Nationalism - Atlantic Council

Russia is destroying monuments as part of war on Ukrainian identity

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi, John Vsetecka — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 20:14:30 +0000

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, efforts continue to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian national memory. This campaign against monuments and memorials is chilling proof that Russia’s invasion goes far beyond mere border revisions and ultimately aims to wipe Ukraine off the map entirely.

The modern history of a single park in east Ukrainian city Luhansk offers insights into the memory war currently being waged by the Kremlin. In 1972, the Communist authorities in Soviet Luhansk decided to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR by transforming a local cemetery into a Friendship of Peoples Park. Once construction got underway, workers soon began uncovering mass graves of people murdered during the Stalin era. This news was suppressed until 1989, when it was belatedly reported in the local newspaper. One year later, a memorial to the victims of Stalinist mass killings was erected at the site.

This initial monument was part of a broader movement for historical justice that emerged in the twilight years of the USSR as local historians, journalists, and officials sought to document the crimes of the Communist authorities in the Luhansk region. Following Ukrainian independence, the opening of national archives made it possible to identify and honor victims of the Communist regime and end decades of censorship that had suppressed knowledge of Soviet crimes against humanity including the Holodomor, an artificially engineered famine in 1930s Ukraine that killed millions of Ukrainians.

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During the early years of Ukrainian independence, Luhansk’s Friendship of Peoples Park remained a space of contested memory. While retaining its old Soviet era name, it gradually acquired a range of new memorials including a monument to Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, a cross marking the grave of the city’s former mayor, and a memorial to the victims of the Holodomor.

In 2009, following decades of public pressure, the park was renamed as the Garden of Remembrance. At this point, it seemed as though the long task of restoring historical memory in Luhansk was finally complete. However, the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 transformed the memory politics of the region once again and revived many of the darkest chapters of the Soviet years.

When Kremlin forces occupied Luhansk in the spring of 2014, they soon began attempting to transform remembrance of the Soviet era. While monuments to Lenin were being dismantled elsewhere in Ukraine, the Russian authorities in Luhansk were erecting new monuments glorifying the Soviet past and celebrating the “liberation” of the city from Ukrainian rule. This mirrored similar processes that were underway in other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including nearby Donetsk and the Crimean peninsula.

Curiously, many memorials in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Soviet era initially remained untouched. This changed with the full-scale invasion of February 2022, which led to a more aggressive approach to the eradication of Ukrainian historical memory. In the second half of 2022, the Holodomor memorial in Mariupol was demolished. By summer 2024, the Russian occupation authorities had also dismantled monuments in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Holodomor and the Stalinist Terror.

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The occupation authorities in Luhansk have attempted to justify these measures by framing the Holodomor as a Ukrainian propaganda myth and positioning memorials to the victims of Soviet crimes as “pilgrimage sites for Ukrainian nationalists.” They have also argued that the dismantling of monuments is in response to grassroots demands from the local population.

Russia’s selective monument removals are part of a deliberate strategy to rehabilitate favorable aspects of the Soviet past while whitewashing the crimes of the Communist era. A similarly partisan approach has been adopted toward the historical role of Tsarist Russia. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to craft a narrative glorifying Russian imperialism that legitimizes Moscow’s land grab while suppressing any traces of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In this manner, Putin is weaponizing the past to serve his own present-day geopolitical ambitions.

The demolition of memorials is only one aspect of Russia’s war on Ukrainian national identity. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of being detained or simply disappearing. Speaking Ukrainian is considered a serious offense. Ukrainians are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship, while thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and sent to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination in camps designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Unlike earlier attempts to erase entire nations, today’s Kremlin campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is taking place in full view of international audiences in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. This poses fundamental challenges to the entire notion of a rules-based international order and represents a major obstacle to any future peace process. As long as Russia remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine, a truly sustainable settlement to today’s war will remain elusive.

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi is a PhD student of history at Harvard University and a lecturer at Kyiv School of Economics. John Vsetecka is an assistant professor of history at Nova Southeastern University.

On June 29, more than eight hundred participants from fifteen countries representing a dozen different religious denominations gathered in the historic heart of Kyiv for Ukraine’s annual National Prayer Breakfast. The day before the breakfast, two Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Father Ivan Levytsky and Father Bohdan Geleta, had been released from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange brokered by the Vatican Diplomatic Corps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the priests back to Ukraine in a speech that drew tears.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

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Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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#BalkansDebrief – Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? | A Debrief with Florian Bieber

sjones — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 14:08:16 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? Football and politics are deeply intertwined, especially in the Balkans, where the mix can be volatile. At the UEFA Euro Cup in Germany this year, nationalistic chants and provocative acts highlighted the ongoing tensions among Balkan nations. Serbia, Albania, and Croatia clashed not only in the stadiums but also in a display of ethnic rivalries.

In this episode Ilva Tare is joined by Florian Bieber, a renowned historian and professor at the University of Graz, specializing in inter-ethnic relations and nationalism in the Balkans. They discuss the complex role of football as both a catalyst for rivalry and a potential bridge for unity in the region.

How does football act as a double-edged sword, fueling both rivalry and potentially fostering unity in the Balkans?

How do nationalistic rhetoric and historical narratives shape the current tensions?

Can the younger generations break the cycle of resentment, or are they destined to inherit past grievances? What role can they play in reconciliation?

Given the political landscape, is peace in the Balkans a realistic goal? What concrete steps can governments and the international community take to foster stability?

Join #BalkansDebrief for a thought-provoking discussion on the dynamics of football, nationalism, and the quest for peace and reconciliation in the Balkans.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Explore the #BALKANSDEBRIEF series

SUBSCRIBE TO #BALKANSdebrief

listen to #bALKANSDEBRIEF as a podcast

MEET THE #BALKANSDEBRIEF HOST

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? | A Debrief with Florian Bieber appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin just reminded the world why Russia must lose

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 21:26:06 +0000

On the eve of last weekend’s Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, Vladimir Putin unveiled a peace proposal of his own. The presentation of this rival peace plan was an obvious attempt to undermine Ukraine’s Swiss initiative, but it also served as a timely reminder that Putin is waging an old-fashioned war of imperial conquest and will continue to escalate his demands until he is defeated.

Putin’s uncompromising vision for a future peace in Ukraine was widely condemned, with Kyiv officials and world leaders rejecting it as an “ultimatum.” Crucially, the terms outlined by the Kremlin leader would leave around twenty percent of Ukraine under Russian control, including significant portions of the country that Putin’s army has so far been unable to capture.

This new peace proposal is the latest example of the growing territorial demands that have accompanied Russia’s ten-year invasion of Ukraine. Time after time over the past decade, Putin has rejected accusations of an expansionist agenda, only to then escalate his invasion of Ukraine further.

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When Russia first attacked Ukraine in February 2014, Putin insisted Moscow had no territorial ambitions beyond the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. “We do not want to divide Ukraine,” he assured the watching world. Within weeks, however, Kremlin forces posing as locals had sparked a separatist war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

For the following eight years, Putin steadily strengthened his grip on the so-called “separatist republics” of eastern Ukraine, while consistently denying any direct involvement. The failure of the international community to hold Putin accountable for this shameless duplicity fuelled a sense of impunity in Moscow that set the stage for the largest European invasion since World War II.

In his February 2022 address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin once again denied harboring any ambitions to annex additional Ukrainian lands. “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory,” he stated. “We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.” Just six months later, Putin demonstrated the true value of his word by solemnly announcing the annexation of four more Ukrainian provinces.

Significantly, the invading Russian army did not fully control any of the Ukrainian provinces claimed by Putin in September 2022. This created a degree of ambiguity regarding the exact geographical extent of Russia’s goals, with Kremlin officials typically limiting themselves to vague calls for Ukraine to recognize the “new territorial realities” created by the front lines of the invasion.

Putin’s new peace plan has now removed all doubt. Indeed, he took special care to clarify that he expects the Ukrainian military to withdraw completely from the four Ukrainian provinces in question, including unoccupied areas. Among other things, this would mean handing over the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, with a prewar population of more than seven hundred thousand, along with Kherson, which was the only Ukrainian regional capital captured by the Russians before being liberated in November 2022.

Ukraine would also have to voluntarily demilitarize, accept geopolitical neutrality, and submit to “denazification,” Kremlin code for the suppression of Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of a Russian imperial ideology. In other words, Putin is insisting Ukraine admit defeat and surrender.

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The terms offered by Putin confirm that he has no intention of reaching a sustainable peace with Ukraine. On the contrary, the Russian dictator evidently remains as committed as ever to his overriding war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing the Ukrainian nation. As if to underline the point, Putin accompanied his latest demands with a chilling warning that “the existence of Ukraine” depends on Kyiv’s readiness to accept his conditions.

In fact, there is even more at stake than the continued existence of the Ukrainian state. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of global security is currently being determined on the battlefields of Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion succeeds, it will signal the dawning of a new era marked by rising international insecurity, ballooning defense budgets, and increasingly frequent wars of aggression.

A victorious Russia would almost certainly remain at the forefront of this descent into lawlessness for many years to come. Throughout the past decade, Putin has steadily escalated his invasion of Ukraine while shifting his entire country onto a war footing. By this point, it should be painfully clear to all objective observers that he will not stop until he is stopped. Indeed, Putin has openly compared today’s war to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great, and frequently speaks in terms of a sacred mission to “return historically Russian lands.”

As anyone with a passing knowledge of Russian history will confirm, there are at least fifteen other countries beyond Ukraine that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All are now potential targets. While it is impossible to know exactly what Putin will do next if he defeats Ukraine, the idea that he will simply choose to stop is perhaps the most far-fetched scenario of all.

Nor will Putin be the only authoritarian ruler looking to embrace a new age of imperial aggression. China, Iran, and North Korea are all already providing the Russian war effort with varying degrees of support, and make no secret of their eagerness to overturn the existing world order. If Moscow achieves an historic victory in Ukraine, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang will also be emboldened, along with a whole host of fellow autocrats throughout the Global South.

The only way to avoid a geopolitical future shaped by rising insecurity and resurgent imperialism is by ensuring Russia loses in Ukraine. Putin’s recent bogus peace proposal is essentially a call for Kyiv’s capitulation and the absorption of Ukraine into a new Russian Empire. This is entirely in line with the policies of escalation he has pursued throughout the past decade, and reflects an imperial agenda that leaves no room for meaningful compromise.

The Russian dictator still clearly believes he can overwhelm Ukraine with brute force while intimidating the wider Western world into inaction. If he succeeds, the consequences for international security will be devastating. Ukraine’s leaders have already responded to Putin’s latest demands with characteristic defiance. Kyiv’s international partners must now go further and provide the military support to secure Ukrainian victory.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Victory in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen Putin’s war machine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 20:58:43 +0000

What will Vladimir Putin do next if he wins in Ukraine? In recent months, more and more Western policymakers have reached the conclusion that a victorious Russia would almost certainly expand the war deeper into Europe as Putin seeks to rewrite the existing world order and continue on his crusade to return “historically Russian lands.” This realization is helping to rally support for Ukraine, with leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron now openly warning that a Russian victory would have disastrous consequences for the rest of Europe.

Not everyone is convinced, of course. Many skeptics point to the Russian army’s surprisingly poor performance during the invasion of Ukraine, and argue that Putin is clearly in no position to embark on further military adventures. According to the doubters, Russia’s obvious difficulties in Ukraine mean Moscow cannot be regarded as a genuine threat to the far greater military might of the NATO alliance. Indeed, some are convinced that any direct Russian attack on the West would amount to a suicide mission.

This argument is dangerously shortsighted. Crucially, it ignores the profound impact military success in Ukraine would have on the Kremlin’s ability to wage war. A Russian victory over Ukraine would transform the geopolitical situation, greatly strengthening Russia militarily, economically, and strategically, while at the same time severely weakening the West. Faced with such uniquely favorable circumstances, it is delusional to believe a triumphant Putin would simply stop and go no further.

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The Russian army has clearly failed to live up to its inflated prewar reputation in Ukraine, but it would nevertheless be reckless to underestimate Moscow’s military potential. Putin’s commanders have learned a series of important lessons since the start of the invasion in February 2022, and have acquired combat experience that no other major power can match. With a battle-hardened and rapidly modernizing army backed by a defense industry operating around the clock, Putin is now arguably in a stronger position relative to his slowly rearming Western adversaries than any Russian ruler since 1945. Victory in Ukraine would further widen this already alarming gap in military capabilities.

The Russian and Ukrainian armies are currently by far the largest and most formidable fighting forces in Europe. If Putin triumphs in Ukraine, he will control them both. While many Ukrainian soldiers would doubtless continue to wage a partisan war or seek to regroup abroad, a victorious Russia would look to rapidly conscript hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians into military service, just as it has already done in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. In addition to a massive manpower boost, Russia would also take possession of Ukraine’s extensive military equipment stores, ranging from stockpiles of artillery shells and attack drones to Western-supplied tanks and missile systems.

Control over Ukraine would allow Russia to reintegrate the vast Ukrainian military-industrial complex that played such a central role in arming the Red Army during the Cold War. For much of the Soviet era, Ukraine produced a large proportion of the USSR’s missiles, tanks, aircraft, and warships. This colossal industrial inheritance was neglected during the first three decades of Ukrainian independence and fell into a state of disrepair, but a Russian occupation administration or Kremlin-loyal puppet regime in Kyiv would likely prioritize the revival of military production. This increased output would allow Russia to rapidly recover from the punishing losses of the Ukrainian campaign, while also enabling Moscow to overcome many of the obstacles created by Western sanctions.

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Economically, the conquest of Ukraine would significantly improve Russia’s financial position and strengthen Moscow’s ability to shape world affairs. The Kremlin would acquire Ukraine’s sizable untapped energy reserves along with potentially trillions of dollars in mineral assets. Meanwhile, the famed Ukrainian breadbasket would enable Russia to establish itself virtually overnight as the dominant force on international agricultural markets. Putin has already demonstrated his readiness to weaponize global food security by blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Control over the Ukrainian farming industry would present the Kremlin with powerful new tools to reward allies and punish opponents.

Many in the Global South would not wait to be bribed with grain shipments or coerced by the threat of famine. Instead, they would readily recognize Russian victory in Ukraine as a major geopolitical turning point and would queue up in Moscow to pay their respects. The emphasis on diplomatic neutrality that is currently evident in much of Asia, Africa, and beyond, would be replaced by a scramble to strengthen ties with the Kremlin. Countries throughout the Global South would begin to ship arms and other military supplies to Moscow, while the West’s already limited ability to impose sanctions on Russia would become hopelessly compromised. Commentators everywhere would soon be trumpeting the dawn of a new post-Western era in international affairs.

Where would a strengthened and emboldened Putin be most likely to strike next? The Kremlin dictator has made clear that he sees the current war as an imperial quest to return “historically Russian lands.” Beyond Ukraine, there are more than a dozen other countries including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, and Moldova that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All would be potential targets. During the build-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021, Putin underlined the scale of his ambition by calling on NATO to retreat to the borders of the former Warsaw Pact. It seems reasonable to assume that success in Ukraine will only make him more ambitious.

There is certainly little to indicate that Putin is in any way intimidated by the West. Quite the opposite, in fact. The Russian ruler has proven so skilled at intimidating his enemies that almost two-and-a-half years into the largest European invasion since World War II, Kyiv’s partners remain preoccupied with avoiding escalation and continue to impose absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. This escalation management is the appeasement of the twenty-first century, and risks inviting the same tragic consequences.

If Russia does expand the war further, the one thing Western leaders cannot do is claim they were not warned. Putin has placed the whole of Russian society on a war footing and is openly preparing his entire country for a protracted struggle against the West. The current invasion is an important part of this struggle, but it is only the beginning. Russian victory in Ukraine would set the stage for even bolder acts of international aggression. It would supercharge Putin’s war machine and radically increase the cost of stopping him. The only way to avoid this disastrous outcome is by making sure the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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US House resolution: Russian abduction of Ukrainian children is genocide

Kristina Hook, Christopher Atwood — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 01:04:43 +0000

For the past month, the Russian military has targeted Ukraine’s civilian population and energy infrastructure with some of its largest nationwide missile and drone attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion just over two years ago. These bombardments underscore the urgency of a renewed push in the United States to pass a stalled military aid package for Ukraine.

Members of the US House of Representatives recently demonstrated that they understand what is at stake and are well aware of the crimes being committed by Russia in Ukraine. On March 19, the US House overwhelmingly passed a resolution “condemning the illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation” by a 390-9 margin.

Russia’s systematic and coordinated abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine has attracted global condemnation, and has led to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Russian government official Maria Lvova-Belova. Following in the footsteps of American allies in Europe, the recently adopted US House resolution signals a major bipartisan US policy shift in labeling and shaming Russian perpetrators.

Although nonbinding, the House’s condemnation officially formalizes individual remarks made by Congressional Representatives indicating that Russia is conducting a campaign of genocide in Ukraine. Specifically, this super-majority of Representatives, including key leaders like Speaker Mike Johnson, affirmed that Russia’s abduction, transfer, and forcible adoption of Ukrainian children is “contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and amounts to genocide.”

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By invoking the UN Genocide Convention, the House’s resolution stresses the severity of Russian crimes in Ukraine. Critically, it also denotes the resulting legal obligations to prevent and punish further genocidal acts against Ukrainians. In other words, Congress has finally recognized what countless experts and advocates have been asking them to acknowledge for much of the past two years.

As a principal author and a key contributor on two independent legal inquiries into the question of Russian genocide in Ukraine published by the New Lines Institute (Washington, DC) and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (Montreal, Canada), we applaud the House’s unequivocal language regarding these crimes and resulting legal obligations.

Our investigations have detailed the Kremlin’s escalating violence against the Ukrainian population over the past two years. Russia’s most recent actions targeting the civilian population fit into a broader pattern of genocidal objectives evident throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, prominent Russian media personalities closely tied to the Kremlin continue to advocate for the eradication of Ukraine.

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Amid mounting international efforts to hold Russian perpetrators to account for crimes taking place in Ukraine, it is important to stress that the central duty of the UN Genocide Convention is prevention rather than punishment. This implies active steps from signatories to ensure that further crimes are not committed and to keep Ukrainian children safe from abduction.

At the same time, the stark reality remains that no genocide has even been stopped in a courtroom. While accountability is vital for surviving victims, international legal processes often take decades and lack the enforcement mechanisms required to decisively end genocides in real-time. Instead, the duty to stop a genocide in motion falls squarely on every country that has ratified the Genocide Convention.

Human rights advocates are currently racing against the clock to locate Ukraine’s missing children and end the daily deportations that continue in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Once Ukrainian children are seized, experts have traced the Kremlin’s efforts to hide these young victims, while subjecting them to frightening surveillance and camps designed to eradicate their Ukrainian identity. The resolution adopted by the US House of Representatives in March confronted this issue squarely, declaring that “the Russian Federation is attempting to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children.”

Numerous survivor testimonies confirm that the best genocide prevention mechanism in Ukraine today is a fully-equipped Ukrainian army with staunch Western backing. Ukrainian officials know this all too well. With their troops now forced to ration ammunition amid growing supply shortages, they are urgently appealing for the international military aid they need to save their nation.

While the recent US House of Representatives resolution’s clear articulation of Russia’s genocidal crimes in Ukraine is a step in the right direction, Western leaders must follow such statements with the necessary actions. It is vital for Congress, along with the rest of the US government and governments around the world, to act without further delay and enact policies worthy of Ukraine’s courage and sacrifice. History is watching, and so is Vladimir Putin.

Kristina Hook is Assistant Professor of Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Christopher Atwood is a specialist on Eastern Europe and the Head of the Advisory Board at the Souspilnist Foundation.

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The sentiments expressed in this recently approved document expand on previous statements made by Patriarch Kirill since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church has frequently asserted that Ukrainians and Russians are “one nation,” and is widely viewed as a key ideological supporter of the war. Kirill’s comments have led to widespread criticism, including a warning from Pope Francis to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.”

The new decree positions Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of a larger spiritual struggle against the West, which it accuses of having “fallen into Satanism.” This is strikingly similar to the ideological arguments favored by Islamist radicals, who have long sought to portray the United States and other Western nations as “Satanic” as part of efforts to justify their extremist agenda. In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, numerous senior Kremlin officials have sought to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential fight with Western “Satanism.” In a further chilling echo of the Islamist doctrine, Patriarch Kirill has also claimed Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine would have their sins “washed away.”

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The Russian Orthodox Church’s endorsement of language more typically associated with religious extremism should come as no surprise. After all, the entire Russian invasion of Ukraine has been framed as a crusade from the very beginning. Following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin compared the occupied Ukrainian peninsula to Temple Mount and spoke of its spiritual importance to the Russian nation. He routinely insists Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has labeled Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The recent confirmation of a holy war against Ukraine and the West comes at a pivotal point in Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since February 2022, Putin’s invading army has been unable to overcome Ukrainian resistance or break the country’s will to defend itself. With little current prospect of a decisive military breakthrough, the Kremlin is now turning increasingly to terror tactics, including a sharp escalation in the bombing of Ukrainian cities and the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian power grid.

By defining the invasion in explicitly spiritual terms, the Russian Orthodox Church hopes to whitewash the war crimes being committed in Ukraine and encourage more ordinary Russians to volunteer. Moscow’s recent declaration of a holy war also sends an unmistakable message to anyone in the West who still believes in the possibility of striking some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. While Putin initially sought to justify the invasion as a pragmatic response to the growth of NATO, it is now apparent that he views the war as a sacred mission and will not stop until Ukraine has been wiped off the map of Europe.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv, Ukraine. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Putin first emerged on Russia’s political stage against a backdrop of terrorist attacks. When he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Putin was largely unknown to the wider Russian public. Weeks later, the country was rocked by a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and southern Russia.

Putin’s hard-line response to these attacks saw him rise to national prominence. This paved the way for his presidential election win in early 2000, while also serving as justification for the Second Chechen War. Putin’s use of macho street slang was welcomed by many, including his famous pledge to flush terrorists “down the toilet.”

In October 2002, armed militants seized a theater in the center of Moscow and held almost one thousand audience members hostage. The ensuing standoff ended in tragedy when a botched intervention by Russian security forces led to the deaths of more than 100 hostages. This incident was to become another key turning point in the Putin era.

In the wake of the theater siege, Putin passed a series of anti-terrorism laws restricting civil liberties. He also significantly strengthened Kremlin control over the Russian media, making it far more difficult for journalists to report critically on the authorities. Crucially, Putin sought to frame the theater attack as an act of “international terrorism.” This played an important role in transforming international perceptions of Russia’s fight against Chechen separatism by equating it with the US-led “War on Terror.”

The largest terrorist attack of the Putin era came in September 2004, when militants stormed a school in Beslan during traditional ceremonies to mark the first day of the new academic year. This high-profile crisis ended in carnage and the deaths of more than 300 hostages. The Beslan massacre transformed the political landscape in Russia. In the wake of the tragedy, Putin moved to end the direct election of regional governors and return to a system of appointment by the Kremlin. This reversed what was widely regarded as one of the main democratic achievements of the Yeltsin era.

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Throughout the 2010s, Russia experienced sporadic suicide bombings across the country. In 2017, an attack on the St. Petersburg metro system led to new restrictions imposed on the popular Telegram messaging app, after an investigation concluded that the platform had been used by terrorists to coordinate their activities.

With today’s Russia already an increasingly authoritarian state, it is not clear what measures remain available to the Kremlin in response to the recent Moscow attack. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the last vestiges of an independent press and civil society have been largely extinguished, while draconian legislation has criminalized any criticism of the war.

Some fear that the Moscow attack may spark a backlash against Russia’s large community of labor migrants, many of whom are Muslims from Central Asia. Meanwhile, some officials are already calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Given the scale of the attack and the rhetoric currently coming out of the Kremlin, most expect the response to be severe.

The March 22 attack in Moscow has seriously damaged Putin’s carefully crafted public image as a strongman ruler who offers his subjects security in exchange for restrictions on their personal freedoms. In order to reestablish his credentials, Putin is likely to target his enemies in Ukraine and the West. In line with past practice, he will also look to tighten his grip inside Russia itself.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 21:09:13 +0000

Over the past week, representatives of the Islamic State have gone to considerable lengths to confirm they were behind the March 22 attack on a Moscow concert hall that left more than 140 people dead. In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the radical Islamist group issued a series of statements claiming responsibility. They then went even further, circulating visual proof including graphic bodycam video footage filmed by one of the assailants.

Despite overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists, Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming Ukraine. While the Russian dictator has acknowledged the atrocity was carried out by Islamist militants, he has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits.

The first clear sign that Putin would seek to implicate Ukraine came on the day after the attack. In an official address to the nation, Putin announced that four suspects had been caught while attempting to reach Ukraine, before accusing the Ukrainian authorities of “preparing a window” for them to cross the border.

This version of events made little sense, given the massive military presence along Russia’s wartime border with Ukraine and the intense security spotlight on the wider region. Putin’s far-fetched story of a Ukrainian escape plan has subsequently been further undermined by his closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has stated that the terror suspects initially attempted to flee across the border into Belarus and not Ukraine.

None of this has deterred Putin. On the contrary, the campaign to blame Ukraine has continued to gain momentum in the wake of the Moscow massacre. The Kremlin-controlled Russian state media has openly questioned the claims of responsibility made by Islamic State, and has directly accused Ukraine of being behind the terror attack.

Russian officials have followed suit, with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stating that Ukraine was “of course” responsible for the attack and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin naming “the bloody regime of Ukraine” along with Washington and Brussels as the organizers of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Putin himself has doubled down on his earlier accusations, and has attempted to position the Moscow terrorist attack as part of a ten-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have rejected Russia’s groundless accusations, suggesting instead that Putin is seeking to exploit the tragedy in order to provide further false justification for the invasion of Ukraine. “Do not let Putin and his henchmen dupe you,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “Their only goal is to motivate more Russians to die in their senseless and criminal war against Ukraine, as well as to instill even more hatred for other nations, not just Ukrainians, but the entire West.”

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Russia has yet to produce any credible evidence supporting its claims of a Ukrainian role in the Moscow terror attack. Instead, the Kremlin appears content to rely on a combination of unfounded allegations, conspiracy theories, and innuendo. This is entirely in keeping with the cynical information strategy that has accompanied the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been based on deceit and distraction from the very beginning.

When Putin first launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014, he did so with a lie so large and so transparent that in retrospect it is difficult to believe it actually happened. As his troops methodically seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, the Kremlin dictator appeared before global audiences and repeatedly denied any Russian military involvement whatsoever. Instead, he insisted that the thousands of well-armed and disciplined troops involved in the operation were actually local militias.

This astonishing duplicity set the tone for the following eight years as Putin expanded the war by occupying much of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout this period, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge any direct role in hostilities and maintained an official policy of blanket denials, despite the fact that the presence of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine was the world’s worst kept secret. In addition to denying Russia’s obvious involvement, the Kremlin also waged an unprecedented information war to discredit and dehumanize Ukrainians.

For the past decade, the most consistent element of Russia’s anti-Ukrainian disinformation offensive has been the depiction of modern Ukraine as a “Nazi” state. This has been a Kremlin propaganda trope for many decades and was a prominent element of Soviet attempts to demonize Ukraine’s statehood ambitions during the Cold War. Putin has enthusiastically revived this tradition and has used it to justify his quest to extinguish Ukrainian independence. Few were surprised in February 2022 when he cited “de-Nazification” as the main goal of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Putin’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda resonates well with Russian audiences drenched in the Kremlin’s World War II mythology, but has been significantly less effective internationally. It is not hard to see why. After all, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, while support for far-right political parties in Ukraine is lower than in most other European countries, with a coalition of Ukrainian nationalist parties receiving just 2% of the vote in the country’s most recent parliamentary election in 2019. Indeed, the entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative is so ridiculous that even US media personality Tucker Carlson, who can usually be relied upon to echo Kremlin talking points, recently admitted it was “one of the dumbest things I’d ever heard.”

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The Kremlin’s attempts to blame the war on NATO expansion have proved far more persuasive among international audiences, but even this seemingly rational explanation has been undermined by Russia’s own recent actions. Putin has frequently stated that NATO enlargement since 1991 poses an intolerable security threat to Russia, but when neighboring Finland and nearby Sweden responded to the invasion of Ukraine by joining the alliance, he reacted with almost complete indifference and made no effort to obstruct the process.

The contrast between Putin’s evident lack of interest in NATO’s Nordic enlargement and his bellicose denunciations of Ukraine’s far flimsier ties to the alliance could hardly be starker. Far from threatening a military response, the Russian ruler actually downplayed the entire issue of Finnish and Swedish membership, and even withdrew the bulk of his troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia itself, and only objects to the alliance if it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine. This relentless flood of disinformation is designed to cloud perceptions and disguise the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As the invasion has unfolded, Putin has become increasingly frank about his true motivations, especially when addressing domestic audiences. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while claiming they would now be part of Russia “forever.” With increasing frequency, Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist and characterizes the war as a crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Ukrainians are painfully aware of Russia’s genocidal goals and have long since grown used to the shameless disinformation being pushed by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of their country. In recent days, many Ukrainians have responded to allegations of their alleged involvement in the Moscow terror attack with typical gallows humor, quipping that according to Putin, “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state headed by a Jewish President.”

The Kremlin’s ludicrous conspiracy theories certainly deserve to be ridiculed, but the implications for millions of Ukrainians are no laughing matter. As Russian dissident Garry Kasparov noted this week, “mocking the absurdities of authoritarians is a worthy endeavor, as long as we never lose sight of how dictatorships like Russia use their laughable lies to justify oppression and murder.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Vladimir Putin’s history obsession is a threat to world peace

Nicholas Chkhaidze — Tue, 19 Mar 2024 20:29:14 +0000

History has always served as an ideological battlefield, but few rulers in the modern era have weaponized the past quite as ruthlessly as Vladimir Putin. For more than two years, the Russian dictator has sought to justify Europe’s largest invasion since World War II by portraying it as a sacred mission to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Putin’s preoccupation with history has become increasingly evident as his reign has progressed, and is closely linked to his deep-seated resentment over the perceived historical injustice of the 1991 Soviet collapse. As early as 2005, Putin was lamenting the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

This sense of injustice has helped fuel Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, a neighboring country that many Russians still regard as a core part of their own nation’s historical heartlands. The existence of an independent Ukraine has long been resented by Putin as a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. Since the early years of his reign, he has made the subjugation of Ukraine one of his foreign policy priorities.

During the initial stages of the Kremlin campaign to reassert Russian authority over independent Ukraine, considerable effort was made to undermine the historical legitimacy of the Ukrainian state among Russian audiences and inside Ukraine itself. As Russian aggression against Ukraine escalated, the Kremlin’s war on Ukrainian history also expanded, with Ukrainians demonized as “Nazis” and dismissed as an “artificial nation.”

Years of increasingly hostile rhetoric paved the way for military aggression. When Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, he began referring to southern and eastern Ukraine as “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). His decision to revive long-forgotten imperial terminology from the Czarist era was the clearest indication yet that Putin intended to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and reverse more than a century of European history.

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Putin formalized his denial of Ukrainian statehood in a controversial history essay published in July 2021. Entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” this remarkable document laid out Putin’s rejection of Ukraine’s right to exist, while arguing at length that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Putin’s essay laid the ideological groundwork for the full-scale invasion that commenced months later.

Over the past two years, history has remained a key front in the struggle to justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the first summer of the war, Putin directly compared himself to Peter the Great and likened the invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century Russian Czar’s wars of imperial conquest.

A year later, Putin ordered the launch of new history textbooks for Russian schoolchildren along with curriculum changes with the apparent aim of legitimizing the ongoing military campaign to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. This was part of a broader trend within Russia to bring the country’s official historical narrative into line with Putin’s increasingly radical brand of revisionism.

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Strikingly, Putin chose to use his high-profile February 2024 interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson as a platform to frame the war in Ukraine as a quest for historical justice. While Carlson clearly wanted Putin to blame NATO and the US for the invasion, Putin himself preferred to embark on a rambling half-hour history lecture explaining the ancient roots of Russia’s claim to Ukraine.

Other senior Russian officials have taken their lead from Putin’s weaponized version of history. The most prominent example of this trend is former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who regularly employs historical references in his frequent attacks on Ukraine and the wider Western world. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever. Ukraine is definitely Russia,” he declared in March 2024.

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its third year, Putin’s historical motivations are becoming more and more apparent. He regularly declares that major Ukrainian cities such as Odesa and entire regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian,” indicating that his imperial ambitions are still far from satisfied.

Many are now asking how far Putin intends to go. He has often expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was the Russian Empire under a different name. If Putin takes his crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands” further and expands the definition to include all of the former Czarist domains, this would place more than a dozen additional countries at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Putin has weaponized history to justify the genocidal invasion of Ukraine and dehumanize the entire Ukrainian nation. Unless he is stopped in Ukraine, the Russian dictator will use the same bogus historical arguments to launch new imperial adventures.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a Research Fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

If these punishing terms had been implemented in spring 2022, It would surely only have been a matter of time before a disarmed and isolated Ukraine found itself facing a fresh Russian invasion with little hope of defending itself. In other words, Putin’s widely touted peace proposal was in fact an attempt to secure the surrender of the Ukrainian state.

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The publication of Putin’s punitive peace plan did not deter Pope Francis from entering the debate in early March with his own controversial call for Ukraine to “have the courage to raise the white flag” and negotiate with Russia. The Pope’s comments sparked outrage in Ukraine and across Europe, with a number of senior officials condemning the religious leader. Days later, the Vatican was forced to backtrack, with Cardinal Pietro Parolin clarifying that the onus in any future peace process should be on Russia as the “aggressor” country.

The most ominous recent contribution to the debate over possible future negotiations has come from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Following his meeting with former US President Donald Trump in Florida, Orban announced that if re-elected in November, Trump plans to cut all US support for Ukraine. “If the Americans don’t give money, the Europeans alone are unable to finance this war. And then the war is over,” commented the Hungarian leader.

These revelations were not entirely unexpected. Indeed, the current deadlock in Congress over US military aid for Ukraine is widely seen as a reflection of Donald Trump’s personal position. Nevertheless, Ukrainians were dismayed by Orban’s claims that Trump’s vision for peace amounts to abandoning Ukraine and letting Russia win. Far from ending the war, this approach would mean the end of Ukraine.

Putin himself has since underlined the obvious flaws in Trump’s strategy. In a March 13 interview, the Kremlin dictator dismissed the idea of peace talks at a time when his army has regained the battlefield initiative thanks in large part to Ukraine’s mounting weapons shortages. “It would be ridiculous for us to start negotiating with Ukraine just because it’s running out of ammunition,” Putin stated.

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At present, the potential negotiating positions of Russia and Ukraine remain poles apart. While Kyiv insists on a complete end to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and the payment of reparations for war damage, the Russian leadership is becoming more and more maximalist in its demands. Putin and other senior officials have long insisted Ukraine cede five partially occupied provinces to Russia. With Russia’s military prospects improving and international support for Ukraine wavering, the Kremlin now appears to embracing even more ambitious goals.

Putin used his high-profile February 2024 interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson to position the war as an historic mission to reclaim “Russian lands.” Meanwhile, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has gone even further, declaring in early March that “Ukraine is definitely Russia.”

These maximalist statements tally with the Kremlin’s increasingly vitriolic anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which portrays Ukraine as an enemy of Russia and an instrument of the West’s anti-Russian policy. For the past two years, the invasion of Ukraine has been depicted by the Kremlin as an existential struggle, with Russia’s national survival dependent on the total subjugation of Ukraine.

This framing makes it difficult to see how any kind of negotiated settlement could prove enduring. On the contrary, while Moscow may seek to temporarily pause hostilities for strategic reasons, it is now obvious that the Putin regime has committed Russia to a long-term war of aggression with the clear goal of destroying Ukraine.

Ukrainians are well aware of Russia’s genocidal agenda. They see the daily incitement to genocide on Kremlin TV, and are regularly confronted with fresh evidence of efforts to eradicate Ukrainian identity throughout occupied regions of Ukraine. Understandably, the vast majority of Ukrainians see no room for compromise between Russian genocide and their own survival. Instead, they are committed to fighting on until Ukraine can achieve the basis for long-term national security.

There are indications that Ukraine’s partners are increasingly recognizing the need for comprehensive security guarantees. Since January 2024, Ukraine has signed a series of bilateral security agreements with partner countries including Britain, France, and Germany. While these documents do not qualify as military alliances, they do formalize current cooperation while outlining avenues for future defense sector partnership.

In recent weeks, French President Emmanuel Macron has raised the stakes further by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. Macron’s suggestion has sparked considerable alarm among European leaders, but supporters have noted that the West gains nothing by signalling its own red lines to the Kremlin. Bilateral security agreements and the French President’s increasingly bold rhetoric cannot replace the unrivaled security provided by NATO membership, but these recent developments do indicate growing recognition in Western capitals that European peace depends on a secure Ukraine.

With Russia’s invasion now in its third year, factors such as Ukraine’s failed 2023 counteroffensive and creeping Ukraine fatigue among the country’s Western partners are contributing to calls for a compromise settlement to end the war. At the same time, Putin appears more confident than ever that he can achieve his expansionist goals and is clearly in no hurry to return to the negotiating table.

In the current circumstances, the best way to secure a lasting peace is by demonstrating to the Kremlin that Russia’s hopes of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood are futile. Putin only understands the language of strength. With this in mind, Ukraine’s international partners must send an unambiguous message to Moscow by ditching their “as long as it takes” mantra and deploying the full weight of their overwhelming economic and technological superiority. This would be more than enough to give Ukraine a decisive battlefield advantage and set the stage for victory over Russia.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that a premature peace with Putin would only lead to more war. Advocates of a negotiated settlement would be wise to listen to these Ukrainian concerns before calling on Kyiv to compromise with the Kremlin. As Winston Churchill observed, meeting jaw to jaw is better than war. However, in this particular case, it should be evident to all that there can be no durable peace in Europe until Ukraine is safe from Russian aggression.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

The local residents we met during our recent visit recalled how the most violent Russian troops had seemed to sincerely believe that by killing Ukrainians they were saving Russia. Nevertheless, those who lived through the occupation did not express fear. Despite facing desperate living conditions and constant insecurity, there was no sense of despair. Instead, they were surer than ever in their identity. We are Ukrainians, they told us.

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Vladimir Putin provided ample indication of his intentions during the buildup to the February 2022 invasion. In a remarkable summer 2021 essay, he argued at length that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), while portraying independent Ukraine as an artificial and hostile entity. This document was widely interpreted as a declaration of war on Ukrainian national identity. It was soon being distributed to Russian soldiers, with the aim of convincing them that it was both necessary and justified to apply the harshest possible measures against anyone who insists on identifying as Ukrainian.

Once the invasion began, it was immediately apparent that this was a war against every aspect of Ukrainian national identity including language, culture, and heritage. This genocidal agenda was spelled out in a high-profile editorial that briefly appeared on Kremlin media platforms in the first days of the invasion before being quietly deleted once it became clear that the triumphant tone of the article was premature. Employing the lexicon of imperial conquest, the author credited Putin with solving the “Ukrainian question” for future generations, and trumpeted the restoration of Russia to its “historic fullness.”

As the invasion unfolded, advancing Russian troops were soon putting the Kremlin’s imperialistic ideology into practice. In a chilling echo of tsarist and Soviet crimes against humanity, Ukrainian community leaders, activists, and patriots were hunted down and abducted, while hundreds of thousands of people living in occupied areas were subjected to forced deportation. Those who remained were confronted with blanket russification and pressured to accept Russian citizenship.

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The Russian invasion has also targeted Ukraine’s national heritage. Hundreds of cultural heritage sites have been damaged or destroyed including museums, galleries, churches, and places of historical importance. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian artifacts and priceless national treasures have been stolen and shipped back to Russia, where they have in many cases been repackaged as Russian relics. Significant numbers of Russian academics and museum curators have acted as accomplices in these crimes.

Today’s war on Ukrainian culture is reminiscent of the Stalin regime’s campaign to destroy an entire generation of Ukrainian cultural leaders during the early decades of the Soviet era. This doomed generation of 1920s and 1930s Ukrainian poets, writers, and artists has come to be known as the “Executed Renaissance.” Like their Soviet predecessors, Putin’s invading army has also targeted contemporary writers, musicians, and artists as living symbols of Ukrainian cultural identity.

In a very real sense, Russia’s total war against Ukrainian identity and culture is actually an admission of failure. It reflects the fact that Ukrainians have resoundingly rejected the Kremlin’s so-called “Russian World,” recognizing it as a ploy to subjugate Ukraine. This has left Putin with no option but to resort to force.

Russia’s invasion recently passed the two-year mark with no end in sight. But while nobody knows when or how the war will end, it is already apparent that Russia will not succeed in erasing Ukraine. On the contrary, the invasion has helped fuel an unprecedented consolidation of Ukrainian identity that many have likened to a national coming of age. Putin believed Ukraine was weak and would soon collapse under the overwhelming weight of his invading army. Instead, Ukrainian national identity has been strengthened in a manner so profound that it may only become fully apparent in the decades to come.

Danylo Lubkivsky is director of the Kyiv Security Forum. He is the former Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and ex-Chair of Ukraine’s UNESCO Commission.

Putin is on an historic mission and will not stop until he is finally defeated

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 11:34:27 +0000

There was no escaping the mounting sense of gloom in late February as the world marked the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion. While a chorus of international leaders voiced their determination to continue standing with Ukraine, it is now evident that Russia holds the upper hand as the conflict evolves into a grinding war of attrition. Indeed, with the future of US military aid in doubt, the mood among Ukraine’s partners is visibly darkening as thoughts turn to the disastrous consequences of a potential Russian victory.

In recent weeks, more and more Western leaders have begun publicly warning that their countries may soon become targets of Russian aggression. The latest leader to sound the alarm was French President Emmanuel Macron, who stated on February 26 that Russia could attack NATO member states “in the next few years.” Macron also sparked a heated debate by refusing to rule out sending Western troops to Ukraine.

