Migration - Atlantic Council

What Kamala Harris’s record in Central America and the Caribbean reveals about her foreign policy approach

Jason Marczak — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 20:02:09 +0000

In April 2021, three weeks after US Vice President Kamala Harris took on the assignment of leading the Biden administration’s efforts to address the root causes of migration from northern Central America, I joined her as one of seven experts offering external perspectives on the issues confronting the region. At the meeting, Harris sought out new ideas to inform the administration’s strategy on topics ranging from transparency and economic development to security and good governance. One takeaway immediately emerged: With migration from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador stemming from decades of insecurity, economic challenges, and weak governance, among other factors, there would be no fast fix for these root causes.

Since US President Joe Biden dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Harris on Sunday, she has emerged as the likely Democratic nominee. So what might US foreign policy look like if she wins the presidency? For Harris, the daughter of Jamaican and Indian immigrants, there are ample clues in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years. Her approach: Listen to a broad array of stakeholders, act, follow up, and then adjust tactics as needed. This approach can take time to implement, but it also proves adaptive to unexpected challenges.

Although the United States’ southern border was not specifically part of the portfolio handed to her, Harris’s indirect involvement—through her role in seeking to reduce migratory push factors in northern Central America—has received considerable scrutiny, especially among those who criticize the Biden administration’s approach to migration. The data at this point indicate that the Biden administration has made progress in reducing the number of migrants arriving at the US border from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to levels last seen toward the end of the Trump administration, even as increased migration from other countries has contributed to a high level of overall encounters at the border.

At the same time, more work is clearly needed to ensure that migration levels from northern Central America do not jump back up. It is imperative that the efforts undertaken as part of the ongoing “root causes” strategy carry forward no matter who wins the US election in November. This means ensuring that local organizations have the technical and financial resources to improve opportunities for job creation and human-capital development and also to combat often-endemic corruption. These and other conditions are needed not just to dampen the drive to migrate but also to create longer-term economic security that ultimately benefits the national security of the United States and partner countries.

In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean . . . she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions.

In one example of her “listen, act, then follow up” approach, Harris traveled to Guatemala and Mexico in June 2021. A month later, she rolled out a five-pillar strategy that revolved around working with in-country partners to address the root causes of Central American migration, noting that “migration to our border is also a symptom of much larger issues” and admitting from the start that “progress will not be instantaneous.” She subsequently visited Honduras in January 2022. In March 2024, she welcomed Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, to the White House for more discussions. This approach suggests that Harris could govern in a manner where decisions are carefully thought out and where a multitude of factors are taken into account before acting.

In its three years, the five-pillar strategy has produced more than $5.2 billion in commitments from companies and organizations to invest in the region while supporting local development in areas of high emigration. And there are signs that migration from the region is now slowing. The number of Guatemalans encountered at the southwestern border last month (11,485) was the second-lowest since November 2020. The number of Hondurans (8,896) was the lowest over the same period. Overall, the proportion of migrants encountered at the US border who are citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has dropped from 49 percent (March 2021) to 18 percent (June 2024).

Still, reflecting the shift in migrant patterns, including new or growing countries of origin, the overall number of migrant encounters by border authorities remains high (130,419 in June) as compared to the last full month of the previous administration (73,994 encounters in December 2020).

Though it has been less high-profile than her Central America work, Harris has also given substantial attention to addressing the many significant challenges facing the United States’ Caribbean neighbors. As she has explained it, doing so is a US national security priority that cannot be overlooked.

In June 2023, just over a year after virtually hosting leaders of fifteen Caribbean nations, Harris became the highest-ranking US official to visit The Bahamas, where she co-hosted the US-Caribbean Leaders Meeting. That meeting—and her overall engagement—has been focused on establishing a greater US presence in the Caribbean at a time in which it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Caribbean prosperity yields benefits for the United States too. The region’s geographic proximity also means that there is a national security imperative for the United States to be more fully engaged in a partnership with the Caribbean.

In keeping with her typical approach, Harris met with Caribbean leaders first to hear their priorities before crafting a strategy. Her priorities started with climate change and the energy transition, expanded to food security, and then extended to security and arms trafficking. At that June 2023 meeting, she announced $100 million of US assistance to address these issues, including Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. (In parallel with these efforts, the Atlantic Council organized the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit on the sidelines of her Bahamas trip.) Still, as with her Central America portfolio, substantial progress will not happen overnight.

Over the coming days and weeks, Harris will set about defining what her foreign policy might look like. In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean, at least, she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions. And she has followed through on implementation, adjusting tactics along the way as the situation on the ground evolves. As she seeks to become commander-in-chief at a time of deep global instability, she will have no shortage of complicated challenges to confront.

Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Kamala Harris’s record in Central America and the Caribbean reveals about her foreign policy approach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Migration dynamics in the Atlantic basin: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

Amal El Ouassif and Constance Berry Newman — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

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The terrible cost of Russia’s war is being felt far beyond the battlefield

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 19:48:34 +0000

Delegates from around 160 countries will gather in Switzerland on June 15-16 as the country hosts a Summit on Peace in Ukraine. The goal of the two-day event is to develop a “common understanding” on a possible path toward a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

This new peace initiative comes at a critical point in the Russia-Ukraine War. More than two years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there remains no end in sight to what is the largest European conflict since World War II. Instead, Vladimir Putin’s invading army is once again advancing, and has recently attempted to open a new front with a cross-border offensive close to Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv.

In parallel to these front line advances, the Russian military is also conducting in a nationwide bombing campaign that appears designed to terrorize Ukrainian civilians and force millions to flee their homes by making large parts of the country uninhabitable. Since the beginning of 2024, Russia has damaged or destroyed around half of Ukraine’s remaining energy generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts. Meanwhile, recent air strikes against civilian targets such as shopping centers have left dozens dead. This air offensive illustrates how the escalating costs of the conflict are being felt far beyond the battlefield.

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The most immediate consequences of Russia’s invasion have been carnage and destruction on an unprecedented scale for twenty-first century Europe. Military losses on both sides have not been officially disclosed and remain hotly disputed, but are widely believed to be in the hundreds of thousands. A similar number of soldiers have suffered life-changing injuries.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have likely been killed during the invasion. Large numbers of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to Russia, including thousands of children. Many more have been abducted and remain missing. A long list of Ukrainian towns, villages, and entire cities have been reduced to rubble.

Even for those who have escaped physical injury or the loss of property, Russia’s invasion has often had a devastating impact. Almost everybody in Ukraine has lost a friend, acquaintance, or family member in the war. Experts are already warning that Ukrainian society must prepare to deal with major mental health challenges for decades to come.

The demographic situation is equally alarming. Around a quarter of Ukraine’s prewar population have been forced to flee their homes, becoming either internally displaced or leaving the country for the neighboring EU. This has led to a dramatic decline in Ukraine’s overall population. The longer the war continues, the less likely it becomes that Ukrainian refugees will return home.

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In areas such as education, the costs of Russia’s invasion are severe and will likely be long-lasting. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine ranked among the world’s most educated populations. However, ongoing hostilities now threaten this status. A generation of young Ukrainians have had their schooling and university studies disrupted or derailed entirely by the war. Inevitably, many have chosen to continue their studies abroad. The same is true for Ukrainian academics. This wartime brain drain represents a massive blow to Ukraine’s future.

The Ukrainian economy has displayed remarkable resilience over the past two years of full-scale war, but even this cannot disguise the harm done by Russia’s invasion. With almost twenty percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation or close enough to the front lines to make normal business activities impossible, many companies have had to relocate or cease operations entirely. Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has created further logistical problems, while also reducing export revenues and depriving the Ukrainian authorities of taxes.

Finally, with Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies focused on war-related priorities and as employment options become more limited, crime is becoming a mounting challenge. According to recent research, most Ukrainian organized crime groups have severed longstanding ties with their Russian counterparts, but remain active and continue to seek opportunities created by wartime realities.

From mental health and population decline to the economy and education, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian society that will be felt for generations to come. This should be at the forefront of people’s minds as they gather in Switzerland to discuss how to end the war and establish a sustainable peace for Ukrainians.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The Kremlin’s bombing campaign has a number of goals. Russia seeks to undermine the Ukrainian economy by reducing industrial capacity, including in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense sector. By forcing Ukrainians to live without regular access to electricity, Russia also aims to demoralize the civilian population and weaken the country’s resilience. Moscow hopes this will fuel public calls for an end to the war and set the stage for a future peace agreement on Russian terms.

Thanks to sunny summer weather and long hours of daylight, the regular power outages currently being experienced across Ukraine are highly disruptive but not yet disastrous. Once temperatures begin to drop and winter draws closer, the implications of Russia’s bombing campaign are expected to become far more serious. Experts predict it will take years to repair Ukraine’s power grid, but urgent steps are required now in order to prevent a potential humanitarian catastrophe from unfolding during the coming winter season.

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The Ukrainian authorities have established a coordination center to address the mounting energy crisis in the country. Current measures to compensate for power shortages include the installation of gas-fired energy generation plants. Imports from neighboring EU countries represent another key source of additional electricity.

The loss of thermal and hydroelectric power generation means Ukraine is now increasingly reliant on the country’s nuclear power plants. The Ministry of Economy is investing in Energoatom to expand capacities, but constructing new plants is both extremely expensive and time consuming.

Renewable energy currently constitutes a significant portion of Ukraine’s remaining energy output, with much of this segment concentrated in the south of the country. While there is considerable room to expand renewable power generation, green energy options offer unstable power output, creating additional practical challenges for the Ukrainian energy grid.

One of the main focuses of the government’s strategy is the decentralization of the Ukrainian energy system. This is expected to involve smaller power plants that will be less vulnerable to Russian bombardment. To support this transition, efforts are underway to streamline procedures for the connection of small-scale power generation facilities to the national grid. A government program is also offering incentives for housing associations to install solar panels on residential buildings.

The biggest security challenge remains protecting the Ukrainian power grid from further Russian attack. In recent months, Ukrainian officials have consistently communicated that additional air defense systems are the country’s top priority. First and foremost, this means US-produced Patriot air defense systems.

