, you know, because their internet gets cut off. They don’t have the means, a lot of the times, to get the messages out. So it is up to the people in the diaspora to continue to amplify their voice and make sure that the world hears what they’re saying and what’s actually happening inside of the country.

ALI ROGIN: Absolutely.

Let’s take a couple questions from the audience. I invite anybody who has a question. While you’re thinking of your questions, I’d love to ask, Azam, you were one of the kind of, as we say, OGs of the anti-hijab movement. You stood on an electric transformer, as we said. You’re a girl of revolution street, which is where these protests were happening. So what does it mean to you to see these women and young girls in the streets now?

AZAM JANGRAVI: The fight for women’s rights in Iran has been ongoing for over forty-four years, as Mehrangiz says. One of the first protests against mandatory hijab in Iran occurred on March 8, 1980, where women have used various campaigns, activist groups, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonments, and mental and physical torture.

In 2018, when I decided to protests against mandatory hijab, there were already ongoing protests against the regime in Iran. The Iranian public was expressing their anger in the protests with a wide range of chants directed towards the regime and its leadership. In the same days, Vida Movahed performed a symbolic act of taking her scarf off and putting it on a stick to peacefully protest hijab laws—a brave move that followed forty years of women’s activism. And this is important because the forty-four years ongoing activism, you know? And I also wanted to be part of these forty-year-old movement and raise my voice against mandatory hijab laws.

As an Iranian woman, I had experienced a lot of problems in my life, particularly when I decided to separate my ex-husband. And these difficulties made me more aware of inequality and separation that Iranian women have to endure. This made me think about what was happening to Iranian women. Then I felt compelled to protest against such cruelties, you know. I believe that each woman in Iran has explained it and said similar problems as this is a year of separation.

My hope was to be part of the activists who cared about creating more awareness in society. And on the day I protested, no one stood by me or supported me when I was arrested, you know. And right now we have seen every man stand for women. This is the more important things. I think this learning and becoming aware process has done so that men are now standing by women, fighting for human and women rights.

ALI ROGIN: To that point—and I’m so sorry to cut you off, Azam, but I do want to get to some audience questions. And somebody asked something that I think ties into this, which is the solidarity that we’re seeing, is that translating to internationally.

Somebody asks, how do you see the influence of regional solidarity among women. Is it active in places like Afghanistan? Are they giving each other energy and support as needed? So let’s broaden it out and look at the regional solidarity that’s happening. What are you all seeing? Whoever wants to take that. And I think, unfortunately, that may be our last question of the session.

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, there were videos of women in Afghanistan that were marching with signs in solidarity with the women of Iran as well. I mean, they’re neighbors and, you know, African women are under terrible suppression and oppression themselves.

And I feel like there has been a global outcry but there needs to be more. There’s actions that have been taken by various countries. At the U.N. there’s a fact finding mission that was created. You know, people banded together and got the Islamic Republic kicked off the Commission on the Status of Women, for example.

But I still feel like there hasn’t been the amount of solidarity that there needs to be and the amount of support for—it’s a human rights issue. It’s a human rights crisis. It’s a women’s rights crisis. So we need people from around the world in various countries that also believe in women’s rights and human rights to also stand up for the women, girls, and the people of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: Excellent. And somebody else asks a question. With all that is going on we see regional neighbors like Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Iran. What does this mean for the protest movement? Are there any implications with other countries in the region normalizing ties with Iran?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: You mean the relationship—the new relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

ALI ROGIN: Yes. Yes. Are there any implications there for the protest movement?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: … We cannot predict the future of these negotiations because a lot of, you know, challenges are between Iran and Saudi Arabia and I don’t believe that everything could be. But we know Saudi Arabia that we—everybody knows is very serious, serious with Islam and with limitations and the discriminations, gender discrimination.

But now we are—you know, we are hearing that something has changed either in Saudi Arabia and this is something that Iranian people they are watching that and they think why they are—you know, they are pushing to a very bad situation, war situation, and Saudi Arabia is going toward and this is something that Iranian women know and they think about it but they don’t compare themselves with women in Saudi Arabia because we had a very different background during shah, during Pahlavi. Pahlavi changed a lot of things in Iran, like women’s rights.

ALI ROGIN: Right.

NAZANIN NOUR: But also anything that—like, anything that legitimizes the government is not going to be a good move. Anything, you know, that emboldens them is not going to be a good move, or solidifies their status.

But it’s not deterring people in Iran from protesting in their own ways. They still do come out to the streets. It might not be to the same effect as it was a few months ago, but the fact that women are taking off their hijabs, men are supporting them—also by wearing shorts, by the way, because that’s not allowed. So, that’s one way that people are dissenting, using civil disobedience. So those types of things are continuing to happen, and they’re not going to stop. And schoolgirls, university students in general, boys and girls, have been protesting for the last few weeks, as well.

So, I don’t believe that that is going to stop what has already started in Iran. There’s no going back, is what the people of Iran say.

ALI ROGIN: In the time that we have left, I’d like to go around. And in a few sentences, can you tell me what you would like to see from the international community, to give the support that this movement needs?

Dr. Kar, would you like to begin?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Now we can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institution, international human rights institution, work for removing gender discrimination in Iran. Now we can understand that all Western government, they should work with human rights institution because, as my friends mentioned about execution, now it’s very important if they can stop it. Because if everybody is getting crazy in Iran by this situation, and either us that are outside Iran, when we get this news we cannot—we cannot—what could we do?

ALI ROGIN: Right.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Because six others, they do one execution in Iran now. And all of them that call it an investigation, it is not justice. They don’t have lawyer. They don’t have lawyer. And the lawyer is coming from government and it is related with government.

So we can say that international community can do a lot of work for Iran, but so far we cannot see any results of that in this movement that now it is our focus.

ALI ROGIN: Azam.

AZAM JANGRAVI: As an internet security researcher and digital security trainer, my concern is about internet, because the Islamic Republic of Iran, when it wants to suppress the people of Iran, they shut down the internet. And it would be good for Iranian people if the international community find a way to help people for internet, and—especially VPNs, especially, you know, support us for helping people, for internet shutdowns.

ALI ROGIN: Right, we’ve seen that the sanctions don’t really seem to discriminate between uses for speaking out, and for doing business with the regime.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Exactly.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin.

NAZANIN NOUR: I just think overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them. Even the smallest action, like heads of states, when they meet with Islamic Republic officials—women not wearing the headscarf. You know, it’s not obligatory; they don’t have to do it.

I think things like, you know, the U.N. just appointed the Islamic Republic to a commission that’s overseeing human rights. And it’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians, because they just executed two people two days ago, simply for running a social media channel that was questioning religion. So, the world needs to stop doing things like that, because all they’re doing is solidifying and emboldening the regime.

They need to pass legislation and do things that support the people of Iran, instead of emboldening the regime. They need to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. They need to, you know, list—the EU can list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The US can pass the MAHSA Act. There’s a lot of things that can be done that haven’t been done yet. And I hope to see that.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin Nour, Mehrangiz Kar, and Azam Jangravi, thank you so much for being here today. This has been a fascinating conversation, and congratulations tonight on the award that you are receiving from the Atlantic Council. It is so well deserved.

I think we can all join in a round of applause for this incredible panel.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Thank you. Thank you for having us.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Thank you.

ALI ROGIN: So that concludes the program. Thank you so much for joining us.

NAZANIN NOUR: Thank you. Ali.

Watch the event

The post How the women and girls of Iran have fueled their ‘unprecedented’ protests: Bravery, solidarity, and innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 28, Peter Engelke, along with UNICEF’s Jasmina Byrne, co-authored an op-ed for The Hill discussing the “polycrisis”: multiple near-simultaneous shocks, with strong independencies among them, taking place in an ever-more integrated world. This includes the likes of the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing war in Ukraine, climate change, economic upheavals, and more. As these factors compound, the authors argue, the ones most hurt will be the world’s youth and children.

To combat this array of crises, the authors advocate for increased investment in foresight capabilities within governing structures, empowering the voices of the youth, and rethinking the management of public goods.

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

The post Engelke in The Hill discussing the polycrisis’ impact on the world’s youth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The “they” is the outside world: the United Nations (UN), the United States, other Western nations, Turkey—countries that call themselves “friends of Syria” but have their own interests at the core of their Syria policies. It’s also Russia, Iran, and the Arab nations that are “normalizing” relations with Damascus.

I know this region well, having traveled there countless times as a senior correspondent for CNN. But this trip in March, after the earthquakes that decimated this region, was different. I was not there just to observe; I was on a humanitarian mission with my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance, or INARA. Greater insight into the aid world and how it functions has worsened my frustrations. I found myself muttering repeatedly, “It’s broken. This isn’t right.”

It has been well over a decade since the first of Syria’s displaced settled in these hills and fields in northwest Syria. They were the residents of Jisr al-Shougour, bombed in June of 2011. Each time I visit, I recall meeting those first arrivals stretching canvas between olive trees for shelter, and the young girl I met sleeping out of the back of her family’s van, telling me they had just come for a few days. Over time, the population swelled with those who fled Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus, and elsewhere. 

The population in Idlib province has more than tripled since people first took to the streets twelve years ago, from under one million to more than three. Hospitals and schools were bombed and not rebuilt. Factories ceased to function or are now in regime territory, meaning the job opportunities and products are inaccessible for those in the rebel-held northwest of the country. Some fields are planted, but many remain unsown. There is potential but no opportunity. 

Every year, as has been the case for more than a decade, there are pleas for more funding for food baskets, for winterization campaigns with images of little faces shivering in subzero temperatures. Every year, funding efforts fail to meet their targets and those pleas go unheeded. Fair or not, the prevailing sentiment in Idlib is that UN agencies responsible for shelter want to keep the population in tents.

INARA in partnership with Kids Paradise provided Ahlam al-Ahmad and her family with hygiene kits, childrens toys, clothing, and food after their tents flooded. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

A little boy plays in muddy and sewage-filled waters at a camp in Syria. There are growing concerns about the spread of diseases such as cholera. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

Ahlam al-Ahmed stands among what she and her family have been able to salvage from the floods. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

The author at a camp INARA set up in partnership with Syria Forum for those who lost their homes in the earthquake. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

I met Ahlam al-Ahmad as she slogged through knee-deep mud. Floods had just ravaged her small camp on the edge of agricultural fields in Idlib, the water so powerful it swept away everything in some of the tents, drowning clothes, kitchenware, mattresses, blankets, small stores of rice, potatoes, and jars of lovingly prepared Ramadan stuffed vegetables. 

Like hundreds of thousands here, she was displaced by war, running away with nothing but the clothes she had on. It has been all but impossible for her family to get back on their feet, to rebuild even the smallest fraction of what they lost. 

“Why do we live here?” she asks rhetorically. “It’s for work. We women work in the fields, it’s the only thing available.”

“I mean we had sorted ourselves out, sort of,” she continues, her voice cracking as she points to what they were able to salvage from the muck. It took her family years to achieve this meager progress—an existence in three tents, one of which acts as the kitchen. But even with four of them working the fields, they couldn’t afford a home with walls—not when their labor yields just three dollars a day. And there is such a yearning for walls.

Adults yearn to lean back against a wall, while many young children don’t even know what it is to live within a stable structure.

Moving beyond an emergency response

Spiraling inflation, coupled with rising global prices, has pushed this population even deeper into poverty. And yet last year the UN barely met half of its funding goal for Syria. The argument has long been that funding the sorts of projects that would allow greater autonomy for the northwest region—such as building proper shelters, factories, and schools—was too risky, what with the incessant and unpredictable Russian and Assad regime bombing campaigns. 

However, for more than three years now the battle lines have remained stable, and the skies no longer buzz with fighter jets raining death and destruction. Yet the humanitarian framework around Idlib is still viewed through the prism of emergency response. That needs to change.

Aside from the emergency response to the recent earthquake, the bulk of funding opportunities for projects in Syria are for small-scale development—efforts such as vocational training and microgrants—and civil engagement interventions. These activities provide little help to the population. Instead, they permit outside players to claim that they support development.

Civil engagement is important and can bring together inspiring minds, but it’s a fruitless exercise based on donor desires and not realities on the ground. “You can’t expect someone who is tunnel-focused on mere survival, on the next meal, to be able to have the mental capacity to focus on anything else. That is how they keep us weak,” explains Hasan al-Moussa, a Syrian friend of mine active in the humanitarian and development space. 

Vocational training and microgrants are important, but they need to be significantly scaled up to have a real impact.

At the same time, there is division among the UN Security Council members not just over cross-border access, but also over whether the focus should be on emergency, early recovery, or development. The emergency cycle that northwest Syria has been stuck in for more than a decade is creating dependency and perpetuating poverty, ignorance and disillusionment, and even that response is falling short of the needs. Early recovery and development projects, which would lay the framework to break the cycle, are too few, too small, too short term. The pattern of the current approach is paralyzing the population in a state of helplessness.

On the ground, the bleak situation can feel almost deliberate, an attempt to keep the population unemployed and uneducated. Just enough comes in for outside officials to point to certain projects and make themselves look good, but nowhere near enough to break the cycle of dependency. More money needs to be put into funding projects that create large-scale job opportunities and access to education for those who have none.

Helping the people of Syria will take moral courage that has long been lacking, and it will take—for once—those who hold the purse strings and power over northwest Syria to put their own politics and interests aside. People deserve the chance to regain agency over their own lives. That is the real humanitarian thing to do.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post It’s broken: The humanitarian response is keeping Syrians in a loop of helplessness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why does population matter for global politics? After all, a Malthusian perspective would warn that more mouths to feed will strain a country’s capacity to provide for its citizens, and that failure to do so will engender political instability and economic impoverishment. Yet, with all due respect to the reverend, the empirical record of the past two centuries makes clear that the opposite is true. Large populations fueled the Industrial Revolution and the incredible economic growth enjoyed by the West. While vast inequalities persist—even grow—global economic productivity has expanded unimaginably over the period, allowing more people to live longer, healthier lives than ever before.

