Introduction

I. Addressing the Soviet legacy

II. Pre-war policies

III. The ethnic variable

IV. Wartime policies undermine population growth

V. Conclusion

About the author

Russia’s future will be characterized by a smaller population. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has virtually guaranteed that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be not only smaller, but also older, more fragile, and less well-educated. It will almost certainly be ethnically less Russian and more religiously diverse. While some might view diversity as a strength, many Russians do not see it this way. In a world with hordes of people on the move to escape war, persecution, poverty, and the increasing impact of climate change, xenophobic political rhetoric sells well.

Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems, beginning in his first months as president. Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades. However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.

The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations. Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.

United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.

While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging. Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.

There have been four important inflection points in demography policy since Putin became president. The first came in 2006, when Putin’s rhetoric about demography finally resulted in specific policies: demography was one of the first four national projects he launched at that time. The second significant change came following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The reaction to that aggression in Ukraine, Moldova, and other former Soviet republics narrowed the number of countries providing labor to Russia.

A third key moment was the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack near Moscow in March 2024. Tajiks made up half of the immigrants to Russia in 2023, but that has become politically problematic in the aftermath of the Crocus attack. The most recent policy shifts accompanied the formation of a new government in May 2024. Initial reports promise a long-term approach that perhaps begins to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality. It comes too late, and the measures proposed fail to offer new solutions.

The paper begins with a summary of the demographic problems the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union and its ineffective initial response. The second section reviews the deteriorating situation after 2013. The third section focuses on ways Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is exacerbating all of these challenges. The conclusion suggests what impact population decline will have on Russia’s future.

Addressing the Soviet legacy

The Soviet Union experienced multiple demographic shocks in the twentieth century. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, recovery appeared possible. Yet by the 1960s, Russia’s high infant mortality and low adult life expectancy were outliers compared with most highly industrialized countries.

The population shock from World War II echoed for decades. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign in 1986–1987 generated a brief improvement in life expectancy, but this was hardly enough to change the dynamic.

Economic disruptions, beginning with Gorbachev’s perestroika and continuing into the 1990s, resulted in fewer births, higher mortality, and significant emigration. The dissolution of the Soviet Union spurred massive population relocation, as millions of Russians and non-Russians returned to their titular homelands. Every former Soviet republic became more ethnically homogeneous. This trend has continued within the Russian Federation, as some non-Russian republics continue to become less Russian. Russians relocating within the Russian Federation have reduced the population in the Far East.

Russia’s immigration-emigration balance involves several population flows. Russians have moved back to Russia from newly independent former Soviet republics. As Russia’s economy improved, labor migrants, primarily from former Soviet republics, have found formal and informal work in Russia. Prior to the war, the immigrants compensated for the multiple waves of (mostly Russian) people emigrating from Russia.

The breakdown of the Warsaw Pact —and then the Soviet Union itself—disrupted economic linkages and supply chains that had existed for decades. Economic insecurity reduced already-declining birth rates across much of the post-Soviet space. Russia’s total fertility rate (TFR)—the number of births per woman—dropped from just below replacement level in 1988 to 1.3 in 2004. Maintaining a population level requires a TFR of at least 2.1 without positive net immigration; Russia’s high adult mortality rate requires one even higher.

In his initial inaugural address in August 2000, Putin warned that Russia could become “an enfeebled nation” due to population decline. Despite the warnings, little was done. Russia’s TFR increased from 1.25 in 2000 to 1.39 in 2007. This slight improvement reflected better economic conditions due to rising oil prices, and a (temporarily) larger number of women in the 18–35 age cohort.

One reason for persistent difficulty in achieving higher birth rates or TFR numbers has been the legacy of Soviet polices. Lack of access to effective birth control and male resistance to condom use resulted in abortion being the widely used solution for unwanted pregnancies. Murray Feshbach calculated that the Soviet-era abortion rate averaged seven per woman. Far less attention has been devoted to male infertility. Alcohol and substance abuse have resulted in unusually high infertility rates among Russian men.

Low birth rates are only one part of the population problem. Unhealthy diet and lifestyle, binge alcohol consumption, and accidents contribute to the high adult mortality numbers. When Putin was first elected president in 2000, Russian men aged 18–64 were dying at four times the rate of European men. Russian women were perishing at about the same rate as European men.
Until early 2005, Putin’s public position was that Russia could offset its population decline by attracting more Russians living in former Soviet republics to return to Russia, bringing with them needed skills while augmenting the ethnic Russian population. This immigration offset much of the population loss in the 1990s but has increasingly declined since Putin became president. Significantly, non-Russians became the dominant labor migrants.

Data from the Russian state statistics service Goskomstat indicate legal immigration peaked at 1.147 million in 1994 and declined each year thereafter, shrinking to 350,900 in 2000 and 70,000 in 2004.

Despite the declining numbers, the Russian government adopted a highly restrictive law in 2002 limiting legal immigration. When the Security Council discussed immigration again in 2005, Putin called for a more “humane approach,” dropping the racial and religious criteria. Yet he followed this with a “clarification” prioritizing Russian speakers. It is possible that Putin understood the situation but adjusted his rhetoric in accord with public opinion.

Russian media reports of a massive influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s were wildly exaggerated. By 2000, as oil prices rose, workers from Central Asia, Ukraine, and Moldova found formal or informal work in Russia. Russia incorporated the populations of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and additional territories since 2022, which accounts for official claims of a larger “Russian” population.

Immigrants to Russia have come overwhelmingly from former Soviet republics, which account for 95–96 percent of the total. Just five countries that were part of the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) had population growth between 1989 and 2004. Migrants from two former Soviet republics with declining populations, Ukraine and Moldova, continued to provide labor until 2014. Putin reiterated the importance of demography in his inaugural addresses in 2012, 2018, and 2024, and in many of his annual call-in programs. Several times he has acknowledged the failure to achieve promised increases in births. Yet there appears to be no learning curve regarding policies. Putin’s 2024 address promised more of the same: paying Russians to have larger families, accompanied by invoking the need for more soldiers to defend the motherland.

Pre-war policies

As the price of oil increased in the 2000s, Putin’s government debated how to use the windfall to address persistent demographic challenges. As in many countries, immigration remains politically fraught. Russian nationalist groups adopted “Russia for the Russians” as a campaign slogan. Improving life expectancy is an ideal solution, but it is slow and expensive, depending on adults taking care of their health. Putin’s government opted for pro-natal policies. In his presidential address in 2006, Putin cited demography as “the most serious problem in Russia today.” Rather than listening to advisers familiar with the basket of diverse policies that improved birth rates in France and Sweden—prenatal and postnatal care, parental leave, daycare, preschool programs, housing support, and other incentives—Russia’s government emphasized “maternity capital.”

The initial maternity capital program offered incentives to women for the birth or adoption of a second or additional child. The funds, paid when a child turned three, could be used for housing, the child’s education at an accredited institution, the mother’s pension, or assistance for children with disabilities. Over time, changes have included payment for a first child and improved housing. The annually indexed funding was enough to encourage additional births in rural areas and smaller towns but had little impact in higher-priced urban areas that are home to 70 percent of the population. Moreover, many women who experienced giving birth in a Russian maternity hospital decided once was sufficient.

The pro-natal policy coincided with slightly higher Russian birth rates, raising the TFR from 1.3 when the maternity-capital program was launched in 2007 to nearly 1.8 in 2015. Most demographers, however, attribute the higher numbers to a (temporarily) larger cohort of women in prime child-bearing years, economic growth due to higher oil prices during Putin’s first two terms, and hopes that nationwide protests over the 2011–2012 elections augured real change. After 2012, the reduced number of returning compatriots offset the gains in births.

Despite the augmented maternity-capital program, Russia’s TFR dropped back to 1.5 by 2019, prior to COVID-19 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian official sources continued to report the rate as 1.8. Without immigration, even a TFR of 1.8 would result in Russia’s population decreasing by about 20–25 percent in each generation.

The other endogenous factor in natural population change is life expectancy. Russia is hardly an outlier in experiencing lower birth rates. Most countries outside of Africa are projected to have smaller populations in the coming decades. Yet Russia continues to be exceptional among developed countries in the rate of mortality among adults aged 18–64. Russia’s economic recovery during Putin’s first two terms as President did lead to some improvement. While Russian men died at four times the rate of European men in 1990, by 2022 the rate was merely double the European rate.

The modest improvements during Putin’s first two terms were due to the economic recovery, greater stability, and efforts to improve healthcare. Yet the major focus of the healthcare program was not the badly needed primary and preventive care. Instead, most of the funds were used to purchase expensive new equipment, creating opportunities for graft.

The improvements in life expectancy began to reverse by 2019. Russia’s COVID-19 response was deeply flawed, resulting in the highest per-capita death rate among industrialized countries, though official statistics have consistently concealed the impact.

Economic benefits from people living longer are double edged. The impact depends on individuals’ capacity to work and the related dependency ratio for the population. Societies need enough able-bodied workers to support the young, the old, and the disabled.

Russia’s demographic issues involve quality as well as quantity. Even before Putin opted to invade Ukraine, Russia was experiencing another significant brain drain. Just before the war, Valerii Fal’kov, Russia’s Minister of Science and Higher Education, told Putin that the number of scientists in Russia was declining. Outside of atomic energy and the defense industry, Russia’s best specialists preferred to work in the US, Europe, and “even China.” Nikolai Dolgushkin, Academy of Sciences Chief Scientific Secretary, reported that emigration by scientists had increased from 14,000 in 2012 to 70,000 in 2021. Russia was the only developed nation where the number of scientific personnel was shrinking.

The challenges have become more serious, as the war on Ukraine has resulted in as many as half a million young men killed or wounded, women choosing to forego having children, women being sent to fight in Ukraine, and more than one million mostly young and highly educated people choosing to leave Russia.

Replacing them has been increasingly undermined by shortsighted government policies. In a country with a history of claiming to be multinational while viewing Russians as the system-forming ethnicity, recent government policies are creating additional difficulties. One of the great ironies of the situation Putin has created is that, in addition to poor rural villagers, the demographic groups best matching his August 2022 decree advocating “preservation and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” are Russia’s non-Russian and non-Russian Orthodox populations.

The ethnic variable

Russia’s birth rates vary across regions and ethnic and religious populations. The rates in major urban centers resemble those of Central Europe, with later marriages, widespread use of birth control, and a large number of single-child families. Rural regions and small towns tend to retain more traditional values around child-rearing. People in these venues marry and begin having children earlier and are far more likely to have two or more children. Yet 70 percent of Russians live in the urban centers. The citizens most likely to have large families live in villages, small towns, and Russia’s non-Russian regions and Republics. In 2023, the non-Russian share of the population was about 30%.

Putin-era policies have persistently undermined the principles of federalism enshrined in Russia’s 1993 constitution. Some non-Russians believe the assault on their special status stems, in part, from Russians fearing their higher birth rates.

Significant differences in birth rates among ethnic and religious groups within Russia pose serious policy challenges. Some groups have been more resistant to the “demographic transition” than others. The predominantly non-Russian and Muslim republics of the North Caucasus are experiencing the “demographic transition” more slowly than most Russian regions. The Chechens in particular have responded to their deportation to Central Asia during World War II with a strong pro-natal ethos.

Comparative studies find relationships between high birth rates and traditional religious beliefs in multiple places. Some accounts emphasize higher birth rates among Muslims, despite wide variation across communities. Religious conservatives in many faiths record higher birth rates: evangelical Christians, Mormons, Hindus, Orthodox Jews, and others. Some groups have historically been known for large families. In Russia, some non-Russian ethnic groups have higher birth rates than Russians. The birth rates in the largely Muslim North Caucasus have been a particular concern for Moscow. Despite birth rates among many ethnic populations declining, births in many non-Russian communities continue to remain higher than those of ethnic Russians.

Several analysts call attention to a phenomenon of ethnic groups that feel threatened responding with high fertility rates. Russia’s “punished peoples”—those accused of sympathizing with the Germans during World War II and deported from their homelands—have received particular attention. Marat Ilyasov, a scholar from Chechnya who now teaches in the US, makes a strong case for the Chechens, one of the groups that managed to return to their ancestral territory, striving for high birth rates to guarantee the nation’s survival. They have the highest birth rates in the country.

Chechens are hardly the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus with birth rates higher than the Russian average. Some official sources intentionally downplay the numbers of Chechens and other non-Russian groups in an attempt to emphasize “Russianness” and downplay the significance of non-Russian populations.

Some Russian demographers suggest that non-Russians are increasingly experiencing the “demographic revolution,” but at a slower pace. While this is plausible, complaints about changing definitions and undercounting in recent Russian censuses provide ample grounds for skepticism regarding the official numbers.

Even the official data show that birth rates continue to be higher among many of the non-Russian groups in Russia. Many leaders of non-Russian peoples claim that these populations are being sent to fight in Ukraine in far larger numbers than ethnic Russians. Russian officials try to emphasize that it is the rural population that provides most of the soldiers, due to the high wages the military offers.

Data show that individuals from ethnic republics in Russia’s far east and south have a far higher chance of being mobilized for combat. While proving intent is complicated, the numbers are shocking. Men living in Buryatia have a 50- to 100-percent greater chance of being sent to fight in Ukraine than a resident of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

It is too early to gauge whether the high numbers of deaths and injuries will stimulate a response by some groups to try increasing birth rates. It does appear that the war is resulting in a more serious decline in births among ethnic Russians in urban centers than in both Russian and non-Russian rural communities. Russia’s non-ethnic-Russian citizens increasingly perceive their populations as being singled out as cannon fodder in Ukraine.

Immigrants have also been pressed into military service, causing a precipitous drop in immigration.

Wartime policies undermine population growth

Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova. After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.

Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan. The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.

Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential. Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).

The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead. This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.

The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.

Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control. However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.

The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.

One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians. After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country. No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.

The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat. These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.

In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons. Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.

Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.

Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty. Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.

Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home. In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19. The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:

Legislation designed to prohibit Russians—especially mobile IT workers—from working while abroad has provoked sharp battles between security services and Russian companies that depend on these employees in a tight labor market.

Treatment of Central Asian and other foreign labor migrants has increasingly shifted to forced labor and sometimes outright slavery. Central Asians working in Russia have been rounded up and sent to join the war on Ukraine. A study of the Uzbek community reports that many Uzbeks have been arrested for minor or contrived offenses and sentenced to terms of fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five years. Once in prison, they are offered the Wagner option of “volunteering” to fight in Ukraine.

Predatory practices have extended beyond Russia’s usual sources of migrant workers. Individuals from Nepal, Syria, and India have been recruited to work in factories or as guards at various venues in Russia. After they arrive, their passports are confiscated and they are sent to fight in Ukraine. As during World War II, punishment squads are deployed to prevent soldiers from retreating. These predatory tactics differ from the treatment of Cuban and African mercenaries who are attracted by the money.

In addition to money, another inducement to attract foreign fighters is the offer of Russian citizenship. If these commitments are honored, the result will be to add more non-Russians to the country’s population. The disastrous long-term impact of the predatory recruitment policies is clear. As information (and bodies) reach families, word spreads. Russian programs to increase labor recruitment in Southeast Asia are being undermined as word of these tactics spreads.

Conclusion

Why would a leader who has proclaimed demography to be one of the most serious threats to a nation’s future launch an unprovoked war against a neighboring country that was a significant source of labor before 2014? We may never be able to answer this. We can conclude that Putin has turned a daunting crisis into a cataclysm.

Putin’s policies cannot solve these demographic problems. He has been reiterating the importance of Russia’s dire demographic situation for a quarter-century. Manipulating demographic data, adding people in occupied Ukrainian regions to Russia’s population, and omitting war casualties from the census do not generate sustainable population growth. These tactics cannot meet the needs of employers who report serious labor shortages in nearly every sector of the economy. Russia’s defense industry is operating “three shifts” by requiring workers to work sixty to seventy hours per week. The sustainability of these measures and the impact on quality raise significant questions. Financial incentives are undermined when workers are compelled to make “voluntary” contributions to fund the war effort.

In 2022–2023, the most serious labor shortages were reported in agriculture and construction, sectors that rely heavily on Central Asian migrants. Now Russia’s government is endeavoring to attract labor from India, Pakistan, and North Korea to replace the war casualties and émigrés. Firms involved in production, retail, logistics, and e-commerce face labor shortages. While manufacturers continue to prefer Russian workers, one company told journalists that bringing workers from India required paying salaries at the same level as those for Russian staff, plus the cost of transporting and registering the workers. Yet the company was looking for a contractor to arrange providing five hundred workers from India. The reasoning was that workers who lack Russian language are less likely to be recruited by competitors, while foreign workers who know Russian are more mobile.

A Russian entrepreneur noted that labor brokers in Kazakhstan smuggle thousands of workers from Bangladesh into that country in containers each year. They are now offering their services to Russian employers, suggesting that the same tactics can be used to bring workers from India. Others point out that labor from India remains crucial in several Middle Eastern countries where wages are higher, making Russia the option for the least skilled and least desirable migrants.

Sources of labor globally are increasing due to population growth in developing countries that face serious impacts from climate change. Demographers project that the major growth in global population during the rest of the twenty-first century will be in Africa. Yet the six African countries with the largest populations also appear on most lists of the places likely to face the greatest threats from climate change. As in Latin America, this will result in “green migration.” These are not traditional sources of labor for Russia, and the regime may choose to rely on these countries for mercenaries.

Putin’s government has not evinced visible concern that Russia’s population might be cut in half by century’s end. Unless Russia’s leaders can develop and finance a more effective set of policies, the only solutions to population decline will be a combination of incorporating non-Russian territory and/or immigration from Asia and Africa.

If Putin truly believed that demography is an existential problem for Russia, he might have calculated how many Ukrainians lived or worked in Russia before annexing Crimea and launching an invasion.

Putin’s regime is both seeking and discouraging repatriation by compatriots. On February 1, 2024, Russian media reported new legislation allowing the government to seize property belonging to Russians outside the country who criticize the war on Ukraine. Multiple instances have been reported of Russian diplomats and security personnel demanding that other countries detain and repatriate Russians who speak freely. Threats to seize their property in Russia are a logical extension of policies threatening family members still living in Russia.

At the same time, Russia’s policy does encourage compatriots to return, even as other citizens continue to depart.

One possible solution to the problems compounding Russia’s labor shortage would be to decentralize policy, allowing Russian regions to make their own decisions about attracting foreign labor. The resulting competition could go a long way toward improving conditions for foreign workers. Regional development was the prime mover in China’s massive urbanization and industrialization after 1978. While this involved horizontal mobility within the country, the model would resemble the significant influx of immigrants that, at least thus far, has kept the US population at well above replacement level. As Russia’s population continues to decline, immigrants will be increasingly vital to economic recovery.

Invading Ukraine while facing a catastrophic demographic challenge appears to have been a massive folly for the Kremlin. Hubris based on an astonishing intelligence failure might account for the miscalculation. Another possible explanation is that Putin understood that Russia’s economic and demographic challenges mean the country would not be in a more favorable condition any time in the coming decades.

Every corner of Russia’s economy is experiencing personnel shortages, while war casualties continue to shrink the able-bodied population. Russians and their leaders must learn to value diversity, or Russia will have an increasingly smaller and older population. Either way, there will be fewer ethnic Russians.

Harley Balzer retired in July 2016 after 33 years in the Department of Government, School of Foreign Service, and associated faculty member of the History Department at Georgetown University. He was founding director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies from 1987-2001. Prior to Georgetown he taught at Grinnell College and Boston University, and held post-doctoral fellowships at Harvard’s Russian Research Center and the MIT Program in Science, Technology and Society. In 1982-83 he was a congressional fellow in the office of Congressman Lee Hamilton, where he helped secure passage of the Soviet-East-European Research and Training Act (Title VIII).

In 1992-93 Balzer served as executive director and chairman of the board of the International Science Foundation, George Soros’s largest program to aid the former Soviet Union. From 1998 to 2009, he was a member of the Governing Council of the Basic Research and Higher Education (BRHE) Program, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and Russian Ministry of Education. BRHE established 20 Research and Education Centers at Russian Universities, and was significantly expanded by the Russian government using their own resources.

His publications have focused on Russian and Soviet history, Russian politics, Russian education, science and technology, and comparative work on Russia and China.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction. 

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s preoccupation with history has become increasingly evident as his reign has progressed, and is closely linked to his deep-seated resentment over the perceived historical injustice of the 1991 Soviet collapse. As early as 2005, Putin was lamenting the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

This sense of injustice has helped fuel Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, a neighboring country that many Russians still regard as a core part of their own nation’s historical heartlands. The existence of an independent Ukraine has long been resented by Putin as a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. Since the early years of his reign, he has made the subjugation of Ukraine one of his foreign policy priorities.

During the initial stages of the Kremlin campaign to reassert Russian authority over independent Ukraine, considerable effort was made to undermine the historical legitimacy of the Ukrainian state among Russian audiences and inside Ukraine itself. As Russian aggression against Ukraine escalated, the Kremlin’s war on Ukrainian history also expanded, with Ukrainians demonized as “Nazis” and dismissed as an “artificial nation.”

Years of increasingly hostile rhetoric paved the way for military aggression. When Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, he began referring to southern and eastern Ukraine as “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). His decision to revive long-forgotten imperial terminology from the Czarist era was the clearest indication yet that Putin intended to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and reverse more than a century of European history.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin formalized his denial of Ukrainian statehood in a controversial history essay published in July 2021. Entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” this remarkable document laid out Putin’s rejection of Ukraine’s right to exist, while arguing at length that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Putin’s essay laid the ideological groundwork for the full-scale invasion that commenced months later.

Over the past two years, history has remained a key front in the struggle to justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the first summer of the war, Putin directly compared himself to Peter the Great and likened the invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century Russian Czar’s wars of imperial conquest.

A year later, Putin ordered the launch of new history textbooks for Russian schoolchildren along with curriculum changes with the apparent aim of legitimizing the ongoing military campaign to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. This was part of a broader trend within Russia to bring the country’s official historical narrative into line with Putin’s increasingly radical brand of revisionism.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Strikingly, Putin chose to use his high-profile February 2024 interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson as a platform to frame the war in Ukraine as a quest for historical justice. While Carlson clearly wanted Putin to blame NATO and the US for the invasion, Putin himself preferred to embark on a rambling half-hour history lecture explaining the ancient roots of Russia’s claim to Ukraine.

Other senior Russian officials have taken their lead from Putin’s weaponized version of history. The most prominent example of this trend is former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who regularly employs historical references in his frequent attacks on Ukraine and the wider Western world. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever. Ukraine is definitely Russia,” he declared in March 2024.

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its third year, Putin’s historical motivations are becoming more and more apparent. He regularly declares that major Ukrainian cities such as Odesa and entire regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian,” indicating that his imperial ambitions are still far from satisfied.

Many are now asking how far Putin intends to go. He has often expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was the Russian Empire under a different name. If Putin takes his crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands” further and expands the definition to include all of the former Czarist domains, this would place more than a dozen additional countries at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Putin has weaponized history to justify the genocidal invasion of Ukraine and dehumanize the entire Ukrainian nation. Unless he is stopped in Ukraine, the Russian dictator will use the same bogus historical arguments to launch new imperial adventures.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a Research Fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2024

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have yet to grasp the true scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are in danger of suffering an history defeat, warns the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 7, 2024

Vladimir Putin is losing Russia’s long war against Ukrainian identity

By Danylo Lubkivsky

Vladimir Putin is the latest in a long line of Russian rulers who have attempted to erase Ukrainian national identity and force Ukrainians to identify as Russians, writes Danylo Lubkivsky.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Vladimir Putin’s history obsession is a threat to world peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A small wave of protests did briefly erupt in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion, but within a few weeks the streets of Russia’s towns and cities were once again empty. Some Russians protested by leaving the country, but the biggest exodus was into silence. Apart from a few notable exceptions, those who opposed the invasion clearly felt unable to make a difference.

While any attempts to gauge public opinion in authoritarian regimes such as Putin’s Russia should be treated with a high degree of skepticism, the available data indicates that many Russians do indeed back the invasion. Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, has identified overwhelming support in its monthly surveys, with more than 70% of respondents consistently voicing their approval of the so-called “Special Military Operation.” Anecdotal evidence, including the pro-war opinions expressed by large numbers of Russians in private conversations with their Ukrainian relatives since the beginning of the war, has further strengthened perceptions of widespread Russian public support.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In the West, it has become common to explain this pro-war sentiment by arguing that Russians have been brainwashed by the Kremlin-controlled state media. Some commentators also mention widespread Russian apathy and disengagement from politics. However, these explanations risk infantilizing Russian society and stereotyping Russians as passive conformists with no agency of their own.

Most Western observers struggle to perceive Russian support for the war as a conscious choice because they are unable to accept that supporting a genocidal war could ever be seen as rational. Nevertheless, studies of past wars of aggression and authoritarianism tell us that the protagonists of evil typically regard their actions as both reasonable and justifiable. In Russia’s case, it is the country’s imperial past and the imperial intimacy of the Russian relationship with Ukraine that serve to justify the current war.

This imperial intimacy reflects deeply rooted historical ideas of kinship and fraternity that have encouraged generations of Russians to view Ukrainians as part of their nation. It is a hierarchical intimacy, with Ukrainians cast in the role of “little brothers” in need of protection and tutelage. This encompasses the necessity of “disciplining” Ukrainians for their own good. Such thinking is a central pillar of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

Putin’s notorious July 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” was a manifesto of imperial intimacy that openly questioned Ukraine’s right to statehood while denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Instead, Putin argued, Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he declared that Ukraine was “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Officially, the Kremlin has sought to justify the war by pointing to decades of post-Cold War NATO expansion while portraying Ukraine as a far-right threat to Russia itself. However, when addressing domestic audiences, Putin has often been more open about his imperial agenda. Speaking in summer 2022, he compared the current invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great and claimed it was now his turn to “return” Russian lands. A few months later, Putin oversaw a lavish Kremlin ceremony marking the “annexation” of four Ukrainian provinces. Amid the unmistakable trappings of empire, he declared that these partially occupied Ukrainian regions had returned to Russia “forever.”

Such imperial posturing in relation to Ukraine resonates widely with the Russian public. Many Russians see today’s war as an historic mission to overcome the injustice of the Soviet collapse and reunite their country with Ukraine following decades of “artificial separation.” The imperial intimacy underpinning their attitudes toward Ukraine allows them to overlook the obvious opposition of the Ukrainian people to this reunion.

Over the past twenty months of full-scale warfare, denial of Ukrainian statehood and talk of imperial revival have become prominent features of Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed information space. Ukrainians are routinely dehumanized and Ukraine itself is dismissed as an intolerable “anti-Russia.” Meanwhile, pundits on Russian state TV regularly discuss the need to exile or annihilate large numbers of Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric is typically framed as the inevitable price of achieving historical justice and saving Ukrainians from themselves.

While it is convenient to blame today’s war on Vladimir Putin and view it as the product of one man’s criminal fantasies, the problem of Russian imperialism is far bigger than Putin alone. Many millions of ordinary Russians support the war because they continue to view Ukraine through the distorting prism of imperial intimacy.

The situation is unlikely to change until a majority of Russians recognize that true patriotism means acknowledging past injustices bestowed by empire on Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Chechens, and many others. This would open the way for the emergence of a new Russia with the potential to live in peace with its neighbors while finally realizing its vast potential. Unless this change occurs, Russian imperialism will remain a major destabilizing factor in global security.

Neringa Klumbytė is director of the Lithuania Program at Miami University’s Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 4, 2023

Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russian imperialism shapes public support for the war against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s the best way to think about European identity and the EU? How do concepts of civic and ethnic nationalism play out in Europe today? As far-right parties increasingly reject Euroscepticism, how might the political landscape in the EU change? What could this mean for next year’s European elections?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, to discuss his new book on European identity and its relationship with the European project.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Rachel Rizzo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s the link between politics & identity in Europe? | A Debrief from Hans Kundnani appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To what extent are we witnessing the rise of the far-right in Europe? What is driving European voters to support far-right candidates? As we gear up for the European Parliament elections next year, what do these political shifts mean for the European project as a whole?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Jon Henley, the Guardian’s Europe correspondent, to discuss to what extent the far-right is becoming more politically mainstream in Europe today.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Rachel Rizzo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – Where is Europe headed politically? | A Debrief from Jon Henley appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What do the results of Spain’s snap election mean for Spanish politics and Spain’s EU Council presidency? What explains the performance of Spain’s main political parties and the discrepancy in pre-election polls? Are the results of the election reflective of a divided Spanish society?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Manuel Muñiz, Provost of IE University in Madrid, to examine the results of the parliamentary elections and impacts to Spanish society and politics.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Rachel Rizzo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s the outcome of Spain’s snap election? | A Debrief from Manuel Muñiz appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Thu, May 11, 2023 • 11:00 am ET

Woman, Life, Freedom: Eight months of ongoing protests in Iran

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – An in-depth conversation examining the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran following the murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, and the decades-long fight for gender equality and social justice in the country.