Not everyone believes a victorious Putin would inevitably go further. Many remain skeptical and claim the Russian dictator is only interested in Ukraine. Others point to the Russian army’s well-documented difficulties during the current invasion as evidence that any Russian attack on the NATO alliance would amount to military suicide. These arguments reflect a fundamental failure among many in the West to grasp the true motives behind Russia’s invasion and the nature of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions.

When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he initially sought to portray it as a defensive measure against “Ukrainian Nazis” and NATO expansion. However, as the conflict has unfolded, it has become increasingly apparent that the Kremlin is waging an old-fashioned colonial war of imperial expansion.

In summer 2022, Putin directly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he proclaimed the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces while declaring them to be “historically Russian lands.” He has since asserted that “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of mankind,” and has issued orders for all traces of Ukrainian national identity to eradicated from areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control.

Putin’s historical motivations were perhaps most immediately obvious during his recent interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson. While Carlson openly encouraged Putin to blame NATO and the US for the invasion, the Russian ruler preferred to embark on a half-hour history lecture that placed the origins of the current war firmly in the distant past. Rather than seeking to justify his invasion in terms of contemporary geopolitics, Putin chose to argue that Ukraine was historically Russian and therefore a legitimate target.

Putin’s chilling dream of reclaiming “historically Russian lands” puts a large number of countries at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine. The Kremlin strongman is notorious for lamenting the collapse of the Soviet Union, but his revisionist ambitions actually extend beyond the boundaries of the former USSR. On numerous occasions, Putin has expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was in fact a continuation of the Russian Empire, while the fall of the USSR was “the disintegration of historical Russia.” “What had been built up over 1000 years was largely lost,” he commented in December 2021.

Based on this twisted logic, the historical arguments used by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine could be equally applied to any country that was once part of the Russian Empire. This would result in a list of potential targets including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole of Central Asia, not to mention Alaska. Anyone tempted to dismiss the idea of Russia invading these countries should consider that just ten years ago, most Ukrainians were equally sure such things were impossible in the twenty-first century.

Nor is Putin solely motivated by his deep-seated desire to reverse Russia’s imperial decline. He also sees the invasion of Ukraine as a fight to end the era of Western dominance and establish a new multi-polar world order. After decades spent bristling at Russia’s reduced status and the perceived humiliations of the post-Soviet period, he is now attempting to frame the war in Ukraine as a battle against Pax Americana to shape the future of international relations. Putin believes victory over Ukraine would represent a decisive breakthrough that would undermine the entire post-1991 world order and reverse the verdict of the Cold War.

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Doubters argue that the Russian army is currently in no shape to undertake any further invasions, never mind confronting the military might of NATO itself. This reasoning is superficially persuasive. After all, Putin’s army has seen its reputation as the world’s number two military take a severe battering in Ukraine. Russian commanders have lost a series of key battles and have suffered catastrophic losses in both men and equipment that have left them increasingly dependent on the brute force of primitive human wave tactics.

Despite these setbacks, it would be foolish to underestimate Russia’s military potential. In the past two years, Putin has placed the entire Russian economy on a war footing. Armaments factories are now working around the clock and are already comfortably outproducing the entire NATO alliance in terms of artillery shells and other key armaments. Russia may have lost hundreds of thousands killed and wounded in Ukraine, but the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of fighting age men who can be mobilized in time for the next big invasion.

Skeptics also tend to overlook the likely impact of victory in Ukraine on Russia’s military capabilities. In practical terms, the conquest of Ukraine would secure hundreds of thousands of additional conscript troops and a vast array of new weapons for the Russian army. Control over Ukraine would significantly enhance the Kremlin war machine by offering renewed access to a range of major Ukrainian enterprises that previously played key roles in the Soviet military industrial complex. It would make Russia the dominant force on global agricultural markets, handing Moscow enormous leverage that could be used to bribe allies and deter opponents.

Crucially, success in Ukraine would provide Putin with enormous additional momentum while simultaneously destabilizing and demoralizing the whole democratic world. Inside Russia, pro-war sentiment would be further strengthened and Putin’s messianic vision of a new Russian Empire would be vindicated. Internationally, Russia’s existing allies would feel free to increase their support, while the countries of the nonaligned Global South would rush to strengthen ties with the triumphant Kremlin. In such a favorable geopolitical climate, Putin would doubtless find it difficult to resist the temptation to escalate his confrontation with the West. Indeed, he would almost certainly see it as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to achieve his historic mission.

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This does not mean we should expect to see Russian tanks on the streets of NATO capitals any time soon. Putin knows he can reach his goals by discrediting NATO rather than actually defeating the alliance on the battlefield. With this in mind, the Kremlin would be far more likely to opt for the kind of hybrid tactics employed during the early stages of the Ukraine invasion in 2014. Indeed, it is all too easy to imagine unidentified Russian troops operating inside NATO territory behind a veil of barely plausible deniability.

An escalation of hybrid warfare against the NATO alliance would enable Moscow to exploit the lack of resolve and fear of escalation demonstrated by Western leaders over the past two years in Ukraine. Would the current generation of US, German, or French leaders be prepared to involve their countries in a war with Russia over an ambiguous “pro-Russian” uprising in an Estonian border town? If not, the absence of a decisive response could fatally undermine NATO’s core commitment to collective defense. The alliance might formally survive such a blow, but the loss of credibility would be catastrophic. It would not be long before individual NATO member countries started forming separate security arrangements of their own and began offering concessions to the Kremlin.

Even if Putin chooses not to test NATO directly, a Russian victory in Ukraine would transform the international security environment and dramatically increase the risk of a truly global war. European countries would be forced to rapidly rearm, with defense budgets soon ballooning to levels that far surpass the current costs of supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Those who begrudge today’s spending on Ukraine would find themselves confronted with security expenditure five or ten times higher.

Putin himself has provided ample evidence that his goals extend far beyond the reconquest of Ukraine. He makes no secret of his commitment to reclaiming what he regards as historically Russian lands, and believes he is fully justified in using military force to do so. Putin’s revisionist agenda is inextricably linked to his other great passion, namely the revival of Russia’s great power status as part of a post-Western world dominated by a handful of regional behemoths. These imperial ambitions led directly to the invasion of Ukraine and make further escalations virtually inevitable unless Russia is defeated.

Ultimately, it is impossible to predict exactly what Putin will do if he wins in Ukraine. He may initially choose to pursue low-hanging geopolitical fruit by seizing small neighborhood countries like Moldova or Georgia. Alternatively, he might seek to press home his advantage against a weakened West by embarking on far bolder military gambits targeting the Baltic states or the Suwałki Gap. Of the many possible post-Ukraine scenarios for Russia, the least likely of all is the idea that an emboldened and victorious Putin would simply stop.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Putin initially sought to portray the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a crusade against “Ukrainian Nazis” and a response to decades of NATO expansion. However, as the war has unfolded, he has become increasingly open about the true nature of his imperial agenda in Ukraine. Putin has directly compared the current invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great, and spent much of his recent high-profile interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson attempting to justify today’s war by arguing that Ukraine was historically part of Russia.

Dmitry Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s influential Security Council, is notorious for echoing Putin’s imperialistic language toward Ukraine. Indeed, he has frequently been even more outspoken than Putin in his denial of Ukrainian statehood and his attacks on Ukraine’s allies. In recent months, Medvedev has warned of possible nuclear attacks on Washington, Berlin, and London, and has vowed to seize more Ukrainian territory including Kyiv.

All this is a far cry from Medvedev’s public persona in 2008 when he replaced Putin as Russian President. At the time, many in the West saw Medvedev as a liberal reformer who would steer Russia toward closer partnership with the West. In fact, the entire Medvedev presidency was a ploy designed to help Putin navigate a two-term constitutional limit before resuming his reign in 2012.

As his political star has waned, Medvedev has sought to reinvent himself as a Russian nationalist hawk. Although often derided as a somewhat buffoonish figure, the former head of state actually plays an important part in Russia’s carefully choreographed political theater. Following the death of Russian nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 2022, Medvedev has largely replaced Zhirinovsky as the Kremlin’s unofficial “court clown.”

In this role, Medvedev often makes outrageous statements and voices extremist opinions. This allows the Kremlin to gauge Russian public opinion and test international reaction, while also making Putin himself appear moderate in comparison. With Russia now actively seeking to deter international support for Ukraine by playing on Western fears of escalation, Medvedev’s often colorful threats have become a key element of the Kremlin’s information operations.

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Medvedev’s latest outburst is nothing new, of course. Indeed, senior Russian officials have been publicly questioning Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the early years of the post-Soviet era. This undercurrent of unapologetic imperialism was one of the main reasons why independent Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma, chose to write a book debunking Russia’s claims to his country. The publication of “Ukraine Is Not Russia” in 2003 directly challenged the Kremlin’s attempts to portray Ukrainians and Russians as indivisible, and was widely viewed in Moscow as a hostile act. Clearly, many within the Russian elite have not forgotten this very public rejection by a country they condescendingly regard as a younger sibling.

In the years following the appearance of Kuchma’s book, Ukraine underwent two pro-democracy revolutions, while Russia grew increasingly authoritarian. For the past decade, Russia’s escalating military aggression against Ukraine has served to further deepen the divide separating the two countries. As Ukrainian society has turned away from the Russian past and sought to embrace a European future, Russian public opinion toward Ukraine has become increasingly radicalized. Genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now an everyday feature of the country’s political discourse and has been completely normalized throughout the Kremlin-controlled Russian media.

By declaring that “Ukraine is definitely Russia” and referring to the country as “an integral part of Russia’s strategic and historical borders,” Medvedev has made a mockery of international calls for a negotiated settlement to end the war. His unambiguous comments should be more than enough to remove any lingering doubts that Russia is committed to the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

In such circumstances, any talk of a peace deal without Ukrainian victory is delusional. There can be no meaningful middle ground between Russia’s genocidal goal and Ukraine’s national survival. Instead, attempts to compromise with the Kremlin would be perceived in Moscow as an opportunity to rearm and regroup before launching the next phase of the invasion.

Many people like to laugh at Dmitry Medvedev. On social media, he is routinely depicted as an angry little man whose absurd antics are a symptom of Russia’s dysfunctional politics and his own personal struggle to remain relevant. However, there is nothing funny about the message he is now delivering. Medvedev’s comments confirm the imperialistic aims of the 2022 invasion and signal Moscow’s intention to wipe Ukraine off the map. With hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians already feared dead and dozens of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble, his threats must be treated as deadly serious.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He was awarded the Peterson Literary Prize for his book “Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality” (Routledge, 2022).

Carlson admitted to being initially shocked and annoyed by this monologue, but eventually concluded that Putin’s insistence on articulating his historic claims to Ukraine was actually “a sincere expression of what he thinks.” This seems a fair assessment. Putin’s obsession with history is well known, as is his conviction that Ukrainians are in fact Russians. Indeed, anyone who has listened to Putin’s many public statements on the topic of Ukraine or read his 2021 essay on the “historical unity” of Russians and Ukrainians will have been more than familiar with the content of his latest lecture.

While Putin has often been accused of weaponizing history, it was nonetheless revealing that he should choose to prioritize his historical grievances in such a setting. After all, this was the Russian president’s first major interaction with the Western press since the start of the Ukraine invasion almost two years ago. Tucker Carlson had been handpicked for the occasion, having won the trust of Moscow officials via years of pro-Kremlin messaging in the US media.

The interview was viewed by many within the Putin regime as a rare chance for Russia to make its case on its own terms to a truly global audience. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, things did not go according to plan. Rather than coming away convinced by the rationality of Putin’s arguments, many viewers were left bewildered by his arcane references to medieval princes and seventeenth century diplomatic correspondence.

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Needless to say, much of Putin’s lecture was complete nonsense that echoed longstanding Russian imperial myths while conveniently overlooking Ukraine’s centuries of documented history. In his traditional manner, Putin ridiculed Ukraine as an illegitimate and artificial state. He dismissed the entire notion of a separate Ukrainian nation, calling it an anti-Russian conspiracy involving everyone from the Poles and the Pope to the Austrian General Staff.

These claims owe more to Kremlin propaganda than any actual academic rigor. In reality, the term “Ukraine” first appeared in the twelfth century, while Ukraine’s statehood struggle can be traced back more than three hundred years. As long ago as 1731, French thinker Voltaire was moved to write, “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.”

Putin’s insistence that southern and eastern Ukraine are historically Russian is similarly unsupported by the available evidence. The 1897 census conducted by the Czarist authorities, which provides the most reliable guide to the demographic makeup of the Russian Empire, identified Ukrainian-speaking majorities throughout much of today’s southern and eastern Ukraine, as well as in a number of regions that are now part of Russia.

Likewise, Putin’s assertion that Lenin and Stalin created modern Ukraine ignores the inconvenient fact that the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic had already existed for a number of years before the early Bolsheviks were finally able to extinguish this fledgling Ukrainian state and impose Soviet rule.

Many more of Putin’s statements have since been comprehensively debunked by everyone from the BBC and TIME magazine to the diplomats of the Polish Foreign Ministry, who were understandably outraged by the Russian leader’s attempt to justify Adolf Hitler’s 1939 invasion of Poland. As Carlson himself showed little interest in challenging Putin, these fact-checking efforts are particularly important.

At the same time, the real takeaway from the interview was Putin’s apparently genuine belief that his antiquated historical arguments could serve as plausible justification for a major war in twenty-first century Europe. This is perhaps the clearest indication yet of the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions that led Putin to invade Ukraine.

Putin is no stranger to openly imperialistic rhetoric, of course. For years, he has subjected domestic audiences to long sermons detailing Russia’s historic grievances and the injustices of the post-Soviet settlement. Ukraine has always been the main focus of this revanchist zeal.

As his grip on power has tightened, Putin has grown increasingly fixated with the idea of reasserting Russian authority over Ukraine, and has come to view this as his historic mission. On the eve of the full-scale invasion two years ago, he described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In summer 2022, Putin directly compared the current war to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great and claimed to be “returning” historically Russian lands.

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Unless Putin is defeated in Ukraine, it is fanciful to imagine that he will voluntarily abandon his increasingly aggressive brand of historical revisionism. On the contrary, it is far more likely that other countries will also fall victim to the Russian ruler’s expanding imperial ambitions. Naturally, Putin assured Tucker Carlson that he has no such intentions, but he has issued similar denials prior to each new stage of his escalating Ukraine invasion. At this point, the most logical conclusion is that he will not stop until he is stopped.

How far could Putin go? Throughout his reign, he has consistently lamented the fall of the USSR, which he has referred to as the demise of “historical Russia.” After the events of the past two years, it should be painfully apparent that anywhere Putin regards as “historical Russia” is potentially at risk.

In theory, at least, the same bogus historical arguments that have been used to justify the invasion of Ukraine could easily be applied to other parts of the former Soviet Union, or to the Russian Empire of the Czarist era. This would create an array of possible targets for Russian aggression including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Alaska, and the whole of Central Asia. A maximalist interpretation could even see all of Central Europe’s former Soviet satellite states besides Poland added to the list.

In today’s increasingly unstable geopolitical climate, talk of further Russian invasions can no longer be dismissed as alarmist. Mounting signs of Western weakness in Ukraine have visibly emboldened Putin, and may yet tempt him to test NATO’s resolve in a more direct manner. He has already succeeded in shifting the Russian economy onto a war footing, and is cranking up arms manufacturing at a rate that far outpaces the West. Even now, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine still very much undecided, it is all-too-easy to imagine waking up to social media posts labeling Kazakhstan an “artificial country” or proclaiming Estonia “historically Russian” as Putin’s tanks roll across the border.

As the tenth anniversary of Russia’s war in Ukraine draws close, Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson should serve as a wake-up call for the collective West. A decade ago, Putin began his attack on Ukraine by occupying Crimea. At first, he acted with a degree of caution, officially denying any role in the military takeover of the Ukrainian peninsula and orchestrating a fig leaf referendum to disguise the crime. Ten years on, Putin now feels confident enough to sit down with one of the world’s most famous journalists and defend the invasion of a major European country by claiming it is rightfully his. Anyone who still believes he would not dare attack NATO is only fooling themselves.

Putin’s history obsession would be comical if the consequences were not so tragic. Using ancient dynasties and long forgotten treaties to justify the biggest European conflict since World War II is indeed farcical, and has duly inspired a flood of memes mocking the Kremlin dictator as a man completed detached from reality. But as we chuckle at Putin the ultimate history bore, he will continue distorting the past to shape the future. At present, there is a very real danger he will have the last laugh.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Such arguments have long circulated in Russian nationalist circles. Indeed, one prominent advocate was celebrated Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who opposed Ukrainian independence and openly questioned the country’s claims to its southern and eastern regions. Solzhenitsyn’s troubling legacy of support for Russian imperialism illustrates why many Ukrainians continue to believe Russian liberalism ends at the border with Ukraine.

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Putin laid out his historical claims to Ukraine in a 5000-word essay published in July 2021 that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Many now see this chilling document as an ideological blueprint for the full-scale invasion that was to follow just seven months later.

When speaking to domestic Russian audiences, Putin has not shied away from describing the invasion in overtly imperialistic terms as a war of conquest. In summer 2022, he directly compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. More recently, he has referred to the areas of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation as “conquests.”

Putin’s stubborn refusal to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist has sometimes led to instances of selective blindness. In May 2023, he was filmed examining a seventeenth century map of Eastern Europe before declaring “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of mankind,” despite the fact that the word “Ukraine” was clearly marked on the map in front of him.

The term “Ukraine” can actually be traced back much further than the seventeenth century. Indeed, as Harvard University Professor Serhii Plokhy and others have noted, “Ukraine” has medieval origins and was first used by twelfth century chroniclers, around six hundred years before Peter the Great rebranded Muscovy as the Russian Empire.

Putin’s claims regarding Russia’s ancestral ties to southern and eastern Ukraine are equally historically illiterate. Throughout the Middle Ages, these regions formed the sparsely populated “Wild Fields” that served as an informal boundary separating the Mongol and Turkish empires from Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Early records show a Ukrainian presence including Cossacks and agricultural communities.

Even as Russian imperial influence spread southward toward the Black Sea, most of the territory Putin now refers to as Novorossiya continued to have a majority Ukrainian population. The only official demographic data from this era, the Czarist census of 1897, creates a picture of highly cosmopolitan urban populations, including significant French and Italian contingents in Odesa and a prominent Greek community in Mariupol. Meanwhile, the rural population throughout today’s southern and eastern Ukraine remained predominantly Ukrainian. In other words, Putin’s assertion that modern Russia has some kind of ancient claim to these regions is complete nonsense.

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Zelenskyy is now signalling to Putin that Ukraine has historical claims of its own. The Ukrainian leader’s recent decree does not indicate Kyiv’s intention to annex Russian territory, but it does send a clear message to Moscow that Ukrainians have a proud national history and will defend themselves against Russian attempts to deny their existence or extinguish Ukrainian identity.

Zelenskyy’s decree also serves as a not-so-subtle reminder that Russia’s own borders are extremely vulnerable to the kind of reckless historical revisionism being pushed by Putin. As the leader of the world’s largest country, which has expanded for centuries to encompass more than ten percent of the planet’s entire landmass, Putin is particularly unwise to argue in favor of reinstating old borders. If taken to its logical conclusion, Putin’s revisionist stance would see Russia cede land to everyone from Finland and Germany to China and Japan. It would also destabilize the wider world, leading to endless border disputes throughout Europe, Africa, and beyond.

Putin’s weaponization of bad history has helped fuel the bloodiest European conflict since World War II. His claims to Ukrainian land are based on an outdated imperialistic mythology that has no place in the twenty-first century and poses a grave threat to global security. The Russian dictator believes he can distort the past to justify the crimes of the present. Unless he is stopped, other countries will suffer Ukraine’s fate.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He is the author of “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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The International Criminal Court has already issued a warrant for the arrest of Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges in connection with the mass deportation of Ukrainian children since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin has yet to be detained in line with the warrant, but the Russian dictator is now obliged to tailor his travel plans to avoid possible arrest. In August 2023, he cancelled plans to attend a BRICS summit in South Africa after the host country was unable to guarantee he would not face legal challenges.

Russia’s January 2024 citizenship decree is the latest evidence of a systematic Kremlin campaign to rob children abducted in Ukraine of their Ukrainian identity and forcibly turn them into Russians. The Ukrainian authorities have so far managed to identify almost 20,000 Ukrainian children who have been subjected to Russian abduction. Many fear the true number of victims may be far higher.

International investigations into the mass abduction of Ukrainian children have found that once taken to Russia, victims are subjected to indoctrination that aims to erase their Ukrainian identity and impose a Russian national identity. This process is undertaken at a network of camps across Russia. Research published by The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) in February 2023 identified 43 Russian facilities for the indoctrination of abducted Ukrainian children, with all levels of the Russian government involved in a large-scale, state-sanctioned initiative.

The mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children by Russia has been branded as an act of genocide. In an April 2023 resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said the abductions matched the international definition of genocide and stated that the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia had the aim of “annihilating every link to and feature of their Ukrainian identity.” The UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five acts that qualify as genocide.

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Evidence continues to emerge that in addition to exposing Ukrainian children to a wide range of patriotic propaganda, Russia is also militarizing them by involving them in various paramilitary structures aimed at teenagers. This includes the Yunarmiya (“Young Army”) youth organization, which was established in 2015 and is funded by the Kremlin. Deported Ukrainian children have reportedly been obliged to undergo military training and coerced into writing supportive letters to Russian military personnel engaged in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

In the first weeks of 2024, details emerged of abducted Ukrainian children being forced to undergo training with the Belarusian military. Belarusian state TV reported on January 10 that 35 children from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine had been sent to Mogilev in eastern Belarus to take part in exercises with the Belarusian military. Belarus is accused of participating in Russia’s abduction operations.

Efforts are ongoing to rescue abducted Ukrainian children and bring those responsible for the abductions to justice. The Ukrainian state and civil society are currently focused on bringing every single victim home. These efforts are benefiting from significant international support. For example, in December 2023, six abducted Ukrainian children were released by Russia thanks to mediation from Qatar.

Further international support is needed if the thousands of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia are to be saved. The clock is ticking and every moment counts. Indoctrination efforts continue in camps across Russia, while the Kremlin is clearly seeking to speed up the process of granting Russian citizenship.

The international community appears to recognize the importance of holding Russia accountable for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. “We cannot allow children to be treated as if they are the spoils of war,” ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan commented in 2023.

This year, it is vital to maintain the pressure on Russia and demonstrate that such behavior has no place in the modern world. The deliberate targeting of vulnerable Ukrainian children has been one of the most shocking features of an invasion that has stunned the world. The abductions are also arguably the most striking evidence that the Kremlin’s ultimate goal is to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely in areas under its control.

Vladyslav Havrylov is a research fellow with the Collaborative on Global Children’s Issues at Georgetown University and lead researcher at the “Where Are Our People?” initiative.

Confident Putin boasts of Russian “conquests” in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Jan 2024 22:19:11 +0000

When Vladimir Putin first embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he sought to disguise the attack as an act of self-defense while claiming Russia had no interest in occupying Ukrainian territory. “We do not plan to impose ourselves on anyone,” he declared.

With the invasion now fast approaching the two-year mark, the Russian dictator apparently no longer feels the need to dress up his true intentions. Buoyed by a very visible recent weakening in Western resolve, Putin is now openly embracing the language of imperialism and referring to Russian “conquests” in Ukraine.

Speaking at a January 16 meeting of municipal authorities in the Moscow region, Putin dismissed Ukraine’s Peace Formula and expressed his unwillingness to discuss the status of the Ukrainian regions currently under Russian occupation. “As for the negotiation process, this is an attempt to encourage us to abandon the conquests we have made over the past one-and-a-half years. Everyone understands that this is impossible,” he commented.

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Putin’s revealing reference to conquered Ukrainian lands underlines the imperialistic ambitions at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. It also further discredits Russian efforts to blame the invasion on imaginary Nazis and a non-existent NATO threat.

On the eve of the invasion, Putin made much of NATO’s post-1991 enlargement and was highly critical of the alliance’s decision to accept former Warsaw Pact countries as members. While Ukraine itself had no realistic prospects of joining the alliance in 2022, Putin claimed the prospect of deepening cooperation between NATO and Kyiv posed an intolerable security threat to Russia.

Putin’s protestations were undermined by his own subsequent lack of concern over Finnish NATO membership. When the Finns responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by abandoning decades of neutrality and joining the alliance, Putin reacted by demilitarizing Russia’s entire 1300 kilometer border with Finland. “If we were a threat, they would certainly not have moved their troops away, even in a situation where they are engaged somewhere else,” commented Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen in August 2023.

While Russia’s NATO claims do not stand up to scrutiny, Moscow’s entire anti-Nazi narrative is even less convincing. During Putin’s reign, the Kremlin has revived and dramatically amplified lingering Soviet propaganda labeling Ukrainians as Nazis. This has helped to dehumanize Ukrainians in the eyes of the Russian population and generate grassroots support for the current war.

Putin himself has been at the heart of this process, regularly equating expressions of Ukrainian identity with Nazism while insisting Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Unsurprisingly, when Putin announced his invasion in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as his main war aim. This was widely understood to mean the eradication of a separate Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of a Russian imperial identity.

The Kremlin’s attempts to portray Ukraine as some kind of fascist threat have played well within the Russian information bubble but have failed to convince international audiences, due largely to the absence of any actual Ukrainian Nazis. Indeed, Ukraine’s far right parties are so unpopular that they actually formed a coalition ahead of the country’s last parliamentary elections in 2019 in a bid to end decades of ballot box failure, but still only managed to secure 2.16 percent of the vote.

Russian propagandists have also been unable to explain how “Nazi” Ukraine could be led by Jewish President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. When quizzed about this obvious inconsistency on Italian TV in May 2022, a clearly flustered Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that Zelenskyy’s Jewishness was irrelevant as “Hitler also had Jewish blood.” This shameful episode highlighted the absurdity of Russia’s attempts to portray democratic Ukraine as a hotbed of Nazism.

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It should now be clear to any objective observer that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has always been an exercise in old-fashioned imperialism. Putin’s most recent statement about Russian “conquests” in Ukraine is not the first time he has adopted the swagger of the conqueror. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. He has repeatedly claimed to be fighting for “historic Russian lands,” while denying Ukraine’s right to exist.

Putin’s increasingly open imperialism raises serious doubts over the possibility of reaching any kind of compromise agreement to end the war. Recent reports in the international media have suggested that he is “quietly signaling” his readiness for a ceasefire, but it is difficult to see how this could work without legitimizing a land grab that would have profound negative connotations for European stability and international security.

The most obvious question is how far Putin’s imperial ambitions extend. The man himself has proclaimed much of unoccupied Ukraine to be historically Russian, including the country’s main Black Sea port city, Odesa, and the entire southern coastline. This alone is reason enough to believe that any ceasefire along the current front lines of the conflict would merely provide Russia with a pause to rearm and regroup before renewing hostilities.

There are also mounting concerns that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will go further. He has repeatedly stated that the entire Soviet Union was “historical Russia,” while the borders of the old Russian Empire stretched even further. If Putin chooses to apply his weaponized version of Russian imperial history in its broadest sense, the list of potential targets would include Finland, Poland, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Alaska, and the whole of Central Asia.

Putin’s use of unambiguously imperialistic language is an indication of his growing confidence amid mounting signs of Western weakness. With vital Ukrainian aid packages currently held up in both the US and EU, Putin clearly believes he can outlast the democratic world and achieve his goals in Ukraine. If he is proved right, Ukrainians are highly unlikely to be the last victims of Russian imperial aggression.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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While polling data in an authoritarian society such as Putin’s Russia must be treated with caution, recent trends identified by Levada and Russian Field are confirmed by a source close to the Kremlin. Valery Fedorov is director of Kremlin-loyal pollster WCIOM and an official advisor to the first deputy chairman of Russia’s presidential administration. In a September 2023 interview with Russia’s RBC, Fedorov reluctantly acknowledged that the number of Russians who actively and enthusiastically support Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is not more than 10-15 percent of the population. “The majority of Russians do not want to seize Kyiv or Odesa,” he commented. ‘If it was up to them whether to the start the “special military operation,” they probably would not have done it.”

Recent WCIOM research also acknowledges a sharp decline in both viewership and audience trust toward Russia’s state propaganda television channels. In 2023, just 40 percent of Russians cited state TV as their main source of information, down from 53 percent five years earlier. Since 2016, trust in Russian state channels as “objective” sources of information has almost halved, plunging from 46 percent to 26 percent.

Interestingly, only five percent of Russians under the age of 25 regard state TV as an objective source of information, compared to 51 percent of those aged 60 and over. This age breakdown is important if one wants to predict future trends. The patterns evident in media consumption match broader attitudes toward the war, with Levada finding that 56 percent of those aged 65 and above unconditionally back the invasion, with this figure shrinking to just 30 percent for those aged below 25.

Clearly, demography is against Putin, with younger Russians far more skeptical about the war. Indeed, a selective analysis of polling data excluding Russians over the age of 50, who were most traumatized by the Soviet and early post-Soviet experience and are therefore most easily susceptible to propaganda, would present a strikingly different picture of current attitudes toward the invasion of Ukraine.

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Based on the findings of different pollsters and non-polling criteria, a picture emerges of conscious support for the invasion of Ukraine among a significant number of Russians representing 30 percent to 40 percent of the population. This is not an unusual figure for totalitarian societies that run on fear and propaganda. Nevertheless, it is not a majority position. The available evidence indicates that the majority of Russians want the war to end, with support for the invasion fading over time and increasingly concentrated among older generations.

Similar trends can be seen in relation to military service. A range of polls show that between 50 and 60 percent of Russians reject a second wave of mobilization. This is a key reason why Putin has been reluctant to announce further mobilization over the past year or so, despite the obvious need to do so. As a result, soldiers mobilized in the final months of 2022 are stuck on the front lines of the war with little chance of any break in their service, prompting protests from family members. Polling indicates that a majority of Russians support calls from the wives of mobilized soldiers for their demobilization.

This is particularly bad news for Putin. It reveals that during almost two years of full-scale war, he has been unable to induce Russians to volunteer for combat in sufficient numbers. There are no lines at army recruitment points in the central squares of Russian cities. Instead, according to the Conflict Intelligence Team and other independent analysis, official numbers of “volunteer recruits” are wildly exaggerated. Russians may be prepared to “support” the war verbally, but they are clearly not rushing to fight themselves.

The most recent indication that Putin may be worried about waning public enthusiasm for the war against Ukraine came in his 2024 New Year address. One year earlier, Putin filmed his annual address alongside soldiers in uniform, with his speech focusing largely on the invasion of Ukraine. This year, however, he opted for a more familiar Kremlin backdrop and only mentioned the war in passing before switching to more mundane topics.

Putin understands the mood in Russia better than many Western commentators, and he appears to sense a declining public appetite for the invasion he unleashed almost two years ago. If this trend continues, it could further constrain Putin and his actions.

Vladimir Milov is Vice President for International Advocacy at the Free Russia Foundation.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Schuman in the Atlantic: Xi Jinping Is Fighting a Culture War at Home

Michael Schuman — Thu, 21 Dec 2023 22:21:55 +0000

Original Source

On December 20, Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Schuman’s latest article in The Atlantic looked at Xi Jinping’s new culture war and how this may lead to “an ever more isolated, indoctrinated, and politicized Chinese populace [that] could become that much more hostile to the West and more supportive of nationalist causes.”

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Michael Schuman

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Fake history is a crucial weapon in Vladimir Putin’s bid to destroy Ukraine

Ihor Smeshko — Tue, 05 Dec 2023 20:46:15 +0000

It is doubtful Vladimir Putin actually believes much of the anti-Ukrainian propaganda coming from the Kremlin’s echo chamber. After all, few educated people would. Still, he and his colleagues have little choice but to vigorously counter Ukraine’s compelling national narrative of a country emerging from centuries of imperial subjugation and reclaiming its place among the European family of nations. Russia’s response has focused on denying Ukraine’s right to exist. The Kremlin’s use of false historical narratives delegitimizing Ukraine is a key element of Russia’s broader campaign to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. As such, it is worthy of far more international attention than it currently receives.

Ukraine’s story is straightforward, unlike the tall tales promoted by the Russian authorities. Contrary to the Kremlin’s claims, Ukraine is a democratic, unified nation with a distinct and varied history stretching back more than a thousand years. In no way is modern Ukraine Russia’s “younger sibling.” In fact, it could easily be argued that the opposite is true. According to its own origin story, Russia emerged from the medieval Kyivan Rus state centered on the Ukrainian capital city. Christianity and European culture came to Russia via Ukraine.

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The many different puzzle pieces that make up Putin’s official version of the deeply troubled historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine simply don’t add up. His claims of a common past and shared identity conveniently ignore centuries of oppressive policies and forced russification imposed on Ukrainians by the Russian imperial authorities throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras.

Nevertheless, Putin has deployed his distorted vision to argue that the two countries are one nation and that, in essence, there is a civil conflict currently underway among the people of Ukraine. This is a people that voted 92 percent in favor of independence in 1991, with majorities in every single region of the country. It is also a people that staged two revolutions since becoming independent in order to remain both free and democratic.

Recent polls consistently indicate that Ukrainians do not want to surrender a single inch of occupied land to Russia in exchange for an end to what Putin euphemistically calls his “special military operation.” Ukrainians and global audiences overwhelmingly recognize this “operation” as a war of aggression that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives over the past twenty-one months, in addition to the thousands killed during the previous eight years of hostilities following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Despite Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), the differences between the two countries are now more immediately apparent than ever. Today’s Ukraine is a democracy, though at times a messy one. In stark contrast, Putin’s Russia is a dictatorship, a top-to-bottom power vertical led by one man.

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The invading Russian army is not the only enemy Ukraine faces; the Russian propaganda that drives and justifies the invasion is arguably just as deadly. Moscow does everything it can to silence Ukrainian voices and make sure that the history of Ukraine is viewed through Russia’s very selective and murky prism. These indoctrination efforts target Russians, Ukrainians, and also international audiences in different ways but with equal gusto.

For many years, it has been apparent that Western politicians, policymakers, and commentators are particularly susceptible to Russian’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda due to their often limited knowledge of the relevant regional history. Today, it has become more important than ever to counter Russia’s false historical narratives, as international support for Ukraine could very well determine the outcome of the war.

If Russian propaganda is not blunted, the average voter in Western countries will be left face-to-face with the fake Ukrainian history disseminated internationally by the Kremlin and its networks of allies and agents. These falsehoods include the central message that there is no separate Ukrainian people or Ukrainian state. Instead, there is only Russia.

This twisted logic allows Putin to claim, with a poker face, that Russia is not waging war against the Ukrainian people, despite the unprecedented bloodshed since February 2022. It forms the basis of his claim that Russia’s full-scale invasion is really an attempt to liberate Ukraine from “Nazis.” According to Putin, Ukraine is part of Russia, so the Western world has no right to interfere in what is essentially an internal affair.

The Kremlin’s weaponized version of history has helped garner high levels of domestic support for Putin and his invasion of Ukraine within Russia itself, if one is to take as gospel the integrity of opinion polls conducted in a dictatorship. Whether these surveys are genuinely representative or not, it is clear that there is no meaningful anti-war movement in today’s Russia.

Little can realistically be done at present about the state of public opinion inside Russia. The real danger is that Russian disinformation regarding Ukrainian history will be allowed to further influence opinion throughout the West and raise doubts over the legitimacy of Ukraine’s fight for survival. This could diminish the supply of military and other support at a time of Ukraine’s greatest need. That would be a tragedy for Ukraine and a disaster for the wider Western world, with grave consequences for the future of international security.

Ihor Smeshko is a Ukrainian politician and former head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence and Security Service.

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Debate has raged for the past twenty-one months over the true extent of Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Many continue to question the validity of polls conducted in wartime Russia, with skeptics arguing that very few members of the public would be comfortable expressing anti-regime opinions to strangers. Indeed, given the draconian legislation adopted in Russia since February 2022 criminalizing criticism of the invasion, there is good reason to treat all research data coming out of the country with caution.

While there are legitimate doubts over the credibility of polling data, the findings detailed in this new report and the Levada Center’s more regular monitoring both closely mirror the available anecdotal evidence, which indicates high levels of public acceptance for the ongoing invasion. Perhaps the most compelling evidence has come from personal interactions between Ukrainians and their Russian relatives. With family ties connecting millions on both sides of the border, there has been ample opportunity for Ukrainians to get a sense of how ordinary Russians feel about the war. This has led to countless painful conversations, with Ukrainians frequently finding that people they have known all their lives now parrot Kremlin propaganda, blame Ukraine for the war, or deny core aspects of the invasion altogether.

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The almost complete absence of any meaningful anti-war activity in Russia is a further indication of public support, or at least acceptance, of the invasion. During the first weeks of hostilities, there were some attempts to hold anti-war rallies in a number of Russian cities, but these modest efforts soon ran out of steam. Some commentators have since argued that it is simply too dangerous to protest. However, wartime restrictions have not prevented Russians from freely voicing their opposition to various specific aspects of the invasion.

Since Putin first announced mobilization in September 2022, Russian soldiers and their family members have recorded and published hundreds of individual protest videos complaining about everything from poor conditions and lack of equipment to heavy losses and suicidal tactics. These publicly available addresses have often been highly critical of the Russian authorities, raising obvious questions about the validity of claims that Russians are afraid to oppose the state. Tellingly, there have been almost no videos of soldiers condemning the war itself or refusing to follow criminal orders, despite an apparent readiness to go public with their often explosive grievances.

The more than one million Russians who are believed to have fled the country following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have also proven largely unwilling to voice their opposition to the war, despite not facing any of the restrictions in place inside Russia itself. While there are large Russian diasporas in multiple cities across Europe, there have been very few anti-war rallies since February 2022 or any other attempts by Russian citizens to protest against the invasion being carried out in their name. When Russians in Finland did recently mobilize to protest, it was to complain against the temporary closure of some border crossings with Russia.

All this is very good news for Vladimir Putin. The Russian dictator had initially hoped to secure a rapid military victory in Ukraine, but he is now actively preparing his country for a long war. He has already moved much of the Russian economy onto a war footing, and seems to have succeeded in convincing the vast majority of his compatriots that they are engaged in a struggle with the West that is both existential and unavoidable. With his home front looking remarkably stable and no sign of any domestic challenges on the horizon, Putin can look ahead to 2024 with a degree of confidence.

These latest indications of continued Russian public support for the war will further dampen any lingering hopes in Western capitals that internal opposition could yet derail the Russian invasion. The timing is particularly unfortunate, with talk of a battlefield stalemate in Ukraine already fueling doubts over the future of Western military aid. For now, Western leaders remain adamant that they will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes. However, they are extremely unlikely to be aided by any kind of anti-war uprising inside Russia itself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Western leaders must choose: Arm Ukraine or enable Putin’s genocide

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 30 Nov 2023 21:27:34 +0000

As the year draws to a close, there is a growing sense of Ukraine fatigue in Western capitals amid pessimistic forecasts, talk of a battlefield stalemate, and recriminations over the perceived failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. This grim mood is raising serious questions about the future of military aid to Ukraine and the prospects for continued Western support into 2024 and beyond.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin is looking more confident than ever. This week, he was in particularly messianic mood as he addressed the World Russian People’s Council. Ukrainians and Belarusians are not independent but are in fact part of the “great Russian nation,” he declared. According to Putin, these two nations have been artificially divided from Russia by the “separatist illusions” of the 1991 Soviet collapse.

Putin’s casual denial of Ukraine’s right to exist is a timely reminder of exactly what is at stake in the current war. The Kremlin dictator is clearly not a rational statesman pursuing limited political goals or seeking a negotiated settlement; he is an all-powerful autocrat who genuinely believes he is on a sacred historic mission. That mission includes the destruction of the Ukrainian nation.

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We already have a good idea of what Putin has in store for Ukraine. In the approximately seventeen percent of the country that is currently under Kremlin control, millions of Ukrainians are subjected to a daily reality that includes the possibility of abduction, torture, death, or deportation. Those who manage to avoid these direct physical threats face the prospect of forced russification as the Russian occupation authorities systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and identity while pressuring the captive population to accept Russian nationality.

The Kremlin began preparing these genocidal policies well in advance of the full-scale invasion. Russian security officers reportedly compiled detailed lists of Ukrainian community leaders who would be targeted by advancing Russian forces in a bid to prevent any coordinated Ukrainian opposition to the takeover of the country. These registers included elected local officials, priests, journalists, teachers, activists, and military veterans. A clear pattern of abductions and disappearances has subsequently been witnessed in every region of Ukraine under Russian occupation. Meanwhile, in liberated villages, towns, and cities, the Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly encountered mass graves, torture chambers, and widespread reports of missing persons.

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, Ukrainian monuments have been pulled down and replaced with commemorations of Russian imperial and Soviet history, while symbols of Ukrainian statehood have been systematically removed from public spaces. Moscow has imported Russian teachers to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren, pushing them to reject their nationality and embrace an alternative imperial identity. Entire parks and museums have been created to aid in this process, with children also forced to express thanks and gratitude to the Russian soldiers engaged in destroying their homeland. Predictably, the Ukrainian language is no longer taught in schools and has been banished from public life throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Perhaps the single most chilling aspect of the Kremlin campaign to eradicate Ukrainian national identity has been the mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children at an extensive network of re-education camps inside Russia itself. This has already led to war crimes charges again Putin from the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It also appears to be a textbook case of genocide according to the UN’s Genocide Convention, which identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five recognized acts of genocide.

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This is not the first time the Kremlin has been accused of committing genocide in Ukraine. In many ways, Putin’s genocidal policies toward Ukrainians are a continuation of the campaign unleashed by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who sought to eradicate Ukrainian identity in the early decades of the USSR. The Stalin regime was responsible for the Holodomor, an artificial famine in 1930s Ukraine that killed millions of Ukrainians. Hundreds of thousands more were murdered during the Great Terror. Much like today’s Russian invasion, the Soviet authorities specifically targeted spiritual, academic, and community leaders who represented Ukraine’s statehood aspirations. The man who coined the term “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, would later call Stalin’s efforts to destroy the Ukrainian nation “the classic example of Soviet genocide.”