If you are bullish on India’s prospects in the coming century, as indeed it appears the consensus in US government circles is, then India’s rise to number one on the population charts is evidence that its best days are yet ahead. If that is the case, then by pursuing a strategic partnership with India, above all other considerations, the United States is backing the right horse to maintain its own relevance. It is commonplace for policymakers to laud India’s “demographic dividend,” which is a wonky shorthand for the fact that India’s huge population is also a young population, with 52 percent of its citizens under the age of thirty. Young people are a valuable resource for any economy. They are in the prime of their working lives, they are avid consumers and fuel the larger economy, and eventually they will have children of their own and buy even more stuff. Countries in Western Europe, as well as Japan and increasingly China, are increasingly skewing older and facing tighter labor markets and greater pressures on public-sector entitlement programs such as pensions (see the turmoil in France) or health care. But India’s younger population promises a huge—and growing—consumerist middle class and a seemingly unending supply of college graduates itching to enter the workforce.

There is, however, a problem. There are too few jobs in India to absorb these aspiring workers. Some economists have labeled India’s record “jobless growth.” The numbers are stark and sobering. To absorb the demand for employment, the Indian economy must create over a million new jobs each month. It presently is creating well fewer, and job creation is slowing even further. Resentment over poor job prospects begets frustration that spills into violence. Nor is this a problem that can be solved by pulling on available policy levers such as India’s oft-maligned labor laws.

The challenge is more systemic and structural, and it lies in the absence of a vibrant manufacturing sector that can absorb the millions of young people entering the economy each year. Rapid population growth is a relatively modern phenomenon globally, and the historical record makes clear that industrial manufacturing was the key to absorbing labor productively. Indeed, the vast reserve army of cheap labor enabled much of the Industrial Revolution as low-wage workers abandoned their farms and took their places on the assembly lines of Manchester and Detroit. India, however, skipped this mass industrial revolution stage. Its growth has been fueled by a booming services sector that specializes in information technology. As China established itself as the factory of the global economy, India aspired to be its back-office business processing hub. While this stimulated the growth of a robust middle class of educated English-speaking office workers, it laid bare the lack of similar opportunities for the tens of millions of young job seekers competing for scarce white-collar positions.

Ashoka Mody, a Princeton economist, argues that the failure of India’s education system is to blame for the current mess. Other culprits include the government’s hesitant and often contradictory approaches to foreign investment and international trade, and its protectionist tendencies that stifle innovation and prevent India from playing a meaningful role in global supply chains in the way that China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and even Bangladesh have. The current moment of hostility between Beijing and Washington, and the ensuing misguided espousal of decoupling, China+1, near-shoring, friend-shoring, and re-shoring policies emanating from Washington appears to offer a glimmer of hope for India’s beleaguered manufacturing sector. Manufacturing could shift from China to India as the United States and others look to reduce dependence on Chinese exports and supply chains. But it is unclear that New Delhi will be able to seize the advantage at a scale required to meet the job needs of its young population. Doing so would require political courage to embrace structural economic reforms and the challenges of global trade to force India’s businesses to be genuinely competitive internationally. If India could manage this, it might be able to harness its population to foster the high rates of economic growth required to make up lost ground on China, though this past lost decade of growth has arguably already set that goal beyond reach.

India’s demographic dividend is thus a demographic time bomb, papered over for now by the success of its information technology sector, largely untapped middle class, rising geopolitical centrality, and masterful public relations by its cheerleaders. But a failure to harness the energies of the world’s largest population is not just a tremendous missed opportunity. It is a millstone weighing down India’s future. A frustrated, underemployed youth population turns restive quickly, and the government’s tactic of distracting it with majoritarian populism and anti-minority scapegoating will not succeed forever. Worse, it will erode the one undeniable achievement of independent India: the building of a diverse, secular, democratic republic against all odds. 

The backsliding has already begun: India is no longer rated a liberal democracy by reputed international organizations, and public opinion surveys indicate that the Indian public’s commitment to democratic norms is worryingly shallow. For the United States and its allies, who have been reminded time and again of just how little influence they wield over India’s foreign policy, these trends should ring alarm bells. For the first time since the era of colonialism, the majority of the world’s population no longer lives in liberal democracies. Indeed the world’s two largest countries, accounting for more than a quarter of all human beings alive today, are actively illiberal and working against the international economic order so painstakingly erected after World War II to cement Western hegemony. If demography is destiny, then the UN’s announcement, while confirming what many knew to be inevitable, still changes everything.

Irfan Nooruddin is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani Professor of Indian Politics in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

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While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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On April 13, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in the South China Morning Post in a conversation on the “lying flat” movement in China.  

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

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The post Nawaz in Dawn: <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1746219/for-pakistan-to-prosper-it-must-invest-in-its-children">For Pakistan to prosper, it must invest in its children</a> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 20, to reflect on the twenty-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative held a discussion to amplify the voices of Iraqi youth. “Trajectories of Iraqi youth two decades after the 2003 invasion: Between aspirations and reality” featured introductory remarks from the Director of the Iraq Initiative, Abbas Kadhim, and was moderated by Hezha Barzani, a Program Assistant for the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council.   

In his introductory speech, Abbas Kadhim stressed the importance of including youth in the debate about the future of Iraq, arguing that “youth are not only entitled to be present, but are called to lead the debate, as they will be the most affected by it”. This was further emphasized in Hezha Barzani’s introduction, where he noted that 60 percent of Iraq’s current population is under the age of twenty-five. 

The panel featured empowerME Program Assistant Nibras Basitkey, who highlighted the importance of being solution-oriented when discussing the future of Iraqi youth. It also featured a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Shival Fazil, who claimed that Iraqi youth “do not feel represented by the current system of government in Iraq and are stretching across ethnic and religious identities in favor of an issue-based coalition, seeking political reform”. Adjunct fellow Hamzeh Hadad from the Center for New American Security noted that the years following the invasion “were tumultuous, with Iraqis facing global issues” such as the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the global pandemic. This point was built upon by co-Founder and President of Sinjar Academy, Murad Ismael, who claimed that “youth in post-ISIS Iraq are rejecting extremism”. 

Problems currently facing Iraqi youth

A consensus was reached among the participating panelists that the present nature of the Iraqi youth is characterized by their collective desire for reform and coalition-building.  The emerging trend of national movements are transcending ethnic, religious, and cultural lines. Hamzeh Hadad explained this phenomenon as being “a product of Iraqi unity against ISIS as well as the younger generation’s exposure to sectarian violence in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s rule”. He also explained the unification of Iraqi youth with the failure of the Iraqi leadership class, which resulted in a widespread protest movement. Another problem currently affecting Iraq is the persistence of internal displacement accompanied both the 2003 invasion and the ISIS insurgency. The second wave of displacement that took after 2024 in Iraq has particularly impacted minority communities. Basitkey, Ismael, and Fizal all pointed to the plight of the Yazidi population which had been persecuted by ISIS and remains scattered with negligible access to basic civilian infrastructures and education. 

When discussing the current threat of ISIS resurgence, Shival Fazil claimed, “it is this growing disillusionment with politics and resentment toward the ruling elite that runs the risk of being exploited and weaponized by the Islamic State or other extremist groups.” 

This statement demonstrates the importance of addressing the concerns of the Iraqi youth and committing to political, economic, and social reform for both humanitarian and security reasons. Youth are also facing the repercussions of climate change, which will continue to be a serious threat to the country, both on livelihoods and security fronts. Hamzeh Hadad pointed to the inadequate preparedness of the country to combat climate change, arguing that “both Iraq and the international community must team up to create the appropriate infrastructures to cope with modern problems such as climate change.” 

Importance of education

One of the most pressing problems currently facing Iraqi youth is limited access and poor quality education. Each of the panelists spoke to this importance extensively. Nibras Basitkey claimed that “this phenomenon was worsened by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and has disproportionately impacted minorities”. Additionally, Iraqi youth experience a significant setback in their education due to limited access to technology during the pandemic. Murad Ismael highlighted the importance of technology in improving education, claiming that “technological training in Iraq is extremely outdated and individuals who pursue higher education in technology in Iraq finish their degree with a high-school level understanding”. He offered that smartphones could be harnessed to improve education, but “there must be a campaign that compels individuals to maximize the educational value of their phones”. Basitkey further argued that “Iraq requires an updated curriculum that would focus on technology and skills that would optimize youth’s chances of obtaining jobs in the local market”. Additionally, “women’s access to education must be significantly improved”. 

The value of economic growth 

Iraq’s economy is highly dependent on oil and most jobs lie in the public sector-this is problematic for numerous reasons. Murad Ismael argued that “a prosperous private sector is essential to a functioning democracy in Iraq”, as the public cannot voice their political opinions freely if they are dependent on a particular political party for employment. Furthermore, oil prices are extremely unstable. Shivan Fazil highlighted the consequences of an oil-dependent economy and advocated for “the establishment of a competitive and reliable private sector”. Economic development is also a social issue. Basitkey argued for “the necessary inclusion of women in the Iraqi economy by challenging social norms and initiating campaigns that encourage women to participate in politics”. This will improve economic growth and mobilize a highly underutilized sector of the population. 

Each of these issues requires a tremendous commitment not only from Iraq but also from the international community. To ensure the success of Iraq’s bright youth population, these issues must be addressed, specifically, those of economic and educational concerns, concluded the panelists.

Britt Gronemeyer is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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Article II of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention identifies five acts that qualify as genocide. The fifth act, forcibly transferring the children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group to another group, concisely and accurately describes Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have attempted to disguise the abductions as a routine wartime security measure, but Moscow’s well-documented efforts to “re-educate” young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians tells a very different story.

Since the invasion began in February 2022, evidence has mounted of a large-scale Russian operation to abduct and indoctrinate Ukrainian children throughout the territories that have fallen under their control. One recent report published by the Yale School of Public Health in February 2023 identified a systematic Russian program to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” commented Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukrainians in liberated regions have recounted how they frequently had to hide children from Russian occupation forces. Numerous Ukrainian orphanages were forced to smuggle children out of occupied areas to prevent them from being seized and sent to Russia. Some of the victims of these Russian abductions have been orphans or children living in care. Others have been physically separated from their families and told they are no longer wanted. In some cases, Ukrainian parents claim to have been tricked or coerced into sending their children to Russia. The overall number of abducted children is not yet known. Current estimates indicate that well over ten thousand young Ukrainians have been abducted and sent to Russia. Many fear the real total figure may be far higher.

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has been indicted alongside Putin by the ICC for the “unlawful deportation and transfer” of Ukrainian children, has spoken openly about the apparent effectiveness of Russia’s indoctrination efforts. In late 2022, she acknowledged that a group of 30 children brought from Russian-occupied Mariupol initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem and shouted the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” but claimed that this criticism was “transformed into love for Russia.”

The abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is only one element of comprehensive Russian efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, any symbols of Ukrainian identity and statehood are suppressed while access to the Ukrainian media is blocked. The Ukrainian language is being removed from the school system, with educators imported from Russia to teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that promotes a Russian imperial identity while demonizing Ukraine. Parents who question these policies are told their children will be taken away if they refuse to comply.

Russia is also imposing more direct measures to outlaw any expressions of Ukrainian identity. Throughout the country, Russian-occupied regions have witnessed the same pattern of arrests targeting anyone deemed a threat to the Kremlin authorities. This typically includes local officials, journalists, former members of the Ukrainian military, civil society activists, and anyone expressing pro-Ukrainian views. In numerous instances, patriotic tattoos or pro-Ukrainian content on mobile phones have led to detentions and disappearances. Investigators working in newly liberated regions have uncovered evidence indicating thousands of civilian deaths along with the widespread use of sexual violence and torture.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While the mass killing of Ukrainian civilians has been well documented, there is not yet any international consensus over whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. A recent UN report found that Russia was guilty of “a wide range of war crimes” in Ukraine, but commission head Erik Mose said investigators had not yet uncovered conclusive proof confirming genocide.

Others argue that more than enough evidence of genocide has already been found, and point specifically to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Speaking to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on March 22, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk characterized the abductions as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” Likewise, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that the abduction of young Ukrainians amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he commented. “This is a genocidal crime.”

In order to prove that Russia is guilty of genocide, it is vital to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is this intent “to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” that legally distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In this particular case, Russia itself has provided mountains of evidence indicating a clear intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, there are few examples in history where a genocidal power has incriminated itself so comprehensively. Vladimir Putin himself has frequently argued against the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity, and has even published lengthy articles denying Ukraine’s historical legitimacy. Meanwhile, genocidal language aimed at Ukraine has become completely normalized in the Russian mainstream media and among senior government officials.

The grotesque calls for genocide that are so commonplace in today’s Russia have helped inspire the criminal actions of Putin’s invading army. Among the long list of crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, the methodical abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children stands out. The scale and systematic nature of the abductions make them an unmistakable symbol of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity and extinguish the Ukrainian nation. It is therefore fitting that this should be the first crime Vladimir Putin is indicted for. Putin hoped the invasion of Ukraine would secure his place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Instead, he looks destined to enter history as a genocidal dictator forever linked with the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Child abductions reveal the genocidal intent behind Putin’s Ukraine invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The warrant states that Putin “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes.”

The ICC is a comparatively new international organization. It was created in July 1998 and formally established in 2002. At present, 123 countries have ratified its statute. They include all the countries of South America, all EU countries, most of Oceania, and roughly half of Africa. All these countries are now theoretically committed to arresting Putin. No sovereign immunity will shield him.

ICC indictments are rare. To date, the court has only indicted 52 people, but it aims to prosecute top culprits. Earlier indictments have targeted former presidents Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. In this context, the indictment of Putin appears entirely natural.