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Azam Jangravi
Iranian women’s rights advocate and a Girl of Revolution Street

Mehrangiz Kar
Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer

Nazanin Nour
Iranian-American actor, writer, and activist

Moderator

Ali Rogin
Correspondent, PBS NewsHour

Introductory remarks

Holly Dagres
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs;
Editor, MENASource and IranSource

HOLLY DAGRES: Good morning, everyone. My name is Holly Dagres, and I am a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and I’m honored here to give remarks for today’s Atlantic Council Front Page event.

Zan, zendegi, azadi—“women, life, freedom”—the slogan heard across the globe. Contrary to the lack of media coverage, this month marks eight months of ongoing protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic. Protests that are taking place in various ways, from street gatherings, rooftop chants, graffiti, to public displays of not wearing mandatory hijab. This continuity is unprecedented. The clerical establishment is in a tinderbox situation, and it’s only a matter of time before the protesters pour into the streets en masse because the people of Iran have had enough. They want the regime gone.

As I speak over thirteen thousand schoolgirls have been poisoned at schools across the country. Many believe this is a punishment for their participation in anti-establishment protests. Additionally, in the past two weeks there have been an alarming rise in executions, with over fifty-seven executed. Human rights organizations widely believe that these wave of executions are an effort to instill fear and silence dissent. Every day, women remain defiant against mandatory hijab, by appearing in the streets without the veil. And even in some cases, dresses and shorts, items of clothing only seen at home, behind closed doors, ordinary freedoms we here take for granted.

The world admires and applauds the bravery of the people of Iran, but especially their women and girls. As an American of Iranian heritage, I’m absolutely thrilled to introduce this incredible cohort of Iranian women who will be accepting the 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran at tonight’s Annual Distinguished Leadership Awards… which I should note will be livestreamed.

Dr. Mehrangiz Kar is a human rights lawyer and an activist. She was one of the first women attorneys to oppose the Islamization of gender relations following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Kar has been an active public defender in Iran’s civil and criminal courts, and has lectured extensively both in Iran and abroad.

Azam Jangravi is an Iranian paralegal, human rights advocate, and former political prisoner, residing in Canada. She is primarily known for being one of the girls of revolution street during the protests against compulsory hijab in 2017. Jangravi was taken into custody in 2018 after removing her headscarf in protest on Enghelab Street, standing atop an electricity transformer box, and waving it above her head. She was later released temporarily on bail and fled from Iran to Turkey, before relocating to Canada.

Nazanin Nour is an Iranian-American actress, writer, and activist. She has appeared on shows such as Netflix’s “Big Mouth,” “Madam Secretary,” and “Persia’s Got Talent,” and can currently be seen in the film “A Thousand Little Cuts” on Showtime. Nour could most recently be seen on stage in Washington starring in the studio theatre production of “English.” She is one of several Iranian Americans in the public eye speaking out on the ongoing situation in Iran.

I’d like to also note that Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami is sick with COVID-19 and was unable to attend, but she is recovering.

Finally, I’m delighted to introduce our brilliant moderator, Ali Rogin, of PBS NewsHour. Ali, over to you.

ALI ROGIN: Holly, thank you so much, and welcome to everybody in the room today and to all our viewers tuning in online, and I’m honored to be joined by these three incredible women.

As Holly mentioned, we are here today to discuss the state of women’s rights and human rights in Iran from prerevolution all the way to the current zan, zendegi, azadi movement and we can do all that in forty-five minutes. That is a very steep task but I know that this is a very well-equipped group to do just that. So let’s get right into it.

The first question I’m going to ask and, parenthetically, before I do I want to note I’m going to ask a few questions and then we’re going to open it up to questions from the audience here and online. So please submit your questions in the format that’s already been presented to the group, and for this panel each of the questions I’m going to ask, the first one will be open-ended, and then each one will be directed to one of you specifically. But I invite anybody to weigh in as well.

So the first question—as Holly mentioned, the Islamic Republic is doubling down on its repressive tactics. It’s increased. There have been thirteen thousand schoolgirls that have been poisoned. Hangings are at a historic high. So what do these oppressive measures tell you about the state of the regime and whether or not it is under pressure from these protests? Whoever would like to begin. Maybe we go down the line.

Dr. Kar?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: OK. As you know, in this movement regular women, students of university, students of high school, all labor and they are involved with that, and in zan, zendegi, azadi all Iranian women from all layers of the society, they are—they were working and now they are working in some other style.

And something that you asked about that, like poisoning, poisoning daughters in high schools, we think the—you know, the reason is because they were working a lot in the movement. And one of their activity was—because probably you don’t know that in schoolbooks, the first page is a picture of Khomeini and the second page is a picture of Khamenei, and the students of high school, sometimes they—you know, they taking out these pictures from their schoolbooks and simply removing—removing—

ALI ROGIN: And they’re removing [them] from the—from the walls?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yeah, removing, in front of the camera—in front of the camera. And these, you know, film and video posted to some media outside the country, and that’s the reason.

I think they are very against the against daughters in high school. And we think that now this is some kind of revenge sometimes… and the government doesn’t care about that and doesn’t say anything and doesn’t investigate—very serious investigate in that, and they don’t say what is this. Sometimes, they say something that is not true… They say that this is not true. This is something that, you know, they pretend that there is nothing, there is no poison.

And this is something that the people in Iran, now they are very angry with that because the students of—women students, daughters and students of high schools, they don’t have any safety, any security. And the parents now, they are very angry. And they go around the high schools, and they say: If the government cannot guarantee our daughter’s life and our daughter’s security, we will go around the high school and we will, you know, find something that they poison them, and this is our duty if the government doesn’t do their duty.

ALI ROGIN: So that’s going to be a big test.

But I’m curious to get all your thoughts—and I apologize; we didn’t discuss this in advance—but who do you think is behind these poisonings?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: The government.

ALI ROGIN: Is it the government?

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, everybody believes it’s regime—the regime is complicit, because this is also a regime that has eyes and ears everywhere. They’re able to—they kidnap dissidents abroad, and bring them back to—for execution. They have intelligence on dissidents abroad. There was the, you know, kidnapping that was—that the FBI foiled the plot against a leading voice, Masih Alinejad. So, it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly, cannot find out who’s behind these poisonings. So, everybody believes that the regime is actually behind this.

And it’s been going on since November of 2022, so that’s months now that this has been happening. And there’s countless videos on the internet from activist groups within Iran that are showing girls in hospitals, you know, with oxygen masks. They can’t breathe, they smell tangerine in the air, or rotten fish in the air. So, it’s very real.

And I know that the regime tries to downplay it, but, you know, it’s also very difficult to kind of loiter around a girls’ school in Iran. And so, again, it’s—again, that’s why it’s very difficult for anybody to believe that the regime is not complicit in this. Parents that have gone to ask questions are met with brute force by regime forces. So, not only are no answers being given, this is still continuing as of just a few days ago, we saw videos from other poisonings. And it’s across all cities and provinces in Iran, too. So—

ALI ROGIN: So, what I’m—what I’m curious about is—Azam, is this an example of the regime really feeling the pressure, that they are taking these steps of poisoning young girls?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Actually, I don’t know. It’s really complicated. But it might be the regime is behind of this situation.

Mehrangiz and Nazanin mentioned about poisoning, and I want to talk about executions. Well, the government is now trying to create fear among people by increasing executions. In the past ten days, over fifty-five people have been executed in—from in which twenty-six Baloch citizens executed. And I think—this by the suppression of Islamic Republic of Iran.

But the protest is ongoing in Balochistan, and every Friday they shut down the internet. And I think we have to talk about Balochistan and Kurdistan and—because the suppression in that areas every time increased by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: That’s a very, very important point.

Azam, I want to stay with you and ask, let’s take a step back and let’s talk about the factors that led to this round of protests.

AZAM JANGRAVI: The protests that begin in mid-September were unprecedented in their scale and duration. People from all level of society, including women of various cities and social classes, came together to demand change.

A key point of contention was the mandatory hijab laws, which require all Iranian women to cover their hair. And although the protests were initially led by women, they soon expand to include men as well. The government attempt to suppress the protest with violence and repression, but the movement continued to grow and gained momentum. People from different backgrounds joined in—driven by a shared sense of frustration with the current government. While there have been some reports of misinformation circulating about the government’s intention, most people understand that the issue of mandatory hijab is just one of the many issue that need to be addressed.

It is clear that until there is real change in Iran, people will continue to demand change and speak out against the injustices in Iran. As I said, the government is now trying to create really fear among people by execution. Two men were executed in the past week, Yousef Mehrdad and Sadrollah Fazeil Zare were executed for just running online group criticizing Islam. Dual Swedish-Iranian citizen also executed last week. Additionally, more than eleven individuals are currently on deaths way—on death row in connection with the now recent protests. The world has been outraged by these killings and has called on Iran to stop them. We need to act now and raise our voices and call on the Islamic Republic to stop their executions.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin, to Azam’s point about the need to raise your voice, we’ve seen some really interesting subversive ways that protesters, especially the young women and girls in Iran, are using social media. They’re using just formats that the regime is not familiar with to register their dissent. So does that add a new dimension that we haven’t seen before in previous iterations of these protests? And how is that affecting how this message is being communicated to the regime?

AZAM JANGRAVI: Yeah, absolutely. Social media’s been a huge help actually in this movement. It’s the first time that we’ve seen it. Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral. An example of that is the video of the girls of Ekbatan. I don’t know if everybody saw that video, but there’s a song by Rema, a popular Afrobeats artist, with Selena Gomez. And they have a song called “Calm Down.” So these young girls made this dance video, and then they were detained afterward, of course, and had to give a forced apology video.

But that went viral. And that caused everybody around the world, from various countries—I mean, this—it was, like, trending billions in hashtags on TikTok. And it raised awareness for people to understand what’s actually happening in Iran. It gives people outside of Iran a connection to those inside showing, hey, we’re actually more similar than you might think, because a lot of people don’t have information on what Iran was like prior to 1979 either. And so social media’s been a really huge tool in pushing this forward.

And this is also—the Gen Zers are the ones who were at the forefront of all of this. And as Dr. Kar and Azzi said, this is—these poisonings seem to be a retaliation for the fact that they have been ripping up pieces of the supreme leader, they’ve been setting fire, there’s countless photos now that are iconic, that Time replicated, with the girls with their backs to the camera with the middle finger. So all of these things that they’re doing, they’re very smart. They know exactly how to get the attention of people across the world, and it’s—we have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran.

ALI ROGIN: And it’s fascinating because it really does seem to be techniques using forums that are just completely unfamiliar to especially the conservative clerics.

So Dr. Kar, for you, you have—for a long time, part of your scholarship has been about tracking the divisions between the moderates, the reformers within the government, and the hardliners, looking from the 1990s to now. So can you get us up to date on what is the balance, what is the tension currently in the regime between moderates and conservatives? Is there any tension there, or is it just completely overrun by conservatives? How do you see those tensions playing out now, versus in previous decades where there was a bit of a reformist element?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: At the beginning I would like say that I practiced as a lawyer twenty-two years in Islamic Republic of Iran, so when I started to practice as a lawyer in Iran I was very young, and immediately we had Islamic—the revolution, Islamic Revolution and victory of Khomeini in this revolution. So I had been in a very complicated situation, not because I was a lawyer but because I was a woman and lawyer. I think two criminal in their eyes, because they—immediately they said that women cannot be judge, so they removed all female judge from judiciary system. And we were not sure that they give us permission to continue work as a lawyer, but they did, and they said because everybody is able to choose a lawyer, probably a mad lawyer, a crazy lawyer, and this is—and Islam—Islam doesn’t care about that. This is something that the people—

ALI ROGIN: If you want to choose a female lawyer, that’s your choice.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, is your choice; if you want to choose a mad, you know, lawyer, that is your choice. And that’s why we could survive. This was the reason, the base of our job.

So I can say that since Khomeini ordered for mandatory hijab, this movement started in Iran and continued. But sometimes it was very slow, it was very hard; sometimes it was getting clear and obvious. I can say that in first decade we were very, very active for mandatory hijab. And for something that is full of, you know, our penal code and family law after they came on power are full of discriminations against women, gender discrimination, and we can say this is some kind of gender apartheid. But we cannot have demonstration. Just somebody like me started talking and writing about these legal discriminations.

After that, the second we had involved with a very bad war between Iran and Iraq, and eight years we had been involved with that. And that’s why everything was closed about women’s rights and human rights, and nobody could talk about that in any other country that is involved with war. So we can say that during the time everything was slow or nothing. Nothing was active in that.

After war, after eight years that the war was over, Hashemi Rafsanjani was on power as president and he ordered open very small, very small opportunity for writing and talking about something, but under control—under very heavy control.

ALI ROGIN: And remind us, this is in the 1990s?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: 1990s, yes. And because I should make short everything, this is history and it is not easy—

ALI ROGIN: No, it—you’re doing a great job.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: After 1990, we reached 1996. And 1996 is very important period of revolution history started because the name is reformism movement. And the president, Khatami, and the people—most people of Iran, for the first time they voted to a president of this system, this political system. After that, because the slogan was different like rule of law and like we should—we should have civil society, it was very important because he ordered and the reformists ordered that women can have independent NGO. And it was very helpful for women. It was the first time that something like that happened in Iran.

But either during this time they didn’t give me permission because it—

ALI ROGIN: How interesting, during the reformist era.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: No, yeah, everything was under control. And they said: No, no, you cannot. You cannot have any NGO. And I do have all documents of that.

But some of young Iranian women, they could register and they could be active as NGO. This was something that started, you know, another kind of—

ALI ROGIN: Activism, or another kind of activism, or—

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Yes, yes, yes, as NGO.

ALI ROGIN: Yeah.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: And it—and they could be very active.

And then, after that, we had some campaign like one million signature and no to stoning and something like that. And Iranians—some part of Iranian women, they came to streets and it was very important. They came to public area, and they were talking and they were giving a slogan against discriminations, not against political system.

But after that, step by step, Ahmadinejad came and stopped everything and suppressed all women activists. And you know, they—most of them, they left Iran, and now they are all over the world. And after that, everybody thought that everything is stopped and never—you know, never be active about women’s rights. But as you know and as you see now, everything is full of energy and started a movement: Mahsa; and zan, zendegi, azadi. This is full of energy. This is full of anger. And this is different with some other that we had been before that.

ALI ROGIN: And to—Dr. Kar, to your point about how many activists left Iran, so now the diaspora is very rich, very, very vocal. And so, Nazanin, I’m curious to get your sense of what is the state of the diaspora now? Are they united around these protests, any more so than perhaps the cohesion was in previous years?

NAZANIN NOUR: Yeah. I want to say, just to that point too that you brought up of differences in the government, reforms, et cetera, that the people—the information coming out of Iran and people I talk to on the ground, most people don’t see any difference between any—they all think it’s the—you know, they’re all cut from the same cloth. So it’s a regime that’s irreformable and irredeemable in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.

To the diaspora, yes, I remember in 2009 I was actually in Iran. I got there two days before the election, the Green Movement elections. And I witnessed what happened afterward, which was the violent suppression and oppression by the state to quash those protests. And I remember that it must have been like a blip in the American media. Maybe it was in a forty-eight-hour news cycle, and then it was gone. And so—and we’ve had protests that have built up in Iran since—you know, for the last twelve to thirteen years. But if you just want to go back, 2017, 2018, 2019. There was bloody November in 2019, fifteen thousand protesters got killed within a few days and it wasn’t on the news at all.

And now we saw that actually, yeah, the diaspora rallied around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity in the entire time that I’ve lived in this country, as far as, you know, giving a spotlight and attention to Iran. There’s protests and rallies that have been held in—major protests and rallies held in cities and countries all over the world ever since September. Most of them are happening in cities every weekend.

And while we would love more media coverage, and attention, and a spotlight kept on Iran and all the atrocities—the poisonings, the executions, the fact that the people want this regime gone—the unity that I’ve seen and the level of attention is something that I’ve never seen before. And it’s absolutely necessary and vital to keep, you know, because their internet gets cut off. They don’t have the means, a lot of the times, to get the messages out. So it is up to the people in the diaspora to continue to amplify their voice and make sure that the world hears what they’re saying and what’s actually happening inside of the country.

ALI ROGIN: Absolutely.

Let’s take a couple questions from the audience. I invite anybody who has a question. While you’re thinking of your questions, I’d love to ask, Azam, you were one of the kind of, as we say, OGs of the anti-hijab movement. You stood on an electric transformer, as we said. You’re a girl of revolution street, which is where these protests were happening. So what does it mean to you to see these women and young girls in the streets now?

AZAM JANGRAVI: The fight for women’s rights in Iran has been ongoing for over forty-four years, as Mehrangiz says. One of the first protests against mandatory hijab in Iran occurred on March 8, 1980, where women have used various campaigns, activist groups, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonments, and mental and physical torture.

In 2018, when I decided to protests against mandatory hijab, there were already ongoing protests against the regime in Iran. The Iranian public was expressing their anger in the protests with a wide range of chants directed towards the regime and its leadership. In the same days, Vida Movahed performed a symbolic act of taking her scarf off and putting it on a stick to peacefully protest hijab laws—a brave move that followed forty years of women’s activism. And this is important because the forty-four years ongoing activism, you know? And I also wanted to be part of these forty-year-old movement and raise my voice against mandatory hijab laws.

As an Iranian woman, I had experienced a lot of problems in my life, particularly when I decided to separate my ex-husband. And these difficulties made me more aware of inequality and separation that Iranian women have to endure. This made me think about what was happening to Iranian women. Then I felt compelled to protest against such cruelties, you know. I believe that each woman in Iran has explained it and said similar problems as this is a year of separation.

My hope was to be part of the activists who cared about creating more awareness in society. And on the day I protested, no one stood by me or supported me when I was arrested, you know. And right now we have seen every man stand for women. This is the more important things. I think this learning and becoming aware process has done so that men are now standing by women, fighting for human and women rights.

ALI ROGIN: To that point—and I’m so sorry to cut you off, Azam, but I do want to get to some audience questions. And somebody asked something that I think ties into this, which is the solidarity that we’re seeing, is that translating to internationally.

Somebody asks, how do you see the influence of regional solidarity among women. Is it active in places like Afghanistan? Are they giving each other energy and support as needed? So let’s broaden it out and look at the regional solidarity that’s happening. What are you all seeing? Whoever wants to take that. And I think, unfortunately, that may be our last question of the session.

NAZANIN NOUR: I mean, there were videos of women in Afghanistan that were marching with signs in solidarity with the women of Iran as well. I mean, they’re neighbors and, you know, African women are under terrible suppression and oppression themselves.

And I feel like there has been a global outcry but there needs to be more. There’s actions that have been taken by various countries. At the U.N. there’s a fact finding mission that was created. You know, people banded together and got the Islamic Republic kicked off the Commission on the Status of Women, for example.

But I still feel like there hasn’t been the amount of solidarity that there needs to be and the amount of support for—it’s a human rights issue. It’s a human rights crisis. It’s a women’s rights crisis. So we need people from around the world in various countries that also believe in women’s rights and human rights to also stand up for the women, girls, and the people of Iran.

ALI ROGIN: Excellent. And somebody else asks a question. With all that is going on we see regional neighbors like Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Iran. What does this mean for the protest movement? Are there any implications with other countries in the region normalizing ties with Iran?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: You mean the relationship—the new relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

ALI ROGIN: Yes. Yes. Are there any implications there for the protest movement?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: … We cannot predict the future of these negotiations because a lot of, you know, challenges are between Iran and Saudi Arabia and I don’t believe that everything could be. But we know Saudi Arabia that we—everybody knows is very serious, serious with Islam and with limitations and the discriminations, gender discrimination.

But now we are—you know, we are hearing that something has changed either in Saudi Arabia and this is something that Iranian people they are watching that and they think why they are—you know, they are pushing to a very bad situation, war situation, and Saudi Arabia is going toward and this is something that Iranian women know and they think about it but they don’t compare themselves with women in Saudi Arabia because we had a very different background during shah, during Pahlavi. Pahlavi changed a lot of things in Iran, like women’s rights.

ALI ROGIN: Right.

NAZANIN NOUR: But also anything that—like, anything that legitimizes the government is not going to be a good move. Anything, you know, that emboldens them is not going to be a good move, or solidifies their status.

But it’s not deterring people in Iran from protesting in their own ways. They still do come out to the streets. It might not be to the same effect as it was a few months ago, but the fact that women are taking off their hijabs, men are supporting them—also by wearing shorts, by the way, because that’s not allowed. So, that’s one way that people are dissenting, using civil disobedience. So those types of things are continuing to happen, and they’re not going to stop. And schoolgirls, university students in general, boys and girls, have been protesting for the last few weeks, as well.

So, I don’t believe that that is going to stop what has already started in Iran. There’s no going back, is what the people of Iran say.

ALI ROGIN: In the time that we have left, I’d like to go around. And in a few sentences, can you tell me what you would like to see from the international community, to give the support that this movement needs?

Dr. Kar, would you like to begin?

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Now we can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institution, international human rights institution, work for removing gender discrimination in Iran. Now we can understand that all Western government, they should work with human rights institution because, as my friends mentioned about execution, now it’s very important if they can stop it. Because if everybody is getting crazy in Iran by this situation, and either us that are outside Iran, when we get this news we cannot—we cannot—what could we do?

ALI ROGIN: Right.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Because six others, they do one execution in Iran now. And all of them that call it an investigation, it is not justice. They don’t have lawyer. They don’t have lawyer. And the lawyer is coming from government and it is related with government.

So we can say that international community can do a lot of work for Iran, but so far we cannot see any results of that in this movement that now it is our focus.

ALI ROGIN: Azam.

AZAM JANGRAVI: As an internet security researcher and digital security trainer, my concern is about internet, because the Islamic Republic of Iran, when it wants to suppress the people of Iran, they shut down the internet. And it would be good for Iranian people if the international community find a way to help people for internet, and—especially VPNs, especially, you know, support us for helping people, for internet shutdowns.

ALI ROGIN: Right, we’ve seen that the sanctions don’t really seem to discriminate between uses for speaking out, and for doing business with the regime.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Exactly.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin.

NAZANIN NOUR: I just think overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them. Even the smallest action, like heads of states, when they meet with Islamic Republic officials—women not wearing the headscarf. You know, it’s not obligatory; they don’t have to do it.

I think things like, you know, the U.N. just appointed the Islamic Republic to a commission that’s overseeing human rights. And it’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians, because they just executed two people two days ago, simply for running a social media channel that was questioning religion. So, the world needs to stop doing things like that, because all they’re doing is solidifying and emboldening the regime.

They need to pass legislation and do things that support the people of Iran, instead of emboldening the regime. They need to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. They need to, you know, list—the EU can list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. The US can pass the MAHSA Act. There’s a lot of things that can be done that haven’t been done yet. And I hope to see that.

ALI ROGIN: Nazanin Nour, Mehrangiz Kar, and Azam Jangravi, thank you so much for being here today. This has been a fascinating conversation, and congratulations tonight on the award that you are receiving from the Atlantic Council. It is so well deserved.

I think we can all join in a round of applause for this incredible panel.

MEHRANGIZ KAR: Thank you. Thank you for having us.

AZAM JANGRAVI: Thank you.

ALI ROGIN: So that concludes the program. Thank you so much for joining us.

NAZANIN NOUR: Thank you. Ali.

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The Biden administration is under increasing pressure from progressive leaders in Latin America and the US Congress to compel Bolsonaro to leave the United States. While the Biden administration needs to demonstrate moral leadership in upholding democracy and the rule of law, acting too hastily could fuel the flames of Brazil’s increasingly polarized politics and do more damage to democracy in the long term. In order to navigate this politically sensitive situation, the US government must follow established legal processes and ensure Bolsonaro does not undermine Brazilian democracy from US soil.

Ideally, Bolsonaro—who may have entered the United States on a diplomatic visa, which would have expired when his successor was sworn in on January 1—would simply return to Brazil voluntarily. He has said he plans to accelerate his planned departure at the end of January, which would resolve the problem.

Should Bolsonaro not leave voluntarily, it may take years to compel his departure, as the history of high-profile extradition requests to the US government shows. However, today there is hope that Bolsonaro will be persuaded to leave the United States of his own accord because of the possibility that he could face years of shameful publicity trying to stave off the extradition the Brazilian government, when it decides the time is right, is almost sure to seek.

While Bolsonaro would have ample opportunity to challenge the evidence against him in US courts before any action is taken to extradite or remove him, the Brazilian government would have an equal opportunity to make the case for Bolsonaro’s responsibility for the riots before the world’s media. The US government also would have the opportunity under US law to provisionally arrest Bolsonaro for at least several months, an indignity he may prefer to avoid.

Since 1964, the United States and Brazil have agreed by extradition treaty that each country must “deliver up” those charged with or convicted of certain enumerated crimes—which include destroying government property, as happened in Brasília—when committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting country and when criminalized in both countries.

While there are some exceptions for when the offense is of a “political character,” the treaty notes that “[c]riminal acts which constitute clear manifestations of anarchism or envisage the overthrow of the bases of all political organizations will not be classed as political crimes or offenses.” It is unlikely that a court would rule that the exception for acts of a “political character” would apply in Bolsonaro’s case, if he is found culpable, because the incitement resulted in violence.

To avoid getting mired in political sensitivities, the Biden administration would be wise to pursue three immediate priorities.

1. Follow the law—even if it moves slowly

First, the White House should demonstrate what the rule of law looks like. If Bolsonaro chooses to stay in the United States, the Biden administration should urge the Brazilian government to initiate a formal extradition request. While it could be appealing to swiftly end Bolsonaro’s presence in the United States by exercising the authority that the president and the secretary of state have to declare him persona non grata (if he actually entered on a diplomatic visa) or to revoke his visa and have the Department of Homeland Security remove him, Bolsonaro would still have the right to contest that in court. In the end, little time would be saved if Bolsonaro wants to delay his return.

The question over Bolsonaro brings to mind one faced by the Obama administration in 2016, when Turkey’s government requested the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish religious leader living in Pennsylvania, following a failed coup against Turkey’s government by some of Gülen’s supporters. However, despite repeated urging (including from then-Vice President Joe Biden) and expert-level consultations in which the Department of Justice explained US extradition requirements to Turkish counterparts, the Turkish government never presented evidence sufficient to convince a US magistrate to turn Gülen over to Turkey for trial.

Insistence on following established legal processes in the Gülen matter allowed the US government to navigate a politically sensitive situation without eroding the rule of law, even under serious pressure from the Turkish government.

While a formal extradition process for Bolsonaro would take several years to unfold, starting with the issuing of a warrant and a hearing to establish whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the charge, this would keep Bolsonaro out of Brazil and, perhaps, allow for restrictions on his access to media and electronics that could be used to incite supporters to further violence.

From there, the process involves several layers of preliminary review by the US Department of State and a probable cause determination by the US Department of Justice before the case is forwarded to the US attorney for the district where the individual is located. An extradition order is not appealable, but Bolsonaro could petition for a writ of habeas corpus to ensure that he gets a hearing. The US secretary of state then makes the final decision whether to extradite.

The Biden administration should be clear that the length of the process is not any indication of US government reluctance to turn Bolsonaro over or interest in delaying the process. Bolsonaro’s status as a former head of state does not privilege or penalize.

2. Provide US law enforcement and intelligence support to Brazil

Second, the Biden administration should also support efforts to hold those responsible for the January 8 attack accountable for their assault on democracy by promising total cooperation from US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share what they know, including any information regarding Bolsonaro’s role in instigating, directing, or supporting it.

A public announcement of US law enforcement’s full cooperation would have a chilling effect on Bolsonaro’s capacity to machinate disruptions to Brazil’s democracy from his current location in Orlando, Florida, given the ability, and obligation, of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent acts of violence or crime emanating from a foreign national on US soil.

3. Allow civil cases to run their course

Third, Bolsonaro no longer holds any official position, so in the United States, he is subject to US laws for civil damages—and the Biden administration should not shield him from culpability. His assets can be tied down or even frozen while US courts decide whether he is liable for the January 8 riots and subsequent events. He could also be required to give depositions and provide evidence about his own actions even outside of any criminal or extradition proceedings.

Life in the United States could quickly look less and less attractive for Bolsonaro. The threat of being cut off from his supporters while under the watchful eye of US law enforcement agencies may be the deciding factor in whether Bolsonaro decides to stay in the United States or go home. Either way, he will face justice.

Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter: @GissouNia.

Tom Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997 to 2007 and as a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019. Follow him on Twitter: @TomWarrickAC.

The post As Brazil investigates Bolsonaro’s role in anti-democratic riots, should the US kick him out? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet Meloni has come a long way since when she defined the EU as “rotten to its core” in 2016 and opposed sanctions against Russia following its 2014 annexation of Crimea. She defines herself and her Brothers of Italy party as conservative—supporting lower taxes and a more business-centric approach—has built strong connections in Washington, and has become a staunch supporter of sending military support to Ukraine. 

Today, Meloni’s position on the United States is clear and well-defined. She has recently struck an agreement with the US International Republican Institute to organize a major conference on Afghanistan in Rome. She is also a member of the Aspen Institute and participated in this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference. She has said that Italy and the United States have “shared roots” and goes on the record with leading American newspapers to defend her positions.