Far from condemning the crimes of the Stalin era, Putin has sought to emulate them. Indeed, he has overseen the rehabilitation of Stalin, with memorials to victims disappearing and new monuments honoring the Soviet dictator sprouting up across Russia. It is likely no coincidence that on November 25, the day Ukrainians honor the millions killed in the Holodomor, Putin ordered the largest drone attack on Ukraine of the entire war.

If Western military support for Ukraine does not continue at current or increased levels, the present stalemate will deepen and much of the country will remain under Russian occupation. There is also a significant chance that the whole of Ukraine could fall under Kremlin control, exposing tens of millions of Ukrainians to the genocidal policies already being implemented throughout the occupied regions. This would obviously be a catastrophe for the Ukrainian nation, but the tragedy would not end there. On the contrary, the repercussions would also be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

A genocide in the heart of twenty-first century Europe would shake the foundations of the entire rules-based international security system and transform the geopolitical landscape. It would plunge NATO into crisis while emboldening Russia and other authoritarian regimes around the world, ushering in a new era of militarism, instability, and international aggression. Even if a major war could be avoided, Western defense budgets would balloon to levels far beyond the current cost of arming Ukraine, while an increasingly hostile international environment would severely hamper economic growth. If Western leaders wish to avoid this nightmare scenario, they must adequately arm Ukraine now.

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The weakening of Kaliningrad’s air defenses is the latest in a series of steps that have revealed the reality behind Moscow’s frequent anti-NATO rhetoric. The first major indication that Russia was being less than honest about its NATO fears came in May 2022, when Sweden and Finland announced plans to abandon decades of neutrality and join the Alliance. Just a few months earlier, the Kremlin had paraded its NATO grievances in a bid to justify the bloodiest European invasion since World War II. In stark contrast, Russia now responded to the news from Stockholm and Helsinki with a shrug.

The complete lack of concern on display in Moscow was all the more remarkable given the fact that Finnish NATO accession would more than double Russia’s existing border with the Alliance, while Swedish membership would transform the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Nevertheless, Putin insisted Russia had “no problem” with this dramatic transformation of the geopolitical landscape in Northern Europe. He actively sought to downplay the issue, declining even to deploy the dark arts of Russian hybrid warfare or otherwise attempt to interfere in the accession process.

The Kremlin response to NATO’s recent Nordic expansion has extended beyond mere indifference. In the eighteen months since Finland’s announcement of impending NATO membership, Moscow has actively demilitarized the Finnish frontier and withdrawn the bulk of its troops away from the border zone for redeployment to the killing fields of Ukraine. Speaking in August 2023, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen confirmed that the border area was now “pretty empty” of Russian troops. “If we were a threat, they would certainly not have moved their troops away, even in a situation where they are engaged somewhere else,” she noted.

A similar process has been underway since February 2022 on Russia’s nearby border with NATO member Norway. Norwegian army chief General Eirik Kristoffersen revealed in September 2023 that Russia had withdrawn approximately 80% of its troops from the border zone. “Vladimir Putin knows very well that NATO is not a threat against Russia,” commented Kristoffersen. “If he believed we were threatening Russia, he couldn’t have moved all his troops to Ukraine.”

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Putin’s readiness to demilitarize his country’s borders with neighboring NATO members is damning evidence that the decision to invade Ukraine had nothing to do with an alleged NATO threat to Russia itself. This does not mean his attacks on the Alliance are entirely insincere, of course. The vitriol Putin frequently displays toward NATO is real enough, but it does not reflect any legitimate security concerns. Instead, Putin resents NATO because it thwarts his revanchist agenda and prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors in the traditional manner. In other words, NATO presents no danger whatsoever to Russian national security, but it does pose a very serious threat to Russian imperialism.

This has long been apparent to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, who clamored to join NATO following the fall of the USSR precisely because they sought protection against what was widely seen as the inevitable revival of Russian aggression. Indeed, while Putin equates NATO enlargement with Western expansionism, the post-1991 growth of the Alliance was in fact almost exclusively driven by fear of Russia among the many countries queuing up to join. Their concerns were shaped by decades and in some cases centuries of brutal subjugation at the hands of the Russian Empire in its Tsarist and Soviet forms. If Russians want somebody to blame for the current NATO presence on their doorstep, they would be well advised to look in the mirror.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has now confirmed that these earlier fears of resurgent Russian imperialism were more than justified. Putin himself has openly compared the current invasion to Russian Tsar Peter the Great’s eighteenth century wars of imperial conquest, and has referred to occupied Ukrainian regions as “historical Russian lands.” He routinely denies Ukraine’s right to exist, while insisting Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). Meanwhile, incitement to genocide has become completely normalized on Russian state television, with Russian soldiers in Ukraine acting on this genocidal rhetoric. The entire NATO narrative has served as a convenient smokescreen for what is a classic campaign of colonial conquest to destroy independent Ukraine.

The Kremlin knows very well that it has nothing to fear from NATO, and is evidently comfortable leaving its borders with the Alliance unguarded. Despite his anti-NATO posturing, Putin is actually motivated by a rising sense of alarm over the emergence of a democratic Ukraine, which he sees as an existential threat to his own authoritarian regime and a hated symbol of Russia’s post-1991 retreat from empire. As Ukraine has gradually slipped further and further away from the Kremlin orbit during Putin’s reign, his responses have become increasingly extreme, evolving from political interference in the 2000s to escalating military aggression since 2014. We have now reached the stage of open genocide.

With the invasion of Ukraine set to enter a third year, too many Western commentators and politicians are still laboring under the delusion that some kind of compromise with the Kremlin remains possible. This assumes the invasion of Ukraine is a conventional war with limited geopolitical objectives, which is clearly not the case. Instead, Putin is a messianic leader convinced of his own historic mission, who has staked everything on the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the reversal of Russia’s Cold War defeat. By pointing the finger of blame at NATO, Putin has sought to distract attention from this chilling reality, but a brief look at Russia’s recently demilitarized NATO borders should be enough to dismiss such claims.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

In late November, Ukrainians commemorate the artificial famine of the early 1930s known as the Holodomor. One of Stalin’s most notorious crimes, this deliberately engineered famine killed at estimated four million Ukrainians in less than two years. Declassified Soviet records now depict Stalin’s behavior as part of a broader campaign to extinguish Ukraine’s statehood aspirations.

Stalin’s bid to crush Ukraine’s dream of independence ultimately failed. Millions of Ukrainians would continue to resist Soviet rule, becoming the largest group of political prisoners during the final decades of the Soviet Union before playing a critical role in the eventual collapse of the USSR. Nevertheless, many irreplaceable features of Ukraine’s cultural heritage were lost forever during the Holodomor. Raphael Lemkin, who first coined the term “genocide,” saw Stalin’s attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as “the classic example of Soviet genocide.” There is now a growing scholarly consensus that defines the Holodomor as an act of genocide committed against Ukraine.

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Modern Ukrainians are acutely aware that their freedom is not free. Most have a friend or family member who has been killed or wounded in Russia’s invasion. Many are also the descendants of people killed by the Stalin regime.

In June 2017, I interviewed Ukrainian museum director Ihor Poshyvailo about the Holodomor, asking how Ukrainians should commemorate Moscow’s past violence. Now, Poshyvailo finds himself working around-the-clock to prevent Moscow’s latest attempt at destroying Ukraine’s cultural heritage. He has condemned modern Russia’s escalating aggression against Ukraine as a genocide and has called the current invasion “a war against our historical memory, against our being Ukrainian.” These accusations are increasingly supported by independent inquiries.

Genocides are called the “crime of crimes” because they target a group’s basic right to exist. In historical terms, genocides are exceedingly rare, complicating scholarly understandings of how this extreme behavior unfolds. Russia-Ukraine relations are remarkable in this regard, as Kremlin dictators are now accused of committing genocide against Ukrainians twice in just ninety years.

Not everyone is surprised. Historian Daria Mattingly, who has studied the Holodomor’s rank-and-file perpetrators, says the genocidal violence of the current Russian invasion reflects the nature of the Putin regime. “As an unapologetic imperial power, Moscow consistently treats the people it oppresses as resources, not human beings worthy of rights and protections,” she comments.

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Moscow’s atrocities in Ukraine blur the lines between past and present. Today, eastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region is relentlessly bombed from just over the Russian border. Grief at the senseless destruction pours out of residents. “Life used to be beautiful here. They have left us without our loved ones, without our parents, without husbands, without sons, without our previous life, without jobs, without anything,” newly widowed Olga recently told a reporter.

Kharkiv also experienced terrible suffering during the Holodomor, when it was among the most badly affected regions of Ukraine. In 1932, a 36-year-old schoolteacher, Oleksandra Radchenko, kept a private diary, later serving ten years in a Soviet gulag after it was discovered by the Soviet authorities. Describing whole villages dying out, she wrote, “I am so afraid of hunger; I’m afraid for the children. It would not be so offensive if it were due to a bad harvest, but they have taken away the grain and created an artificial famine.”

For some Ukrainians, understanding the Holodomor’s long-suppressed history has been key to reclaiming their national identity. In 2019, I sat down with renowned scholar and theologian Ihor Kozlovskyi. Detained by Russia’s proxy forces in eastern Ukraine in 2016, he was tortured for nearly two years before being released in a prisoner exchange. When I asked him why understanding the Holodomor was important for modern Ukrainians, he told me this was the only way “to build our truly independent state free of aggression and dictatorship.”

Kozlovskyi passed away from a heart attack this year, but his words remain more important than ever. Learning from the past also holds a somber warning for the West. Despite strenuous Soviet efforts to hide information about the Holodomor, some intrepid journalists raised the alarm even as the genocide unfolded. Notwithstanding these news reports, personal appeals, and confirmation from his own diplomats, US President Franklin Roosevelt officially recognized the Soviet Union in November 1933, spurred on by what some scholars now call a mixture of US economic self-interest and realpolitik.

Today, many Western leaders continue to insist Putin cannot be allowed to repeat Stalin’s crimes. But Ukrainian pleas for comprehensive aid to expel Russian forces and finally break this violent cycle are only being partially addressed. On the anniversary of the Holodomor, Western leaders have the opportunity to bring life-saving poetic justice to the people of Ukraine, fighting against the memories and brutal realities of two Kremlin dictators.

Kristina Hook is Assistant Professor of Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine’s heritage protection unit carries echoes of the World War II era “Monuments Men” and the US Army’s 2019 creation of a Cultural Heritage Task Force charged with ensuring the US military is equipped to preserve local heritage sites. However, there are key differences: Ukraine’s new Territorial Defense Forces unit is not only working to protect the physical cornerstones of Ukraine’s national identity, but to collect an expanding body of evidence for future prosecutions.

Since the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022, Russia has been accused of committing countless war crimes in Ukraine. Targeted attacks on Ukraine’s cultural heritage are seen as part of a broader strategy to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity, which Russia regards as an existential threat to its own imperial identity. Some Ukrainian cultural leaders have defined the Russian invasion as “a heritage war.” Ihor Poshyvailo, the director of Kyiv’s Maidan Museum who currently serves in the Ukrainian military’s cultural heritage protection unit, has described Russia’s invasion as a war “against our historical memory. Against our soul.”

By mid-November 2023, UNESCO had verified damage to 329 cultural sites in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This includes damage to 125 religious sites, 143 buildings of historical and artistic importance, 28 museums, 19 monuments, 13 libraries, and one archive. From Odesa’s National Art Museum to Kherson’s regional library, and from Kharkiv’s Drobytskyi Holocaust Memorial and Memorial to Victims of Totalitarianism to Zaporizhzhia’s Popov Manor House museum, Russia has shelled, bombed, and looted Ukraine’s cultural heritage extensively across the country.

The Russian military’s campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity is sparking strong resistance and a determination to hold Russia internationally accountable. The recently formed Territorial Defense Forces unit is working alongside a growing network of cultural industry experts committed to cataloging Russian crimes.

Ukrainian museum experts have set up the Heritage Emergency Response Initiative (HERI) to document Russia’s attacks while working in coordination with UNESCO. HERI works to collect resources to support museums across Ukraine, responding to regularly updated requests from different regions of the country. Some museum staff have been painstakingly evacuating their collections and storing them to protect priceless works of art from Russian aggression, while others have stayed behind despite obvious dangers to help safeguard Ukraine’s cultural heritage.

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Ukraine’s cultural guardians are also receiving international support. One year after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the US Department of State announced that it would invest $7 million to support Ukraine’s cultural heritage protection efforts. In addition, the US Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command has joined forces with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative to train Ukrainian soldiers in protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict.

The Smithsonian Institution has also partnered with the Kosciuszko Foundation to provide museums with the necessary tools and technology to safely store priceless works of art. Across the Ukrainian border in neighboring Poland, the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has established a Cultural Assistance Center to help coordinate domestic and foreign actions to protect Ukraine’s cultural resources.

In a March 2023 study commissioned and published by the European Parliament, researchers determined that the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict is covered by international humanitarian law, human rights law, cultural law, and criminal law. A report for the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine found concrete evidence that cultural property has been intentionally targeted during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is being fought along many different fronts. This includes the targeting of cultural heritage as Russia attempts to erase Ukraine’s national identity and impose an imperial identity on a conquered nation. The creation of a dedicated Territorial Defense Forces unit reflects Ukraine’s determination to expose this genocidal agenda. By documenting the deliberate destruction of their country’s cultural heritage, Ukrainians aim to raise international awareness of the criminal objectives underpinning Russia’s invasion. Ultimately, the aim is to hold Russia accountable for its crimes.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Dagestan and the surrounding North Caucasus region have a long record of ethnic nationalism and religious extremism, especially following the import of Wahhabism in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conflicts between nationalist and religious extremist groups have plagued the region for years. This extremist influence was on full display during the storming of Makhachkala Airport.

The attempted pogrom also echoed the worst excesses of Russian nationalism, which has a history of antisemitism stretching back hundreds of years. The term “pogrom” itself can be traced to imperial Russia, which witnessed frequent outbreaks of deadly violence targeting Jewish communities. Meanwhile, the most notorious antisemitic forgery in history, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, originated in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century.

This legacy of antisemitic baggage is particularly important at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively promoting an aggressive brand of imperial nostalgia. Officially, modern Russia is a pluralistic state that celebrates its ethnic and religious diversity. Indeed, Putin has accused neighboring Ukraine of antisemitism and has framed the current invasion as a quest to “de-Nazify” the country. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, there is little evidence to support such assertions.

The groundless claim that Russia invaded Ukraine to combat Nazism is a transparent attempt to justify an old-fashioned war of imperial aggression. When confronted with the uncomfortable fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is himself Jewish, top Kremlin officials have retreated into the quagmire of antisemitic conspiracy theories. In May 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attempted to dismiss Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity by declaring that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.” More recently, Putin alleged that Zelenskyy had been deliberately chosen by the West as a Jewish puppet to cover up the “anti-human essence” of the Ukrainian state.

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There is antisemitism in Ukraine, of course, just as there is in all states. The real issue is whether extremist actors have inordinate political power, enjoy the support (or at least inaction) of the government, or the ability to coordinate large-scale violence. In Putin’s Russia, that may well be the case. Many see the recent attempted pogrom at Makhachkala Airport as a direct consequence of the antisemitic invective that has become increasingly normalized in the Russian public discourse following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In the nationalistic environment of wartime Russia, the country’s Jewish community has faced accusations from some quarters of being insufficiently supportive of the invasion. Senior Rabbi Berel Lazar has felt obliged to speak out against “vulgar antisemitism” that poses a “huge danger” to Russian Jews. In one particularly chilling incident, prominent Russian journalist Alexei Venediktov found a pig’s head with the word “Judensau” (German for “Jewish pig”) placed outside his apartment.

Russian Jews with close ties to the Kremlin have also become targets of antisemitic attacks. Russia’s most high-profile propagandist, Vladimir Solovyov, recently faced criticism that his media network employs too many Jewish staffers. When Solovyov’s colleague and fellow pundit Yevgeny Satanovsky, who is also Jewish, used strong language to accuse senior Russian Foreign Ministry officials of antisemitism and criticize the government’s policy on Israel, he was promptly dismissed.

These developments are fueling alarm among Russia’s remaining Jews and reawakening painful historical memories, while also sparking debate over the future security of the community. Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt was Chief Rabbi of Moscow for almost thirty years, but was forced to flee the country in March 2022 after refusing a request from state officials to publicly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He has since called on Russian Jews to leave the country.

“When we look back over Russian history, whenever the political system was in danger you saw the government trying to redirect the anger and discontent of the masses toward the Jewish community,” Rabbi Goldschmidt told The Guardian in December 2022. “We’re seeing rising antisemitism while Russia is going back to a new kind of Soviet Union, and step by step the iron curtain is coming down again. This is why I believe the best option for Russian Jews is to leave.”

Joshua Stein holds a PhD from the University of Calgary and is a researcher on antisemitism and ethics.

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In the West, it has become common to explain this pro-war sentiment by arguing that Russians have been brainwashed by the Kremlin-controlled state media. Some commentators also mention widespread Russian apathy and disengagement from politics. However, these explanations risk infantilizing Russian society and stereotyping Russians as passive conformists with no agency of their own.

Most Western observers struggle to perceive Russian support for the war as a conscious choice because they are unable to accept that supporting a genocidal war could ever be seen as rational. Nevertheless, studies of past wars of aggression and authoritarianism tell us that the protagonists of evil typically regard their actions as both reasonable and justifiable. In Russia’s case, it is the country’s imperial past and the imperial intimacy of the Russian relationship with Ukraine that serve to justify the current war.

This imperial intimacy reflects deeply rooted historical ideas of kinship and fraternity that have encouraged generations of Russians to view Ukrainians as part of their nation. It is a hierarchical intimacy, with Ukrainians cast in the role of “little brothers” in need of protection and tutelage. This encompasses the necessity of “disciplining” Ukrainians for their own good. Such thinking is a central pillar of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

Putin’s notorious July 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” was a manifesto of imperial intimacy that openly questioned Ukraine’s right to statehood while denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Instead, Putin argued, Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he declared that Ukraine was “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

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Officially, the Kremlin has sought to justify the war by pointing to decades of post-Cold War NATO expansion while portraying Ukraine as a far-right threat to Russia itself. However, when addressing domestic audiences, Putin has often been more open about his imperial agenda. Speaking in summer 2022, he compared the current invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great and claimed it was now his turn to “return” Russian lands. A few months later, Putin oversaw a lavish Kremlin ceremony marking the “annexation” of four Ukrainian provinces. Amid the unmistakable trappings of empire, he declared that these partially occupied Ukrainian regions had returned to Russia “forever.”

Such imperial posturing in relation to Ukraine resonates widely with the Russian public. Many Russians see today’s war as an historic mission to overcome the injustice of the Soviet collapse and reunite their country with Ukraine following decades of “artificial separation.” The imperial intimacy underpinning their attitudes toward Ukraine allows them to overlook the obvious opposition of the Ukrainian people to this reunion.

Over the past twenty months of full-scale warfare, denial of Ukrainian statehood and talk of imperial revival have become prominent features of Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed information space. Ukrainians are routinely dehumanized and Ukraine itself is dismissed as an intolerable “anti-Russia.” Meanwhile, pundits on Russian state TV regularly discuss the need to exile or annihilate large numbers of Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric is typically framed as the inevitable price of achieving historical justice and saving Ukrainians from themselves.

While it is convenient to blame today’s war on Vladimir Putin and view it as the product of one man’s criminal fantasies, the problem of Russian imperialism is far bigger than Putin alone. Many millions of ordinary Russians support the war because they continue to view Ukraine through the distorting prism of imperial intimacy.

The situation is unlikely to change until a majority of Russians recognize that true patriotism means acknowledging past injustices bestowed by empire on Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Chechens, and many others. This would open the way for the emergence of a new Russia with the potential to live in peace with its neighbors while finally realizing its vast potential. Unless this change occurs, Russian imperialism will remain a major destabilizing factor in global security.

Neringa Klumbytė is director of the Lithuania Program at Miami University’s Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies.

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Jewish president picks Muslim defense minister: Ukraine’s diverse leadership debunks Russia’s “Nazi” slurs

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 04 Sep 2023 23:52:04 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the removal of Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov on September 3 in what was the biggest change among the country’s political leaders since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than eighteen months ago. Reznikov’s departure comes following weeks of speculation over allegations of financial improprieties at the Ministry of Defense, and reflects Ukraine’s desire to demonstrate a zero tolerance approach toward allegations of corruption.

Reznikov is set to be replaced by Rustem Umerov (pictured), who currently chairs Ukraine’s State Property Fund and has previously played key roles as a negotiator in prisoner exchanges with Russia and the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative. While Umerov is a strong candidate in his own right, his status as a member of Ukraine’s Muslim Crimean Tatar minority makes his anticipated appointment particularly significant on a symbolic level. Once Umerov is confirmed, Ukraine will have a Jewish President and a Muslim Minister of Defense, underlining the diversity of the country’s leadership while exposing the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda.

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When Russian President Vladimir Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he identified the “de-Nazification” of the country as one of his two key war aims, alongside the complete demilitarization of Ukraine. In doing so, he was building on decades of similar disinformation. Indeed, the Putin regime’s degrading depictions of Ukrainians as fascists can be traced all the way back to the Stalin era.

Throughout the Cold War, Moscow propagandists sought to discredit Ukraine’s centuries-long independence struggle by associating it with Nazi collaboration. In the post-Soviet era, Russian officials have actively sought to revive these slurs, and have argued consistently that Ukraine’s pro-democracy 2014 Euromaidan Revolution was in fact a far-right coup that transformed the country into a hotbed of fascism. By the time of last year’s full-scale invasion, references to “Nazi Ukraine” had become completely normalized throughout Russia’s carefully choreographed and heavily censored mainstream media.

This Nazi narrative has played predictably well among domestic Russian audiences conditioned to view contemporary politics through the distorting prism of the Soviet Union’s cataclysmic World War II experience. Perhaps more surprisingly, it has also been embraced beyond Russia by some leftists and opponents of America’s dominant role in international affairs. Crucially, however, nobody has been able to provide any convincing evidence to support the Kremlin’s lurid claims.

While Russian propagandists insist today’s Ukraine is overrun with Nazis, Ukrainian far-right groups are actually confined to the margins of the country’s political landscape. During Ukraine’s 2014 presidential election, which took place just a few months after a popular uprising that Russia had characterized as a fascist putsch, the two leading far-right candidates were backed by less than 2% of the Ukrainian electorate. Five years later, Ukraine’s main nationalist parties sought to overcome a long record of ballot box rejection by forming a coalition to contest the country’s parliamentary elections. They received just 2.15% of the vote. These pathetic results are a reminder that contrary to the Kremlin’s wild assertions, support for far-right politicians in today’s Ukraine is lower than in virtually any other European country.

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The election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine in spring 2019 served as a further blow to Russia’s fact-free fantasies about “fascist Ukraine.” Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots and high-profile showbiz career as a Russian-speaking comic should theoretically have made him the archetypal enemy of the allegedly nationalistic Ukrainian population; instead, Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity was never an issue among Ukrainian voters, who elected him by a landslide margin of over 73%.

Russian officials and propagandists have twisted themselves into all sorts of knots in their desperate attempts to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could so overwhelmingly support a Jewish leader. Most notoriously, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared during a spring 2022 interview on Italian television that Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots meant nothing as Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.” The fallout from Lavrov’s disgraceful comments was predictably severe. Following a chorus of international condemnation led by Israel, Putin was obliged to intervene and personally apologized to the Israeli PM on behalf of his foreign minister.

The Kremlin must now also explain how their nightmarish vision of xenophobic, intolerant Ukraine tallies with the appointment of an ethnic minority Muslim as defense minister during arguably the most important war in the country’s entire history. Rustem Umerov has not been chosen on the basis of his ethnicity or faith, of course; he has been picked to succeed Oleksii Reznikov because he is viewed as the best person for the job. Nevertheless, his selection would have been unthinkable if Ukraine even vaguely resembled the far-right dystopia of Russian propaganda.

All this is just one more reminder that Putin’s whole invasion has been based on shameless lies. In an effort to disguise its illegal war of aggression, Russia has sought to cynically exploit some of Europe’s most painful historical wounds, and has attempted to dehumanize its Ukrainian victims by baselessly branding them as modern-day successors to Nazi Germany. In reality, the only fascists in Ukraine are the Russian troops sent by Putin to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. These soldiers of authoritarian empire are fighting a brutal but ultimately losing battle against an increasingly self-confident Ukraine that is comfortable in its diversity and united by its European identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Western leaders should know that downplaying the geopolitical changes currently taking place in Georgia is short-sighted. The West’s weak response to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia is now widely seen as a major strategic blunder that emboldened Vladimir Putin and set the stage for the genocidal invasion of Ukraine. Fifteen years on, the revival of Russian influence in Georgia is helping to convince Putin that despite major setbacks, he will ultimately be able to achieve his goals in Ukraine.

While the Western world has united in opposition to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Georgia has stood aside and has instead adopted a range of Kremlin-friendly policies. Crucially, the Georgian authorities have flatly refused to join international sanctions against Russia. Meanwhile, Tbilisi recently restored direct flights with Russia, despite calls from the EU and US not to do so. Government officials have also echoed Kremlin propaganda accusing the West of attempting to pressure Georgia into attacking Russia.

Meanwhile, critics have accused the Georgian authorities of embracing anti-democratic policies similar to those adopted by Russia in recent decades. In spring 2023, the ruling Georgian Dream party attempted to implement new laws that closely mirrored existing Russian legislation targeting civil society organizations as “foreign agents.” This initiative was eventually blocked by large-scale public protests, but efforts to demonize civil society and the country’s political opposition have continued.

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The impact of Russian propaganda in the Georgian information space is another problematic issue that is particularly evident in the rehabilitation of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. For years, the Putin regime has promoted a revisionist approach to Stalin, portraying him a strong leader whose role in securing victory over Nazi Germany outweighs his crimes. Among Georgian audiences, Russia has successfully utilized Stalin’s Georgian roots, with the Soviet dictator emerging as a figurehead for an anti-Western strain of Georgian nationalism that aligns closely with Kremlin narratives.

In recent years, 11 new statues to Stalin have been erected in Georgia, while one recent Georgian opinion poll found almost 46% of respondents agreed that “patriotic Georgians should be proud of Stalin.” This change in attitudes toward Stalin has yet to attract much attention in the West, but it serves to highlight the vulnerability of Georgian society to Russian information warfare.

Failing to address Georgia’s slide into Russia’s geopolitical orbit would be a costly mistake. To avoid this outcome, Washington and Brussels need to adopt clear policies. Time is of the essence. As Russian influence continues to grow in today’s Georgia, Western leverage is inevitably diminishing. It is vital that the West puts its legitimate leverage to work without delay to demonstrate that further steps toward Moscow will come with considerable costs. This would help the Georgian people to democratically reverse the country’s dangerous current trajectory.

The alternative would be disastrous for Georgia, Ukraine, and Western interests. If Putin is able to reassert Russian dominance over Georgia and derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions while continuing to occupy twenty percent of the country, he will be encouraged to believe that a similar outcome will eventually prove possible in Ukraine. That would prolong the current war and pave the way for further acts of Russian aggression.

Giorgi Kandelaki is a former Georgian MP and a former Chair of the Georgian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He is currently a project manager at the Soviet Past Research Laboratory (Sovlab), a think-tank dedicated to researching Georgia’s totalitarian past and countering the weaponization of history.

This refusal to recognize Ukraine as an independent nation is a longstanding Russian tradition stretching back hundreds of years. From the eighteenth century onward, successive Russian rulers have viewed any expression of a separate Ukrainian identity as direct challenge to Russia’s imperial identity and a potential catalyst for the breakup of the Russian state. In the modern era, independent Ukraine’s gradual embrace of European democratic values has added an ideological dimension to this Russian opposition, with Kremlin leaders fearful that Ukrainian democracy could prove contagious and spell doom for their own authoritarian regime.

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Ukraine’s first push for statehood came in the seventeenth century, when Ukrainian cossacks rose up in an ultimately failed attempt to establish a state of their own. The modern independence movement gained ground throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leading to the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918 during the chaotic aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The Ukrainian People’s Republic proved to be short-lived, but in many ways it paved the way for the independent state that would emerge from the wreckage of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Russia’s denial of Ukrainian identity and refusal to accept the reality of Ukrainian independence are now fueling an invasion that many view as genocidal in nature. According to the UN, a crucial indicator of genocide is the “denial of the existence of protected groups or of recognition of elements of their identity.” A very large number of public statements by Russian officials including Putin would seem to meet this definition. Russia’s efforts to destroy Ukraine’s cultural heritage, along with the relentless barrage of genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed mainstream media, strongly indicate genocidal intent.

In areas of Ukraine under Russian control, local populations are being subjected to a range of genocidal policies including summary executions and mass deportations, along with the abduction and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination of children. Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all symbols of Ukrainian national identity are being systematically removed. An international investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces during the occupation of Kherson found that “Putin’s plan to extinguish Ukrainian identity includes a range of crimes evocative of genocide.”

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So far, Putin’s invasion is failing to achieve its imperial objectives. Indeed, the war he unleashed in February 2022 appears to have greatly consolidated Ukrainian national identity and confirmed the finality of the country’s historic departure from the Russian sphere of influence. Last year, as Ukrainians marked Independence Day for the first time since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy stressed the impact of the war on Ukrainian national identity, commenting that Ukraine had been “not born but reborn.”

Evidence of this rebirth can be seen in villages, towns, and cities across Ukraine. Millions of people who initially fled the Russian invasion have since returned home. Many are choosing to switch to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives, while interest in Ukrainian history and culture has risen to unprecedented highs. Despite the horrors of the ongoing invasion, national pride is soaring, while polls consistently indicate overwhelming opposition to any kind of compromise peace that would cede Ukrainian land to Russia.

Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy, the Mykhailo Hrushevsky professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, echoes President Zelenskyy’s comments on the profound impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian identity. “What you see today in Ukraine is really something that many other nations experienced. It is a war for independence. And the war for independence is very much about the formation of this new identity,” he commented during an interview with NPR.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin set out to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. In doing so, he was pursuing a genocidal agenda that has deep roots in Russian imperial history. However, the Russian invasion has backfired disastrously for the Kremlin, greatly strengthening Ukrainian national identity while poisoning bilateral ties and shattering historic links that had once bound the two countries closely together. Russians may still be in denial over Ukrainian identity, but sooner or later they will have to face up to the reality of living next door to a strong and independent Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Throughout his 23-year reign, Vladimir Putin has enthusiastically embraced this imperial identity. Soon after taking office, he signaled his intentions by reintroducing the Soviet national anthem and consciously reviving the gold-plated splendor of the Czarist court. More recently, he has emphasized the continuity between the imperial past and his own regime by lamenting the fall of the USSR as the “disintegration of historical Russia” and vowing to reclaim “historically Russian lands” from Ukraine.

Putin’s bitterness over the break-up of the Soviet Union has fueled an unhealthy obsession with Ukraine that has come to symbolize his increasingly messianic brand of Russian imperialism. Among the many perceived injustices of the Soviet collapse, it is the emergence of an independent Ukraine that rankles Putin most. He insists Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and claims the entire notion of a separate Ukrainian national identity is an anti-Russian plot hatched by foreign agents. During the build-up to the current war, the Russian dictator published a 5,000-word essay questioning Ukraine’s right to exist, and described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

Such posturing is nothing new. Russian rulers have been denying Ukrainian national identity and suppressing Ukraine’s statehood ambitions for more than three hundred years. This grim history of oppression is studded with atrocities such as the 1708 Baturyn Massacre and the artificially engineered famine in 1930s Soviet Ukraine, which left millions dead and is now recognized by more than 30 countries as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation. These unpunished crimes helped fuel a sense of imperial impunity that laid the ideological foundations for the current invasion. Almost a century after the horrors of the Holodomor famine, Russia is once again accused of committing genocide in Ukraine.

Throughout the Czarist and Soviet eras, Russia’s many landmark crimes in Ukraine were accompanied by relentless waves of russification in every sphere of Ukrainian life. This took place alongside the slow but steady suffocation of Ukraine’s national aspirations under layer upon layer of restrictions and bureaucratic bans. Perhaps the single most succinct example of Russia’s pathological refusal to acknowledge the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity remains the Valuev Circular. This 1863 Czarist decree banning the publication of Ukrainian-language literature declares: “a separate Ukrainian (“Little Russian”) language never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

Disinformation has always played an important part in Russian efforts to suppress Ukrainian identity. Long before the era of social media fakes and Kremlin troll farms, Russian agents were actively destroying or rewriting ancient chronicles to fit imperial orthodoxies and remove anything that could strengthen Ukrainian claims to a national narrative of their own. Indeed, it is somewhat fitting that the term “Potemkin Village,” which is used to denote acts of shameless political deception, can be traced back to the artificial villages allegedly erected by Czarist officials in the Ukrainian countryside for the benefit of visiting Russian Empress Catherine the Great.

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The dawn of Ukrainian independence did little to dampen Russia’s imperial ambitions, with Moscow continuing to treat post-Soviet Ukraine as a vassal state. The turning point came in late 2004, when attempts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election in favor of a Kremlin-friendly candidate sparked massive street protests in Kyiv that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. This was to prove a watershed moment in Putin’s reign. The Orange Revolution sparked painful memories of his own experience as a young KGB officer in East Germany as the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Empire in Central Europe crumbled. Putin became convinced the West was plotting a similar pro-democracy uprising in Russia itself, and began to view Ukraine not just as an accident of history but as an existential threat to his own regime.

After the Orange Revolution, Putin’s policies toward Ukraine grew increasingly aggressive while his rhetoric became openly imperialistic. When years of energy cutoffs, trade embargoes, and attempts to subvert domestic Ukrainian politics all failed to force the country back into the Russian orbit, he eventually resorted to military force with the 2014 occupation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This proved counter-productive, fueling a surge in Ukrainian patriotic sentiment and dramatically accelerating the nation-building processes that had been underway in Ukraine since the early 1990s. Faced with the prospect of losing Ukraine entirely, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Amid the horrors of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia’s imperialistic objectives have become increasingly obvious. Kremlin officials routinely deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, while genocidal anti-Ukrainian outbursts have become completely normalized on Russian state TV channels. Meanwhile, Putin himself has proudly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great.

The actions of Russian forces inside Ukraine more than mirror this imperialistic rhetoric. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, with millions more subjected to forced deportation. Those who remain in occupied regions are being pressured into accepting Russian passports as part of a ruthless russification campaign. Time and again, survivors of Russian captivity have recounted the especially brutal treatment reserved for anyone considered a Ukrainian patriot.

None of this is entirely surprising to Ukrainians, who have spent much of their lives in the shadow of Russia’s imperial pretensions and are painfully aware of their colossal neighbor’s longstanding disdain for Ukrainian statehood. While many Ukrainians were admittedly taken aback by the ferocity of the Russian onslaught, few were genuinely shocked to witness yet another manifestation of the imperial aggression that has shaped their country’s history for generations. This familiarity helps to explain why an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are so determined to fight on until their country is fully liberated. They understand the futility of trying to compromise with the Kremlin and recognize that any attempt to strike a deal would be interpreted by Putin as an invitation to go further.

As Ukrainians defend their statehood on the battlefield, they are also attempting to remove any remaining symbols of Russian imperialism from the country. In the past year, high profile departures have included Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument and the giant Soviet crest adorning the shield of Kyiv’s iconic motherland monument. In everyday life, more and more Ukrainians are opting to switch to the Ukrainian language, exploring different aspects of Ukrainian culture, and expressing an interest in Ukrainian history. A war of independence is taking place along an 800-mile front and in the minds of millions of individual Ukrainians.

An understanding of Russian imperialism in Ukraine is essential for anyone seeking to make sense of today’s war. Putin has attempted to blame the invasion on everything from nonexistent Nazis to imaginary NATO security threats, but at heart it is an old-fashioned colonial war of extermination. In words and deeds, Russia has made clear that it seeks to destroy the Ukrainian state and erase Ukrainian identity. Asking Ukrainians to negotiate with this genocidal agenda is absurd and grotesque. Instead, the goal must be a decisive Ukrainian victory over Russian imperialism. Until Europe’s longest independence struggle reaches a successful conclusion, a sustainable peace will remain elusive.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The launch of this new textbook is worthy of particular attention. As an officially sanctioned guide to Russian history that is clearly designed to shape the world view of young Russians, it highlights many of the key messages at the heart of modern Russian imperialism and lays bare the Kremlin’s efforts to weaponize history in order to justify its own wars of aggression.

Unsurprisingly, the textbook glorifies centuries of Russian imperial expansion and whitewashes the crimes of the Soviet era, while dehumanizing Ukrainians as Nazis and portraying the West as implacably hostile to Russia. It defends the Russian invasion of Ukraine and places Putin alongside other leading Russian imperialists such as Peter the Great and Stalin as a “gatherer of Russian lands.” Meanwhile, setbacks such as the collapse of the USSR and the loss of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space are portrayed as part of a long-term Western anti-Russian conspiracy.

One of the key threads running through the new textbook is the notion of Russian victimhood. Russia is consistently portrayed as a victim of Western intrigues and is never the aggressor. Needless to say, there is no thought for the entire nations subjugated or destroyed by Russian imperial aggression. In this highly distorted and hopelessly partisan reading of history, the largest nation on the planet is also the world’s biggest victim.

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The messianic view of Russian history outlined in this newly published textbook is part of a long tradition of Russian exceptionalism dating back to Czarist times that portrays Russia as a nation on a sacred civilizing mission. With Russia depicted as an unquestionably positive force for good in the world, the use of force in pursuit of this role becomes easily justified. Such twisted logic remains prevalent today and helps to explain the popularity of otherwise absurd arguments framing the invasion of Ukraine as an attempt to rescue Ukrainians from themselves.

This embrace of exceptionalism encourages Russians to romanticize the violence that has defined much of their country’s history. It also reinforces a sense of continuity linking the Czarist and Soviet past with the Putinist present. For millions of Russians, post-Soviet military campaigns including the frozen conflict in Moldova, two Chechen wars, the invasion of Georgia, the seizure of Crimea, and the intervention in Syria are all part of a expansionist tradition stretching back centuries.

Putin himself has spoken of the USSR as “historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.” He has directly compared his Ukraine invasion with the imperial conquests of Peter the Great, and has made clear that the goal of today’s war is to reclaim “historically Russian lands.” No doubt Putin’s Czarist predecessors would find these imperial ambitions immediately recognizable.

In line with Putin’s claims to be restoring historical justice in Ukraine, the new textbook rejects the idea of Russia as a colonial power and instead speaks of “reuniting” territories or liberating neighboring nations from oppression. Meanwhile, those who have dared to condemn or fight against Russian expansionism are depicted as agents of the West or nationalist extremists. The incorporation of new territories by Russia is portrayed as beneficial for the people being incorporated, regardless of whether they themselves agree.

The recent publication of Russia’s new history textbook is a comparatively minor event at a time when the Kremlin is waging a genocidal war of imperial conquest in the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, it should serve as a wake-up call for anyone still laboring under the delusion that Putin is a rational leader pursuing limited geopolitical objectives. On the contrary, he presides over a regime and a society that openly embraces a brand of imperialism which most Europeans assumed had been consigned to the ash heap of history generations ago.

This imperialistic mindset represents perhaps the greatest single obstacle to a sustainable peace in Europe. Even if the invasion of Ukraine ends in military failure, the underlying problem of Russian imperialism will remain until Russians are forced to confront their country’s long history of imperial aggression. This will likely be a painful process, but it is unavoidable if Russia is to eventually emerge as a modern state and reintegrate into the wider community of nations.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the recently published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

#AtlanticDebrief – Where is Europe headed politically? | A Debrief from Jon Henley

jbatchik — Tue, 22 Aug 2023 13:02:39 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

To what extent are we witnessing the rise of the far-right in Europe? What is driving European voters to support far-right candidates? As we gear up for the European Parliament elections next year, what do these political shifts mean for the European project as a whole?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Jon Henley, the Guardian’s Europe correspondent, to discuss to what extent the far-right is becoming more politically mainstream in Europe today.

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Why Putin’s Russia cannot accept its borders

Glenn Chafetz, John Sipher — Fri, 11 Aug 2023 23:37:48 +0000

To understand Russia’s current obsession with Ukraine, it is important to recognize that Russia was never a state in the common usage of the term. Unlike the modern Turkish state that emerged from the Ottoman Empire, or Great Britain, which acquired and lost an empire, Russia never had an identity separate from empire. As British historian Geoffrey Hosking observed, “Britain had an empire, but Russia was an empire.”

The Kremlin’s preferred narrative of Russia rising from present-day Ukraine (“Kyivan Rus”) is a Moscow-concocted fairy tale. The officially endorsed 1000-year history of Russia is a self-created and self-perpetuated myth that generations of Russian dictators have promoted to justify their external expansion and internal repression.

Instead, what we think of today as Russia started out as a loose collection of independent city states that included Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, and Moscow, the last of which attained particular significance toward the end of Mongol rule a little over 500 years ago. Kyiv was no more a part of Russia then than it is now. There was no common language, no common administration, and no joint identity. Indeed, it would be centuries before the rulers of Muscovy attempted to assert their dominance over Kyiv and the lands of today’s Ukraine.

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It was the era of Mongol rule and not the Kyivan Rus inheritance that paved the way for the rise of the Russian Empire. Under Ivan III (“The Great”), Muscovy established itself as the strongest of the city states to emerge from the Mongol period. Ivan called himself “Tsar of all Rus,” but he was actually more like the mayor of Greater Moscow. It was Ivan who started the expansion of Muscovy, initiating the so-called “gathering of Russian lands.” His expansionist vision has been embraced by virtually every subsequent ruler of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation.

Ivan III’s quest to acquire new territories, often under the guise of “reuniting the lands of the ancient Rus,” continues to this day and has had a profound impact on world history. As Historian Stephen Kotkin has noted, “Beginning with the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, Russia managed to expand at an average rate of fifty square miles per day for hundreds of years, eventually covering one-sixth of the earth’s landmass.”

Few of the peoples inhabiting the lands Ivan III and his successors claimed saw themselves as Russian, at least not before they were “gathered.” At the time of Ivan III’s death, Muscovy covered less than a fifth of the area of today’s Russia; notably, it did not include the territory of modern Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, or all of Siberia. Crimea, about which Vladimir Putin rhapsodizes, was not part of the Russian Empire until Catherine II took it from the Crimean Khans in 1783.