Following their ICC indictments, al-Bashir and Gaddafi became international pariahs. Putin and his regime are not likely to fare any better. After this indictment, no serious politician or public figure will want to meet with or even talk to Putin. He cannot travel abroad without considering the possibility of arrest and extradition to The Hague.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In light of his new status as an indicted war crimes suspect, Putin will likely find that he is no longer invited to international forums such as G20 or the United Nations General Assembly. Since all power in Russia is concentrated to Putin, this means Russia has effectively lost its voice on the international stage.

Another consequence of the indictment is that no democratic political leader who values their own reputation will want to have any further contact with Putin. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emanuel Macron will need to rethink their earlier policies of holding regular phone conversations with Putin. Likewise, there is no longer any realistic chance of a negotiated peace settlement between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine brokered by the international community. Meanwhile, Kremlin-friendly European politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban will have to abandon their personal links with Putin.

There are limits to the impact of the ICC indictment, of course. Many influential countries in addition to Russia itself do not recognize the court, with the list including the United States, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, even those countries that have yet to sign and ratify the ICC statute will be well aware that continuing to maintain close ties with Putin could now hurt their international standing.

Chinese President Xi Jingping has just confirmed that he will visit Putin in Russia on March 20-22. While few expect him to alter his plans in light of the ICC arrest warrant, his visit is unlikely to be good for China’s reputation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had quite intense contacts with Putin in recent years. As the leader of a NATO member state, will he maintain this level of engagement after Putin’s indictment? I doubt it.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The implications of the ICC arrest warrant are not limited to the international arena. It is also likely to impact Putin’s standing within Russia, undermining his absolute power and leaving him more isolated than ever.

Russian investigative journalists have recently revealed that the increasingly reclusive Putin now travels in armored trains between his three main residences in Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, and Sochi, with special railway stations constructed at each location for his personal security. He rarely dares to meet anyone in person, only physically convening Russia’s Security Council three times over the past year. Now a wanted man, Putin’s paranoia looks set to worsen.

With Putin unable to play his usual active role in international negotiations, his value as Russia’s national leader will be greatly diminished. This will have a significant negative impact on Russia’s international standing that will continue for as long as Putin remains in office. Putin’s domestic political position will be seriously undermined, with members of the Russian elite drawing the inevitable conclusion that he is now a liability.

The indictment against Putin sends a powerful message to other senior figures within the Russian establishment, leaving them in no doubt that they are also vulnerable to possible prosecution. If the Russian President can be charged, they may also be indicted for their participation in Putin’s alleged crimes against humanity. Loyalty to Putin was once seen as the only way to get ahead in modern Russia; it now looks increasingly like a dangerous dead end.

The Russian leader is unlikely to appear in The Hague any time soon. Nevertheless, the ICC decision to indict him for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while significantly weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. He is co-author with Andrius Kubilius of the new book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 16, 2023

Poland defies Putin with landmark decision to give Ukraine fighter jets

By Peter Dickinson

Poland is set to become the first Western nation to supply Ukraine with fighter jets, Polish President Andrzej Duda has confirmed. Duda said Ukraine would receive four Polish Soviet-era MiG-29 jets “in the next few days.”

Conflict Missile Defense

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By pointing the finger directly at Putin, the ICC has created an extraordinary opportunity to bolster its own legitimacy, build further solidarity in support of Ukraine, and permanently undermine Russia’s world-altering imperialist drive. However, to bring this to fruition without actually getting Putin in the dock, the international community must be careful to put Ukrainians themselves at the very center of their efforts to achieve justice.

When the ICC was established in 2002, it was a watershed moment in human history. Never before had so many states come together to accept the jurisdiction of a permanent international court over their territories, a “court of last resort” meant to try only the most heinous of crimes.

Unfortunately, the ICC’s poor conviction record and its tendency to focus almost entirely on African countries has led to disaffection and undermined its legitimacy. This is why it is so significant that although Putin is only the third sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC for war crimes, he is the first leader of a major power.

This is also why it matters that in the Ukraine case, the ICC received the largest ever state party referral to open an investigation. This unprecedented show of international resolve has the potential to revive the court’s authority. If states continue to provide it with the necessary logistical and material support, perhaps the ICC can begin to live up to its lofty aspirations to end impunity for atrocity crimes.

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It is also important that the ICC chose to make the warrants public instead of keeping them sealed. It did so because “the conduct addressed in the present situation is allegedly ongoing, and public awareness of the warrants may contribute to the prevention of the further commission of crimes.”

In other words, if not even Putin himself can escape the court’s notice, Russian soldiers all the way down the chain of command should also not expect to get away with war crimes. While there is unfortunately little evidence to suggest that international justice mechanisms like the ICC have been effective in deterring future atrocities, this does not mean that the ICC’s decision to name and shame Putin won’t have other important deterrent effects.

Perhaps most significantly, the warrant permanently isolates Putin and spells doom for lingering efforts to resume “business as usual” with today’s Russia. While some critics allege that the ICC warrant will provoke the accused and escalate conflict, the fact is that Putin has already become radicalized beyond redemption and was unlikely to show restraint in Ukraine anyway. Because the ICC’s warrant has no statute of limitations, either Putin will stand trial or the threat of it will haunt him until the end of his days.

Unless Putin is held accountable or loses power, there can never again be normalized relations with Russia. This signals to the many countries, particularly in the Global South but also in Europe, who have continued to hedge their bets over the war, that there is little point in doing so unless they want to risk their own reputations on the world stage. It also eliminates any diplomatic leverage Putin may have had in a peace process, because the ICC has made it clear that without accountability all the way to the very top, there can be no peace at all.

What remains unclear is how the ICC’s move will impact the thinking of the Russian elite, whose loyalty is critical for Putin’s survival. Many are hopeful, such as Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak, who described the warrants as “the beginning of the end for the Russian Federation in its current form on the world stage.”

The ICC’s high degree of scrutiny and willingness to go straight for Russia’s biggest fish may certainly make some of Putin’s supporters think twice, which could undermine the current regime and ultimately incentivize a future Russian government to hand the dictator over to The Hague. This is not beyond the realm of possibility. Indeed, it has already happened before with Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia. While it was once unimaginable that these war criminals would ever be handed over, they were both eventually extradited by their successors.

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Although it is impossible to predict, most observers agree that regime change is unlikely to happen anytime soon in Russia. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin is safe for now. Indeed, there is good reason to expect him to cling even harder to power, precisely to avoid the possibility that any successor would hand him over to the ICC. It is also worth remembering that Putin has successfully nurtured a revisionist, imperial mindset in the country and has made the Russian media heavily complicit in his crimes. This makes the possibility of a peaceful change of power something of a pipe dream.

Herein lies the main problem for those who long to see Putin in the dock. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. In theory, if Putin sets foot in any one of the 123 countries which have ratified the Rome Statute, he would have to be arrested and sent straight to The Hague. Unfortunately, as the case of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir shows, states cannot always be counted on to live up to this obligation.

With this in mind, what can the ICC and the wider international community do to ensure the warrant for Putin’s arrest becomes a genuine step towards meaningful justice? The ICC has an important role to play outside of the courtroom, but it needs the logistical and material support to live up to it. While the Court documents atrocities and gives them a permanent place in the public record, it should also give victims a sense of ownership over the process by facilitating their participation in the trials themselves and through its own outreach to affected communities.

Given the unlikelihood of Ukrainians seeing Putin stand trial, it will be critical for the court and its supporters to nevertheless manage expectations and communicate what is happening and why the process still matters. The court must also work in partnership with Ukrainian civil society, without whom such extensive evidence on child deportations could never have been collected and acted upon in real time.

In this sense, it is crucial to remember that the ICC is meant to complement, not replace, Ukraine’s own judicial system in how it handles war crimes on its own territory. Ukraine’s courts are already overwhelmed by the size of the caseload, which only continues to grow. The international community must do everything it can to support Ukraine’s capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes in a fair and impartial manner.

The international community should also create a broader framework in which to pursue justice and accountability. One immediate step is to establish clear mechanisms to help locate, trace, and reunite all separated Ukrainian children with their families and legal guardians. This means supporting Ukrainian civil society activists who not only facilitate family reunification but stand ready to provide the vast array of services Ukrainians will need for years to come in order to recover from the horrors of the war. Even when peace and the rule of law are restored in Ukraine, much will depend on how well the country can pursue a holistic, comprehensive form of justice.

To come full circle back to the question of whether the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is indeed “historic,” a cynical read would be that this moment ultimately highlights the most important gap in international law when it comes to Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. It remains impossible for the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression if the states in question are not parties to the Rome Statute. Until there is a viable international mechanism to prosecute aggression and the collective political will to do so, the root causes of this war can never be fully addressed, rule of law will never be fully restored, and impunity will continue.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 16, 2023

Poland defies Putin with landmark decision to give Ukraine fighter jets

By Peter Dickinson

Poland is set to become the first Western nation to supply Ukraine with fighter jets, Polish President Andrzej Duda has confirmed. Duda said Ukraine would receive four Polish Soviet-era MiG-29 jets “in the next few days.”

Conflict Missile Defense

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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When the invasion began, my company with more than 5000 employees near Odesa on the Black Sea had to close its doors immediately. We paid salaries as long as we could. Several dozen workers are now fighting against the ongoing Russian invasion.

At first, I couldn’t eat or sleep. Due to a medical issue, I couldn’t fight. But I could organize. Prior to the war, my logistics company had been able to transport anything throughout Ukraine, across the Black Sea, and beyond. After the war started, we immediately pivoted and began moving humanitarian goods, setting up Help Ukraine Center warehouses and distribution centers in Poland. The mere act of sorting clothes began to make me and dozens of other volunteers, including many Ukrainians, feel useful.

There have been moments of exceptional pain and exceptional clarity during this long year. When Russian soldiers occupied my home outside Kyiv in the first weeks of the war, I immediately called the Ukrainian army and gave them the GPS coordinates. My large home was destroyed. I have no regrets.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As the war ground on and Ukrainians received more clothes than they could possibly wear, more of our countrymen were coming back from the frontlines without arms and legs. Ukraine didn’t deal well with its soldiers who were maimed during World War II; veterans were ignored and forced to sit at home. It was time for a transformational change.

Society should celebrate sacrifice and welcome differences; we can do this by giving Ukraine’s heroes world-class prosthetics and treatment free of charge in their home country and in their language. However, the Ukrainian state is nearly broke. Ukrainian hospitals, overwhelmed with complex injuries, are dealing with problematic amputations that only have costly solutions. I will never forget when one soldier without an arm on the right side of his body and only two mangled fingers on his left hand showed me a picture of the heavy wooden arm he was offered in Kyiv.

We had to get involved. Together with my longtime business partner Philipp Grushko and Olga Rudnieva, one of the most capable managers in Ukraine, we began to sketch ambitious plans at our warehouse in Lublin, Poland. Over the din of British volunteers whistling as they sorted clothes and blankets, and the reverse noise as the forklift loaded vans headed to Lviv, we resolved to build a modern medical center for children and adults to focus on the future, not the everyday suffering that renders the most resolute useless.

Superhumans Center will be the leading war trauma hospital in Ukraine and will include a state-of-the-art prosthetics and facial reconstruction center. Our experts will carefully restore mobility, comfort, and quality of life to Ukraine’s war heroes, children, and civilians who have been gravely injured in Russia’s war of aggression and are now dependent on a prosthesis due to amputation. Amputations aren’t a fun subject, and the challenges are hard in today’s Ukraine, but we will meet them.

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This beautiful vision is not a pipe dream. Superhumans Center will open in April. We are grateful to have the support of Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska, Sting and his partner Trudie Styler, and many others. Howard G. Buffett has changed thousands of lives by backing and building our medical center.

Ahead of the construction schedule, we are refitting a government-owned hospital in collaboration with Ukraine’s Ministry of Health. The first phase includes a rehabilitation clinic, prosthetics lab, and psychological support unit. In the second half of 2023, wards and further surgical departments will open. Eventually, we will open an educational center to train prosthetic specialists and rehabilitation professionals.

Can the international community help? You bet. Dollars and doctors are what we most desperately need. We invite medical doctors and prosthetic specialists to join our effort and give a week of their precious time to train Ukrainian doctors in person in Lviv.

We’re already changing lives. In January, we measured and fitted two Ukrainian soldiers for state-of-the-art bionic hands that they will receive in March. Andriy Gidzun and Vitaliy Ivashchuk both lost their arms in early 2022 as a result of Russia’s invasion. They were overjoyed as they experienced the ability to hold a cup again and catch a ball.

This is just the beginning. The need has never been greater. More than 10,000 Ukrainians likely need complex operations or prosthetics now. Tragically, this number will only grow. Russia continues to indiscriminately shell civilian targets across Ukraine and shows no signs of relenting.

As the invasion enters its second year with Russian President Vladimir Putin still undeterred, we Ukrainians know that the end of the war is far away. Superhumans Center will be there, rebuilding one life at a time, arm by arm, leg by leg.

Andrey Stavnitser is the co-founder of the Superhumans Center in Lviv, Ukraine, and the co-owner of the largest private port in Ukraine. He tweets @stavnitser.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Superhumans Center: Symbol of Ukrainian defiance amid Russia’s war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These thefts, as the New York Times recently reported, are not isolated episodes, but part of a wider and premediated effort by Russian President Vladimir Putin to destroy the culture of Ukraine. This is an aspiration that Moscow has repeatedly tried and failed to fulfill over the past several centuries.  

“Women at War,” a new US exhibition featuring a variety of works by twelve female Ukrainian artists, is a symbol of defiance to the Kremlin’s latest attempt to expunge Ukraine’s heritage. Though a number of the artists featured in the exhibition have fled to Europe or America since the full-scale invasion began, all of the works on show were originally crafted in Ukraine itself.