She also seems to have reversed her once Kremlin-friendly positions, recently criticizing Russia on multiple occasions for its “unacceptable” invasion of Ukraine. She was one of the biggest supporters of current Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s stance on sending weapons to Kyiv, pitting herself against populist politician Matteo Salvini from the right-wing League party (who once entered the European Parliament wearing a Putin T-shirt). 

Yet still, Meloni’s rhetoric at home offers a more complicated picture and begs the question: Can the United States really trust her?

Although she portrayed herself and her party to Washington’s ruling elites as a conservative, they have time and again refused to renounce the party’s ties to Italian fascism. When Italy’s parliament voted to dismantle the neo-fascist party Forza Nuova in October 2021—after it orchestrated a violent attack against one of Italy’s leading unions—the Brothers of Italy abstained from voting. More recently, a video of a young Meloni resurfaced in which she claimed that dictator Benito Mussolini was a “good politician” and that “there have not been other politicians like him.” The Brothers of Italy’s logo even strongly resembles that of Italy’s neo-fascist, post-World War II party, the Italian Social Movement.

But most importantly to American interests abroad, Meloni has long been a Euroskeptic; her seemingly pro-European stance, demonstrating unwavering support for Ukraine and hosting pro-EU conferences in Rome, is a recent phenomenon. Up until 2019, Brothers of Italy was a major proponent of dissolving the Eurozone and a strong supporter of Brexit. Party leaders also criticized the European Central Bank, often referring to the institution as a place of “usurers and lobbyists.” But during the 2019 European elections, Meloni ran with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, becoming its president in 2020, and has since then made an effort to forge strong ties with European Parliament President Roberta Metsola.

The Warsaw-Budapest model 

If there’s one thing the United States has learned in recent years, it’s that far-right parties often go rogue—and do so very quickly. Consider the cases of Poland and Hungary. 

Following a long run of centrist governments, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party rose to power in 2015 and began opposing the EU, migration, and LGBTQ rights. However, much like Meloni’s party, PiS is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group and was founded largely on conservative principles inspired by the Ronald Reagan-era US Republican Party. Today, Poland under PiS is seeing an erosion of the freedom of expression, judicial independence, and women’s rights. 

In Hungary, meanwhile, Prime Minister Victor Orbán has corroded the country’s democratic stability since coming to power in 2010 by allowing himself more powers through constitutional reforms. He has also attacked the media and instituted anti-immigration policies. Similar to PiS, Orbán’s Fidesz party ran with the conservatives through the European People’s Party, the European Parliament’s center-right group—using it as something of a Trojan horse to break into European establishment politics.

Together, Poland and Hungary have taken steps in recent years to prevent the EU from implementing a post-pandemic recovery plan and the resettlement of migrants, thereby undoing the bloc’s cohesion. Budapest also sets itself apart from Brussels given its largely pro-Russian stance, refusing to send military aid to Ukraine and formalizing gas deals with the Kremlin. Moreover, its democratic backsliding has serious implications on the United States and the transatlantic partnership because it weakens their ability to strengthen economic ties, tackle common security threats such as Russia, and fight climate change.

Searching for Meloni’s true colors 

The deep cultural, trade, and security ties between Washington and Rome mean the White House will need to watch its Italian partner’s positioning closely. 

Strategically, Italy is a vital partner in securing NATO’s southern flank around the Mediterranean Sea, where the spillover effects of North Africa’s conflicts seriously risk destabilizing the Alliance. Italy also plays a crucial role in Libya by supporting peace negotiations in the country, where Russia has deployed mercenaries from the the Wagner Group to exert greater power over the region. Italy is also home to the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet in Naples, where more than 33,000 US service members are stationed.

Italy alone can do little to fend off American enemies abroad, secure US interests, and strengthen the transatlantic alliance. But it can have a great impact as a pillar of multilateral cooperation within the EU and NATO by creating a stronger bloc against Russia, securing a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, and find durable solutions to issues such as migration and climate change.  

But Meloni has given plenty of indications that she may not be that reliable partner. She showed her true colors after a European Parliament resolution called Hungary “a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” She criticized the vote, saying that “Orbán has won the elections” and therefore Hungary is a “democratic system.”

Meloni’s EU stance, though it has moderated a bit in recent years, also reflects an Orbán-style view. For instance, she opposes the primacy of EU over national laws, and during this year’s campaign, she stated that the defense of national interests over European ones remains paramount. She also vehemently opposes a new majority voting system in which individual EU members states would no longer have veto power. She recently declared that if Brothers of Italy were to win, “the joke will be over” and that Italy will start “defending its interests” just like “other countries.” 

Meloni’s open support for Orbán also begs the question of whether she will drift back toward Hungary’s position of opposing further sanctions on Russia. Just recently, she was photographed with a pro-Putin regional minister who in 2016 established a fake consulate for the Ukrainian breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic in Turin. Her likely coalition partners, Salvini’s League and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, have a history of fondness for Putin.

The Brothers of Italy’s track record is a giant warning sign that the party is likely to disrupt European unity—much to the detriment to the common fight against Russia and to Washington’s interests. This is why the Biden administration should adopt a more cautious approach toward Meloni than it has so far. 

For one, it should make clear to Meloni that democratic backsliding in Italy will not bode well for the transatlantic partnership. If Italy pursues anti-democratic policies at home and supports semi-autocratic leaders abroad, joining forces with the United States against Russia—as helpful as it may be—will do little in achieving an overall freer and more prosperous world. Washington should also firmly condemn all and any links between Brothers of Italy, neo-fascism, and pro-Putin ideologies and refuse to meet with members of her party who have a demonstrated history of supporting any such principles. 

Maintaining such a firm stance would send a clear message: The United States won’t tolerate another rogue European actor.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director for the North Africa Program within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a native of Italy.

The post Which Giorgia Meloni will Washington get? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the current scene in Europe on the struggle between European integration and Euroscepticism? What do Italy and Sweden’s elections mean for European unity and cooperation, particularly in the face of Russian aggression? Should Europe be expecting a resurgence of populism or the far-right in Europe?

For this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Senior Fellow Damir Marusic sits down with Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, to discuss these issues and answer the “Jean Monnet” question: if Europe can be adaptable and resilient in the face of crisis.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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Damir Marusic

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – Will Jean Monnet’s vision for Europe win out? | A Debrief from Nathalie Tocci appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meloni’s main challenger is former Prime Minister Enrico Letta’s Democratic Party (PD), which is currently polling at around 22 percent. Letta, who some see as a continuation of Italy’s old politics, has stated that this election will decide whether Italy will stick with the likes of France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU) in general, or side with right-leaning European partners like Poland and Hungary as primary partners. With the strength of the conservative coalition, which also includes the populist League and center-right Forza Italia parties, the latter may become reality. 

Either way, much is at stake for Italy, which faces a snap election at a time when the country is reeling from converging crises of inflation, surging cost of living, uncertain energy security, and the ongoing war in Ukraine. 

One of the first—and most challenging—responsibilities of the incoming government will be to draft its budget law for 2023, which must be submitted to the European Commission by mid-October and approved by the end of the year. This and debt sustainability are the issues that both Brussels and financial markets are anxiously monitoring.  

The current government will also leave a lot on the agenda. The next government will have its docket full with issues like tax reform, competition regulation, judicial reform, and even enacting a minimum wage—Italy is one of six EU countries without a federally regulated minimum wage, and will have to introduce one to comply with new EU law. 

Meanwhile, climate change and energy solutions have surfaced as important campaign battlegrounds for the first time, especially since the new government will face a potentially volatile winter marked by Russian gas cut-offs. Candidates have prioritized discussion of economic and energy challenges, including the effects of the war in Ukraine, with both Meloni and Letta proposing measures to limit spiraling energy prices. 

Anti-immigrant sentiments have also been a campaign feature, particularly after Meloni shared a video on social media of an undocumented immigrant raping a woman, for which she was heavily rebuked by her rival Letta. LGBTQ+ and abortion rights, which could face restrictions under a Meloni-led government, are also the subject of debate. 

How did Italy go from technocrats to far-right populists?  

Prime Minister Mario Draghi—who is credited with leading Italy out of the COVID-19 economic downturn—has largely been viewed as a figure of economic stability in Europe, thanks to his tenure as former president of the European Central Bank and his role as a vocal advocate of EU responses to the economic and energy crises stemming from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Taking over as a technocrat only eighteen months ago, he resigned in July when the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) withdrew its support from the governing coalition—accusing Draghi of failing to do enough to address Italy’s worsening economic conditions—and the League and Forza Italia followed suit. 

President Sergio Mattarella had turned to Draghi early in 2021 as a steady hand outside of party politics who could lead the country out of the darker days of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite opposition from M5S, which preferred a political government. However, the collapse in July of Draghi’s technocratic government perhaps showed that  leaders cannot prevail outside of party politics. 

Italy is no stranger to technocratic governments, as Draghi’s is the fourth in the past two decades. But dissatisfaction with unelected leadership has already paved the way for populists in the past: Mario Monti was similarly installed as prime minister in 2011 in the wake of the global financial crisis, but two years of public dissatisfaction gave way to a populist surge headed by M5S, which earned the highest share of votes in its first-ever national election after Monti’s government fell apart in 2013. 

History now seems to be repeating itself, with the parties withdrawing support from Draghi in favor of an electoral approach to resolving the country’s challenges (Meloni and other right-wing leaders were already calling for early elections by the time Draghi resigned).

The rise of Meloni’s far-right brand 

Entering conservative politics in her teens, Meloni’s popularity has skyrocketed in recent years. Her controversial views on the EU and anti-immigration positions resonated with an increasingly disaffected public, propelling her party from 4 percent in 2018 to more than 25 percent in 2022.  

Meloni, 45, describes herself and the Brothers of Italy as conservatives. Individual freedom, private enterprise, educational freedom, the centrality of the family and its role in society, border protection from unchecked immigration, and the defense of Italian national identity are among the issues she campaigns on the most. 

Concerns in the West about the Brothers of Italy’s roots as a neofascist party have been met with claims that fascism has been handed over to history. But Meloni doesn’t hide her admiration for autocratic Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, for instance, and also opposes gay rights, claiming that children should be raised by a mother and a father. As prime minister, Meloni says she would put up naval blockades in the Mediterranean to deter migrants, while her slogans “God, family, fatherland” and “Less Europe, but a better Europe” worry Europeans. While she appears to have embraced Atlanticism in the final days of the campaign, it’s unclear how serious she is about that stance. 

While she has stated that Italy will continue to support Ukraine, her coalition would undoubtedly raise questions about the country’s policy, given the ties of League leader Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi, the former prime minister who now heads Forza Italia, to Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

A new headache for the EU? 

With the Ukraine war and growing energy crisis absorbing the focus in Brussels, the EU may not be enthusiastic to work with the likes of Meloni, who could lead Italy down the path already traveled by Hungary or Poland, as Letta warns. 

Meloni sees Italian individualism as the solution to becoming a more influential European actor. “We want a different Italian attitude on the international stage, for example in dealing with the European Commission, [but] this does not mean that we want to destroy Europe, that we want to leave Europe, that we want to do crazy things,” she said last month. “It simply means explaining that the defense of the national interest is important to us as it is for the French and for the Germans.” 

A Meloni-led government could well be at odds with the Commission from an early stage. The leader of the Brothers of Italy has questioned EU fiscal requirements, claiming that the EU Stability and Growth Pact—which aims to keep national budget deficits below 3 percent of gross domestic product—should not apply in the current economic climate, and that Italy should not be subject to those conditions to receive pandemic recovery funding. She has also decried the EU’s response to the energy crisis, citing the impact of continued rising prices on firms and households.  

Meloni’s premiership could also see Italy tilt toward protectionism. For example, her party wants the state to purchase a controlling share in Telecom Italia, which Meloni says would result in a “state owned, non-vertically integrated network and private operators operating under free competition,” effectively cutting out other European investors. 

Will Meloni tone down her calls for Italy’s sovereignty once she enters Palazzo Chigi?  Many populist leaders have done just that in recent years after winning elections. Chances are that a more conventional political line toward Europe will be embraced once in power—but that remains to be seen. 

The lay of the land 

For the first time, Italians are voting to fill a shrunken Parliament. A 2020 constitutional referendum reduced the number of seats in the lower house from 630 to 400, and shrank the senate from 315 members to 200. A smaller legislature will reduce the size of future majorities, which means more emphasis on party loyalty and potentially more stability to implement legislative agendas. 

Here’s a look at the main contenders and what they promise: 

• The centrodestra (center-right) coalition is led by the Brothers of Italy, joined by Salvini’s League and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. The Brothers, who are marked by a post-fascist history, focus on promoting the traditional Italian family, while the populist League has called for curbing immigration and rolling back EU authority. Italy’s mixed electoral law favors broad coalitions of this nature, making a center-right government all the more likely. 
• Letta’s PD, which polls show as neck and neck with Meloni’s party, heads the center-left coalition. According to polls, the three right-wing parties have a total of 46.5 percent of the vote, compared to the center-left alliance’s 29 percent. Letta has ruled out an alliance with the populist M5S, claiming that the government crisis has resulted in an “irreversible” break between the two parties. Letta’s party has positioned itself as the pro-European alternative to the right’s brand of nationalism and maintains an anti-Putin stance and support for LGBTQ+ rights. 
• The Five Star Movement (M5S), led by former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, has decided to run alone. The party divided when former leader Luigi Di Maio left to form the Civic Commitment (Impegno Civico) party; support for M5S has since plummeted from 32 percent in the 2018 to roughly 12 percent now. It proposes to issue common EU debt in order to establish an energy-recovery fund, to review the EU Stability and Growth Pact, and to allow workers to keep more of their gross wages. On social policy, M5S overlaps with the PD. 
• Action (Azione) is a liberal party led by Carlo Calenda, a member of the European Parliament. It has joined with the former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva in what the two parties call a “third pole” alliance. While the partnership is currently polling at about 7 percent, it’s possible the third pole’s appeal to centrist and moderate voters could lead to a new political geography in Italy in the long term. 

What’s next for Italy? 

The conditions for this election show that Italy cannot continue to be governed by technocrats. But will Italians be better off under the leadership of a so-called sovereign coalition—or is this the final episode of populist politicians exploiting the hearts of disappointed citizens? There seems to be little concern about whether Italy will remain a solid transatlantic partner, but the big question mark looms over relations with Europe. Will Italy fight at any cost for a Europe whole and free, or will it simply squabble with other European countries?

As the Italians say, non si sa—no one knows. 

Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and host of the Europe Center’s #BalkanDebrief series. 

Akshat Dhankher is a program assistant at the Europe Center. 

The post Could Italy become Europe’s newest problem child? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis?

As concerns continue to grow over Europe’s capacity to endure a winter with less Russian natural gas, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Dr. Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge University, on Europe’s energy, climate and geopolitical reckoning. What are the historical origins of Europe’s predicament? Is the current crisis only caused by war in Ukraine? Why have Western Europe politicians become more “energy illiterate” when describing policy objectives? Is this a geopolitical and climate-related reckoning for Europe, in addition to it being an energy security-related reckoning?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

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The post #BritainDebrief – What are the origins of Europe’s energy crisis? | A Debrief from Dr. Helen Thompson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What future for the Scottish Lib Dems?

As Nicola Sturgeon recently declared her intention to hold a second independence referendum without Westminster’s consent, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Alex Cole-Hamilton, leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, to discuss the future of the union. Can the Scottish Lib Dems benefit from the recent wins that their English counterparts have had lately? How will the Scottish Lib Dems tailor their electoral strategy under a Truss premiership?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What future for the Scottish Lib Dems? | A Debrief with Alex Cole-Hamilton appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What does the Tory leadership contest say about race in Britain?

The candidacies of Rishi Sunak, Sajid Javid, Suella Braverman, and Kemi Badenoch for the leadership of the UK Conservative Party (and the UK premiership by extension) have demonstrated the potential for ethnic minority politicians to break “the glass ceiling” of political leadership. To understand these dynamics further, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Tomiwa Owolade, contributing writer to the New Statesman magazine, on how the political advancement of ethnic minority politicians reflects on British society at large. Are American ideological frames on race misapplied to British realities? Why is a party of social conservatism open to the possibility of an ethnic minority leader? Will there be an ethnic minority prime minister in the near future?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What does the Tory leadership contest say about race in Britain? | A Debrief from Tomiwa Owolade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Boris Johnson announces his resignation from the premiership, the question on everyone’s mind is: now what?

To get to the potential outcomes of Johnson’s departure from No 10, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Tom McTague, Staff Writer at The Atlantic, to discuss what to watch out for in both the Conservative Party and British politics in the near future. Who are the frontrunners to replace Johnson? Will the Conservative party retain its Johnsonian inertia? Will Labour benefit from dysfunction in the Conservative party? What does it say about Britain and its post-Brexit trajectory?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Former staff

Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BritainDebrief – Bye Boris Special: Now what? | A Debrief from Tom McTague appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Kazakhstani authorities have made it clear that they do not condone Moscow’s military campaign. At the same time, Nur-Sultan has been cautious about expressing outright condemnation. In early March, a number of Central Asian nations including Kazakhstan abstained in a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion. Similarly, Kazakhstan did not vote for a US-sponsored resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

On the other hand, the first deputy chief of staff of the Kazakhstani presidency Timur Suleimenov stated during a recent event in Washington DC that the situation in Ukraine is a “war” and not a “special military operation” as the Kremlin insists. While this choice of words may not seem like a major development, it is quite meaningful that a senior Kazakhstani official used this particular term while in the US capital.

Kazakhstan has also sent humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Aircraft with medical supplies were dispatched to Ukraine on at least three occasions throughout March. For example, one March 28 flight from Almaty to Katowice in Poland carried a total of 17.5 tons in aid for Ukraine including bedding and food products.

Crucially, Central Asia’s largest nation has not recognized the independence of the so-called separatist republics created by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine. Kazakhstani citizens have also publicly voiced their displeasure over the invasion. The biggest anti-war protest to date among member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States took place in Almaty on 6 March. Some five thousand individuals reportedly participated.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The most prominent single indication of Kazakhstan’s unease over the war in Ukraine was the recent decision to cancel the country’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9. The move to scrap this year’s parade was accompanied by bans on the display of military symbols and restrictions on the staging of WWII commemorations at schools.

The Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense officially stated that this was down to budgetary savings as well as “other issues.” However, given the enormous importance of the holiday to Russia and its status as a symbol of post-Soviet unity, this step was clearly meant as a message to Moscow.

It is important to note that Victory Day celebrations are not solely a legacy of the Soviet Union or a reflection of ongoing ties to contemporary Russia. The holiday is also a nationally important memorial day in its own right for Kazakhstan. It is estimated that over 600,000 Kazakhstani soldiers died during WWII while fighting for the Red Army. Some segments of Kazakhstani society were unhappy to see this year’s celebrations silenced, but it seems that geopolitical considerations were given priority. 

Unsurprisingly, a number of prominent Russians voiced their displeasure at Kazakhstan’s decision and made some fairly aggressive statements in response to news of the cancelled Victory Day parade. For example, prominent Russian TV presenter Tigran Keosayan threatened the country with a “Ukrainian scenario.”

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It would be easy to cherry-pick contradictory examples of how Nur-Sultan has behaved regarding the conflict in Ukraine. Certain decisions suggest that the Kazakhstani leadership supports Russia, while other statements and developments provide a different picture.

Rather than portraying inconsistency, recent developments demonstrate how Kazakhstan and other countries across the Caucasus and Central Asia must walk a fine line to avoid angering Moscow and prevent potential negative repercussions. After all, the threat of Russian military intervention has never been more apparent or immediate. Keosayan’s aforementioned diatribe demonstrates how high-profile Russians have no reservations when it comes to menacing neighboring countries including official allies of Russia such as Kazakhstan.

In light of the cautious path that Nur-Sultan must walk to avoid Moscow’s wrath, the recent cancellation of the Victory Day parade should be understood as a significant development. It was a modest but nonetheless meaningful protest against Russia’s use of military aggression within the former Soviet space.

Kazakhstan has plenty to be proud of regarding the role of its soldiers in WWII. However, Victory Day celebrations have become inextricably linked to modern Russian nationalism and the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. This makes Victory Day a problematic and controversial holiday for non-Russian former Soviet republics. Given the recent anti-war protests in Almaty and concerns for the security of their own country, many Kazakhstanis would likely have objected to a public holiday so closely tied to Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions.

While Washington and other Western capitals would welcome an increase in pro-Kyiv statements from Nur-Sultan, the importance of canceling this year’s annual Victory Day parade should not be underestimated. It was a geopolitically bold decision that reflects Kazakhstan’s refusal to blindly align itself with the Kremlin.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies consulting firm. Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Central Asia.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 6, 2022

Making Putin pay: Russia must finance the rebuilding of post-war Ukraine

By Kira Rudik

Making Putin pay: Russian assets currently frozen in the West could potentially be used to finance the rebuilding of post-war Ukraine but this will require both creativity and political will from Western leaders.

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UkraineAlert May 8, 2022

Vladimir Putin’s WWII victory cult is a recipe for international aggression

By Andrej Lushnycky

Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia’s traditional Victory Day commemorations marking the defeat of Nazi Germany into a nationalistic celebration of militarism that helps justify Moscow’s war of aggression in Ukraine.

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New stamp captures Ukraine’s resolve to defy Putin and defeat Russia

By Peter Dickinson

A new Ukrainian postage stamp commemorating an iconic act of resistance to Vladimir Putin’s invasion has become a symbol of surging patriotic pride and growing confidence in Ukraine’s eventual victory over Russia.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Kazakhstan cancels Victory Day in protest over Putin’s Ukraine War appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This holiday dates back to the end of WWII but it has undergone a dramatic upgrade during the reign of Vladimir Putin. Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has transformed veneration of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany into something approaching a religious cult and has placed it at the heart of modern Russian national identity.

Under Putin, Victory Day has become the holiest day on the Russian calendar and a ubiquitous feature of patriotic propaganda. Meanwhile, anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of the “Great Patriotic War,” as WWII is still known in Russia, is treated with a severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

Putin’s victory cult serves a number of useful functions for the Kremlin. It has proved remarkably effective in reviving Russian patriotism following the humiliation of the Soviet collapse and the missed opportunities of the 1990s. It has also provided the perfect antidote to grim revelations of Stalinist terror while helping to whitewash the extensive crimes against humanity committed by the USSR during and after WWII.

The contemporary political implications of this victory cult go far beyond the need to reconcile modern Russians with their country’s troubling twentieth century history. By rehabilitating the Soviet past, Putin has succeeded in legitimizing the authoritarian present.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Throughout Putin’s reign, Russia has enthusiastically deployed the language and symbolism of WWII as rhetorical weapons against the country’s perceived enemies, who are routinely denounced as “fascists” and “Nazis.” The list of domestic and international targets is necessarily long and includes more or less anyone who disagrees with the Kremlin. However, pride of place is reserved for Ukraine, which has long been portrayed by Russian officials and propagandists as the heir to Nazi Germany.

In recent years, this mythmaking has become a matter of life and death for millions of Ukrainians. Ever since the 2014 seizure of Crimea, the propaganda narrative of “Nazi Ukraine” has been used extensively to justify further Russian aggression against the country. Unsurprisingly, Putin claimed in his February 24 declaration of war that the primary goal of the current invasion was the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine.

For adherents of Putin’s victory cult, Ukraine’s Nazi status has become an article of faith that requires no evidence or further explanation. This belief in the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative has remained unchanged despite inconvenient facts such as the complete absence of far-right parties in the Ukrainian government or the 2019 election of Jewish Russian-speaker Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukrainian president.

Over the past ten weeks of full-scale warfare, the terms “Ukraine” and “Nazi” have become virtual synonyms within the Kremlin media bubble. Indeed, a high-profile article published by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti in April stated explicitly that “de-Nazification” actually meant “de-Ukrainization” and anticipated the destruction of the Ukrainian nation.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Russsia’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine is so inundated with false historical narratives rooted in Putin’s victory cult that much of the war-related commentary now coming out of the Kremlin is completely detached from reality and impossible to decipher without reference to the Kremlin’s twisted WWII mythology. This was most recently demonstrated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s anti-Semitic outburst on Italian TV, which saw him claim that Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity meant nothing as “Hitler also had Jewish blood.”

Putin and his colleagues desperately need a history lesson in the realities of WWII and the Soviet role in the conflict. While the Western allies were armies of liberation during WWII who brought democracy and long-term stability to much of Europe, the Red Army led an occupation that left tens of millions trapped behind the Iron Curtain. Modern Russia still refuses to recognize this uncomfortable truth, preferring instead to accuse the nations of Central Europe of ingratitude.

Every nation needs to question its past. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin is actively engaged in denial. This includes attempts to justify many of the most shameful episodes of the Soviet era. The Kremlin is particularly sensitive to discussion of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact which divided Eastern Europe and directly sparked WWII. Putin has gone to remarkable lengths to defend the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and has criminalized any attempts to suggest Soviet responsibility for the outbreak of war.  

Modern Russia’s victory cult also seeks to nationalize the allied defeat of Hitler. It makes almost no mention of the US Lend-Lease Act that provided the USSR with close to USD 160 billion (in current dollar terms) in weapons and other vital supplies. Likewise, Putin’s transformation of Victory Day into a celebration of Russian nationalism means that the countless soldiers from other Soviet republics are largely airbrushed out of the Kremlin’s WWII narrative. Needless to say, rose-tinted Russian coverage of the war largely ignores the staggeringly callous use of Soviet troops as cannon fodder or the hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers executed by their own comrades.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin reacts with fury and indignation whenever attention is drawn to the widespread accounts of mass rape and other atrocities as the Red Army advanced into Central Europe. Russia’s failure to officially acknowledge these crimes is not merely an historical injustice. On the contrary, Moscow’s glorification of the perpetrators has helped create a sense of impunity that paved the way for the strikingly similar atrocities witnessed in recent months throughout the occupied regions of Ukraine.

Stalin’s vindication after WWII is one of the factors that makes Putin so reckless now. If Stalin could stand tall among the winners despite his heinous crimes and complete disregard for human life, why shouldn’t Putin accomplish something similar? The West’s readiness in 1945 to allow the partition of post-war Europe was a betrayal of Western values that sanctioned the triumph of one authoritarian system over another. Putin expects today’s Western leaders to display similar moral flexibility on the subject of Ukraine.

For the past two decades, Putin has distorted and weaponized the Soviet WWII experience in order to revitalize Russian nationalism and justify an expansionist foreign policy. The sheer scale of Soviet losses in the fight against Hitler has made many outside observers reluctant to criticize this trend, but it is now clear that Putin’s victory cult is a recipe for international aggression. It has created a menacing climate of militarism within Russia that has already spilled over into Ukraine with catastrophic consequences. Unless this cult is confronted and condemned, other countries will suffer a similar fate.

Andrej Lushnycky is president of the Ukrainian Society of Switzerland.

Further reading

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The German Bundestag on April 28 finally agreed to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine in an historic vote that marked a departure from months of caution in Berlin and efforts to avoid confrontation with the Kremlin.

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What’s at stake in France’s Presidential Election?

As French President Emmanuel Macron maintains a lead ahead of his far-right challenger Marine Le Pen, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviews Ambassador Gérard Araud, former French Ambassador to the US and Senior Fellow, for #BritainDebrief to discuss how this election will impact France. What is France’s role in NATO? What will happen to the European Union and France-Russia relations if Le Pen wins the election?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What’s at stake in France’s Presidential Election? | A Debrief from Ambassador Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nia joins the Associated Press to discuss the classification of crimes in Ukraine as a ‘genocide’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jump to an expert reaction:

Amber Rahim Shamsi: Can Khan’s ‘agitational politics’ mount a comeback?

Farieha Aziz: An opportunity to bring back free speech

Ammar Habib Khan: A brewing economic crisis requires a steady hand 

Can Khan’s ‘agitational politics’ mount a comeback?

The big question for the incoming Shahbaz Sharif-led coalition government will be when to hold elections. The timing will depend on political opportunities and costs, the economic agenda, and administrative delays. The current parliamentary tenure—during which two prime ministers were elected—comes to an end in summer 2023. 

Ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan is pushing for early elections. He is betting on riding a sympathy wave triggered by his narrative of “regime change” through a foreign conspiracy, a notion hyped through rallies. His party also hopes to build pressure for snap polls through resignations from the lower house of parliament. Khan is hoping agitational politics will be enough to overcome the loss of military support and political allies. 

The Sharif government will want the agitations by Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party to die down as it aims to pick the next army chief before November and avoid the political fallout from the persistent inflation and high taxes that marked the Khan government’s economic management. The government-allied parties also have a legislative agenda to prevent the forms of electoral rigging they condemned in 2018, which included the failure of the electronic results transmission system and alleged irregularities in counting votes.

There are also legal and administrative impediments to early elections—constituencies will need to be redrawn based on a new census due next year. The 2017 census was marred by legal challenges mounted by several political parties that are now allied with Shahbaz Sharif. 

The last government alliance between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) lasted less than a year. The stability of this coalition between the two parties will depend on its ability to see through a common legislative agenda with an eye on the next election. 