If Putin is concerned with righting historical wrongs, he should give Crimea back to the Crimean Tatars. He won’t do this, of course, because the dynamic of imperial conquest and Russification is a key component of legitimacy for Putin, as it has been for almost all of Russia’s rulers (Yeltsin and Gorbachev partially excepted). Russia expands because its rulers need an external threat to justify their autocracy. This was as true for the Soviet period as it had been for Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.

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Putin’s Russia laments the loss of imperial glory, and has never come to terms with its repressive past. The security-expansion paradox driving Russia’s foreign and domestic policies is a vicious cycle that all empires experience to one extent or another. Acquisition creates threats inside the newly acquired territories and on the expanding borders of the growing empire. Expansion demands inward Russification and repression, and further outward expansion. As Catherine the Great famously said, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”

This dynamic can end in two ways: Either through external containment or internal democratization. The latter has proved problematic for the Russian people, and is not something Russia’s neighbors should count on happening any time soon. The former has worked before, during the Cold War.

Modern Russia remains an empire and does not see itself as a Great Power unless it dominates its neighbors. Consequently, Russia will continue to threaten, attack, and absorb its neighbors until the West acts collectively to contain it.

Russia and its apologists will complain that containment ignores Russia’s legitimate security concerns. This is a canard because Russia’s security concerns constantly expand. In reality, Russian leaders have absolutely nothing to worry about if they return to their country’s internationally recognized 1991 borders. The West has always respected these borders; it is Russia that has not. Until modern Russia moves beyond its deeply ingrained imperial identity, this is unlikely to change.

Glenn Chafetz has more than 30 years of experience in government, academia, and the private sector. He is now director of 2430 Group, a non-profit that helps defend the US private sector from state sponsored threats. John Sipher worked for the CIA’s Clandestine Service for 28 years. He is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a co-founder of Spycraft Entertainment.

Russia is targeting Ukrainian national identity with attacks on heritage sites

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 03 Aug 2023 20:04:15 +0000

In the early hours of July 23, a Russian missile struck and partially destroyed the Transfiguration Cathedral in Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa. It was the latest in a long line of attacks on Ukraine’s cultural heritage that many believe reflect the Kremlin’s overriding goal of eradicating Ukrainian identity along with Ukrainian statehood.

The attack on the Transfiguration Cathedral was seen as particularly shocking as the damaged building is the city’s largest church and sits in the heart of Odesa’s UNESCO-listed historic center. However, the incident was far from unprecedented. Days later, Russian forces shelled St. Catherine’s Cathedral in Kherson, which ranks as another of southern Ukraine’s most prominent Orthodox landmarks.

In late July, UNESCO officials confirmed they have now officially verified damage to 274 Ukrainian heritage sites since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost eighteen months ago. The list includes 117 religious sites, 27 museums, 98 buildings of historical or artistic interest, 19 monuments, and 12 libraries. Other available data suggests UNESCO’s figures may actually be conservative. In January 2023, researchers from the Smithsonian Institution’s Cultural Heritage Monitoring Lab claimed to have already identified almost 1,600 cases of damage to heritage sites in Ukraine.

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Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has consistently targeted pillars of Ukrainian art, history, and society. Numerous Ukrainian and international commentators claim these attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites are part of a deliberate Russian campaign to eliminate symbols of Ukrainian national identity.

These arguments are supported by Vladimir Putin’s own frequent denials of Ukraine’s historical legitimacy and his insistence that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). Nor is Putin alone in questioning Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation. Over the past eighteen months, genocidal anti-Ukrainian narratives have become a routine daily feature of Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed state TV.

The genocidal rhetoric coming out of Moscow provides critical context for the attacks on heritage sites currently taking place across Ukraine. According to the director of Ukraine’s Maidan Museum, Ihor Poshyvailo, Russia’s ongoing invasion is best understood as a “heritage war.” He argues that the invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin should not be viewed as a traditional war over territory or as a military campaign with limited political goals, but instead as “a war against our historical memory. Against our identity. Against our culture. And, of course, against our future.”

This sentiment has been echoed by Olesia Ostrovska-Liuta, a prominent figure in Ukrainian cultural circles and the current director of Kyiv’s popular Mystetskiy Arsenal visual arts museum. “This Russian war in Ukraine is very tightly connected to culture,” she commented in April 2023. “The basic assumption which lies beneath this assault is that Ukraine should not exist as a separate phenomenon with its own political agency. Any Ukrainian otherness from Russia should be erased. It is genocidal in its objectives and in its action, as we have already seen. Culture is at the very core of this war.”

Member of the European Parliament Sabine Verheyen, who chairs the European Parliament’s Culture and Education Committee, is one of a number of international figures to level similar accusations against the Kremlin. “Russia is trying to destroy not only Ukrainian cultural heritage, but also national uniqueness, tradition, and ultimately, the Ukrainian right to exist,” she stated in late 2022.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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High-profile targets of Russian attacks have included the Ivankiv Historical and Local History Museum in Kyiv region, which housed a collection of paintings by revered Ukrainian folk artist Maria Prymachenko, who famously inspired Picasso. The museum was destroyed by the Russian army during the very first days of the invasion in February 2022.

Russian forces have also targeted a range of national monuments crucial to securing historical and cultural memory, including the Drobitsky Yar Holocaust Memorial in eastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, which was shelled in March 2022. The attack prompted Ukraine’s Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center to tweet: “Russia continues to attack not only the civilian population of Ukraine but also the places of remembrance.”

In late July 2023, a Russian airstrike hit a school in northern Ukraine’s Sumy region that houses a research center dedicated to the man-made Stalin era famine known as the Holodomor, which has been recognized by more than 30 countries as an act of genocide against Ukraine. Modern Russia continues to deny that the artificial famine was a deliberate attempt to target Ukrainians.

Ukraine’s literary treasures have also been frequently targeted. The Russian military has bombed libraries across the country, with dozens reportedly destroyed completely and more than 150 left severely damaged. One high-profile victim was the Rare Book Library at Kharkiv’s Karazin University, which housed more than 60,000 historic books and manuscripts.

Ukrainians have responded to the existential challenges of the Russian invasion by demonstrating remarkable resilience. This is as true in the cultural world as it is on the military and economic fronts. Nevertheless, greater international engagement is needed to provide the material and organizational backing necessary to protect and repair Ukraine’s heritage sites. Ultimately, the best way to safeguard Ukrainian culture and national identity is by providing the country with the arms it needs to defeat Russia. Until that happens, the steady destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage will continue.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The Russian Orthodox Church has traditionally been a strong supporter of the secular authorities in Russia. This was true for centuries during the era of the Russian Empire. It was also the case after Stalin revived and reorganized the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943 following 25 years of brutal Soviet persecution. Similarly, in more recent times the Church has been instrumental in promoting Vladimir Putin’s dream of restoring the Russian Empire. In 2012, Patriarch Kirill addressed Putin personally as the savior of modern Russia and compared his reign to a “miracle of God.”

The support of the Russian Orthodox Church has grown as the invasion of Ukraine has progressed, with Patriarch Kirill becoming one of the war’s most prominent promoters. In his sermons, he has accused “foreign forces” of trying to divide Russia and Ukraine, which he often describes as “one people.” These thinly veiled attempts to blame the war on the Western world while denying Ukraine’s right to an independent national identity closely echo the Kremlin’s own imperialistic talking points.

Patriarch Kirill has continued to defend the invasion despite mounting evidence of Russian war crimes committed in Ukraine. He has remained unmoved by the atrocities uncovered in liberated towns such as Bucha, or the seemingly endless accounts of mass killings, sexual violence, torture chambers, child abductions, and forced deportations throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. He is silent regarding the constant missile and drone assaults against civilian targets including homes, apartment buildings, shopping centers, churches, hospitals, schools, and grain storage facilities.

Instead, Patriarch Kirill has indicated that the Russian Orthodox Church may even be willing to overlook such crimes. “The Church realizes that if someone, driven by a sense of duty and the need to honor his oath, stays loyal to his vocation and dies while carrying out his military duty, then he is without any doubt doing a deed that is equal to sacrifice. He sacrifices himself for others. And therefore, we believe that this sacrifice washes away all the sins that a person has committed,” Kirill stated in a September 2022 sermon.

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While Patriarch Kirill’s efforts to justify the invasion of Ukraine have garnered considerable international attention, his stance is far from exceptional and appears to be broadly representative of the mood in today’s Russia. Indeed, Russian aggression against Ukraine is not the result of plans determined by President Putin alone; nor is Patriarch Kirill the only establishment figure to publicly back the invasion. On the contrary, levels of support, or at least acquiescence, among the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian society as a whole remain scandalously high.

Not one of the approximately 400 Russian Orthodox Church bishops in Russia has spoken out against the war. The Russian Orthodox Church clergy is a huge body including more than 40,000 full-time clerics, priests, and deacons internationally. Only approximately 300 members of the clergy signed a joint public statement criticizing the war, with many of the signatories based outside of Russia. Moreover, 700 university rectors have signed a public statement supporting the war.

While opinion polls in totalitarian societies must be treated with a high degree of skepticism, the available data indicates that Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine has remained consistently higher than 70% for the past eighteen months, according to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center. The contribution of the Russian Orthodox Church to this pro-war consensus has been considerable and is damning.

Russian theologian Sergei Chapnin, who formerly served as deputy editor-in-chief of the Moscow Patriarchate Publishing House and is now based at the Orthodox Christian Study Center of Fordham University, has been highly critical of what he sees as the hypocrisy of the Russian Orthodox Church bishops. In an open letter published in February 2023, he reproached them for being “embittered castle-builders swilling the cocktail of imperial myth, resentment, and unbelievably primitive eschatology. You stand by a man [Patriarch Kirill] who justifies war crimes and has betrayed the Church. You repeat his words, retell his criminal arguments.”

In a January 2023 sermon, Patriarch Kirill predicted the Russian invasion would leave the Russian Orthodox Church triumphant in Ukraine and warned: “there will be no trace left of the schismatics because they are fulfilling the devil’s evil bidding of eroding Orthodoxy on Kyivan land.” This chilling prophesy is unlikely to be fulfilled. While Kirill attempts to justify imperial aggression, Ukrainians are demonstrating their own spiritual values through solidarity. Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, Ukrainians of all faiths and walks of life remain united. They are driven by a commitment to freedom that is the opposite of the intolerance preached by Kirill.

Borys Gudziak is Metropolitan Archbishop of Philadelphia of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States, Head of the Department of External Church Relations of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and President of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv.

The ensuing military stalemate laid the basis for a 1991 UN-mediated settlement plan, which established a cease-fire and a UN buffer zone along the sand berm; called for a self-determination referendum; and set up a mission, MINURSO, to monitor the cease-fire and organize the referendum. The vote never took place due to Moroccan objections. Subsequent negotiations failed to achieve a breakthrough, even though the two sides continued to abide by the cease-fire. In 2007, under pressure from France and the United States, Morocco proposed an autonomy plan that would provide for a degree of self-government for Western Sahara under its sovereignty. The Polisario rejected it out of hand for denying the Sahrawi population’s right to self-determination.

The conflict remained frozen until a series of events in 2019-2021 reignited hostilities, spreading tensions through the wider region. Starting in 2019, Rabat convinced a number of Arab and African governments to open consulates in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, signaling their recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the territory. In November 2020, the 1991 cease-fire collapsed when Morocco seized a section of the UN buffer zone to clear a blockade of a key route by Polisario activists and in response the Front resumed its attacks against Morocco in Western Sahara. Tensions escalated further in December 2020 when the Donald Trump administration extended US recognition to Morocco’s control of Western Sahara, and again in August 2021, when Algeria broke off diplomatic relations with Morocco, partly over the latter’s unilateral moves in Western Sahara.

A low-intensity conflict

The intensity of the hostilities over Western Sahara during the conflict’s latest round has remained fairly limited, mainly due to a military imbalance in favor of Rabat. Since the end of the cease-fire in 2020, the Polisario has been able to do little more than fire at the Moroccan sand berm in a series of hit-and-run attacks. Yet the vast majority of its attacks are confined to a northeastern section of the former UN buffer zone inside Western Sahara, suggesting that the group is unable to carry out attacks in the rest of the territory. The Front largely demobilized after the 1991 cease-fire, maintaining only minimal forces; it then lost one of its main arms suppliers, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, in 2011, leaving it mostly dependent on outdated equipment. Morocco, from its side, can deploy technologically advanced weapons, including drones, which have granted it air superiority.

The most destabilizing incidents have come from alleged Moroccan attacks on Algerian and Mauritanian civilian convoys. These have threatened to widen the conflict to the rest of the region. In November 2021, an alleged Moroccan drone strike in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara resulted in the deaths of three Algerian truck drivers en route to Mauritania. The incident prompted the Algerian presidency to publicly pin the blame on Rabat and vow retaliation. A second such incident occurred in April 2022, when Algeria accused the Moroccan air force of killing another three people in an attack on a civilian truck convoy near the Mauritanian border.

More recently, an attack inside Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara has highlighted the potential for further military escalation. On May 20, an alleged bomb attack reportedly targeted a segment of a 100-kilometer conveyor belt used by Morocco to export phosphates from a mine located deep within Western Sahara to the coast. Moroccan and pro-Polisario media outlets refrained from reporting on this incident, but the pro-Polisario nongovernmental organization Western Sahara Resource Watch released a series of videos supporting the claim that the incident had happened. If the incident did in fact take place, it would mark the first such attack in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara since the cease-fire’s collapse. While the fact that neither side publicized the alleged event suggests a shared interest in avoiding an escalation at this stage, this kind of attack hints at the possibility of a new, more dangerous phase in the conflict, should diplomacy fail to contain tensions.

The UN Security Council’s hesitations and de Mistura’s role

Divisions and inaction marked the UN Security Council’s initial response to the restart of the conflict in 2020. The council remained inactive for weeks after the cease-fire collapsed due to deep divisions within its ranks between pro-Polisario (such as Russia among the permanent members, as well as several African and Latin American countries) and pro-Morocco member states (such as France and many Arab and West African governments). Pro-Polisario members wanted the council to publicly put more pressure on Rabat, while pro-Morocco states supported the kingdom’s reluctance to allow any form of international scrutiny of the conflict.

All attempts to push the council to discuss and take a position failed. When Germany requested consultations on the matter in December 2020, Rabat suspended diplomatic ties in retaliation. In April 2021, the United States tried to push the council to take a stance on the need to avoid an escalation and appoint a new UN envoy, but this initiative crashed on a roadblock thrown up by India, which acted on Morocco’s behalf. This move was enough to block the US initiative, as Washington realized that the costs of overcoming New Delhi’s objection would far outweigh the initiative’s benefits.

Faced with a paralyzed Security Council, the Joe Biden administration tried to ease hostilities in Western Sahara. It pushed for the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the new UN envoy, overcoming Rabat’s initial rejection. Yet, it refrained from clarifying its position on former President Trump’s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, in an apparent attempt to avoid antagonizing either side.

The Security Council’s divisions and widening gap between Morocco and the Polisario meant that de Mistura had to operate within a very tight policy space. Following the collapse of the cease-fire, the two sides presented diverging views regarding the format and substance of future negotiations. For Rabat, the only way to return to talks was to resume the 2019 roundtable format, which included Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario, and to discuss acceptance of its 2007 autonomy plan. The roundtable format was a short-lived negotiating arrangement introduced in 2019 by former UN envoy Horst Kohler, who resigned after only two negotiating sessions for personal reasons, leaving the position vacant until de Mistura’s appointment. The Moroccans view the Polisario as an Algerian proxy and contend that only a grand bargain with Algeria and Mauritania can end the conflict. From its side, the Polisario insists on direct bilateral talks with Morocco to set the terms for a self-determination referendum.

De Mistura embarked on rebuilding ties with regional actors through the use of constructive ambiguity. By prioritizing direct bilateral consultations and keeping a relatively low profile, he gradually expanded his scope of action. His use of the phrasing “all concerned” to avoid precisely describing who should be involved in future negotiations, and invitation to Morocco and the Polisario Front to move beyond their current positions, provided a basis for moving forward. In particular, the “all concerned” language allowed him to sidestep the issue of who should be involved in diplomatic efforts related to Western Sahara by addressing all the parties with a stake in this conflict, whether as direct parties or regional observers. Through such constructive ambiguity, he was able to avoid defining exactly which actors should be involved and which plan should be the basis for negotiations. In October 2022, the Security Council adopted amendments to its annual resolution on Western Sahara that echoed the envoy’s wording, thus providing him with much-needed backing and placing pressure on the parties to engage with him.

Washington’s role

The Biden administration has started playing a somewhat more assertive role in efforts to revive UN-brokered negotiations. Over the past months, US officials have engaged with all parties involved, aiming to contain regional tensions and rebuild the UN framework for Western Sahara. Washington’s unique position as the only external actor capable of engaging with all stakeholders makes it a critical interlocutor.

Other external actors have struggled to have any impact. France has strengthened its relations with Algeria over the past months, to the detriment of its traditionally close ties with Morocco. Two events in particular contributed to the deterioration. In January 2023, President Emmanuel Macron met with Algerian Chief of Staff Said Chengriha in Paris; and Morocco accused French members of the European Parliament of backing, if not championing, a resolutioncondemning Moroccan violations of press freedom. For its part, in 2022 Spain publicly endorsed the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan as “the most serious, realistic and credible basis” to solve the conflict, angering the Polisario and Algeria. Germany also expressed its support for the Moroccan plan, having mended its ties with Rabat. And Morocco sees Russia, which is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, as too close to Algeria’s and the Polisario’s stancesto be a credible mediator.

Despite its privileged position, Washington has been reluctant to invest significant political capital in ending the conflict, considering it a low-priority issue. Instead of applying pressure, the administration has tried to build confidence among all the main stakeholders by leveraging their desire for strong ties with the United States. To this end, the Biden administration has worked to establish closer economic and security ties with Algeria, maintained relations with Morocco, and offered the Polisario the prospect of an expanded diplomatic relationship. But its reluctance to make a bigger push for negotiations could hamper the UN envoy’s efforts.

Indeed, Morocco has yet to modify its position. Moroccan diplomats continue to engage with the UN envoy, but refuse to abandon the 2019 roundtable format or negotiate beyond their autonomy plan. The Polisario remains open to discussing the envoy’s proposals, but skeptical of the current circumstances for negotiations due to a lack of international attention toward the conflict and a weak negotiating position.

Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara

Despite the temporary lull in tensions, Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara has further exacerbated regional tensions. The Moroccan media celebrated the July 17 announcement as another diplomatic victory for the kingdom. The move did not go unchallenged. Three days later, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned it as “a blatant violation of international law.”

Israel’s step may have bolstered Morocco’s efforts to formalize its control over the territory but is unlikely to inject real momentum in its strategy to secure international support for its claim. International media highlighted how the move strengthens the dominant narrative that Rabat has the upper hand in this conflict, but Israel’s controversial role in the region suggests that few other states will follow its example.

Supporting a fragile path back to negotiations

The Western Sahara conflict continues to present significant challenges to regional stability, but recent diplomatic efforts offer hope for progress. With some modest backing from the Security Council, de Mistura has managed to open some limited space to pursue a political solution. To ensure that the UN envoy’s efforts to revive talks have any chance of success, Washington should engage more proactively as a relatively impartial broker by extracting concessions from both sides to create a climate more conducive to resuming negotiations. As a first confidence-building step, the United States could ask Rabat to release at least some of the Sahrawi activists who have been detained since protests in Gdeim Izik in 2010 and grant the UN envoy unrestricted access to Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. On the other side, it should encourage the Polisario to unilaterally suspend its military operations against Morocco. Such steps, if successful, could be enough to lay the basis for a resumption of negotiations.

Riccardo Fabiani is the project director of the North Africa program at the International Crisis Group

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Ukraine is finally freeing itself from centuries of Russian imperialism

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 01 Aug 2023 20:07:23 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the very different developmental paths the two countries have chosen following the collapse of the USSR three decades ago. Although Vladimir Putin continues to promote Soviet-era propaganda depicting Russia and Ukraine as “one people,” it is obvious to independent observers that the divide between the neighboring nations has never been wider. Since 1991, Ukrainians have done much to shake off the shadows of authoritarian empire and regain their agency; in contrast, Russian society remains firmly trapped in the imperial past.

There are a number of key factors behind Ukraine’s post-Soviet transformation from totalitarian society to a more recognizably European identity. At the grass roots level, Ukraine has experienced three revolutionary protest movements that have empowered the public and redefined the relationship between the state and society. The 1990 Granite Revolution, 2004 Orange Revolution, and 2014 Euromaidan Revolution all championed the fundamental democratic principles of individual human rights and the rule of law. Nothing comparable has taken place in Russia, hence the passivity and almost complete lack of agency that characterizes modern Russian society.

Ukraine has also experienced an extended period of democratization. With the exception of the 2004 presidential vote, every single Ukrainian election since 1991 has been recognized by international watchdogs as free and fair. The consolidation of Ukraine’s democratic culture has been supported by the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, with both the EU and NATO setting reform benchmarks that have helped to build a genuinely durable democracy. Unlike Ukraine, Russia struggled to establish a credible democratic system during the early post-Soviet period and is now once more a dictatorship.

Since regaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has slowly but steadily sought to distance itself from the country’s imperial inheritance by removing symbols of the totalitarian past. Beginning in the early 1990s with policies that were often enacted at the local level, this process gained momentum following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and the 2015 adoption of decommunization laws, which brought Ukraine closer into line with similar legislation already in place in the three Baltic states and much of Central Europe.

Under Putin, Russia has moved in the opposite direction. The Putin regime has built modern Russian national identity around the quasi-religious veneration of the Soviet role in World War II, and has actively rehabilitated Stalin. While most Ukrainians hold negative views of the Soviet dictator, a majority of Russians regard him positively. Crucially, Ukraine’s anti-totalitarian legislation targets both the Soviet and Nazi regimes, while Russia has criminalized any attempts to compare the two. Ukraine’s laws equating Nazi and Soviet crimes reflect resolutions adopted earlier by European bodies including the European Union, the OSCE, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

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In response to the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, Ukraine’s decommunization drive has broadened to embrace derussification in a more general sense. This focus on the legacy of the Russian Empire in Ukraine was perhaps long overdue. After all, Putin himself has spoken openly of the continuity between the Czarist and Soviet empires, which he and many others in modern Russia regard as different chapters in the same imperial history. Indeed, in a December 2021 documentary, Putin specifically lamented the fall of the USSR as “the disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.”

With Russian troops now waging a genocidal war in Ukraine and Putin declaring occupied Ukrainian lands to be “forever Russian,” Ukrainians have responded by seeking to remove all symbols of Russian imperialism from their country. Place names have been changed and statues of Russian generals, politicians, and literary figures have been dismantled. The most striking example of this process was the removal of a major monument honoring eighteenth century Russian Empress Catherine the Great from the heart of Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa, a city which had formerly been viewed as a bastion of pro-Russian sentiment in independent Ukraine.

The societal shift away from Russian influence in wartime Ukraine is also immediately apparent at street level. In protest at Putin’s weaponization of the Russian language, many Ukrainians have chosen to switch from Russian to Ukrainian in their daily lives. Ukrainian radio stations no longer play Russian pop music, while Ukrainian TV channels have stopped broadcasting the Russian dramas, comedy shows, and soap operas that once dominated the country’s broadcasting schedules. Even the Russia-aligned branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has scrambled to distance itself from Moscow.

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Ukraine’s rejection of the authoritarian past and embrace of democratic values helps explain why the country has been able to resist Russian military aggression so successfully. The vibrant civil society and dynamic culture of volunteerism that have evolved in Ukraine over the past three decades have played key roles in the fightback against Russia’s invasion.

The differences between modern Russia and Ukraine are also very much in evidence along the front lines of the war. The Russian army is still dominated by rigid hierarchies that stifle battlefield initiative, and is marked by a culture of submissive deference to authority characterized by frequent video addresses by soldiers appealing personally to Putin. In contrast, the Ukrainian military displays high degrees of mobility and adaptability that reflect the comparative freedoms of modern Ukrainian society. A Russian officer from the Czarist or Soviet eras would feel instantly at home in Putin’s army, but he would find that he had very little in common with his Ukrainian counterparts.

The momentous events of the past eighteen months have confirmed the historic shifts of the previous three decades. It is now beyond any reasonable doubt that Ukrainians have decisively rejected the imperial past and have instead chosen a European future. By the time Russia’s full-scale invasion began, a majority of Ukrainians had already become confident in their ability to shape their own future and no longer clung to the paternalistic comforts of the authoritarian era.

A May 2023 poll by the Razumkov Center found that a record 87% of Ukrainians rejected the restoration of the Soviet Union. This number is likely to climb even higher as any lingering nostalgia for the authoritarian past fades away amid a mounting catalog of Russian war crimes and the passing of the last fully-fledged generation of Soviet Ukrainians. If Putin hoped his invasion of Ukraine would signal the dawn of a new Russian Empire, he could not have been more mistaken.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Russia’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children may qualify as genocide

Vladyslav Havrylov — Thu, 27 Jul 2023 20:46:13 +0000

South African officials confirmed on July 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend next month’s BRICS summit in Johannesburg amid fears that he may face arrest in connection with a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court over his alleged role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Putin’s decision to stay away from the summit is a very public humiliation for the Russian dictator that highlights the challenges created by the ICC war crimes charges against him. These problems are likely to escalate further as the fate of abducted Ukrainian children continues to attract international attention. Indeed, some have argued that the abductions qualify as genocide.

Russia appears to recognize the scale of the damage being done to the country’s international standing by the scandal surrounding the mass abduction of Ukrainian children, and has responded by attempting to portray these deportations as humanitarian measures designed to protect Ukrainian children caught up in the war zone. During a June visit to St. Petersburg by a delegation of African leaders, Putin claimed that Ukrainian children had been transferred to Russia legally in order “to save their lives and health.”

Russian efforts to justify the deportations on humanitarian grounds are undermined by widespread evidence of indoctrination programs designed to pressure children into abandoning their Ukrainian identity and adopting Russian nationality. If Ukrainian children are being taken to Russia purely for their own safety, why is it necessary to brainwash them with Kremlin propaganda and turn them into Russian citizens?

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The available evidence indicates that Russian efforts to indoctrinate abducted Ukrainian children are both systematic and extensive. A February 2023 report published by the Yale School of Public Health identified a large-scale Russian initiative to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” said Yale Humanitarian Research Lab executive director Nathaniel Raymond. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

In mid-July 2023, the UK imposed sanctions on a number of Russians tied to the abduction of Ukrainian children. British officials said the deportations were designed to “erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity” via the relocation of Ukrainian children to a network of re-education camps. “In his chilling program of forced child deportation, and the hate-filled propaganda spewed by his lackeys, we see Putin’s true intention: to wipe Ukraine from the map,” commented British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly.

It is not known how many children are involved in Russia’s abduction program. Ukrainian officials say they have identified almost 20,000 victims, but some fear the true total number may be far higher. Efforts to rescue Ukrainian children taken to Russia are now gaining momentum, but so far only a few hundred have been returned to Ukraine. Many have provided first-hand accounts of indoctrination efforts including daily recitals of the Russian national anthem and punishments for expressions of Ukrainian patriotism.

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The warrant for Putin’s arrest issued by the ICC in March 2023 identifies the “unlawful deportation of children” as a war crime. Some have argued that the methodical nature of the deportations and accompanying “re-education” mean Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children may actually qualify as an act of genocide. Article two of the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as any one of five acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The large-scale deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children appears to be in line with the fifth act, which is defined as “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

There are signs of growing international awareness regarding the potentially genocidal nature of Russia’s mass abductions. In a move welcomed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution in April 2023 officially recognizing the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia as “genocide.” PACE Deputy Paulo Pisco said the mass deportations of Ukrainian children were organized in a systematic way with the aim of “annihilating every link to and feature of their Ukrainian identity.”

More recently, US Congressman Joe Wilson, who chairs the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, told a hearing dedicated to the plight of Ukrainian children that Russia’s mass abductions qualified as an act of genocide. “Russia has been kidnapping Ukrainian children to Russia or Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine and forcibly russifying them,” he noted. “This is a war crime and I believe amounts to genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.”

Many in Ukraine have echoed these accusations. During a March 2023 interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk described the abduction of Ukrainian children as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” One month earlier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Switzerland that Moscow’s policy of forced deportations amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he said. “This is a genocidal crime.”

There currently appears to be little prospect of Vladimir Putin or any other senior Kremlin officials facing justice for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. At the same time, it is also clear that outrage over the deportations has deepened Russia’s isolation and helped consolidate international opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. Putin is no doubt acutely aware that his travel plans now hinge on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes, while members of the Russian establishment must also recognize that they will be tarnished by association for as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin.

Vladyslav Havrylov is a research fellow with the Georgetown University Collaborative on Global Children’s Issues and a researcher at the Ukrainian project “Where Are Our People.”

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

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Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

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It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history.

Shahira Amin — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 15:13:23 +0000

“This is the land of my ancestors,” American actor Danny Glover proudly said to a small group of journalists, including myself, in December 2006, as he kneeled and kissed the ground at the Pyramids of Giza.

I soon discovered that Glover’s conviction is shared by many other American performers of African descent, who take pride in the notion that the kings and queens of ancient Egypt are their ancestors. Many African-American musicians and artists embrace their purported connection with ancient Egyptian civilization, drawing inspiration from it for their music and art.

The idea is rooted in Afrocentrism, a cultural and political movement that originated around the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the colonial era ended and slavery was abolished—to counter Eurocentrism, which favors European and Western civilization over non-Western civilizations. The pushback against the colonialist ideas of supposed white superiority empowers Africans in the diaspora who—based on the Afrocentric theory—can be proud of their alleged links to the ancient kingdom that has fascinated the modern world with its art and culture.

Best known for his roles in the Lethal Weapon franchise, Glover, who also provided the voice for Jethro—Tzipporah’s father in the 1998 animated film, The Prince of Egypt—jokingly said to me that he identifies as Egyptian during a 2018 visit to Aswan to attend an African film festival.

However, as much as Afrocentrists claim that ancient Egypt was a predominantly black civilization, it has been refuted by the Egyptian government, which has been promoting ancient Egyptian civilization as the chief element of Egyptian heritage.

This was evident from the lavish parade organized by the state in 2021 to transport twenty-two royal mummies from the Egyptian museum to their new resting place—the National Museum of Civilizations—which featured a rare performance by an Egyptian soprano, who sang in an ancient Egyptian language no longer spoken today. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was on hand to welcome the ancient Egyptian mummies upon arriving at the museum.

Many Egyptians shun their Africanness, preferring to associate themselves with the Middle East and identify as Muslims and Arabs. African refugees in Egypt often complain of harassment and discrimination and claim Egyptians are “racist,” looking down on Sub-Saharan Africans as inferior. Egypt’s Coptic Christians and secularists, meanwhile, choose to distance themselves from Arabism and Islam, associating themselves with ancient Egyptian heritage instead. This is part of a xenophobic nationalism that emerged as a push back against the 2012-2013 rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as opponents of the Islamist group feared that Islamist President Mohammed Morsi would seek to “Islamize” society.

As a result, a series of recent incidents have rubbed Egyptians the wrong way, triggering accusations of “Afrocentrism” from critics and a firestorm on Egyptian social media platforms.

The latest of these is the exhibition “Kemet: Egypt in Hip-Hop, Jazz, Soul, and Funk,” currently being held at the National Museum of Antiquities in the Dutch city of Leiden. The exhibit which continues until September 3, takes visitors on “a musical journey through history,” according to its webpage. The show explores the influence of ancient Egypt in the works of Western musicians of African descent, showcasing photographs, music videos, album covers, and artworks that explain how ancient Egypt served as an inspiration to these artists and how it is reflected in their music.

The mere suggestion by the curators that “Egypt is a part of Africa” has drawn a backlash from the Egyptian government, which retaliated by banning the museum’s team of archaeologists from excavating in Saqqara. At a parliamentary session on May 2, Ahmed Belal, an Egyptian member of parliament, slammed the exhibit, accusing the curators of “distorting Egyptian identity” and “attacking Egyptian heritage and civilization.”

Joining the chorus of condemnation, many Egyptians took to social media to express their rejection of “attempts to distort our history.” Photos of a sculpture showcased at the exhibition, which depicted King Tutankhamun as black, widely circulated on social media platforms and were deemed “offensive” by critics. The backlash from Egyptians prompted the show’s organizers to publish an additional webpage that unapologetically explained the exhibition’s aim, warning that “racist” comments would not be tolerated and would be removed.

The uproar over the controversial exhibition came on the heels of an online hullaballoo over the trailer of a Netflix series portraying Cleopatra as black. The fact that a non-white actress—Adele James—was selected to play the role of the ancient Egyptian queen in the historical series Queen Cleopatra infuriated many Egyptians who accused Netflix of “deliberately erasing and reinterpreting history” and “spreading misinformation.”

Speaking to BNN Breaking, Dr. Zahi Hawas, a prominent archaeologist, insisted that Cleopatra was not black nor of African descent. He argued that she was “of Greek descent” and “resembled the queens and princesses of Macedonia.” Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef also criticized the casting of a mixed-race actress in the Netflix series. In an episode of Piers Morgan Uncensored, he called the decision “cultural appropriation ” and “falsification of history.”

The Netflix series also spurred a lawsuit against the California-based streaming platform, which was filed by Egyptian lawyer Essam Khalaf. He demanded the Queen Cleopatra series be retracted, describing it as “historical forgery.” Another lawyer, Mahmoud El Sennary, also filed a legal complaint against the streaming service with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, accusing it of “blackwashing Cleopatra.”

The casting of James in the Netflix series and the Leiden exhibition are not the only incidents that have recently sparked controversy in Egypt.

In March, American comedian Kevin Hart had his planned show in Cairo canceled over “Afrocentric remarks” he had allegedly made.

Hart is believed to have said, “We must teach our children the true history of Black Africans when they were kings in Egypt and not just the era of slavery cemented by education in America. Do you remember the time when we were kings?”

Although it is unclear if and when Hart had made the remarks, Egyptian social media users called for the show’s cancellation, accusing him of “blackwashing” their history.

In what appears to be an attempt to appease the nationalists, the authorities decided to call off the comedian’s Cairo debut, citing “logistical issues.”

The angry reactions of Egyptians to the incidents mentioned above have raised eyebrows in the West. Many Europeans and Americans fail to understand the fuss. Why are Egyptians so touchy over any suggested links between Africans in the diaspora and ancient Egypt? A plausible explanation is that decades of looting and trafficking of Egyptian cultural artifacts have made Egyptians defensive—they fear that their heritage and culture are being hijacked. It hasn’t helped that many of the ancient artifacts that were seized during the colonialist era, such as the Rosetta Stone—seized from Egypt by forces of the British empire in 1801—continue to be in possession of other states.

Statements like the one made by former US President John F. Kennedy in 1961—that the United States had “a special interest in the civilization of ancient Egypt from which many of our cultural traditions have sprung”—are seen by Egyptians as appropriation of their ancient civilization. While Kennedy meant well—at the time he was trying to convince Congress to appropriate $10 million of US taxpayer money to rescue Nubian monuments from flooding—similar statements by other Westerners laying claim to ancient Egyptian heritage are not always made in good faith.

Although comments by some Egyptians on social media in reaction to the Leiden exhibit and the Queen Cleopatra series can indeed be dismissed as “racist,” colonialist attitudes denying Egyptians the right to ownership of their history and culture are equally abhorrent.

Perhaps the Arabic hashtag used by social media activists to criticize Netflix says it all: “Egypt for Egyptians.” Egyptians are growing increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as imperialist agendas and attempts to separate them from what is rightfully theirs: their cherished heritage. Western cultural appropriation of ancient Egyptian civilization is a pattern that has persisted since the colonialist era, and Egyptians are now responding with the same nationalist slogan used during the Urabi revolt which demanded an end to British and French hegemony over their country. It is their way of saying, “Enough is enough.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:38:50 +0000

As the Wagner mutiny unfolded in Russia over the weekend, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes about popcorn as millions of Ukrainians settled down to enjoy the spectacle. This gleeful reaction was perhaps predictable, given the unimaginable horror and suffering Russia has brought to Ukraine over the past sixteen months, but there may also be a number of good practical reasons for Ukrainians to cheer Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived revolt. The exact terms of the deal that caused the Wagner warlord to call off his mutiny are not entirely clear and may still be subject to revision, but it is already safe to say that the affair has left Russia weakened and demoralized in ways that favor Ukraine.

The first point to note is that the drama is likely to continue. As Russia’s neighbors can all testify, Vladimir Putin does not honor agreements. He is also notorious for never forgiving traitors. Whatever happens next, we will almost certainly witness the end of Wagner as an independent military force. Individual units will either be broken up, exiled to Belarus, or integrated into the regular Russian army. Putin and his military chiefs simply cannot run the risk of allowing the mercenary group to maintain its powerful military potential.

This will have a considerable impact on the invasion of Ukraine. Wagner troops were responsible for virtually all of Russia’s modest advances over the past year, including the much-hyped seizure of Bakhmut. Wagner’s success was largely down to a distinctive and brutal military doctrine heavily dependent on human wave tactics. These shock troops will find life very different in the ranks of the regular Russian military. Russian generals will view all former Wagner fighters with suspicion and will be reluctant to give them prominent offensive roles. This is a sensible security response to recent events, but it will undermine the Russian military’s already extremely limited ability to advance in Ukraine.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?”

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death.

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door.

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new.

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity.

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night.

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time.

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them.

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib.

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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How the Saudi Pro League transformed from being unknown to inescapable

Hezha Barzani — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 13:34:17 +0000

Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, Karim Benzema, Sergio Ramos, N’Golo Kanté, and many more of international soccer’s biggest stars are either now playing or have mulled over the possibility of joining the Saudi Pro League (SPL)—Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer league.

Those players are soccer legends, playing at giant European clubs and winning multiple team and individual accolades. They’ve gone from competing in World Cup and Champions League finals to now playing in, or seriously considering playing in, Saudi Arabia. How did the SPL go from a virtually unknown entity to one of the hottest soccer topics in the world?

Outside its homegrown SPL, Saudi Arabia entered the international soccer scene when its Public Investment Fund (PIF) purchased Newcastle United in 2021 for 300 million pounds (over $405 million). At the time of their purchase in the middle of the 2021-2022 season, Newcastle was ranked second to last in the English Premier League (EPL). After having spent around 250 million pounds (nearly $310 million) on new players, Newcastle’s Saudi owners have completely changed the trajectory of the English club in one season, with the team finishing fourth in the EPL this season, a remarkable achievement that secures them a spot in Europe’s top competition next year: the Champions League.

But that’s not all for the PIF’s big soccer investments. At a June 5 announcement, the PIF unveiled its Sports Clubs Investment and Privatization Project, which includes transforming four Saudi clubs—Al Ittihad, Al Ahli, Al Nassr, and Al Hilal—into companies, each of which is 75 percent owned by the PIF and 25 percent owned by different respective nonprofit foundations.

The transformation of these clubs into companies signals the beginning of a broader privatization project, as SPL clubs were formerly under the control of the Saudi Ministry of Sports, with the SPL teams heavily relying on the ministry for financial support. According to a tweet by the PIF, this privatization process would allow soccer and other sports to grow through the attraction of new investments and sponsorships, including from the private sector.

Why is Saudi Arabia spending billions of dollars on sports investments? Some believe that it has to do with the kingdom wanting to diversify its economy and increase tourism, aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030; others believe that Saudi Arabia is “sportswashing”—using these investments to boost its reputation in the Western world. It could be argued that both of these reasons are true, since investing in soccer—the most popular sport in the world—makes financial sense, with the added bonus of offering countries the opportunity to improve their global image.

Grabbing headlines

The SPL’s first significant move was the ground-breaking signing of Ronaldo, one of the greatest soccer players of all time, in December 2022 to Al Nassr for the “biggest salary” in soccer history worth close to 200 million euros (nearly $250 million) a year. Not only did this move surprise the world, but it also set a precedent for future enormous contracts, like Benzema’s three-year, $643 million deal with Al Ittihad and Messi’s rumored one-billion-dollar deal over two years to play for Al Hilal. Although he ultimately decided to join US Major League Soccer team Inter Miami, Messi has well-known ties to Saudi Arabia in his role as a tourism ambassador, a role under which he visits the kingdom frequently.

Since the SPL is not under the rule of the Union of European Football Associations, there are no spending rules, meaning there is no limit on the salaries that Saudi clubs can offer players. The absence of those rules gives SPL clubs an unbelievable advantage in securing talent from Europe, mainly because the PIF’s privatization plan provides the mechanisms for large companies, like Saudi Aramco, to invest in the league.

While the SPL is making international headlines with its big-name signings, these headlines haven’t shied away from calling out Saudi Arabia on its controversial human-rights record. “Sportswashing” often tops articles discussing Saudi Arabia’s, Russia’s, and China’s soccer and other sports ventures. Numerous prominent human-rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, have been shedding light on the “sportswashing,” most recently highlighting FIFA’s controversial decision to award Saudi Arabia’s state tourism authority sponsorship of the 2023 Women’s World Cup despite its history on women’s rights.

Concerns with the Saudi Pro League

The SPL business model relies on big-name signings to increase the overall value and competition of the league, with an ambitious goal for the SPL to be among the top ten leagues in the world, according to Saudi state news agency SPA. With that being said, this lofty goal for the SPL to become a top-ten league is nowhere near an easy task. For reference, the SPL is currently ranked the fifty-eighth highest-quality league in the world, according to the Twenty-First Group.

Although the SPL is attracting some of soccer’s greatest names, these players are no longer in their prime, with the SPL being perceived by some as a “retirement league.” The real challenge will be if the SPL can attract young talents, such as Kylian Mbappé and Erling Haaland, to leave Europe and play in Saudi Arabia during their prime years. This drastic change would be extremely unlikely, as Europe solidly remains the international soccer hub, with the world’s major competitions taking place on that continent.