Curated by Monika Fabijanska at the Fridman Gallery in New York, the exhibition demonstrates that, in contrast to Russian imperial dreams, a thriving and independent Ukrainian artistic tradition exists. Indeed, as Fabijanksa has observed, “[Ukrainian artists] have their own culture and dreams and, often, that dream is about independence and about an identity that is their own, without the threat of annexation, invasion, and annihilation.”  

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This exhibition has now traveled to the Stanford in Washington Gallery, where American Purpose, an intellectually engaging online magazine devoted to covering politics and culture, held a reception on January 12 welcoming its arrival. Opening remarks from several speakers including the historian Sonya Michel, who saw the exhibition in New York and helped bring it to Washington, testified to its ability to bring home the daily indignities, humiliations, and horrors of the war.  “Women at War” will remain at the Stanford in Washington campus until March 22.

The exhibition, which includes a seven-minute film by Oksana Chepelyk that is titled “Letter from Ukraine,” features various artworks ranging from cartoons of the hellishness of daily life in the Donbas to a superb life-size oil painting on canvas by Lesia Khomenko called “Max in the Army.” The solitary and solemn uniformed Max, himself an artist and the husband of Khomenko, is shown saluting and staring into the distance, offering a poignant reminder of the isolation that can accompany heading off to join the army. Was Khomenko saying farewell to him as much as he was to her?

Several drawings depict rape victims of Russian soldiers. Wrestling with such depravity could not have come easily. Dana Kavelina, who was born in 1995 in Melitopol and now lives in Germany as a refugee, took this challenging subject up in a series of searing drawings called “Communications. Exit to the Blind Spot.” She not only addresses the vile actions of Russian soldiers in Ukraine but also the “rape camps” established by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s. The drawings are never less than harrowing. One, for example, features blood spooling from several women’s bodies and men depicted with red hands. These women, as the exhibition notes, were “purposefully destroyed by repeated rapes,” but Kavelina is searching for a way to bring “subjectivity” to these victims and to bear witness to their anguish. 

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Perhaps the most significant piece in the exhibition required the least overt artistry. A white linen sheet hangs at the entrance with a poem written on it in felt pen:

“May you choke on my soil.

May you poison yourself with my air.

May you drown in my waters.

May you burn in my sunlight.

May you stay restless all day and all night.

And may you be afraid every second.”

Olia Fedorova wrote these words while Russian forces besieged her home city Kharkiv in March 2022. Her text reflects the feelings of ordinary Ukrainians caught up in the horrors of Russia’s invasion. She captures the rage, helplessness, and flinty determination that outsiders can only begin to comprehend when they see the mass graves in Bucha, the hundreds of destroyed cars piled high outside Irpin, or the viral video of one girl’s birthday party in her bright yellow family kitchen just before it was destroyed by a Russian missile.   

The exhibition also shines in detailing the hardships of everyday life since Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and establishment of puppet regimes in eastern Ukraine. In this regard, a series of 12 cartoon drawings by Aleutina Kakhidze is very instructive indeed. She vividly depicts the journey her elderly mother had to make to collect her paltry pension. We learn that it took her up to eleven-and-a-half hours to cross numerous military borders, with endless delays and no predictability. In the final picture, her mother’s heart gives out as she waits for her pension to be processed. While shocking, the outcome is all too common as senior citizens were often forced to stand in long lines.

The tone of the exhibition is not always grim. Consider the series of photographs by Yevgenia Belorutets entitled “Victories of the Defeated.” Her marvelously evocative four photographs introduce us to the ordinary beauty of daily life in post-industrial Ukraine in spite of all the hardships. Covered in coal soot and outfitted in large gloves and an ill-fitting jacket, one woman in a blue stocking cap stares knowingly at the camera while the female subjects in two others smile broadly and even laugh.

Far from cowering before Putin and his thugs, Ukrainians remain defiantly triumphant. As Zhanna Kadyrova explains in an accompanying note that she composed in March 2022, passivity in the face of terror is not an option. “For the first two weeks of the war, it seemed to me that art was a dream, that all twenty years of my professional life were just something I had seen while asleep, that art was absolutely powerless and ephemeral in comparison to the merciless military machine destroying peaceful cities and human lives. I no longer think so: I see that every artistic gesture makes us visible and makes our voices heard!” Yes, they do. Both the Stanford in Washington Gallery and American Purpose deserve plaudits for helping to ensure that the efforts of Ukrainian artists to thwart Russian tyranny attract the attention they so abundantly merit.

Jacob Heilbrunn is the editor of the National Interest and Melinda Haring is the director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center in Ukraine. Both Heilbrunn and Haring are non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 26, 2022

Eight reasons for Ukrainian optimism in 2023

By Brian Mefford

Ukrainians have experienced an incredibly traumatic year but the country enters 2023 with reason for cautious optimism that Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion can be decisively defeated, writes Brian Mefford.

European Union NATO

UkraineAlert Dec 25, 2022

Bakhmut: Fortress of freedom

By Andriy Yermak

Western support for Ukraine must remain strong in 2023 to prevent a Russian victory that would fuel a global authoritarian revival, warns the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Dec 22, 2022

Russia’s defeat is the top global priority for 2023

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ensuring that the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat is vital for the international security system and must be the strategic priority for 2023, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Resisting Russia one artwork at a time appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shakhtar Donetsk approached the current Champions League campaign in near complete disarray. The club had not played competitively for around half a year following the abandonment of the Ukrainian Premier League season in late February 2022 in response to Russia’s full-scale military invasion of the country.

With the largest conflict since World War II raging across Ukraine, most of Shakhtar’s expensively assembled foreign stars chose to leave the club. This left Croatian trainer Igor Jovicevic with a threadbare squad of local youngsters charged with filling the void created by the sudden departure of Shakhtar’s celebrated Brazilian imports.

Most observers expected this inexperienced side to be completely outclassed in what is Europe’s premier football competition. Instead, Shakhtar put together a highly credible Champions League group stage campaign that saw the club defeat Germany’s Leipzig in style before drawing against both Real Madrid and Celtic to secure a place in February’s Europa League playoffs. This six-point haul was a considerable improvement on the previous season’s effort, which had seen Shakhtar collect just two points and exit European competition before Christmas.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The scale of Shakhtar’s achievement was most immediately evident in the club’s first group stage tie. Despite being considered rank outsiders, the Ukrainians scored a shock 4-1 victory away in Leipzig. Ten of Shakhtar’s starting eleven players in Germany were Ukrainian, while six were under the age of 23. Some had been signed recently from less fashionable Ukrainian clubs such as Desna Chernihiv and FC Mariupol and were enjoying their first taste of Champions League football.

Other highlights of the campaign included an impressive 1-1 draw with the mighty Real Madrid. Shakhtar actually came within seconds of what would have been an historic victory over Madrid, only for the Spanish giants to grab an injury time equalizer in the ninety-fifth minute.

The undoubted star of this season’s Shakhtar show has been turbo-charged winger Mykhailo Mudryk. The tattooed and coiffured 21-year-old Ukrainian player looks every inch the celebrity footballer and was already turning heads before this year’s campaign. Following a series of stunning Champions League performances, he is now regarded as one of the most sought-after players in world football.

Mudryk weighed in with a total of three Champions League goals and two assists. He was also recognized by UEFA as the fastest player in the Champions league group stages with a top speed of 36.6 kilometers per hour. This emerging superstar is now being widely tipped for a big money transfer to English Premier League club Arsenal and could soon break the record for the most expensive Ukrainian player.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Shakhtar’s success is all the more remarkable as the club has been forced to play its Champions league ties in exile. With the Russian invasion making it impossible to stage Champions League games anywhere inside Ukraine, Shakhtar has played home matches in Polish capital Warsaw.

This nomadic existence is not entirely new for the club. Shakhtar has been unable to stage matches in hometown Donetsk since the city was first occupied by Russia in spring 2014, and has spent the past eight seasons alternating between temporary bases in Lviv, Kharkiv, and Kyiv.

The scale of the war unleashed by Putin meant that this season’s Champions League campaign involved additional logistical issues for the club as players and staff traveled from their base in western Ukraine’s Lviv region. With no civilian flights currently possible in Ukrainian airspace, players were forced to endure ten-hour coach journeys across the border into Poland prior to and following European games.

Shakhtar players also suffer from the same wartime trauma and anxiety as millions of their compatriots. Most members of the overwhelmingly Ukrainian first team squad have friends and family living across the country who are experiencing the daily horrors of the Russian invasion including missile attacks and drastically limited access to light, heating, water, and other basic amenities.

Despite these uniquely difficult circumstances, morale within the club has remained remarkably high. There is a strong sense of camaraderie among the players and an awareness that their success on the football pitch can provide a welcome distraction from the war while also inspiring fellow Ukrainians to defy their doubters.

Overcoming overwhelming odds has become something of a Ukrainian national pastime in 2022. When Putin’s invasion began on February 24, the entire country was widely expected to fall within a matter of days. Instead, Ukraine’s courageous and brilliant resistance has humbling the once vaunted Russian military and won the admiration of the watching world.

Shakhtar’s heroics are of a far humbler nature, of course. Nevertheless, the club’s determination to overcome wartime adversity has captured the imagination of football fans across Europe and provided Ukrainians with one more symbol of their country’s refusal to accept defeat.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Oct 25, 2022

Poll: 86% of Ukrainians want to fight on despite Russian terror bombing

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure marks a dramatic escalation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the increasingly desperate Russian ruler seeks to avert military defeat.

Conflict Human Rights

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se) brings a practical approach to the field of educational research and policymaking. When analyzing the contents of textbooks used in national school curricula, it assesses content in relation to international standards of peace and tolerance, delving into parts of the curriculum that meet and do not meet these standards.

This work, which has been progressing for more than a quarter of a century, rests on the assumption that school education is the key to fostering the development of peaceful and tolerant societies. Of course, it can also be a tool for political and religious radicalization when exploited by ill-intentioned actors. Given that textbooks reveal what a society believes at present and its future aspirations, they are powerful political predictors.  

The principles of peaceful and tolerant education also apply to educational content produced in conflict-affected areas. It is inarguably important that this material is free from inaccurate, biased, or discriminatory depictions of different groups in society and that students are taught the values of peace, responsible citizenship, equality, and tolerance in all circumstances. In conflict zones, peace education aids peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

Attitudes promoting peace, tolerance, and non-violence range from a national to an international context or one that blurs the lines between the two. In a national context, on the one hand, IMPACT-se examines state-approved education with regard to ethnic and religious minority groups as well as other marginalized groups in society, such as women and immigrants. Examples of these include textbooks referencing the Sunni-Shia divide or the traditional role of women in Iranian and Saudi Arabian curricula, immigrants in the United Arab Emirates’ multicultural school system, or the Kurdish community in the Turkish education system. On the other hand, IMPACT-se also analyzes the curricula of minority groups—such as the Orthodox Haredi Jewish education system and Arab language curriculum in Israel—to monitor references made to an ethnic, religious, or cultural majority.

Case studies of international conflicts and animosity between peoples or coalitions of nations relevant today represent another category, such as those of Ukrainian and Russian history textbooks. Here, textbooks present skewed historical narratives and dismissal of the “other,” with little impetus for peace-making as a strategy to resolve conflicts. The curricula do not offer balanced perspectives on historical events, which reduces students’ ability to question such narratives and move beyond them toward conflict resolution. The historically longstanding conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, however, is a case that transcends national boundaries. Not only does IMPACT-se pay attention to references made to Palestinians in Israeli curricula and vice versa, but also how the conflict is framed in countries with a large Palestinian population—Jordan being the most prominent example.

IMPACT-se examines textbooks from many disciplines covering entire curricula, including Islamic studies, Jewish thought, moral education, history, geography, biology, mathematics, and the sciences. In addition to textbooks, teacher guides constitute authoritative blueprints for how educational materials are interpreted and presented in the classroom and, thus, serve as key sources for research. Furthermore, as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) highlights in their guidebook, beyond the identification of obvious content—such as references to and the frequency of text and examples inciting hate or violence toward the “other”—a careful approach is necessary to uncover hidden curricula and underlying assumptions in the way historical events, religious issues, and ethnic and racial backgrounds are represented, or how civic and moral norms are passed down to future generations.

When conducting research, IMPACT-se closely monitors the question of national identity and how it is presented. It considers the promotion of a national identity that leads to peaceful prosperity, respect for minorities, and good global citizenship as a must. When the teaching of national or, at times, transnational identities depict a reality that includes conflict and repression of minorities, it sounds the alarm bell. IMPACT-se often identifies transnational identities, including discussions of expansionism, such as pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, Khomeinism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Kurdism.

Across its corpus of work, IMPACT-se is guided by international standards prescribed by declarations, international recommendations, and documents of the United Nations (UN) and UNESCO on education for peace and tolerance. Such milestone documents include the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1965 UN Declaration on the “Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1995 Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, the 1995 Integrated Framework for Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

IMPACT-se’s international researchers are guided by such standards and conventions when searching for wording, imagery, and ideologies likely to foster prejudices, misconceptions, stereotypes, and misunderstandings, or encourage mistrust, racial hatred, religious bigotry, and national hatred. They also tackle ideas or theories that justify or promote acts and expressions of violence, incitement to violence, hostility, harm, and hatred toward other national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. The end goal is essentially to encourage the development of curricula that promote tolerance, understanding, and respect by developing a capacity for non-violent conflict resolution, using educational materials that are up-to-date, accurate, complete, balanced, and unprejudiced, and employing equal standards to promote mutual knowledge and understanding between different peoples.

To ensure the accuracy of the representation of obvious and hidden content, IMPACT-se combines quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze descriptions of the “self” and the “other,” as well as historical and social constructions within school curricula. A comprehensive review of all disciplines and volumes of textbooks ensures that curricula are assessed as a whole, rather than based on selected books or pages. The identification of key content is assisted by secondary literature on peace education.