So far, Ukraine’s pleas have largely gone unanswered. Although Ukrainian diplomats claim to have identified one hundred “available” Patriot systems worldwide, there has been no rush to supply Ukraine. Only Germany has committed to deliver one system, with talks continuing over possible delivery of Patriots from a number of other partner countries including Romania. Unless Ukraine’s air defense deficit is resolved, all other efforts to counter the Russian bombing campaign of the country’s energy sector may prove futile.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

Another way in which Sheinbaum could partner with her Central American neighbors is by working together to seize nearshoring opportunities. Specifically, she and her regional counterparts could promote a mechanism whereby Central American economies would be able to join the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Nearshoring, or bringing international supply chains and production closer to the US market, can provide significant economic benefits, creating jobs and fostering economic stability in Mexico and throughout Central America. Promoting economic integration through the USMCA could provide a structured framework for this cooperation. The idea has been floated for a couple of years now, first by Costa Rica in 2022. This move would enhance the competitive edge of Central American economies, which in many ways are too small to make a difference on their own but together could create economies of scale. Bringing other Central American countries into the USMCA would allow these nations to benefit from the same trade advantages enjoyed by Mexico. It could also reduce many of the economic pressures that drive migration, namely a lack of jobs and insufficient wages.

Furthermore, Sheinbaum’s administration could adopt a more humanitarian approach to migration, focusing on protecting migrant rights and providing humanitarian assistance. While López Obrador touted his tree-planting “Sembrando Vida” program, Sheinbaum could take the programs a step further. This approach aligns with her broader progressive values—she is a self-described humanist—and can enhance Mexico’s role as a regional leader in addressing the migration crisis. During the campaign, Sheinbaum repeatedly mentioned increased investments in social and youth programs in Central America, which, if designed holistically and sustainably, could effectively curb migration from Mexico’s neighbors. This is particularly important now, as US President Joe Biden prepares to roll out an executive order that would allow the United States to temporarily close its southern border if a threshold of encounters with migrants at the border is reached—reportedly, an average of five thousand crossings in a week or 2,500 in a day.

Regional security is another area in which Sheinbaum could make a big difference. Almost three dozen candidates were assassinated during the current electoral campaign, and record-breaking violence in the country is resulting in more than thirty thousand homicides each year. Improved and increased intelligence-sharing between Mexico and Central American countries can help combat organized crime and violence, which are significant push factors for migration. This is also an area in which the United States and Mexico may look to double down on their cooperation. Sheinbaum has pledged to address the rampant impunity in Mexico—less than five percent of criminal investigations are solved and many crimes go unreported. While Sheinbaum is unlikely to approach the security issue in the severe manner of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, she has recognized the urgency of this issue for the livelihood of millions of Mexicans.

Sheinbaum’s presidency could bring about significant positive change in Mexico and its relations with Central America. Her administration’s policies on energy and environmental sustainability, economic integration, and migration will have an important impact on the future of the region. The first female president of Mexico has the opportunity to redefine her country’s role in Central America, address the root causes of migration, and promote a more stable and prosperous region. In this new chapter for Mexico and the region, the Aztec nation could very well be a strong and stable partner for Central American nations.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director, operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

The post Three ways Mexico’s new president could transform Central America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to watch in Mexico’s elections: A supermajority and a superpower

Jason Marczak — Thu, 30 May 2024 18:50:43 +0000

Sunday marks the biggest election day in Mexico’s history. One hundred million Mexicans are registered to cast ballots for more than twenty thousand positions across all levels of government. The task ahead for the most closely watched of those posts—the next president—will be a daunting one, with much riding on two other electoral outcomes: the composition of Mexico’s Congress and the US election five months later.

Following the official three-month presidential campaign, polling indicates that one candidate has a firm lead. Assuming former Mexico City Head of Government Claudia Sheinbaum performs on par with expectations—the latest Reforma poll gives her a 20 percentage point lead over former Senator Xóchitl Gálvez—the candidate of the governing MORENA party will become Mexico’s first female president on October 1. The lack of movement in this poll since the campaign season began on March 1 is noteworthy. Sheinbaum has only dropped 3 percentage points (to 55 percent support) in the last three months. Other polls give Sheinbaum a lead of anywhere from 11 to 22 percentage points, with voter turnout one of the major factors to watch on Sunday.

More uncertain is what will happen in Mexico’s Congress. What has scuttled attempts by the current Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to fully carry out some elements of his government’s plan has been the checks provided by Congress. With a simple majority of seats—rather than the supermajority of two-thirds of the seats—the MORENA coalition rallied to pass some important pieces of legislation, but it has been impeded from making major constitutional changes, including controversial proposals for the popular election of Supreme Court judges and eliminating independent regulators.

Thus, this Sunday’s vote will determine whether López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum, could advance the outgoing president’s stymied constitutional proposals. Polls—although less numerous and harder to calculate given the sheer number of candidates up for election (628 combined senators and deputies)—indicate continuity in Congress. Polls by the newspaper El Financiero, for example, predict that the MORENA coalition will secure 49 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies with opposition parties taking 40 percent. The check on power provided by Congress in this scenario, in which MORENA would lack a supermajority, would likely give assurance to international markets, since uncertainty around such reforms and their repercussions can generate anxiety for investors.

Counting the ways to count

How does Mexico’s unique vote-counting work? While the final congressional breakdown will take some time to determine, expect declarations on the presidential winner on Sunday night. Hours after polls close, results will begin to be shared from two different systems that count votes: the quick count and the preliminary electoral results program (PREP).

The quick count takes a predetermined, statistically representative sample of polling stations, and then it gives a minimum and maximum possible vote percentage for each candidate. Results are expected to be announced around 11:00 p.m. (CST), with all eyes on whether the margin of possible votes indicates a clear winner. The PREP, which is operational beginning at 8:00 p.m. (CST), reports results in real time from all polling stations as transmitted, which means that urban votes are likely to be accounted for earlier in the process. And to make things even more complicated, the official counting does not begin until June 5, thus the importance of the earlier vote-counting methods to give more timely results.

The other election

The next Mexican president will also have a keen interest in the vote-counting on November 5. The US election, and in particular how Mexico figures into the campaign leading up to election day, will set the stage for the coming years of bilateral ties. A newly inaugurated Mexican president may be forced to immediately respond to US campaign rhetoric.

Security and migration are top issues both north and south of the Rio Grande. While Sheinbaum has pledged to continue the current government’s focus on social and educational programs to reduce violence, Gálvez favors a strategy that puts greater emphasis on the security apparatus to combat crime. On migration policy, both candidates would continue to take a human-centered approach that recognizes and seeks to find solutions to the high demand for labor. A third important bilateral issue will be the review period of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, also known as USMCA, as the 2026 sunset clause approaches. This is all the more important now that Mexico is the United States’ number one trade partner. Here, a new Atlantic Council report suggests several ways that the next Mexican administration can unlock even greater border commercial efficiencies and new trade and investment.

Amid a fast-changing global order, a prosperous Mexico and strong US-Mexico ties will be increasingly important for the United States. US and Mexican security and economic concerns are deeply intertwined, as are their people. Sunday’s vote will set a crucial marker for how the relationship develops for the rest of the 2020s.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Warrick quoted in The Latin Times on Border Patrol ties with local businesses

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:46:27 +0000

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How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa

El Mehdi Boudra — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:34:53 +0000

A decade ago, Cabo Verde, a predominantly Christian country, restored its Jewish cemeteries under the patronage of a Muslim leader, King Mohammed VI of Morocco. This vibrant example of Africa’s historical, cultural, and religious diversity was celebrated on March 6, when an assembly of Jews, Christians, and Muslims gathered in Praia, the country’s capital, to commemorate years of efforts to conserve an essential aspect of Cabo Verde’s past. This achievement transcends a single community and embraces a larger vision of Cabo Verdean society. The Jewish cemeteries are now not merely materialized memories but pivotal platforms for fostering interfaith dialogue and, by embodying the spirit of unity in diversity, have become beacons of inspiration for generations.

The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

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In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

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Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

Maria Avdeeva — Thu, 16 May 2024 11:03:17 +0000

Residents of Kharkiv have been monitoring reports with increasing urgency for the past five days as a new Russian offensive edges closer to the city. The stresses of war are nothing new to the Kharkiv population, which has been under daily bombardment since the start of the current year. Nevertheless, the opening of a new front less than half an hour’s drive from the city’s northern suburbs has raised the stakes dramatically.

Since the Russian offensive began last Friday, harrowing footage of burning villages and fleeing civilians has flooded social media, adding to the sense of mounting danger. Evacuation efforts are still underway in the border region, with around eight thousand people so far brought from nearby communities to Kharkiv.

So far, Russian troops have made modest progress, advancing up to eight kilometers into Ukraine and capturing a number of Ukrainian villages. While the incursion is currently regarded as too small in scale to threaten Kharkiv itself, the reappearance of Russian soldiers in the region for the first time since 2022 has sparked considerable alarm and dismay.

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Russia’s new offensive did not come as a complete surprise, of course. On the contrary, the build-up of Russian troops across the border had been common knowledge for weeks. Kharkiv Regional Council member and political sciences professor Halyna Kuts says she has been preparing for some time, and has a bag of emergency items packed and ready.

Kuts is one of many people in Kharkiv to express anger at restrictions preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Due to fears of possible Russian retaliation, most of Kyiv’s partners insist the military aid they supply only be used within Ukraine’s borders. These restrictions prevented Ukraine from attacking concentrations of Russian troops as they prepared for the current offensive. “We could have destroyed them, but we were not allowed to,” says Kuts.

With Russian troops now gradually moving toward the city, Kuts believes the only option is to “dig in” and prepare to defend Kharkiv. “This is no longer a center of culture and science; this is a military fortress. Everyone should be carrying a gas mask, bandages, and water with them at all times,” she says.

In recent days, it has become much rarer to encounter children on the streets of the city. Some families have now left Kharkiv due to the deteriorating security situation, heading west for the relative safety of Poltava, Kyiv, or beyond. Youngsters who remain are obliged to attend classes underground or online.

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Olha Kashyrina, the co-founder of a Kharkiv publishing house specializing in children’s books, has spent recent evenings watching the glow of artillery fire on the horizon as fighting edges closer and closer to her home in Kharkiv’s Saltivka residential district. She estimates that there is now less than twenty kilometers separating her from the Russian army. For the time being, Kashyrina continues working in her publishing business and volunteering to help evacuees find temporary accommodation. However, if Russian troops advance further and the city comes within artillery range, she plans to leave.

Others insist they will not leave Kharkiv under any circumstances. Kashyrina’s publishing house colleague Svitlana Feldman has spent recent days stockpiling power banks, generators, and headlights for employees. “Adaptability is the key skill now,” she explains. One of the most dangerous aspects of daily life in Kharkiv is commuting to the office, so the company now encourages working from home.