While the reputation of being known as a “retirement league” will be hard to shake for the SPL, the impact of securing aging talent can be seen in Ronaldo’s impact. When Ronaldo joined Al Nassr, the Saudi club had 864,000 followers on Instagram; Al Nassr currently has fifteen million followers on Instagram. While there are doubts about securing high-level youth talent to play in Saudi Arabia, what is clear is that signing aging legends like Ronaldo and Benzema still has significant upsides by securing millions of new fans—who then will travel to watch these legends play, growing the Saudi tourism industry—and increasing merchandise and TV revenue, among other benefits.

Looking to the future

Saudi Arabia is levying its soccer investments both at home and abroad as its main push to make a bigger splash in the international sports world; but it’s not stopping at soccer. One of its major investments, which uses a similar business model to the SPL by securing top-level talent with insane contracts, is the LIV Golf league—another initiative backed by Saudi’s PIF (which has already invested two billion dollars). LIV Golf is attracting renowned golfers like Phil Mickelson, who is reportedly being paid two hundred million dollars to participate in the series. On June 6, a major announcement was made as the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour, the leading US professional golf organizer, agreed to merge with LIV Golf, ending a year-long litigation battle that heavily impacted the sport.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has offered to pay for new sports stadiums in both Greece and Egypt in an effort to join the two nations’ 2030 World Cup bid. The kingdom is already hosting the 2029 Asian Winter Games and has showcased an interest in potentially hosting the 2036 Olympics.

When looking to the future, it’ll be important to keep an eye on Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors—specifically Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—who have also invested considerably in international soccer and the sports industry. Seeing the large expansion of Saudi’s soccer investments could cause Qatar and UAE to also ramp up their domestic soccer leagues and increase other sports-related expenditures.

All of this is a sign that Saudi Arabia is disrupting the international soccer world, which has traditionally been controlled by Europe and the West. While these bold investments into soccer and other sports are for economic and social purposes, they also convey Saudi Arabia’s ability and willingness to disrupt other sectors and fields as it attempts to grow its international power.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

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Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

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This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

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It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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At first glance, Russia’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9 was a non-event at best and an embarrassment at worst. Putin’s short speech held no surprises, while the presence of just one antique tank during the military parade itself could only be interpreted as evidence of the dire state of the Russian armed forces.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the event was the identity of the people selected to sit directly alongside Putin on the Red Square podium. While Victory Day marks the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Adolf Hitler, neither of the elderly gentlemen sitting alongside Putin actually fought against Nazi Germany. Instead, they were both veterans of the Soviet security services who had respectively participated in efforts to suppress Ukraine’s independence movement and crush Czechoslovakia’s 1960s anti-Soviet uprising.

To Putin’s right sat the 98-year-old Yuri Dvoikin, who volunteered for the Red Army during World War II but never actually made it to the front lines. Instead, after training as a sniper in 1944, he was dispatched by the Soviet secret police to Lviv in western Ukraine, where his job was to assist in the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. The campaign against Ukraine’s independence movement was particularly brutal, with the Soviet authorities employing terror tactics and large-scale deportations. Although the Ukrainians were able to inflict significant casualties on Soviet forces, they were ultimately defeated by the early 1950s.

On Putin’s left sat the 88-year-old Gennady Zaitsev, who, like Dvoikin, never served in what Russia still refers to as the Great Patriotic War. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1953 and joined the KGB six years later after completing his military service. In 1968, he helped suppress the Prague Spring by, among other things, capturing the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1970s, KGB chief Yuri Andropov appointed Zaitsev to lead the elite Alfa anti-terrorist unit.

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Putin did not have to sit between these two former secret policemen. Indeed, on Victory Day of all days, it would have been far more natural to appear alongside veterans of the war against Hitler’s Germany. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin’s choice of neighbors was a deliberate and symbolic move.

For many within the Russian and Ukrainian elites, Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message would have been crystal clear. The Russian dictator was signaling that despite widespread criticism of the Federal Security Service and its bungling role in the invasion of Ukraine, he continues to value his secret police and sees them as the linchpin of his authoritarian regime.

Putin was also signaling to Ukrainians and domestic critics of his invasion that he is willing to do whatever it takes to win. Soviet forces committed innumerable crimes in their suppression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1968, they had no qualms about crushing a country that, like today’s Ukraine, sought to go its own way. By sitting alongside decorated veterans of these two criminal Soviet campaigns, Putin was indicating his approval of their actions and his readiness to embrace similar methods.

The good news is that Putin does not currently appear capable of replicating the bloody Soviet-era crackdowns in western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. This was all too evident on Victory Day, with the lone T-34 tank rumbling across Red Square serving as the perfect metaphor for Russia’s reduced military might after suffering catastrophic losses in Ukraine. However, the Russian dictator remains defiant and is clearly keen to signal that he has no intention of backing down.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is the latest stage in the unfinished Soviet collapse

Richard Cashman — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:43:46 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over one year ago, growing numbers of international commentators and policymakers have reached the conclusion that the invasion is an act of old-fashioned imperialism. Until recently, such characterizations of Putin’s Russia had been restricted to the fringes of the international debate, but they are now firmly established in the mainstream.

One reason for the erstwhile reluctance to describe Russian behavior as imperial was the implication that despite the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation itself was still fundamentally an empire in terms of structure and mentality. This creates obvious policy and diplomatic complications for Western leaders seeking to engage with Moscow and integrate Russia into a common European security architecture. Added to this is the understandable fear of playing into Kremlin narratives about the West seeking to break up Russia.

It is perhaps for these reasons that recent use of the imperial label has most often been in the context of Moscow “re-acquiring” an imperial mindset under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In reality, however, it makes more sense to view today’s Russia within the context of ongoing imperial decline.

This process of imperial retreat began in 1989 with the loss of the outer empire in Central and Eastern Europe, and has since led to violent efforts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine to preserve what Russia views as its inner empire. Recognizing modern Russia’s imperial identity will not make policy and diplomacy any easier, but it should lead to fewer illusions.

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When addressing today’s Russian Federation, the concept of “de-imperialization” probably has wider utility than “decolonization,” as it focuses on the core imperial issue of power without the need for agonized debate about the exact nature of a colony.

In respect of institutions and imperial organization, much about Russia has remained constant since the initial phase of decline in 1989-91. Within the Russian Federation, elected regional governors were short-lived phenomena and economic flows have continued to move overwhelmingly from the peripheries to the metropole. In the military sphere in Ukraine, which the Kremlin sees as integral to the core of its empire, ethnic minorities from the peripheries of the Russian Federation have been disproportionately mobilized in order to preserve favorable sentiment in major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Beyond the Russian Federation, many imperial linkages have also remained. The Commonwealth of Independent States was swiftly established in 1991, while the non-Russian former Soviet republics became known as the “near abroad,” indicating Russian perceptions of partial sovereignty. Tellingly, Russia’s new internal security service, the FSB, was given the remit for these former Soviet republics rather than the Kremlin’s external service, the SVR.

While the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe and the 1991 Soviet collapse entailed an acknowledged loss of prestige, imperial attitudes in Russia’s metropolitan political, academic, cultural, and information spaces have remained largely devoid of self-examination. This has become abundantly clear from the bilious propaganda targeting Ukrainians (along with Kazakhs, Baltic peoples, and Georgians) over the last year.

Crucially, Russia did not suffer a decisive military defeat in the 1989-1991 period in the fashion that ended the other land-based European empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. Even with strategic defeat in Ukraine, Russia is not going to be occupied and have a post-imperial reality imposed on it. And so, ultimately, it is only Russians who can carry themselves to that reality, as the maritime empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have substantially, though not entirely, managed to do following their respective military failures to sustain empire.

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Despite the genuine security complications entailed by a contiguous imperial core and peripheries, a conscious process of de-imperialization still seems, in principle, a route open to Russia. It need not entail further territorial losses from Russia’s recognized 1991 borders, but should involve Russian federal institutions being reformed and the independence of neighbors being respected. This should include their right to join an alliance like NATO without threats of invasion, just as Finland and Norway have been able to do.

Indeed, this has latterly been the message from Russian opposition figures including Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexei Navalny, who have outlined policies for continuing Russia’s process of de-imperialization. This does not necessarily have to be a hard sell to the Russian people. The metropoles of Europe’s maritime empires initially feared that the loss of empire would make them poorer; in fact, it made them richer.

In contrast, Putin and the clan which assumed power in Moscow at the turn of the millennium have coordinated all policy with the aim of reversing rather than managing Russia’s imperial decline. This has meant denial of the long-known problem of Russian chauvinism and further concealing rather than confronting of Russian and Soviet crimes committed in the name of empire.

The International Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes means the process of delegitimizing his leadership is now underway. The logical concomitant policy step is building relationships with alternative Russian elites who already or might in future support further de-imperialization.

In addition to realistic policy-making at the state level, Western academics and journalists can contribute to “decolonizing” Russian, Eurasian, and Slavonic studies and associated cultural spaces, drawing on similar approaches to European and North American history.

Western governments and their cultural emanations can prioritize engaging with countries of the global south to debunk the absurd but successful Kremlin narrative portraying Russia as an anti-imperial center of power, both historically and still today. This might include developing university programs and organizing academic conferences and exchanges, but also via objective news, cinema, television, and social media. Facilitating messages from countries like Ukraine, as a former imperial subject, might also modify policy-making in these countries.

The process begun in 1989 certainly did not culminate in 1991. Renewed awareness of its ongoing nature is to be welcomed, but from that should flow realistic policy that supports rather than compromises Russia’s former imperial subjects, and empowers Russians working toward a post-imperial future.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Putin cancels Victory Day parades as Ukraine invasion continues to unravel

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:08 +0000

With Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations less than one month away, the Kremlin has taken the highly unusual step of canceling a number of military parades in regional capitals. Scheduled parades to mark the World War II Soviet victory over Nazi Germany have been called off in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, which both border Ukraine. Victory Day celebrations in Russian-occupied Crimea have also reportedly been scrapped.

The cancellations are officially due to security concerns related to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, numerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is also increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Whether the real reason is security issues or equipment shortages, the decision to cancel this year’s Victory Day parades represents a painful blow for Vladimir Putin that hints at the grim reality behind Moscow’s upbeat propaganda portrayals of his faltering Ukraine invasion.

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Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations are closely associated with Putin personally. Throughout his reign, he has placed the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of efforts to rebuild Russian national pride following the perceived humiliations of the 1990s. Putin has transformed traditional Russian reverence for the Soviet war effort into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own dogmas, feast days, and heretics. Victory Day itself has become by far the biggest holiday of the year, with the defeat of Nazi Germany elevated above all other events and achievements as the defining moment in Russian history.

This victory cult has long set the tone in Russian politics and public life. Domestic and foreign opponents of the Putin regime are routinely attacked as “fascists,” with all manner of current affairs issues viewed through the polarizing prism of World War II. This trend is nowhere more evident than in the official Russian approach toward Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainian authorities have been groundlessly branded as “Nazis,” while the current invasion of the country is portrayed as a modern-day continuation of the fight against Adolf Hitler.

The significance of Victory Day for national identity in Putin’s Russia and the holiday’s close associations with the war in Ukraine make this year’s parade cancellations especially embarrassing. Other public celebrations could be postponed or abandoned without much fuss, but failure to mark Victory Day points to serious problems that are difficult to disguise even in Russia’s tightly controlled information environment. While Kremlin propagandists continue to insist the invasion of Ukraine is going according to plan, the apparent inability of the authorities to guarantee security inside Russia during this most important of national holidays would suggest otherwise.

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While traditional Victory Day events will not take place on May 9 in some Russian regional capitals, the country’s main holiday parade in Moscow is set to proceed as planned. However, Putin will likely have little to celebrate. In recent months, his invasion has met with a series of setbacks on both the military and diplomatic fronts that leave the prospect of victory more distant than ever.

In Ukraine, Russian efforts to launch a major offensive fell flat during the first three months of 2023, with the Russian military securing only nominal gains despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and equipment. High casualty rates and a reliance on suicidal “human wave” attacks have led to plummeting morale among Putin’s invading army, with recently mobilized troops particularly prone to demoralization. Since the beginning of the year, dozens of videos have been posted to social media featuring groups of Russian soldiers addressing Putin and other state officials while complaining of poor conditions, cannon fodder tactics, and heavy losses. This is fueling doubts over the Russian army’s ability to mount major offensive operations.

Meanwhile, Russia’s winter bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure appears to have ended in failure. Putin had hoped to destroy the Ukrainian energy grid and freeze Ukrainians into submission, but a combination of creativity and enhanced air defenses enabled Ukraine to keep the lights on. In a sign that the worst of the crisis is now over, Ukraine resumed electricity exports to neighboring European countries in early April.

Nor is there any indication that Western support for Ukraine is in danger of weakening. On the contrary, during the first three months of 2023, Ukraine’s partners expanded their military aid to include previously taboo items such as modern battle tanks and Soviet era fighter jets. Putin still hopes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, but international opposition to his invasion currently appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, this continued Western resolve was the key message behind US President Joe Biden’s February visit to Kyiv.

There was further bad news in March when the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged Putin with war crimes over his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While the Russian dictator is not expected to appear in court anytime soon, the indictment is a serious blow to Putin’s prestige that undermines his status both domestically and on the international stage. Weeks later, Finland joined NATO in a move that more than doubled the length of Russia’s shared borders with the military alliance. Even Xi Jinping’s much-hyped visit to Moscow failed to lift the mood, with the Chinese leader offering plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete support.

These unfavorable circumstances will make Putin’s job all the more difficult as he attempts to strike the right note in this year’s Victory Day address. With little to look forward to, he is likely to seek inspiration from the glories of the past. However, comparisons between World War II and Russia’s present predicament may not prove very flattering. At the height of the Nazi advance in late 1941, Moscow famously staged the annual October Revolution parade on Red Square with the might of the invading German army located a mere few miles away. In contrast, Putin is evidently now unable to defend Russia against the far more modest threat posed by a country he expected to conquer in just three days. Throughout the Putin era, Victory Day has served to showcase Russia’s resurgent strength, but this year’s holiday may become a symbol of his regime’s growing weakness.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Anti-war Russians struggle to be heard

Christopher Isajiw — Thu, 06 Apr 2023 18:12:04 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Putin regime has worked hard to present the impression of overwhelming Russian domestic support for the war effort. This has involved everything from celebrity endorsements and relentless pro-war coverage in the Kremlin-controlled mainstream Russian media, to online flash mobs and carefully choreographed mass rallies in central Moscow.

Meanwhile, a ruthless clampdown has made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for dissenting voices to be heard. Nevertheless, opposition figures continue to question the true levels of public backing for the invasion, while insisting that large numbers of Russians are either opposed or indifferent. The real situation within Russian society is certainly far more complex than the Kremlin would like us to believe, but today’s suffocating atmosphere means there is little reason to expect an increase in visible anti-war activity any time soon.

Officially at least, Putin’s approval rating has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion just over one year ago. According to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Russian President’s rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023. The same source indicates consistently high levels of support for the invasion of Ukraine, with over 70% of respondents expressing their approval in every single survey conducted throughout the past thirteen months.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is eroding Kremlin influence in Kazakhstan

Kamila Auyezova — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 13:32:31 +0000

The invasion of Ukraine was meant to advance Vladimir Putin’s vision of a revived Russian Empire. Instead, it is forcing neighboring countries to reassess their own relationships with Moscow and fueling growing calls for decolonization and derussification throughout a region that was once viewed by many international observers as an informal extension of Russia itself.

This embrace of decolonization is nowhere more evident than in Kazakhstan, the largest state in Central Asia and a regular target of imperialistic Russian rhetoric. In the year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment. Meanwhile, the Kazakh authorities have made it clear that they do not condone Moscow’s military campaign in Ukraine and refuse to back the war.

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One of the earliest indications that Kazakhstan would not align with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine was the decision in spring 2022 to cancel the country’s traditional World War II Victory Day celebrations. The cancellation was an unambiguous rebuff to the Putin regime, which has placed the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany at the heart of modern Russian national identity and expects regional leaders to demonstrate their loyalty via reverence for the Soviet war effort.

This snub was followed by an even more direct and public fallout in June 2022. While sharing a stage with Putin at a flagship annual economic forum in Saint Petersburg, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that he would not recognize Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most eye-catching indication of Kazakh public support for Ukraine has been the “Yurt of Invincibility” initiative, which has seen a number of traditional Kazakh yurts set up in Ukrainian towns and cities in recent months to help Ukrainians cope with electricity blackouts caused by Russian bombing of the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Organized by the Kazakh business community and backed by private donations, the yurt initiative has proved highly popular among Ukrainians while sparking considerable anger in Russia. However, Kremlin attempts to elicit an official response from the Kazakh authorities were politely declined, with Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stating there was “nothing to explain.”

It is not hard to imagine why the appearance of “Yurts of Invincibility” across Ukraine struck such a nerve in Russia. Manned by activists offering free electricity and internet access along with hot drinks, the yurts represent a humane response to the inhumanity of Russia’s brutal invasion. In a very real sense, these traditional Kazakh abodes serve as symbols of post-colonial solidarity between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

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Russian discontent over the critical Kazakh response to the invasion of Ukraine has led to attacks on Kazakhstan from Russian officials and in the country’s Kremlin-controlled information space. Since the start of the invasion, pundits on Russia’s notoriously inflammatory political talk shows have begun speculating over the possibility of future Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan. During a November 2022 episode of prominent regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show, one commentator declared: “the next problem is Kazakhstan.” He went on to claim that “the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine.”

These provocative statements were echoed by Russian Ambassador to Kazakhstan Alexei Borodavkin, who warned in December 2022 that “radical nationalist tendencies” were becoming more and more visible in Kazakhstan, before suggesting Russia was ready to “help” the Kazakh authorities address this issue.

The Russian Ambassador’s comments were particularly provocative as they closely mirrored the kind of language used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. This played on longstanding Kazakh fears that Moscow may attempt to exploit the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which is concentrated in northern regions of the country bordering the Russian Federation.

Suggestions that ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan are somehow oppressed have sparked a bitter response from many Kazakhs, who pride themselves on their tolerant attitude toward Russia and their respectful approach to the shared inheritance of the imperial past.

Unlike other post-Soviet states, Russian remains an official language in today’s Kazakhstan. The country also accepted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization into the Russian military in late 2022. Critics say this welcoming stance makes a mockery of Kremlin propaganda claims about a rising tide of Russophobia in today’s Kazakhstan.

The past year has witnessed historic shifts in allegiances and attitudes across the entire post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russian imperialism has prompted countries throughout the region to question the nature of their own ties to the Kremlin and seek geopolitical alternatives capable of countering Russian influence.

In Kazakhstan, the invasion has amplified anti-imperial sentiment and enhanced existing decolonization processes. These trends look set to gain further momentum in 2023. Geography alone dictates that Kazakhstan cannot realistically hope to cut all ties with Russia, but there is no escaping the fact that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has seriously undermined Russian influence in a country where all roads once led to Moscow.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

Child abductions reveal the genocidal intent behind Putin’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 20:58:18 +0000

The recent International Criminal Court decision to charge Vladimir Putin with war crimes has shed much-needed light on one of the darkest chapters of Russia’s ongoing invasion. During the past year, Russian forces have reportedly abducted thousands of children from occupied regions of Ukraine and attempted to deprive them of their Ukrainian identity. This campaign of forced deportations and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination reveals the genocidal intent at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

Article II of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention identifies five acts that qualify as genocide. The fifth act, forcibly transferring the children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group to another group, concisely and accurately describes Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have attempted to disguise the abductions as a routine wartime security measure, but Moscow’s well-documented efforts to “re-educate” young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians tells a very different story.

Since the invasion began in February 2022, evidence has mounted of a large-scale Russian operation to abduct and indoctrinate Ukrainian children throughout the territories that have fallen under their control. One recent report published by the Yale School of Public Health in February 2023 identified a systematic Russian program to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” commented Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

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Ukrainians in liberated regions have recounted how they frequently had to hide children from Russian occupation forces. Numerous Ukrainian orphanages were forced to smuggle children out of occupied areas to prevent them from being seized and sent to Russia. Some of the victims of these Russian abductions have been orphans or children living in care. Others have been physically separated from their families and told they are no longer wanted. In some cases, Ukrainian parents claim to have been tricked or coerced into sending their children to Russia. The overall number of abducted children is not yet known. Current estimates indicate that well over ten thousand young Ukrainians have been abducted and sent to Russia. Many fear the real total figure may be far higher.

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has been indicted alongside Putin by the ICC for the “unlawful deportation and transfer” of Ukrainian children, has spoken openly about the apparent effectiveness of Russia’s indoctrination efforts. In late 2022, she acknowledged that a group of 30 children brought from Russian-occupied Mariupol initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem and shouted the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” but claimed that this criticism was “transformed into love for Russia.”

The abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is only one element of comprehensive Russian efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, any symbols of Ukrainian identity and statehood are suppressed while access to the Ukrainian media is blocked. The Ukrainian language is being removed from the school system, with educators imported from Russia to teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that promotes a Russian imperial identity while demonizing Ukraine. Parents who question these policies are told their children will be taken away if they refuse to comply.

Russia is also imposing more direct measures to outlaw any expressions of Ukrainian identity. Throughout the country, Russian-occupied regions have witnessed the same pattern of arrests targeting anyone deemed a threat to the Kremlin authorities. This typically includes local officials, journalists, former members of the Ukrainian military, civil society activists, and anyone expressing pro-Ukrainian views. In numerous instances, patriotic tattoos or pro-Ukrainian content on mobile phones have led to detentions and disappearances. Investigators working in newly liberated regions have uncovered evidence indicating thousands of civilian deaths along with the widespread use of sexual violence and torture.

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While the mass killing of Ukrainian civilians has been well documented, there is not yet any international consensus over whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. A recent UN report found that Russia was guilty of “a wide range of war crimes” in Ukraine, but commission head Erik Mose said investigators had not yet uncovered conclusive proof confirming genocide.

Others argue that more than enough evidence of genocide has already been found, and point specifically to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Speaking to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on March 22, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk characterized the abductions as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” Likewise, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that the abduction of young Ukrainians amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he commented. “This is a genocidal crime.”

In order to prove that Russia is guilty of genocide, it is vital to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is this intent “to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” that legally distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In this particular case, Russia itself has provided mountains of evidence indicating a clear intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, there are few examples in history where a genocidal power has incriminated itself so comprehensively. Vladimir Putin himself has frequently argued against the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity, and has even published lengthy articles denying Ukraine’s historical legitimacy. Meanwhile, genocidal language aimed at Ukraine has become completely normalized in the Russian mainstream media and among senior government officials.

The grotesque calls for genocide that are so commonplace in today’s Russia have helped inspire the criminal actions of Putin’s invading army. Among the long list of crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, the methodical abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children stands out. The scale and systematic nature of the abductions make them an unmistakable symbol of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity and extinguish the Ukrainian nation. It is therefore fitting that this should be the first crime Vladimir Putin is indicted for. Putin hoped the invasion of Ukraine would secure his place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Instead, he looks destined to enter history as a genocidal dictator forever linked with the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Will morale prove the decisive factor in the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 22:13:28 +0000

Graphic footage emerged this week on social media depicting what appeared to be the final moments of a captive Ukrainian soldier being summarily executed by Russian forces. The brief video of this apparent war crime shows an unarmed Ukrainian POW, who was later identified as Chernihiv native Oleksandr Matsievsky, calmly repeating the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine” before being gunned down by his captors in a hail of bullets.

These memorable last words resonated deeply with the Ukrainian public, who responded with a mixture of outrage over the criminal nature of the killing and admiration for the stunning courage of the victim. Within hours of the video’s appearance, Matsievsky was being commemorated across Ukrainian social media with hundreds of portraits and memes paying tribute to his defiant stand. Murals have already appeared on the streets of Ukrainian cities. There is even talk of a monument.

Matsievsky is the latest symbol of Ukraine’s unbreakable resolve in a war which has already produced plenty. From the famous “Russian warship, go f**k yourself” of the Snake Island garrison, to the seemingly superhuman tenacity of the Azovstal defenders, Ukraine has witnessed a large number of iconic moments over the past year capturing the spirit of resistance that has gripped the country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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This is not at all what Russia was expecting. When Putin gave the order to invade Ukraine, he had been led to believe the Ukrainian public would welcome his troops and had been assured that organized military resistance would collapse within a matter of days. Billions of dollars had been spent preparing the ground by bribing Ukrainian officials to change sides and back the invasion. The stage was supposedly set for a triumph that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and confirm Putin’s place among Russia’s greatest rulers.

It is now clear that Putin’s complete misjudgment of Ukrainian morale was one of the most remarkable intelligence failures of the modern era. He appears to have fallen into the trap of many long-serving dictators and surrounded himself with loyalist yes-men intent on telling him what he wanted to hear.

This toxic trend was exacerbated by the enforced isolation of the Covid pandemic, which appears to have further fueled Putin’s Ukraine obsession and strengthened his conviction that the country must be subjugated at all costs. In the increasingly claustrophobic climate of the Putin Kremlin, it is hardly surprising that his intel chiefs chose to reinforce these prejudices and encourage his reckless imperial ambitions. If they had attempted to counsel caution, they would likely have been dismissed.

This sycophancy was to have disastrous consequences. Far from greeting Putin’s invading army with cakes and flowers, the Ukrainian nation rose up and united in defiance against Russian aggression. Tens of thousands flocked to enlist in the Ukrainian military and territorial defense units, while millions more mobilized to support the war effort through fundraising, donations, and the improvised production of essential items such as anti-tank obstacles and Molotov cocktails.

Within weeks of the invasion, a vast network of Ukrainian volunteers was supplying frontline soldiers with everything from food and medicines to drones and jeeps. Despite the horrors of the past year, this steely determination to defy Russia remains firmly intact throughout Ukrainian society. Whatever else today’s Ukraine may lack, morale is certainly not an issue. Quite the opposite, in fact.

The same cannot be said for the Russian army. In response to the catastrophic losses suffered during the first six months of the invasion, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. The bulk of the estimated 300,000 men mobilized last year are now in Ukraine, where they are being thrown straight into battle despite being untrained and under-equipped.

Since late January, a steady stream of videos have begun appearing on social media featuring groups of mobilized Russian troops appealing to Putin or their own regional representatives. They typically complain of suicidal tactics and heavy casualties while protesting their role as frontline shock troops and calling for redeployment to rear areas. In some cases, mobilized men have announced that they will directly refuse to follow orders.

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Growing signs of demoralization within the ranks of the Russian military could become a major issue for the Kremlin at a time when Putin faces no other obvious domestic challenges to his war policy.

At present, there is little sign of significant anti-war sentiment on the home front inside Russia. On the contrary, independent surveys indicate consistently high levels of public support for the invasion, while those who do object have largely chosen to keep quiet or flee the country. While many question the validity of polling data in a dictatorship, the complete absence of any meaningful efforts to protest the war points to a passive acceptance of the invasion at the very least.

The prospects of a Kremlin coup look to be similarly slim. While many within the Russian elite are said to have been appalled by the decision to invade Ukraine, they have since reconciled themselves to the new reality and are for the most part far too personally dependent on Putin to mount any serious challenge to the Kremlin.

This leaves the military as the one potential source of serious opposition to the war. If Russian commanders persist with their human wave tactics and mobilized troops continue to die in large numbers, the current tide of discontent may evolve into outright mutiny, with highly unpredictable consequences for Putin and his regime.

The importance of morale in warfare has long been recognized. Napoleon Bonaparte famously observed that three-quarters of military success is down to morale. This helps explain why the Ukrainian army has over-performed so spectacularly during the first year of the invasion, while Russia itself has struggled to live up to its prewar billing as the world’s second most powerful military.

Crucially, Ukrainians know exactly what they are fighting for. They are defending their homes and families against an enemy intent on committing genocide and wiping their country off the map. Understandably, they need no further motivation. In contrast, Russians have been told they are fighting against everything from NATO expansion and gay parades to Anglo-Saxon Satanists and Ukrainian Nazis.

While Ukrainian soldiers are focused on the clearly defined objective of liberating their country, Russia’s war aims appear to be far more ambiguous and are often subject to sudden revision. Once the cannon fodder approach of the Russian generals is factored in, it is no surprise that morale is becoming such an issue for Putin’s army.

Could collapsing morale decisively undermine the Russian invasion? We should have a better idea regarding the scale of the problem in the coming few months, as both Russia and Ukraine pursue major spring offensives that will test the resilience of their respective armies. At this stage, Putin is preparing for a long war and still hopes to outlast the West. He has a stable home base and sufficient resources to potentially continue the invasion for at least two more years. However, the situation could change dramatically if his demoralized army refuses to fight.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

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Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

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If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:01:41 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

Security

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

This week, our team at the DFRLab released two investigative reports on how Russia employed information operations before and after its invasion of Ukraine one year ago today. The first report, Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine, examines how the Kremlin and its media proxies employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine.

To research this report, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation published from 2014 to 2021 to identify recurring anti-Ukraine rhetoric, then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets in the ten weeks leading up to the invasion. This allowed us to produce a timeline showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion one year ago today, these narratives effectively served as his talking points, recurring more than 200 times during his remarks.

In our new reports, the @DFRLab analyzed 10,000+ narrative examples from Russian sources before the invasion that contained false and misleading narratives used later to justify the war. In his speech announcing the invasion, Putin used such narratives 200+ times in one speech. pic.twitter.com/bgjzSbzqnp
— DFRLab – @dfrlab.bsky.social (@DFRLab) February 22, 2023

The second report, Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine, compiles some of our most important findings on Russian information operations identified over the last year in our Russian War Report. Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its information strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America.

We will continue marking the first anniversary of the war next week with the publication of the DFRLab Cyber Statecraft Initiative report, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment. A Parallel Terrain analyzes Russia’s continuous assaults against the Ukrainian information environment, not only striking though but attempting to contest and claim this environment in parallel with its conventional invasion. It examines how Russian offensives and Ukrainian defense move through this largely privately owned and operated environment, and how this war has highlighted the growing role that private companies play in conflict. This report will be published February 27. 

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington, DC

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

On February 21, Vladimir Putin delivered an address to the Russian parliament that regurgitated many of the same narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which we explored in our Narrative Warfare report. The speech attempted to depict Putin as innocent of the bloodshed he started one year ago today. Putin spoke of a self-sufficient Russia and urged entrepreneurs to give up investments from overseas. Putin also urged Russian parents to protect their children from the “degradation and degeneration” of the West, one of the recurring themes we documented in Undermining Ukraine. Putin also said that the Sea of Azov “again became Russia’s landlocked sea” and added that Russia would develop the ports and cities in the area; he did not provide a timeline for this endeavor, however.

Putin also announced the creation of a special fund to compensate and assist those involved in the war and the relatives of the dead and wounded, as well as an additional fourteen days of annual leave for combatants to be with family and loved ones.

Putin delivered his speech just hours before US President Joe Biden delivered an address in Warsaw.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

On February 23, the Russian defense ministry claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were planning a provocation against the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria “with the involvement of the nationalist Azov battalion.” The ministry added that Ukraine plans to stage an attack by Russian forces in Transnistria as a “pretext to invade.” To accomplish this, Ukrainian soldiers would allegedly dress in Russian military uniforms. Several pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated pictures alleged to show military equipment along the border of Transnistria. These accusations are eerily similar to ones made by leaders the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Putin used as a pretext for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In light of these allegations, the Moldovan government issued a statement on February 23 denying the Russian defense ministry’s claims and urged the population to remain calm and follow credible sources.

Later that evening, the Russian defense ministry released another statement claiming there was “a significant accumulation of personnel and military equipment of Ukrainian units near the Ukrainian-Pridnestrovian border, the deployment of artillery at firing positions, as well as an unprecedented increase in flights of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the territory of the PMR [Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic].” These claims were shared without any evidence. According to the statement, these purported plans represent a direct threat to the “Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” and Russia will “adequately respond to the impending provocation of the Ukrainian side.”

It should be noted that both statements referred to the unrecognized Transnistria region as the “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic,” the pro-Russia separatist name for Transnistria. Russian authorities previously referred to the area as Pridnestrov’ye, the Russian word for Transnistria, which tacitly acknowledged it was a part of Moldova, while “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” implies it is an independent entity.

On February 22, Putin revoked a 2012 decree that contained a clause stipulating Russia’s commitment to search for ways to settle the Transnistrian conflict “with respect to Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutral status.” The Kremlin warned that relations between Russia and Moldova are “extremely tense,” accusing the Moldovan government of having an anti-Russian agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov recommended that Moldovan authorities “be cautious” in their assessments of the Transnistrian settlement.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Ukrainian intelligence reported on the movement of Russian convoys not bearing identification marks headed toward the Chernihiv region. The troops reportedly wore uniforms resembling those of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian military bloggers also reported that a Russian reconnaissance drone was detected in the Sumy region. Low-res satellite imagery indicates there may be renewed activity at the Zyabrovka airfield in Belarus, located north of Chernihiv, as movement was detected on February 18. In February 2022, before the invasion, Zyabrovka served as the site of joint air drills with Russia. Poland-based Rochan Consulting also reported that S-300 systems facing Chernihiv were deployed last month.

On February 21, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said that Russia intensified its operations earlier this month in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Skibitsky said Russia is concentrating military efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. On February 23, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense also reported on heavy fighting near Bakhmut, but said Ukrainian forces have managed to keep a key supply route in the western direction open despite Russia’s attempts at encirclement over the last six weeks. The UK ministry confirmed Vuhledar is under heavy shelling and said there is a “real possibility that Russia is preparing for another offensive in this area.”

On February 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced new commander roles, with Andrey Mordvichev leading the Central Military District (TsVO), Sergey Kuzovlev leading the Southern District (YuVO), Yevgeny Nikiforov leading the Western District (ZVO), and Rustam Muradov maintaining command of the Eastern District (VVO), which is responsible for operations in Vuhledar. Muradov is the commander who ordered the frontal assault on Vuhledar from February 8 to 10, which resulted in the defeat of the 155th Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. On February 20, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu presented epaulets to senior officers at the National Center of Defense Management in Moscow.

Meanwhile, the internal power struggle between Russian defense officials and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues. In a series of audio clips, he accused the Russian defense ministry of lying about supplying Wagner troops with requested artillery munitions, claiming soldiers received only twenty percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them. Prigozhin urged the ministry to fulfill its promises instead of “lying” to the Russian public. Russian military bloggers defended and amplified Prigozhin’s claims, accusing the defense ministry of failing to support Russia’s most effective forces.

On February 23, the Russian army shelled Liubotyn in Kharkiv oblast with a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system, resulting in damaged buildings. Damage was also reported in Lemishchyne and Morozova Dolyna, also in Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian artillery shelling. In Kupiansk, two people were reportedly buried under rubble after a Russian S-300 missile strike. Observers also reported explosions in Kramatorsk.

That same day, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak announced the “preventive expansion of security measures” along the country’s borders with Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, where the first fortifications are already underway.

According to a Reuters report, the European Union will develop and implement a program for the joint purchase of artillery shells for Ukraine. This will enhance coordination and facilitate investment in new production facilities.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

As previously noted, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin published multiple audio recordings lashing out at Russian military leadership for not adequately supplying a Wagner Group division with artillery munitions. The audio recordings revealed the model of collaboration between the Wagner Group and Russian Army according to Prigozhin.

On February 20, in reply to a media inquiry by RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo about insufficient ammunition supplies, Prigozhin said that “there is ammunition in the country” and “the industry is producing as much as needed, even with oversupply,” but “no decisions are made” to supply the Wagner Group. “No one understands where alleged limits are coming from, where procedures to receive [ammunition] are coming from, no one knows the ways one or the other documents are signed,” he added. “Everyone is showing me upwards saying: ‘You know, Yevgeny Viktorovich, you have complicated relationships up there….You need to go, apologize, and obey. Then your fighters will receive ammunition.’”

In another audio recording on February 21, Prigozhin went further, stating “The Chief of General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and the Minister of Defense [Sergei Shoigu] are handing out commands to the right and left not only to not give ammunition to the Wagner Group, but also to not provide help via air transport….This is direct opposition that is nothing short of an attempt to destroy the Wagner Group. It can be equated to treason.” In another audio recording that day, Prigozhin said that “other divisions are in constant undersupply of ammunition.” He claimed that “a bunch of near-the-war functionaries” are “trying to twist intrigues” by “calling Telegram channels and telling them, ‘Do not publish Prigozhin. Write that he – I don’t know – eats ammunition or sells it to Americans.'” By the end of the day, the Russian Ministry of Defense denied that it was blocking ammunition supply to “voluntary assault squads.” In return, Prigozhin accused the ministry of lying about ammunition supplies to Wagner Group forces fighting near Bahkmut.

The next day, on February 22, Prigozin continued to pressure defense ministry decisionmakers to supply Wagner Group with ammunition by forwarding a graphic image showing dozens of dead men lying on the snowy ground, as well as a screenshot of an ammunition request dated February 17 addressed to Chief of Staff Gerasimov. In an audio recording posted around the same time, Prigozhin stated, “The final signature needs to be made by either Gerasimov or Shoigu. None of them want to make the decision. I’ll explain. The Wagner Group allegedly does not exist. Previously, we received ammunition via some military divisions that are allegedly taking Bakhmut instead of us. But there is no one else and everyone knows about it by now.”

He also mentioned that a call to “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”) had been “launched on social media.” Wagner accounts on VKontakte and pro-war Telegram channels amplified variants of the slogan.

Wagner campaign image using a variant of Prigozhin’s slogan, “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”). It warns that not supplying Wagner forces with sufficient ammunition is “criminal” and either “a mistake or a betrayal.” (Source: VK/archive)

The DFRLab also identified a petition on Change.org with the slogan; it was deleted by February 24.

Screenshot of Google Search result showing the now-deleted Change.org petition. (Source: Change.org/archive)

Finally, in an audio recording on February 23, Prigozhin announced, “Ammunition shipment begins…on paper for now, but the most relevant papers are already signed.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s invasion shatters the myth of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 21:59:11 +0000

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reaches the one-year mark, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is still far from over. Nevertheless, it is already abundantly clear that Ukraine’s relations with Russia have fundamentally changed forever. After Mariupol, Bucha, and countless other Russian war crimes, there can be no more talk of a return to an earlier era of close ties and blurred borders.

The troubled history of Russian-Ukrainian relations stretches back centuries. It a story of unequal interaction shaped by the politics of Russian imperialism. During the post-Soviet era, the bilateral relationship has been particularly turbulent as Russia has sought to retain its dominant position while preventing Ukraine from asserting its independence. Throughout this period, the Kremlin’s heavy-handed and tone-deaf policies have consistently proved counter-productive, serving only to widen the divide separating today’s Russia and Ukraine.

The first major watershed moment in this unfolding geopolitical divorce came in 2004 with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, which saw mass protests over a rigged presidential vote leading to the subsequent election of pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko in a rerun ballot. Prior to the vote, Putin personally visited Ukraine to support pro-Kremlin candidate Viktor Yanukovych. This hubris backfired spectacularly and was widely regarded as a key motivating factor behind the huge street protests that erupted weeks later.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian media responded to the Orange Revolution with a coordinated anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign that set the tone for many years to come. Yushchenko and his American wife, First Lady Kateryna, were vilified, while Ukraine itself was dismissed as an artificial country and Ukrainians dehumanized as “fascists.” Within months of Ukraine’s popular uprising, Moscow launched the Russia Today TV channel (now RT) to take the information war to international audiences.

A furious and humiliated Putin regarded the Orange Revolution as an act of aggression against Russia and accused Western governments of orchestrating the protests. This was to prove a major turning point in his reign. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Putin had frequently spoken of integrating Russia into the club of leading democracies. After 2004, he turned sharply away from the West and began to court a more traditional form of Russian nationalism. This included the championing of the Russian Orthodox Church and the rehabilitation of early twentieth century White Russian emigre imperialist ideologies.

While Putin’s Russia lurched back toward the authoritarian past, Ukraine continued to consolidate its fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution had succeeded in ending government censorship over the Ukrainian media, meaning that there was no centrally orchestrated anti-Russian campaign in Ukraine to match the Kremlin’s own poisonous anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Instead, many of Ukraine’s most popular TV channels continued to broadcast Russian-made content and adopt Russia-friendly editorial positions. This reflected the prevailing mood within Ukrainian society, with attitudes toward Russia remaining broadly positive.

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The second major watershed in the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Ukraine was the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. When Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country following the mass killing of protesters, Putin chose to intervene directly by occupying Crimea and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russian media escalated the information war against Ukraine, branding the revolution a “putsch” while portraying Ukrainians “Nazis” and puppets of the West with no real agency of their own.

The onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 had a profound impact on Ukrainian public opinion. As Russian troops flooded into Kremlin-created “separatist republics” in the east of the country, polls showed a surge in negative Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia’s political leaders. Similar trends were evident among Russian audiences, with Ukraine rising to second place behind America in polls identifying hostile nations.

During the eight years after the 2014 crisis, Ukraine and Russia moved further apart as the undeclared war between the two countries in eastern Ukraine rumbled on. In a bid to reduce the Kremlin’s ability to wage information warfare, Ukraine banned Russian social media, newspapers, TV channels, and Moscow-made television content. Meanwhile, affirmative action policies led to a rise in Ukrainian-language TV, cinema, and pop music, while many Russian cultural figures found they were no longer welcome in Ukraine.

Attitudes toward the shared part also diverged. While the Putin regime rehabilitated the Soviet era and glorified the Red Army role in World War II, decommunization legislation adopted by the Ukrainian authorities in 2015 outlawed Soviet symbols and led to a wave of name changes across the country as cities, towns, villages, and individual streets ditched Soviet-era names. Once seen by some as virtually indivisible, the two countries were now on strikingly different trajectories.

The spring 2019 election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s new president sparked fresh hope for a revival in Russian influence, but this was short-lived. As a native Russian-speaker who had spent much of his showbiz career in Moscow prior to entering politics, Zelenskyy was seen by many Russians as a potentially pliable partner. However, he proved just as principled as his predecessor, refusing to implement a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the Minsk peace plan to end the simmering war in eastern Ukraine and shutting down a series of TV channels linked to Russia’s unofficial representative in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk. Zelenskyy also sought to revive international interest in the Russian occupation of Crimea, launching the Crimean Platform initiative in summer 2021.