As part of the qualitative stage of content analysis, passages and images are classified into categories establishing their significance in inciting hate and conflict, or, alternatively, in encouraging reconciliation and peace. Extracts referencing historical, political, social, religious, and cultural implications are analyzed further. All extracts identified in this process are documented and coded in a program, enabling the ability to contrast extracts within and between subjects. An additional method of discourse analysis allows researchers to account for the importance of idiosyncrasies and particular societal characteristics that vary from country to country.

Further attention is paid to pedagogic specificities in how textbooks of a particular discipline are structured and how they utilize text, imagery, and exercises in unison. IMPACT-se reports do not paraphrase or attempt to illustrate preconceived notions. As part of the quantitative analysis stage, researchers apply frequency and space analysis to determine how much content is dedicated to a certain topic and then verify the validity of the previous qualitative stage.

IMPACT-se is dedicated to conducting follow-up research on the countries and curricula it covers in its reports, keeping up with the ever-changing landscape of domestic and international politics, whose dynamics often filter into educational programs. Such a reality also presents the organization with an opportunity to assess the extent to which improved educational standards promoting peace and tolerance in school curricula have positively impacted emerging policies and vice versa.

Marcus Sheff is the CEO of The Institute for Monitoring Peace and cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se).

The post How an organization is promoting non-violence, tolerance, and peace in school education across the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the same way, institutional capital has remained concentrated in developed markets. Investors have sought to optimize for near-term returns rather than sustainable returns through diversification. The situation has resulted in unprecedented levels of liquidity: Global assets under management (AUM) have grown by more than 40 percent since 2015 and are expected to grow from over $110 trillion today to $145 trillion by 2025.

Investors looking for returns need to look to new markets. Africa—the most demographically dynamic region of the world—has been making headlines for the massive investment potential it offers, and yet has been stubbornly ignored. The continent’s average growth over the past two decades has oscillated between 4.5 percent and 5 percent, with five countries averaging over 6 percent. While the recession induced by COVID-19 hit wealthy countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development hard with a 5.5 percent contraction in 2020, African countries were more resilient, only shrinking by 2 percent.

Despite the compelling economic data, the African growth story has not resulted in the concomitant boost in investment from global players. Investment into the region is made by the same long-time investors, including development finance institutions. Meanwhile, mainstream institutional investors remain on the sidelines.

Surveys have long documented the difference in risk perception between investors with established operations on the continent and those that are considering opportunities from afar. Those already invested in the region see Africa as the most attractive investment destination, while those that don’t have operations in African markets view it as the second-least attractive region. For funds and firms that have yet to enter African markets, a stubborn dichotomous view of African risk—one that oscillates between seeing the continent through a lens of foreign aid and another that embraces the high risk/high return view—creates confusion and causes hesitation. Furthermore, the mainstream investment strategy used by investors in developed markets—one that is data dependent and push-oriented—is ill-suited to the opportunities in African markets.

From data dependence to trend analysis

Developed markets are data rich. In North American or European economies, investing is governed by subsector experts who focus on niche industries and specialized asset classes. The accelerating financial complexity and sophistication of highly public markets in developed countries progressively made specialists critical to finding opportunities and delivering returns. The internet economy of the 2000s and the growing importance of real-time data has accelerated the specialization. Now, large data sets and artificial intelligence-powered analysis have become quantitative assets to specialist investors.

This was not always the case. Prior to the 1980s, top-level generalists who deeply understood political economy dynamics were successful investors. In the post-war era, international investors navigated domestic social change, reconstruction, decolonization, and oil shocks to build the continent’s first private equity firms and iconic multinational companies. Over the same period, the emerging computer revolution transformed economics from the study of human behavior in an environment of scarcity to a series of equations and advanced mathematical modelling. Economics as a science grew up alongside Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs, resulting in a disconnect between economic and geopolitical analysis and an elevation of data in business decision-making.

In contrast to developed economies, African markets are defined by a lack of real-time, reliable data and strong interaction between political and economic realities, thus developed market analytical approaches will fall short. Cutting and pasting the data-dependent, specialist model in African markets leaves managers unable to understand and mitigate the operational, on-the-ground market risks. Country risk assessments, developed by economists at international financial institutions, tend to position geopolitical risk as a matter of insurance instead of being central to investment decision-making in projects and deals with medium-to-long-term returns horizons.

Taking a more intersectional perspective bringing together economic and geopolitical analysis requires an understanding of the trends currently reshaping the continent.

Most investors still operate on dated perceptions of African markets driven by oft-repeated factoids and the news cycle, failing to recognize the mutually reinforcing trends that have over the past twenty years restructured many African economies and enhanced their resilience. Coups grab headlines but day-to-day political stability makes for boring news. Despite the recent coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, the map of Africa is no longer a swath of autocratic regimes as it was in the 1980s but rather a mosaic with standout democracies such as Ghana and Senegal, which have—for the most part—been fortifying their institutions.

Regional powers such as Kenya and Nigeria, despite setbacks, have been on a trajectory of democratic progress. After the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, the country reformed its electoral process and promulgated a new constitution in 2010 which devolved power. In Nigeria, the 2015 elections marked a turning point: the first time since the return of civilian rule in 1999 that an opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, won against the People’s Democratic Party that had ruled until then. In the 1990s, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) only identified three democratic countries in Africa. In 2020, the EIU ranked twenty African countries as hybrid or higher on a democratic scale, despite democratic backsliding globally (including in the United States).

Accompanying the increasing political stabilization, economic diversification has also shored up African economic resilience. The continent’s sustained growth cannot only be attributed to high commodity prices but also is the result of a progressive shift away from raw material export models toward services and middle-class-based consumption.

The “oil curse” that colors the conversation of African economic growth is proving to be less powerful even in major oil exporters such as Nigeria. The oil price collapses of 2008 and 2014-16 revealed a previously unrecognized level of resilience on the continent. When oil hit a low of twenty-six dollars a barrel in 2016, regional gross domestic product fell to 2.2 percent from 3.4 percent the previous year, but the continent did not become mired in stagnation as it did in the “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, growth recovered in 2017, revealing structural improvements (particularly in Nigeria).

Diversification has been supported by increased investments made in infrastructure, deepening regional integration culminating in the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2019, and greater amounts of disposable income that have supported domestic markets for consumption. African countries have had greater choice in international partners. Over the past two decades, China has become Africa’s most significant trading partner and the largest financier of infrastructure in the region to the tune of twenty-three billion dollars between 2007 and 2020. Over seven billion dollars of that financing went to telecom infrastructure. Increasing mobile penetration and digitization accelerated by COVID-19 are undergirding an exponential growth in venture capital into African markets. In 2016, total venture capital flowing into the region was just above $350 million. Five years later, it crested four billion dollars, with the lion’s share going to Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Kenya, and with over 60 percent of the capital coming from US-tied entities.

The interaction of political stabilization, better macroeconomic management, technological change, and young demographics will support the continent in returning to growth after the COVID-19 crisis. Just like in the case of the 2016 oil shock, African growth bounced back to 3.7 percent in 2021, showing unanticipated resilience after the continent’s economy contracted by 1.7 in 2020. By analyzing the trends and accepting that rapid growth is neither linear nor smooth, investors can find success in African markets.

Pull over push strategies

Understanding transformative macro trends is sine qua non, but not enough to guarantee successful ventures. It is also critical to employ a pull strategy rather than a push approach. The latter focuses on creating new consumer needs and desires and then pushing relevant products into the market. The former instead rests on identifying unserved market needs and then creating products to meet that latent demand. Push strategies work well in consumption-based economies supported by efficient capital markets such as the United States or Europe in which affluent consumers can be convinced that their want of the newest mobile phone is actually a need. African markets are best-suited for pull strategies.

Most large European and US investors have a self-referential bias whereby they consider African opportunities through the lens of their own market operating environments. Many of them are looking to simply add a high-risk premium to compensate for investing in African markets on top of their familiar underlying asset structures. Some seek short-term, liquid, and safe assets such as treasury bonds while others pursue high internal rates of return (IRRs) in a seven-year fund lifecycle. Some are looking for real assets with developed secondary markets to ensure liquidity, while others want to deploy billions of dollars through thematic strategies such as infrastructure or climate.

Each “push” strategy will be exposed to difficulties that can create Goldilocks-type scenarios: not enough market depth, too few “bankable” projects, too much volatility, not enough liquidity, too much risk, inadequate profitability, and other such conditions. The list of reasons not to invest therefore becomes overwhelming and results in the accumulation of dry powder.

Fundamentally, African market realities are different—liquidity more often than not comes with volatility due to systemic local currency risk on the continent. The days of making 20 percent IRR in relatively safe private equity (PE) environments are also long gone: The first and second vintage in the early 2000s of African PE funds invested in banks, telecoms, and other low-hanging fruit, leaving only difficult operational, consumer-facing firms for today’s investors to build. Reports from both the International Finance Corporation and the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association—better known as AVCA—show returns of less than 10 percent in African PE due to currency fluctuations. High returns can be found in the African early-stage venture space, but those opportunities are often too small for institutional investors.

To gain access to the tremendous opportunities that African markets offer at scale, emerging market investing must be built on pull strategies based on intersectional approaches, incorporating an understanding of existing demand and working to find overlaps between the realities of African markets and the requirements of investors. For example, the billions flowing into climate and environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) funds can deliver good returns, strong developmental impact, and advancement of United Nations sustainable development goals if investors think beyond immediate climate resilience within today’s economic context and recognize that African countries have a dual imperative–stimulating rapid green growth and alleviating poverty.

On a continent where six hundred million people lack reliable access to electricity, additional generation capacity is a critical priority on which the green or digital revolutions depend. While climate investors rightfully eschew investments in coal, natural gas generation opportunities may prove a good opportunity as they can create the base power necessary for broad-based solar. Likewise, attractive carbon reduction opportunities can be found in agribusiness, so having the flexibility to invest outside the energy sector increases the potential for success.

A flexible and intersectional approach can also help asset managers wanting to deploy billions of dollars in the short term. By recognizing that market absorption capacities will limit their deployment, they can invest smaller amounts in the nascent private debt industry, which will grow rapidly in the next three to five years given the continuously growing financing gap in African markets.

If large asset managers want the diversification and returns that these markets can offer, they must accept the intrinsic trade-offs found in emerging markets. If liquidity is the priority, an investor can buy bonds in Cairo, Lagos, or Johannesburg but must accept the concomitant volatility and depreciation risk resulting from the underlying assets being valued in local currencies.

If predictability and stability are desired, then an investor must prepare for illiquidity. While investing in illiquid assets in the real economy offers opportunities ranging from infrastructure to agribusiness to renewable energy, exits are difficult to time. The classic high risk, high return investment profile does exist but is now concentrated in the emerging tech and creative industries.

With recession looming on the horizon in the United States and Europe, investors who want to participate in the next wave of growth and create wealth from—and in—fast-growing emerging and frontier markets in Africa and beyond need to adjust their approaches to invest along transformational trends, navigate political economy concerns, and tap latent demand.

Twenty years ago, the Economist dubbed Africa “the Hopeless Continent.” Today, the associated risks with investing in Africa are very different. Risk perception must be updated to reflect the increasing resilience, digitization, and integration that now are taking hold in African markets. Investors will succeed if they work to understand market realities instead of coming with pre-defined investment strategies, if they find the overlap between their internal requirements and market needs, and if they embrace flexibility and intersectional approaches. The geopolitical and economic dynamics of this post-COVID-19 world make looking at African markets not a niche option but rather a mainstream necessity.

Guillaume Arditti is founder of Belvedere Africa Partners and a lecturer in international relations at the Political Sciences Institute of Paris (Sciences Po).

Aubrey Hruby is a co-founder of Tofino Capital, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

An abbreviated version of this article also appears on LSE Business Review.

The post The Africa investment imperative: Diversification and resilience amid economic downturns appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 30 signatories of the retracted letter are the latest in a series of high-profile figures to voice their support for some kind of negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine. In recent weeks, similar appeals have come from diverse sources ranging from geopolitical commentators and media pundits to Elon Musk and Pope Francis. These peace proposals have been widely condemned as misguided and ill-timed, with critics arguing that any attempt to impose a ceasefire at the current stage of the war would only reward Putin and pave the way for further Russian aggression in the years to come.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It is not hard to see why skeptics question the timing of recent ceasefire initiatives. Russia currently occupies around 20% of Ukraine but is losing ground on multiple fronts. In a series of counteroffensives that began in late August, the Ukrainian military has succeeded in liberating much of northeastern Ukraine while also reducing Russia’s foothold on the right bank of the Dnipro River in the south of the country. A prolonged pause in hostilities would rob the Ukrainian army of the military momentum it currently enjoys while enabling Putin to rescue his rapidly unraveling invasion.

Crucially, a ceasefire would freeze the conflict and provide Russia with vital breathing space to rearm and regroup. Putin’s army suffered catastrophic losses during the first eight months of the invasion, with tens of thousands of Russian soldiers killed and more than a thousand tanks captured or destroyed. His military now needs time to train and equip new units of troops made up of freshly mobilized Russians.

Nor is there any indication that Russia is genuinely interested in ending the war. On the contrary, Putin has recently adopted a series of escalatory measures including Russia’s first mobilization since World War II and the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). He has also introduced elements of martial law in some Russian regions and moved to put the entire Russian economy on a war footing. These steps leave little room for doubt that the Russian dictator is preparing for a long war and has yet to abandon his original goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The most obvious problem with recent proposals to freeze the conflict is the fact that a ceasefire would leave one-fifth of Ukraine under Kremlin control and condemn millions of Ukrainians to a bleak and uncertain future under indefinite Russian occupation. United Nations investigators have already confirmed that Russia is guilty of committing war crimes in Ukraine. Many observers believe the ultimate objective of the invasion is the genocide of the Ukrainian nation.