Throughout the hybrid regime experiment headed by Khan, the army had to fend off political attacks from the Pashtun nationalist movement called the PTM and subsequently from PML-N supremo Nawaz Sharif and his daughter. Now an army that is sensitive to its cohesion, morale, and domestic image will need to contend with an angry Khan and his supporters. 

There were several reports the evening that Khan was ousted that he had tried or threatened to engineer a military coup. The next day, his supporters were on the streets in large numbers calling out the army chief, the judiciary, the government alliance, and the United States, which is accused of facilitating Khan’s removal. 

A number of pro-PTI social media users who have pushed trending hashtags against the army have been arrested, but with more PTI rallies planned in the coming weeks, matters could escalate. It remains to be seen whether Khan, who has been careful not to directly accuse the army chief of collusion so far, will go his rival Nawaz Sharif’s way and openly name the military leadership or, more cunningly, continue to let his support base do the talking. 

— Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Center of Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi.

An opportunity to bring back free speech

In a tweet on April 9, now Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif congratulated media outlets and civil-society organizations for their efforts in getting the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) Amendment Ordinance—an executive order by the Imran Khan government to restrict free expression—declared unconstitutional by the Islamabad High Court. He also acknowledged what he called “unprecedented curbs on freedom of expression.”

Undoubtedly the striking down of Khan’s amendments to PECA is a welcome step. But the court also struck down language from the 2016 law, which was introduced by Sharif’s PML-N, after a challenge brought by journalists who were victimized by the law. 

It is the 2016 law—bulldozed through parliament by the PML-N as it enjoyed a majority—that was used to clamp down on political opponents, dissidents, activists, and journalists. Khan’s PTI put the law toward the same end and sought to expand its scope, though that effort was challenged and thwarted before it could be used.

Going forward, the hope is that the incoming regime will have learned its lessons and now understands what it means to be discredited, kept off air, be targeted with malicious cases, and prevented from organizing and expressing themselves through ‘legal’ manipulations and extra-legal means—whether online or offline. The expectation of civil society is that the new government will not only put an end to all such policies and practices, but they must ensure illegal detentions of critics do not remain the norm. To do so, the new coalition must withdraw all politically motivated cases under PECA and other laws, take down the social media rules created under PECA, put in the legislative work to undo laws such as PECA, refrain from using media and telecommunications regulators in a partisan manner, and be open to feedback and criticism. That means hearing out the same civil-society groups and media outlets that the prime minister congratulated on what they require to really end Pakistan’s culture of censorship and self-censorship.

—Farieha Aziz, is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

A brewing economic crisis requires a steady hand 

A commodity supercycle of rising prices that refuses to take a breather, a global transition toward hawkish monetary policy, and the vulnerability of Pakistan’s economy to food and energy prices are going to add a layer of complexity in a volatile political environment. If the populist economic decisions taken by the outgoing government are not reversed, they are going to have an adverse impact on fiscal and external deficits, which would constrain the new government’s capacity to drive meaningful change. 

The first order of business ought to include a phase-out of energy subsidies and ensuring the availability of food staples at affordable prices, which is as much of a supply-chain issue as it is a pricing issue. A phase-out of energy subsidies would lead to a spurt in inflation, followed by second-round effects as goods and wages are repriced. How soft or hard the landing will be depends on whether monetary policy is more proactive or reactive. A resumption of Pakistan’s International Monetary Fund program and securing external funds from key partners would be critical to avoid an external funding crisis, given the excessive reliance of the economy on imported food and energy. On the economic front, the next two quarters will be challenging, and navigating them without any populist uprising backed by the opposition can be deemed a short-term success.

—Ammar Habib Khan is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center.

The post Experts react: A new leader emerges from Pakistan’s political turmoil. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

All this amounts to a new geopolitical reality that the public was not expecting. Now, voters across the continent are facing opportunities to express their views at the polls in a series of key votes.

In Hungary and Serbia, right-wing leaders Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić successfully played up their ability to protect their populations in the context of the war, convincingly winning elections last weekend. But the upcoming presidential vote in France on April 10—with a second round held April 24—may be the most significant of the lot, given the size and importance of the country. 

The run-up has been like no other in recent memory. With voters already transfixed by the war, few are paying attention to the electoral contest. The campaign itself has offered little reason for voters to refocus: President Emmanuel Macron, the current front-runner—who announced he would run at the last moment—has spent little time on the trail, while most candidates canceled rallies after the war broke out. As a result, a recent poll found only 62 percent of French people are interested in the campaign, a figure that’s far lower than usual.

How the war influences this election could be instructive far beyond France.

The impact on voters

When the war started, 82 percent of the population claimed to be “concerned” by it, with 65 percent saying it will play an important part in determining their vote.

Another poll asked voters to rank the main issues that will shape their choice. Cost of living remains the top one (52 percent), followed by the war in Ukraine (33 percent) and the environment (28 percent). Normally, domestic issues such as employment dominate such polls, but the shift in priorities—in the 2017 presidential election, no foreign or military issues were among the top concerns—stands to reason: The war has already had tangible consequences on the French economy (the rising price of gas, for instance) and society (around thirty thousand refugees have arrived in France). This means the line between foreign and domestic policy is blurred.

The French public is more or less receptive to the Russian narrative on Ukraine, with one out of two believing at least one of the Russian arguments on the origins of the war—such as the notion that the West is pushing Ukraine into NATO or that Russian-speaking Ukrainians support the invasion. But this does not mean they support Russia, since 78 percent of voters in late February believed the Russian invasion was “illegitimate.” All the candidates have condemned the attack, and now pro-Russian voters—already very skeptical of the political and media system—will need to choose from what is available, or sit out the election completely.

The impact on candidates

For their part, the candidates were required to adapt their electoral strategies and, sometimes, their views as the result of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Macron—seen as a solid crisis manager—has benefited from the rally-around-the-flag effect, and statistics show that voters most likely to rank Ukraine as an important factor in their decision are also more likely to vote for him than any other candidate. As president of the Council of the European Union (EU), Macron is also at the front lines when negotiating with the other European leaders at a time when the EU is playing a major role on energy policy, refugees, and financing the delivery of weapons. Yet the political benefits of Macron’s geopolitical role are starting to ebb as the war is not as urgent for the French public as it was when it started.  

The other candidates were aware of the advantage Macron was earning on the world stage. Valérie Pécresse, a right-wing challenger, convened a “strategic council of defense” in an attempt to burnish her own leadership credentials—but it failed to gain traction when compared to Macron’s real-life global leadership. Still, Macron’s advantage could backfire: Juggling a demanding international agenda and electoral campaigning is a difficult task requiring mental agility. Moreover, his crisis managing means he is spending less time explaining his policy proposals to voters.

Meanwhile, the fact that three of the top five candidates—Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon—had once praised Russian President Vladimir Putin has not translated into a real electoral liability for them. The difficulties for Zemmour are more related to his inability to improve his image and to address the concerns of French voters on the economy. On this, at least, Le Pen is on more solid ground, having devoted much time to campaigning specifically on pocketbook issues. Zemmour also failed to connect on the question of refugees. The promise of keeping foreigners out of France has been a signature issue of his campaign, even as the public has warmly welcomed Putin’s Ukrainian victims. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, Mélenchon is the last real hope for the left, so left-wing voters appear ready to overlook his past comments on Russia.

Showing clear support for Ukraine is a strategy struggling candidates adopted. Yannick Jadot, the Green candidate, has been demonstrating in the streets and attacking French companies still doing business with Russia, including accusing TotalEnergies of being “complicit in war crimes.” But there are limits to this tactic: None of the candidates advocated for a non-fly zone, since no one wants France to become a co-belligerent in the war.

Though all candidates have expressed support for Ukraine, the war has revealed deeper shifts.

For example, Jadot and Socialist candidate Anne Hidalgo back the continued delivery of weapons for the Ukrainian military and called for an embargo on Russian gas and coal (not as large a sacrifice for France as for Germany, since it has invested heavily in nuclear power), while all the other major candidates opposed the embargo or did not take sides. Le Pen and Mélenchon, who have argued that France should withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command, have had to admit that the timing for this move was not right. The distrust of NATO also extends to European defense, as the far right remains skeptical of strengthening it. Finally, Macron and Pécresse committed to increase military spending, while the left did not make specific commitments.

The politics of uncertainty

The war in Ukraine has put geopolitics front and center in France as in no other recent election. Yet still, only half the population describe themselves as informed about foreign policy, and there are strong misunderstandings—among voters and some candidates alike—about several issues: what NATO is and does, what nuclear deterrence means, what it means to be at war, what France’s vulnerabilities and points of diplomatic leverage actually are.

Unfortunately, however, this month’s race is unlikely to change any of this—and the potentially record level of abstention, at a time of such grave crisis for the democratic world, is a troubling symptom of the lack of enthusiasm of the French people to make their voices heard.

This election has not sparked any passion, within France or abroad, and has been mostly overshadowed in the news by the war in Ukraine. The far right is now the leading political force in the country, and Le Pen could actually win the presidency. Yet few within France are thinking through the repercussions of such a result on European politics and French diplomatic engagement. The winner of the election will play a critical role within the United Nations, NATO, and the EU, as well as dealing with Russia to shape future European security.

With populist victories in Hungary and Serbia, and inflation breaking records, European unity is at stake in this year’s elections. While all eyes are directed toward Ukraine, looking away from rising populists is not an option.

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and previously worked for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

The post How will Russia’s war in Ukraine reshape the European political scene? Look to France. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is not the first time in the history of Pakistan’s democracy that a prime minister has faced a vote of no-confidence, but Imran Khan could be the first to be ousted through one. Infamously, no prime minister in Pakistan’s history has ever completed their full term, either. Should Khan survive the upcoming vote, he might still have a shot at doing so.

The government’s poor performance has helped unite Pakistan’s opposition parties

Last month, Khan announced that he was reducing petrol prices and power tariffs to provide public relief amidst skyrocketing inflation and a steep devaluation of the Pakistani rupee. But the announcement failed to stop the country’s two main opposition parties—the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)—from calling for the government’s ousting. The ruling party has also been criticized for its unpopular choice of chief minister in Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province, where poor administrative control together with reports of nepotism and corruption has eroded political support and galvanized an internal revolt within the ruling party.

Pakistan’s powerful military prefers indirect influence to a coup

Political strife in Pakistan has historically been a catalyst for the military to intervene in politics. Pakistan has had three military coups over the course of its seventy-four year history, and has spent half its existence under direct military rule. The last military dictatorship ended in 2008 and heralded a return to democracy marked by competitive multi-party elections, yet the military remains a powerful actor in Pakistan’s politics. The Army for its part has rejected allegations of political interference, and has publicly asked the country’s opposition as well as the media to refrain from dragging it into politics. That said, many still believe the Army’s support was critical in helping Khan catapult to power in the country’s last general election in 2018. The military is also believed to maintain influence over key political decisions, evident most recently in the divisive appointment of the country’s intelligence services chief. In recent days, Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa also met with the prime minister. While ongoing political intrigue has fueled some speculation that the Army may be withdrawing its tacit support for Khan, behind-the-doors meeting between the two suggests that Army may be looking for ways to avert a major collision that could spur further political and economic instability.

Populist rhetoric has exacerbated the crisis

Prime Minister Khan and his ministers are using populist appeals in an attempt to weather the political storm. These appeals range from accusing the opposition of being part of a foreign conspiracy to destabilize the current government, to criticizing the West for trying to dictate Pakistan’s foreign policy, to invoking religious nationalism to rally Khan’s supporters. The prime minister’s decision to slash power tariffs and petroleum prices, while locally popular, is likely to be at odds with an agreement that his government has undertaken with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the country’s widening fiscal deficit. The Opposition, in turn, has used the IMF bailout to accuse the prime minister of selling Pakistan’s sovereignty to the West. Indeed, staving off pressure from the IMF while fending attacks from the Opposition will be a difficult balancing act for Khan. In a bid to win and maintain support, both the ruling party as well as the Opposition are likely to step up their use of populist rhetoric, even if it risks economic and political uncertainty.

In the balance: Free and fair elections

Should Prime Minister Khan lose the House’s confidence after the motion is tabled tomorrow, a new National Assembly session will be convened followed by an election for a new leader of the House. It remains to be seen whether the opposition will be able to remain united behind a consensus candidate for the position of prime minister, and indeed whether a stable coalition can make the transition into government or if fresh elections will have to be called. Pakistan’s last two general elections were mired in controversy and allegations of rigging. Indeed, opposition parties in Pakistan maintain that if Khan continues in power and is allowed to choose a new chief of army staff before the country’s next election (currently slated for October 2023), those elections may also not be impartial. The PTI, for its part, has come under criticism for having introduced controversial changes to the country’s Elections Act, which both the opposition and the Election Commission of Pakistan have argued are detrimental to the health of a clean and transparent electoral process.

Uncertainty is the only certainty

The Opposition needs 172 votes in Pakistan’s 342-member National Assembly to unseat Khan, and believes that together with PTI dissidents they may have just enough to make that happen. The prime minister, meanwhile, has warned the opposition that it will “lose this match badly.” The outcome of the vote will be consequential either way. Should Khan survive, he is likely to ratchet up accountability of the Opposition. He will also have to tackle rising prices quickly while consolidating control within his own ranks. Should the Opposition prevail, current leader of the Opposition Shahbaz Sharif has said that political parties intend to form a national government that excludes the PTI. The political uncertainty borne of such a move will not be without implications for a fragile economy, especially if Khan takes to the streets and launches nationwide protests. Irrespective of the prime minister’s fate following the vote, the ability of Pakistan’s delicate democracy to withstand impending political turbulence will determine just how far it has come as well as the miles it still has to go.

The writer is a PhD candidate at Yale University and incoming Assistant Professor at Tufts University’s Department of Political Science. Twitter: @fahdhumayun

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. ​At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

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With Putin’s thinly-veiled threats raising the prospect of Europe’s largest conflict since WWII, the international community has responded by engaging the Kremlin in an intense diplomatic dialogue while providing Ukraine with urgent deliveries of defensive weapons. Meanwhile, journalists from around the world have flooded into Kyiv as Ukraine has become the leading international news story.

It would be reasonable to assume that Ukraine’s own domestic political agenda has also recently been dominated by the looming threat of a full-scale Russian invasion. However, this is not the case. Instead of mobilizing the country’s many different political forces to unite in confronting the Kremlin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has spent much of the past few months pursuing divisive policies that risk weakening the country while strengthening his own grip on power.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

One area of concern is the failure to make meaningful progress in much-needed judicial reform. Despite multiple public commitments to advance this key reform, Zelenskyy has been unable to move the long-stalled process forward. The most recent setback came in early February with a third consecutive failed attempt to approve a new anti-corruption prosecutor despite the fact that all the requisite procedural steps were finalized months ago. Critics blame this lack of progress firmly on the Office of the President.

President Zelenskyy’s anti-oligarch law is another indication of a power consolidation that threatens to undermine political competition by granting the president-controlled National Security and Defense Council powers to determine exactly who is an oligarch. Aspects of the law relating to media ownership have grave implications for freedom of speech. Once its comes into force in May 2022, the legislation will potentially allow Zelenskyy to muzzle the Ukrainian media.

There are already alarming signs of unwelcome interference in the information sector. While efforts to combat Russian disinformation are broadly recognized both within Ukraine and by the international community as necessary, there have also been attempts to target individual journalists following criticism of Zelenskyy. Criminal cases against a number of TV channels have also raised eyebrows.

By far the most dangerous development in recent months has been the growing political tension between the current authorities and the country’s opposition forces. In January 2022, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was charged with treason in relation to the trade in coal from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine during his time in office.

Poroshenko is Zelenskyy’s main political rival and is widely tipped to run against him in 2024. While specific details of the charges against Poroshenko have yet to be made public, the prosecution of a key competitor for the presidency has been widely condemned as politically motivated.

Other politicians have also been targeted by the authorities. The State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) recently questioned members of the parliamentary grouping tied to former parliamentary speaker and Zelenskyy critic Dmytro Razumkov. Following criticism of Zelenskyy by Holos party, I was recently summoned for questioning by the SBI over party-related activities dating back to 2020.

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The timing of these developments is particularly concerning. Why would the president of a nation under siege from a military superpower turn on his domestic opponents? Whatever the motivations behind President Zelenskyy’s policies, his recent actions undermine national security at what is a critical moment for Ukraine.

By taking steps that bring his commitment to Ukraine’s democratic development into question, Zelenskyy also risks weakening the international community’s resolve to support the country against Russian aggression. Ukraine’s international partners have always maintained that their continued backing reflects support for the historic democratic transformation underway in the country. In this moment of acute danger, it is more crucial than ever to demonstrate the credibility of Ukraine’s democratic credentials.

I believe now is the time for all political forces in Ukraine to unite against the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion. We must put aside political squabbles and personal rivalries while we face the challenge presented by Putin and his ultimatums. The national interest must come before any individual agendas.

Unless we are united, Ukraine will not be strong enough to defend itself. Every Ukrainian politician must ask themselves two key questions before making any decisions: Will this unite or divide Ukrainian society? Will this strengthen or weaken the country?

Ukraine has made historic nation-building progress in recent years, but this journey is far from over. Russia is clearly determined to reverse Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic choice and is seeking to intimidate the international community with the threat of a major European war.

For Ukraine and the wider democratic world, the stakes in the current confrontation could hardly be higher. With the country’s survival as an independent state under threat, Ukraine urgently needs national unity.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Holos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

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Europe’s future will be decided in Ukraine

By Oleksii Reznikov

The international community must urgently demonstrate its resolve to punish Russia in order to deter a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that would plunge Europe into chaos, warns Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

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UkraineAlert Jan 18, 2022

Ben Wallace: Putin’s bogus NATO fears disguise Ukraine ambitions

By Peter Dickinson

As geopolitical tensions continue to mount in Eastern Europe, UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace has published an essay exposing the chilling reality behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post With Putin poised to invade, Zelenskyy must prioritize Ukrainian unity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Dagres’ Atlantic Council report on Iranian social media mentioned in Politico’s Morning Tech newsletter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As it turns out, Americans are neither anointed for easy greatness nor immune to the ills and sins to which other peoples are prone. The wisdom of the ancient philosophers and the American founders about the vulnerability of republics first to chaos and then to tyranny applies to Americans as well as to others whose democracies have failed in the past.

For Americans, the stakes are high. American identity, unlike that of most nations, is rooted not in blood or ethnicity but in self-evident truths of human equality. Through the embrace of such ideals, immigrants to the United States become, as Abraham Lincoln put it, the “blood of the blood and the flesh of the flesh” of all other Americans. Those ideals make the American nation. The political expression of that national identity, rooted in universal truths, is democracy. Give that up and the United States is no longer a “new nation, conceived in liberty.” We would degenerate into an ethno-state, a white man’s country along the lines of the Confederacy—and, if former President Donald Trump and his circle have their way, a tyranny.

The stakes for the world are high as well. American democracy has inspired the world’s democratic movements for longer than many think. After the Union’s victory in the Civil War, the French abolitionist and liberal Édouard René de Laboulaye wanted to celebrate what he and others saw as a twin victory of liberty over the slave state that was the Confederacy and of democracy over chaos or tyranny. He conceived of a great Statue of Liberty to mark that victory. She still stands in New York Harbor, her torch held aloft as inspiration for Europe and the world.

Since 1941, the United States has stood as the bulwark of democracy and liberty in the world. Despite all our mistakes, blunders, and hypocrisies, US leadership has brought about much good. The vision of a free world of republics at peace with one another was not an American idea (it was philosopher Immanuel Kant’s), but the United States was the first great power to try to make it happen. 

Yet now, with American democracy under pressure, its adversaries take new heart. Not since the 1930s, the Great Depression, and the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany and Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union has democracy seemed so on the defensive and tyrants so emboldened. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping appear to believe that the future belongs to them. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine speaks with glee about American decline while threatening war in Europe. China threatens war to conquer Taiwan. The United States’ democratic friends in Europe and Asia seem disheartened, wondering whether the country that they have taken for granted and relied upon (while complaining about it) can be counted on. 

US President Joe Biden and his team appear to grasp this. They have tried to frame their strategy in terms of a global contest between democracy and aggressive authoritarianism. They recognize that the United States must strengthen democracy at home. Biden, like former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, seems to understand that the domestic fight against political extremism depends on delivering for the American people. He also seems to understand—as did Roosevelt and former Presidents Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan—that American democracy cannot prosper if it stands alone, beleaguered, in a world in which tyrants are on the march. Thus, Biden is trying to rally the world’s democracies—to help them, and thus ourselves, better contend with contemporary problems and show that democracy can deliver.

It’s a start. 

In the immediate aftermath of the January 6 attack, I wrote that the long-term damage to the country would depend in large part on whether leading Republicans turned away from radicalism. At first it seemed that they might, given the determination with which Congress, in a bipartisan way, reconvened after the rioters had been cleared from the US Capitol to complete their work and recognize Biden’s victory. 

But I was too optimistic. Trump maintains his position as the leading figure in the Republican Party and holds fast to the big lie that he somehow won the 2020 presidential election. With notable exceptions such as US House members Liz Cheney of Wyoming and Adam Kinzinger of Illinois, leading Republicans have gone silent or equivocated in the face of the attempted overthrow of the electoral process. Trump’s extremist movement appears both determined and committed to authoritarian principles. Just this week, former Trump adviser Peter Navarro defended the attempt to nullify the election result. The Trumpist movement’s activists have continued to defend and advance Trump’s authoritarian message, as the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab has reported. But this isn’t just another fringe political movement; polls show significant support among Republicans for the Trumpist radicalized right.

It will not be easy to fix the problems that led to this radicalization. But nor will it be easy to overthrow American democracy and the constitutional order. At home, the US House’s Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack is at work. So is the US Justice Department in its investigation of the attempt to subvert a presidential election through intimidation and violence.  

Lincoln’s Secretary of State William H. Seward made a good point when he said: “There was always just enough virtue in this republic to save it; sometimes none to spare, but still enough to meet the emergency.” I hope he’s right.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration. Follow him on Twitter @AmbDanFried.

The post The American torch of democracy is flickering appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How second- and third-order implications of emerging tech are changing the world

Developing new technologies used to be primarily an economic and commercial issue, but it is increasingly also about foreign and security policy. Emerging technologies in particular have become both an object and a driver of international cooperation and competition, shaping the global landscape in different and sometimes unexpected ways. To put it simple, high tech has come to signify high politics, too. Today, digital and tech advancements are geopolitical issues of the highest order, even more so with the second wave of digital innovations, which are more systemic in reach and will determine future economic and technological supremacy as well as respective security environments.

The development of cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, for instance, has become the new playing field for great power competition between the United States and China, both striving for digital supremacy and spheres of economic influence. Such increasing bipolarity in the international system comes with a price tag for many countries around the globe. European states in particular are torn between their alignment in terms of values with the United States and their dependency on close economic ties with China for the sake of their own economic health. In worrying about an escalating rivalry, many countries and state conglomerates have started to pursue their own digital sovereignty, yet lag behind in the global race of tech development, innovation, and cyber capabilities.

On technology-induced societal changes

The international debate concerning technological change also includes many ethical, social, and legal questions in fields such as human rights and individual freedoms, competition and market structure, consumer protection, or public health. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised significant questions about the role of technology in crisis management. Conversations around technological advances, new forms of work, and the change in skills needed have dominated the employment policy debate in many countries around the world. The platform economy, technological advances, and artificial intelligence are irrevocably changing economic structures, tasks, and ways of working, and even what we understand by “work.”

Europe, for example, is already a patchwork of highly varied local economies and markets. McKinsey Global Institute claims that by 2030, more than half of Europe’s workforce will face significant transitions. Automation will most likely require almost all workers to gain new skills. About ninety-four million employees may not need to change occupations altogether, but will need retraining, as technology already handles 20 percent of their current activities. While some workers in declining occupations might be able to find similar types of work, estimates indicate that some 21 million will need to change occupations by the end of this decade. Newly created jobs are going to require more sophisticated skills, which are already scarce today, and the potential social implications cannot be underestimated in scale.

Similar trends are becoming obvious in the United States, too. Having studied 702 occupational groupings, Oxford University researchers Carl Frey and Michael Osborne asserted already in 2013 that technology will inevitably transform many sectors of life: there is high probability, they estimated, that 47 percent of US workers will see their jobs automated within two decades. These fears have subsequently been echoed by similar studies inter alia from the European think tank Bruegel, the McKinsey Global Institute, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), showing automation affecting between 14 and 54 percent of jobs in the “near future.” Furthermore, half (48%) of the 1,896 experts surveyed by the Pew Research Center in 2014 envisioned a future „in which robots and digital agents have displaced significant numbers of both blue- and white-collar workers—with many expressing concern that this will lead to vast increases in income inequality, masses of people who are effectively unemployable, and breakdowns in the social order.“ The future is already here, and these effects and trends, in addition to the geopolitical competition over new technologies, will continue to transform our world significantly.

In this paper, authors from the Atlantic Council and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland examine the transformation of technology and work in a broader social and political context, look at strategies that different regions of the world employ, and evaluate the transition’s geopolitical impact. The change in the global division of labor as well as its impacts are already well known. Consequences of the transformation of work challenge the very basis of the well-being of society, which has traditionally relied on productivity growth to increase wealth and living standards across the board. By all means, the fourth industrial revolution challenges the traditional segmentation describing work, skills, income, and many of the operating principles of society as it is known today. However, even if technology is reshaping the modern workplace and working processes, and jobs are lost sometimes faster than new work can be created, these changes do not happen overnight and decision makers have time to react to them.

This page contains only excerpts of the paper in order to give readers an introduction to the topic and the opportunity to browse through alternative futures. To access all content, please download a digital copy of the report.

Imagining alternative futures

To better understand the geopolitics of technology during the next five to ten years, the authors present three scenarios describing possible future developments. The projections portray a “not-so-distant-future,” in which technological transformation shapes a post pandemic world.

The first scenario, Postpandemic Letdown and Western Disarray (The Local Picture), uncovers the digital divides and inequalities within automated working life and COVID-19 aftershocks. The second scenario, Europe in a Bipolar Tech World (The Global Picture), reflects deepening US-China tensions and a drifting toward a transatlantic split. The third scenario, Counting the Costs of Technonationalism and the Balkanization of Cyberspace (The Regional Picture), depicts regulation and global governance efforts gone wrong. Together they broaden the horizon and underscore the importance of good decision-making today.

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Postpandemic letdown and western disarray

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

After a spurt of inclusive growth, in which most segments saw gains, all the prepandemic structural problems resurfaced, particularly the inequalities that had grown worse under the pandemic.

China Cybersecurity

Report Dec 8, 2021

Europe in a bipolar tech world

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

With no sign of Beijing backing down, the US administration lays out a strategy for restructuring NATO to be targeted on Russia and China, combining its allies from Asia and Europe into an enlarged, redefined alliance.

China Cybersecurity

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Counting the costs of technonationalism and the balkanization of cyberspace

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

While it started as a well-meaning effort to prevent disinformation and propagation of violent extremism, the increasing regulation began to fracture the Internet into at least three largely separate regimes, reinforcing the forces of technonationalism and protectionism.

China Cybersecurity

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The post Unpacking the geopolitics of technology appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hopes were high in the middle of 2021 that the West would pull out of the pandemic and see accelerated growth and a return to relative normalcy after a year of deep recession. Yet after a spurt of inclusive growth, in which most segments saw gains, all the prepandemic structural problems resurfaced, particularly the inequalities that had grown worse under the pandemic.

Believing it is best not to depend too much on the vagaries of human employment, employers raced to automate as much of their business as possible. For the unskilled and semiskilled, whom everyone depended on for basic services during the pandemic, it was a double whammy. Initially, their wages had grown as employers had no choice but to hike pay to attract any workers. Then, without the necessary tech skills, they soon learned they were expendable when firms began to automate their operations. Despite central banks’ monetary-easing efforts, there was no return to prepandemic full employment. Worker participation rates dropped in the advanced economies as many of the low-skilled workers grew frustrated in the search for good-paying jobs. Over time, many of the unskilled and semiskilled dropped out of the workforce or retired early.

The more tech-savvy workers had largely done well and saw their wages improve in the aftermath of the pandemic. That initial improvement was not, however, replicated year after year. Automation was now also impacting the more complex work processes that formerly required skilled humans to operate. Although not all their jobs were made redundant, there was enough disruption that even retained skilled workers felt the pervasive, growing sense of job insecurity. The prepandemic pattern of capital being remunerated much more than labor resumed. Business leaders made the case that productivity gains from automation had boosted GDP in advanced economies above prepandemic levels and government revenues as well, which helped with increased social welfare demands.