With Russia’s soft power influence inside Ukraine in apparently terminal decline, the confrontation entered a dangerous new phase which saw the Kremlin adopting an increasingly radical stance. Russian officials and propagandists began questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, which was branded as an unnatural “anti-Russia” that sought to divide the “Russian people” and could no longer be tolerated.

In July 2021, Putin himself took the highly unusual step of publishing a long, rambling personal essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that questioned Ukraine’s right to exist and was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Seven months later, many of the core ideas from this essay would feature in a series of unhinged speeches that marked the launch of the current full-scale invasion. Earlier talk of brotherhood had given way to openly genocidal rhetoric.

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The brutality of Russia’s invasion has disproportionately affected the predominantly Russian-speaking populations of eastern and southern Ukraine, leading to an historic shift in attitudes toward Russia in what were previously the most pro-Russian regions of the country. Dozens of towns and cities in these regions have been reduced to rubble, with thousands of civilians killed and millions subjected to forced deportation. As a result, anti-Russian sentiments that were traditionally more prevalent in central and western Ukraine are now also widely embraced in the south and east. A recent poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group found that 98% of Ukrainians believe the Russian military is guilty of war crimes, while 87% also hold Russian citizens accountable.

Ukrainians now overwhelmingly express negative attitudes toward the Russian population and have been horrified to witness the popularity of the war among ordinary Russians. They point to the consistently high levels of support identified by Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, and also note the almost complete absence of anti-war protests. Millions of Ukrainians with friends and family in Russia have learned from bitter personal experience that many Russians wholeheartedly back the war and refuse to acknowledge the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Amid the horrors of today’s full-scale war, the breakdown in relations between Russia and Ukraine has now reached the point of no return. Evidence of this historic shift can be seen throughout Ukrainian society. Large numbers of Ukrainians are switching their everyday language from Russian to Ukrainian. Derussification efforts have gained new grassroots momentum, with individual communities seeking to remove the last vestiges of the imperial past in both its Czarist and Soviet forms. Ukrainians are also deserting the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in growing numbers and flocking to the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The current war has accelerated an ongoing deterioration in bilateral ties that has long reflected Russia’s misguided efforts to keep independent Ukraine in the Kremlin orbit. For decades, Russian leaders have been oblivious to the transformations taking place in post-Soviet Ukrainian society and have ignored Ukraine’s strengthening national identity. Their efforts to prevent Ukraine’s departure from the Russian sphere of influence have proved self-defeating and have resulted in deepening hostility along with a realization among Ukrainians that their country will never be truly free until it cuts all ties with Russia.

Many Russians remain in denial over the depth of the divide now separating them from their Ukrainian neighbors, preferring instead to blame everything on phantom fascists and meddling Westerners. This is wishful thinking. In reality, the two countries have never been further apart and the seeds of hatred sown by Putin’s invasion will continue to define the bilateral relationship long after Russia is defeated.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of “Fascism and Genocide: Russa’s War Against Ukrainians” published by Columbia University Press.

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One of the key reasons behind the sharp recent rise in casualties is Russia’s growing reliance on mobilized personnel with limited military training. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin responded to escalating losses in Ukraine by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Most of the approximately 300,000 men who were mobilized last year have now been deployed to Ukraine. The arrival of these additional numbers helped Russia to blunt Ukraine’s advances during the winter months, but it is unclear whether mobilized troops will prove as effective in an offensive capacity.

Many mobilized Russians appear to be less than enthusiastic about their new role as the shock troops of Putin’s faltering invasion. Since the first week of February, a growing number of video appeals have been published on social media featuring groups of mobilized soldiers complaining about everything from a lack of basic military equipment to the suicidal orders of their superiors. In one fairly typical video, the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan claim their men are being used as “cannon fodder” in Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians expected to take part in Putin’s big offensive, this emerging trend could pose a significant threat to the Kremlin. If current casualty rates are any indication, the coming attack could result in unprecedented loss of life and spark a complete collapse in morale among Russia’s already demoralized mobilized troops. This would make life very difficult for the Russian army in Ukraine, which would find itself confronted by a breakdown in discipline that would severely limit its ability to stage offensive operations. Nor is there any guarantee that the problems would stop there. Russia’s own experience in 1917 is a reminder of the unpredictable consequences that can follow when an army in wartime stops taking orders.

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It is still premature to speak of mutinous mobilized soldiers, of course. Nevertheless, maintaining military discipline may be the biggest single challenge currently facing the Putin regime. At present, the Russian dictator appears in little danger domestically, with independent polling by the Levada Center continuing to identify strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. While some question the validity of this data, there is no escaping the near complete absence of any genuine anti-war activity in today’s Russia. One year since the invasion began, most opponents have chosen to remain silent or have left Russia altogether.

Likewise, Putin seems to have weathered the worst of the economic storm brought on by Western sanctions. The Russian economy has been hard-hit by measures imposed over the past year, but the damage has been significantly less than anticipated and is certainly far from fatal. This may change if the country’s economic outlook continues to worsen, but at this stage there is no indication that shrinking incomes or the departure of Western brands from Russian stores will fuel protests anytime soon. While members of the Russian elite are also feeling the pinch, most owe their positions to Putin and see no realistic alternative to the current status quo, however imperfect.

The relative calm on Putin’s home front contrasts sharply with the precarious position of his army in Ukraine. Putin had initially anticipated a quick and triumphant campaign that would confirm Russia’s Great Power status and extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Instead, he finds himself embroiled in the biggest European conflict since World War II with his battered army in increasing disarray and his hopes of military success dwindling.

In order to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, Putin must now rely on the overwhelming numbers provided by mass mobilization. This is a tried and tested Russian tactic, but it also carries considerable risks. Sending thousands of untrained men to fight against battle-hardened and highly motivated Ukrainian troops could result in the kind of carnage that breaks armies. If that happens, the fallout would likely reverberate throughout Russia and destabilize the entire regime. Putin may then find that saving his invasion is the least of his worries.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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The last big Russian collapse caught the world by surprise and was far from universally welcomed. Indeed, some in the West saw the looming 1991 disintegration of the USSR as hugely destabilizing from an international security perspective and sought to prevent it. Most notoriously, US President George H. W. Bush traveled to Kyiv just weeks before the August 1991 Ukrainian Declaration of Independence to warn members of Soviet Ukraine’s parliament against “suicidal nationalism.”

Critics argue that the international community has been equally accommodating of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Russia’s imperial influence since the turn of the millennium. The Second Chechen War, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine all failed to fundamentally disrupt relations between Russia and the West. Indeed, in areas such as the energy sector, cooperation continued to deepen even after Moscow had illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparked a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These flourishing economic ties helped create the financial foundations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

As the Putin regime has attempted to reassert its imperial influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that were formerly part of the Czarist and Soviet empires, Moscow has also been actively restricting the rights of the dozens of different national and ethnic groups within the boundaries of the modern Russian state. Despite calling itself the Russian Federation, today’s Russia is a highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian country. National minorities throughout Russia must contend with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in their homelands while also playing a disproportionately prominent role in the Kremlin’s wars of aggression.

Over the past year, Putin’s imperial ambitions have run into serious trouble in Ukraine. The Russian dictator expected a short, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his invading army has suffered catastrophic losses in both men and armor amid a series of battlefield defeats that have seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite these setbacks, Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists continue to promote an unapologetically imperialistic agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently hinted that Moldova may face the same fate as Ukraine, while menacing statements directed at the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations are routine features of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Until this imperial aggression is addressed, it will remain the greatest single threat to European security.

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There are various different perspectives on the problem of Russian imperialism. Some commentators advocate a reformed Russia existing as a genuinely federal and broadly democratic state within its current borders. Others argue that today’s Russia is an unrepentant empire and will remain so until it is broken up into a series of smaller countries.

This second and more radical option alarms many Western policymakers and commentators, who fear that the break-up of the Russian Federation would have disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation and regional security. Gloomy forecasts anticipate a Russian collapse leading to a chaotic aftermath marked by the rise of nuclear-armed regional warlords and uncontrolled migration involving tens of millions of people.

In many ways, these fears mirror similar concerns at the time of the Soviet collapse. However, while the fall of the USSR brought considerable human misery for huge numbers of former Soviet citizens, this was accompanied by only a relatively small number of localized armed conflicts. Meanwhile, those nations that escaped the Soviet sphere of influence and were welcomed into NATO and the EU have gone on to prosper. Indeed, it is no coincidence that post-Soviet Russian aggression has focused on Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, all countries that the West hesitated to embrace after 1991.

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

Botakoz Kassymbekova — Wed, 01 Feb 2023 11:26:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin insists Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” but his brutal invasion of Ukraine has revealed a remarkable lack of “brotherly” Russian empathy for Ukrainians. While many people in other former Soviet republics have identified with Ukraine’s suffering, relatively few Russian citizens have shown any sign of compassion or remorse for the genocidal violence being perpetrated in their name.

According to research conducted by Russia’s internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, Russian public support for the war remained above 70% throughout 2022. Speaking to Germany publication Der Spiegel in early 2023, Levada Center scientific director Lev Gudkov observed that mounting evidence of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine had made virtually no impact on Russian public opinion. “The Russians have little compassion for the Ukrainians. Almost no one here talks about the fact that people are being killed in Ukraine.”

Much of the available evidence supports these poll findings and points to a remarkable absence of empathy. Millions of Ukrainians have friends and family in Russia. Many report being shocked by the lack of compassion they have encountered since the start of the invasion. Rather than sympathy or concern, they have been confronted by cold indifference, outright denials, or pro-Kremlin propaganda tropes.

The hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled the country over the past year have not staged any major anti-war rallies while in exile, despite no longer being subject to draconian Kremlin restrictions. Inside Russia itself, there have been no significant protests since the first weeks of the war. The contrast provided by mass anti-government rallies over the past twelve months in other repressive dictatorships such as China and Iran has cast the silence of the Russian population in an even more unfavorable light.

This apparent lack of empathy for the victims of Russian imperial aggression is nothing new. Many Russians displayed similar attitudes toward the two Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet era and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. More recently, the 2014 invasion of Crimea was widely cheered and remains arguably the most popular single event of Putin’s entire 23-year reign. Such thinking reflects the unapologetically imperial identity which the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet and Czarist eras.

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Modern Russian national identity remains firmly rooted in notions of a sacred imperial mission that perceives Russia as being a unique civilization locked in an eternal struggle against various constructed foreign enemies. Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same. Indeed, it is telling that while Soviet communism has long since been consigned to the ash heap of history, today’s Russia has seamlessly inherited the USSR’s Cold War-era animosity toward NATO, the United States, and the Western world in general.

The sense of imperial mission pervading modern Russian society has helped nurture values of sacrifice and obligation at the expense of individual human rights. Many Russians take it for granted that they are destined to rule over other nations and interpret their colonialism as fundamentally benevolent, even when it is obviously unwelcome. Russia’s victims must be liberated, whether they like it or not.

Whether driven by the Orthodox faith, the communist ideology, or Putin’s far vaguer notions of a “Russian world,” this highly paternalistic brand of imperialism grants Russians the right to speak on behalf of their subject peoples. Accordingly, there is no need to actually listen to these conquered peoples or empathize with them, even while proclaiming them as “brothers.” Those who oppose this holy crusade are logically understood to be representatives of evil. It is no coincidence that a whole host of senior Russian officials include Putin himself have sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a battle against Satanists.

While Russian opposition figures are often critical of the Putin regime, they are typically far less outspoken on the topic Russian colonialism, the root cause of the current genocidal Ukraine invasion. Instead, some seek to portray themselves as the real victims of the Kremlin while failing to make the obvious connection between the authoritarianism they claim to oppose and the imperialism they choose to ignore. By blaming everything on Putin, they embrace the same convenient victimhood that the Kremlin itself promotes when faced by the negative consequences of its imperial policies.

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The national mythologies of today’s Russia and Ukraine could hardly be more different. While many Russians readily embrace their country’s imperial identity, imperial ideas do not resonate in Ukraine. Even before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, Ukrainians already tended to define their national identity in terms of resistance to the narrative of submission, while prioritizing personal freedoms over obligations to the state.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building journey has been shaped by a struggle for true independence. This has led to the merging of civic and anti-colonial resistance movements, with the country’s two Maidan revolutions serving as important landmarks on the road toward internal and external freedom.

For almost two decades, Ukraine’s trajectory has been viewed with mounting anger and alarm in the Kremlin. Haunted by the Soviet collapse of the late twentieth century, the Putin regime regards Ukraine’s democratization as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat.

For the time being, other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan act as alternatives to Ukraine’s anti-colonial identity. In these countries, domestic democratic development has been stifled by Kremlin-backed regimes that have chosen not to break decisively with the imperial past. However, there are signs that the current status quo may not be as stable as Moscow would like to think.

Ukraine’s defiant resistance to Russia’s invasion is energizing civil society throughout the former USSR and fueling unprecedented debate over the role of Russian colonialism. On the international stage, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has introduced contemporary global audiences to the realities of modern Russia’s imperial identity.

Commentators around the world are now actively discussing the practical implications of a post-colonial Russia. Such talk is no longer considered entirely fanciful. On the contrary, many now believe that defeat in Ukraine would deal a decisive blow to hopes of a new Russian Empire and transform the entire Eurasian political landscape. Ultimately, It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova is Assistant Professor of Modern History at the University of Basel.

And yet we now know from leaked and captured documents that Russia’s military and political elite anticipated only minimal organized resistance in Ukraine. Rather than preparing for a major war, they genuinely believed a large proportion of the Ukrainian population would greet them as liberators. Strikingly, they also doubted whether the country’s military had the stomach for a serious fight.

These absurd expectations were shaped by decades of misleading Kremlin propaganda. For generations, the Russian state has denied Ukraine’s right to exist and questioned the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity. Putin has been a particularly prominent advocate of such arguments and has frequently claimed that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). In the years between the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of February 2022, he repeatedly branded Ukraine an artificial country that had been unjustly separated from its rightful place as part of historical Russia.

Russian state propagandists have also long sought to discredit Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition toward Euro-Atlantic integration by dismissing it as a foreign plot. Rather than acknowledge the Ukrainian people’s right to determine their own future, the Kremlin has consistently insisted that the vast majority of Ukrainians see themselves as Russians but are victims of an extremist fringe acting in the interests of outsiders.

Such delusions seem to have penetrated the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. At no point in the lead-up to the war does anyone in the Kremlin appear to have taken the idea of Ukrainian agency seriously. Instead, they assumed the 2022 invasion would be a repeat of the spring 2014 takeover of Crimea, which saw Russian troops rapidly seize the Ukrainian peninsula amid post-revolutionary political paralysis in Kyiv. This was to prove an extremely costly mistake.

From the very first hours of the invasion, Russian troops ran into fierce Ukrainian resistance and began suffering heavy losses. Just over a month after the first columns of Russian tanks had crossed the border, Putin was forced to admit defeat in the Battle of Kyiv and withdraw from northern Ukraine entirely. His army has yet to regain the initiative, and has since retreated from Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine and Right Bank Kherson in the south.

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As well as fatally underestimating Ukraine’s military capabilities, Putin also wildly overestimated the strength of his own army. Like many senior figures in Moscow, he took Russia’s military superpower status for granted and did not seriously consider the possibility of defeat at the hands of a minor state such as Ukraine. This confidence was shared by most Russians, who have traditionally embraced notions of their country’s military might with the zeal of religious dogma.

Despite a series of embarrassing setbacks in Ukraine, large numbers of Russians remain in denial and cling to the hope that Russia has yet to deploy its full military potential. Putin himself has fueled such wishful thinking by declaring that he has “not yet begun” to wage a real war in Ukraine. However, this bravado cannot disguise the significantly less imposing reality of a depleted and demoralized Russian army that is increasingly dependent on mobilized troops, outdated armor, and Iranian drones.

Putin has recently adopted a somewhat strange war strategy that appears primarily designed to appease domestic audiences. Since early October, Russia has been focusing on the mass aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. This air war is hugely expensive and offers minimal military advantages. However, it is psychologically effective in convincing Russian audiences that their cause is not yet lost.

The Kremlin’s carefully curated propaganda machine works hard to amplify the impact of these airstrikes while exaggerating the hardships experienced by the Ukrainian civilian population. Likewise, state media also trumpets every minor gain achieved by Russian troops on the ground in eastern Ukraine, even when these advances are measured in meters. This creates the impression that Russia has stopped trying to win the war and is merely attempting to demonstrate that it is not losing.

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The war is far from over, of course. In September 2022, Putin demonstrated his resolve by ordering Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Many international observers expect him to mobilize a further 500,000 troops in the coming weeks. This massive increase in Russian military manpower is already reducing Ukraine’s ability to advance and could allow Moscow to regain the initiative in the months ahead.

At the same time, the damage to Russia’s reputation has already been done. Russia’s global standing has always relied heavily on international perceptions of the country as a major military power. This myth has now been ruthlessly exposed on the battlefields of Ukraine. Countries which had earlier felt obliged to remain on good terms with Russia now understandably feel they have little to fear, while those who previously saw Moscow as a powerful partner have been forced to rethink this relationship.

Domestically, the consequences may be even more critical for Putin. Belief in Russia’s military strength served as the foundation stone of the country’s modern national identity. It was a source of patriotic pride that helped justify the often harsh living conditions and limited individual rights that all Russian citizens are forced to accept. This entire facade is now in danger of collapsing.

The failing invasion of Ukraine is not only exposing the relative weakness of the Russian military; it is revealing the rot at the heart of the Russian state and the emptiness of the Kremlin’s imperial posturing. This raises a number of grave questions about the future of the Russian Federation that Putin is unable to answer. For the past 22 years, he has succeeded in creating a parallel propaganda universe, but reality is now rapidly closing in.

Victor Tregubov is a Ukrainian political activist and commentator.

This has brought post-Soviet Ukraine into ever more intense confrontation with Putin’s Russia, which views the current Ukrainian trajectory as an existential threat to its own brand of authoritarian imperialism. If the former imperial heartlands of Ukraine succeed in freeing themselves from the Kremlin, this would drastically undermine Russia’s influence over other neighbors such as Moldova and Belarus along with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In a worst-case scenario, Ukraine’s integration into the Western world could serve as a catalyst for the collapse of the Russian Federation itself.

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Modern Ukraine’s civilizational split from authoritarian Russia began with the country’s December 1991 referendum, which produced a landslide vote in favor of Ukrainian independence. This momentous issue was decided not by violence but at the ballot box, following extensive public dialogue. The 1991 referendum set the political tone for independent Ukraine and established peaceful transfers of power via democratic means as a core principle for the newly independent country.

Ukraine’s political climate has not always been so orderly, of course. This is especially true of the numerous occasions when Russia has sought to interfere directly. Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Revolution of Dignity stand out as particularly important turning points in the unraveling relationship between post-Soviet Kyiv and Moscow. These revolutions highlighted the Ukrainian public’s determination to prevent Russia from derailing the country’s democratic development.

Crucially, both revolutions were grassroots movements sparked by Russian interventions seeking to prevent Ukraine’s European integration and steer the country back toward a more authoritarian form of government. On both occasions, ever-widening groups within Ukrainian civil society engaged with each other and learned to cooperate, often forging ties with other regions of the country.

These people power uprisings marked the consolidation of Ukrainian civil society and highlighted the country’s capacity for collective action. As a consequence, civil society now has a high sense of self-efficacy and social capital. Independent Ukraine’s two revolutions established the democratic principle of rule by the people not only in theory but also in practice, while highlighting the diverging political paths of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine.

Another crucial turning point in Ukraine’s nation-building journey was the annexation by Russia of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s subsequent armed intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This did much to undermine pro-Russian sentiment and strengthen Ukrainian identity throughout the country.

Putin’s use of force in 2014 discredited Russia as a potential partner while serving to remove much of his traditional support base in Ukraine. With economic opportunities sharply reduced and the political climate turning decisively against Moscow, many Kremlin sympathizers in the occupied parts of the Donbas and elsewhere in Ukraine chose to relocate to Russia. Others soon became disillusioned with the realities of the Russian occupation.

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As relations with Russia have deteriorated, ties with the global Ukrainian diaspora have flourished. For decades, the Kremlin sought to portray the diaspora in dismissive terms as a reactionary force that was out of touch with contemporary Ukrainian realities. In recent years, diaspora Ukrainians have debunked these stereotypes and served as a vital bridge between the country and its international partners.

Deepening ties with Ukraine’s Western partners have played an important role in consolidating the country’s historic turn toward the democratic world. Much of the support Ukraine has received since 2014 has been conditional on social and economic reforms that have re-affirmed the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Civil society actors and government officials have come to recognize that these conditions lead to higher standards of living and a better quality of life in general. This is in stark contrast to relations with Russia, which even before the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 had long been associated with stagnation and inertia.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s historic turn toward the West has been dramatically reinforced by the previously unimaginable horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While Russian troops have killed thousands of civilians and destroyed entire Ukrainian cities, Ukraine’s Western partners have offered a wide range of essential aid and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees. For many Ukrainians, the experience of the past ten months has fundamentally altered perceptions of both Russia and the West. While they will long remember the Western response with immense gratitude, they will never forgive Russia.

The war has also fostered national integration within Ukraine by fueling unprecedented interaction among people from different regions of the country. This integration has been happening as Russian missiles and bombs fall equally on Ukrainian citizens regardless of their region, ethnicity, or worldview. With the ferocity of the Russian invasion forcing millions of citizens to flee their homes in the Donbas, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, and numerous other provinces, a massive cultural exchange is taking place as different segments of the population are brought together and united by a common cause.

This cultural exchange extends beyond Ukraine’s borders to the country’s European neighbors. Millions of Ukrainians have sought sanctuary in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, and a host of other European countries. The support extended by these countries shows that they, in turn, all appreciate the sacrifices currently being made by Ukrainians in defense of European security.

The huge refugee wave since February 2022 has resulted in entirely new levels of interaction between Ukrainians and other Europeans. As a result, earlier misconceptions are being replaced by a more nuanced understanding of each other and an appreciation of how much Ukrainians have in common with the wider European community. The growing solidarity and engagement of the past ten months is laying the foundations for what promises to be decades of intensifying partnership and cooperation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but it is already difficult to see how Putin can achieve his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing a Russified Ukraine back into the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. Instead, the war has dramatically accelerated long-term trends and widened the civilizational divide separating Moscow and Kyiv. A reduced Russia now looks destined to spend an extended period in international isolation, while Ukraine is firmly on track to cement its position as a valued member of the democratic world.

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the US Congress during his historic December 2022 address, “Your money is not charity. It is an investment in global security and democracy.” Indeed, at present it would appear that US support for Ukraine has been one of the most successful foreign policy investments in American history.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

Putin is preparing for a long war

Alexander Motyl — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 01:37:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin has just admitted Russia is in serious trouble. A comparison of his recent New Year address with the speech he delivered just one year earlier reveals a dramatic change in tone, focus, and language that hints at mounting alarm behind the scenes in the Kremlin over the rapidly unraveling invasion of Ukraine. Gone, too, was the Moscow skyline setting that typically serves as the backdrop for this keynote annual address. Instead, a somber-looking Putin spoke while flanked by rows of soldiers in uniform.

This symbolism matters. In modern Russia, the head of state’s New Year speech is an important tradition that seeks to set the tone for the coming year. On this occasion, the mood Putin sought to convey was of a country facing the prospect of a long and difficult war. After months spent downplaying the invasion of Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation,” he was now belatedly acknowledging the severity of the situation.

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Back on December 31, 2021, Putin had been far more upbeat. “We are united in the hope that changes for the better lie ahead,” he said. “As we ring in the New Year, we hope that it will bring new opportunities for us. Of course, we hope luck will be on our side, but we understand that making our dreams reality primarily depends on us.” The final line of his address was downright soppy: “May love fill every heart and inspire us all to achieve our goals and scale the greatest heights. For the sake of our loved ones and for the sake of our only country, our great Motherland.”

Could this really have been the same Vladimir Putin who was already planning to unleash a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and plunge Europe into its largest conflict since World War II? In fact, despite the massive Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and Moscow’s visibly worsening relations with the West, neither of these important developments was mentioned at all.

What a difference a year makes. In a nine-minute New Year speech that was reportedly the longest of his 22-year reign, Putin marked the arrival of 2023 by lashing out at the Western world and warning that the fate of Russia was at stake. “The West lied about peace,” Putin declared. “It was preparing for aggression, and now they are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia. We have never allowed this, and never will allow anybody to do this to us.”

Domestic opponents were also targeted. In an apparent reference to the large numbers of military-age Russian men who chose to flee the country in the second half of 2022 rather than join the invasion, he noted that the past twelve months had “put a lot of things in their place, clearly separating courage and heroism from betrayal and cowardice.”

The speech concluded on a defiant and ominous note, with Putin indicating that Russia’s survival as an independent state was now under threat. “Together, we will overcome all difficulties and preserve our country’s greatness and independence,” he said. “We will triumph, for our families and for Russia.”

There was no frivolous talk of love, trust, and hope as in December 2021. No dreamy wishes, no hopeful expectations. This time, Putin was sounding the alarm bell. Naturally, the West was at fault and the Russian dictator himself bore absolutely no responsibility for the mess his country currently finds itself in.

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Putin seems to believe, or at least wants the Russian public to believe, that Russia is tottering on the edge of a precipice with its very existence as a coherent state now in danger. In his address, he spoke several times of the need to defend and preserve Russia’s independence. This was new and noteworthy.

For many years, Putin has consistently expressed his commitment to maintaining Russia’s Great Power status and its prominent role in the international arena. He has frequently accused the West of wanting to subvert Russia. But fear of losing independence was a problem for Ukrainians, Balts, and Russia’s other neighbors. It was not something for Russians to worry about.

Can Putin be serious? Of course, he may simply be trying to terrify his domestic audience and thereby prepare the Russian public for further sacrifices in the futile and unwinnable war against Ukraine. Alternatively, he and his colleagues in the Kremlin may really sense that, their publicly expressed bravado notwithstanding, the writing is on the wall for Russia.

More than ten months since the invasion of Ukraine began, very few analysts still see a clear path to victory for Russia. On the contrary, there is broad agreement that Putin’s options are narrowing as his military fortunes decline. Russia has already been noticeably weakened by the failing invasion. Defeat in Ukraine could lead to the break-up of the Russian Federation itself, or turn the country into a vassal state of China or the West.

Putin’s speech was an unambiguous attempt to mobilize Russian society and place the whole country on a war footing. It is not yet clear whether this was successful. One thing is for sure: if the coming year turns out to be anything like 2022 for Russia, there is little chance that Putin will still be around to deliver another New Year address on December 31, 2023.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

2022 REVIEW: Russia’s invasion has united Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 21 Dec 2022 17:05:20 +0000

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Western coverage of the country has tended to exaggerate regional differences, creating the impression of a weak state with divided loyalties. Misleading portrayals of Ukraine as a nation split between pro-Russian east and pro-European west have had a profound impact on outside perceptions, leading many international observers to believe that much of the local population in eastern Ukraine would actively support Russia’s 2022 invasion or at least remain neutral.

Such thinking can be traced back to Russia, which has long promoted the idea of modern Ukraine as an artificial state with a large ethnic Russian minority in need of Moscow’s protection. For years, Vladimir Putin denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). He openly accused Ukrainians of occupying historically Russian lands and declared Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

These distorted perceptions of Ukraine’s history and national character meant that few expected the country to survive against the full might of the Russian military. On the eve of this year’s invasion, there was general agreement in Moscow and most Western capitals that Ukraine would be defeated within a matter of days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not seen as a credible wartime leader and was widely expected to abandon Kyiv. Likewise, the military prowess of the Ukrainian army and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation were also underestimated.

Inside the Kremlin, it appears that Putin’s decision to invade was influenced by a combination of faulty intelligence and over-consumption of his own anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian dictator seems to have genuinely believed myths about an oppressed pro-Russian minority in Ukraine who would welcome his invasion and rise up in support of the advancing Russian army. Rarely in international affairs has anyone ever been so mistaken.

In fact, no Ukrainian region welcomed Putin’s invading army. While instances of collaboration have been recorded throughout the occupied regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, these have proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the number of people prepared to collaborate has been dwarfed by the sheer scale of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian occupation. Russian troops who were told they would be treated as liberators have been shocked and distressed to find themselves acting as occupiers in hostile territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all regions have been brought together by the common cause of defeating Russia. An invasion that was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood has inadvertently united the country.

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Ukraine’s nation-building journey did not begin overnight with the advent of this year’s Russian invasion, of course. A modern Ukrainian national identity has been gradually evolving throughout the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Key milestones in this journey include the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the shock waves caused by the subsequent Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the significance of the changes that have taken place within Ukrainian society since February 24 cannot be overstated. Crucially, attitudes toward key issues of national identity and foreign policy have become aligned throughout the country.

The biggest changes have taken place among Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have suffered most from Russian aggression. It is one of the bitter ironies of the invasion that the devastation inflicted by Putin’s troops has fallen disproportionately on the regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to be protecting. The Russian army has reduced dozens of towns and cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to rubble and killed thousands of civilians. Millions more have been subjected to a brutal occupation regime marked by executions, abductions, terror tactics, and forced deportations.

Until 2022, these Ukrainian regions had traditionally been more sympathetic to the Soviet past and tended to favor pro-Russian politicians. Many openly embraced Soviet myths of Russians and Ukrainians as “brotherly peoples.” However, the horrors of the invasion have forced a radical rethink and led to the widespread rejection of Russia.

The rift caused by the current invasion has moved beyond far politics. Following the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, most Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russia’s leadership while remaining largely positive toward the Russian people. This is no longer the case. Ukrainians have noted that the vast majority of ordinary Russians appear to support the war or at least refrain from criticizing it. Millions of Ukrainians with Russian relatives have experienced this phenomenon for themselves in painful telephone conversations.

As a consequence, most Ukrainians no longer draw any meaningful distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. An August 2022 poll conducted by Ukraine’s Rating Agency found that only 3% of Ukrainians held positive views of Russians while 81% regarded Russians negatively. This negative rating was almost double the 41% recorded just four months earlier. Ukrainian antipathy towards Russians will only deepen as the war takes a greater toll in civilian lives, military casualties, and physical destruction.

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Ukraine’s fundamental break with Russia has impacted every aspect of the country’s social, cultural, and religious life. The Russian language is now noticeably in decline among Ukrainians because it is negatively viewed as the language of military aggression. Many Ukrainians who grew up predominantly speaking Russian are becoming bilingual or switching to speaking Ukrainian.

There is growing public support across the country for policies of de-Russification. Almost three-quarters of Ukrainians (73%) back the idea of renaming streets and public places commemorating Russian historical figures and events, including two-thirds of respondents in eastern Ukraine. By weaponizing Russian history and using it to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has convinced millions of previously sympathetic Ukrainians to view symbols of the Russian imperial past as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing attack on Ukrainian statehood.

Support for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has also plummeted, with recent polling indicating that only 4% of Ukrainians currently identify as adherents. This is hardly surprising, given the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the principal cheerleaders of Putin’s invasion. Recent searches of Russian Orthodox Church premises in Ukraine have netted an array of Russian passports, imperial symbols, and literature denying the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Converging Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are immediately apparent in relation to the peace process and foreign policy. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey conducted in July 2022 found almost no difference of opinion between Ukrainians who identified as Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking on the issue of a potential land-for-peace deal to end the war, with 85% of Russian speakers opposed compared to 90% of Ukrainian speakers. Likewise, there was no longer any evidence of a significant regional split, with 83% in eastern Ukraine and 85% in the south opposing any territorial compromises with the Kremlin.

The same shift toward greater national consensus is evident on foreign policy matters. Regional differences over the country’s future geopolitical direction were long seen as the most obvious indication of a divided Ukraine. However, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, successive surveys have found that clear majorities in all regions of Ukraine now support Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, enthusiasm for deeper integration with Russia or membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Union has evaporated.

By invading Ukraine, Putin hoped to reverse the verdict of 1991 and bring Ukrainian independence to an end. Instead, Russia’s attack has backfired disastrously. The full-scale invasion which began on February 24 has served to accelerate Ukraine’s nation-building progress and unite the country in ways that would have been difficult to image just one year ago. The trauma and sacrifices of the past ten months mean that these changes are in all likelihood irreversible and will continue to shape Ukraine’s development for decades to come as the country strengthens its sovereignty and moves further away from Russia.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

US President Joe Biden describes Putin as a rational actor who has miscalculated. This is probably true, but it is also important to recognize Putin’s miscalculation as a symptom of a flawed worldview that is disconnected from reality. In short, Putin fell into the same trap that eventually catches out many long-serving dictators; he drank his own Kool-Aid.

In a military context, believing in one’s own inflated prowess is catastrophically dangerous. Thanks to decades of propaganda, Russians take it for granted that their country is a military superpower. This myth has been shattered in Ukraine. Despite having less than one-third of Russia’s population, a far smaller economy, and being an emerging democracy rather than a militarized dictatorship, Ukraine has more than held its own for almost a year against the invading Russian army.

While the West has provided Ukraine with significant military aid, the extent of Western involvement in the war should not be overstated. So far, only about one percent of the relevant available Western weaponry has actually been sent to Ukraine. Key partners such as the US, UK, France, and Germany have resisted Ukrainian pleas for tanks, jets, and long-range missiles. Instead, they have provided anti-tank weapons, limited quantities of artillery, and shorter range missile systems. Nevertheless, this has proved sufficient to stop Russia’s offensive and liberate about half of the territory occupied by Putin’s troops during the initial stages of the invasion.

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Faced with mounting setbacks in Ukraine, Putin has become increasingly delusional. Rather than acknowledge Russia’s embarrassing defeats and catastrophic losses, he insists everything is going according to plan. This is creating opportunities for Russia’s far right forces, which do not suffer from the same limitations. While Kremlin officials absurdly attempt to portray retreats as “goodwill gestures,” the far right wins over the Russian public by speaking frankly about the country’s military disasters in Ukraine.

Until the invasion began in February 2022, the only political opposition in Russia was represented by jailed anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who had attempted to play broadly by Western democratic rules. When the war started, the remnants of Russian civil society were ruthlessly stamped out. Prominent opposition figures were jailed or forced into exile, while new laws criminalized all forms of public dissent. These trends have intensified over the intervening nine months, extinguishing any lingering hopes of a serious democratic opposition to the Putin regime.

Instead, the most serious challenge to Putinism may come from a newly emerging political movement that is even further to the right on the political spectrum than Putin himself. At present, this is a disorganized but vocal movement that has found its voice in the many unofficial Russian “war correspondents” and social media accounts reporting on the invasion while bypassing the Russia’s Kremlin-controlled mainstream information space. Most write from a Russian nationalist perspective while employing ethnic slurs for Ukrainians. They are unambiguously pro-war and often apparently pro-Putin. However, their content is frequently at odds with Russia’s official propaganda and highly critical of the military officials leading the invasion.

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While there is currently no single nationalist leader, the most prominent figure among Russian ultra-nationalists is Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group paramilitary force. Prigozhin once sought to distance himself from Wagner but has recently made his connection very public. He has released footage of his recruitment speeches and has opened a swanky head office in Saint Petersburg. This reflects the rising profile of Wagner itself. Formerly seen as a shadowy mercenary group used by the Kremlin in hybrid war hot spots such as Ukraine, Syria, and Africa to create a veneer of plausible deniability, Wagner has been one of the few Russian military units to perform credibly during the initial stages of the Ukraine invasion and has visibly grown in stature.

With his own public profile on the rise, Prigozhin has begun testing the boundaries by publicly deriding senior figures within the Russian military hierarchy. Meanwhile, his Wagner troops operate in Ukraine as an army-within-an-army, pursuing their own clearly defined battlefield objectives and openly positioning themselves as a military elite in contrast to the under-performing regular Russian army.

Wagner fighters have become the poster boys of the ultra-nationalists, who are themselves less prone to official delusions and more interested in the realities of hard power. Freedom from the constraints of the Kremlin propaganda machine is a major asset in their struggle for credibility among Russian audiences. This makes the far right a potentially formidable opponent in a future internal power struggle against the Putin regime.

It is hard to predict what the world could expect from a post-Putin Russia ruled by far right forces, but there is clearly little room for optimism. An ultra-nationalist successor regime would likely be even more inclined to wage war against Russia’s neighbors while ruthlessly targeting civilians. This extremism would be driven in part by the growing conviction within nationalist circles that Putin is failing in Ukraine precisely because he has not been ruthless enough in his leadership of the war.

Putin’s domestic position is not yet sufficiently weak to talk of an imminent fall from power, but it is already apparent that he is far weaker today than he was just one year ago. At the same time, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has catapulted a wide range of formerly fringe nationalist figures into the Russian mainstream and transformed Yevgeny Prigozhin into a political heavyweight. This swing to the right has not yet been fully appreciated by many Western observers, but it offers alarming indications of where Russia may be heading politically and must be watched carefully in the months ahead.

Stanislav Shalunov is founder and CEO of NewNode and creator of FireChat.

Throughout the 1990s, civic attachment to the Russian Federation remained weak. Meanwhile, more overtly imperial forms of identity proved to be far more popular, leading to calls for a return to the Soviet and Czarist eras or for a resurgent Russia to lead a new Eurasian empire. This trend was evident even before the Soviet Empire fell, with celebrated dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn calling in 1990 for a new Russian Union of the three Eastern Slavic nations (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus). This concept would be revived and broadened almost two decades later to serve as the basis for Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

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The continued popularity of supra-national imperial identities in post-Soviet Russia was clear during the 1993 constitutional crisis, which saw an alliance of communists and extreme nationalists attempt to overthrow President Yeltsin. Three years later during the Russian presidential election, Yeltsin embraced the imperial agenda of a union state with Belarus to help counter strong revanchist support for Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov.

By the time KGB veteran Vladimir Putin became president at the turn of the millennium, Russia was already visibly shifting away from its brief flirtation with European integration. Putin openly embraced Russia’s imperial identity and laid claim to Eurasia as the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. He was reportedly obsessed from the very start of his presidency with the idea of bringing Ukraine firmly back into the Russian orbit.

Putin’s position was perhaps predictable. The Soviet KGB where he spent the formative years of his professional career was a strikingly chauvinistic institution that openly embraced a sense of Russia’s imperial mission. This mentality was passed on to the KGB’s post-Soviet successor agencies, which assumed a dominant role in Russia following Putin’s rise to power.

Among policymakers in Putin’s Russia, other former Soviet nations such as Ukraine were never credited with real agency or genuine sovereignty. Instead, they were routinely regarded as part of modern Russia’s informal empire. Such ideas enjoyed widespread support among the Russian public and were heavily promoted in the carefully curated Russian mainstream media.

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In 2012, Putin returned to the presidency with the goal of entering history as the gatherer of Russian lands. In practice, this meant completing the reintegration of Belarus and Ukraine. Putin had always viewed these two East Slavic states are core members of his envisioned Eurasian Economic Union. With Crimea annexed in 2014 and Belarus transformed into a Russian puppet state in 2020, the last and decisive step in this historic process was to be the complete subjugation of Ukraine in 2022.

Unfortunately for Putin, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Far from completing his historic reunification mission, the rapidly unraveling attack on Ukraine has shattered Russia’s reputation as a Great Power and as a military force to be reckoned with. As a consequence, many now view Russia as a declining power.

Moscow’s ability to project influence throughout its former empire has suffered accordingly. This presents Russia’s neighbors and the Western world with a golden opportunity to encourage the evolution of a post-imperial Russian identity that could serve as the basis for Russia’s reintegration into the wider international community.

In order to achieve this goal, the democratic world must rethink its own policies toward Russia and stop informally acknowledging Moscow’s claims to a sphere of influence. This outdated and unhelpful approach merely serves to legitimize Russia’s imperial ambitions. Instead, the West should treat Russia as an ordinary nation state and hold Moscow to the same standards applied to others.

Western leaders should also encourage the non-Russian states of the former USSR to stop buttressing Russia’s supra-national identity and end their participation in post-Soviet structures whose main purpose is to prolong Russia’s regional dominance. Members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and Eurasian Economic Union should be encouraged to withdraw. Armenia should be encouraged to return to the EU Association Agreement it abandoned under Russian pressure in 2013.

Another key step toward a post-imperial Russia is elimination of the grey zone between NATO and the EU on one side, and a Russia-dominated Eurasia on the other. While the current war in Ukraine cannot continue forever, a fresh Russian invasion is virtually inevitable unless Ukraine in offered a clear road map toward NATO membership. Ukraine’s current position in the geopolitical grey zone helps keep Russia’s imperial aspirations alive and makes a lasting peace in Europe unattainable.

Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU would rule out any further Russian invasions and dramatically reduce the scope for new imperial adventures. This would lead to a decline in support within Russia for aggressive imperial ideologies and discredit the entire notion of Putin’s “Russian World.” Instead, we would likely witness the growth of Russian civic identity.

Three decades after the fall of the USSR, Russia is currently in real danger of losing its Great Power status. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine has exposed internal weaknesses and sparked an unprecedented collapse in Russian influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. It is clearly in the interests of the democratic world to encourage this process of imperial retreat. The transformation of Russian national identity into a post-imperial and civic form would pave the way for a new era of European peace and productivity. The ultimate beneficiaries of this would be the Russian people themselves.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His forthcoming book is “Genocide and Fascism, Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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Putin’s speaking style is also worthy of note. In contrast to twentieth century dictators like Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler who were notorious for raving and gesticulating wildly, Putin’s often outrageous assertions are delivered in a soft-spoken and understated tone that creates the impression of a level-headed and entirely rational politician.

The annual Valdai Discussion Club held in Moscow this October was a case in point. Putin’s keynote address was a diatribe against the West, which he accused of attempting to eliminate the rich diversity of cultures around the world. Putin claimed he stood for traditional values, the dignity and sovereignty of all peoples, and the free exchange of science and cultural achievements. He assured listeners that he was against isolationism and any kind of racial, ethnic, or religious intolerance.

This was Putin the impeccable humanist on display. It would be difficult to imagine a figure further removed from Medvedev’s bloodcurdling proclamations. Judging by Putin’s demeanor at the Valdai event, few would believe this was the same man who had ordered the destruction of Grozny, Aleppo, and Mariupol, or who just months earlier had unleashed the largest European conflict since World War II.