Some Kharkiv residents have already fled from the Russian invasion once and do not intend to do so again. Liudmila, who came to Kharkiv from Donetsk when it was first occupied by Russia ten years ago, says she will not evacuate and is instead placing her faith in the Ukrainian army to defend the city, much as it did in 2022. This is a common refrain in today’s Kharkiv. While almost everyone is watching anxiously for signs of an escalation in the current offensive, there is also a mood of defiance and plenty of confidence in the city’s ability to defend itself.

Defiance can be expressed in different ways. For Halyna Kuts, this means proceeding with Kharkiv’s annual Vyshyvanka Day parade on May 16 in one of the city’s underground metro stations. This colorful annual event, which features people sporting Ukraine’s traditional embroidered shirts, is widely seen as a celebration of Ukrainian patriotism and national identity. With Russian troops advancing toward the city, Kuts says it is now more important than ever to host this year’s parade as planned.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 14 May 2024 13:08:20 +0000

Russia launched a cross-border offensive into northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region on May 10, opening a new front in its ongoing invasion. The attack had been widely anticipated, but the apparent ease with which Russian forces were able to penetrate the Ukrainian border sparked considerable alarm and allegations of security blunders.

The debate over Ukraine’s apparent failure to secure the border overlooks the fact that fortifications are typically located some 15 to 20 kilometers behind forward positions. Nevertheless, the renewed presence of Russian troops in northern Ukraine marks a significant escalation in the war.

During the first five days of the offensive, Russia has been able to establish two separate bridgeheads on Ukrainian territory and advance between five and seven kilometers into the country. These modest gains reflect the relatively small numbers of Russian troops involved in the initial incursion. However, that may change in the coming days as the Kremlin has concentrated approximately 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers across the border and continues to reinforce the ongoing offensive.

Ukrainian officials had earlier predicted the start of Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv region toward the end of May or in early June. The recent US decision to grant Ukraine a major new aid package may have convinced the Kremlin to attack earlier than planned in order to exploit the remaining window of opportunity before fresh deliveries of US weapons reach the front lines.

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At this point, Russia’s immediate military goals look to be rather limited, as can be seen from the numbers of troops involved. The initial objective may be the establishment of a buffer zone along the Ukrainian border in the Kharkiv region. This is something Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin leaders have spoken about repeatedly in recent months. If Russian forces do manage to advance further and establish a foothold around 15 kilometers inside northern Ukraine, this would place Kharkiv itself within range of Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s former capital and second-largest city with a prewar population of more than one and a half million, Kharkiv has been subjected to intensive Russian bombing since the beginning of 2024. The city’s power plants were destroyed in March, while residential districts are frequently subjected to missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. There are now fears that Russian artillery could take this campaign of destruction to the next level. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov has repeatedly warned that his city risks becoming a “second Aleppo,” a reference to the Syrian city reduced to rubble almost a decade ago following relentless bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces.

Russia’s end goal appears to be the depopulation of Kharkiv. Moscow aims to make the city unlivable and force the vast majority of its over one million residents to flee. By emptying Kharkiv of its civilian population, the Kremlin hopes to create the conditions for the city’s capture. However, this would require far more troops than Russia currently has available in the region.

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While many observers assume Kharkiv remains Russia’s primary objective, the new offensive may actually be an attempt to destabilize Ukraine’s broader defenses. By opening up a new front in the north of the country, Russia creates dilemmas for Ukrainian commanders and forces them to divert key units that are currently holding the front line in the east of the country.

The present military situation is rapidly evolving and extremely challenging for Ukraine, but it is not yet critical. Indeed, given the clear battlefield advantages enjoyed by defensive forces since the start of the war more than two years ago, the Ukrainian military theoretically has every chance of preventing any major breakthroughs and should also be able to inflict significant losses on advancing Russian forces. However, Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself are currently being severely hampered by an inability to strike Russian targets across the border.

Throughout the war, most of Ukraine’s international partners have insisted that the weapons they provide only be used on Ukrainian territory. These restrictions contradict all military logic and have created uniquely favorable conditions for Russia, which is able to concentrate troops close to the Ukrainian border and prepare to attack without fear of being targeted. Unless Ukraine is granted the right to hit military targets inside Russia, it will be extremely difficult to defeat the current offensive or prevent more cross-border attacks similar the recently opened front in the Kharkiv region.

Russia’s new Kharkiv offensive is an attempt by the Kremlin to capitalize on considerable advantages in both manpower and firepower. Despite suffering staggering losses over the past two years, Putin has succeeded in creating a force far larger than the army that first invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been seriously weakened by more than half a year without major arms deliveries, and is unable to strike back effectively due to restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners. None of this means Russia is guaranteed to succeed, but it does make it far more difficult for Ukraine to prevail.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing

Maria Avdeeva — Tue, 07 May 2024 14:50:36 +0000

Everywhere you look in Kharkiv today, there is evidence of Russian bombing. After four months of relentless aerial attacks, Ukraine’s second city is dotted with ruined buildings, while boarded-up windows have become a ubiquitous feature of the urban landscape. A little over two years ago, this had been a vibrant city known for its many universities and robust industrial economy. It is now becoming the latest symbol of the human suffering inflicted by Russia’s invasion.

There are still plenty of reminders that Kharkiv remains home to over a million people. Freshly planted flowerbeds bloom in bright spring colors. Downtown traffic is still sometimes congested, with delivery boys on bikes and scooters weaving their way through jams of taxi drivers, private cars, and public transport. Supermarkets and many small businesses remain defiantly open, while municipal workers emerge to diligently clear up the mess after each new explosion. But there is no mistaking the menace of sudden death and destruction that now hangs over the city.

Located just thirty kilometers from the Russian border, Kharkiv is Ukraine’s most vulnerable major city and has been on the front lines of the war for more than two years. Russia’s initial blitzkrieg attack on Kharkiv in early 2022 was repelled, with Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive then pushing Putin’s invading army further away from the city. However, since the beginning of 2024, Kharkiv has become the principle target in a new Russian offensive which aims to take advantage of Ukraine’s mounting ammunition shortages and lack of air defenses.

Bombings are now a daily occurrence. Russia employs a mix of weapons including everything from ballistic missiles and drones to vast quantities of long-range glide bombs that are steadily destroying the city from a safe distance. These attacks target residential neighborhoods and critical civilian infrastructure in what appears to be a calculated campaign to make the entire city unlivable.

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Amid the constant threat of bombing, Kharkiv residents continue to display the kind of remarkable resilience that is now synonymous with Ukraine. The city’s Makers coffee chain is a good example of this dogged determination. The chain has actually expanded since the start of the war, doubling its presence in Kharkiv from two outlets to four, while also opening a new branch in the front line city of Kupyansk. Dmytro Kabanets, the twenty nine year old owner of the chain, believes it is vital for local residents to have a sense of community. “The feeling of not being alone is invaluable. People need to know there are others ready to lend a hand, both emotionally and practically,” he says.

Despite this upbeat attitude, he admits staying in business in today’s Kharkiv is becoming more and more difficult. The windows of the chain’s flagship coffee shop are boarded up as a precaution against further bomb damage. Due to Russian attacks on the city’s energy infrastructure, electricity supplies are a major challenge for all local businesses. After both of Kharkiv’s biggest power plants were destroyed in March, the city has experienced rolling blackouts. The rumble of generators has become a background feature of everyday life, with restaurants offering “generator-friendly’ menu items that require minimal power to prepare.

Many analysts believe Russia’s objective is to depopulate Kharkiv ahead of a summer offensive that will aim to seize the city and deliver a decisive blow to Ukrainian resistance. Rumors of looming encirclement and evacuations swirl around on social media, often fueled by Russian disinformation. For now, there is no indication of a mass exodus from Kharkiv, but the strain and trauma of recent months are forcing residents to make hard decisions.

Yevhen Streltsov, who runs the city’s Radio Nakypilo, says everyone approaches the issue of whether to stay or go in a highly personal manner. Some residents are bracing themselves for a repeat of the artillery barrages that rocked Kharkiv in the first months of the war. Others say they will only leave if the city is under direct threat of Russian occupation. “The situation is tense, but there is no panic,” he says, noting that he and his team are determined to continue their mission of broadcasting to the local population.

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For some Kharkiv residents, the stress has already become too much. Exhausted and emotionally drained by months of Russian bombardment, they are heading westward to Kyiv or beyond. Many are leaving their homes for the second time, having returned to Kharkiv after initially fleeing the city in the first days of the invasion.

Inevitably, the outflow of people is having an impact on the local economy. Revenues at the Makers coffee chain have dropped by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Across Kharkiv, companies are reluctantly shutting down as people move their families to safety, with some businesses being put up for sale. Many of the city’s public spaces now feel eerily empty, especially once evening arrives.

It is still far too early to write Kharkiv off. While more and more residents are understandably seeking to escape the horrors of daily bombing, many remain determined to stay put. The population is clearly declining, but it remains nowhere near the lows witnessed during the early months of the invasion, when only around 300,000 people remained in the city.

If Russia does launch a serious campaign to capture or encircle Kharkiv in the coming months, this would represent by far the Kremlin’s most ambitious undertaking since losing the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. The Ukrainian army will fight hard to defend the country’s second city, and they will be supported by a still sizable local population. Given the considerable difficulties Russia has encountered in seizing much smaller towns such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, it is far from certain that Putin’s invading army currently has the offensive capabilities to take Kharkiv.

As the summer campaigning season approaches, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine is rising and requires urgent international attention. Kharkiv is now the focal point of Russia’s entire invasion and is in desperate need of increased air defenses. This is the only way to prevent it from becoming the largest in a long line of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by the Russian military.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv

Maria Avdeeva — Mon, 29 Apr 2024 14:59:56 +0000

Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, is currently the Kremlin’s number one target. Since the start of 2024, Kharkiv has been the primary focus of a Russian bombing campaign that has sought to capitalize of Ukraine’s dwindling supplies of air defense ammunition in order to terrorize the civilian population and destroy vital infrastructure.

The Kremlin’s goal is to make Kharkiv “unlivable” and force a large percentage of its approximately 1.3 million residents to flee. Moscow hopes this will demoralize Ukraine and pave the way for the city’s capture by Russian forces during a widely anticipated summer offensive in the coming months.

Putin is not relying on missiles and drones alone to do the job of depopulating Kharkiv. In recent months, Russia has also unleashed an elaborate information offensive that aims to fuel panic and uncertainty among the city’s embattled population via a combination of aggressive propaganda and destabilizing disinformation.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

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Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Ukrainian government officials and energy sector representatives anticipate that it could take years to repair the extensive damage done to power plants targeted in Russia’s recent attacks. Nor would this necessarily solve the problem. As numerous commentators have already pointed out, repaired facilities would remain vulnerable to future Russian airstrikes. Indeed, some of the plants struck since the beginning of 2024 had only recently been fixed following earlier bombardment.