Moreover, automation was helping firms deal with China, which was increasingly unfriendly to Western businesses. After being the other large economy that didn’t suffer a severe recession during the pandemic, China’s growth sputtered in the years following the initial outbreak of the coronavirus. Continuing outbreaks from different variants, such as delta or omicron, crippled parts of Chinese industry. Xi Jinping’s data security reforms also hit China’s tech firms hard. Beijing’s efforts to de-Americanize China’s supply chains— part of the Made in China plan—caused more disruption. With tensions increasing, US and Chinese firms sought to avoid any dealings. European businesses were caught in the crosshairs, and some bowed out of the Chinese market for fear of US secondary sanc- tions while others concentrated on doing business with China and sold off their US interests. With the contraction of global supply chains, US and European firms saw an opportunity to eliminate jobs through advanced automation technologies. Chinese businesses were more constrained in investing in automation technologies as the government was worried about higher unemployment. Robotics and 3D printing also took off in the labor-saving effort by Western businesses.

Workers’ Rights and Reforms

Smaller countries fared better than larger ones in stanching the growing societal divisions that grew out of rapid technology changes. To begin with, the income disparities were not as high in the many smaller European countries that had invested in expensive social welfare efforts. There was an understanding that automation could not be stopped—and shouldn’t be for the sake of improved efficiencies and all-around productivity. After all, automation was a godsend for Western societies with low birth rates and rapidly aging societies. Instead, the unskilled should be incentivized to learn new skills. Indeed, the educational systems would have to be completely remade. Everyone had a right to periodic sabbaticals for months of learning new skills. Just as there was a right to healthcare and retirement, all workers had opportunities for lifelong learning. Businesses could see the benefits.

Larger European countries had a harder time coming around to revamping the whole educational system, despite the benefits these smaller countries were achieving. There was pushback by businesses against another set of enhanced worker rights which the private sector would have to shoulder. In these bigger societies, reform had been more difficult for some time, adding to the challenge undertaking these reforms. In France, for example, where the reelected Macron government had been trying to lessen the burdens on employers, there was worry that enhancing the existing training programs and relatively generous social welfare would be too costly. Critics cited the low educational standards in job-deprived and socioeconomically disadvantaged areas as the real culprit for workers not being able to easily upgrade their skills.

In the United States, deep political partisanship combined with a decentralized educational system slowed any reforms. Americans had seen sagging educational standards for some time, which federal government officials felt increasingly powerless to reverse given much of the authority for the educational sector rested with local and state officials. Conservatives decried the growing role of government in the economy and saw the new proposed training-voucher scheme as pushing the country toward socialism and higher taxes. The growing numbers of college and high-school dropouts fueled populism at both ends of the political spectrum—left and right—leading to a political crisis. When the unemployed staged a million-person march on Washington, the National Guard was called out to protect the protesters from armed right-wing militant groups. As it was, the battles between protesters and the radicals resulted in several hundred dead and much of downtown Washington vandalized. Similar riots broke out across the country. At the congressional midterm elections, lawmakers calling for increased training programs and a top-to-bottom reform of the US education system were elected. Businesses also saw that they had gone too far with automation and promised to retrain existing workers for new jobs instead of just firing them.

New Social Model Evolving

Aided by the lessening of fears of a super-competitive China, Western leaders felt they had some maneuvering room to develop a new social model countering what was the fragmenting effect of the new technologies. Just as World War II had been important for spurring a new social peace buttressed with healthcare and pension benefits for all, the postpandemic era ended up redefining social welfare. Educational excellence would no longer be reserved for the privileged who could pay for it. Everyone had a right to having their abilities fully developed with no one being left behind. For decades, teachers in many Western societies had been poorly paid.

That changed along with the importance of providing a good education to everyone. Several big corporate CEOs took the lead in trying to regain the trust of their employees by offering more social benefits—paying for educational and retraining programs—and promising new employment to those whose jobs were eliminated through automation.

With personal dignity being so connected with employment, the concept of work was expanded. Volunteerism was honored and treated as equivalent to paid work. Moreover, with the rapid expansion of the educational sector, many jobs were created that did not exist before. Small and medium-size businesses—not just the big ones—became more adept at retraining and finding new opportunities for their workers. Where young workers once planned to spend only a few years with an employer, they now found the advantages of staying and benefiting from retraining so enticing that many ended up, like their grandparents, staying with one firm for their whole careers.

At times it had looked like some Western societies would be pulled apart and there was no hope of finding a solution to inequalities. Yet there was a deep, popular well of support for inclusiveness. The pandemic had been an eye-opener for many of the deep divisions in society. For the more tech-savvy, younger, and coming-of-age generation, it was intolerable that the unskilled and semiskilled should be “losers” in the latest technological revolution. Older generations—increasingly victims of automation—also began seeing the benefits of a better social safety net. Over time, the fears fueling populism dissipated and centrist politics came back with the maintenance of a social consensus, a broad-based popular expectation for political leaders.

This page is only an excerpt of a technology foresight report in order to give readers an introduction to the topic and the opportunity to browse through alternative futures. To access all content, please download a digital copy of the paper or return to the main report page.

Report Dec 8, 2021

Europe in a bipolar tech world

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

With no sign of Beijing backing down, the US administration lays out a strategy for restructuring NATO to be targeted on Russia and China, combining its allies from Asia and Europe into an enlarged, redefined alliance.

China Cybersecurity

Report Dec 8, 2021

Unpacking the geopolitics of technology

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

In this paper, authors from the Atlantic Council and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland examine the transformation of technology and work in a broader social and political context, look at strategies that different regions of the world employ, and evaluate the transition’s geopolitical impact through alternative futures.

China Cybersecurity

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Counting the costs of technonationalism and the balkanization of cyberspace

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

While it started as a well-meaning effort to prevent disinformation and propagation of violent extremism, the increasing regulation began to fracture the Internet into at least three largely separate regimes, reinforcing the forces of technonationalism and protectionism.

China Cybersecurity

Learn More

GeoTech’s Economy of Trust Newsletter

Latest GeoTech Cues & Analyses

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P: +1.202.864.0888 | T: @ACGeoTech

The post Postpandemic letdown and western disarray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, Biden promised to turn the clock back on Trump’s policy changes. When it came to China, however, Biden piled onto Trump’s hostility toward Beijing. US tariffs on Chinese imports have stayed in place despite Beijing’s call for them to be reduced. The Biden administration, in coordination with the EU, has sanctioned China for its ruthless repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang and taken additional measures to punish the country for cyber hacking. Sino-US tensions continued to build in the South China Sea and over Taiwan. With no sign of Beijing backing down, the US administration lays out a strategy for restructuring NATO to be targeted on Russia and China, combining its allies from Asia and Europe into an enlarged, redefined alliance. Neither European nor Asian allies are keen on these US ideas, but temper their criticism to avoid offending the still predominant superpower.

Squeezed by Sino-US escalating tensions

With both Asians and Europeans less than enthusiastic, Washington puts the enlarged NATO idea on the back burner. Yet Europeans are less able to fend off Washington’s idea of resurrecting the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which was used to embargo exports of sensitive materials to communist countries. The US administration believes the competition over emerging technologies is at the heart of the conflict with China. Many in Washington subscribe to the belief that the Asian country has only become the leading tech competitor through its theft of US intellectual property. Besides export controls of cutting-edge tech, decision makers seek to wean Europe off China’s tech exports. Denying the country’s tech giants market access to Europe and the United States would, American strategists believe, curb Chinese innovation.

Increased US extraterritorial measures mean that the EU finds it hard to proceed with its goal of “strategic autonomy” and finding a “third way” without European businesses incurring restrictions on access to US markets. The US administration says it will offset any harsh anti-Chinese measures by offering greater support to the Europeans against Russia. Northern European export-dependent economies are likely to be conflicted and divided in their reactions to such an anti-Chinese push by Washington. The Baltic states, ever mindful of the Russian threat, are an exception and welcome the increased US commitment. At the same time, the Baltic states have been part of the 16+1 format with China, a platform initiated by Beijing to foster cooperation; although they lack deep ties with China, most of them have been hoping (like other Eastern Europeans) for more Chinese investment and trade. Under pressure from Washington, the countries of the region sign on to the US offer, sacrificing the possibility of strong economic ties with the Asian giant.

By contrast, the Scandinavian nations and Germany find the increased hostility toward China under Biden or any other subsequent US president very unwelcome. Berlin’s most important trading partner is China; Finland is the biggest EU investor in China in proportion to the size of its economy, and China is Sweden’s largest trading partner in Asia. Overall, the EU has become the country’s biggest trading partner and the two sides—EU and China—recently signed an upgraded trade deal, expanding the one that was signed and then halted in 2021. Squeezed between the United States and China, the Europeans—particularly Nordic nations and Germany— would pay a stiff economic price for going along with any US strictures against China and would use their diplomatic power to argue for a course change in US foreign policy.

Other EU countries are less economically dependent on China, but resent US interference and push back against US extraterritorial measures while professing their commitment to strong transatlantic ties. The EU tries to walk a fine line and neither offend Beijing nor Washington, finding it increasingly hard to defy American decision-makers on sanctions and tariffs against China without endangering US/NATO security guarantees.

All European governments on edge

At home, the European social model is under increasing pressure. Like the United States, many EU member states instituted new taxes on the wealthy to cover budget shortfalls. While subsiding during the first waves of the coronavirus, populism is on the upsurge again. After the initial economic surge, European economies slow, giving populism a new lease on life. The EU and immigrants are targets for the renewed surges, and nationalists are gaining election victories in multiple member states. There is a growing sentiment in favor of protectionism and the establishment of more border controls. Eastern Europeans even begin refusing entry to European citizens with immigrant backgrounds.

European split on a single foreign policy

Despite initial efforts to find a united middle ground, Europe splits and wavers in the face of US pressure. France and the Baltic, one or two of the Nordic, and several East European states try to temper growing US antagonism, but share Washington’s worries about a “hyperpuissance” in the East. Since Brexit, the United Kingdom has been trying to open new markets in Asia, including in China, but sees no real alternative to the United Sates remaining its closest ally. London remains the first to always accede to US pressure.

The Baltic and East European governments worry that Russia will take advantage of Western weakness and intervene in their countries. Moscow’s strong ties with China are seen as giving Putin more self-confidence despite Russia playing a junior role to Beijing. Germany and some of the Nordic states become even more adamant in their belief that China is their economic lifeline. With Western markets slowing, Asia looks to be the only outlet. Italy and some of the Eastern European states like Hungary are also eager for new Chinese investments, and hedge their bets.

Out with strategic autonomy, in with hedging

The growing split and mutual attacks by the two internal camps paralyze the EU. The initial rescue package that many observers saw as a step toward greater integration is never repeated. The idea of strategic autonomy is forgotten. Enlargement is at a standstill despite renewed calls from Ukraine, Georgia, and others seeking entry. China’s deteriorating human rights record and saber-rattling against Taiwan angers many European publics, sparking a growing popular movement throughout Europe opposed to China. Germany seeks to mediate, going along with some punitive measures against Beijing and Moscow, but diluting others. Berlin and Paris publicly object to US interference in EU affairs.

Europeans in both camps secretly welcome Chinese efforts to invest in developing countries, hoping the economic assistance can help stimulate economic activity and tamper migration even though they fear the Chinese efforts will end up bolstering authoritarianism throughout the world. Yet European countries don’t have the means to engage even in their traditional backyards. Paris has given up its fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Europe watches as Russia and China increasingly call the shots in Africa and the Middle East. Focused on battling China in East Asia, the US administration puts the blame on Europe for these failures, without wanting to intervene itself. The only united effort that all member states can still agree on is beefing up maritime patrols in the Mediterranean to close the EU’s external southern border.

In Washington, there is finger-pointing over who lost Europe. There’s a growing realization that the United States overreached despite its initial effort to rally the West. While in Europe, there is a worry about the future of the European project. Both the United States and the EU seek to paper over differences, but for China, the transatlantic split is further evidence of Western decline, feeding the hardliners’ appetite for more aggressive actions to expand Chinese influence in the region and beyond.

This page is only an excerpt of a technology foresight report in order to give readers an introduction to the topic and the opportunity to browse through alternative futures. To access all content, please download a digital copy of the paper or return to the main report page.

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Postpandemic letdown and western disarray

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

After a spurt of inclusive growth, in which most segments saw gains, all the prepandemic structural problems resurfaced, particularly the inequalities that had grown worse under the pandemic.

China Cybersecurity

Report Dec 8, 2021

Unpacking the geopolitics of technology

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

In this paper, authors from the Atlantic Council and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland examine the transformation of technology and work in a broader social and political context, look at strategies that different regions of the world employ, and evaluate the transition’s geopolitical impact through alternative futures.

China Cybersecurity

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Counting the costs of technonationalism and the balkanization of cyberspace

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

While it started as a well-meaning effort to prevent disinformation and propagation of violent extremism, the increasing regulation began to fracture the Internet into at least three largely separate regimes, reinforcing the forces of technonationalism and protectionism.

China Cybersecurity

Learn More

GeoTech’s Economy of Trust Newsletter

Latest GeoTech Cues & Analyses

1030 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005
P: +1.202.864.0888 | T: @ACGeoTech

The post Europe in a bipolar tech world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Two trends come together: digital sovereignty and fighting disinformation. At one time, Western democracies were committed to an open, free Internet with minimal government involvement. That was, however, before the social media channels became the arena for hatred and disinformation. The Europeans got angry when the big US tech giants did such a poor job policing it. In the United States, Republican politicians accused the tech companies of being biased, banning Trump and other conservatives from Twitter as well as other outlets. At the same time, many moderate politicians, like their European counterparts, thought Facebook, Google, and others could do a better job eliminating hate speech. Worldwide, “Internet sovereignty” was catching on. Already in 2019, thirty-three governments shut down the Internet 213 times, up from the previous year. Whereas “Internet sovereignty” was once associated just with China’s “Great Firewall” of censorship, it became popular with other governments, such as India, Russia, Turkey, and Indonesia, too.

While there were varying degrees of government control over the Internet, the trend line became clearer and darker as democracies moved in the direction of authoritarianism, believing that liberal markets were no model for the digital age. While they still decried China’s growing repression and use of social media to target dissidents, the Internet was seen as a threat to democracy, too, rather than a bulwark—the way it was originally portrayed. For Western elites, the unregulated digital space was a conveyor belt of disinformation, making it virtually impossible to govern. The French post-pandemic presidential election, for instance, was marred by widespread disinformation campaigns both by domestic as well as international foes of President Macron. The newly elected president blamed his near-defeat (it was only on the recount that he emerged victorious) on the disinformation coming from right-wing extremists. Anti-immigrant groups throughout Europe were active in trying to defeat him and other liberal forces.

The right-wing, Trump-supported attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, had been pivotal in persuading lawmakers that there had to be more oversight of social media. For many progressives in the Democratic Party, the tech companies were too big and monopolistic anyway and should be broken up. It was only a half step for them to call for more regulation of the companies to prevent the spread of domestic radicalism. The United States also instituted curbs on Chinese technology, including their apps. The government in Beijing moved to tightly regulate China’s tech companies’ operations abroad, convincing US regulators that those companies could not be trusted with data gathered in the United States. Over time, US tech companies saw their market share dwindle in China and Asia, as more and more US government regulatory curbs encouraged Chinese tech companies to leave the US market, too.

While it started as a well-meaning effort to prevent disinformation and propagation of violent extremism, the increasing regulation began to fracture the Internet into at least three largely separate regimes, reinforcing the forces of technonationalism and protectionism. Because of security fears, the United States and China became highly protected tech markets; Europe has less of a choice, not having tech champions of its own, so both US and Chinese tech companies operated there, but under EU regulatory control. The economic costs of such a fractionalizing of the Internet were staggering. Before all the new regulation, a report by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) had estimated that at least half of all trade in services is ICT-enabled (between 50 and 56 percent); digital commerce would account for 25 percent of global trade by 2025; and that this percentage would likely accelerate by an order of magnitude over the coming decade.

Efforts to negotiate globally agreed standards governing the use of software codes, data sharing, and/or commercialization of private content and storage of data, as well as minimally accepted standards on privacy—vital for the continuing flow of data—broke down or became too complex in view of the proliferation of national requirements. Digital commerce depends on open commercial, scientific, and academic data flows. Without such flows, joint research efforts also ceased to exist. Increasingly, scientists were only working with counterparts in their own country, not those outside. In particular, the number of Chinese students and researchers in the United States began to dwindle significantly.

The medical and other supply chain shocks from COVID-19, combined with the growing US distrust of China, lent support to the increasing protectionism and breakdown in flows of information and people. In addition, the United States sought to export its standards. Even before the recent regulatory-driven breakup, the American decision-makers had tried to mobilize support for anti-China “clean networks” banning Huawei infrastructure. It wasn’t always successful, however. China offered too many economic enticements for countries even in the United States’ own backyard—Latin America— for all countries in the region to fall in line with Washington’s dictates.

Europeans decide to fight back

Europeans began to worry about their own ability to trade—not just with China but other countries in China’s orbit—and stayed out of the US clean networks program themselves, even though they followed many of the guidelines for their domestic systems due to worries, for example, about the security of data running over Huawei-built infrastructure. Brussels therefore began efforts to counterbalance the fractionalizing of cyberspace, calling on Washington and Beijing to support an international effort to map the future of the world’s climate, using the latest breakthroughs in quantum computing. Taking a leaf out of its own history, EU leaders thought cooperation on climate—a pressing interest for all, like the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community after WWII—could decrease the centrifugal dynamics of technonationalism.

At first, Washington was wary, but when it saw Brussels sign an agreement with Beijing for a joint research effort, it wanted in. The EU said there would be no proprietary information. The detailed output—a mapping of likely effects of climate change over the next hundred years—would be a free good for countries participating in the project. Such data would be the basis for policy decided by the next UN Climate Conference, which the Europeans were scheduled to host. Any country not participating would be at a disadvantage. The fruits of an international brain trust using the latest quantum computing could demonstrate how cooperation was much more powerful than competition and conflict, curbing for a time at least the growing US-China hostility. Without more international cooperation on climate change, decision makers risked incalculable harm to everyone’s future. Were Americans really ready to balkanize the Internet if it meant undermining prospects for global innovation that could help save the planet? Moreover, EU leaders were confident that young people everywhere would side with them, putting pressure on Washington and Beijing to limit their competition and explore avenues for an era of great power cooperation.

This page is only an excerpt of a technology foresight report in order to give readers an introduction to the topic and the opportunity to browse through alternative futures. To access all content, please download a digital copy of the paper or return to the main report page.

GeoTech Cues Dec 8, 2021

Postpandemic letdown and western disarray

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

After a spurt of inclusive growth, in which most segments saw gains, all the prepandemic structural problems resurfaced, particularly the inequalities that had grown worse under the pandemic.

China Cybersecurity

Report Dec 8, 2021

Unpacking the geopolitics of technology

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

In this paper, authors from the Atlantic Council and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland examine the transformation of technology and work in a broader social and political context, look at strategies that different regions of the world employ, and evaluate the transition’s geopolitical impact through alternative futures.

China Cybersecurity

Report Dec 8, 2021

Europe in a bipolar tech world

By Mathew Burrows, Julian Mueller-Kaler, Kaisa Oksanen, and Ossi Piironen

With no sign of Beijing backing down, the US administration lays out a strategy for restructuring NATO to be targeted on Russia and China, combining its allies from Asia and Europe into an enlarged, redefined alliance.

China Cybersecurity

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The post Counting the costs of technonationalism and the balkanization of cyberspace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In order to appreciate the reality of Zelenskyy’s anti-oligarch legislation, it is important to understand the roots of the oligarchic system as it exists in today’s Ukraine. In 1991, Ukraine gained independence with a 70-year legacy of state ownership. Those with ties to the former Communist regime emerged as the first generation of post-independence oligarchs.

The second generation of oligarchs took shape as the 1990s progressed and key economic assets became concentrated in the hands of several dozen people, many of whom remain active players in Ukrainian politics and the economy. A number of oligarch clans with regional ties to Kyiv, Dnipro, and Donetsk grew to dominate many aspects of Ukraine’s national life and compete for access to state resources.

Every oligarch clan had its own ensemble of loyal MPs, ministers, and officials in various positions throughout the state apparatus. By the time President Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014, virtually all key sectors of the Ukrainian economy were under the control of the oligarchs. Crucially, this control also extended to the Ukrainian media.

Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity and the subsequent undeclared war with Russia have created a new set of challenges for the oligarchic system. Since 2014, Ukraine has witnessed the emergence of a genuinely independent National Bank along with independent management at state energy giant Naftogaz. Decentralization reforms have deprived central government of its monopoly on control of state budgets. At the same time, the state has been empowered by security considerations in response to ongoing Russian aggression.

While these developments placed some limitations on oligarch influence, they did not succeed in derailing the oligarchic system as a whole. Frustration over the continued power of the oligarch clans was a key factor behind Zelenskyy’s presidential election victory in 2019, when he came to power amid campaign trail commitments to combat the old elite and usher in a new era of greater equality.

Many voters expected Zelenskyy to attack the oligarchs in one way or another. Instead, during the first two years of his presidency, he has undermined many earlier steps to curtail oligarch influence. The independence of the National Bank and Naftogaz has been limited, while other major state-owned assets have fallen under oligarch control. Meanwhile, changes to the country’s tax code have targeted small businesses and households while leaving oligarch interests relatively untouched.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The measures required in order to genuinely limit the power of Ukraine’s oligarch clans are well known. These include the creation of an independent judiciary; strengthening of antitrust laws and antitrust authorities; corporate governance reform in the public sector; elimination of tax benefits for big business; and greater transparency in media funding.

There is nothing to indicate that the present Ukrainian authorities plan to implement any of these steps. Instead, they appear to have chosen populist anti-oligarch posturing as a tool to tackle political opponents, while at the same time maintaining or even strengthening relations with favored oligarch clans.

The Office of the President has created deliberately vague anti-oligarch legislation that does not contain any objective steps to limit oligarch influence. Instead, it enables the National Security and Defense Council, which is personally appointed by the president, to determine who is an oligarch and who should face restrictions on owning media or participating in the political life of the country.

For example, the legislation defines “media influence” in terms of ownership, funding, and influence over editorial policy. Does the placement of advertising by oligarch-owned companies constitute funding? Would this be classified as a way of influencing editorial policy? It all depends on the interpretation favored by the National Security and Defense Council, which was not constitutionally intended for such a role.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Recent developments illustrate why many remain skeptical about talk of an anti-oligarch crusade. As soon as the anti-oligarch bill was signed into law by President Zelenskyy in early November, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko immediately sold his media assets. Nevertheless, a number of MPs from Zelenskyy’s own Servant of the People party argued that this would not prevent Poroshenko from being identified as an oligarch due to uncertainties in the application of the new law. Notably, other oligarchs with large media empires who enjoy friendlier relations with Zelenskyy did not seem at all bothered by the new legislation.

Due to the obvious potential for highly subjective and politically motivated application, I regard Ukraine’s anti-oligarch legislation as a power grab disguised in the language of political populism.

Zelenskyy could certainly use a boost to his flagging ratings, following the failure to contain Covid-19 and a number of damaging corruption scandals. This new law could prove popular with large sections of the Ukrainian electorate who hunger for an end to the impunity of the oligarchs. More importantly, it can be used to attack Zelenskyy’s political opponents.

The current authorities seem to be convinced that Zelenskyy’s falling approval ratings are primarily the result of information attacks rather than their own weak policies and political mistakes. It is therefore likely that the new anti-oligarch law will be selectively used and will spark new conflicts between the government and big business. Instead of serving as a tool to reduce oligarch influence, there is a danger the law will become an instrument of pressure and coercion that will plunge the country into crisis and derail badly needed reforms.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Holos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 8, 2021

De-oligarchization of Ukraine is President Zelenskyy’s top priority

By Andriy Yermak

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s anti-oligarch agenda holds the key to Ukraine’s reform ambitions and is vital for the country’s future national security, argues presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak.

Corruption Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Oct 12, 2021

Medvedev echoes Putin’s dangerous Ukraine obsession

By Peter Dickinson

Former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev has penned a vitriolic essay attacking the current Ukrainian leadership that underlines the scale of Moscow’s dangerous obsession with the loss of Ukraine.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Oct 19, 2021

Putin’s Ukraine war is world’s worst-kept secret but he remains in denial

By Peter Dickinson

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to acknowledge his country’s involvement in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine makes progress towards peace virtually impossible.

Conflict Russia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s Anti-Oligarch Law: President Zelenskyy’s populist power grab? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A total of 130 bidders were competing for 43 frequencies, but more than a third were scooped up by a single company, Avers, owned by Ihor Palytsia, a parliamentarian and close ally of oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. The controversial oligarch has ties to Zelenskyy and was sanctioned by the US earlier this year over allegations of “significant corruption.”

What should have been a step forward for media pluralism in Ukraine thus turned into a tightening of control in the hands of those who already enjoy too much media power. As the owner of 1+1 Media Group, consisting of eight television channels with a combined audience share of around 20%, Kolomoisky wields significant political influence in today’s Ukraine. His media assets were used to promote the 2019 election campaign of President Zelenskyy, whose hit shows previously aired on Kolomoisky’s network.

Zelenskyy stands accused of maintaining links to the oligarch since taking office, shaping the policies and personnel of his government in line with Kolomoisky’s interests and reaping positive media coverage in return. That dependency is likely to increase as the president wrestles with mid-term unpopularity and begins to plan his 2024 re-election campaign.

There are few grounds for thinking that Ukraine’s recently adopted anti-oligarch law will do much to alter this power dynamic. Critics argue that the criteria for determining who qualifies as an oligarch are either subjective or open to manipulation. What defines involvement in political life when the linkages between wealth and power are usually private and deniable? What constitutes a monopoly when ownership and control of business assets are often exercised through proxies?

It is hardly reassuring that the job of adjudicating on these matters will fall to the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), a body wholly under presidential control. Applying the provisions of the bill objectively and fairly requires the involvement of an independent agency with proper investigative powers subject to transparent and accountable working practices. Without that, it looks ominously like a mechanism of executive power aimed primarily at settling scores with selected rivals, especially former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.

Can we expect the NSDC to look honestly at the connections between Kolomoisky and the Office of the President when seeking to determine his involvement in politics? What efforts will it make to uncover the full extent of Kolomoisky’s business empire, given that much of his wealth is held outside Ukraine? This has become a particular point of sensitivity for Zelenskyy following the leak of the Pandora Papers and revelations that he holds significant wealth offshore, much of it derived from earlier work for Kolomoisky’s media empire. The conflicts of interest are too great to have much confidence in a process falling directly under presidential authority.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Another major deficiency in the bill is that it does nothing to address the problem of local oligarchic networks, many of which represent a significant problem in their own right. To highlight one example, Dnipro Mayor Borys Filatov is accused of running the city and its surrounding region as a personal fiefdom for six years. Opponents claim the real power behind the throne has always been local powerbroker Hennadiy Korban.

Both men have been close allies of Kolomoisky for many years, despite a brief falling out. They stand accused of serious abuses of power including claims by the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine that Dnipro is now among the most dangerous places for Ukrainian journalists to work following the alleged beating of local television crews by Filatov’s Municipal Guards earlier this year.

No action has been taken by the authorities in Kyiv over these allegations and none is expected. Korban and Filatov are now said to exert influence on Zelenskyy’s office via the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Kryrl Tymoshenko, a PR specialist and Kolomoisky associate from Dnipro who has worked with Korban and Filatov in the past.

This relationship will likely become more important to Zelenskyy as he prepares to fight for re-election since the two men are at the forefront of efforts to mobilise regional political leaders from across Ukraine in support of the president as part of a newly formed Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Expediency means that Korban and Filatov will probably continue to enjoy a relatively free hand in Dnipro.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s Western partners can’t afford to be indifferent to the deficiencies of Zelenskyy’s deoligarchization strategy. At best, it represents a missed opportunity to address an issue that has been at the root of the country’s developmental malaise ever since independence. At worst, it risks becoming a tool for perpetuating the very problems it is meant to tackle.

Ukraine’s oligarchy cannot be dealt with selectively and any attempt to do so should be condemned. The minimum requirement is that implementation of the rules should be handled transparently and impartially by an independent authority. This should come with a requirement on the government and president to be open about their relationships with those who wield significant private wealth.

The US and EU should be monitoring implementation of the bill and pressing for changes that reflect international best practice. Any revisions need to take into consideration the recommendations of the Venice Commission, which are expected by the end of the year.

If Ukraine’s recently adopted anti-oligarch law fails to deal effectively and even-handedly with the problem of oligarchic influence, Western governments should signal their willingness to impose additional targeted sanctions on those who enjoy impunity despite being responsible for corruption and human rights abuses. Experience has shown that this remains the most effective way to focus minds and encourage progress.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 6, 2021

Disarming Putin’s energy weapon: Ukraine must connect to EU grid

By Anders Åslund

With Vladimir Putin seeking to restrict energy supplies to Ukraine, it is increasingly clear that Kyiv must connect to the European electricity grid in order to reduce its vulnerability to Kremlin blackmail tactics.

Conflict Energy & Environment

UkraineAlert Oct 12, 2021

Medvedev echoes Putin’s dangerous Ukraine obsession

By Peter Dickinson

Former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev has penned a vitriolic essay attacking the current Ukrainian leadership that underlines the scale of Moscow’s dangerous obsession with the loss of Ukraine.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 4, 2021

Ukraine faces energy crisis as Putin weaponizes gas and coal supplies

By Aura Sabadus

As the winter season draws closer, Ukraine faces a looming energy crisis on multiple fronts which could lead to domestic political instability and deepen the country’s dependence on Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Conflict Energy & Environment

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s anti-oligarch law could make President Zelenskyy too powerful appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Have American culture wars come to Britain?