Alleged Russian war crimes include the mass execution of civilians and the bombing of schools, hospitals, and residential buildings. Entire cities in the east of the country have been reduced to ruins by Russian airstrikes and artillery. In areas controlled by Moscow, Ukrainian civilians have been subjected to abductions, torture, and forced deportations. Meanwhile, the occupation authorities have set about eradicating all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

As Ukrainian forces have liberated towns and villages across southern and eastern Ukraine, they have discovered mass graves and torture chambers with sickening regularity. Accounts of sexual violence are equally widespread. Some Ukrainian civilians have simply disappeared without trace. The many strikingly similar accounts of life under Russian occupation in different regions of Ukraine suggest that Russian war crimes against the civilian population are not isolated excesses; on the contrary, they form a core part of the Kremlin’s military strategy for the complete subjugation of Ukraine.

No Ukrainian leader could legitimately abandon millions of fellow civilians to such a fate. Unsurprisingly, President Zelenskyy has ruled out any negotiations with Putin and stated that Ukraine will instead seek to liberate the entire country from Russian occupation. International efforts to pressure Kyiv into a compromise peace will not change Zelenskyy’s mind or convince the vast majority of Ukrainians that they are being unreasonable. For them, it is a matter of life and death. Either Putin is defeated or their nation will cease to exist.

Beyond the immediate issue of protecting Ukrainian civilians from Russian war crimes, opponents of a ceasefire also note that anything short of defeat in Ukraine will set the stage for further Kremlin wars of aggression. Putin has paid a high price for his decision to invade Ukraine, but if he is able to secure Russian control over the areas currently under occupation, he will regard the sacrifices of the past eight months as worthwhile. It will only be a matter of time before Ukraine faces a new Russian invasion.

Almost all wars ultimately end at the negotiating table. However, it is vital for global security that any future peace talks with Russia take place on Ukraine’s terms. That can only happen if Putin’s invasion ends in decisive defeat. Until then, there should be no negotiations about Ukraine without Ukraine.

Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on Twitter @MTemnycky.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 25, 2022

Poll: 86% of Ukrainians want to fight on despite Russian terror bombing

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure marks a dramatic escalation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the increasingly desperate Russian ruler seeks to avert military defeat.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Oct 18, 2022

Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Giving in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail would not end the war in Ukraine. What it would do is set a disastrous precedent that makes a future nuclear war far more likely while encouraging uncontrolled nuclear proliferation.

Arms Control Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post A ceasefire would condemn millions of Ukrainians to Russian occupation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The manner in which an estimated 107,000 people got out of Mariupol still remains little understood. Russian roadblocks surrounded the city and citizens were not allowed out. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken presented an evacuation plan on March 3 which Russia quickly rejected. The international community demanded safe passage for civilians, but the Russians stalled.

The first convoy of vehicles left Russian-held Mariupol on March 5-6, and it did so without Russia’s permission. Father Pavel Kostel, a priest with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church who was in Mariupol at the time, was part of the first convoy that got out. In this September 24 interview, he explains how people cunningly circumvented the Russian checkpoints and made their way to freedom. The interview has been edited for clarity.

Did you lead a convoy of cars out of Mariupol on March 5?

We did not lead a convoy of cars ourselves; we joined the main convoy of about 100 cars. We couldn’t take the initiative because we had a problem leaving Mariupol. As turned out, everyone was a leader. Everyone tried to help everyone in the convoy. A large group of people left, and I was one of those people.

How did you get out?

I’ll start with how the convoy actually formed. We found out by chance that there was an opportunity for many cars to pass. We heard a radio report. There were no normal communications. I could hardly get a cell phone signal. The priest who was with me heard the report, and we just started driving because we had no contact with other people. We passed three military checkpoints, but they stopped us at the fourth. That checkpoint was blocking men of conscription age, from 18 to 60 years old, from leaving Mariupol. Cars began to accumulate at the checkpoint, and a convoy formed of around 100 cars between the third and fourth roadblocks. That’s why so many cars and buses gathered. Someone tried to count the people, but everything was very chaotic, and we do not know the final number.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Where did the convoy stay overnight? Did you sleep in your cars?

We were stuck between roadblocks at a kind of fork in the road when the head of the neighboring village council saw all the people, women, and families with children, and told us about a remote village, some 30 kilometers from the Mariupol-Zaporizhzhia highway, where we could sleep. He said to go to the village of Temryuk. We drove from 11:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., and it was almost curfew when we got there. People were worried. We didn’t know how the Russians would react. The people in the convoy refused to go to the village at first. The head of the village talked them into it because it was really cold, so we went there to spend the night.

What happened next?

Mariupol Mayor Vadym Boychenko facilitated talks to get buses out of the city. We were supposed to join these buses the next day, March 6.

How did you get out of the village?

We gathered near the village school at 8 a.m. for a meeting. Everyone who was in cars agreed to go together. It happened spontaneously because no one knew each other. Everyone wanted to get out of that hell. No one appointed me leader. Who am I, after all. I’m just a priest. I told them that I knew the mayor, and that there was an opportunity to join the convoy of buses. But then we got news that the buses had not been allowed to leave.

Someone from the village told me that we could bypass the fourth checkpoint by taking a road through the fields. Some people went to the fields to check and confirmed that there was a road. A group of cars went ahead as scouts because they knew the road. A large column of cars followed after them. We hoped that our sheer numbers would keep the Russians from shooting us. One car is easy to shoot up, but a convoy has too many witnesses. I think that this is what prevented us from being robbed.

When we were driving along the road on Sunday, we saw dead Russians at a checkpoint. Russian soldiers left their own dead comrades behind. They didn’t even want to pick them up. It was terrible. We were zigzagging around them. That’s when you understand that this is war. You understand that you can also die. You don’t know what lies in store for you. We drove around them. Ahead of us, there were three more Ukrainian checkpoints. They checked us to make sure we weren’t saboteurs.

What was the experience like as you crossed the first three Russian checkpoints out of Mariupol?

They didn’t see us as a group at all. They examined each car and the people in it separately. They didn’t pay that much attention to the fact that it was a column of cars. If they had wanted, they could have taken anyone from the convoy and that would have been it. But then they weren’t as aggressive toward people as they are now. They didn’t rob anyone or take money, as happened later. My assistant and I introduced ourselves as priests. We told them that they we were leaving just like everyone else. Of course, the Russian soldiers introduced themselves as being from the Donetsk People’s Republic. “Where are you going?” We had a residence permit in western Ukraine, in Kamianets-Podilskyi, so we were a little worried about that. But they let us pass without any problems. They said, “We’ve got priests, too.”

Some of them asked strange questions, some were more aggressive, but there was no super-aggressive interrogation. That started later. They didn’t force any of the men to get undressed.

Where are you a priest now?

I am a priest in the Pauline Order, the monastic Order of St. Paul the Hermit. We have five monasteries in western Ukraine. My brothers, priests, live in a church with a monastery in Kamianets-Podilskyi. The order sent me there, and now I help them; we work together. We eagerly await the liberation of Mariupol, of course! I have contacts there who stayed, but I can’t just go back. Priests are in danger there now.

Is there anything else we should know about the evacuation?

It’s very difficult to talk about the evacuations because people in Mariupol do not believe the city authorities. Everyone remembers and talks about the evacuations with a lot of emotion. Why did it happen this way and not another way? Why didn’t the authorities organize it?

You have to understand that when you leave Mariupol and see Russians in front of you, there are no rules. People always hope that somehow the Russians will be reasonable, that they won’t kill you, but they have no conscience. This is the lottery that our life has become. You shouldn’t trust them because they don’t keep any promises.

It’s a miracle that we got through at all. Everything could have turned out differently. You just go into the unknown full of adrenaline and thank God that everything worked out.

Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Vladislav Davidzon is a journalist based in Paris, France, and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is the author of “From Odessa with Love.” Marta Smyrnova contributed reporting. Editor’s note: This essay has been edited for clarity.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 24, 2022

Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is one of the 21st century’s worst war crimes

By Paul Niland

The Russian destruction of Mariupol ranks among the gravest crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century and sends a clear message to the international community that can be no compromise peace with Putin.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Sep 21, 2022

Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is a desperate bid to freeze a losing war

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine is a sign of the Russian dictator’s mounting desperation as his invasion continues to unravel and his country’s geopolitical isolation deepens.

Central Asia Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 17, 2022

Putin’s Russian Empire is collapsing like its Soviet predecessor

By Taras Kuzio

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian influence in the post-Soviet region is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukrainian priest recounts escape from Russian siege of Mariupol appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For those living in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, the situation is far worse. Schools under Russian control are being forced to adopt a Kremlin-curated curriculum designed to demonize Ukraine while convincing kids to welcome the takeover of their country and embrace a Russian national identity. Teachers and parents who dare to object face potentially dire consequences.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion began on February 24, Ukrainian children have been among the primary victims of what is Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Hundreds have been killed, while millions have been displaced by the fighting and forced to flee to unfamiliar surroundings elsewhere in Ukraine or outside the country. Thousands of Ukrainian children are also thought to have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation.

The Kremlin is now targeting young Ukrainians as part of its campaign to eradicate Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russian control. In an address to mark the start of the new school term on September 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined the importance of indoctrinating Ukrainian schoolchildren.

Putin dedicated part of his speech to Ukraine, lamenting that Ukrainian children aren’t taught that Russia and Ukraine were once both part of the Soviet Union or that Ukraine has no history as an independent state. He also declared that the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine was historically Russian territory that had been wrongly included within Ukraine’s borders by the Bolsheviks. Putin blamed the education system in Ukraine for distorting historical facts and contributing to the creation of anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine that posed a threat to Russia.

This emphasis on the reeducation of young Ukrainians should come as no surprise. Throughout Putin’s 22-year reign, the Russian school system has grown increasingly politicized as the Kremlin has sought to bring aspects of the national curriculum into line with officially endorsed narratives. Textbooks and teaching materials have been developed to reflect the state’s approved view of Russian history in particular, with children subjected to highly sanitized versions of the Soviet past.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

In occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has embarked on a comprehensive reeducation program that includes specific efforts to challenge the entire notion of a separate and distinct Ukrainian nation. This began during the initial period of occupation with the removal of Ukrainian textbooks and all symbols of Ukrainian statehood from schools. In some cases, Ukrainian history books were demonstratively burned.

The occupation authorities have attempted to pressure Ukrainian teachers into adopting the Russian curriculum. Despite the obvious risks involved, many have refused to cooperate. Russia has sought to overcome objections via both threats and incentives. Those who agree to adopt the new Kremlin-approved teaching guidelines are offered cash payments, while anyone who objects faces dismissal along with possible imprisonment or worse.

Confronted with a shortage of Ukrainian teachers willing to cooperate with Moscow’s russification agenda, the occupation authorities are seeking to import staff from Russia itself. Hundreds of Russian teachers are believed to have agreed to relocate to Ukraine and teach in the occupied regions. Unsurprisingly, the subjects most in demand are Russian history, literature, and language. This influx of Russian teachers has been accompanied by the distribution of new textbooks aligned with Kremlin thinking.

Volunteering to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine may not be entirely risk-free for educators who choose to do so. A number of Russian teachers were reportedly detained during Ukraine’s recent successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region after having been abandoned by the fleeing Russian military. While details have yet to be confirmed, they may now face criminal charges.

The risks are far higher for Ukrainian parents who refuse to enroll their children in schools offering the Russian curriculum. The occupation authorities have warned parents who protest that they face fines and possible imprisonment. In some cases, Kremlin appointees have threatened to remove parental rights and separate children from their families. With forced deportations and the illegal adoption of Ukrainian children already well-known features of the occupation, these cannot be treated as idle threats.

Russia’s campaign to completely russify the Ukrainian education system is part of a broader drive to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and eradicate Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russia’s control. The apparently voluntary participation of Russian schoolteachers in these efforts raises troubling questions about the role of non-military personnel in possible war crimes. With hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children currently vulnerable to Kremlin indoctrination, their fate is a powerful argument for the urgent liberation of Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Dr. Oleksandr Pankieiev is a research coordinator and editor-in-chief of the Forum for Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta’s Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 13, 2022

Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The stunning success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region has exposed the rotten reality behind Russia’s military superpower reputation and convinced many that a decisive Ukrainian victory is now possible.

Conflict Corruption

UkraineAlert Aug 23, 2022

A strong Ukraine is the best solution to Europe’s Russia problem

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ukraine’s courageous response to Putin’s invasion has inspired the world but some Western leaders remain in denial over the threat posed by a hostile Russia, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Sep 17, 2022

Putin’s Russian Empire is collapsing like its Soviet predecessor

By Taras Kuzio

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian influence in the post-Soviet region is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Weaponizing education: Russia targets schoolchildren in occupied Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The report, which according to Amnesty was written in an effort to protect civilians, has unwittingly endangered them by fueling Russian propaganda narratives. The unintended yet predictable consequences of the report have prompted Amnesty International to announce a much-needed internal review. 

Amnesty accused the Ukrainian armed forces of “launching strikes from within populated residential areas as well as basing themselves in civilian buildings.” The report implies some sort of blanket prohibition on operating in civilian areas or using civilian infrastructure, when in fact the military’s responsibility under international law is to avoid locating military objectives near populated areas and to protect civilians from the dangers resulting from military operations to the maximum extent possible. Amnesty’s misinterpretation has muddied the waters with potentially disastrous consequences.

In a recent episode that illustrated the problematic nature of the report, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya referenced Amnesty’s findings as justification for Russia’s occupation and militarization of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine. The Russian armed forces stand accused of using the plant, which by Nebenzya’s own admission is civilian infrastructure, to house the artillery and rocket systems it uses to attack Ukrainian forces on the other side of the Dnipro River. When the Ukrainians fire back, they are accused of targeting civilian infrastructure.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

How did Amnesty get it so dangerously wrong? The organization itself wants to know and will undertake a review conducted by external reviewers to examine the decisions and working practices within Amnesty that led to the publication of the release. “We want to understand what exactly went wrong and why, in order to learn lessons and improve our work in the field of human rights,” Amnesty International said. 