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There are alternatives to simply repairing Ukraine’s old power grid and hoping for the best. Looking ahead, many industry experts and officials favor a more diverse and decentralized model for the Ukrainian energy sector. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, CEO of Ukrainian electricity transmission system operator Ukrenergo, recently argued that instead of relying on 15 to 20 large electricity generation facilities dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, Ukraine should be aiming to construct a nationwide network featuring hundreds of far smaller power plants.

This national energy upgrade should incorporate the latest technologies and take maximum advantage of Ukraine’s considerable renewable electricity generation capabilities. From a military perspective, it would be significantly more challenging for Russia to inflict critical damage on such a decentralized Ukrainian power grid. With a large number of potential targets spread out across the country, the cost of doing so would also likely be prohibitive.

The Ukrainian private sector can play a critical role in the transformation of the country’s energy industry. For the past two years, Ukrainian companies have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II. They have successfully adapted to incredibly challenging conditions and have overcome a wide range of obstacles, including in the energy sector. But in order to lead the way in building a new generation of power plants, the country’s energy entrepreneurs require access to the necessary financial tools.

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While Ukraine’s energy industry has received considerable financial support since 2022 from international donors and development institutions, most funding has gone to the public sector. This is understandable, given the need to keep state-run critical infrastructure functioning. However, in order to advance to the next stage, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must look to make new projects economically viable for Ukraine’s private sector.

Without access to financing along with additional efforts to minimize the economic risks involved in new projects, the large-scale construction of decentralized energy facilities is unlikely to happen. Ukraine’s state-owned energy companies are already occupied with the restoration of their existing assets, and are not realistically in a position to embark on dozens of new projects in parallel. Providing access to financing could help spur competition within the Ukrainian private sector and pave the way for significant investment.

Much of the financial support for Ukrainian energy initiatives currently comes from international financial institutions. At present, many of Ukraine’s largest private sector players do not meet their criteria, while others are too small to appear on their radar. With little prospect of overcoming financial obstacles, some Ukrainian energy sector companies are already turning their attention to more economically viable projects outside Ukraine. Unless the situation changes, others may follow.

Financing the decentralization of Ukraine’s energy sector should be recognized as a strategic priority. Russia is clearly aiming to destroy the Ukrainian power grid and hopes this will break the country’s ability to resist. Withstanding the Russian attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is therefore vital for the wider war effort. The Ukrainian private sector is a logical partner in this undertaking, but needs access to the financial tools that only the country’s international partners can provide. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, “Give Ukrainian entrepreneurs the financial tools, and they will finish the job.”

Yuri Kubrushko is co-founder of the Green Recovery Fund.

Polymeropoulos book review of “But You Don’t Look Arab and Other Tales of Unbelonging” in The Cipher Brief

gmatchett — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 19:43:31 +0000

Original Source

On April 23, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos wrote a book review for The Cipher Brief of Hala Gorani’s “But You Don’t Look Arab and Other Tales of Unbelonging.”

The review covers the story of Emmy Award-winning international journalist Hala Gorani, from her time as a globe-trotting correspondent and anchor with her own lifelong search for identity as the daughter of Syrian immigrants.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Putin’s plan to depopulate Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 21:26:47 +0000

Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, is in danger of becoming a “second Aleppo” amid a surge in Russian airstrikes, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned this week. In an April 17 interview with The Guardian, Terekhov said that unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defenses from the country’s partners, Kharkiv would suffer the same fate as Syrian city Aleppo, which was partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

Terekhov is the latest in a series of high-profile voices to raise the alarm over the increasingly dire situation in and around Kharkiv. Located in eastern Ukraine close to the front and just thirty miles from the Russian border, the city has been the primary target of a new Russian air offensive that appears designed to depopulate large parts of Ukraine. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported The Economist in early April.

Russian attacks on Kharkiv’s civilian infrastructure and residential districts have increased dramatically over the past few months, killing dozens and leaving the city’s approximately 1.3 million residents with often sporadic access to electricity. A wave of Russian bombings on March 22 proved particularly damaging, destroying Kharkiv’s two main power plants and network of substations in a calculated move to plunge the city into darkness.

Hospitals, businesses, and homeowners are now scrambling to secure generators and other alternative power sources in anticipation of further blackouts, with children forced to study online or in makeshift underground classrooms. For now, most Kharkiv residents appear intent on staying put. However, if the situation does not improve in the coming months, there may be a mass exodus ahead of the winter season. Indeed, many fear that without enhanced air defenses, conditions inside the city could become intolerable much sooner.

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The destruction of Kharkiv would certainly be a major war crime, but it would be far from unprecedented. On the contrary, the methodical depopulation of Ukraine’s second city would be very much in keeping with the destructive tactics employed by Russia ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two years ago.

From Mariupol to Bakhmut, the Russian military has reduced a long list of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble as it has slowly steamrollered forward along the largely static front lines of the war. Although it is not possible to accurately determine casualty figures in areas currently under Russian occupation, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone.

While the Kharkiv region has been the worst hit, the recent escalation in Russian bombardments has impacted the whole country, with attacks on the power grid in particular creating unprecedented challenges for the entire Ukrainian energy sector. This appears to be the result of extensive planning in Moscow, with Russian military officials learning important lessons from the failure of their winter 2022-23 energy infrastructure bombing offensive.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, Russia has began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” the CEO of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

The timing of the current bombing campaign also suggests Moscow is looking to take advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses. With a vital aid package held up in the US Congress for more than half a year, the Ukrainian military is currently suffering from a wide range of shortages, leaving front line commanders and air defense crews with no choice but to ration dwindling supplies of ammunition.

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Ukraine’s main port city and international maritime gateway, Odesa, has been heavily targeted in recent months. Attacks on residential areas in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of northern Ukraine have also accelerated noticeably. In early April, a massive barrage of missiles succeeded in penetrating Ukraine’s depleted air defenses close to the country’s capital, destroying the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. “Why? Because we had zero missiles. We ran out of all missiles,” a clearly exasperated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told PBS NewsHour.

Ukrainian officials are now urgently appealing for extra air defenses to help counter Russia’s bombing campaign. So far, the response has been muted, with only Germany confirming plans to hand over a Patriot system. Others, such as the Netherlands, have offered to purchase Patriot systems on behalf of Ukraine. While these steps are welcome, much more needs to be done to protect Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s infrastructure.

Many analysts believe improved air defenses are not enough and argue that in order to effectively counter Putin’s terror-bombing tactics, Ukraine must be given the necessary long-range weapons to target Russian launch sites. However, this would require Ukraine’s partners to overcome their well-documented fear of escalation and reverse a longstanding ban on the use of Western weapons for attacks inside Russia. At present, there is little sign of that happening.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has already issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Russian military officers over the 2022-23 bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, but this is of little comfort to the beleaguered Ukrainian population, who know it will be years before they see even symbolic justice served. Meanwhile, the current bombing campaign continues to gain momentum. This new air offensive is far more ambitious than Russia’s earlier efforts, with the apparent end goal of rendering entire Ukrainian regions uninhabitable.

Unless Ukraine’s air defenses are dramatically upgraded in the near future, the country will face a humanitarian catastrophe that could potentially define the future course of the war. Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine decisively on the battlefield, but his bombing campaign may yet succeed in breaking Ukrainian resistance by forcing millions of civilians to flee their blacked out homes and ruined cities.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Meloni’s active leadership coincides with the need for Italy to step up to protect its national and European interests, as Europe simultaneously contends with a land war on its eastern front with Russia, navigates strained and worsening economic relations with China, and devises a workable Africa strategy to stem the flow of migrants. To address all these challenges, Italy needs to be the economic and military mainstay of Southern Europe in the Mediterranean.

Linchpin of the Mediterranean

Italy should use its G7 presidency this year to both cement and chart forward a credible strategy toward its reemergence as the indispensable Mediterranean nation in addressing the global challenges posed by revisionist China and Russia.

Italy, in reestablishing its Mediterranean preeminence, needs to act simultaneously as a steady anchor, enthusiastic beachhead, and humane guard post. Italy can and should play an anchor’s role in the economic and military fortification of Europe and NATO’s eastern front. Italian industry is critical in meeting the greater demand for armaments in defense of Europe. Beyond its defense industry, Italy is well positioned to play a critical role in greater north-south infrastructure development linking the Baltic and Black seas with the Adriatic. Italian industry has much to benefit from both these developments.

The Chinese Communist Party’s arbitrary and autocratic handling of the Chinese economy—and its impact on the global economy—has put a premium on diversified and resilient global supply chains. China’s unpredictability necessitates greater commercial engagement between Europe and India and the Indo-Pacific. In short, it calls for closer links between the free and open economies and nations of the Indo-Pacific with that of the Med-Atlantic. Italy, given both its geography and its history, is best positioned to be the Mediterranean beachhead for the European Global Gateway initiative in response to the BRI. The increased flow of Indo-Pacific and Med-Atlantic trade and commerce holds two additional benefits. First, it represents the largest economic driver for fostering growth and development in African economies. Second, it will serve as a timely driver for the development of southern Italian communities. Italy’s recent Africa Summit complements and emphasizes the first point.

A transport and diplomatic connector

The time has come for both the Mediterranean and Italy to accept the mantle as the continental linchpin connecting the free and open economies and societies of the Indo-Pacific and Med-Atlantic. Growing strategic convergence between Rome and Washington may serve as a timely ballast for fortifying NATO, transatlantic solidarity, European resiliency, and Europe’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific. Under Meloni’s energetic leadership and with Italy hosting the G7 later this year, the stage is set for the reaffirmation of Italy as a geostrategic actor with the full support of the United States.

Kaush Arha is president of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.

Paolo Messa is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and founder of Formiche.

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Irregular migration starts well before the US southern border. Focus on the driving causes of the problem.

María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila — Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:09:57 +0000

With US President Joe Biden and former US president (and current candidate) Donald Trump both scheduled to visit the southern border on Thursday, the spotlight is once again on the United States’ immigration policies. But it is an issue that extends well beyond the US-Mexico border. In 2023, a record 520,000 people crossed the treacherous jungle between Colombia and Panama known as the Darién Gap, more than double the number reported the year before, according to figures from the government of Panama. This figure highlights the critical need for comprehensive policies in the United States and in the region that not only ensure citizen and border security but also address migration as part of a broader, interconnected security challenge in the Western Hemisphere, spotlighting the pivotal role of the countries that migrants traverse.