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While Medvedev uses the language of the gutter, Putin adopts the academic tone of the historian and disguises his imperial aggression by arguing at length that Russians and Ukrainians are actually “one nation.” He expresses exasperation at the alleged oppression of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population, and positions his invasion as an unfortunate necessity. Whereas Medvedev is the voice of righteous fury, Putin is the voice of reason.

Unfortunately for the Kremlin, Putin and Medvedev’s good cop, bad cop routine is now failing in the West. The international media spotlight of the past nine months has done much to expose Russian lies and reveal the naked imperial ambition behind Moscow’s talk of phantom fascists and oppressed minorities. Few remain receptive to Putin’s convoluted explanations for the invasion of Ukraine other than ideological allies and those still willing to buy into the Kremlin’s conspiratorial narratives.

The contrasting rhetoric being offered up by Putin and Medvedev has proven more successful among domestic audiences and has helped convince millions of Russians that the Kremlin authorities know what they are doing in Ukraine. Raised in an authoritarian political culture, many Russians find Medvedev’s extremism emotionally appealing and are persuaded by Putin’s more measured approach.

The impact of this strategy is plain to see. While the Russian death toll for the invasion of Ukraine approaches 100,000 and the Russian economy continues its downward slide, there is no sign of any significant domestic opposition to the war. As more Russian sons and husbands return from Ukraine in coffins, the durability of the Kremlin duo will be further tested, but at present their double act appears highly effective.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University, Newark. Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics, living in Almaty.

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

No politics… except Palestine

Where is the UAE?

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

Gulf neighbors get cozy

DECEMBER 15, 2022 | 10:01 AM WASHINGTON | 6:01 PM QATAR

The long-term impact of Morocco’s magical World Cup run

The world abruptly woke up from the roller-coaster ride of a dream that was Morocco’s miraculous World Cup run on Wednesday when the Atlas Lions lost 2-0 to defending champion France in the semifinals. But Morocco nonetheless succeeded by inspiring millions of children from Africa and the Middle East, uniting much of the world during an uncertain time with its historic performance.

Not only was Morocco the first African and Arab nation to ever reach the semifinals of the World Cup, but it accomplished that feat with a roster in which fourteen out of twenty-six players were born abroad, mostly in Europe. While this phenomenon can be attributed to the failure of some European nations to assimilate migrants from North Africa, it has implications for the future of international soccer teams in African and Arab nations. Children in the region and in the diaspora have seen the successes of Morocco and could now be inspired to play for the nation of their cultural roots over the country where their family may have emigrated. Western nations are known for having powerhouse teams made up from immigrants, most notoriously France’s 2018 World Cup-winning team, in which twelve of twenty-three players had African roots, spanning nine different nations. Therefore, this shift in which nation a player chooses to represent could cause a seismic shake-up in the international soccer hierarchy, with more African and Middle Eastern teams potentially rising in rank from a generation of youth that have been inspired by the 2022 Atlas Lions.

Off the field, it could be argued that Morocco’s World Cup run was more successful in bringing together the Arab and African community than traditional diplomatic routes—showcasing the overwhelmingly positive impact that soccer and other sporting events can have. With Africa and the Middle East having large youth populations, governments in the region and international organizations should seize this positive momentum by building infrastructure and programs to support inclusive sporting opportunities for young people.

From kids running around with a soccer ball at their feet in the historic streets of Marrakech, to neighboring nations such as Tunisia celebrating the victories of Morocco’s team like their own country had won, to internally displaced people’s camps in northern Syria tuning into the matches, the Middle East and Africa stood and cheered in unison behind the Atlas Lions and the beautiful game. Although their inspiring World Cup run is over, this special group of Moroccans has forever etched their names into history and changed the future of soccer and the region for the better.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

DECEMBER 10, 2022 | 2:18 PM WASHINGTON | 10:18 PM QATAR

Morocco’s triumphs signal a new world order in more than soccer

Soccer has proven to be much more than a simple sport. It is a powerful diplomatic tool, an avenue for national branding, and a potent apparatus for symbolic power in the Bourdieusian sense. When an underdog with a 0.01 percent chance to win the 2022 World Cup at the start of the tournament advances to the semifinals and eliminates football legends such as Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, it is undeniably added symbolic capital to the regional and international credit of the Atlas Lions.

With a stunning, intense victory over Portugal on Saturday, Morocco became the first Arab country and the first African country to make the World Cup semifinals. The kingdom’s wins were perceived as symbolic redemption for defeats and deceptions of MENA and African countries in modern times, as well as an act of metaphorical revenge against Western colonizers and imperialist legacies. African and Middle Eastern populations have been fervent supporters of this tournament’s dark horse, as they can identify with its tenacity and resilience vis-à-vis teams four times its market value (based on the transfer value of each team’s players).

Although the Moroccan team relies heavily on diaspora players, with fourteen out of twenty-six team members born abroad—mostly in European nations such as France, the Netherlands, or Spain—these double nationals chose to play under the colors of their country of origin. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a failure of European integration and assimilation of migrants from North African nations. These phenomenal footballers couldn’t identify with their host countries and continued to pay allegiance to the Arab Islamic kingdom where their families emigrated from.

Players who prostrate to pray after each win and wave the Palestinian flag, alcohol-free matches, and high-level competition in an Arab land are all peculiar and novel sights for global spectators. These symbolic elements could be signs of a changing world order where euro-centric value systems are no longer dominant, and a more diverse football culture is being established. Similarly, European teams such as Italy and Germany that were disqualified early could also be a symbolic reflection of their own countries’ post-pandemic woes. Could France be next?

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

DECEMBER 7, 2022 | 1:54 PM WASHINGTON | 9:54 PM QATAR

No politics… except Palestine

FIFA and Qatar have diligently worked to silence issues deemed too political, from rainbow flags and attire in support of LGBTQ rights to t-shirts commemorating the death of Mahsa Amini and demanding rights for Iranian women. Stadium security and police have forced fans to hand over their items or have taken fans away from the stadium areas. Those instances have circulated widely on social media and fan group chats. Too frequently, security has made an issue where one really did not exist, resulting in more attention, not less, on the fan advocate.

In contrast, support for Palestinians is prominent across the World Cup, with Palestinian flags and chants everywhere: matches, the souq, public transportation, and even social media platforms. In Morocco’s win over Spain, players and fans donned the flag for photos, and fans sang pro-Palestine songs. Fans from elsewhere in the world who are not well versed on the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict are learning; some fans are even now becoming converts to the Palestinian cause. Examples of fans donning the Palestinian flag are more and more common each day in malls, television interviews, and the many fan areas in and around Doha.

One lasting outcome of the World Cup could well be that fans who were disinterested in the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict are now at least interested and remain aware of happenings in the broader Levant. The world may also see more Palestinian flags at international matches moving forward as World Cup fans continue to commemorate their attendance in Qatar by raising the flag that they were gifted–and commentators would be forced to acknowledge the change in fan behavior.

—Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is attending the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 2:11 PM WASHINGTON | 10:11 PM QATAR

Where is the UAE?

Noticeably absent from the Gulf’s neighborhood block party is an Emirati presence. This unique tournament has Arab culture and societies on display—whether they qualified for the World Cup or not. Unlike the Qatari, Saudi, and Palestinian flags found everywhere, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) flag is noticeably missing from the fan zones and stadiums. Plus, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan only came to Doha on an official visit on December 5, well after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) initial visit to Qatar to take in the spectacle. And unlike MBS and his informal family visits with the Qatari royal family, the UAE leader’s visit was short and formal. Despite lingering trust issues between Qatar and the UAE in the post-blockade period, the lack of Emirati presence is somewhat surprising during the first-ever Middle East-hosted World Cup. Arguably, Abu Dhabi appears to be taking its relationship with Saudi for granted as MBS, on behalf of Riyadh, soaks up the love from Qatari leaders.

DECEMBER 6, 2022 | 1:55 PM WASHINGTON | 9:55 PM QATAR

In Rabat, unprecedented unity behind the Atlas Lions

You want drama? Heart-pounding, nerve-wracking drama? Join a sports bar full of Moroccan fans desperately cheering on their beloved underdog Atlas Lions in a scoreless draw against mighty Spain. And you want a heart attack? Have it go to penalty kicks. You want an explosion of joy? Morocco, three-nil.

A busy street in Rabat during Morocco’s World Cup match. And the hotel sports bar. pic.twitter.com/vX49AfVDZb
— Dan Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro) December 6, 2022

Here in Rabat, the work week might as well be over. Delirious Moroccans are pouring into the streets, honking, dancing, singing their hearts out.

The Moroccan squad played with the pluck, modesty, and unity that characterizes this nation. Morocco is a leader in Africa and the Arab world, but does not flaunt its weight. It is used to not being in the room with great powers. It looks after its own interests, is a good partner to those it chooses as its friends (the United States, and now Israel, among them), and rarely makes much of a fuss.

But it is also a society that feels deeply proud of its ancient history, cultural diversity, and the broad consensus in support of the royal leadership. A quiet, humble self-confidence expresses itself in cultural pride and legendary hospitality.

Tonight, Moroccans are more unified than ever. As the exhausted players tossed Bono, the hero goalkeeper, into the air, the happy din in the streets was already rising.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is the director of the N7 Initiative.

DECEMBER 5, 2022 | 9:22 AM WASHINGTON | 5:22 PM QATAR

Gulf neighbors get cozy

Saudis make up the third-largest group of ticket purchasers behind Qataris and Americans. After a shocking win against Argentina, the Saudis came out of their proverbial shell. They wore their flag proudly around their shoulders, bought up green scarves with their national symbol, and could be spotted at Saudi matches and even non-Saudi matches in their team’s jerseys. Saudis and Qataris could be seen partying at the Saudi House, a pavilion set up on the Corniche, or the main thoroughfare along the Doha waterfront. In short, it’s now “cool” to be Saudi at the World Cup.

With this newfound status, the Saudis have embraced the atmosphere and have actively engaged with fans from around the world. By fixing thobes and ghutrahs (robes and headscarves) of foreign fans embracing the local culture, joking in social media posts asking “Where’s Messi?!,” and simply striking up conversations with other fans, no matter where they are from, the Saudis are a key fixture in this World Cup. In many ways, they have made the tournament their own, playing host alongside the Qataris, to ensure fans from other parts of the world have fun and begin to see that Gulf Arabs are not as often portrayed in Western media according to stereotypical representations.

Along with the strong representation of Saudi fans, senior leaders from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia took part in the tournament’s opening ceremony and attended matches. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s seat next to FIFA President Gianni Infantino on the ceremony stage was no coincidence: It was a clear overture from the Qatari emir that it was time for the two countries to put the blockade, which was in effect from 2017 to 2021, behind them and start anew. Similarly, attendance at matches, and sharing of the royal box, by senior members of both Qatari and Saudi ruling families is a sign that the countries are looking forward.

At a more grassroots level, under a program established for the tournament, Qatari families are hosting fans, which has enabled them to reconnect with families, friends, and colleagues. Many Qataris are hosting multigenerational Saudi families, solidifying deep connections based on their time together and shared experiences attending matches. To ease congestion on roads and infrastructure during the World Cup, Qatar closed its schools, meaning that Qatari children are home and likely spending significant time with their guests—meaning the connections they build are likely to result in future communication and travel between the two countries.

DECEMBER 2, 2022 | 1:02 PM WASHINGTON | 9:02 PM QATAR

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

The Saudi Arabia versus Argentina match during the 2022 World Cup resulted in one of the biggest upsets in Argentina’s history, with the two-time champions experiencing its first defeat in thirty-six matches. The day of the November 22 match, Saudi ministries, government agencies, schools, and universities were directed to end working hours early so that people could watch the game. After Saudi Arabia’s victory, King Salman declared the next day a national holiday.

The Saudi victory brought euphoria not just to Saudis but also the entire region, with social media users from other Arab countries sharing videos of their reactions to the Saudi national team victory. As journalist Sarah Dadouch put it: “The Arab world in particular witnessed a rare moment of shared ecstasy.”

The outcome of the game was not a coincidence. As Saudi Sports Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Turki Al Faisal stated, the team had been preparing for that moment for three years. The ministry’s significant efforts to promote and support soccer reflects its overall direction and goals.

The sports sector is one of the vital pillars of Saudi Vision 2030 and the Ministry of Sport’s dedication is tangible in Saudi Arabia, where one can witness the enhanced facilities and increased citizen participation in sports. This change did not occur overnight, and it is partly the result of the widespread public support for sports and entertainment and a desire to compete at the international level.

—Lujain Alotaibi is a project coordinator at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. Follow her on Twitter: @LM_Otaibi.

MENASource

Dec 2, 2022

Saudi Arabia lost at the 2022 World Cup. But its sports sector is winning.

By Lujain Alotaibi

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

NOVEMBER 25, 2022 | 9:08 PM WASHINGTON | 5:08 AM QATAR

The ties that bind the US and England

The relationship between the United States and England is uniquely close; it’s appropriate, perhaps, that the two teams drew when they played in Qatar. The connections are very strong: Nine of the twenty-six-man US squad play in UK leagues, the same number that play in the United States (the remainder play in Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey). Some even play in the same club teams.

It goes deeper. US defenders Antonee Robinson and Cameron Carter-Vickers were born and raised in England. Midfielder Yunus Musah lived in England in his teenage years, went through Arsenal’s players’ academy, and even played for the English youth national team—before making the decision to play for the United States. “It was very difficult because, as I’ve said, I had such a great time in England. They did a lot for me in that country,” he said recently. The United States “obviously took one of ours, which we weren’t very happy about,” said England coach Gareth Southgate laconically earlier this week.

Friday’s draw means England has yet to beat the United States in the World Cup. They have played only three times at that level, and the United States won the first encounter in 1950, shocking the world’s oldest footballing nation; the second and now the third were draws.

—Andrew Marshall is the senior vice president of engagement at the Atlantic Council.

NOVEMBER 23, 2022 | 1:24 PM WASHINGTON | 9:24 PM QATAR

A World Cup for all Arabs, but…

By Sarah Zaaimi

Qatar and its leadership are aggressively branding the 2022 World Cup as an event for all Arab countries: The first event of the sport hosted by an Arab and Muslim-majority country, they claim. The rest of the Arab states, however, may feel differently about such a statement, given the contentious nature of pan-Arabist discourse in an undeniably racially, religiously, and linguistically hybrid region and Qatar’s interventionist records in many regional conflicts.

The ongoing World Cup actively included contributions and elements from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Moroccan artist RedOne produced the official music and designed the launching event; the official cup balls were created in Egypt; and Arabs from various countries are providing security for the event, sculpting the iconic globe trophy, or participating in the dozens of artistic performances on the agenda. Doha is also a hub for Arab expatriates who constitute a core component of Qatar’s workforce, operating primarily in the government, media, business, and hospitality industries. Despite their tremendous contributions, these migrants possess no pathway toward Qatari citizenship, according to the laws in place.

Beyond the buoyant façade reflected at the launching event, where Arab leaders from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan came together to celebrate the kick-off of the World Cup, many structural differences persist between the MENA brothers. It is essentialist and reductionist to label all countries with Arabic-speaking majorities or Arab cultural elements as “Arab.” The region is much more complex and has undergone serious revisionist identity quests since the pan-Arab ideology of the fifties and sixties. For example, countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, with significant Amazigh communities, find it insulting to be reduced to one component of their complex and multi-layered heritage. Other communities in the region must feel the same, like Kurds, Assyrians, Nubians, etc.

On the political front, Qatar, in its pursuit to widen its geostrategic reach and overcome its “small state syndrome” ended up upsetting many fellow MENA countries. The healing process from the schism with other Gulf Cooperation Countries hasn’t been completed yet, especially with the UAE. Qatar’s financial and ideological meddling in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is still fresh in the memories of the citizens of these countries. At the same time, Al-Jazeera and Qatari media continue to upset multiple MENA regimes and undermine the territorial integrity of certain sovereign states. A World Cup for all Arabs, yes, but…

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 12:03 PM WASHINGTON | 8:03 PM QATAR

Money talks. And Saudi Arabia’s World Cup squad was screaming today.

By Hezha Barzani

Saudi Arabia just defeated one of the World Cup favorites—Lionel Messi led Argentina, with the Saudis breaking the third-highest ranked FIFA team’s thirty-six game unbeaten streak. This game is already being regarded as one of the most shocking upsets in World Cup history, but it is also just one piece of an enormous economic and cultural focus placed recently on the sport by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Last year a Saudi Arabia-led consortium, led by the Saudi sovereign wealth fund (the Public Investment Fund), purchased Newcastle United for over £300 million (over $405 million). This purchase was significant from an economic standpoint, as Saudi Arabia joined Gulf neighbors Qatar (ownership ties with Paris-Saint Germain) and the United Arab Emirates (ownership ties with Manchester City) in the lucrative European soccer investment arena. This purchase also aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which includes revamping the nation’s tourism sector and branding the Kingdom as a “football loving nation.” In addition to the massive purchase of Newcastle United, it is clear that economically, Saudi Arabia has long-term commitments to the sport, with its sovereign wealth fund recently announcing more than two billion dollars in soccer sponsorship deals.

A large portion of these deals involves the development of Saudi Arabia’s domestic soccer clubs. From a cultural perspective, Saudi Arabia getting involved in European soccer will have a profound impact on the Saudi youth population and overall development of their soccer talent. With the Cup being played in neighboring Qatar, Saudi soccer academies are expecting an enrollment spike, while the government is simultaneously promoting more physical activity, showcasing how the Kingdom is laying plans for long-term international success.

With Saudi Arabia bidding to co-host the 2030 World Cup, it is making a strong play to become the capital of the soccer world in the Middle East. This decisive win against Argentina further cements its claim, but only time will tell if this victory was luck or the first sign of an emerging soccer powerhouse—thanks to the government’s economic and cultural investment.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 10:18 AM WASHINGTON | 6:18 PM QATAR

How China stands to win from Western attacks on Qatar

By Ahmed Aboudouh

Western media has launched a campaign to criticize World Cup host Qatar for its abhorrent record on LGBTQ+ rights and migrant labor, mainly of Asian origin. While justified, the campaign has been widely castigated as selective, hypocritical, and indicative of a double standard. China has found a chance to exploit this apparent Western grudge against the first Arab and Muslim country to host the World Cup. In addition to a Chinese construction company building Lusail Stadium, which will host the World Cup final, other firms supplied the tournament with everything “made in China”—from LED big screens, a solar power plant, and clean energy shuttle vehicles, to flags and throw pillows.

China knows how this feels. It has been chastened in the past while hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics with diplomatic boycotts and a similar media crusade for its “genocide” against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is no doubt that the reasoning behind such campaigns is entirely just. But going soft on hosts with even worse human rights records, as was the case with Russia in 2018, while scolding Qatar is mindboggling.

These kinds of media campaigns can be self-harming at best for two reasons. First, they signal that Western countries, especially Europeans, will seek to maintain hegemony over soccer by wielding prejudice. Second, they encourage China (and other rivals) to score geopolitical points by doubling down on smaller countries’ grievances toward those over-the-top media offensives and positioning China as a viable alternative and trusted leader of the Global South. Years of backbreaking diplomatic work to confront China’s soft power expansion in the Middle East is now at risk.

— Ahmed Aboudouh is a nonresident fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and a senior journalist covering world affairs at the Independent newspaper in London.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022 | 8:39 AM WASHINGTON | 4:39 PM QATAR

Watch for the Iran team’s small acts of defiance to continue

By Masoud Mostajabi

In the history of the World Cup, Iran has qualified a total of six times—five under the Islamic Republic. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranians across the globe have agreed on little. But when it has come to supporting Team Melli (“the nation’s team”), all have cheered—until now. At the 2018 Cup, Iran’s win over Morocco provoked celebration among the likes of exiles and diaspora communities, then Islamic Republic President Hassan Rouhani, and former heir apparent to the throne Reza Pahlavi—an outpouring stemming from a shared membership in a national family.

However, for the first time in memory, this year many Iranians have soured on the team, thanks in large part to Team Melli’s meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi before traveling to Qatar—which came amid the deadly crackdowns by Raisi’s security services against protesters. The team’s silent protest by refusing to sing the national anthem on Monday was widely seen as too little too late. Iranians expect more from a team they consider a representative of the people. In a country losing its youth, a loss or win in a tournament is meaningless. Unlike most fans enjoying the games, Iranians are in mourning.

However, these players are themselves part of this generation of youth, having grown up watching heroes such as Ali Daei and Ali Karimi, vocal supporters of today’s protests. Many of the players have commented in support of the protestors, changed their social media profile photo to black, or covered up the national emblem. It’s early in the tournament, so the world can watch for these small acts of defiance to continue—with Friday’s match against Wales the next major opportunity.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter @MMostajabi1.

NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 10:22 AM WASHINGTON | 6:55 PM QATAR

Why Iran’s subtle stance is being seen as “meaningless”

By Holly Dagres

Since antigovernment protests began in Iran on September 16 after Mahsa Jina Amini was murdered by so-called “morality police,” many Iranian athletes competing in international competitions have taken clear stances that show solidarity with the protesters. But one group of athletes that has disappointed Iranians is Team Melli, the Iranian men’s national soccer team. Except for heaving worn black jackets over their kits during a World Cup friendly with Senegal on September 27, Team Melli has not taken a notable stance.

However, what has caught the attention of many Iranians is that Team Melli met with hardline President Ebrahim Raisi last week and took celebratory photos of their World Cup entry. Photographs of both incidents have gone viral, and not for a good reason, as these events took place while protesters were being fatally beaten with batons or shot by security forces. As a result, many Iranians see Team Melli not as their team, but rather as the team of the Islamic Republic. This was best captured by a banner hanging over a bridge in Tehran that read “don’t let your foot slip on the blood,” referring to the blood of both protesters slain since September 16 and those being killed by security forces while the match between England and Iran took place. Right before the game began, Team Melli finally took a subtle stance by remaining silent during the Islamic Republic’s anthem. While their silence and stony faces may seem significant to an outsider, it’s a belated gesture that many Iranians interpret as meaningless given how little Team Melli has done to show solidarity with their international platform.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

NOVEMBER 20, 2022 | 4:15 PM WASHINGTON | NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | 12:15 AM QATAR

Focus on Qatar’s human-rights record is justified—but why have other hosts been left unscathed?

By Joze Pelayo

Despite the loud beats of FIFA anthem “Tukoh Taka,” World Cup watchers can still clearly hear the outrage against Qatar.

The significance of the first World Cup in the Arab world has been overshadowed by legitimate criticism about the country’s track record on minority rights and treatment of migrant workers. Serious abuses need to be addressed.

But Western coverage so far has been based on double standards and selective outrage; were the calls for a boycott of Russia’s World Cup in 2018 and the Beijing Olympics in 2022 this loud? The Biden administration had announced a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing event due to China’s ongoing genocide against Uyghurs. Russia used its 2018 World Cup, and also its 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, to sportswash and distract the world from Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea—a prelude to today’s invasion—and the Russian leader’s increasingly imperialistic ambitions. Where was the outrage from European critics then?

Qatar is the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to host the World Cup—so one wonders whether that is the variable that makes Qatar the target of critical countries. Or, will countries critical of Qatar this year similarly scrutinize the 2026 host countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico—regarding migrants’ rights?

Qatar’s mistreatment of predominantly South Asian workers is deplorable, and criticism is justified. But the selective outrage shown mainly from some countries in Europe is also borderline arrogant and racist.

On a brighter note, the United States’ Nicki Minaj, Colombia’s Maluma, and Lebanon’s Myriam Fares are bringing the Arab-Latin relationship and a shared passion for soccer to a new level with “Tukoh Taka,” which features English, Spanish, and Arabic lyrics. The song briefly reached number one in iTunes in the United States, making it the highest-charting FIFA World Cup song ever—and Fares the first Arab artist to reach such a spot in the United States.

—Joze Pelayo is an assistant director at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative/Middle East Programs.

The post Offside: Watch the World Cup alongside the Atlantic Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kherson euphoria highlights the folly of a premature peace with Putin

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:26:51 +0000

Last week’s liberation of Kherson produced some of the most iconic scenes since the beginning of the Russian invasion. The arrival of Ukrainian troops in the city sparked wild celebrations from a civilian population brutalized by eight months of Russian occupation. “This is what liberation looks like. This is what liberation feels like,” commented CNN’s Nic Robertson in one of many memorable reports from the city. Sky News correspondent Alex Rossi described the atmosphere as “euphoric” as he was mobbed by joyous locals cheering Russia’s retreat.

Despite harsh conditions and a lack of basic amenities in Kherson, the party began almost as soon as news of the Russian military withdrawal was confirmed. Speaking to AFP, one Kherson resident summed up the mood in the liberated city. “We have no electricity, no water, no heating, no mobile or internet connection. But we have no Russians! I am extremely happy. We can survive anything but we are free.”

This footage should be compulsory viewing for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Putin’s Russia. Despite overwhelming evidence of the Kremlin’s genocidal agenda in Ukraine, opinion pieces continue to appear with depressing regularity in the international media arguing that the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to pressure the country into peace talks.

The authors of such articles typically acknowledge Russia’s criminality before emphasizing the alleged inevitability of compromise. The wave of emotion that swept Kherson following the city’s liberation is a timely reminder for advocates of appeasement that compromising with the Kremlin actually means condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of Russian occupation.

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At this point, it is no longer possible for any honest observer to deny knowledge of Russian war crimes in occupied Ukraine. In every single liberated region of the country, Ukrainian forces have encountered the same grim revelations of mass graves and torture chambers along with accounts of abductions, executions, sexual violence, and forced deportations involving millions of victims.

Meanwhile, the methodical Russian bombardment of cities such as Mariupol is believed to have killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. Attempts to document these atrocities are still at an early stage, but United Nations inspectors have already confirmed that Russia has committed war crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russian occupation forces have also made no secret of their desire to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Wherever the Kremlin has established control, the Ukrainian language has been suppressed and the Ukrainian currency phased out. Access to Ukrainian media has been blocked. Teachers have been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren. At the same time, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have explicitly declared their intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and proclaimed their genocidal denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. This is the ghoulish reality that so-called foreign policy realists believe Ukraine must be made to accept.

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Russia currently occupies around 20% of Ukraine. Any peace agreement reached in the near future would inevitably involve ceding some or all of this territory to Moscow for an indefinite period. Millions of Ukrainians would then face a desperate future. Many would make the agonizing choice to flee their homes for free Ukraine, leaving behind their former lives and worldly possessions. Those who remained would be forced to adopt a Russian imperial identity or risk savage repression if they continued to resist.

Despite the risks involved, resistance would likely continue. The outpouring of emotion in liberated Kherson highlighted the strength of Ukrainian national feeling in occupied areas of the country and made a mockery of the idea that Moscow enjoys the support of the local population. Just weeks before Putin’s troops retreated from Kherson, the Kremlin claimed 87% of residents had voted in favor of joining Russia. The widespread public jubilation that greeted Russia’s withdrawal vividly illustrated the absurdity of that figure.

Nor is it clear exactly what everyone is so afraid of. Ukraine has already shattered the myth of Russia’s military invincibility and has successfully liberated more than half the territory occupied since the invasion began nearly nine months ago. Putin’s once vaunted army is demoralized and decimated, while the Russian dictator himself is an international pariah. His energy weapon has been partially disarmed and he has recently been forced to distance himself from earlier attempts at nuclear blackmail following rebukes from China and stern warnings from the United States. It makes no strategic sense whatsoever to offer Putin a face-saving peace deal at this point.

For now, there is little public indication that Western leaders are listening to calls for a return to negotiations. Instead, they remain insistent that any decision to resume diplomatic efforts can only be made by Ukraine. However, as the war drags on and the economic costs for Ukraine’s partners continue to mount, the voices currently pushing for Ukrainian concessions will grow louder.

As the war enters a potentially decisive period, it is vital to keep in mind that any compromise would come with crippling costs. For Ukraine, it would mean betraying and abandoning millions of citizens. For Western leaders, it would mean empowering Putin while sacrificing the foundational values of the democratic world. The problems posed by an aggressive and revisionist Russia would be unresolved, but the West’s position would be significantly weaker.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. Their country has been devastated by Russia’s invasion and their population left deeply traumatized. Thousands have been killed and millions have been forced to flee. Nevertheless, Ukrainians also understand that Putin must be defeated before peace can return to Europe. All they ask for is the continued support of their international partners. One way to demonstrate this support is by ending unhelpful appeals for a premature peace.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Although there were no legal grounds for the removal of Catherine, her continued presence often sparked political conflicts within Odesa society and on the national stage. This tension reflected growing demands to reassess the nature of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia as a new generation of Ukrainians increasingly questioned the imperial dogmas established by centuries of Czarist and Soviet official histories.

Many also objected specifically to Catherine and pointed to her personal role as a key figure in the subjugation of Ukraine. While the Russian empress is known internationally as Catherine the Great, significant numbers of Ukrainians object to this title and regard her instead as a notorious tyrant. They note that Catherine extinguished the broad autonomy of the Ukrainian Cossacks and oversaw the aggressive colonization of Ukraine.

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Catherine’s eighteenth century reign is closely associated with the imperial myths that now serve as historical justification for Vladimir Putin’s campaign to reconquer Ukraine and destroy Ukrainian statehood. Under Catherine, Russian imperial power expanded into southern Ukraine and Crimea, with the Czarist authorities posing as pioneers and founders of towns and cities such as Odesa that in reality had already existed in one form or another for centuries.

It was during this period that Catherine’s favorite, Grigory Potemkin, is said to have erected the infamous “Potemkin Villages” along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in order to create the false impression of a prosperous and happy colony for the visiting empress. Some historians now believe the legend of the Potemkin Villages may itself be a fabrication, but critics of Catherine nevertheless see it as fitting that her oppressive conquest of Ukraine is associated with one of history’s most notorious political deceptions. To them, she is anything but “great.”

Despite this challenging legacy, Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument was broadly popular among residents of the Black Sea port city until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. This popularity was not based on support for her actions against Ukrainian statehood or Cossack autonomy; instead, Catherine served as a symbol of the imperial identity that many in Odesa embraced following the Soviet collapse. She embodied the sense of pride Odesites felt over the prominent place occupied by their hometown in Russian imperial history.

Attitudes have changed dramatically since February 24. The shock and trauma of Russia’s invasion has convinced many Odesites to abandon their previous enthusiasm for the city’s Russian imperial heritage and has sparked a surge in public demands for the removal of Catherine.

It is not hard to see why. From the early days of the invasion, it has been clear that Odesa is one of the Russian army’s primary objectives. The city’s port has been blockaded by the Russian Black Sea fleet, with the nearby coastline fortified in anticipation of a possible Russian amphibious landing. Inside the city itself, Odesites have grown used to the daily terror of missile airstrikes and kamikaze drone attacks.

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For Putin, Odesa has enormous strategic and symbolic importance. Capturing the port city would allow him to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea altogether and strangle the Ukrainian economy. Most analysts agree that without Odesa, Ukraine would no longer be economically viable as an independent state. The city could also serve as an excellent launch pad for the Russian occupation of Moldova.

Odesa’s place in the Russian imagination also makes it a particularly valuable prize. Many of Putin’s compatriots view Odesa as a sacred Russian city and bitterly resent its present status as the southern capital of independent Ukraine. They regard Odesa as even more deeply entwined in Russian national identity than Crimea or Kyiv and sincerely believe the city’s return to Kremlin rule would help correct the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Crucially, Putin has harked back to Catherine the Great in his attempts to provide historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine and the capture of Odesa. Likewise, Kremlin officials and regime proxies have actively revived the term “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”), which was coined during Catherine’s reign to refer to her imperial possessions in southern Ukraine. In areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces, Catherine’s legacy has been used to legitimize the Kremlin’s claims. This is part of a conscious attempt to change the optics of the invasion and portray Russia as liberator rather than an aggressor.

Unfortunately for Putin, Odesites have shown little interest in being liberated by him or his soldiers. On the contrary, they have rallied to the defense of their city and have loudly condemned the Russian invasion. One of the many ways in which Odesites have expressed their opposition to Russia’s imperial aggression is by demanding the removal of the city’s Catherine the Great monument.

The Odesa authorities were initially hesitant to bow to public pressure, with Odesa City Council refusing in September to support a proposal to dismantle the Catherine monument. However, following an online public vote, Odesa Mayor Hennadiy Truhanov announced on November 5 that he would now back calls for the removal of the statue. On day later, the monument was fenced in and a notice from the municipal authorities appeared announcing that it would soon be dismantled.

Skeptics caution that the saga of Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument may still be far from over and warn that recent steps could simply be a stalling tactic to ease tensions and prevent further embarrassing acts of vandalism. However, the symbolism of Odesa’s boarded up Russian empress is already undeniable and reflects the city’s decisive turn away from the imperial myth-making that Putin has tried so hard to exploit.

The Kremlin has sought to win Odesites over with a highly sanitized and largely mythical version of history, but Moscow’s appeals to imperial nostalgia have clearly fallen flat. While Putin’s Russia remains trapped in the past, today’s Ukraine is building its identity around a compelling vision of the country’s future as an increasingly self-confident European democracy. This has proved far more persuasive to Odesites than the authoritarianism, isolation, and endless aggression offered by the Putin regime.

For decades, Odesa was arguably Ukraine’s most Russophile city. However, the current invasion has made Russia so toxic that even formerly sympathetic Odesites no longer want anything to do with Moscow’s imperial agenda. Putin claims to be waging war in order to return “historic Russian lands,” but in reality he has only succeeded in convincing Ukrainians that there is no place for Russia in their country’s future, and no place for Russian Empress Catherine the Great in a free Odesa.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Arestovych is not wrong. Ukraine has been waging a methodical and highly effective counter-offensive in the region around Kherson since the summer months. This campaign has featured incremental gains along a broad front alongside precision airstrikes on bridges to cut the Russian army off from resupply. These tactics appear to have worn down Putin’s troops and paved the way for today’s painful decision to withdraw.

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If confirmed, Russia’s retreat from Kherson will be a hugely significant development that could serve as a turning point for the entire war. In terms of military strategy, the loss of Kherson leaves Moscow with little chance of achieving its stated goal of occupying key port city Odesa and seizing Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coastline. Instead, Putin’s invading army will find itself confined to the eastern half of Ukraine up to the Dnipro River.

While Russia’s withdrawal will have a significant military impact, the loss of Kherson will resonate far beyond any immediate strategic implications. Kherson is the only regional capital captured by Russia since Putin launched his invasion almost nine months ago. The Kremlin has gone to great lengths to strengthen its grip on the city and surrounding region, ruthlessly crushing any potential opposition while imposing policies of russification and eradicating symbols of Ukrainian identity.

Kherson was one of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions to be illegally annexed by Russia on September 30 as Moscow sought to raise the political stakes of its invasion following a series of battlefield setbacks. The annexation ceremony took place amid much pageantry in the Kremlin’s imposing St. George’s Hall, with Putin himself delivering a fiery anti-Western speech before declaring the four regions to be irreversibly part of the Russian Federation. He now faces the embarrassing task of explaining why “forever” turned out to be less than six weeks.

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Unsurprisingly, Putin does not appear in any hurry to accept the blame for the loss of Kherson. Instead, he was conspicuously absent from the carefully choreographed TV event announcing the Russian army’s withdrawal. This is very much in keeping with Putin’s traditional aversion to bad news, which also saw him pass on responsibility for unpopular Covid-related decisions to local officials and regional governors.

Given the gravity of the situation facing the Russian army in Ukraine, even Putin’s much-vaunted propaganda machine may now struggle to shield him from criticism. The retreat from Kherson is the latest in a long line of defeats that have done much to shatter Russia’s reputation as a military superpower and raise questions about Putin’s leadership.

During the first weeks of the invasion, Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv and was forced to withdraw from northern Ukraine. After months of minimal progress in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin then suffered another crushing blow when a lightning Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in liberating most of the Kharkiv region in a matter of days. With morale now likely to plummet further, his invasion is in danger of unraveling completely.

The loss of Kherson will spark a fresh round of recriminations inside Russia as supporters of the invasion and regime officials search for guilty parties to blame for the debacle. The mood among regime loyalists and hardliners is already dark. Former Kremlin advisor Sergei Markov branded the decision to leave Kherson, “Russia’s biggest geopolitical defeat since the collapse of the USSR.” Meanwhile, influential pro-war Telegram account War Gonzo, which has over 1.3 million mostly Russian subscribers, described the announced withdrawal as, “a black page in the history of the Russian army. Of the Russian state. A tragic page.”

Putin will now be hoping his beleaguered troops are able to dig in and defend a new front line along the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. He desperately needs to secure some breathing space in order to train and equip recently mobilized troops, but Ukraine appears in no mood to accept increasingly urgent Russian proposals for a fresh round of negotiations. Instead, Kyiv will seek to press home its obvious advantage.

The liberation of Kherson will provide the whole Ukrainian nation with a welcome morale boost and will also energize the international coalition of countries supporting the fight back against Russia’s invasion. Ukraine has held the military initiative in the war since July and has now once again demonstrated that it is more than capable of defeating Russia on the battlefield. Victory in Kherson will be seen as further proof that Ukraine can deal a decisive blow to Putin’s imperial ambitions if provided with the tools to do so.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

According to Reuters, Ukraine informed Russia during the first days of the invasion that it was ready to meet Moscow’s demands and rule out the possibility of future NATO membership, only for this offer to be rejected by Putin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy went public in the following weeks with similar proposals to abandon Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, but Russia chose to continue its invasion.

The entire notion that Russia views NATO as a credible security threat was further undermined in summer 2022 when Moscow passively accepted neighboring Finland’s historic decision to join the military alliance. Putin has repeatedly cited Ukraine’s deepening NATO ties as justification for his invasion, but the prospect of imminent Finnish membership provoked no meaningful security response whatsoever from the Kremlin.

If Putin genuinely believed a NATO invasion of Russia was even a remote possibility, he would surely have reinforced the Finnish border. On the contrary, in the months following Helsinki’s decision to join the alliance, Russia dramatically reduced its military presence close to Finland and the nearby NATO member Baltic states in order to bolster the invasion of Ukraine. Whatever Putin may say in public, he clearly understands that NATO poses no threat to Russia.

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Russian myth-making about “Ukrainian Nazis” is even older than complaints over NATO expansion and dates all the way back to Soviet World War II propaganda. For decades, Moscow has exaggerated wartime cooperation between Ukrainian nationalist groups and the Third Reich while conveniently ignoring the far more consequential Nazi-Soviet Pact. By conflating Ukraine’s centuries-old liberation movement with Nazism, generations of Kremlin leaders have sought to render Ukrainian national identity toxic in the eyes of domestic and international audiences alike.

Putin’s enthusiasm for the “Nazi Ukraine” trope is very much in line with his broader efforts to place the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of modern Russian identity. Over the past two decades, Putin has turned traditional Russian reverence for the generation who defeated Hitler into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own feast days, holy relics, and doctrinal dogmas. This has enabled him to whitewash the crimes of the Soviet era while attacking contemporary adversaries as the spiritual successors to the Nazis. In Putin’s Russia, accusations of Nazism are a routine feature of the public discourse and have been leveled against a dizzying array of individuals, organizations, and entire countries, but Ukraine remains by far the most popular target.

The effectiveness of these tactics has always depended heavily on outside ignorance of Ukraine and Russia-centric reporting by Moscow-based international correspondents. Unfortunately for Putin, his invasion has shone an unprecedented media spotlight on Ukraine that has done much to debunk the whole “Nazi Ukraine” narrative.

This was long overdue. Throughout the past 31 years of Ukrainian independence, the far-right has never come close to achieving power in Ukraine and remains significantly less influential than in many other European countries. While far-right candidate Marine Le Pen received 41.45% in France’s 2022 presidential election, the Ukrainian far-right typically struggles to secure low single digit support at the ballot box. During Ukraine’s last presidential election in 2019, the leading nationalist candidate garnered 1.6% of the vote. Months later in the country’s most recent parliamentary election, many of Ukraine’s far-right parties joined forces in a bid to improve their fortunes. This united nationalist platform failed miserably, winning a mere 2.15% of votes.

Nothing highlights the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” allegations better than the rise of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian President is both Jewish and a native Russian speaker. According to the Kremlin, this should make him deeply unappealing to Ukrainian voters. On the contrary, Zelenskyy was elected president by a record margin and subsequently secured a unique parliamentary majority for his newly formed political party. This success was all the more remarkable as it was achieved during wartime elections held amid an atmosphere of heightened patriotic fervor.

Since the start of the invasion, Russia’s failing efforts to portray Ukraine as a Nazi state have forced Moscow into ever more implausible mental gymnastics. Unable to produce any actual Ukrainian Nazis, regime officials and propaganda proxies have attempted to argue that the very idea of an independent Ukraine is in itself a Nazi concept, while also acknowledging that Putin’s stated war aim of “de-Nazification” in practice means the “de-Ukrainization” of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s confusion was perhaps most immediately evident in the bizarre and disgraceful anti-Semitic comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a May appearance on Italian TV program Zona Bianca. When asked to address the obvious contradictions between Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” claims and the fact that Ukraine has a Jewish president, Lavrov responded by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.” His statement sparked a wave of global condemnation, with Putin eventually forced to intervene and offer a personal apology to Israeli leaders.

This embarrassing incident illustrated the remarkable recent degradation of Russian diplomacy, which has now reached the point where it is often indistinguishable from internet conspiracy theories. Forced by Putin’s invasion to defend the indefensible, Russia’s top diplomats have retreated into an alternative reality world of blanket denials and dark fantasies. While Lavrov rants about “Jewish Hitler,” Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya stuns his colleagues with fantastic tales of genetically engineered Ukrainian mosquitoes. No wonder exasperated British Ambassador Barbara Woodward recently felt moved to ask, “How much more of this nonsense do we have to endure?”

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The awkward absence of Ukrainian Nazis and Russia’s non-response to Finland’s NATO membership bid have left Putin in desperate need of new narratives to explain his ongoing invasion. Disinformation researchers have recently noted a spike in Russian references to Ukraine as a “terrorist state” amid apparent efforts to position the war as a counter-terrorism operation. This has included a high-level campaign led by Putin himself and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who have both groundlessly accused Ukraine of plotting an act of nuclear terrorism involving a dirty bomb.