For the second in a series for #BritainDebrief asking foreign correspondents based in the UK about the country’s predicament, Europe Center senior fellow Ben Judah spoke to Yasmeen Serhan, a London-based staff writer at The Atlantic. Yasmeen is the author of a recently acclaimed piece “What Euro 2020 has revealed about Englishness” and covers populism and nationalism.

Are US-style culture wars coming to Britain? Does US media impose a narrative on the UK? How are issues of race and identity similar but different on both sides of the Atlantic. And what’s the right word for the Special Relationship between both countries, given Boris Johnson reportedly doesn’t like the term?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Former staff

Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BritainDebrief – A foreign correspondent’s view: US culture war in Britain? A debrief from Yasmeen Serhan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A foreign correspondent’s view: Is British democracy at risk?

In the first of a new series interviewing foreign correspondents based in Britain on their views on the country’s predicament, Europe Center senior fellow Ben Judah spoke to Annette Dittert, Senior Correspondent and Bureau Chief of Germany’s ARD, who is the author of a viral piece published in English in the New Statesman “The Politics of Lies” on covering what she sees as an erosion of the rule of law.

Is the situation similar to that of Poland and Hungary a decade ago? What makes Johnson’s ” the politics of lies?” And how does this shape Britain’s image in Germany and Europe more widely?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Former staff

Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BritainDebrief – A foreign correspondent’s view: Is British democracy at risk? A debrief from Annette Dittert appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Britain vs. disinformation: A crisis or an exaggeration?

From vaccines and Brexit to foreign ops, the subject of disinformation and how to handle it is constantly invoked in the UK debate. But how much of the threat is this really? To find out, Europe Center senior fellow Ben Judah spoke to David Patrikarakos, journalist and author of War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century for #BritainDebrief.

What has the UK done right? And what is the UK doing wrong faced with this problem? And is the issue really the content?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Former staff

Damir Marusic

Former Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian Corruption

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BritainDebrief – Britain vs. disinformation: A crisis or an exaggeration? A debrief from David Patrikarakos appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nooruddin quoted in Wall Street Journal on how Covid-19 has punctured Narendra Modi’s aura appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s not often that a convicted kidnapper serving an eleven-year jail term morphs from prisoner to prime minister and president of his country in a matter of days. But when protesters, angered by fraudulent parliamentary elections, took to the streets last fall, Japarov was not only liberated but celebrated by a large contingent of Kyrgyz citizens who consider him to be a populist savior. Since his ascent to power in October, he has been hard at work gutting Kyrgyzstan’s ministries, rewriting its constitution, and seeking revenge against his critics, not least of which is the United States.

The cinematic elements of Kyrgyzstan’s unraveling political narrative were not lost on US Ambassador Donald Lu, who remarked last year that although the story bore a striking resemblance to “a Hollywood mafia movie,” the ending was not yet foretold. As Lu moves on to his new role in the US State Department overseeing Central and South Asia, his successor has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to stand up to the Japarov regime and curtail its attacks on Kyrgyz and US institutions.

In the past few months, the Kyrgyz security services have been cracking down on NGOs, journalists, academics, and anyone with the nerve to directly or indirectly criticize Japarov. US organizations have likewise found themselves targeted. Andrew Kuchins, a respected Central Asia scholar and the president of the American University of Central Asia (AUCA), was brought into the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior for questioning about illegally importing drugs. The absurd insinuations against Kuchins will hopefully be dropped, but they were almost certainly intended to send a message not just to the university but also to Washington. What’s more, the accusations leveled against Kuchins are part of a disturbing crackdown on Kyrgyz civil society as a whole.

That AUCA and its president have been caught up in a state-sanctioned battle over progressive and liberal-minded institutions is not that surprising. Kyrgyz dissident and human-rights activist Leila Nazgul Seiitbek suggested in an interview that one potential explanation for this incident is retaliation for US criticism of Japarov and scrutiny of organized crime in Kyrgyzstan. Lu has not shied away from calling attention to Japarov’s abuses and has vocally highlighted the case of Kyrgyz customs official Raimbek Matraimov, who is facing sanctions under the US Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for his involvement in a scheme that relieved the Kyrgyz treasury of over $700 million through an elaborate smuggling empire. The attack on the president of what is arguably the United States’ most important lever of soft power in the region serves as a warning not to make waves in Bishkek.

Among the absurd accusations lobbed at AUCA is the charge that the university is turning the Kyrgyz gay. That is according to a series of videos circulating on social media that highlight the dangers posed by women’s-rights and LGBTQ activists, who the videos claim pose a direct threat to traditional Kyrgyz values and are capable of plunging countries into chaos. The videos warn that the United States is planning to start a war in Central Asia and name USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and other pillars of US soft power as agents of Kyrgyz destruction. The videos feature alarming surveillance footage of AUCA students and NED representatives, suggesting they could be the work of state security services.

These apparent attempts to intimidate and silence American institutions and their Kyrgyz partners merit the full attention of Lu’s successor. Washington’s interest in Central Asia has been waning for some time—and for good reason. As the United States plans to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, it has even less justification than usual to engage with Central Asia. (Although the US government is reportedly discussing basing American troops in a number of Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan didn’t make the list.) In terms of US interests, Kyrgyzstan is far from a priority. There is also no way that the United States can reasonably outspend Russia or China in a region that is a priority for Moscow and Beijing.

But a few things are certain.

American soft power and democracy-building efforts make a tangible difference when it comes to the safety and civil liberties of the Kyrgyz people. The United States and European Union are among Kyrgyzstan’s only allies in the fight to keep independent media alive.

Allowing the government of Kyrgyzstan to entrench itself by scapegoating the United States and other Western powers has the potential to fuel dangerous anti-American sentiment that could manifest itself in organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which has recruited from Kyrgyzstan.

American government agencies spend between forty and sixty million dollars a year in Kyrgyzstan on a variety of initiatives meant to improve quality of life and governance in the country, but it seems that many Kyrgyz people don’t enjoy the benefits of these programs or associate those benefits with the United States. An EU-funded public opinion poll in 2017 found that less than half of Kyrgyz respondents felt that the US-Kyrgyzstan relationship was on good footing. The fact that the Kyrgyz state’s attempts to vilify the United States resonate so widely points to at best a public-relations failure and at worst grave mismanagement of resources that aren’t reaching those who need them. When China builds a factory in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz know who built it. Russia, likewise, is careful to claim credit for its soft-power contributions. 

The United States must do the same. Washington needs to continually make the argument that the West is not the cause of Kyrgyzstan’s problems. It cannot allow Japarov to make it the scapegoat for the country’s endemic corruption and inequality. As Japarov takes an ax to Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, ministries, and criminal code while forcing civil society underground, he is steadily eliminating anyone who might challenge him.

Lillian Posner is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. She holds a master’s degree in Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies from Georgetown.

Further reading

New Atlanticist May 18, 2021

An Afghanistan at peace could connect South and Central Asia

By Emily Carll

Afghanistan’s potential as a contributor to development and prosperity in Asia has gone unrealized. If it were a stable neighbor, as the current Afghan peace process is meant to make it, Afghanistan could harness its potential as the “heart of Asia” and connect the South and Central Asian regions.

Afghanistan Central Asia

New Atlanticist Oct 28, 2020

Hopes dim for reformed Kyrgyzstan as new president consolidates power

By Andrew D’Anieri

“Kyrgyzstan stands at a dangerous crossroads,” Noah Tucker says, “with leadership in parliament and the executive now firmly held by an unelected leader.”

Central Asia Corruption

New Atlanticist Oct 8, 2020

Kyrgyzstan gripped by political chaos again: What comes next?

By Eurasia Center

For the third time in fifteen years, citizens in Kyrgyzstan rose up in protest, as opposition groups took over government buildings amidst charges of vote rigging in the recent parliamentary elections. Atlantic Council experts respond to the recent instability in Kyrgyzstan and what it means for the region and the international community.

Central Asia Corruption

The post The gathering threat to the US in Kyrgyzstan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post D’Anieri in The National Interest: Kyrgyzstan’s Japarov emulates Putin’s authoritarian model appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jourová and Murphy were speaking at the Atlantic Council’s EU-US Future Forum during a session moderated by Fran Burwell, a distinguished fellow at the Council’s Europe Center, on how to defend democracy in turbulent times. 

Below are some of the key takeaways from the conversation.

What an alliance of democracies can achieve

• US President Joe Biden has proposed a summit for democracy this year in part to counter the influence of China’s autocratic model. More international cooperation is essential, Jourová said, given that “there is plenty of work [to do] on both sides of the Atlantic to convince the people that democracy can deliver a reasonably good life.”
• To Murphy, that is an argument for the ambitious plans that Biden and Democrats in Congress are pursuing to pump some six trillion dollars into the economy, paid for in part by higher taxes on the wealthy. What’s needed is a “conversation about how to lift our citizenry up together, as a mechanism to defend the ability of democracy to deliver real economic mobility,” Murphy said.
• Murphy added that the EU and United States should also aim to “embolden democratic movements and reform communities in countries where the space for political dissent is narrow,” in the interest of promoting both economic opportunity and good governance.

Careful digital regulation

• Jourová, who helped craft Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation, said more “proportionate” regulation of the online space is critical to protecting democracies from the meddling of Russia and China in particular. The European Commission has proposed a pair of new laws, the Digital Services Act and the Digital Marketing Act, to increase transparency and fight disinformation.
• Jourová, who herself was recently barred from entering Russia in retaliation for EU sanctions against Russian officials, added: “We are considering introducing sanctions against the foreign producers of disinformation.”
• But Jourová, who grew up behind the Iron Curtain in Czechoslovakia, also noted that she’s particularly wary of online censorship. To that end, she wants the EU to support quality journalism “by means of different funding programs” and through legislation.
• Murphy doesn’t see the need for a heavy government role in regulating social media beyond mandating more disclosure of who’s paying for online messages. “Many of the decisions are going to have to be made by the companies themselves,” Murphy said. “They’re going to have to decide that they want to be part of the solution.” But he criticized Facebook’s recent decision to temporarily halt all political ads as an over-the-top solution that could choke off voices and funding to candidates who aren’t personally wealthy or politically connected. 

The legacy of the Capitol attack

• Former US President Donald Trump’s popularity as someone who wanted “to set the existing system on fire” should be a reminder of democracy’s shortcomings, Murphy said. Trump supporters believe “the elites have corrupted American government and they want something fundamentally different,” said Murphy, who was evacuated from the Senate chamber during the January 6 attack on the US Capitol. “If we don’t respond by significantly changing the balance of power, then we will be perpetually under threat with respect to very unstable behaviors like we saw on the 6th.”
• Jourová described January 6 as a “lesson” for Europe. “We really need to keep the society stable,” she said. And “I don’t know any better system than a democratic system where people are heard.”

Watch the event

Daniel Malloy is the deputy managing editor at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

New Atlanticist May 4, 2021

Why the EU-US Future Forum?

By Benjamin Haddad

The forum, which runs from May 5 through May 7, intends to provide a new platform to discuss trade, tech, energy, space, defense and security, and the recovery from COVID-19.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

Seizing the advantage May 3, 2021

How the US and EU can counter digital threats together

By Harry I. Hannah

Russian and Chinese threats all seek to exploit gaps in Western cyber defenses and digital and information governance. To close these gaps as a part of its defense strategy, the United States should develop a strong collaborative relationship with the European Union in the digital and information sphere.

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

New Atlanticist Feb 5, 2021

Emmanuel Macron’s plan to rebuild US-Europe relations

By Katherine Walla

For French President Emmanuel Macron, “the number-one priority in relations with the new US administration” is clear: to boost “results-oriented multilateralism.”

China European Union

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The post Nooruddin in The Hindu: Pulling India’s democracy back from the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 23, 2020, Robert Manning was quoted several times in The Straits Times.

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As one of the reformers who entered government in the tumultuous period following the historic events of early 2014, I recognize that we have now reached an ominous crossroads in Ukraine’s nation-building journey. We may not have entirely lost the war yet, but we have clearly lost a major battle.

Over the course of the past six years, thousands of young Ukrainians interupted their careers for the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to transform their country. Some took up public positions in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity. Others did so during the later governments of Volodymyr Groysman and Oleksiy Honcharuk. Unfortunately, this period of idealism and optimism is now over.

In their place, officials who share a completely different set of values have returned to power. Most advocates of reform and supporters of liberal, pro-Western views have been forced out of the public sector altogether. Some are now being targeted illegally by the security services.

The wave of enthusiasm which saw so many talented and ambitious young Ukrainians embrace public service in recent years is unlikely to be repeated. While there is no shortage of patriotic sentiment within the private sector, everything has been done to discourage the country’s top talent from joining the government.

The list of deterrents includes deliberately uncompetitive salaries, bogus criminal cases, and the near-certainty of relentless attacks from Ukraine’s oligarch-controlled mainstream media. Understandably, few see this as an enticing prospect.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the current situation is the fact that a little over one year ago, President Zelenskyy had a unique chance to fundamentally change the country. His unprecedented victory in Ukraine’s April 2019 presidential election, together with his Servant of the People party’s equally impressive triumph in the parliamentary election three months later, provided an unrivalled opportunity to push through a program of bold and quite possibly painful reforms.

Instead, Ukraine has lurched in entirely the opposite direction. A president who ran on a vague but broadly reformist platform has now undone most of the modest progress that came before him. In the space of the past eight months, Ukraine has regressed eight years.

How has this dramatic reversal of Ukraine’s national trajectory been achieved? As is so often the case in the history of independent Ukraine, the decisive role has been played by the country’s oligarchs. Their near-complete control of the Ukrainian media has made it possible to marginalize and discredit democratic forces. Their pervasive influence throughout the civil service, law enforcement, business, and especially the judiciary has allowed them to sabotage, block, stifle, and ultimately reverse reform after reform.

The results of this oligarch-led counter-revolution are plain to see. With Ukraine’s continued Euro-Atlantic integration no longer a foregone conclusion, the country’s pro-Russian lobby is once again gaining in confidence and raising its voice. Meanwhile, Western support for Ukraine is gradually becoming less forceful as formerly dependable allies begin to question the direction the country is taking under President Zelenskyy.

These doubts over Ukraine’s future trajectory are shared by domestic audiences. In recent weeks, millions of Ukrainians have looked on with a mixture of bewilderment and anger as the Constitutional Court has casually cancelled some of the most significant reforms of the past six years.

With Zelenskyy’s blustering response to the escalating crisis apparently becoming bogged down in parliament, there are fears that the Constititional Court will now continue in the same vein. Many expect the court to reverse even more of the post-2014 legislation that had fleetingly brought Ukraine closer to the dream of a European future.

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The changes that have taken place in Ukraine during the first eighteen months of the Zelenskyy presidency have little in common with the ideals that the president himself claimed to represent while on the campaign trail. Crucially, they also directly contradict the will of the Ukrainian people, who have demonstrated time and again that they wish to see the country pursue a radical reform agenda.

This disconnect between promises and policies is a recipe for instability and unrest. However, a return to mass protests holds little prospect of achieving a satisfactory outcome unless the underlying problems facing Ukraine are finally addressed.

It is now painfully clear that efforts to transform Ukraine since 2014 have failed to the alter the foundations of the state or usher in a genuinely new era. Instead, as long as we continue to play by the rules of the oligarchic system, Ukraine will remain doomed to go round in circles.

Ukraine’s periodic post-Soviet popular uprisings have achieved some important gains such as the right to free and fair elections and an end to blanket government censorship. Unfortunately, this progress has failed to tackle the root causes of the country’s chronic resistance to reform.

Recent developments leave little doubt that Ukraine’s fate is still ultimately in the hands of an all-powerful oligarchic class which is actively opposed to the rule of law and more than ready to make terms with the Kremlin. Until the national discussion focuses specifically on ways to solve this problem, Ukraine’s future will remain hostage to the interests of the oligarchs.

Serhiy Verlanov is the former Head of Ukraine’s State Tax Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 8, 2020

Why a Biden presidency is very good news for Ukraine

By Anders Åslund

After Joe Biden’s US presidential election victory was declared, President Zelenskyy was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate him. He was wise to do so. Ukraine has much to gain from a Biden presidency, as does Zelenskyy personally.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Oct 25, 2020

Ukrainian local elections: Zelenskyy fairytale is over

By Anders Åslund

Ukraine’s October 25 local elections served as a vote of no confidence in President Zelenskyy’s ruling Servant of the People party and reflected a deep sense of disillusionment with all national political parties.

Democratic Transitions Elections

UkraineAlert Oct 29, 2020

Kremlin memory wars and the search for a unifying Ukrainian national identity

By Olesya Khromeychuk

Ukraine’s post-Soviet quest for an inclusive national identity capable of uniting the country has had to contend with memory wars fueled by domestic political rivalries and renewed Russian imperial ambitions.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The breakup of the Soviet Union shattered this rigid ideological control over the past, but it created a whole new set of problems. Since 1991, the dogmas and taboos of Soviet orthodoxy have been replaced by memory wars that continue to loom large over efforts to forge coherent national identities in newly independent countries throughout the post-Soviet world.

For the past three decades, rival interpretations of Ukraine’s experience during the Soviet and Tsarist eras have repeatedly been exploited for political gain. These often purposely polarized versions of the past have served as proxies in the fight for votes and have allowed various political groups to avoid focusing on the problems of the present.

Predictably, Ukraine’s contested history also played a central role in the information offensive that accompanied Russia’s 2014 invasion. To this day, competing historical narratives remain at the heart of the undeclared but ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.

The challenge of finding a unifying national narrative is not unique to modern Ukraine. From Brexit to the Black Lives Matter movement, countries around the world are currently struggling to strike the right balance between past and present. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s unwelcome status as a laboratory of Kremlin hybrid warfare lends the country’s experience a special significance that extends far beyond the borders of the former Soviet domains.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

What role should history play as modern Ukraine seeks to forge an inclusive civic national identity that is capable of uniting rather than dividing the country? This was the topic of a recent discussion organized by the Ukrainian Institute London.

Countering fakes with facts is not enough, argued leading information warfare analyst Peter Pomerantsev, who currently serves as director of the Arena Research Initiative based at the LSE Institute of Global Affairs and Johns Hopkins University.

Pomerantsev has published a number of award-winning books since 2014 exploring the Putin regime’s use of weaponized information and the Kremlin’s hybrid war against Ukraine. He was one of the people behind a recently published report entitled “From Memory Wars to a Common Future: Overcoming Polarisation in Ukraine.”

The study recognises the complexity of Ukrainian history and stresses that “debunking manipulations of history is of course important, but if it is the only strategy, it also risks repeating and reinforcing the agenda and framing set by the Kremlin.” In order to break out of this vicious cycle, the report advises, it is necessary “to foster a more constructive discourse around history that brings Ukrainians into a common national conversation.”

The success of any future discourse depends heavily on the ability of Ukrainians to identify common ground. Maria Montague, who served as a researcher on the Memory Wars report, explained that various themes uniting Ukrainians were evident during focus groups conducted in different parts of the country. These included the traumas and economic hardships of the 1990s, the Soviet Union’s Afghan War, and the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. Participants across Ukraine also shared negative attitudes towards corruption and a common sense of resilience.

Interestingly, attitudes towards these shared experiences were similar among Ukrainians, regardless of their geographical location. This directly challenges traditional representations of Ukraine in the international media, which tend to depict the country as hopelessly divided into a pro-Russian east and pro-European west.

Anna Chebotariova, a sociologist and coordinator of the Ukrainian Regionalism Research Platform at the University of St Gallen, believes the reality on the ground is far less straightforward. “When you go to the level of Ukrainian oblasts, the picture is much more kaleidoscopic. In all regions of Ukraine, there is a very strong local identity,” she notes.

During the recent discussion, audience member and journalist Yuri Bender shared an anecdote that underlined the dangers of attempting to simplify Ukraine’s complex and multi-layered identity politics. He recalled how he had recently spoken with a group of young men from eastern Ukraine who identified as supporters of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and had spent their holidays in Crimea. While relaxing in a bar one evening, they had begun to cheer for Ukraine’s national football team. This upset some local ethnic Russian customers, who turned the TV off. A fight between the two groups ensued.

This episode is a reminder that national identity in Ukraine often defies easy definition along ethnic, linguistic, or ideological lines. Here we see a group of Russian-speakers who welcomed the Kremlin’s “Russian Spring” in eastern Ukraine coming to blows over issues of identity with an ostensibly like-minded group who had backed the Russian seizure of Crimea. There are two obvious conclusions: Ukraine’s regional identities are far more nuanced than many observers appreciate, and it is inadvisable to generalize about the identity politics of Ukrainian society’s “pro-Russian” contingent.

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The key message from the recent discussion on Ukrainian national identity was the importance of focusing on historical themes that have the potential to unite Ukrainians.

While it is convenient to blame Russia for exploiting divisions in today’s Ukraine, the fact remains that there are profound differences within modern Ukrainian society stemming from historical experience. Ukrainians must be encouraged to address painful issues in ways that respect rather than deny or dispute these differences.

The most problematic issues relate to the Second World War in Ukraine. While attitudes towards the Nazi occupation are overwhelmingly negative, opinion is significantly more divided on the role of the Red Army, with western Ukrainians in particular inclined to dwell on the brutality of the Soviet regime. At the same time, the idealization of the WWII-era nationalist movement in western Ukraine often alienates audiences in other parts of the country.

How should Ukraine approach these hugely emotive topics?

If Ukrainian society chooses to avoid discussing WWII, the debate will continue to be dominated by the Kremlin. This will have implications for the current conflict. If Ukrainians are unable to discuss WWII without reducing the debate to the level of partisan confrontation, how can they expect to enter into a constructive dialogue over the ongoing war in the east of the country?

The Memory Wars report suggests the need for a human-centric approach to sensitive topics from the past. Research has found that nuanced personal experiences can help facilitate meaningful discussion, with people who are otherwise reluctant to recognize the validity of competing narratives becoming more prepared to engage in complex debate.

This is vital. As a researcher, I have learned much about Ukrainian WWII nationalism from people whose views I do not share, but who are able to hold a discussion in which there is space for both speaking and listening. I learned about the Volyn massacre from someone whose family had suffered during these WWII-era events. Rather than chastising Ukrainians, she was interested in fostering debate.

At present, I cannot yet imagine listening to a separatist or a Russian soldier who had fought in eastern Ukraine. The wounds of the conflict are still too raw. But I would like to think that learning to address our complex past can also equip us to accept the painful present.

Ironically, Russian attempts to divide Ukrainians along historical lines appear to have backfired. Over the past six years, Ukrainians from all backgrounds have come together like never before to defend the country in a war that was supposedly rooted in their irreconcilable differences.

This offers hope for the future, but the national identity debate is still far from finished. Until Ukrainians can foster a constructive dialogue between those who differ over the country’s troubled past, Ukraine will remain hostage to memory wars that benefit nobody but the Kremlin.

Dr Olesya Khromeychuk is the director of the Ukrainian Institute London and a visiting research fellow in the Department of History at King’s College London.

Further reading

BelarusAlert Sep 17, 2020

Belarus national awakening offers hope for Ukraine as Soviet collapse continues

By Solomiia Bobrovska

Belarus has emerged from its post-Soviet slumber and has set out on the road to democracy. This is good news for the Belarusians themselves. It is also a welcome development for Ukraine but less so for Russia.

Belarus Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Jul 6, 2020

Czar Putin wants a new age of empires

By Nataliia Popovych and Danylo Lubkivsky

In both word and deed, Putin has made it clear that he rejects today’s rules-based international order and seeks to reverse the verdict of 1991. His vision for a new age of empires represents an existential challenge to the West.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2020

East Ukraine’s European roots and the myths of Putin’s Russian World

By Alvydas Medalinskas

Moscow has sought to justify the war in eastern Ukraine by claiming it historically belongs within the “Russian World”, but this ignores the region’s deep Ukrainian roots and cosmopolitan heritage.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Kremlin memory wars and the search for a unifying Ukrainian national identity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unfortunately, Derkach is far from the only Russian agent currently serving as a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

There are dozens of MPs in today’s Ukrainian parliament who are actively spreading anti-Western propaganda and promoting Russian interests. They attack the independent state institutions that serve as pillars of Ukraine’s cooperation with the European Union and International Monetary Fund, while also working to discredit civil society activists and pro-reform Ukrainian politicians. Some of these MPs are Russian agents similar to Derkach. Others represent Ukrainian oligarchs whose interests match those of the Kremlin. 

The increasingly vocal anti-Western agenda in today’s Ukraine relies heavily on social media troll farms and national TV channels controlled by Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy and Vladimir Putin’s closest Ukrainian ally Viktor Medvedchuk, who was sanctioned by the US back in 2014. 

These platforms have been used to promote a consistent series of messages designed to undermine Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Reformers are routinely branded as servants of George Soros, or “Sorosiata”. Ukraine is declared to be under “external governance”, with the US accused of curating everything from the Ukrainian political arena and civil society to the country’s media. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are repeatedly informed that their country has been enslaved by the IMF and Ukrainian land will soon be sold off.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine is a democracy and the political forces promoting these messages have every right to voice their opinions. However, there is a remarkable degree of hypocrisy behind much of this aggressively anti-Western rhetoric.

Most of the pro-Kremlin politicians who are currently leading the assault on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration also benefit greatly from the advantages offered by interaction with the Western world. They control companies in the European Union, frequently spend their vacations in the West, keep their savings in Western currencies, and often choose to educate their children in places like the UK or Switzerland. In other words, pro-Kremlin Ukrainian MPs who personally enjoy the perks of Western integration are simultaneously killing the dreams of less privileged Ukrainians who want to see European standards implemented inside Ukraine itself.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Ukraine’s continued Euro-Atlantic trajectory is now at risk, along with the limited progress made since 2014, such as the introduction of visa-free EU travel for Ukrainian citizens.

My colleagues and I at Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Action Centre cannot help but feel that this is a grave injustice. We are therefore calling on Western nations to consider imposing visa bans and other restrictions on Kremlin agents and other anti-Western forces in the Ukrainian parliament.

As part of this initiative, we are compiling a comprehensive data bank covering anti-Western Ukrainian parliamentary decisions and propaganda spread by MPs who also benefit from their personal and professional ties to the West. The end goal is for these members of parliament to face the ramifications of their own anti-Western activities.

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There are a number of international legal and policy tools available which could be used to restrict access to the West for Kremlin agents in the Ukrainian parliament.

All of these MPs qualify as politically exposed persons. According to international anti-money laundering standards, this makes them high-risk clients for financial institutions, lawyers, and real estate agents. In line with this status, Western financial institutions are obliged to verify the source of wealth if they, their family members, or companies under their control happen to be clients of banks in the EU, UK, Switzerland, or the US.

The publicly available online asset declarations of most suspected Kremlin agents and oligarch representatives in the Ukrainian parliament make it clear that they typically have considerable unexplained wealth. Moreover, many of these MPs fail to declare the Western companies they ultimately control.

It is also worth noting that Western financial institutions are obliged to treat the family members of Ukrainian MPs in the same manner as politically exposed persons when conducting full enhanced due diligence. With this in mind, we are calling for Ukraine’s partners in the West to explore the implementation of existing anti-money laundering regulations.

Personal visa bans and sanctions are more overtly political tools which Ukraine’s Western partners could also use in addition to anti-money laundering regulations. For example, objections from a single EU member state would be sufficient to block a Ukrainian MP from entering the European Union if they were judged to be actively undermining Ukraine’s relationship with the EU.

This is not a matter of EU interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. On the contrary, the anti-Western activities of Ukrainian MPs should be treated as a security issue for the entire European Union. This is particularly relevant for EU member states in Central Europe, who might otherwise find themselves faced with the alarming prospect of sharing a future border with a Kremlin-friendly government in Kyiv.

Our immediate goal is to prepare well-documented and fact-based analysis detailing the anti-Western activities of Ukrainian MPs. It will then be up to Ukraine’s Western partners to consider whether it is appropriate to introduce consequences for Ukrainian politicians who seek to deny their compatriots the Euro-Atlantic advantages that they themselves currently enjoy.

Daria Kaleniuk is the Executive Director of Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Action Centre.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 28, 2020

Ukraine must think globally in its hybrid war with Russia

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine is likely to last decades. Kyiv’s best hope of success lies in broadening the context of the conflict and backing international efforts to contain the Kremlin.

Conflict Non-Traditional Threats

BelarusAlert Aug 26, 2020

Belarus is a reminder that the USSR is still collapsing

By Franak Viačorka

With the emergence of an independent Belarusian national identity, we are entering a new stage in the Soviet collapse. Thirty years after the empire officially expired, the last outpost of Soviet authoritarianism in Central Europe is finally in eclipse.

Belarus Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Sep 6, 2020

Has Vladimir Putin poisoned his pet pipeline project?