Most immigrant traffic to the United States goes through and comes from Latin America. A lack of economic opportunities, climate vulnerabilities, political instability, and the pervasive influence of organized crime are often cited as push factors for these migrants. However, recent migration patterns also reveal a diversification of nationalities at the US southern border, underscoring the global nature of the challenge. In addition to regional events such as the collapse of Venezuela, political instability in Haiti, violence in Ecuador, and the ongoing and unrelenting crackdown in Nicaragua, conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in the Middle East are also fueling the migration crisis. Most migrants at the US southern border in recent years originated in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, despite the persistent conception of most migrants coming from Central America, in December, more than half of migrant encounters at the US-Mexico border involved citizens of other countries, such as Russia, India, Brazil, Afghanistan, Romania, Turkey, and others.

As such, Latin American countries and the United States should work together to develop and implement policies and strategies that address the driving causes of migration that are specific to the region and mitigate the region-wide risks of such a large migrant flow—much of which now comes from outside the region.

Specifically, the United States should work with the countries originating high numbers of migrants to improve conditions and thus prevent the need for people to leave their countries—whether from Latin America and the Caribbean or other parts of the world. That starts with a holistic security strategy to address the challenges of human, drug, and arms trafficking. Supporting local economic growth and human capital development, employing climate change mitigation and adaptation programs, and fostering coordinated, multifaceted responses to the drug supply chain would create a more secure hemisphere and decrease the number of people fleeing violence.

Additionally, the United States needs to recognize that its current policies aimed at deterring migration are ineffective and often harmful. The hardline policies that were put in place by the Trump administration and have largely been continued by the Biden administration have done little to nothing to curb migration flows. At the US-Mexico border, migration crossings have hit a record high, with more than three hundred thousand Border Patrol encounters with migrants in December. This context demands a reevaluation of current strategies aimed at deterring migration.

Instead of continuing its failed effort at deterrence, Congress should focus on developing humane, legal pathways to migration, recognizing pull factors in the United States, which will decrease the frequency of irregular migration. A straightforward recommendation is for clear, realistic timelines for US judges to expeditiously deliver decisions on asylum cases.

The United States should not take on all of the burden. There are opportunities to work in the region and support regional partners on integrating displaced migrants in third countries, from the region or from other parts of the world, to help alleviate the migration flow to the US border. A new report by the Atlantic Council also puts forward the idea of the United States supporting a regional task force “with the goal of jointly addressing the factors behind irregular migration and insecurity.” The idea builds on the existing work of countries such as Costa Rica and Panama, which are working hand in hand to establish more streamlined, efficient, and unified border crossings. Last week, these two countries, with the assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, inaugurated a one-of-a-kind border facility. Building on the Atlantic Council’s recommendation for a regional task force to address these challenges, the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala are already moving in this direction. The three nations have just “committed to establish an operationally focused trilateral working group aimed at enhancing security, law enforcement processes, and infrastructure along their international borders”—a concrete manifestation of a collaborative approach to solving regional challenges.”

Migration and security are inherently interlinked issues, and the urgency for a collaborative, multifaceted approach to both cannot be overstated. The United States must work with and support other countries in the hemisphere to holistically mitigate the root causes of migration and create safer conditions for citizens across the region.

María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former minister of foreign affairs of El Salvador.

The post Irregular migration starts well before the US southern border. Focus on the driving causes of the problem. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era

Jason Marczak, María Fernanda Bozmoski, Matthew Kroenig — Mon, 26 Feb 2024 20:00:00 +0000

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The strategic interest of the United States and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) lies in strengthening their western hemisphere partnership. Shared borders, economic interests, and security alliances bind these nations, along with a common goal for prosperity.

However, the perception of waning US interest and the rise of external influences necessitate the rejuvenation of and renewed focus on this partnership. In May 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security established the US-LAC Future Strategy Working Group to redefine the US-LAC partnership.

This strategy promotes mutual and inclusive economic growth, renewed cooperation through enhanced commercial and investment ties, a renewed paradigm on bolstering security and reducing migration flows across the region, and a focus on preparedness in the face of natural disasters and the energy transition. Acting on this strategy could significantly benefit US economic and security interests. The United States should capitalize on immediate opportunities, like promoting nearshoring as a means to growth and prosperity across the Americas, while maintaining a medium-term strategy tailored to each country’s specific needs.

This strategy paper highlights the importance of adaptability and practicality, particularly as the global economic landscape evolves and power shifts foresee new leading economies by mid-century. In addition, the strategy advocates for the significance of the US-LAC relationship amid the recalibration of US worldwide interests.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

China pairs actions with messaging in Latin America. The United States should do the same.

By David O. Shullman

China has coordinated trade, financing, and investment with diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and information operations to deepen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should, in turn, pair diplomatic engagement and messaging with greater attention to regional countries’ needs.

China Economy & Business

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

Don’t let geopolitics undermine Latin America’s hard-won free markets

By Stephen B. Kaplan

The United States is concerned about China’s close economic ties to Latin America and the Caribbean; however, the US response should be careful not to undermine longstanding market norms and popular trade liberalization policies

Caribbean China

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

How the United States can counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere

By Atlantic Council

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center present a new series on US and allied strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

China Economy & Business

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Warrick mentioned in NBC on why House Republicans want to impeach secretary Mayorkas

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Feb 2024 21:20:44 +0000

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The post Warrick mentioned in NBC on why House Republicans want to impeach secretary Mayorkas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This year’s bipartisan immigration bill offers a border blueprint for 2025

Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 21 Feb 2024 14:28:20 +0000

On February 7, the US Senate blocked consideration of a bipartisan compromise proposal for border security and immigration, just three days after its public release. The compromise bill was the result of painstaking, months-long negotiations, and may have a longer shelf life than the past few weeks’ political frenzy suggests. While the bill has some flaws, it was the best achievable, bipartisan approach the United States could get in 2024 to break a decades-long gridlock on border security and immigration policy. This landmark bill is worth understanding because it may be the starting point for major reforms in 2025 no matter who wins the White House and the two houses of Congress in the November 5, 2024 election.

How we got into this mess

To simplify this divisive debate, many Republicans want fewer migrants allowed into the United States. Republicans have particularly focused on what they call “catch and release,” a term Democrats consider pejorative (because it likens desperate people fleeing persecution or economic hardship to fish being caught for sport).

When migrants without visas enter the United States, often fleeing violence and extreme poverty in their home countries, many claim political asylum. Current law says that anyone who is physically present on US territory, no matter where they enter, with or without authorization, can ask for asylum. Border Patrol or other Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials can deport individuals entering without authorization using an administrative process called “expedited removal” without going to immigration court, but not if the individual asks for asylum. Those asking for asylum are interviewed under a low initial bar that allow them to pursue their asylum claim in the United States through immigration court if they have a “credible fear” of persecution in their home country. However, because there are too few immigration judges and courts, it takes up to five to seven years to adjudicate most asylum claims. The federal courts will not allow most migrants without visas to be kept in detention for such a long period, because they have not been found guilty of a crime and there are not enough detention beds for millions of asylum applicants. This is especially true of family groups with minor children, for which judicial decisions against long-term detention are even more strict. Hence, judicial decisions require asylum applicants to be released until their cases are heard by an immigration judge.

However, current law says applicants cannot legally work in the United States until six months after they file their asylum claim in immigration court or with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’) US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—a restriction in the law that is not subject to adjustment either way by the executive branch. Until migrants get a work authorization document from USCIS or a decision on their asylum claim, most depend on public aid, funds from relatives, friends, or charities, or work without legal authorization. Currently, more than half of all asylum applications are denied, but many migrants get to live and work in the United States for years until they receive that final decision and, even then, many will not be sent home. This is what entices more than a million migrants a year to pay rapacious human-smuggling cartels so they can make a dangerous, costly trek north through Central America and Mexico to arrive at the southwestern US border.

Democrats and migration advocates, for their part, see the United States as a safe haven for those fleeing persecution and desperate poverty, and say the United States can and should allow asylum claims at the US border. Most Democrats also want to see those who came to the United States without authorization as children receive legal status and a pathway to citizenship. A significant number would extend this offer to law-abiding, hard-working adults who are already here. Most Republicans oppose any kind of what they call “amnesty” for those who came to the United States without authorization. Some businesses, however, see a benefit to having more workers in the United States, especially for low-wage service jobs.

US public opinion, in broad terms, wants to see an immigration system that is both just and fair—allowing deserving applicants to get asylum, while denying entry to those without a valid legal claim.

President Joe Biden was elected in 2020 after campaigning on reversing the restrictive immigration policies of the Donald Trump administration—but the Biden administration did not request additional resources to process large numbers of additional migrants. Starting almost as soon as Biden signed new immigration executive orders on January 20, 2021, congressional Republicans demanded the administration stop the increasing numbers of migrants who began arriving without visas at the US southwest border. In April 2022, the Biden administration released a detailed plan to address the rising numbers, but did not request additional funding for it. As the COVID-19 pandemic eased in 2022, the Biden administration prepared to rescind the authority under federal public-health law used by the Trump administration to turn many migrants away without giving them a hearing on their asylum claims. (Legal challenges to those Trump policies were before the Supreme Court in January 2021, but were dropped after the Biden administration reversed some of the policies.) The Biden administration announced a number of post-pandemic new steps in January 2023, which took effect in May. As has happened in the immediate aftermath of every major immigration policy change in the Obama and Trump administrations, the numbers of migrants initially went down, but then began to increase.

Significantly—and unfortunately—the June 2023 budget deal between Biden and then-Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (the “Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023”) put fiscal restraints on the budgets of the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services (HHS), and State—the departments that collectively fund the border and immigration system. For 2024 and 2025, the only way these departments can get additional funds to address growing needs is through emergency supplemental appropriations.

Understanding the Biden’s administration’s groundbreaking October border supplemental

On October 20, the Biden administration submitted a $105 billion supplemental spending request for Ukraine, Israel, and the Indo-Pacific, including $13.6 billion for border security and immigration. This package responded to Republican demands to condition more money for Ukraine’s defense on the Biden administration doing more about the southwestern border. Unlike regular budget submissions, in which each cabinet department lays out its separate request—making it difficult to see how cross-department programs support each other—this time the administration buried at the end of a detailed fact sheet an excellent laydown that showed with clarity how all the parts of the administration’s border supplemental request worked coherently. The administration wanted to do six things together:

Address the delays in processing asylum and other cases by increasing the number of immigration judge teams by 375, around a 60-percent jump.
Give CBP an additional $4.5 billion for expanded operations, including money for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants to local governments and nongovernmental organizations to provide shelter and services to migrants who were released after being given a notice to appear for their asylum hearing. This would help take the burden off states and cities that otherwise would need to provide aid for these migrants, because most applicants could not legally work. CBP would also get $849 million for inspection technology to detect smugglers trying to get migrants, drugs, and contraband into the United States.
Provide additional government attorneys to process the increased number of asylum cases, and for additional investigators and other personnel, via $2.5 billion for the DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Add asylum officers and technology to more quickly handle the increased workload of processing claims, with $755 million for DHS’ USCIS.
Increase funds for law-enforcement agencies—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency—for support functions, including testing DNA to ensure that adult migrants were not making false claims about being related to the children traveling with them.
Increase migration and refugee-assistance programs at the Department of State by $1.3 billion.