As Amnesty begins its assessment of what went wrong, Oksana Pokalchuk has offered her own diagnosis. In an op-ed published in the Washington Post on August 13, Pokalchuk identified some of Amnesty’s missteps, including its failure to adequately cooperate with the Ukrainian government and its wild misinterpretation of international law. 

Amnesty’s argument that the Ukrainian military should somehow protect populated areas from afar is completely out of touch with the military realities of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Pokalchuk noted. Instead, she explained, assessments of how well a military protects civilians must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Shame is an important tool for compelling governments and militaries to adhere to international norms. But so is cooperation. Pokalchuk highlighted that the Ukrainian government has a solid track record of responding to Amnesty’s concerns and was not given adequate time to respond in this instance. 

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The founder of the UA Recover Initiative, Donald Bowser, has called attention to Ukraine’s successes in compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). In what he identified as one of the great reforms in the Ukrainian military over the last eight years, thousands of Ukrainian officers were trained on IHL in joint programs with international organizations. IHL has been integrated into the curriculum of both military universities and army training programs. Given Ukraine’s record on compliance, it seems Amnesty had other avenues to voice their concerns that could have enabled them to advocate for Ukrainian civilians without empowering their Russian attackers. 

Pokalchuk also recounted how Amnesty’s Ukrainian branch was silenced in favor of a team of international researchers who were unfamiliar with the local language and context. Pokalchuk described the attitude of the main branch as “condescending and unfair” and highlighted the “total disregard for the principle of international solidarity proclaimed in Amnesty’s statute.” 

But while Amnesty’s main branch stands accused of colonial attitudes, the organization’s Canadian branch has tried to demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine. In its own statement, Amnesty Canada expressed regret that the press release was published without sufficient context and did not pay due attention to the numerous war crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine. It also condemned the instrumentalization of the report by Russian propagandists. 

“Several years ago, Amnesty International purposefully decentralized to better listen, respond to, and be led by the voices of human rights defenders on the frontlines. Unfortunately, this press release defaulted to outdated ways of working that centralize knowledge and decision-making while placing local expertise and understanding at the margins. We have done this at considerable risk to our colleagues and rights holders in Ukraine,” Amnesty Canada wrote.

As Pokalchuk emphasized in her editorial, Amnesty has a dedicated staff of human rights advocates and researchers, all of whom share a commitment to humanitarian values including amplifying diverse voices and international solidarity. As it conducts its postmortem, returning to those values is step number one. Amnesty’s leadership has a responsibility to uphold its stated mission and to place its trust in its staff, especially when they raise red flags. Failure to do so in Ukraine has proved disastrous but can hopefully serve as a much-needed wake-up call.

Lillian Posner is a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. She earned her master’s degree in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies from Georgetown University.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 23, 2022

A strong Ukraine is the best solution to Europe’s Russia problem

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ukraine’s courageous response to Putin’s invasion has inspired the world but some Western leaders remain in denial over the threat posed by a hostile Russia, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Aug 24, 2022

Ukraine’s six key conditions for peace talks with Putin’s Russia

By Anders Åslund

After six months of battlefield setbacks in Ukraine, there are indications that Vladimir Putin is seeking a return to the negotiating table. Anders Åslund sets out six key conditions for Ukraine ahead of any potential peace talks.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Jun 30, 2022

Goodwill gestures and de-Nazification: Decoding Putin’s Ukraine War lexicon

By Peter Dickinson

From “goodwill gestures” to “de-Nazification” and “reclaiming Russian lands,” the Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson decodes some of the key phrases from the lexicon of Putin’s Ukraine War into plain English.

Central Asia Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Amnesty announces review as Ukraine report backlash continues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation has shocked and impressed many observers around the world. But those of us who live and work in Ukraine are not nearly so surprised. As the conflict approaches the six-month mark, it is important to understand that a war designed to crush Ukrainian independence has in fact resulted in a stronger, unifying Ukrainian identity centered on the principles of freedom and democracy. This is best exemplified by the mood among young Ukrainians.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s war is not the first time Ukraine’s emerging post-Soviet generation has risen to the challenge of resisting a return to authoritarianism. In 2004, when widespread voter fraud in the country’s presidential election seemed poised to undo independent Ukraine’s hard-fought freedoms and fledgling democratic values, young Ukrainians were among the leading organizers of the Orange Revolution.

Ten years later, Ukrainian youth once again rose to the occasion, but this time as leaders of the Euromaidan Revolution following the Ukrainian government’s Kremlin-backed decision to reject an Association Agreement with the European Union. As the Russian Federation now seeks to rob Ukraine of its sovereignty, we are once again witnessing Ukrainian youth at the center of the fight for the future of their country.

This younger generation of Ukrainians born following the collapse of the USSR is leading positive change on multiple fronts including the military and civil society. Many thousands are currently serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As the war rages around them, young Ukrainians are also volunteering in large numbers to distribute humanitarian aid through digital platforms like SpivDiia that match people’s needs with resources from businesses and private individuals. 

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Young Ukrainians in government are designing cutting-edge solutions to meet emergency wartime needs. Young journalists are risking their lives to provide accurate information and document Russian war crimes. Many of these journalists have recently been recognized for their professional accomplishments, including Ukrainska Pravda Chief Editor Sevgil Hayretdın Qızı Musaieva, who was named this year by Time Magazine as one of the world’s top 100 most influential people.

Another example is Mykhailo Fedorov. The 31-year-old Minister of Digital Transformation and Ukraine’s youngest cabinet member has rallied the Ukrainian IT community and lobbied international tech companies to support Ukraine in the digital hybrid war against Russia. He is also behind the wartime adaptation of a government app that is providing social benefits to millions of internally displaced people who lost their jobs as a result of the war. Deputy Minister of Health Mariia Karchevych is another high-profile government official under 35 who is coordinating the flow of humanitarian aid throughout the country.

In addition to supporting the country’s wartime needs, young Ukrainians are also on the frontlines of the fight against Russian propaganda. From the very first days of the invasion, numerous professional and grassroots initiatives have emerged to expose the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.

In the months and years to come, youth will remain on the Ukrainian frontlines, both literally and figuratively. They will need to play an integral part in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, helping to shape important initiatives such as youth-friendly mental health services and educational efforts to address wartime interruptions in learning.

As the world marks International Youth Day on August 12, it is important that we recognize the contributions of young Ukrainians in government and civil society as well as in the military. And as national and international stakeholders look to rebuild Ukraine, it is also crucial that we continue supporting, listening to, and engaging this younger generation to make sure they remain at the heart of the post-war recovery process.

Ukraine’s resilient response to Russian aggression highlights the country’s commitment to democratic values and active citizen participation. It reflects a remarkable readiness to take personal responsibility for the future of the country. Amid the horrific destruction of the Russian invasion, young Ukrainians are playing a crucial role in consolidating an even stronger sense of national identity. This victory is as strategically important as any military success for the future of Ukraine’s statehood.

Mehri Druckman is IREX’s Country Director for Ukraine and Chief of Party for the USAID funded Ukraine National Identity Through Youth (UNITY) program. SpivDiia is an IREX grantee.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 9, 2022

Flawed Amnesty report risks enabling more Russian war crimes in Ukraine

By Lillian Posner

Amnesty International’s recent report accusing Ukraine of endangering civilian lives has sparked a wave of international criticism and is being actively used by the Kremlin to justify Russian bombing of civilian targets.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 10, 2022

Putin is running out of excuses as Ukraine expands the war to Crimea

By Peter Dickinson

Russian officials have denied that Ukraine was behind an audacious August 9 attack on an airbase in occupied Crimea but Moscow’s excuses are beginning to wear thin as Vladimir Putin’s invasion continues to unravel.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Aug 5, 2022

Russia’s invasion is putting the future of Ukraine’s forests at risk

By Yehor Hrynyk

As the Russian invasion approaches the six-month mark, Ukraine’s forests are facing the twin threats of frontline wildfires and wartime emergency economic measures that could lead to a disastrous increase in logging.

Conflict Eastern Europe

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Generation UA: Young Ukrainians are driving the resistance to Russia’s war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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One of the key problems facing the Ukrainian authorities is a lack of access to information. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Health no longer has a comprehensive picture of the medical situation in occupied regions of the country. This makes it difficult to get insights and assess the scale of the healthcare problems in areas under Russian control. Nevertheless, assessments of the available evidence and an awareness of the general situation in Russian-occupied Ukraine can help identify the top priorities for Ukrainian and international healthcare professionals. 

One of the most significant risks comes from the possible spread of pathogens. As temperatures reach seasonal highs throughout July and August, human contact with blood-sucking insects and ticks becomes more common. This often leads to the spread of infectious diseases.

Another major problem is limited access to drinking water. This increases risks posed by contaminated water and also makes it difficult for people in occupied regions of Ukraine to maintain desirable standards of personal hygiene and sanitation. This can cause mass outbreaks of diarrhea, hepatitis A, cholera, and other infections.

Due to Russia’s military strategy of carpet-bombing Ukrainian towns and cities into submission, basic infrastructure has been severely damaged in much of occupied southern and eastern Ukraine. Many areas now have limited access to drinking water, while remaining water supplies are often not subject to normal treatment.

The risk of a cholera outbreak is believed to be particularly high in Mariupol, a Russian-occupied Ukrainian port city in Donetsk Oblast with a pre-war population of almost half a million that was largely reduced to rubble during a brutal Russian siege. According to the Mariupol municipal authorities, the city’s 22 pumping stations were all destroyed during the fighting, while sewage treatment and drainage systems are also unable to function properly. Large numbers of dead bodies remain trapped beneath the rubble and are decomposing, further complicating the city’s precarious healthcare situation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s invasion has displaced millions of Ukrainians and thrown large numbers of people together in ways that create potential for healthcare emergencies. Concentrations of children with different vaccination status during evacuation procedures risks fueling outbreaks of vaccine-preventable illnesses such as measles and diphtheria.

COVID-19 also remains an issue. Prior to the Russian invasion, only 35% of the Ukrainian population had been vaccinated, representing one of the lowest rates in Europe. A sharp increase in COVID cases could lead to overcrowding in hospitals at a time when healthcare facilities are desperately needed to care for military and civilian casualties. 

Meanwhile, possible delays in the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis are a matter of considerable concern. In particular, if patients stop taking their medications due to impaired access to medical care in occupied parts of Ukraine, this can lead to a rise in cases of antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis.

Similarly, people living with HIV cannot afford to stop taking their medications. Skipping doses may lead to the reappearance of strains resistant to treatment which pose a high risk not only to current patients but to those who may contract the disease in the future.

Large numbers of abandoned livestock are further complicating the healthcare situation in wartime Ukraine and increasing the threat from animal-borne diseases. The uncontrolled movement of animals or their undisposed carcasses, as well as the destruction of wildlife habitats, can lead to the spread of pathogens among humans along with wild and domestic animals. 

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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International support for Ukraine has so far focused on the provision of weapons along with humanitarian aid efforts for those displaced by the fighting. Looking ahead, it is vital that Ukraine’s partners also help to address the growing healthcare issues created by the Russian invasion.

The list of medical items currently required by Ukraine is long. This includes diagnostic kits, rapidly deployable field hospitals, immunobiological drugs for the treatment of the diseases like diphtheria, tetanus, botulism, and malaria, as well as vaccines for routine immunization (including against hepatitis A and cholera), disinfectants, portable water treatment systems, and means for pest control.

In order to establish a healthcare system capable of responding to epidemic risks, the Ukrainian parliament is set to finalize the second draft of a law on public health that features over 850 proposals from MPs and 400 proposals from international experts.

In preparation for the second reading, experts from the WHO, USAID, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health, and the Ukrainian Public Health Center are involved in finalizing the draft law. Considerable revisions remain before this law can be implemented. This sizable task will require further support from the international community.

Ihor Kuzin is Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Health and Chief State Sanitary Doctor.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 30, 2022

Goodwill gestures and de-Nazification: Decoding Putin’s Ukraine War lexicon

By Peter Dickinson

From “goodwill gestures” to “de-Nazification” and “reclaiming Russian lands,” the Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson decodes some of the key phrases from the lexicon of Putin’s Ukraine War into plain English.

Central Asia Conflict

UkraineAlert May 27, 2022

South Ukraine holds the key to Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Taras Kuzio

The biggest European battles since WWII are currently raging in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region but the ultimate outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War is likely to be decided hundreds of miles to the south.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 6, 2022

Ukraine defies Russia and launches electricity exports to EU neighbors

By Aura Sabadus

Ukraine’s remarkable wartime synchronization with the electricity grid of continental Europe moved up a gear at the end of June with the landmark launch of commercial electricity exports to neighboring Romania.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine at risk from infections and epidemics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the world grapples with pressures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and the war in Ukraine, there is an urgent need for Africa, Europe, and the United States to work more closely than ever before on their common challenges in order to build a more secure and equitable future for all. That was the central message that emerged from a timely forum on a trilateral partnership between the US, African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU), hosted on June 16, 2022 by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and Europe Center.  

“I hope Africans choose the United States and the EU as their partners of choice,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee. The conversation, held in collaboration with the Delegation of the EU to the United States, featured an array of distinguished leaders from Europe, Africa, and North America. It served as a follow-up to the AU-EU Summit held in Brussels on February 17, 2022. 

Here are some highlights, ranging from insights on economic investment and development collaboration to lesser-discussed ways in which the United States, EU, and AU can build a new transatlantic partnership.  