By Diane Francis

Germany had long resisted US calls to abandon the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, but the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has now sparked a dramatic shift in German opinion.

Economic Sanctions Geopolitics & Energy Security

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The case for sanctioning Ukraine’s anti-Western MPs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Emma Ashford writes about way forward for US leadership in the world. Even under a Biden administration, the US can not approach foreign policy as it once did.

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Emma Ashford

Former Resident Senior Fellow, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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For the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Atlantic Council Resident Fellow Julian Mueller-Kaler joins AICGS’ Jeff Rathke and Eric Langenbacher for another episode of the Zeitgeist, a podcast focused on Germany, the United States, and the transatlantic relationship.

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The intensity of these memory wars has taken many by surprise, but the competing arguments they involve are all too familiar when viewed from Ukraine. Ever since their country first gained independence in 1991, Ukrainians have struggled with a national identity crisis rooted in rival interpretations of the country’s turbulent past. Advocates of a clean break from the Soviet era have embraced a liberation narrative that depicts Ukraine as a post-colonial country looking to shed the vestiges of Russian domination. Opponents of this approach have rejected attempts to portray Ukraine as a victim and instead sought to maintain traditionally close ties with Russia. This has resulted in increasing political polarization that has often expressed itself in the removal or erection of contentious monuments.

Ukraine’s memory wars have rumbled on throughout the past three decades and been marked by periodic escalations. Since the early 1990s, streets have been gradually renamed, Soviet symbols have been removed from public places, and countless monuments have been dismantled. This was initially most evident in western Ukraine, before gathering momentum in central Ukraine and the east of the country during the 2000s. The 2004 Orange Revolution was a particularly important landmark in the evolution of Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity, leading to reevaluations of the country’s past and greater awareness of Soviet crimes against humanity. Pro-Kremlin forces fought back by rallying around the memory of the USSR’s WWII experience and the Red Army’s lead role in the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The biggest turning point for independent Ukraine’s evolving national identity came in early 2014, when the country’s Euromaidan Revolution reached a bloody climax and was rapidly followed by the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Much like the Orange Revolution a decade earlier, Ukraine’s Euromaidan protest movement was driven by a desire to embrace democratic European values while rejecting the authoritarianism associated with both the Soviet past and the contemporary Russia of Vladimir Putin.

When the protests first erupted in Kyiv, thousands of Soviet monuments remained in place across Ukraine. The most prominent Lenin statue in the Ukrainian capital was the first to be toppled. It came down in December 2013, setting the tone for the months ahead. As events escalated in early 2014 and it became increasingly obvious that Moscow sought to undermine Ukrainian independence, the removal of Soviet statues took on a defiant character and merged with the wave of resistance sweeping the nation.

The Ukrainian government then attempted to formalize this process, introducing a series of Decommunization Laws in spring 2015 that outlawed most Soviet monuments and mandated name changes for streets, villages, towns and cities honoring Soviet figures. When the dust finally settled in 2017, thousands of Lenin monuments had been dismantled, while changes to place names had transformed the map of Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s decommunization drive did not bring the country’s memory wars to an end. Some felt the process did not go far enough and continue to push for further changes. Others objected to the removal of familiar local landmarks or accused the authorities of attempting to rewrite history. Meanwhile, the appearance of replacement statues and place names caused an entirely new round of confrontations.

While public disagreements continue, there are also strong indications that many Ukrainians are tired of endless disputes over the country’s past. TV comedian Volodymyr Zelenskyy was careful to avoid Ukraine’s divisive memory politics during his 2019 presidential election campaign. Instead, he played down the importance of historical controversies and appealed for national unity. This proved hugely popular and helped him secure a landslide victory over incumbent Petro Poroshenko.

Since taking office in May 2019, President Zelenskyy has continued to distance himself from contentious historical themes. During his annual New Year address to the nation, Zelenskyy directly questioned the importance of the country’s recent enthusiasm for toppling monuments and renaming streets. “What difference does it make?” he asked. This convenient stance allows Zelenskyy to avoid unpopular or polarizing positions, but it also risks abandoning the national identity debate to populist politicians and extreme elements.

With its epic memory wars showing no signs of waning, Ukraine serves as both a fascinating case study and an important cautionary tale for other countries that are currently wrestling with their own histories and looking to reevaluate the past. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukraine observers to reflect on Ukraine’s recent decommunization efforts and asked them to consider what lessons could be learned from the country’s extensive monument-toppling experience.

Olesya Khromeychuk, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, King’s College London: Injustice is invisible. Whether because of the color of one’s skin, one’s gender, or social background, it is experienced daily by all who lack the good fortune to be born into privilege, but it mostly goes unseen. What is visible is the celebration of those who were instrumental in the perpetuation of this injustice. When the match is lit in a powder keg, as was the case with the beating of protesters by riot police in Kyiv in 2013, or the killing of George Floyd by the police in Minneapolis in 2020, people look for an object that can embody that invisible but omnipresent injustice. That’s when monuments take center stage.

When, in 2013, Kyiv’s most famous Lenin fell, starting an avalanche of Soviet monument removals all over Ukraine, it was very much in the spirit of rebellion against abuse of power and curtailing of freedoms. Lenin was not only the symbol of decades of Soviet rule, but also of the ongoing interference of the Kremlin, corruption, and injustice. For some time, the plinth where Lenin had stood was occupied by a golden toilet, an apt metaphor for Ukraine’s obscene inequality. In reaction to the spontaneous toppling of Lenin monuments, the Ukrainian state ordered a top-down “decommunization” of the country. This was an attempt by the authorities to take charge not only of national memory but also of the history that was unfolding before its eyes.

Decommunization was criticized for conducting only superficial consultations with local communities on the removal of monuments and the changing of place names, and for using Soviet-style, centralized methods to remove traces of the Soviet past. Nevertheless, the job was done: most of the monuments to Soviet leaders are gone, apart from those that remain in Crimea, the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, and the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.

Was formal decommunization in Ukraine the acknowledgment of injustice that the protesters had sought when they toppled the first Lenin? To some degree. But cleansing the country of the symbols of past abuses of power can hardly keep at bay the wrath of the public towards current political mishandling, especially when governments change but injustice remains. If there’s one thing those in power in Ukraine, and elsewhere in the world, can learn from the recent Ukrainian experience, it is not to wait for public anger to reach the level when monuments get toppled.

Vladislav Davidzon, European Correspondent, Tablet magazine: Decommunization in Ukraine was in many ways a long overdue process that could not have been avoided. It was also in many instances mismanaged in a polarizing and haphazard fashion which only served to undermine important relationships with the country’s neighbors and allies. Ukraine’s diplomatic relations with Romania, Hungary, Poland and Israel all suffered to one extent or another because of inflexibility in presenting strongly held memory policies. Indeed, the Hungarian case was bad enough to cause long-term damage to Ukraine’s core national interests such as the cause of NATO integration.

Armed mobs taking down statues by force, without the benefit of any sort of legal process or fair procedure, is not just unfair; it also leads to unpredictable side-effects and fallout that can ripple through society. The polarizing political climate of monument removal in Ukraine after 2014 was at least partially responsible for the the backlash towards Westernizing and modernizing impulses that emerged among a portion of Ukrainian citizens, particularly in the south and east of the country where nostalgia for the Soviet past has traditionally been stronger. It also played into the hands of propagandists who did not have Kyiv’s best interests at heart, while at the same time strengthening the Kremlin’s revisionist agenda, which revolves around the glorification of WWII and the rehabilitation of at least certain aspects of the Soviet era.

Ukraine’s experience is a reminder of how moving too quickly and attacking cultural points of reference that an older generation still holds dear can be destabilizing enough to cause serious recoil. Historical issues which are not settled in a democratic and controlled manner can explode with uncontrollable effect. Conversely, if they are repressed for the social or political greater good, they can also lead to the parallel threat of festering quietly and weakening society from within. Anyone who witnessed the turbulence of the decommunization process in Ukraine during recent years can only urge caution and delicacy.

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Alya Shandra, Editor, Euromaidan Press: The push to reassess the legacy of historical figures that we are currently seeing around the world is understandable. Ukraine witnessed much the same processes after the country’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, when many figures from the Soviet pantheon were toppled, including a huge number of Lenin statues that had survived the Soviet collapse. These communist-era statues served as visual markers of the country’s totalitarian past at a time when this past was being weaponized by Russia to resurrect its former empire. Their removal was emblematic of Ukraine’s choice to pursue a future as part of the Western world.

Unlike the toppling of statues currently taking place in other countries, the removal of Ukraine’s Lenin monuments was largely mandated by law as part of the decommunization measures adopted after the Euromaidan Revolution. At the time, there was criticism that the process was conducted via “Soviet methods”, meaning that it was done too rapidly and with little public discussion. For those caught up in the revolutionary moment, it felt like the right thing to do. However, in hindsight, a more open and detailed public debate could have been very beneficial for Ukraine. For example, the push to remove monuments could have been used to inform modern Ukrainian society about Soviet atrocities. If this had been done, then perhaps fewer than one-third of Ukrainians would be nostalgic for the USSR, as one recent poll suggested. We might also have fewer social divisions based on the politics of memory.

Ukraine’s decommunization experience also serves as a reminder of a basic rule at the heart of memory politics – the removal of monuments creates a vacuum that begs to be filled. Who should occupy the empty pedestal? This is a discussion any society engaged in toppling outdated heroes must be ready to have.

Peter Zalmayev, Director, Eurasia Democracy initiative: Instead of consolidating Ukraine’s post-Soviet society, the country’s hasty decommunization process has only exacerbated its myriad tensions. It was perhaps naive to expect a different outcome, given that Ukraine remains deeply divided by conflicting interpretations of the past.

Any nation’s historical memory necessarily features a multiplicity of narratives and includes figures who are revered as heroes by some and denounced as villains by others. No figure is more polarizing in Ukraine than nationalist icon Stepan Bandera. While Lenin monuments have been toppled by the hundred since 2014, statues of Bandera have gone up and streets have been renamed in his honor, including in Kyiv. Whatever one’s personal view of Bandera’s historical legacy, it is undeniable that his glorification, coupled with the wholesale destruction of totems of the Soviet past, has made Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the country’s east and south particularly susceptible to Moscow’s propaganda and wary of Ukraine’s post-Maidan trajectory. “Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater!”, the saying goes.

As Americans yearn to right historic wrongs and topple politically incorrect monuments, they must understand that the more rushed and chaotic the process, the less chance there is of any permanent healing and reconciliation. As Ukraine’s experience demonstrates, the US risks undermining national cohesion whilst in the grip of the current Jacobin zeal.

Peter Dickinson is the Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Blog.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 8, 2020

Containing the Kremlin: Why the West must rethink policy towards a revisionist Russia

By Oleksii Reznikov

After more than five years of deadlock in Russia-Ukraine peace talks, it is obvious that fresh approaches are needed in order to end the war on Europe’s eastern frontier and contain the Kremlin.

Conflict NATO Partnerships

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2020

East Ukraine’s European roots and the myths of Putin’s Russian World

By Alvydas Medalinskas

Moscow has sought to justify the war in eastern Ukraine by claiming it historically belongs within the “Russian World”, but this ignores the region’s deep Ukrainian roots and cosmopolitan heritage.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 27, 2020

Russia is quietly occupying Ukraine’s information space

By Taras Kuzio

Viktor Medvedchuk is Ukraine’s leading pro-Kremlin politician and a personal friend of Vladimir Putin. Medvedchuk’s expanding media empire is sparking concerns over Russian influence in Ukraine’s information space.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Toppling Lenin: The lessons of Ukraine’s memory wars appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The occasion itself yielded few major surprises. At one point, Zelenskyy appeared to backtrack on his campaign commitment to serve just one term as president and suggested he would be willing to seek reelection in 2024. He also offered dark hints of coming legal troubles for his predecessor Petro Poroshenko. However, the real story of the press conference was that it was taking place at all.

One of the most striking features of Zelenskyy’s first year in power has been his minimal engagement with the mainstream media. This is perhaps doubly surprising given Zelenskyy’s own showbiz background and his efforts to cultivate the image of an everyman alternative to Ukraine’s deeply entrenched (and deeply discredited) political elite. The former TV comedian’s natural charisma and ease in front of the cameras had appeared tailor-made for today’s 24-hour news cycle. Instead, he has emerged over the past twelve months as a somewhat distant figure.

Zelenskyy’s lack of communication with journalists actually predates his presidency and was a prominent feature of the 2019 election campaign. As the presidential race unfolded, his reliance on social media posts, YouTube videos, and broadcasts of a hit TV show in which he starred as the fictional president of Ukraine earned Zelenskyy the label of virtual candidate.

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This inaccessibility has not gone unnoticed. On the contrary, media industry representatives have repeatedly criticized the Ukrainian president for allegedly avoiding awkward questions and accused him of shying away from all but the tamest of grillings. Complaints of this nature first surfaced over a year ago during the final week of the 2019 presidential election campaign, when a group of around 20 Ukrainian media outlets penned a joint appeal to Zelenskyy calling on him to finally speak with the press. “Our readers, viewers and listeners are asking questions we cannot answer since we have not once talked with you directly,” they complained.

Little has changed since Zelenskyy took office. Following his inauguration in May 2019, it took Ukraine’s new president over four months to hold his first press conference. He then somewhat overcompensated by staging a record-breaking press marathon in October 2019 that began at 10am and continued until beyond midnight, with around 300 journalists asking the Ukrainian president a total of over 500 questions. This spectacular feat earned Zelenskyy plenty of headlines, but the novelty factor of the marathon itself also served to underline the absence of more routine interaction with the media.

Zelenskyy’s record with the international media has been slightly more encouraging. He has given a number of feature interviews to the likes of Time magazine and the UK’s Guardian newspaper that have garnered considerable international attention. Indeed, his Time interview saw him appear on the cover of the magazine, becoming the first Ukrainian leader to do so.

On the eve of his hotly-anticipated first face-to-face meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2019, Zelenskyy held a joint interview with a number of international media outlets including France’s Le Monde, Germany’s Der Spiegel, and Poland’s Gazeta Wyborcza. He has also turned his hand to op-eds, with a contribution recently appearing in the New York Times to mark Zelenskyy’s first anniversary as president.

This international engagement has not been mirrored on the domestic front, where presidential interviews have been few and far between. Low points over the past year have included a bizarre faux interview to mark the first hundred days of his presidency which featured Zelenskyy being gently questioned by Stanislav Boklan, one of his co-stars from the Servant of the People TV show that served as a springboard for the Ukrainian president’s political career.

With little apparent interest in traditional media engagement, Zelenskyy has instead continued to rely primarily on direct communication with the public through his hugely popular social media platforms (the Ukrainian president has 9.5 million followers on Instagram and over 1.1 million followers on Facebook). However, there are signs that this strategy may soon require some revision. A recently published study by Ukrainian media monitoring NGO the Institute of Mass Information indicates that Zelenskyy’s social media posts are rapidly losing their appeal, with video viewing figures on Facebook and Instagram now a fraction of the multi-million audiences witnessed during the 2019 election campaign and the early days of the Zelenskyy presidency.

In a sense, Zelenskyy’s preference for direct social media messaging is a sign of the times. It echoes US leader Donald Trump’s own Twitter presidency and reflects the rising importance of digital democracy elsewhere in the Western world. Indeed, Ukraine’s president can claim to be an innovator in his own right who has taken the trend to new heights. Given the unprecedented success of their social media campaigning strategies in 2019, it is only natural that Zelenskyy and his team should wish to continue in the same vein. Nevertheless, in an emerging democracy like Ukraine where strict state censorship remains a relatively recent memory, a president who shuns the mainstream media is sure to set alarm bells ringing.

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A free press plays a vital role in any democratic society, and Ukraine’s flawed but pluralistic media landscape is currently among the freest in the former Soviet Union. The post-Soviet Ukrainian media had once been tightly controlled by the government. This changed with Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which proved a watershed moment in the development of the country’s fledgling democracy.

Since 2004, direct government influence over the Ukrainian media has declined dramatically and been supplanted by the private interests of oligarchs who own virtually all of Ukraine’s leading TV channels, radio stations, publications, and online platforms. This has resulted in a highly subjective and partisan media environment which nevertheless provides platforms for most points of view.

By choosing to remain aloof from the Ukrainian media circus, Zelenskyy clearly hopes to maintain control over the messages reaching domestic audiences. This approach also prevents the polished public image of the president from becoming tarnished. Such precautions may be wise. On the few occasions when he has faced challenging questions, Zelenskyy’s often short-tempered responses have suggested a man uncomfortable with criticism and temperamentally ill-equipped to deal with hostile journalists. This makes the president’s lack of media interaction understandable from a strategic perspective.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy’s reluctance to engage with the mainstream media is a disservice to the Ukrainian electorate that sits uneasily with Ukraine’s democratic ambitions. In a healthy democracy, it is the role of the media to enable dialogue between the government and public while holding the authorities to account. During the first year of his presidency, Zelenskyy has made this task significantly more difficult.

Tetiana Gaiduk is Head of Communications at the Kyiv-based TRUMAN Agency.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 12, 2020

Can Saakashvili rescue Ukraine’s reform agenda?

By Peter Dickinson

President Zelenskyy has appointed former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to lead Ukraine’s National Reform Council. What might this appointment mean for the country’s stuttering reform agenda?

Democratic Transitions Political Reform

UkraineAlert May 18, 2020

Zelenskyy’s first year: New beginning or false dawn?

By Steven Pifer

Volodymyr Zelenskyy generated a wave of optimism when he became Ukraine’s sixth president on May 20, 2019. One year on, it is not clear whether his presidency will prove to be genuinely transformational or just another false dawn.

Democratic Transitions Ukraine

UkraineAlert May 18, 2020

Ukrainians reject modern Russia’s WWII victory cult as geopolitical divide deepens

By Victor Tregubov

A nationwide survey conducted on the eve of this year’s WWII anniversary events found that a clear majority of Ukrainians now blame the USSR together with the Nazis for sparking the Second World War.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s showbiz president shuns mainstream media appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I worked in the Ukrainian government of President Poroshenko from 2014 until 2016, and was then invited to serve on President Zelenskyy’s Free Speech Council in autumn 2019. This gives me some personal insights into the two administrations. I have come to believe that criticism of Zelenskyy’s record does not fully reflect the day-to-day realities of his administration and fails to acknowledge the significant progress being made.

In a sense, Zelenskyy has only himself to blame for the negative verdicts of his first year in office. The former comedian’s entire election campaign focused on his credentials as an outsider running against the Ukrainian establishment, but he has since had to balance this rhetoric against the practicalities of operating within the existing political system. This has led to compromises and fueled an inevitable degree of disillusionment among his supporters. Nevertheless, the past twelve months have produced a series of steps that are broadly in line with the change in political culture promised by Zelenskyy in spring 2019.

For the first time in Ukrainian history, a law establishing mechanisms for the impeachment of the president has been passed, while the immunity previously enjoyed by members of parliament has been abolished. In a move targeting the widely mocked practice of so-called “piano-voting” in parliament, criminal liability has been introduced for MPs found guilty of voting on behalf of absent colleagues. Meanwhile, criminal responsibility for illegal enrichment has been reinstated following its cancellation during the Poroshenko presidency.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Even his detractors have recognized that the election of Zelenskyy was a triumph for Ukraine’s democratic credentials. He has since moved to strengthen the country’s fledgling democracy with the adoption of a new Election Code that meets many of the objectives long championed by the country’s vocal and influential pro-democracy activist community.

There has been progress in the notoriously corrupt sector of state-owned enterprises. Following years of unfulfilled promises, the unbundling process at Ukraine’s energy giant Naftogaz has been rapidly achieved over the past year in cooperation with the EU. Zelenskyy has also initiated a radical shake-up of the government approach towards privatization, with over a thousand state-owned enterprises and assets penciled in for auction and a new investor-friendly approach to sales adopted that incorporates best international practices and unprecedented levels of transparency.

In autumn 2019, MPs approved a mechanism for concessions that paves the way for a whole new era of public-private partnerships in Ukraine and the upgrade of the country’s infrastructure. The first concession tenders for the ports of Olvia and Kherson took place in late 2019. These tenders attracted significant attention from the international investment community and have already been successfully completed.

One of the most eye-catching reforms during Zelenskyy’s first year was the repeal of a moratorium on the sale of agricultural land that had been in place since the turn of the millennium. The adoption of a new Land Law in March 2020 was a landmark event for Ukraine, which until then had been one of only six countries globally without an agricultural land market. The end of the moratorium was accompanied by measures to create a more transparent land register. Although many in Ukraine remain opposed to farmland market reform, it is undoubtedly a major policy decision that previous reformist governments had flirted with but ultimately shied away from.

President Zelenskyy’s 2019 election campaign was a masterclass in digital marketing that will be studied for years to come. Since taking office, he has followed up on this success by promoting the concept of “a country in a smartphone”, with more and more government services becoming available via digital platforms. This was reflected in the creation of the new Ministry of Digital Transformation in August 2019. Earlier this year, Ukraine launched the “Diya” application, which allows users to obtain digital versions of documents such as driver’s licenses and passports. This digitization drive is a powerful blow against corruption with the potential to dramatically reduce graft within state agencies.

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The above examples offer an indication of the reformist agenda President Zelenskyy has pursued since taking office. His record is far from unblemished. Indeed, it is easy to understand the mounting concerns over Zelenskyy’s personnel choices, but this should not obscure the advances that are also taking place. While the removal of many high-profile reformers from senior government positions in March and April 2020 has caused widespread alarm, it is also important to recognize bold pro-reform moves such as the recent decision to appoint former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to head up Ukraine’s National Reform Council.

During a press conference to mark his first anniversary in office on May 20, President Zelenskyy conceded that a single five-year term would not be sufficient to fulfill his promises to the Ukrainian electorate. Few would argue with this assessment. Nor is there any consensus on the durability of the changes implemented so far.

There are certainly grounds for skepticism. With political pressure mounting against NABU, it remains to be seen whether this anti-corruption agency will be allowed to operate effectively and independently. Huge questions also remain over whether Saakashvili will have enough political support to make an impact as head of an enhanced but nonetheless advisory National Reform Council. The jury is still out on these and a wide range of other issues.

Any assessment of Zelenskyy’s first year as Ukrainian head of state must take into account the fact that in political terms, he remains an absolute beginner. The former comedian and showbiz producer is currently on what is probably one of the steepest learning curves in the history of world politics. He may not have lived up to the impossibly high billing of his meteoric rise to the presidency, but Zelenskyy’s initial twelve months in office provided sufficient indications to believe that he may yet come to play a transformational role that is closer to the hype surrounding him.

Tetiana Popova is Managing Partner at Arena Media Expert and a member of President Zelenskyy’s Free Speech Council. She formerly served as Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Information Policy (2014-16).

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 23, 2020

From virtual candidate to compromised president: Zelenskyy’s tough first year

By Ilya Timtchenko

Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected as the sixth president of independent Ukraine in April 2019 with a mandate to transform the way the country was governed. One year on, many voters are disillusioned.

Democratic Transitions Ukraine

UkraineAlert May 18, 2020

Zelenskyy’s first year: New beginning or false dawn?

By Steven Pifer

Volodymyr Zelenskyy generated a wave of optimism when he became Ukraine’s sixth president on May 20, 2019. One year on, it is not clear whether his presidency will prove to be genuinely transformational or just another false dawn.

Democratic Transitions Ukraine

UkraineAlert Apr 14, 2020

Zelenskyy puts Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution on trial

By Adrian Karatnycky

Criminal charges against prominent Ukrainian activist Tetyana Chornovol represent a watershed moment in the country’s modern history that risks putting Ukraine’s entire Maidan Revolution on trial.

Democratic Transitions Rule of Law

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s novice president may yet live up to the hype appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nooruddin as a panelist at The Asian Leaders Council at UVA: Citizenship Amendment Bill Webinar appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s not that Zelenskyy himself is seen as personally corrupt. On the contrary, close observers credit him with a disinterest in self-enrichment that is rare in Ukrainian politics. The problem appears to be with those around him: the friends and allies that supported and sponsored his rise to national prominence, first as a television celebrity and then as an insurgent presidential candidate. Does Zelenskyy have the strength of will to deliver on his pledges to the Ukrainian people, even at the cost of breaking those bonds of personal loyalty?

This question is asked most often, though not exclusively, in connection with Ihor Kolomoiskiy, the controversial oligarch and media owner whose television network helped establish Zelenskyy as a star and whose resources fuelled his bid for political office. Under Zelenskyy’s predecessor, Kolomoiskiy had become a virtual exile from Ukraine, dividing his time between Switzerland and Israel in a bid to stay clear of corruption probes at home and elsewhere. Zelenskyy’s election victory allowed him to return as Ukraine’s most powerful oligarch and political kingmaker. Many saw Kolomoiskiy’s hand in the dismissal two months ago of Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk and his government after the two men reportedly clashed over key appointments to a state company.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

International attention is understandably focused on the fate of Privatbank, the country’s largest deposit holder, formerly owned by Kolomoiskiy but nationalised in 2016 when it emerged that alleged internal fraud had ripped a USD 5.5 billion hole in the bank’s balance sheet. Hailed at the time as a big step towards strengthening Ukraine’s financial sector, the nationalisation is a decision that Kolomoiskiy has been working to reverse using all the influence at his disposal. Ukraine’s Supreme Court was due to hear a case in late April brought by two of Kolomoiskiy’s business associates aimed at declaring Privatbank’s nationalisation effectively unlawful. The court postponed the hearing at the last minute citing unspecified “interference” in its work.

The IMF has been commendably consistent in its message that continued financial support depends on Ukraine’s willingness to stand firm and take steps to recover losses from the former owners of failed banks, including Privatbank. The result is a new banking law, slated for adoption by the Ukrainian parliament this month, which would block Kolomoiskiy and others from regaining control of their former assets.

Many see this banking legislation as evidence of a break between Zelenskyy and Kolomoiskiy. Indeed, the bill itself is widely referred to as the “Anti-Kolomoiskiy Law” and enjoys Zelenskyy’s public backing. Yet for each step forward there always appears to be at least one step back. Recently deposed Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka has accused the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) of blocking investigations into Privatbank’s former management and claims he was removed precisely for his willingness to take action against those considered politically “untouchable”. His assessment seems to be shared by leading anti-corruption campaigners in Ukraine.

The struggle over Privatbank isn’t the only example of concerns about the rule of law posing a threat to the integrity of Ukraine’s financial sector. Another recent court case, barely noticed outside Ukraine, has caused shock waves within the country’s banking community. It came last month when the Supreme Court overturned rulings by the lower courts imposing an asset auction on TMM, a construction company that had refused to settle a EUR 15 million debt with Ukrsotsbank. By ordering the return of TMM’s auctioned assets, the ruling effectively writes off the company’s debt at the expense of the lender and those who bought its assets in good faith.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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This ruling has drawn allegations of interference on the part of Zelenskyy’s inner circle, with a senior member of the construction firm linked to Zelenskyy’s television production company, Studio Kvartal-95. The production company’s former head, Ivan Bakanov, a friend of the president’s since childhood, is now in charge of the SBU. Two months after Bakanov took over, the SBU unexpectedly reopened an investigation, previously closed by the Prosecutor General’s Office, looking into Ukrsotsbank’s handling of the asset auction.

Banking sources in Kyiv say this is more than a routine struggle over assets. The ruling creates a huge headache for the Ukrainian financial sector as a whole because there is now uncertainty about whether collateral loan contracts are still legally enforceable, at least as far as debtors connected to the ruling elite are concerned. This is likely to have a chilling effect on the willingness of banks to lend money generally, hardly something that is consistent with Ukraine’s need to boost entrepreneurship and private sector growth.

The record of President Zelenskyy’s first year in office provides little basis for thinking that he will turn out to be the transformational leader Ukrainians voted for. If he wasn’t able to deliver on his most radical promises while his mandate was fresh and public support still high, it needs to be asked whether he will find the courage to do so as his options begin to narrow towards the back end of the electoral cycle. There is still plenty of time to change course, but only if Zelenskyy is prepared to make the tough decision to break with friends and allies that appear to be holding him back.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 28, 2020

Coronavirus crisis spells doom for Putin’s dreams of rebuilding the Soviet empire

By Solomiia Bobrovska

The coronavirus crisis has sparked a collapse in oil prices that is hitting Russia hard. With the Kremlin coffers increasingly empty, could change be on the horizon in Moscow for the first time since 1991?

Coronavirus Russia

UkraineAlert Mar 30, 2020

Coronavirus must not distract the world from Russia’s war in Ukraine

By Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze

The coronavirus crisis is creating unprecedented challenges for the international community, but existing security threats like the Russian attack on Ukraine must not disappear from the diplomatic agenda, argues Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze.

Conflict Coronavirus

UkraineAlert Apr 30, 2020

Broadening Ukraine’s foreign policy horizons in the post-coronavirus world

By Hanna Shelest

Ukraine’s foreign policy has traditionally focused on the choice between Russia and the West, but the country could benefit from a more global approach to diplomacy with clearly defined regional strategies.