The administration’s logic was to increase the capacity of the entire system that processes asylum and other immigration claims, thus shortening the time that applicants waited for a hearing and reducing the societal burden on supporting migrants until they got decisions in their individual cases. The additional funding for enforcement—and for people, technology, and programs to address smuggling of people and illegal drugs like fentanyl—was intended to respond to both Republican and Democratic concerns.

Administration officials testified before the House and Senate appropriations committees, conducted private briefings on Capitol Hill, and spoke to professional organizations, but did not embark on a major, nationwide public-outreach program to explain the logic of the border and immigration appropriations package to the US public.

Figure 1: Cases pending before immigration courts, fiscal years 1998-2022

If anything, the administration’s border and immigration supplemental could be criticized for not being large enough to erase the growing backlog in asylum cases that began to accelerate during the Trump administration. (See Figure 1.) The best available public study of immigration-court capacity said that to erase the backlog of cases that existed at the end of Fiscal Year 2022 would require increasing the number of immigration judge teams by two hundred each year for five years—implying that the administration’s request for 375 immigration judge teams needed to be thought of as a down payment, not an end state. The total number of pending asylum cases is now even greater, more than three million, likely requiring even more immigration judge teams to resolve the backlog over a five-year period.

Understanding the landmark bipartisan Senate compromise bill

After more than ten weeks of intense negotiations, the bipartisan Senate compromise bill that emerged was the first serious effort in more than a decade to do what Congress has almost never done on border security and immigration: combine major policy changes with the resources required to make those changes succeed. Congress traditionally separates authorizations and appropriations into separate committees that jealously guard their turf. As an Atlantic Council study in December 2020 explained, congressional responsibility for the homeland security enterprise is divided among eleven major committees in the House and nine in the Senate. The executive branch is little better, with four major cabinet departments having important roles (DHS, Justice, HHS, and State) and major policy decisions led by the National Security Council and the Domestic Policy Council, but funding decisions controlled by the Office of Management and Budget. As a previous Atlantic Council report highlighted, aligning policy and resources is a chronic problem in the homeland security enterprise. The bipartisan Senate supplemental, negotiated by key senators with Homeland Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and the White House, represented a landmark in uniting policy changes with increases in resources that are needed to make the policy changes work.

First, on the resource side, the bipartisan Senate compromise proposed to appropriate more money for border and immigration security ($20.3 billion) than the administration requested ($13.6 billion). The bipartisan bill also made major shifts in how that money was allocated.

Some of these shifts were fundamental, and reflected Republican skepticism about how migration cases should be processed faster and more efficiently if the compromise version had passed.

The Department of Justice’s request was cut substantially, but preserved a significant increase of approximately a hundred immigration judge teams. This reduction in judicial capacity from the administration’s October request was offset by an increase in the number of USCIS asylum officers, who would have begun to process cases under the negotiated policy changes for newly arriving migrants who otherwise would have had to wait years for an available immigration judge to hear their legal claims.
ICE would get more than three times the requested amount, with the additional funding going to increase the number of personnel, increase detention space to 46,500 beds, and increase the number of removal flights to return migrants whose claims are denied. To fully unlock the full appropriation, ICE would need to report to Congress that it has increased detention space and the number of removal flights.
USCIS would get substantially more than initially requested to increase the number of asylum officers who, under the new rules made possible by the compromise, could make decisions in most asylum cases.
The compromise version substantially cut funding for supporting migrants awaiting hearings, but still proposed to give FEMA $1.4 billion from CBP for the shelter and services program for migrants awaiting a decision—which, under the new policy changes, should take six months rather than five to seven years.
The Department of State did not get as much as it requested for migration and refugees, and much of the funding it would have received was to increase the capacity of Latin American countries to receive returning migrants whose claims were denied.

The policy changes in the bipartisan Senate version were compromises intended to bring on both Republican and Democratic support:

No longer would there have been a low bar that allows most asylum applicants to stay in the United States for years while waiting for an immigration judge to hear their case.
Instead, thousands of USCIS asylum officers would have made faster decisions on most asylum cases, ideally within six months, without waiting years for the case to be reviewed by an immigration judge. All asylum applicants would have undergone thorough security vetting. Each applicant would need to prove to the asylum officer by “clear and convincing evidence” that they qualify for asylum. The expectation, based on experience, was that most applicants would not qualify for asylum, but those who are found eligible would get immediate work authorization so they can support themselves.
Asylum applicants would get the right to counsel, but at their own expense. (Children and those deemed incompetent would be eligible for government-provided counsel.)
There was a limited appeal option for applicants whose requests were denied, but most cases would not have to be heard by courts. Those found not eligible for asylum would have been removed from the United States. ICE would have had significantly greater resources to carry out removals of those who did not qualify for asylum protection under the Convention Against Torture or other US laws.
If the number of inadmissible migrants exceeded 8,500 in a single day, or five thousand a day over a seven-day period, the bill would have required the Secretary of Homeland Security to “close” the border to asylum claims. Migrants could still claim protection under other US laws, such as the Convention Against Torture, but the standard of proof for such claims is higher and very few migrants qualify for it. Based on current levels of migrants arriving at the southwest border, the border would have been “closed” to asylum claims for most of the past four months, according to those involved in the negotiations.
Afghan allies resettled in the United States after the August 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan would have been allowed to stay and become permanent residents after they passed security vetting.
The bill would have required additional training for Border Patrol officers, improvements in ICE’s “alternatives to detention” program, and upgrades to technology at CBP and USCIS.
USCIS and ICE would get streamlined hiring authorities to hire the thousands of new officers and agents required to implement the bill.

The bipartisan Senate bill went a long way toward addressing long-time Republican concerns. If the bill had been passed and implemented (and funded) in subsequent years, it would have significantly reduced the use of “catch and release” because those migrants who qualified for asylum would get a much faster determination and be eligible for work more quickly. Those not eligible would have been removed from the United States much more quickly than at present.

For Democrats, the compromise bill did not address important issues like adults who came to the United States as children without authorization—called Dreamers, from the proposed Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. Many Democrats also objected to the new asylum restrictions. However, for Democrats and migration advocates, the bipartisan Senate compromise promised faster determination of asylees’ eligibility and additional resources, including faster work authorization, to integrate those eligible into US society. This represented a significant improvement over the present situation, in which cities are being overwhelmed by needing to support those awaiting their court dates.

The bipartisan Senate compromise, while a definite improvement over the alternative of current funding levels and nothing else for a year, did have its flaws and limitations.

The most serious concern was that the additional resources would not be sufficient to process all asylum applicants within six months of arrival. But even if more personnel and resources would ultimately have been required, the compromise bill was an important first step.
The system set up by the bill would have taken at least two years to become fully operational—hiring and training the additional officers, agents, judges, and other personnel, buying the additional screening technology, and expanding needed facilities. In the meantime, the backlog of three million cases would not be reduced, and might increase further.
The bill did not clarify the status of migrants already here, leaving millions of people in limbo for years, waiting for their claims to be heard. There is no bipartisan consensus on what to do about this.
The bill tried to prioritize dealing with the current influx of new arriving migrants and did not have a clear plan or the resources to address the backlog of more than three million pending immigration cases. Even so, the compromise was a rational approach to the increasing numbers of migrants arriving every week. In an ideal world of bipartisanship, additional work would need to take place to develop an approach for eliminating the current backlog of cases.
One of the most fundamental problems with the bipartisan Senate bill was that it did not end the incentives for people to pay smugglers to get them to the US southwest border. To be fair, a small group of senators trying to negotiate a complex legislative package has limits on what it could try to achieve in ten weeks. But the bipartisan Senate bill can be fairly described as treating the symptoms of the problem, not the underlying condition. Even so, as doctors say, the first priority is often to stabilize the patient before treating the underlying conditions. There are three approaches that could help with the underlying conditions.
- Since July 2021, the Biden administration has had a “root causes” strategy, directed by Executive Order 14010, focused on reducing the “push” factors that drive migrants to leave home and make the dangerous and (to them) expensive journey north. Republicans, in particular, are leery of Democratic efforts to address the root causes of what is a global migration crisis. It is true that violence, extreme poverty, and the effects of climate change on agriculture are driving millions of people worldwide to believe they have no choice but to leave their homes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia and come to the United States, Europe, or richer countries in Asia. Solving the root causes driving global migration will take a decade or more, at a global price tag that starts in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and there is no bipartisan consensus in Congress ready to take on even a significant part of this challenge.
- Deciding who is eligible for asylum before migrants arrive at the southwest border would be a more practical, but still ambitious, approach. The Biden administration proposed this as a policy initiative and set up small “Safe Mobility Offices” in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Columbia that are under-resourced but starting to show promise. However, the administration has not put forward publicly a comprehensive plan (that is, policy plus personnel plus resources plus legislative language) comparable to the October border supplemental or the bipartisan Senate bill. Under this approach, people in Latin America could appear before a US official in their home country, or at least in a nearby safer country, and get a binding determination of their eligibility for asylum before they travel thousands of miles in the hands of dangerous smuggling cartels. Setting up asylum “overseas processing centers” in countries like Colombia, Panama, or Mexico would probably be more efficient and less costly overall than dealing with more than one million people per year coming into the United States who are hoping they can win their cases—when the reality is that very few will succeed. (The United States currently does almost all refugee interviews and processing overseas, so there is precedent for this model.) Overseas processing centers for asylum applicants would take several years to develop, and each center would effectively become a small “American” city of several thousand US or international citizens (including US asylum officers, support staff, and security) in the middle of Mexico or several Central American countries. This would require negotiations comparable in complexity to setting up a US military base in a foreign country—which the United States has done many times. Even if a civilian overseas processing center is less expensive than a military base, three or four would likely cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars each once salaries, housing, and facilities are included.
- Tackling the criminal cartels responsible for most of the smuggling is another line of effort the Senate compromise did not emphasize. This would require increased efforts by US and Latin American law enforcement, military, intelligence, judges, and prisons. The limited success the United States has had against narcotics cartels shows that this will not be easy.