Watch full event

Security cooperation 

• The impact of the war in Ukraine was a major area of concern for European, African, and US officials alike. “We are facing, indeed, the greatest global food security crisis of our time,” said Stavros Lambrinidis, EU ambassador to the United States, during his opening remarks. He noted the severe repercussions of Moscow’s aggression and military tactics in preventing the flow of grain exports from Ukraine, especially on African food access. Lambrinidis stressed the need for Europe, Africa, and the United States to “stand with and by each other.”  
• As Africa continues to deal with its own regional conflicts, French Ambassador to the United States Philippe Étienne pointed to the ongoing transatlantic cooperation in the field of security “where the EU and the United States are very much aligned, especially fighting terrorist groups in the Sahel and unfortunately in other parts of Africa.” He went on affirm the need for the EU and United States to assist African security forces states in counterterrorism training. Étienne highlighted France and Ivory Coast’s new international counterterrorism academy near Abidjan as an example.
• Phee discussed the United States’ role in the Horn of Africa, where American troops were recently deployed to Somalia. “The choice of a new prime minister, the recent revision of the AU mission in Somalia, support from outside actors like the United States to reinforce the security architecture, as well as support by US and EU to help Somalia and the Horn deal with the devastating drought that is affecting those countries—all those factors I think create an opportunity that we have not seen in a while for the Somalis to finally begin to move forward.” Phee also made note of developments in Sudan where “inspiring and amazing” leaders in civil society, the professional world, and among the youth are “saying they want their country to be a democracy.”

Social and youth empowerment 

• AU Ambassador to the United States Hilda Suka-Mafudze called for greater “recognition of Africa as a global player,” and encouraged further action by AU partners to help strengthen the continent’s health and education capacities.
• Themis Christophidou, director-general for education, youth, sport, and culture for the European Commission, outlined EU initiatives to “nurture people-to-people contact” between Europe and Africa including research and university partnerships, cultural and artistic exchange programs, and developing pathways for legal migration. She acknowledged the importance of investing in Africa’s youth calling them “the continent’s greatest asset.” 
• In a similar vein, Scott Taylor, vice dean and professor for diversity, equity, and inclusion at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, addressed the idea of ‘brain drain’ and explained why there should be greater focus on creating mechanisms for African talent, on the continent and abroad, to return to and stay in Africa so that they can contribute their global skills and expertise to local economies.  

Revitalizing investment 

• Senegal’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations Cheikh Niang described the EU’s 150 billion-euro Global Gateway Investment Package as “an opportunity for Africa and Europe to strengthen development cooperation.” The initiative aims to help Africa accelerate its green transition, digital revolution, health and education systems, and job creation.
• Arianna Vannini, principal adviser on international partnerships for the European Commission, explained the importance of this new investment commitment. “It does not aim at simply establishing a trade relationship; it doesn’t focus only on infrastructure,” she said. “It expands to human development, and it involves further dialogue with our partner countries, the local communities, the voice of partners on the ground and in particular the young generations which are such a key resource for a young continent like Africa.”
• Abdoul Salam Bello, alternative executive director for the World Bank Africa Group, stressed the need for collaboration on how to implement large investment programs at the continental, national, and local level. He stated that the Global Gateway “will be a very good opportunity” as long as the national development plans of African states are fully considered, and increased attention is given to supporting the continent’s private sector because “that’s where the prospect of growth will be.”
• Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa at the US Agency for International Development Diana Putman said that the US government was updating its Africa policy to enhance partnerships with African states and the African Union on issues of economic growth, health security, and climate change. “There is a clear commitment on the part of the different agencies to reset our relationship and make sure that Africans realize we see them as full partners.”

Narayan Felix is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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On June 7, an article co-authored by Mathew Burrows was published by the Wilson Center’s New Security Beat, which discussed the dangers of a growing cohort of youth who feel disillusioned by political failures.

“Failing to examine youth engagement trends may be a serious blind spot— and thus a threat to democracy. It is a question that merits closer examination. When youth disengage, they are often saying they don’t have a high level of confidence or trust in existing economic, political, or social entities,” said Burrows and his co-author, Steven Gale of the US Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning.

“They may also want to “opt out” because they perceive that their generation is not being heard or treated fairly. Whatever their reasons, youth disengagement will ultimately have negative impacts beyond democratic engagement with potential shockwaves on social stability, the well-being and mental health of individuals (youth and their families), and individual and country-level economic productivity and quality of life.”

The post Burrows in New Security Beat: Youth disillusionment as a danger to democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

WHEN I WAS GROWING UP IN THE PRE-INTERNET 1980s in Cali, Colombia, my father subscribed to Time magazine, and every week, the shiny, ostensible purveyor of everything that was of import in the world arrived in the mail.

I’d scour Time in search of any news—good, bad, whatever—about Colombia. Save for an occasional natural disaster reviewed in a paragraph or two, there never was any. Until Pablo Escobar became the world’s anti- hero in the late 1980s, and except for Gabriel García Márquez’s Nobel prize for literature in 1982, Colombia was mostly absent from global and certainly from US consciousness. I read the dry entry on Colombia in Collier’s Encyclopedia and attempted to make sense of its insufficient information. Was this how people in other parts of the world viewed us? A far-away, underdeveloped tropical nation whose primary assets were a plethora of birds (thank God for that “Colombia is the country with the most variety of birds” stat) and coffee?

When I auditioned for the Manhattan School of Music, a female profes- sor, considered one of the leading pianists of her generation, said: “You’re from Colombia? I have a good friend from Argentina. Perhaps you know her?”

Alas, I did not. But I understood then that even though the distance from Miami to Cartagena is a mere 1,100 miles—while Buenos Aires is 4,410 miles—for many in the Northern Hemisphere, anything South of Mexico was one big blob of sameness—unremarkable save for the extremes of tragedy and crime.

Colombia-and Colombians-were largely invisible

It wasn’t that we had nothing to offer. Colombia had a decent soccer team, even if it never seemed to get past the first rounds of the World Cup. It had Juan Valdés and Gabriel García Márquez. And, to our eternal consternation, in the mid-1980s, it had Pablo Escobar, whose infamy eclipsed all those other blips of achievement.

But, of course, there is a world of difference between notoriety and respect, recognition and scorn.

And then, the music came.

It started almost surreptitiously with Carlos Vives and his new take on vallenato, an almost subversive artistic creation at home (after all, wasn’t vallenato the music of the proletarian masses?) that suddenly found exotic acceptance in the United States.

Then came Shakira with her crossover aspirations, her bilingual hits—a first-ever for a Colombian artist—and her use of Colombian rhythms and patriotic expression. When Shakira sang “En Barranquilla se baila así” in 2005 as she shimmied to the beat of “Hips Don’t Lie,” millions of people, for the first time, looked up her native city on a map.

It took roughly a decade, but now, two generations of musical artists have followed in Shakira’s steps and, almost impossibly, stepped into an international spotlight that was unimaginable in my teen years.

Music has long been the great equalizer. Historically, it has crossed barriers of race, class, politics, nationality, and language, with music in English— the world’s vast lingua franca—consumed by people from around the world. Thanks in no small measure to a growing contingent of Colombian super- stars that includes Shakira, Juanes, Maluma, Camilo, and J Balvin, music in Spanish has also sliced the language barrier and is listened to broadly by non-Spanish speakers worldwide.

How did this happen? Our circumstance as a country in near-perpetual conflict favored the development of music as an alternative, outlet, and solution. Yet, music was long insular in Colombia. We listened to local acts and imports from the United States, Spain, Argentina, and Mexico, as did most Latin Americans. Colombia was a depository of music from other places, but our own rhythms and beats were regarded as too, well, Colombian ever to be appreciated outside the confines of our borders.

Seen dispassionately, the evolution of Shakira is almost miraculous. As a young girl growing up in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, there was no one she could artistically emulate or aspire to and no industry to viably sup- port her brand of youth-oriented, slightly rebellious rock. Shakira not only managed to set foot outside Colombia into other Spanish-language countries but improbably pierced the veil of mainstream acceptance, becoming a global superstar who sang in English, recognized on equal footing with artists like Madonna and Ricky Martin in their heyday. It had never happened before to one of us. Once Shakira was able to break that barrier, possibilities unfolded for new generations.

After all, the musical movement borne out of Medellín is a post-narco phenomenon, fueled by young artists who sought to depict their social malaise through music and strove to get ahead through musical art that came from their very own streets and culture, rather than through violence or conformism.

When J Balvin showed “molas,”¹ “palenqueras,”² and “chivas”³ in his video of “Mi Gente” (my people), he served as a de facto ambassador for Colombian culture and folklore, placing it on a platform that allowed for its mass consumption. When Maluma tattooed the word Medellín on his famous chest and sang using the colloquial language of his city’s streets, he turned preconceived notions of Latin crooners on their heads, offering the image of the singer as a patriotic symbol instead. When Camilo sings “No es vida de rico, pero se pasa bien rico,” (“It’s not a rich man’s life, but we have a great time”) he speaks not just for millions of young Colombians, but for the millions of young Spanish speakers who tackle their struggles with humor.

Yet, until just a few years ago, the fact that musicians were leading the fray in terms of raising Colombia’s visibility abroad was widely discounted. Until relatively recently, music was seen as mostly a trivial pursuit, certainly not a “real” career, and unworthy of serious consideration by influential decision makers and politicians.

Except, musicians overall have become the decision makers, and Colombian musicians, in particular, have become global leaders. This is obvious, not just in terms of fame—easily measurable nowadays by the number of social media followers and music streams and downloads, but also in terms of tangible social and economic impact and influence. Colombian musicians today are the single most recognized ambassadors of the country’s culture, folklore, and traditions and are also vocal agents of change. Witness Shakira’s Fundación Pies Descalzos (Barefeet), Juanes’s Fundación Mi Sangre (My Blood), and Maluma’s ElArtedeLosSueños(the Art of Dreams) foundation. Not only do they transform lives inside Colombia, but they raise the country’s equity everywhere.

And now we have Encanto, an animated Disney film remarkable for its sheer visual beauty (which reflects the beauty of the Colombian countryside near the coffee-growing region where the mythical casita stands), uplifting family themes, and joyful music, much of it performed by—Oh My Good- ness—actual Colombians! At the time of this writing in March 2022, the film’s soundtrack had spent eight non-consecutive weeks at No. 1 on the fabled Billboard 200 chart, which measures consumption of all albums in every genre. No soundtrack has ever done that in the chart’s history.

That’s not the only record it’s set. Encantois the first soundtrack to go to No. 1 since 2019 and the sixth animated soundtrack to ever top the chart. 

Beyond that, Encanto is a film set in Colombia, with a predominantly Colombian cast that sings and speaks in Spanish and English. Animated or not, this degree of exposure and success for our country is unprecedented on the screen.

As Colombian actor John Leguizamo, who voices Bruno in Encanto, once told me: “It’s more common to see aliens than Latinos on mainstream film and television.” And Colombians? Aside from Leguizamo and Sofía Vergara, there are no other actors you can name off the top of your head.

For years, movies about Colombia were filmed elsewhere. Such block- busters as Collateral Damage and Clear and Present Danger, for example, were both shot in Mexico because Colombia was deemed too dangerous, and Colombian characters were played by Mexicans or Spaniards speaking with the wrong accent.

Encanto, on the other hand, really minded its Ps and Qs, from accents to outfits to minute details like the hand-painted tableware, the embroidered dresses, the food, the various colors of our skin, and the animals— from the ubiquitous toucan to the yellow butterflies that are synonymous with García Márquez.

Many years ago, I asked Carlos Vives–who performs two songs in the soundtrack—if he thought his music was too regional and Colombian root- based to attain international success.

“Being local is what allows me to be international,” he replied, way ahead of his time. It’s not surprising, with this mentality, that Maluma and Sebas tian Yatra, another new-generation Colombian singer, are also featured in Encanto.

The year 2021 was a watershed year for Latinos in film, with In the Heights, West Side Story,and Encanto featuring Latin lead actors, none of them hugely famous. After all, it’s been a year of breaking parameters, zeroing in on inclusivity and diversity, and looking beyond the well-mined bubbles. But in film, the only major success thus far has been Encanto, a musical and arguably the narrowest in scope. What made it work?

I want to think Colombia and its music made it work. Yes, the country is indeed that dangerous, with thousands displaced from their homes every year because of violence, as the film superficially shows. But it’s also that beautiful, that exuberant, that passionate, that family-oriented, that hospitable, that delicious, that musical, and yes, that magical.

Now, that musicality is systematically finding its way to the rest of the world. Music isn’t something you can taste or smell, like our coffee, or see and touch, like our birds. But thanks to an ever-growing number of artistic collaborations and an increasingly solid business infrastructure, it’s become perhaps the most effective and widely-lauded vehicle to transmit eminently Colombian emotions to the world, without constraints of borders or language.

At the 2022 Academy Awards, Encanto, an animated musical based in Colombia and proudly featuring Colombian voices and sounds, won Best Animated Feature. At the 2022 Grammy Awards, there were eight nominees from Colombia in the four Latin categories, more than any other country.

It’s not just about what happens with our music on an international stage. Inside our borders, for perhaps the first time ever, there’s a multi-tiered, highly-profitable music industry that allows inspiration to have a ripple effect that reverberates throughout the local economy: from the recording studio to the 50,000 tickets Karol G sold to her show at Estadio Atanasio Girardot in Medellín.

At a recent international award show, Maluma performed with four fellow artists from Medellín, all wearing t-shirts that said: “Medallo en el Mapa,+ Música–  Violencia,” (Medallo⁴ in the Map + Music – violence).

The message was proud, but also defiant.

Thanks to music, we are finally being seen and heard. And we are making change happen.

Portions of this essay originally appeared in the article by Leila Cobo published by Billboard on January, 2022 “With ‘Encanto,’ Colombia Is Finally Seen and Not Just Heard,” accessible here: https://www.billboard.com/music/latin/encanto-colombia-positive-image-1235017931/

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