Coronavirus Politics & Diplomacy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Zelenskyy fails to deliver on promise of a new beginning appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For Medium World, Alistair Somerville and Atlantic Council Resident Fellow Julian Mueller-Kaler go head to head on whether European center-left and left wing parties should take on the right wing populists at their own game.

The post Should the European Left take on the populists at their own game? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Robert Manning in Global Times about the necessity of US – China cooperation on Coronavirus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Coronavirus will change the world. The “how” is growing clearer with each day of its global spread.

Unpredictable events produce unforeseen outcomes. Yet sift carefully through the deluge of reporting, and one can discern the first outlines of how this entrepreneurial pathogen will leave its mark.

Here’s just a short list of what we know already as the coronavirus has reached some 94 countries, with more than 100,000 cases and more that 3,400 deaths.

What we’re learning – in real-time, Darwinian fashion – is that proactive countries, societies and individuals are performing far better than reactive ones. Governments that engage in truth-telling are heading off dangers faster than those that obfuscate or delay. (More on that below.)

This week, we were also reminded of the benefits of international collaboration and trust – and the dangers where it doesn’t exist – both in addressing health emergencies and their global financial implications.

For her part, International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, pointing to “more dire scenarios,” made available $50 billion to help countries deal with the virus, including $10 billion at zero interest for the poorest of nations.

Here’s a short (by no means complete) list of what should, or could be, other implications:

The United States and Europe should take this moment as a wake-up call to pay far more attention to addressing non-military national security threats, including their excessive dependence on China for crucial supply chains that reach from pharmaceuticals to “rare earth” materials used in almost all our high-tech gear. Today, about 80% of pharmaceuticals sold in the US are produced in China. China is also the largest and sometimes only global supplier for the active ingredient of some vital medications.

Chinese leaders will have to rapidly adjust their economy to the new reality in which global manufacturers will diversify supply chains, wherever they can, at the cost of Chinese workers. In a country where economic growth figures buy authoritarian leaders their credibility, this year’s slowdown and job losses could have far-reaching consequences.

Chinese leaders are already addressing these challenges through new economic stimulus programs, which are a good thing, but the temptation at the same time has been for more authoritarian controls and nationalist rallying, which is less good, particularly if you live in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the region.

Iran, one of the four countries hit hardest by coronavirus, with more than 4,700 cases and 124 deaths, is lurching between measures to stop its spread among an increasingly distrustful population and steps it has taken to accelerate its uranium enrichment toward a nuclear weapon.

Iran could choose to rapidly reduce its costly, malign regional behavior, which neither its citizens nor its neighbors can afford. It could pull back from recent steps to increase its uranium enrichment in the direction of weapons grade materials. The alternative, which appears to be the course Iranian leaders have chosen, is an ultimately reckless and perhaps suicidal path of internal repression, ensuring hardline electoral outcomes and external aggression.

Coronavirus has made that path even less sustainable. Watch this space.

This column has tried to keep a healthy distance from U.S. domestic politics. And pathogens are nonpartisan. However, it’s hard not to reach conclusions, looking around the globe, that also reflect on the U.S. coronavirus response.

Countries that delay and dither in their initial responses (China, Italy) pay a heavy up-front price, and those that respond rapidly and responsibly can contain infection rates rapidly (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong).

Italy and Hong Kong present a powerful comparison. Though Hong Kong shares a border with mainland China, it only this week passed the 100-case mark with two deaths, while Italy has had more than 4,600 cases and almost 200 deaths

Inflection Points

Feb 29, 2020

Coronavirus special edition: Europe’s historic test amid expanding, global ripples

By Frederick Kempe

If the EU and its member states respond smoothly and in a coordinated fashion, the coming days could reinforce the collective value of the European Union. Should the EU appear ineffective as the virus spreads, that will color European attitudes for decades to come.

Coronavirus Crisis Management

Lay aside Italy’s higher population. The more decisive difference was Hong Kong’s proactivity. It closed its schools when Hong Kong had fewer than forty cases and will keep them closed until mid-April, at the earliest. Italy only this week announced a limited closure. Hong Kong also closed most public venues – restaurants, bars, sporting events and theaters. Italy’s response has been spottier, and thus its numbers have grown even as it exported the virus.

If you live in the United States, it’s hard to be reassured by the country’s relatively low number of cases and deaths – 300 and 19. That’s because of the serious lack of testing kit availability until now. Less than 1,600 people have been tested across the country.

A final lesson in this incomplete list is that international leaders must better address our fragile global economy’s ability to absorb shocks like coronavirus, and that should start by addressing our record corporate and sovereign debt levels. Global debt is nearing $244 trillion, the highest level on record.

With most Western central banks near zero interest rates, monetary tools are insufficient to counteract coronavirus – as the Fed demonstrated through the ineffectiveness of its half point cut. Global debt levels restrain the far better alternative of fiscal stimulus.

Lesson here: if kind fate should allow us to slip by this coronavirus without a global pandemic, global recession, or financial meltdown, addressing this debt overhang should be a matter of global urgency.

Perhaps the most important lesson of the past weeks of coronavirus is that the recent rise of authoritarianism globally and the rise of populism and nationalism among Western-style democracies provide a poor recipe for sound, trusted, experienced management of an unfolding global health emergency.

No doubt the coronavirus scare has contributed to the Biden surge of the past week, as American voters in the Democratic party scanned the available choices for steadiness and experience – and other moderate candidates rallied around his flag.    

So, the first returns are in regarding how the coronavirus episode might change the world. No doubt the virus is a curse, but it also could be a blessing if politicians and voters heed its lessons.

As Winston Churchill said on the cusp of World War II, “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”

*          *          *

Geopolitical implications of coronavirus

As the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak continues to accelerate its spread worldwide, the international community is facing a global crisis with public health, geopolitical, and economic repercussions. Go beyond the headlines to access the Atlantic Council’s deep expertise in policy areas impacted by this growing global emergency.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

MUST-READS FROM A WORLD IN TRANSITION

This week’s top reads again focus mostly on the various aspects of coronavirus, which continues to capture global public attention despite a news week that put Senator Joe Biden in Democratic driver’s seat and had Turkish and Russian leaders in Moscow, deliberating the future of Syria’s Idlib.

The pieces include the FT’s look at the danger of debt crisis, two Iranian brothers reflecting on what has gone wrong with their country’s health system, a public health professional’s comparison of coronavirus with the Spanish flue of 1918 and the lesson of effective leadership, and the work of the Atlantic Council’s own Digital Forensic Research Lab in tracking an “infodemic.”

Also don’t miss item #5 and Steve Sestanovich’s smart look in Foreign Affairs at the “deep state” that really makes Russia tick – and thus what Putin’s eventual successor must manage.  Our own Anders Aslund reflects on the curiously enduring nature of “Russia’s kleptocratic autocracy.”

#1. THE VIRUS AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT

The seeds of the next debt crisis
John Plender / FINANCIAL TIMES

Read every word of John Plender’s “Big Read” on record debt levels in the Financial Times if you want a richer understanding of the most vulnerable part of the coronavirus-hit economy.

The numbers: the ratio of global debt to gross domestic product hit an all-time high of 322% in the third quarter of 2019 and total debt reached some $253 trillion. “The implication,” writes Plender. “If the virus continues to spread is that any fragilities in the financial system have the potential to trigger a new debt crisis.” Read More →

#2. IRAN AND THE VIRUS

How Iran Completely and Utterly Botched its Response to the Coronavirus
Kamiar Alaei and Arash Alaei / THE NEW YORK TIMES

Two Iranian doctors, brothers who were arrested in 2008 in the country, reflect in the New York Times on how a country that has one of the best health care systems in the Middle East has become the poster child for how to get everything wrong in the face of coronavirus.

Nowhere have high officials been as badly affected. Among the more than 3,500 cases are 23 members of parliament, a deputy health minister and several government officials. Among the 107-plus deaths is a senior adviser to the supreme leader.

“Lives could have been saved and the scale of the contagion contained if the Islamic Republic had not made health policy subservient to its politics,” the brothers write. Read More →

#3. PANDEMIC LEADERSHIP LESSONS

What We Can Learn From the 20th Century’s Deadliest Pandemic
Jonathan D. Quick / THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Much separates our times from the days of the Spanish flu of 1918, which took 675,000 lives in the United States, compared by 53,000 in all World War I combat.

On the good side: We have better antibiotics, hospitals, health systems and communication. More problematic: the world’s population is four times larger with more than half in urban areas. Globalization and high-speed travel provide much more opportunity for “community spread.”

But what both periods have in common is how effective leadership can save or cost lives, writes Jonathan D. Quick, author and public health professional. He draws a powerful comparison between Philadelphia of 1918, which muckraker Lincoln Steffens called “the worse governed city in America,” and St. Louis, whose quick, proactive reactions kept its death rates at half those of Philadelphia. It didn’t help that President Woodrow Wilson was so focused on winning World War I that he wouldn’t head pandemic warnings from his Army, Navy, or personal physician. Read More →

#4. WELCOME TO THE INFODEMIC

The Coronavirus and how Political Spin has Worsened Epidemics
Atlantic Council DFR Lab / THE SOURCE

This week, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab in its newsletter featured a round-up of what we’re seeing across the information environment about coronavirus, in our effort to provide a trusted source on what’s right and wrong.

“We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic,” said Tedros Adhonom Ghebreyesus, the director general of the World Health Organization, at the Munich Security Conference last month.

“This is an immediate stress test in the collective effort including government, media and private industry to build resilience against active disinformation and passive misinformation,” our DFRL lab wrote. “Human lives hang in the balance.” Read More →

#5. PUTIN’S SUCCESSOR

The Day After Putin
Stephen Sestanovich / FOREIGN AFFAIRS

We Need a Small War
Anders Aslund / BERLIN POLICY JOURNAL

Steve Sestanovich’s must-read on Russia in Foreign Affairs suggests that experts have been asking the wrong questions about the country and Putin – “on his personality, his wealth, his approval ratings.”

Instead, he suggests studying “his true legacy.” In Sestanovich’s view, that is the re-empowering of the state bureaucracy and, in particular, the national security establishment, “the hydra-headed complex of military intelligence, and law enforcement ministries.”

He convincingly argues these institutions “may well determine not only who becomes the next president of Russia but what Russian politics will look like after Putin.” Read More →

Also don’t miss the Atlantic Council’s Anders Aslund in Berlin Policy Journal. Anders is one of the keenest minds on Russia’s economic structure as “an authoritarian kleptocracy.” He analyzes why this “classic decline power” resists reform, ignores growth, neglects its population – and survives. Read More →

QUOTE OF THE WEEK

ATLANTIC COUNCIL TOP READS

New Atlanticist Mar 4, 2020

The “time is now or never” for Central Europe to grasp Three Seas opportunity, Estonia’s president says

By David A. Wemer

Now that an investment fund to fuel the development of stronger cross-border transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure links in Central and Eastern Europe has been launched, countries in the region “need to quickly decide” whether they want to participate before the opportunity vanishes, according to Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

New Atlanticist Mar 6, 2020

French minister: Europe is ready to prove its strength

By David A. Wemer

Despite anxiety about the state of the European Union in the face of Brexit and political populism, French Minister of State for European Affairs Amélie de Montchalin argued that there is growing evidence that Europeans are “starting to see Europe as capable of being strong [and] sovereign.” Recent joint European actions and renewed focus on building Europe’s ability to act autonomously has proved “that we can use the capabilities that we have, the power we already have, to take initiative,” de Montchalin said at the Atlantic Council on March 6.

European Union Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Mar 5, 2020

UK remains committed to positive global role after Brexit, defence secretary says

By David A. Wemer

“The security of Europe is vital to the United Kingdom’s security [and] that will not change because we have left the political union of the European Union,” UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said on March 5.

European Union NATO

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The post Shahid co-chairing at the Rethinking Civil Society Project, University of York, discussing the CAA and NRC in India appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Atlantic Council Resident Fellow Julian Mueller-Kaler joins AICGS’ Jeff Rathke and Eric Langenbacher for a new episode of the Zeitgeist, a podcast focused on Germany, the United States, and the transatlantic relationship.

The post Hamburg as barometer: What’s happening in German politics? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

They are underestimating the forces that are changing the very nature of the world economy – a growing degree of “deglobalization” in the face of U.S.-Chinese decoupling.  At the same time, they are overestimating the power of monetary and fiscal stimulus to keep the global economic party going.

When G-20 finance ministers meet this weekend in Riyadh, they’ll do so at a time when all of the world’s ten major economies are slowing – and several confront recession. Next week, Beijing is likely to announce a delay in the meeting of its National People’s Congress due to the coronavirus outbreak.

This week, Apple raised fears of more global corporate troubles to come with a virus-caused revenue warning. The full ripple effects of the virus, and of the economic impact of humans scared to be with other humans, will show up in first quarter results, in particular in tourism, travel and on all Chinese and global companies that depend on Chinese supply chains and markets.

Despite all that, investor complacency persists in no small part due to a fundamental misunderstanding of how rapidly the world has changed, economically and politically. We are only in the opening pages of this new era of major power competition and technological change, and there’s no model to “price in” its impact.

Within democracies, the public’s faith has been shaken in capitalism and globalization to produce results that deliver greater prosperity. Most recently, that has driven everything from the recent Irish election victory of Sinn Fein, to the UK’s departure from the European Union, to the erosion of the German political center.

Most dramatic is the growing possibility that U.S. presidential elections this year could produce a showdown between two populists of different stripes but similar decibels, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Both are septuagenarian insurgents who appeal to hard-core, unconventional constituencies, and that’s prompted global concern that the new U.S. normal may be abnormal.

All of that is unfolding against a backdrop of a major power test that at its heart is a systemic struggle between democratic and authoritarian capitalist models. Though traditional security analysts continue to worry about how U.S.-Chinese, U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Iranian tensions could unravel into armed conflict, the more likely outcome is a resource-sapping, continual competition that stops short of kinetics but involves information warfare, cyber assaults, and economic clashes ranging from trade wars to targeted sanctions.

But let’s get back to investors and their complacency, which is as easy to explain as it is increasingly hard to justify.

Every time the global economy approached the brink in the decade since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, some intervening force pulled us back. The latest came last year when it looked as though the global economy might slow to below 2 percent GDP growth, generally considered a way to measure the onset of a global recession.

Central banks stepped up. As the International Monetary Fund has pointed out, 49 central banks cut interest rates 71 times last year. The result was a 0.5 percent global GDP boost, according to the IMF. Monetary policy saved the day.

Investors understand that coronavirus could be a major 2020 shock, but they are wagering again that something will prevent this from being an economic disaster. They realize the U.S. Fed and other central banks may have fewer monetary tools to deploy, so they are counting on increased fiscal stimulus from governments.

For example, Chinese lenders on Thursday cut their one-year loan prime rate, which is used across the financial system, by 0.1 percentage point to 4.05 percent. The result was a rallying of Chinese stocks that day of 2.2 percent of the benchmark CSI 300 index.

That followed the Chinese central bank’s cut to its medium-term lending rate this week, as well as dozens of other measures Beijing has introduced in recent days to support businesses hit by the epidemic. The Financial Times reports that China’s central bank thus far has made 300 billion RmB available to large lenders and local banks in hard-hit areas, particularly Hubei province.

Even so, the S&P Global Ratings forecast that China’s 2020 growth could fall to 4.4 percent from its 6 percent level last year, if the coronavirus hit continues through April. Most predictions of that sort probably err on the optimistic side, and it may be wishful thinking that China’s economy will make up most of what is being lost once coronavirus recedes.

Inflection Points

Feb 29, 2020

Coronavirus special edition: Europe’s historic test amid expanding, global ripples

By Frederick Kempe

If the EU and its member states respond smoothly and in a coordinated fashion, the coming days could reinforce the collective value of the European Union. Should the EU appear ineffective as the virus spreads, that will color European attitudes for decades to come.

Coronavirus Crisis Management

At the same time, the eurozone economy barely grew in the fourth quarter of 2019, up only 0.1 percent from the previous quarter, the slowest rate since 2013. Germany had zero growth. Real GDP in the eurozone was up just 0.9 percent in 2019, the slowest rate since 2013. (With the UK now leaving the EU, its leaders failed to agree on their budget on Friday due to insoluble differences.)

Governments across the world see these storm clouds, and a Bloomberg survey of economic forecasts shows that budgets are loosening in more than half of the world’s 20 biggest economies, providing some of the fiscal stimulus that central bankers have been seeking from their government counterparts.

Markets are wagering that the combination of fiscal and monetary measures will again prevent the worst.

However, what if they’re wrong?

Other than the United States, major central banks are tapped out, some of them experimenting with negative interest rates. Some experts argue that our low interest rate environment allows greater borrowing for fiscal stimulus.

That’s risky business.

Global debt is nearing $244 trillion, the highest level on record, and that’s not a good record to be breaking. Public debt is the highest in advanced economies since WWII. In a recent Atlantic Council report, Global Risks 2035 Update, author Mathew Burrows explores a worst-case scenario he calls “Descent into Chaos.” It starts with growing indebtedness hitting China first and then spreading to the Western world, triggering a worldwide economic meltdown.

Burrows isn’t in the business of predicting the timing of global downturns. Yet it would be unwise to take one’s eye off this ballooning debt at this moment of uncertainty.

Investors are counting on the playbook of the last decade to hold out for a little longer.

That’s a risky bet in this year of coronavirus, slowing growth, growing debt, and rising geopolitical uncertainty. We’re near the end of a bull run that’s in year ten of a seven-year cycle.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

MUST-READS FROM A WORLD IN TRANSITION

This week’s top reads include Nouriel Roubini’s look in Project Syndicate at the “blissful denial” of financial markets and Ashley J. Tellis’ rich look at U.S.-Indian relations in Foreign Affairs. New York Times reporters look at how the job of national security advisor is changing under Robert O’Brien, who came to the Atlantic Council recently to lay out his plans.

In a departure from form, Inflection Points includes some U.S. domestic politics, given Peggy Noonan’s rich look at the Bloomberg “catastrophe” in this week’s Democratic debate – and its meaning.

Don’t miss this week’s must-reads, the FT’s look at two unfolding disasters, one in Syria’s Idlib and the other on the Venezuelan border with Colombia.

#1. FINANCIAL MARKETS “BLISSFUL DENIAL”

The White Swans of 2020
Nouriel Roubini / PROJECT SYNDICATE

Famed economist Nouriel Roubini warns in Project Syndicate of financial markets blissful denial “of the many predictable global crises that could come to a head this year, particularly in the months before the US presidential election.”

In particular, he points to potential disturbances involving China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as “white swans,” rather than black swans, as it should be easier to see them coming. “Any of them could trigger severe economic, financial, political and geopolitical disturbances unlike anything since the 2008 crisis.” Read More →

#2. TRUMP IN INDIA

The Surprising Success of the U.S.-Indian Partnership
Ashley J. Tellis / FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has planned an “epic spectacle” to greet President Trump when he lands Monday in the western city of Ahmedabad for his first presidential visit to India.

Ashley Tellis delivers a brilliant scene-setter in Foreign Affairs, tracking why, three years into Trump’s “American First” presidency, “the strategic partnership with India that successive U.S. administrations have cultivated as a silent bulwark against China hasn’t just survived – it has flourished.” Read More →

#3. TRUMP AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Under O’Brien, N.S.C. Carries Out Trump’s Policy, but Doesn’t Develop It
Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger / NEW YORK TIMES

Trump’s national security advisor touts new “streamlined” National Security Council
David A. Wemer / THE ATLANTICIST

Few matters are more important than tracking the capability of President Trump’s national security team as he wrestles down a lengthening list of global challenges.

When the Atlantic Council recently hosted Robert C. O’Brien, the President’s new national security advisor, he impressed with his calm bearing, demonstrating the mettle that had made him one of America’s most effective hostage negotiators.

He laid out his plan to return the National Security Council staff to the size and effectiveness of the model introduced by General Brent Scowcroft, Atlantic Council chairman emeritus and two-time national security advisor. Read More →

New York Times reporters Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger, however, argue that by opening NSC staff meetings with printouts of Trump tweets, O’Brien is implicitly showing the job has morphed from one of advising presidents, to one “justifying, enacting or explaining” Mr. Trump’s policy.

This comes in a week when President Trump has removed his acting director of national intelligence, an act that prompted Admiral William H. McRaven (former commander of U.S. Special Operations) to pen a warning in the Washington Post of the perils “if good men …can’t speak the truth.” Read More →

#4. CAN BLOOMBERG RECOVER?

The Best Democratic Debate in Years
Peggy Noonan / WALL STREET JOURNAL

As a rule, Inflection Points doesn’t stray into U.S. domestic politics, except when it directly relates to international defining moments.

Yet as the U.S. election this year will be an Inflection Point of its own, this week’s top reads include Peggy Noonan’s rich look at this week’s stunning Democratic debate and what she called not a bad night for Bloomberg but a “catastrophe.”

 “Bad news/long-shot news: it was the worst performance in recent debate history – but if he can turn it around it will be the biggest comeback in modern primary history.” Read More →

#5. LIVES ABANDONED AND FORGOTTEN

‘It looks like judgment day’: inside Syria’s final battle
Chloe Cornish in Beirut and Asmaa al-Omar in Istanbul / FINANCIAL TIMES

Venezuela: refugee crisis tests Colombia’s stability
Michael Stott in Maicao and Gideon Long in Bogotá / FINANCIAL TIMES

This week’s two must-reads come from FT reporters tracking unfolding disasters in Syria and Venezuela, and the tragic refugee flows spawned by the cruelties of dictators Assad and Maduro – and by the failure of the civilized world to effectively oppose them.

“To hundreds of thousands of people who escaped other battles,” write reporters Chloe Cornish and Asmaa al-Omar, “Idlb …is now the scene of an unfolding humanitarian disaster and the dying days of Syria’s revolution” in a civil war that already has left 500,000 dead.

Michael Stott and Gideon Long report on how the shape of the Venezuelan crisis is changing, with wealthier and middle-class refugees in the first stages now being joined by poorer, older, sicker and more vulnerable Venezuelans.

“Unlike other humanitarian crises, it is a disaster caused not by war or natural disaster but by misrule on a grand scale,” they write.

PERSON OF THE WEEK

ATLANTIC COUNCIL TOP READS

New Atlanticist Mar 4, 2020

The “time is now or never” for Central Europe to grasp Three Seas opportunity, Estonia’s president says

By David A. Wemer

Now that an investment fund to fuel the development of stronger cross-border transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure links in Central and Eastern Europe has been launched, countries in the region “need to quickly decide” whether they want to participate before the opportunity vanishes, according to Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

New Atlanticist Mar 6, 2020

French minister: Europe is ready to prove its strength

By David A. Wemer

Despite anxiety about the state of the European Union in the face of Brexit and political populism, French Minister of State for European Affairs Amélie de Montchalin argued that there is growing evidence that Europeans are “starting to see Europe as capable of being strong [and] sovereign.” Recent joint European actions and renewed focus on building Europe’s ability to act autonomously has proved “that we can use the capabilities that we have, the power we already have, to take initiative,” de Montchalin said at the Atlantic Council on March 6.

European Union Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Mar 5, 2020

UK remains committed to positive global role after Brexit, defence secretary says

By David A. Wemer

“The security of Europe is vital to the United Kingdom’s security [and] that will not change because we have left the political union of the European Union,” UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said on March 5.

European Union NATO

The post Global investors underestimate downside economic risks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When we meet for breakfast in a downtown Kyiv cafe next to the central post office that serves as the nerve center of his vast postal empire, Smelyansky says the fuss is a symptom of the thinking that keeps millions of Ukrainians trapped in poverty. “I would be much richer if I accepted bribes,” he quips. This one-liner captures the essence of Smelyansky’s argument. He sees himself as a reformer on a mission to change the way the Ukrainian public sector operates, and makes no apologies for expecting to be paid the market rate. On the contrary, he believes the old practice of paying relative peanuts to top officials served as an open invitation for the kind of institutionalized corruption that has crippled the Ukrainian economy ever since the country first achieved independence in 1991. This is hard to argue with. Senior members of Ukraine’s public sector are notorious for living in multi-million dollar palaces and acquiring fleets of luxury cars while declaring absurdly low official salaries, with the illicit rich pickings on offer driving a culture where top positions are routinely sold to the highest bidder and complex networks of interdependency keep the corruption gravy train firmly on track. The only way to break this vicious circle, says Smelyansky, is to recruit a new generation of professionals and offer them salaries that can compete with the private sector.

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Since taking on the role of Ukrposhta CEO in 2016, Smelyansky has grown used to the idea that his salary is public knowledge. At first glance, his basic monthly pay of around $35,000 does indeed seem startlingly high by Ukrainian standards. With bonuses, he could potentially take home twice as much. However, he is quick to point out that this is actually far less than many CEOs in Ukraine’s private sector currently receive, and significantly lower than the salaries he himself has commanded in the past. Odesa-born Smelyansky came to Ukrposhta from the US, where he was headhunted for the post while working for KPMG in New York, having earlier graduated from George Washington University Law School and received an MBA from Georgetown University. Why did he agree to swap a promising career in the upper echelons of the corporate world for the uncertainties and turbulence of the post-revolutionary Ukrainian public sector? Like many other reformers, Smelyansky was enticed by the prospect of bringing about meaningful change in Ukraine and drawing a line under decades of dysfunction. “If I can change Ukrposhta, this symbol of the lingering Soviet mentality, then anything can be changed in Ukraine.”

The task he faced upon arrival at the helm of Ukraine’s national postal service could certainly be described as Herculean. The company he took over was the country’s second-largest employer with around 70,000 staff and over 11,000 branches. It was also riddled with corruption. “The whole system was in balance. Everyone was stealing,” he says. As a self-proclaimed disruptor intent on shaking up the entire institution, Smelyansky did not expect to receive a particularly warm welcome, but he did not shy aware from confronting his detractors. He recalls the moment in the early days of his tenure when he gathered a number of Ukrposhta managers into a meeting room overlooking the company car park and asked them to point to a single-vehicle parked outside that could be bought on their official salaries. A stony silence ensued. The gesture did not win him many friends, but he had made his point.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Confronting corruption was only part of the problem. Since 2016, Smelyansky has sought to transform the corporate culture within Ukrposhta and overcome the pervading sense of inertia that is all-too-common in the Ukrainian state sector. Over the past four years, he has begun the process of bringing the vast Ukrposhta branch network into the digital age, gotten the business model back on track by demanding market rates from the state for pension delivery services, and launched innovative initiatives such as an export school to teach Ukrainian SMEs how to sell their wares on Amazon and eBay. These efforts have produced striking increases in both revenues and postal traffic. Ukrposhta reported record annual profits last year of more than UAH 600 million. When Smelyansky arrived in 2016, the postal operator was shipping 46,000 express parcels per year. By early 2020, the figure was 47,000 per day. There has also been unprecedented international recognition. At the 2019 World Post and Parcel Awards in Dublin last summer, Ukrposhta’s E-Export Program took top spot globally in the Corporate Social Responsibility and Postal E-Commerce categories.

So far, these impressive results have failed to convince Smelyansky’s critics. He is philosophical about the negativity he continues to encounter, and argues that it may require a generational shift in thinking before attitudes evolve. “You have to begin teaching people at kindergarten age that professional success is a good thing,” he says. “The guy living in a mansion and driving a luxury sedan on an official salary of $300 is not a hero. The guy running a big company successfully and earning an honest salary is who you should aspire to be. As it is, people know the bosses are stealing, but they sleep better because they don’t know how much is being stolen. At the same time, they complain that I should not have such a high salary in a poor country, but the reason they are poor is because all the managers on low salaries already stole everything.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 13, 2020

Nation-building Ukraine marks a year of Orthodox independence

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine has recently marked one year of Orthodox independence. The country’s religious landscape has yet to change dramatically, but the significance for Ukraine’s nation-building journey cannot be overstated.

Civil Society Russia

UkraineAlert Feb 18, 2020

Russian escalation dampens hopes for peace in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russian hybrid forces in eastern Ukraine launched a series of artillery bombardments and localized advances early on February 18. What does this latest escalation mean for the already faint hopes of an end to the six-year conflict?

Conflict Russia

UkraineAlert Dec 12, 2019

European integration is taking root across Ukraine despite Russia’s best efforts

By Alyona Getmanchuk

A new nationwide study has highlighted the progress made across Ukraine towards greater European integration as the country seeks to move closer to the rest of Europe despite Russian efforts to derail the process and reassert its dominant position.

European Union Eurozone

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post The case for high state salaries in Europe’s poorest country appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For The Hill, Dr. Mathew Burrows, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy and Risks Initiative, and Atlantic Council Resident Fellow Julian Mueller-Kaler explain why trying to beat Trump in the race for cheap publicity is most certainly the wrong strategy for winning back the White House in November.

The post Democrats need more than histrionics to beat Trump in November appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Shahid in The Globe Post: What Drives Ethnic Cleansing in Post-Colonial South Asia? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the Leadership Excellence Institute Zeppelin, Atlantic Council Resident Fellow Julian Mueller-Kaler writes about the emergence of modern technologies and their potential social implications, should capitalism fail to reinvent itself.

The post Emerging technologies and their potential social implications appeared first on Atlantic Council.