The shifting politics

The idea of joining a year’s worth of military assistance to Ukraine and Israel to more money for border security and migration arose in late 2023 after it became clear Ukraine would need more help against Russia’s invasion, Israel would need help after Hamas’s October 7 attack, and increasing numbers of migrants were continuing to arrive at the US southwest border after the end of the pandemic. Under the Biden-McCarthy budget deal, the only way to get additional funds was through an emergency supplemental appropriation.

In late November, Republicans said they would require immigration policy changes as a condition for passing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Over the next ten weeks, a group of Senate Republicans and Democrats, with participation from Mayorkas and White House officials, worked on what became the bipartisan compromise announced February 4. The secrecy of the talks had many stakeholders worried their core interests and values were at risk. In hindsight, it appears that the secrecy was what made compromises on several key points possible.

However, in mid-January, with the release of the bipartisan Senate compromise imminent and following a White House meeting with congressional leadership on the overall package, the table was overturned when former president and likely Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump said social media “I do not think we should do a Border Deal, at all, unless we get EVERYTHING needed to shut down the INVASION of Millions & Millions of people, many from parts unknown, into our once great, but soon to be great again, Country!”

This provoked a reaction from the former president’s supporters, leading Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to call the deal “dead on arrival” even before details had been released. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, after initially supporting the bill when its text was rolled out on February 4, said on February 5 that Republicans should vote against a procedural vote scheduled for February 7. Biden addressed the nation on February 6, calling for public support for the bipartisan Senate compromise. A key procedural vote in the Senate to move the bill forward, which needed 60 votes, failed 49-50. On February 11, the Senate voted 67-27 to move forward with the Ukraine, Israel, Indo-Pacific, and humanitarian packages—everything except border security and immigration.

The debate on the Senate compromise was significantly affected by misinformation (and disinformation) about the bill’s provisions. Most notably, the bill’s number of five thousand inadmissible migrants who would trigger the border being “closed” to asylum seekers was twisted into the idea that five thousand inadmissible migrants would be allowed into the United States. (See above for the details of how this would really have worked.) The reality was that those five thousand migrants would be subjected to the full panoply of security checks and legal requirements for asylum, so that only the small number actually eligible for asylum would actually be allowed to stay in the United States. This provision started, ironically, from a Republican demand that the Biden administration “close the border” whenever there were large numbers of migrants trying to cross without authorization, and the five-thousand figure was a compromise that Democrats could accept in order to write the authority into law. (Democrats were no doubt aware that a future Republican administration would almost certainly use this authority.) Biden said on January 24 he would use this authority. Republicans claimed he did not need additional authority, but the Republican interpretation would be open to judicial challenges, whereas Section 244B(f) of the bipartisan compromise would have significantly narrowed the courts’ ability to overturn such a determination. This kind of attention to detail was largely lost in the claims by the compromise’s opponents.

Make no mistake: A year of not having additional resources to deal with the current numbers of arriving migrants will further severely strain the nation’s immigration system. Officials in cities like New York and Denver are saying they are at a breaking point. ICE is talking about having to release detainees to cover a $700 million shortfall. CBP will have to pull money away from increasing processing capacity for cargo and arriving lawful travelers—increasing delays and holding back the US economy. Taking away funds needed by FEMA for disaster relief will directly hurt the millions of US citizens who suffer from natural disasters and have nowhere else to turn. Strains on CBP and ICE personnel will likely increase turnover as many leave for other, less stressful law-enforcement positions. While Trump said he will run on his vision for border security, Biden said on February 6 that Democrats will ask voters to hold Trump and Republicans responsible for blocking the Senate compromise.

The prospects for either side getting a better deal after the November 2024 election are limited. If Biden is reelected, expectations are that he will still face a closely divided Congress, and the problems with the border and immigration system will likely have grown worse with congressional inaction during 2024.

If Trump is elected, his December 2023 vow to be a “dictator” on “day one” and close the US border should be taken seriously. Doing this through executive authority alone would lead to immediate court challenges, because the right to claim asylum is written into federal statutes. Even if Trump then demanded that DHS and Justice Department officials defy federal court orders and promised those officials pardons if they carried out his instructions, my assessment is that few federal officials outside of Trump’s immediate orbit would do it. They likely would not want to jeopardize their post-Trump careers by defying federal court injunctions to enforce existing laws that allow asylum applicants to remain in the United States until their claims are heard by an immigration judge. Courts and Democrats are likely to slow down some of Trump’s most ambitious plans. Democrats will point to the 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise as the best offer a Trump administration may get if it needs Democratic votes to pass a budget or statutory changes.

It is always possible that whoever wins in November 2024 will overreach in 2025 on immigration policy and a one-party approach in 2025 will go nowhere. It is also possible that the outcome of the failure of the bipartisan Senate proposal in 2024, plus a year of inaction, may convince a supermajority in the Congress that a bipartisan approach is essential, desirable, and unavoidable.

Thus, the details of the bipartisan Senate compromise could well become the starting point for talks in 2025.

Recommendations

Two core ideas of the bipartisan compromise should be maintained:
1. Resource decisions and policy decisions on border security and immigration need to be linked—advancing one without the other will not work.
2. In the absence of truly comprehensive immigration reform, increased funding for the back-office functions to process asylum and other immigration cases within weeks, not years, is essential. This will provide both Republicans and Democrats with important parts of what they want: an end to “catch and release” and an immigration system that is just, fair, and reflects US values.
The Biden administration should adjust its budget numbers for Fiscal Years (FY) 2025 and 2026 to include ramping up the hiring of additional officers, agents, judges, and support personnel needed to implement something like the bipartisan Senate compromise with the goal that something like the 2024 bipartisan compromise can be enacted sometime in late FY 2025. These additional personnel are needed to address the current backlog and numbers of arriving migrants, even if the policy changes could not be made. Hiring and training more people will take time to implement—and should be ramped up as soon as possible.
For future federal budget negotiations, the Biden administration should make funding for the Department of Homeland Security part of the “revised security category” that currently includes only military spending (budget account 050). This may sound technical, but it would have fundamental, far-reaching consequences to strengthen US security. Future negotiations between a Democratic White House and a Republican-led house of Congress (whether the House or Senate) are likely to involve tradeoffs between security spending and domestic spending. This was the essence of the negotiations during the past decade, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. However, the 2023 budget deal ended up pitting more funding for homeland security against other domestic spending priorities. Instead, both Democrats and Republicans would benefit politically from thinking of border security and immigration as integral to the security of the United States, so no one thinks of DHS as a “non-security” program during federal budget negotiations.
The Department of Homeland Security and the homeland security enterprise need to think of their mission as: “We lead the defense of the nation against non-military threats.” To the greatest extent possible, both DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to become more nonpartisan and “above politics.” This was a core recommendation of the Atlantic Council’s Future of DHS report in September 2020. It remains valid today.
As a long-term goal, DHS and the homeland security enterprise will be better off separating from the most partisan, toxic aspects of immigration policy. At one time, monetary policy was one of the most divisive issues in US politics. Most college students who take US history courses hear of William Jennings Bryan’s famous 1896 “cross of gold” speech, with few understanding the parallels between the divisiveness of monetary policy then and immigration policy today. It took the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 to take the bulk of monetary policy out of the hands of Congress and the White House. Congress set broad goals—currency stability and full employment—and then let the Federal Reserve Board decide how to balance both goals. Over the past century, admittedly with some dramatic ups and downs, the US economy has led the United States to a level of prosperity and security without precedent in human history. Something comparable for US immigration policy could help drive both security and prosperity for the next century.

About the author

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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The post This year’s bipartisan immigration bill offers a border blueprint for 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

President Zelenskyy’s dual citizenship proposal presents wartime dilemmas

Mark Temnycky — Thu, 08 Feb 2024 21:24:32 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy marked the country’s recent Unity Day holiday on January 22 by thanking Ukrainians around the world for their wartime support and calling for changes to the Ukrainian Constitution that would allow for dual citizenship. Zelenskyy confirmed he was submitting the relevant legislative proposal to the Ukrainian Parliament.

If passed, the bill would allow Ukrainians to hold more than one citizenship. This would have significant implications for Ukraine itself and for the large international Ukrainian diaspora. According to the Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian diaspora currently numbers around 20 million people. Most would potentially be eligible for Ukrainian citizenship. Restrictions on dual citizenship have previously deterred many members of the diaspora from applying for Ukrainian passports.

Zelenskyy’s proposal has been welcomed by many within the Ukrainian diaspora. If adopted, it could help strengthen ties between Ukraine itself and the global Ukrainian community, while granting diaspora members an opportunity to have a greater say in Ukraine’s development. It would make it far easier to visit Ukraine and open a business, purchase property, or otherwise invest in the country, while also providing diaspora Ukrainians with the chance to vote in elections or even run for office themselves.

For existing Ukrainian citizens, acquiring a second passport would potentially open multiple doors in terms of travel, work, and study. Ukrainians have enjoyed visa-free access to the European Union’s Schengen Zone for limited time periods since 2017, and have also benefited from a range of measures to ease border restrictions since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Nevertheless, the prospect of holding an EU, US, or other Western passport would certainly appeal to many.

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While there is likely to be considerable public support for Zelenskyy’s dual citizenship proposal, any attempt at implementation in today’s wartime environment could prove highly problematic. Crucially, it remains far from clear what the initiative would mean for military service.

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now approaching the two-year mark, most analysts believe the conflict has evolved into a war of attrition. With its far larger population, economy, and industrial base, this places Russia at a considerable advantage. The Russian military has also demonstrated a striking disregard for heavy losses in Ukraine, repeatedly employing so-called “human wave” or “meat assault” tactics to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses by sheer weight of numbers.

Ukraine cannot afford to accept such high casualty rates. The country has a far smaller pool of military-age men to draw from, and has already experienced a major decline in population as a direct result of Russia’s invasion. Current martial law restrictions mean most Ukrainian males eligible for military service are not permitted to exit the country. However, if changes to the Ukrainian Constitution made it possible to apply for a second citizenship, opportunities may arise for Ukrainian citizens to use newly acquired passports in order to leave Ukraine and avoid conscription.

Meanwhile, a relaxation in Ukraine’s dual citizenship restrictions could also potentially result in members of the Ukrainian diaspora who took Ukrainian passports becoming eligible for military service. Any uncertainty over the status of new passport holders with regard to conscription would be likely to deter many from applying.