While the idea of Ukraine nuking itself may seem far-fetched even by Russian standards, this is by no means the Kremlin’s most audacious excuse. Since late September, senior regime officials have gone even further and have been actively seeking to rebrand the invasion of Ukraine as a holy war against Satanism. Putin set the tone by calling his opponents “Satanic” during a landmark address marking the official annexation of four Ukrainian regions.

Others have enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. In October, the deputy secretary of Russia’s influential National Security Council, Alexei Pavlov, declared that it was becoming “more and more urgent to carry out the de-Satanization of Ukraine.” This call was echoed by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who stated in a November 4 post marking Russia’s National Unity Day that the goal of the Ukraine invasion was “to stop the supreme ruler of Hell, whatever name he uses: Satan, Lucifer, or Iblis.” Key propagandists including Vladimir Solovyov have also endorsed the idea that Russia is at war with Satanism.

Behind Moscow’s increasingly outlandish attempts to justify the invasion stands a deeply unpalatable truth. Far from being a reaction to Western encroachment or Ukrainian extremism, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is the product of an unapologetically imperialistic mindset that he shares with millions of Russians who refuse to accept the verdict of 1991.

Putin’s entire reign has been shaped by his burning resentment at the perceived injustice of the Soviet collapse, which he regards as the “disintegration of historic Russia.” This has fueled his obsession with Ukraine, which for centuries occupied a key position at the very center of Russian imperial identity. Putin sees the existence of an independent Ukraine as a symbol of the unjust post-Soviet settlement and regards the country’s embrace of European democracy as an existential threat to Russia. He has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while arguing that modern Ukraine has been artificially separated from Russia. On the eve of the invasion, he called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The Russian dictator’s most revealing remarks came in summer 2022, when he directly compared his invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. Putin sought to qualify this claim by insisting he was merely “returning historically Russian lands,” but the actions of his invading army bear all the hallmarks of a brutal colonial conquest. Russian troops have reduced entire cities to rubble and killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, the Russian military has engaged in mass executions and forced deportations. Meanwhile, all symbols of Ukrainian national identity have been ruthlessly erased.

This is the grim reality that all advocates of appeasement and proponents of a negotiated peace must address. Nobody wants to end the current war more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that there is no room for compromise between genocide and survival. Russia has gone to great lengths to disguise the true nature of its imperial war in Ukraine, but Ukrainians are not fooled. They understand perfectly well that unless Russia is decisively defeated, Ukraine will cease to exist.

Instead of listening to Moscow’s fake grievances and fairytales about devil-worshiping phantom fascists, the international community must make clear to the Kremlin that Russian imperialism has no place in the modern world. The increasingly absurd nature of Putin’s excuses is an indication of his mounting desperation, but he has yet to abandon the colonial conquest of Ukraine. Unless he is forced to do so, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial ambitions will remain a threat to world peace.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Opinion polls indicate that most Ukrainians share this sentiment and understand victory to mean the return of all occupied territories. In a June 2022 survey conducted by IRI, two-thirds of Ukrainians supported the liberation of eastern and southern Ukraine including Crimea. These poll results identified only minor regional differences ranging from 64% in the west and 67% in the south to 59% in the east. Meanwhile, just 5% of Ukrainians would be prepared to recognize Crimea as Russia and 2% would accept Moscow’s attempts to annex eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Ukraine’s complete liberation remains an ambitious goal but it is no longer confined to the realms of fantasy. Following a string of stunning counteroffensive advances in September and October, many now believe Ukraine could push Russia back to the front lines of February 24 by the end of this year and return the rest of the country to Ukrainian control by the middle of 2023.

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Vladimir Putin would be highly unlikely to survive the humiliation of a decisive Ukrainian victory. While it is impossible to predict exactly how his reign might end, it is equally hard to imagine the strongman Russian ruler surviving such a disastrous defeat. This is particularly true as the war is widely perceived within Russia as Putin’s personal project.

We can already say with some confidence that if Putin is ousted, his successor will not be a democrat. Modern Russia has no credible national democratic movement and lacks the pluralistic political traditions that made it possible for democracy to take root in post-Soviet Ukraine and the Baltic states. Given the political climate in Russia, any successor would almost certainly be a nationalist figure from within the ranks of the current elite. However, he (and yes, it would inevitably be a “he”) would probably be more pragmatic and therefore less prone to ranting about Ukraine.

In order to escape war guilt and bring sanctions to an end, he would seek to blame everything on Putin. This could help secure breathing space to repair Russia’s battered economy and armed forces. It would also give Ukraine some time to embark on a massive post-war reconstruction drive. At the same time, numerous major obstacles to a sustainable peace settlement would remain.

One of the most immediate challenges of the post-war period will be the quest for justice. In practice, this will mean attempting to charge the leaders of a nuclear power with war crimes. No successor regime will hand over Putin or any other senior Russian officials to an international tribunal, so it is reasonable to assume that war crimes prosecutions would have to take place in absentia. Nevertheless, it is vital for those guilty of war crimes to be held publicly accountable. Defendants should include a wide range of Russian politicians and military commanders along with the many regime propagandists who have provided the ideological foundations for Putin’s genocidal invasion.

Another urgent question will be how to make Russia pay for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. The obvious answer is to use the frozen Russian assets currently held by various Western nations. Work is already underway to create a legal framework for the reallocation of these frozen Russian assets, but this process could take years and will be fiercely contested by the Kremlin.

War crimes prosecutions and reparations can help undermine the sense of impunity within Russian society that helped make the current invasion possible. While most available evidence confirms overwhelming Russian public support for the war in Ukraine, Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, has found that a clear majority of Russians do not believe they are morally responsible for the deaths of Ukrainian civilians or the widespread destruction taking place in Ukraine.

Such attitudes are hardly surprising in an authoritarian society where nobody has ever been held accountable for the horrors of the Soviet era. Nevertheless, it is in everybody’s interests to end this cycle of impunity and encourage Russians to confront the crimes being committed in their name.

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Whatever form Ukrainian victory takes, it will not mark the end of the historic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Today’s war is part of a grim saga stretching back centuries that is rooted in Russia’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist.

Putin himself has frequently claimed that modern Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”) and has accused Ukraine of being an artificial “anti-Russia” that poses an existential threat to Russian statehood and cannot therefore be tolerated. This genocidal logic is widely embraced in today’s Russia and will not disappear overnight. In reality, it may take decades before a majority of Russians are finally able to accept that Ukraine is a separate and fully independent nation.

Any leader of a post-Putin Russia would almost certainly continue to regard Ukraine as a threat. While they may not necessarily share Putin’s highly emotional obsession with the country, they would likely view Ukraine’s consolidation as a European democracy as a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia. In order to prevent this nightmare scenario, they would seek to undermine Ukraine’s economic recovery and derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In public at least, Russia’s new leaders could be expected to declare their commitment to peaceful coexistence with Ukraine. However, such politically convenient rhetoric would not stop them from continuing to wage a hybrid war against the country. This could include everything from cyber warfare and terrorist attacks to political assassinations, disinformation operations, infrastructure sabotage, and the funding of pro-Russian networks throughout Ukraine. It would only be a matter of time before Ukraine faced a renewed Russian military threat.

In order to prevent another Russian invasion, Ukraine must transform itself and become a European Israel. Ukraine’s defense spending was already in the region of 4-5% of GDP prior to the onset of the current full-scale invasion. This must remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Likewise, the international security support that Ukraine has received since February must continue beyond the end of the current hostilities. It is vital that the Ukrainian military maintain its technological and organizational edge over the Soviet-style Russian army. Ultimately, this is the only security guarantee that matters.

Ukraine’s leaders appear increasingly confident of victory but they are also under no illusions regarding the future of relations with Russia, regardless of who sits in the Kremlin. “Knowing what I know first-hand about the Russians, our victory will not be final,” Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny told TIME magazine in September. “Our victory will be an opportunity to take a breath and prepare for the next war.”

The current war is merely the latest chapter in Europe’s longest independence struggle. This struggle will only end when Russia finally accepts that Ukraine is a sovereign country and Ukrainians are not Russians.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Of course, the results of the upcoming Congress cannot be determined with metaphysical certitude. The world will have to wait for the latest big reveal, like always, to see if Xi still rules the roost. Perhaps more importantly, the global community will find out who else will sit on the all-powerful Standing Committee of the party’s Politburo with him,¹ to gauge how much control he will command in coming years. However, barring unforeseen circumstances, world leaders should expect to see Xi at global forums for at least five more years.

The implications of Xi’s continued grip on power are tremendous for both China and the world. The decisions he makes in Beijing will reverberate well beyond China’s borders to influence the global economy, the development of technology, international governance, and war and peace. At this stage in China’s political cycle, the world would usually ask: Who will rule China? This year, the important question is: What will Xi do with his power?

Return of one-man rule

To appreciate the importance of the twentieth Congress, it is critical to understand how dramatically Xi has altered the way China is governed. Beginning in the 1980s, the Communist Party fostered a system of collective leadership, in which power was shared within the party and between the party and state apparatus. This system was developed to include regular, peaceful transitions of power from one leadership team to another at congresses held every five years. Top leaders stayed in their official posts for no more than ten years. The system was a reaction against the turmoil of the first three decades of the People’s Republic. Mao ruled as more than a dictator—he was practically a Communist demigod; his every word was gospel. However, allowing one person to wield such immense power proved catastrophic for China. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958-61), an ideologically motivated attempt to catapult a poverty-stricken China into the ranks of the rich by mass movements, left some 30 million Chinese dead from famine. He followed that up in 1966 with the Cultural Revolution, a campaign to uproot the stubborn vestiges of an old, corrupt China (and solidify Mao’s own political position), which resulted in a decade of widespread violence and economic paralysis. By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, China was exhausted, desperately poor, and dangerously isolated.

The reformers who eventually succeeded Mao, led by Deng Xiaoping (a victim of the Cultural Revolution himself), reacted against the trauma of one-man rule. “It is not good to have an over-concentration of power,” Deng said in a 1980 speech on this subject. “It hinders the practice of socialist democracy and of the Party’s democratic centralism, impedes the progress of socialist construction, and prevents us from taking full advantage of collective wisdom.”²

The Communist Party still dominated—that was the unfortunate lesson of the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989—but within the party and state, space opened for greater debate on policy. That allowed for a wider range of expertise to influence the policy process and earned the Chinese state a reputation as a “technocracy”—a finely tuned, generally pragmatic, and usually predictable policymaking machine. It is impossible to separate China’s tremendous economic success from the emergence of this collective governance system.

Xi has thoroughly altered this system. He has sidelined other major figures in the governing order and claimed their power for himself. For instance, in the past, the premier, the number two position in the ruling hierarchy, took responsibility for economic matters. The current person in that post, Li Keqiang, was widely expected to take on this role when Xi’s leadership team first took control in 2012. However, under Xi, Li has become a marginal figure. Xi has grasped control over the policymaking process across all sectors by dominating high-level commissions of top leaders on various areas of policy and by promoting allies and loyalists into key positions throughout the party and state apparatus.³

Xi’s grip on policy has been further enhanced by the relentless promotion of his personality cult. Xi is presented to the Chinese people (and from there, the world) as a brilliant theoretician who possesses the wisdom to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and resolve the most complex problems facing the international community. Xi’s ideas, encapsulated in Xi Jinping Thought, echo Mao’s Little Red Book in the way they have become the source of extensive study and fawning reverence. Xi’s mere utterance can send officials and bureaucrats scampering to decipher and implement his wishes.

To a great degree, what Xi wants, Xi gets. As a result, Chinese policymaking has become increasingly dependent on the decisions and desires of a single individual. That has already rendered the direction of Chinese policy less predictable.

Anticipating the course of Chinese policy has thus become a matter of identifying Xi’s priorities—whether national, ideological, or personal. In a sense, the current system of Chinese governance is exactly what Deng and his fellow reformers intended to avoid. China and its vast population have again been set adrift on the whims of a single individual.

The future of zero-COVID

Attempting to read Xi’s mind is a dangerous (and thankless) task. Yet any attempt to assess the direction of Xi’s China must give it a whirl. Fortunately, after a decade in charge, Xi has left a lengthy record of speeches, initiatives, and actions that offer a foundation from which to peer into the future of Xi’s agenda. Of course, as with the stock market, past performance cannot determine what might come with certainty. Xi could break with his own precedents and shift course in the face of new challenges and circumstances, or he could come under enough pressure internally or externally to compel him to revise his agenda. At the same time, he has expressed a slate of ideas and beliefs that can help the beleaguered China watcher more comfortably envision the course upon which he could take the country. The fact that Xi is more ideologue than pragmatist also makes it somewhat safer to assume his past practice will continue into the future.

Still, there remains some expectation (or hope) both within China and elsewhere that Xi will change aspects of his policies once he secures his coveted third term. This thinking holds that Xi will have greater flexibility in policy choices once his own authority is locked on track. This possibility is discussed most often in relation to Xi’s most prominent program: zero-COVID.

Xi’s insistence that his government keep COVID cases at or near zero has prevented a major pandemic on the scale suffered in most other countries. However, the continuation of the zero-COVID policy nearly three years since the epidemic’s initial outbreak in Wuhan has suppressed economic growth, badly damaged small businesses, and fomented widespread public frustration. Speculation has persisted for some time that Xi might be willing to ease the strict pandemic controls—which include recurring lockdowns of major cities, long quarantines for travelers, and repetitive testing—after the upcoming Congress. That expectation is based on the assumption that Xi has insisted on maintaining zero-COVID for personal political motivations. After having touted zero-COVID as a great success both at home and abroad, Xi became “boxed in” by a political narrative that ties him intimately with the approach.⁴ This has made it difficult for him to change course from a political perspective, especially ahead of the Congress. A major outbreak before Xi’s anointment would simply be too embarrassing for him to risk. With the Congress behind him, the argument goes, Xi will be freed to adjust or even lift zero-COVID to address pressing economic concerns.

Yet there are equally good reasons to suspect zero-COVID is here to stay, at least in some form. Five years ago, there was similar chatter that Xi would return to liberal economic reform once he claimed his second term. Instead, he moved further from that path. Xi may calculate that that political narrative in which he defeated the virus where other, mere mortal leaders failed will continue to be too useful to his stature to lift zero-COVID, even after the Congress. He also seems to believe that abandoning the policy would have negative political consequences for the Communist Party more broadly, A late July 2022 Politburo meeting concluded the policy needed to be addressed within a political perspective. After all, the party markets itself to the Chinese public as infallible; ditching zero-Covid could appear an unacceptable admission it has erred.

There is also a possibility that Xi is committed to zero-Covid because he believes it is best for China, or his vision of what China should be. The assumption underlying much of the debate about zero-COVID is that the leadership wants to find an off-ramp but has not managed to do so. There are some members of the political and business elite who would support a loosening of the COVID strictures. However, Xi has continually reiterated that zero-COVID is the best policy for China, even as its economic and social costs mount, and the approach appears to present possible political downside as well. The two-month lockdown of Shanghai earlier this year provides a telling example. Despite these problems, Xi has shown a consistent tendency to tighten the state’s grip over society to advance his ideological agenda of a refashioned China and to solidify his personal grip on party and state. Zero-COVID has been and can continue to be a convenient tool to achieve his goals. For instance, while business leaders may be troubled by the growing isolation of China due to restrictions on travel and quarantines for travelers, Xi may see these measures as a way to limit foreign influence—a physical cordon on dangerous outside ideas and information to match the digital Great Firewall. Note that Beijing reduced the quarantine period for incoming travelers in June but has not eased restrictions on Chinese nationals’ outbound travel, introduced in May. Furthermore, Xi may find the enhanced monitoring of the populace and empowerment of local, community-level officials in the name of pandemic prevention useful to tighten state control over society. That suggests zero-COVID, or a form of it, may become a fact of life in China. It is likely that a number of its restrictions and rules will be retained to the benefit of Xi’s surveillance state but to the detriment of personal privacy.

The future of economic policy

Another element in the debate about zero-COVID is the current miserable condition of the Chinese economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts gross domestic product (GDP) will expand a mere 3.3 percent in 2022. Zero-COVID is a major contributing factor to this slowing growth. Its persistent lockdowns and restricted travel have suppressed consumption, supply chains, and small business, especially in the service sector. The assumption among many China experts is that at some point, Beijing will have to loosen COVID controls to alleviate the deepening economic problems.

However, Xi appears to be deviating from past practice in regard to the importance of economic growth as a policy goal. China watchers have been conditioned over the past three decades to assume the Chinese leadership will prioritize economic development over all other issues. The Communist Party has long marketed the country’s high growth rates as a mark of its competence and legitimacy. Further, the party’s obsession with social stability prompted officials to fear the joblessness and discontent caused by weak economic conditions. Amid zero-COVID, however, Xi has signaled that economic development may no longer be the party’s No. 1 priority. In recent months, even as Li, the premier, has exhorted local officials to resurrect economic growth, the party has also been willing to accept economic sacrifices in order to maintain the zero-COVID stricture.

That could be part of a much broader and critical shift in the direction of Chinese policy. Going forward, the pursuit of economic development may be balanced, or even downgraded, relative to political, security, and social concerns.⁵

Such a shift has major implications for China’s economic relations with the rest of the world. It explains why Xi has replaced the long-standing, guiding principle of “reform and opening up” with a new mantra of “self-sufficiency.” Xi will almost certainly continue to stress the need to reduce China’s vulnerabilities to the outside world by substituting imports with homemade alternatives. As Xi once said: “The essence of the new development dynamic is realizing a high level of self-reliance.”⁶ Xi will therefore persist in his efforts to develop Chinese technologies through state-led industrial policies with their heavy subsidization of local high-tech industries, despite their massive waste of resources and underwhelming results thus far.

That suggests two important trends for economic policy in Xi’s third term. First, he will continue to prioritize economic security over economic efficiency—in other words, he is willing to sacrifice growth for political objectives. Second, Xi’s economic agenda will also foment greater competition with the United States and other advanced economies in cutting-edge technologies—most of all semiconductors. Chinese policymakers will persist in pursuing tactics, such as forced technology transfer and subsidization, that are a cause of trade friction with Washington. Overall, Xi’s economic policies will have the effect of limiting the further integration of the Chinese economy into the global economy, likely increasing disputes with trading partners, encouraging foreign governments to impose restrictions on business investment and trade with China, and capping the ability of Chinese companies to go global.

Xi’s penchant for political control will influence the course of economic policy in other ways as well. He has partially reversed domestic economic liberalization, and instead, he is reasserting a level of state influence over the private sector. The most visible manifestation of that trend has been the imposition of greater regulation on many sectors of the economy over the past two years. That campaign constrained the ability of some companies, especially in technology, to expand, or, in the case of private education services, even survive. Global investors wonder if the harsh crackdown has finally run its course. But that is the wrong question to ask. Xi has displayed a wariness of private enterprise distinct from his recent predecessors. He has spoken of the need to “prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital,”⁷ and he appears to fear that the growing wealth and influence of private companies and entrepreneurs could present a threat to the Communist Party’s dominance. Xi may intend to subordinate the private sector to the interests of the state and party. Under Xi, the Communist Party adopted a policy to enhance its control over the management of private companies. Xi has also elevated the narrowing of income disparities, between both income groups and regions of the country, to priority status in Beijing’s economic agenda with his campaign for “common prosperity.” Although the policy platform to achieve “common prosperity,” remains a vague work-in-progress, the prominence placed on this idea is a signal that Xi disapproves of the unfettered expansion of personal wealth generated through entrepreneurship and private enterprise. Such an attitude is detrimental to economic development since it discourages entrepreneurial activity and innovation. As in all countries, however, pressuring the rich makes for good politics, and Xi seems to revel in such populist exploits. Though Chinese officials have stressed that “common prosperity” is not a code for soaking the wealthy, its main achievement thus far has been arm-twisting major private firms to divert more profits into charitable causes. Expect Xi to persist in these populist causes as a method of bolstering his credentials as a “man of the people.”

Xi and Taiwan

All the factors discussed above add up to slower growth, and a problem for the Communist Party. The leadership will no longer be able to justify their repression with the promise of economic benefit. The party’s implicit social contract with the public—let us rule and we will make you rich—could break down. Xi must instead find other sources of “performance legitimacy,” or other measures of the party’s right to rule, and new endeavors to rally support for and redirect frustration away from the Communist regime.

It has become fairly obvious over the course of Xi’s term that he is attempting to capitalize on nationalist causes as a substitute for economic development and the new source of party legitimacy. Much of Xi’s public discourse focuses on achieving national rejuvenation. This goal goes beyond simply gaining wealth to restoring China’s greatness on the world stage. Inevitably, such appeals to nationalism lead to the issue of Taiwan. Claiming Taiwan has long been a top priority for the People’s Republic, but Xi appears to be elevating the issue even higher on Beijing’s to-do list. Further, he is doing so in potentially dangerous and destabilizing ways. Beijing has not held any serious dialogue with Taipei since the current Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen, took office in 2016. Instead, Xi has chosen to increase diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan in an attempt to prevent Tsai from extending her government’s international stature and ties to other countries, especially the United States. Since mid-2020, Xi has launched a concerted campaign of military intimidation by routinely sending squads of jets buzzing near the island and holding drills in the surrounding waters. Beijing has intensified efforts to isolate Taiwan’s government on the international stage. For example, China employed economic coercion against Lithuania after the Baltic nation strengthened ties with Taipei. China’s protests reached a fever pitch in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August 2022. Accusing Washington of undermining the idea of “one China,” Beijing threatened the United States with unspecified countermeasures and staged extensive military exercises surrounding Taiwan, creating the effect of a blockade for the first time.

All parties are blaming one another for this escalation. Yet it is undeniable that the Xi administration has purposely chosen a more hostile, militant approach to the Taiwan question. Xi’s posture could be driven by a fear that the island is being drawn ever more tightly into the United States’ orbit and away from China’s. A debate has erupted among foreign policy analysts over whether Washington is fanning those fears, inadvertently or otherwise, by its persistent displays of support for Taiwan’s democratic government. As is the case with much of Xi’s foreign policy, however, his assertive approach has created the very situation he intends to prevent. Rather than convincing Tsai to submit, Xi reinforced Taiwan’s determination to gain greater international support, and prodded other governments, including the United States, to express and provide that support. In August 2022, for instance, the administration of US President Joseph R. Biden opened formal trade negotiations with Taiwan.

It does not appear that Xi perceives or accepts the counterproductive nature of his Taiwan policy. He seems committed to coercion, viewing this as his best method of preventing Taiwan’s drift toward Washington. One reason could be that appearing “tough” on Taiwan bolsters his domestic political stature. Another could be that other options are unappealing. If he is unwilling to make compromises with the Tsai administration, he may see dialogue as a dead end.

Once Xi secures his third term, the big question is how much pressure he will bring to bear on Taiwan. Beijing’s reaction to the Pelosi visit offers contradictory clues. On the one hand, Beijing’s military exercises crossed red lines, most of all in the People’s Liberation Army’s decision to blockade the island. This move suggests Xi may be aiming to create a “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait, in which the Chinese military exerts greater control in the waterway and intensifies its harassment of Taipei’s government. On the other hand, Beijing restrained its military from taking certain risks during those exercises. For instance, no planes entered Taiwan’s airspace. That indicates that Xi, fearing actual conflict, may place limits on how drastically he wishes to alter the status quo.

Either way, the emerging cycle of reaction and counterreaction is potentially creating a downward spiral into heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Barring some unforeseen and tectonic shift in policy in Washington and Taipei, Beijing’s more assertive attitude to the Taiwan issue will likely continue in Xi’s third term. This raises the frightening prospect of conflict over Taiwan, either accidentally—such chances increase with the intensity of Beijing’s military harassment—or by design. The centralization of power in Xi Jinping raises the possibility that he could decide a military solution to the Taiwan problem is necessary perhaps to bolster his own political position. With the highest ranks of the Chinese government stacked with loyalists, he could encounter little internal opposition to such a drastic course of action.

That is speculation, of course, but the direction of Xi’s Taiwan policy is transforming the risk of war over the fate of the island from an outside possibility to a more urgent danger to the security and stability of East Asia.

Xi and the world

The more aggressive position on Taiwan is part of a much wider shift in China’s foreign policy under Xi’s guidance. When Xi took power a decade ago, the United States was still China’s partner. Since then, Xi has transformed Washington into China’s chief adversary. The finger-pointing goes both ways as to which side is to blame. Xi’s government admits to no responsibility for soured relations, but it is indisputable that Xi’s policies have played an outsized role in causing the US-China rift. His predatory industrial programs, aggressive pursuit of contested territorial claims in the South China Sea, and his friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which persists despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have all contributed to strained relations.

Xi is not likely to become any friendlier. He appears to believe the United States is determined to suppress China’s rightful ascent into a global power. The Chinese political and academic elite seem to be convinced that the US is in inexorable decline, and Washington is trying to “keep China down” in order to cling to its wobbly hegemony. This thinking permeates many of Xi’s foreign and economic policies. His “self-sufficiency” drive is meant to protect China from what he sees as Washington’s nefarious designs to use the United States’ economic heft and technological advantages to restrain China’s economic advance. His partnership with Putin is designed to decrease his economic reliance on the West and enlist Moscow as a partner in his quest to undermine the US-led world order. Xi’s latest diplomatic projects, the Global Security Initiative and Global Development Initiative, aim to replace the norms and rules of the current liberal order with a system more favorable to autocratic regimes and the expansion of Chinese power. Barring a dramatic turn in US policy to capitulate and align with Beijing’s interests, none of these efforts to overthrow Pax Americana are likely to change in Xi’s next term. The more powerful Xi becomes, the more they may intensify.

To many inside and outside of China, Xi’s anti-US sentiments have set the stage for a dangerous gamble. Still relatively poor and far behind in technological development, China needs friendly relations with the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and the Asia-Pacific to continue to achieve economic progress. However, Xi probably does not see it that way. An adversarial relationship with the United States is, in many respects, beneficial to Xi’s political standing, especially at home. The narrative of Xi’s personality cult is that he is the man with the will and the wisdom to attain the “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation. Too long a victim of the West, China will now seize its moment to overcome its enemies and restore its greatness. This epic drama requires a villain and the United States (along with its allies, especially Japan) can play that role nicely. It is clear that Xi wants the Chinese public to despise and distrust the United States. Chinese media has become a constant anti-US propaganda machine, painting Washington as resolutely hostile, and US society as violent, racist, and unjust. By pushing such messaging, while raising the Great Firewall ever higher to constrain the flow of outside information into the country, the Chinese state is attempting to reshape and control Chinese public opinion about the United States. Xi, as the star of this show, is often portrayed as standing firm against the big, bad Americans, finger-wagging the US president, for example, on Taiwan. Around the world, too, Xi can portray China as a better alternative to the (supposedly) decaying and irresponsible United States, and himself as the statesman to usher in a new era. By pursuing this course, Xi aims to rally other nations already hostile to Washington and transform himself into the leader of a new global order, with China at its apex.

This narrative may serve Xi’s political interests, but it does not bode well for his relations with Washington since it makes serious dialogue or compromise almost impossible. The main goal of Beijing’s current diplomacy appears to be gaining compliance from other governments to align with Xi’s goals, and it often degenerates into threats, warnings, and demands. Much of the fiery rhetoric may, again, be directed at a domestic audience to bolster Xi’s credentials as a diehard defender of the nation. It may also be motivated by Beijing’s growing conviction of the inevitability of its rise and belief that eventually, even the most recalcitrant nations will have to submit. Whatever the cause, five more years of Xi’s foreign policy almost certainly means five more years of increasing conflict with many of the world’s major economic and military powers. This includes not only the United States and its allies, but also emerging nations that feel threatened by Beijing’s aggressiveness, such as India and Vietnam.

Conclusion

In his decade at China’s helm, Xi Jinping has brought about drastic changes in Beijing’s governance, economic agenda, and foreign policy. There is little evidence at this point that he intends to alter course. Instead, there is more reason to believe that the more entrenched Xi becomes in his position, the more aggressively he will pursue his agenda at home and abroad. The only caveat is whether current poor conditions in China—a slowing economy, the strains of zero-COVID, and greater tensions with the international community—have weakened him enough to allow other factions with the Communist Party to place officials into senior positions who can check his power and alter his policy program. That will not be known until the upcoming Congress. Such an outcome is certainly possible. Yet policymakers around the world would be wise to approach the twentieth Party Congress with the assumption that Xi stays in charge and in control.

Working under this assumption means the world’s China watchers will need to adjust the way in which they understand the process of policymaking in Beijing. To an increasing degree, Beijing’s decisions will be Xi’s decisions. Determining what the Communist government will or will not do is becoming a process of figuring out what fits with Xi’s personal political calculations and ideology. As shown by zero-COVID or “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Xi will make policy choices that may be beneficial to his own political standing, or helpful for his vision for China’s future, but harmful to the country in many other respects. In a system heavily dominated by Xi loyalists, the degree of policy debate may narrow, creating “echo chamber” conditions that shield Xi from the real impact of his choices and the information he requires to make sound decisions.

It is also likely that Xi’s third term will see a continuation, and possibly an intensification, of the trends already underway in Chinese policy. In foreign affairs, that means greater hostility to the United States and its global allies, closer relations with Russia and other autocratic regimes, more aggressive pursuit of regional territorial claims and other interests, and heightened tensions over Taiwan. With the economy, Xi will almost certainly remain cool to liberalization and persist with state-led industrial programs, the fixation on self-reliance, and heavier control of the private sector. In general, Xi’s third term will likely see rising nationalism and continued decoupling from the world in business, information, culture, education, and even personal exchanges.

Perhaps the biggest unanswered question about Xi’s third term is: what happens five years from now, when China is again due for another leadership shuffle? Having flushed the party’s collective governance system down the political toilet, Xi has created uncertainty over how leaders will be selected and how the country will be governed in the future. Can the system of collective rule be reestablished? Or will Chinese politics become a contest of competing strongmen?

A case can be made that Xi, by holding onto power, has merely restored China to its usual norm. The era of collective leadership can be seen as a brief aberration in a political environment more often dominated by an individual. At the same time, many in the political and business elite in China likely remain wary of a reversion to the days of Mao, when the fate of the nation rested in the unreliable hands of a single leader. Perhaps pressure will mount in coming years to restore greater balance within Chinese governance. Or perhaps Xi will manage to quash any further resistance and rule for life. After four decades of walking a fairly predictable path, Xi is sending China into the unknown.

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its fifteen other programs and centers.

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Report May 11, 2022

China’s faltering “zero COVID” policy: Politics in command, economy in reverse

By Jeremy Mark, Michael Schuman

Could Beijing’s doubling down on the “zero COVID” policy undermine the narrative of China’s superiority in responding to the pandemic—and the image and stature of Xi’s rule?

China Coronavirus

Report Jul 28, 2022

Cooperation with China: Challenges and opportunities

By Michael Schuman, David O. Shullman

Cooperation with China should focus on areas where our interests still align and where we can keep Beijing grounded in the international system. Like-minded allies and partners must pair such efforts with commitments to defend against China’s violations of international norms, impose costs on irresponsible behavior, and strengthen themselves and current global institutions to compete effectively and uphold liberal values.

China Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Oct 3, 2022

Why China’s leadership must respond to the country’s property crisis

By Jeremy Mark

The country’s rapidly metastasizing property downturn threatens to engulf heavily indebted developers, homeowners, financial institutions, and local governments.

China Economy & Business

1 For an explanation of how the congress works, see “Raising the Curtain on China’s 20^th Party Congress,” https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/raising-curtain-chinas-20th-party-congress-mechanics-rules-norms-and-realities-power.

2 Deng Xiaoping, “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” Aug 18, 2980, in The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2 https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/on-the-reform-of-the-system-of-party-and-state-leadership/

3 Nis Grunberg, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Jan. 27, 2022. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Nis_Gr%C3%BCnberg_Testimony.pdf

4 Jeremy Mark and Michael Schuman, “China’s Faltering ‘Zero-COVID’ Policy: Politics in Command, Economy in Reverse,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-faltering-zero-covid-policy-politics-in-command-economy-in-reverse/

5 Howard Wang, “’Security Is a Prerequisite for Development’” Consensus Building Toward a New Top Priority in the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of Contemporary China, Aug. 7, 2022 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2022.2108681

6 Xi Jinping, “Understanding the New Development Stage, Applying the New Development Philosophy, Creating a New Development Dynamic,” Quishi, July 8, 2021 http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-07/08/c_641137.htm

7 Xi, “Understandng the New Development Stage.”

The post What Xi Jinping’s third term means for the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Memo to Elon Musk: Only Ukrainian victory can stop Vladimir Putin

Doug Klain — Wed, 05 Oct 2022 20:16:04 +0000

Ukraine should get real and agree to a ceasefire with Russia. An uncomfortable peace is better than continuing this horrific war, even if that means allowing Russia to keep the Ukrainian lands it currently occupies and perhaps has some right to.

This is the essence of the deeply flawed argument put forward by US tech billionaire Elon Musk on social media in recent days. Musk garnered headlines for his Kremlin-friendly peace proposals, but in reality he is merely one of many voices in the West calling on Ukraine to abandon millions of its citizens to perpetual Russian occupation in order to end Europe’s biggest armed conflict since World War II.

Ever since the early days of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, advocates of appeasement have pushed the idea that Ukrainian political and territorial concessions are the only way to end Russian aggression. These arguments ignore the genocidal reality of the war while denying agency to Ukrainians and relying on flawed assumptions of Russia’s behavior and capabilities.

Russia has not put forward a single sensible peace plan since the invasion began on February 24. Moreover, Moscow has rejected Ukraine’s proposals. During the initial stage of the war, Ukraine offered to abandon NATO membership and make further concessions to the Kremlin, but Putin preferred to proceed with his bid to seize Kyiv.

Despite multiple military setbacks, Moscow’s position has hardened over the intervening months, with Putin essentially demanding Ukraine’s capitulation and insisting that any settlement must include the surrender of entire Ukrainian regions to Russia. Such imperial posturing cannot serve as the basis for serious negotiations.

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The idea that Ukraine should be willing to trade some of its regions in exchange for peace might make sense in the abstract. This is especially true for those who believe Russia’s policymakers remain fundamentally rational actors who are merely seeking greater security for their own state. However, this logic ignores the crimes committed under Russian occupation and the genocidal agenda underpinning the entire invasion.

When the Russian army retreated from northern Ukraine in the second month of the war, advancing Ukrainian troops encountered widespread evidence of war crimes in the formerly occupied suburbs of Kyiv including mass executions and large-scale sexual violence against women, men, and children. Similar revelations in other liberated regions and testimonies of people who have fled occupied Ukraine indicate that these crimes are a deliberate feature of Russia’s so-called Special Military Operation.

In areas of Ukraine currently under their control, Russian forces are terrorizing the civilian population. Millions of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation, with special laws adopted in Moscow to allow for the Russification of Ukrainian orphans. Children who remain in regions of Ukraine under Russian control are forced to undergo indoctrination in schools, with teachers imported from Russia to impart distorted histories. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language is being eradicated from public life along with all symbols of Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainian media outlets are blocked and residents are pressurized to accept Russian citizenship.

More than seven months since the invasion began, it is now impossible to escape the conclusion that Russia aims not only to extinguish Ukrainian statehood but also to eradicate Ukrainian national identity wherever it is able to establish its authority. When proponents of a supposedly realistic peace agreement call on Ukraine to cede territory, they are actually asking Ukraine to accept genocide. Plainly, no Ukrainian leader could ever agree to a peace deal that consigned the civilian population to such a fate.

Nor do most Ukrainians share Elon Musk’s belief that they have no option but to compromise with the Kremlin. As a result of Russian aggression, Ukrainian national identity has never been stronger. Record numbers of Ukrainians back Euro-Atlantic integration, while recent military successes have further strengthened Ukrainian resolve to liberate all Russian-occupied regions of the country.

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Elon Musk and other self-styled realists fail to grasp that Russia currently has far more reason than Ukraine to seek an off-ramp from the conflict, even if it may be hard to swallow for Russians. Russia is now clearly losing the war and has suffered a string of humiliating defeats on the eastern and southern fronts over the past month. Ukrainian forces are receiving some of the best weapons in the world along with the financial, intelligence, and military support of NATO and other global partners. Ukrainian morale is high, with soldiers fighting to free their homeland and their families from occupation.

Russia, on the other hand, is in increasingly dire straights. Putin has launched Russia’s first mobilization campaign since World War II in order to compensate for staggering battlefield losses. While the actual number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine remains a closely guarded secret, even the most conservative estimates put the figure in the tens of thousands. The Russian military has also lost huge amounts of equipment in Ukraine including more than 1000 tanks. Putin now finds himself forced to rely on nuclear intimidation in order to maintain the fearsome mystique of his once-vaunted army. Unsurprisingly, the remaining Russian forces in Ukraine are suffering from collapsing morale.

Meanwhile, the situation inside Russia is also deteriorating. Sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine are hurting the economy, while travel restrictions are narrowing the horizons of ordinary Russians. An estimated 700,000 Russians have fled the country in the two weeks since mobilization was announced, inflicting further economic damage and fueling public discontent.

Ukraine is currently advancing simultaneously on multiple fronts against what is an increasingly poorly-armed and demoralized enemy. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe Russia can regain the battlefield initiative in the months ahead. With this in mind, it makes little sense to preach restraint or expect concessions from Kyiv.

Putin’s nuclear blackmail is the elephant in the room, of course. His threats must be taken seriously, but the West cannot allow nuclear saber-rattling to become a trump card that enables Russia to claim whatever territory it wants. Putin knows the specter of a nuclear strike frightens Western leaders and sparks whispers of ending support for Ukraine. If he succeeds, he will use the same tactic again and again. Others, too, will take note and draw the obvious conclusions.

The best response to these nuclear threats has come from the Ukrainians themselves. Officials in Kyiv have defiantly declared that while a nuclear strike would dramatically increase the costs of the war, it would not alter the eventual outcome. In other words, even if Putin crosses the nuclear threshold, he will not be able to prevent a Ukrainian victory. Western leaders should follow suit and make crystal clear that any nuclear escalation would have catastrophic consequences for Russia.

Ukrainians want peace, but not at any price. Crucially, they recognize that unless they are victorious, their homeland will cease to exist. Elon Musk and other proponents of land-for-peace proposals need to understand that the single best way to bring peace to Ukraine is by sending the weapons that will help secure a Ukrainian victory. There is no middle ground between Russia’s goal of destroying Ukraine and Ukraine’s own will to survive.

Ukraine is not standing in the way of peace. Nor is peace something that can be imposed on Ukraine by the country’s Western partners. Anyone who genuinely wants to bring the Russian invasion to an end should focus on pushing the international community to give Ukrainians the tools they need to defend themselves. Until Russia is decisively defeated, the war in Ukraine will go on and the suffering of Ukrainians will continue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @DougKlain.

A comprehensive defeat in Ukraine would argue strongly against continued revanchism and aggression by any successor, especially when such actions precipitated Putin’s downfall. Meanwhile, economic distress would prevent the rearming of the depleted and demoralized Russian military. With a GDP one-twentieth the size of NATO’s, Russia does not possess the resources to continue endlessly confronting the West.

Reaching out for help from China, Iran, or North Korea is also unlikely to help Putin’s successor. Iran and North Korea are economic lightweights whose defense sectors are a generation or more behind the West.

China has a long and difficult history with Russia in the Far East and, over the long term, is a much greater threat to Russian interests. Siberia is both thinly populated and endowed with enormous energy, timber, and mineral resources. China has long cast a covetous eye toward the region. Beijing is well aware that Moscow’s ability to defend its enormous borders is minimal, and that encouraging Russian dependence on Chinese economic and military assistance will lead to Chinese dominance and control.

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For any successor regime, sanctions relief and reestablishing a sound economy based on energy sales and commodities exports will be a top priority, not more war and crisis. Putin’s extraordinary aggression is driving Europe away from Russian energy and toward alternate sources, killing the golden goose that enabled Russia to escape from the economic weakness of the 1990s. Russia’s economic future lies in closer integration with the West and the international community, not deeper isolation. However attractive it may be to autocrats, the North Korean model will not appeal to the Russian people.

Inside Russia’s power vertical, elites will wish to move away from an environment where fear of imprisonment or assassination has become the rule. If Putin is removed from power, self-preservation on the part of Russia’s oligarchs, generals, and senior functionaries will be a primary driver. Few will want to return to an environment of fear and distrust. Any new leadership will be mindful of the reasons behind Putin’s fall and will likely take heed. Just as the Politburo moved to end the terror following Stalin’s death, a return to normalcy and stability will likely be a high priority in a post-Putin environment.

Because there is no obvious mechanism for a peaceful transition of power, there is potential for a power vacuum to develop in the event of Putin’s ouster. Russian leaders will certainly want to avoid state collapse or dismemberment, as happened after the fall of the Soviet Union. This argues for more power-sharing and a more balanced approach to government where ministries, courts, and parliament can check the tendency towards absolutism.

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While true Western-style democracy may not emerge in the short term, some liberalization would be likely in a post-Putin Russia. Even following a failed campaign in Ukraine, Russia enjoys numerous real advantages. There are no direct threats to Russian territory or sovereignty, while the country has a powerful nuclear arsenal, a huge land area with vast natural resources, an educated and enterprising population, and a strong and intact culture. Western leaders will be eager to embrace a reformed Russia posing no threat to its neighbors. Sensible Russian leaders will recognize and want to leverage these opportunities.

The emerging generation of Russians will also have a voice in a new Russia. Though effectively controlled and even repressed by Putin, many younger Russians are aware of the outside world, do not support the war in Ukraine, and want a more open and prosperous life. Social media provides a platform to organize and give voice to this generation that the state can only suppress with difficulty.

There is currently a tendency to see Russia and Russians as irredeemable. And there is clearly a strain in Russian history and culture that suggests imperialism and expansionism are embedded in the national DNA. But many states (Japan, Germany, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all come to mind) have managed to throw off militarism and autocracy.

We should be careful to guard against the assumption that Putin’s successor will inevitably be worse than Putin himself. That logic drives us into the “don’t humiliate Putin” camp, which is shorthand for “don’t let Ukraine win.” That can’t be good for Ukraine, the West, or the wider world.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

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