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The issue of military service is currently high on the Ukrainian wartime agenda amid debate over how best to bolster the depleted ranks of the army. A recent proposal by Ukraine’s military chiefs to conscript up to 500,000 civilians has met with a mixed reaction in Kyiv, with Zelenskyy refusing to offer his public support and instead calling for further details before making a decision.

Differences of opinion over the correct approach toward mobilization are believed to have contributed to mounting tensions between Ukraine’s civilian and military leadership. This was widely cited as a contributing factor behind Zelenskyy’s February 8 decision to replace Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny. Any constitutional changes to introduce dual citizenship would further complicate an already challenging and politically sensitive situation.

President Zelenskyy’s proposal to enshrine the right to dual citizenship in the Ukrainian Constitution reflects growing awareness of the important role played by the global Ukrainian diaspora. If implemented, it would probably prove a popular measure that would significantly increase the number of Ukrainian passport holders and provide millions more people with a stake in the country’s future. However, there are a number of practical reasons why progress on this issue remains unlikely in the current wartime conditions.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A renewed Italian role in the Mediterranean

Since assuming office in October 2022, Meloni has made the Mediterranean a focal point of her foreign policy agenda. From addressing irregular migration to reducing reliance on Russian energy, the motivations behind this agenda are clear: the Mediterranean Sea, with its strategic location as a gateway to three continents and its abundant natural gas and oil resources, is crucial for Italy. This truth holds as much weight today as it did historically when the Roman Empire sought to assert its dominance by controlling the Mediterranean region.

In her first year as prime minister, Meloni visited Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. During her first diplomatic mission, she orchestrated a two-day visit to Algeria alongside Claudio Descalzi, the chief executive officer of Italian energy company Eni, signaling an effort to further her predecessor Mario Draghi’s strategy of reducing Italy’s dependence on Russian gas. Throughout the visit, she emphasized a “virtuous model of collaboration” between African and European partners. She also took part in numerous photo opportunities with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, to underscore her efforts to emphasize the warm relationship between Italy and Algeria.

In early 2023, Meloni continued her engagements with North African leaders, traveling to Tripoli, Libya, where she met with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah to finalize substantial energy investment agreements, address migration challenges, and discuss security threats posed by Sahelian Islamist groups. During her visit, Eni and Libya’s National Oil Company signed an eight-billion-dollar gas investment deal aimed at facilitating exploration and production for both domestic and European markets. Additionally, Italy provided Libya with five ships for the Libyan coast guard to bolster patrols against irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

In July 2023, Meloni made two separate visits to Tunisia in under ten days, following a surge in migration from the North African country to Italy. Along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Meloni negotiated the signing of a memorandum between the European Union and Tunisia worth 150 million euros, aimed at revitalizing Tunisia’s economy and strengthening its coast guard capacities to combat irregular migration.

Middle power or global player?

Italy has long grappled with formulating a cohesive foreign policy, oscillating between assertiveness and mediation. During the Cold War, Italy assumed the role of a mediator, often acting as an intermediary between the United States and the Eastern bloc in the Mediterranean. Hindered by its struggling economy and internal ideological divisions, Italy failed to attain the status of an assertive, leading power capable of guiding rather than following.

Italy’s engagement in the Mediterranean has followed a similar path, vacillating between prominent and passive stances. In the 1950s and 1960s, Eni founder Enrico Mattei positioned the company to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies in North Africa through strategic alliances with countries such as Egypt under Gamel Abdel Nasser. These efforts were in part aimed at strengthening Italy’s role in the region.

But since the early 2000s, and especially in the wake of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, Italy’s approach to the Mediterranean has been primarily reactive. Policies such as former Prime Minsiter Enrico Letta’s “Mare Nostrum,” aimed at tackling Mediterranean challenges through multilateralism and economic development, and former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s “Minniti Plan,” emphasizing border control and law enforcement, were chiefly reactive strategies to the perceived migration crisis gripping Europe. These strategies often lacked a cohesive long-term vision and strategic foresight, relying instead on short-term fixes.

A path to renewal

The Mattei Plan for Africa seeks to establish an Italian agenda that prioritizes Africa’s needs and avoids predatory practices. Through investments in infrastructure and renewed energy, Italy aims to reclaim an assertive role in the region.

For this repositioning to succeed, however, the Meloni government must avoid repeating past mistakes. Instead, it should adopt forward-looking approaches aligned with global trends, such as addressing climate change and providing green energy solutions, while forging lasting relationships with African elites committed to impactful policies. While short-term gains may appeal to transient foreign policy agendas, it is the pursuit of long-term benefits that distinguishes leaders with enduring legacies.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

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A thirsty reality: Iran’s dire water situation

Nik Kowsar — Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:22:35 +0000

Despite climate warnings since 1988, Iranian officials have consistently ignored regional environmental concerns, especially following the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). For example, they prioritized dam construction and increased groundwater extraction for food self-sufficiency, disregarding environmental impacts. Former Agriculture Minister Issa Kalantari is now warning of irreversible groundwater depletion, with an annual deficit of over 30 billion cubic meters (BCM). This acknowledgment raises concerns about the sustainability of Iran’s current water management practices, particularly when hundreds of dams constructed after the war are not in good condition.

During Iran’s population surge—ten to over eighty-five million over the course of a century—its renewable water resources have gone from 130 BCM to 80-85 BCM. Projections indicate a potential halving of resources by 2041, raising concerns as Iran’s population is expected to surpass 100 million. Per capita water availability for Iranians may drop below 500 cubic meters, marking absolute scarcity. Once adept at groundwater management, Iran now faces consequences like land subsidence due to depleting groundwater, which affects food self-sufficiency. This has led to farmers abandoning lands, causing an influx of ten million people into the outskirts and shanty towns since 2013—ten times the number of Syrian villagers migrating during the 2006-2009 drought in the Hasakah governorate. Many researchers have linked the Syrian conflict to this drought.

Regardless of the numerous opportunities to enhance its water management policies, the government persistently adheres to the path of Iran’s “Water Mafia”—a non-official alliance that comprises the energy ministry, executives, academics, consulting engineers, influential contractors, and a cadre of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders overseeing the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. Disturbingly, if this group opts to construct a dam like Gotvand—where a multimillion-ton mass of salt became a part of the reservoir despite many warnings about this possibility due to nearby saline geological formations—there seems to be no governing authority capable of halting their actions.

The concept of top-down decision-making in Iran is not novel; Iranians have been acquainted with such a system for centuries. However, the adverse effects of water mismanagement have never wrought such devastation on the land and its water resources (the latter of which are steadily diminishing). Since the 1980s, when President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s post-war reconstruction plans garnered substantial attention, the landscape of Iran has been transformed by the construction of numerous dams along rivers, absorbing considerable financial resources over time.

In the late 1980s, the establishment of two key organizations—the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, equipped with significant machinery and war-acquired experience, and the Iran Water & Power Resources Development Company (IWPC)—resulted in an enduring business alliance. IWPC was founded by a group of engineers, mainly consisting of the students who occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. During Rafsanjani’s era and beyond, those entrusted with managing water and agriculture, despite warnings from experts, advertised that constructing dams and transferring water between watersheds would guarantee self-sufficiency. However, these decisions, made without consultation with independent and qualified experts, led to a decline in lakes, wetlands, rivers, and groundwater sources.

In 2016, many believed that a successful nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions would allow the Islamic Republic to address its financial challenges, solve the water crisis, and rehabilitate its endangered lakes and rivers. The Center for Naval Analysis, an institute in Washington, later warned the US government of escalating and enduring water tensions that could lead to local protests, potentially sparking violence worldwide and undermining US national interests. The report also highlighted the possibility of global terrorism and civil war over shared resources. This warning gained attention in December 2017-January 2018 during an unexpected uprising in Iran that reverberated across the nation—the largest at the time since the 1979 revolution. Thousands protested, leading to swift intervention from security forces. Official reports acknowledged over twenty casualties, with unofficial sources suggesting the death toll exceeded fifty. The critical aspect was that protestors lost their lives in towns that were struggling with the harsh impacts of water scarcity.

In 2019, the nation witnessed another widespread uprising, with reports indicating that over 1,500 protestors lost their lives at the hands of security forces. In Mahshahr, a town in the Khuzestan province in southern Iran, and other towns, individuals affected by the regime’s detrimental water policies were fatally shot. The unrest persisted into 2020 and 2021, as people in Khuzestan clashed with security forces over water-related issues, resulting in further loss of lives. Despite being considered a water-rich province, with major rivers like Karun, Karkheh, and Jarrahi, and possessing vast oil and gas reserves, Khuzestan has tragically become a victim of poor water management. Many rivers and marshes in the region have dried up due to the water management schemes implemented by the government and the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

Amidst the desiccation of wetland areas—exemplified by Hoor-al-Azim in Khuzestan—intricate sediment deposits have become susceptible to the elements. With even the faintest breeze, these minuscule particles ascend into the air, launching as dust storms that target the cities within the province. This matter has engendered a noteworthy deterioration in air quality across various sectors of Khuzestan, concurrently fostering the widespread illness of thousands of residents in the province.

Inequities in Iranians’ access to water

Iran’s uneven water rights approach disproportionately impacts citizens in marginalized provinces, causing severe water scarcity. Provinces like Sistan and Baluchistan, Kerman, Fars, Isfahan, Southern Khorasan, Hamedan, Yazd, Khorasan-e Razavi, and Semnan face widespread water poverty due to disappearing lakes, groundwater depletion, and contamination. Projects like the Karun-3 dam and the Khersan-3 dam, as well as water allocation, displace residents, resulting in enduring hardships. On top of this, climate change and vanishing glaciers intensify water losses in different river basins. Inter-basin water transfers fuel further tension, benefiting lobbyists and the Water Mafia while simultaneously exacerbating environmental injustice against marginalized populations. Despite government assurances, residents of Zayandeh Rud basin resort to illegal well pumping, causing groundwater depletion, land subsidence, and health issues, threatening Isfahan’s existence. In northern Iran, Lake Urmia has dried up due to dam construction and unsustainable farming, leaving behind a saline desert filled with residues and particles contaminated by industrial and human wastewater and chemical fertilizers. Strong winds disperse these toxic particles, harming millions in nearby areas.

Despite the evidence of human and environmental damage from expensive water management projects, it has been empirically proven that, in many regions of Iran, nature-based solutions—unlike dam constructions and inter-basin water transfers—are more efficient and cost-effective. But Iran’s Water Mafia consistently opposes projects prioritizing efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as these initiatives undermine their ability to extract commission money.

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Nowadays, IRGC generals and water executives have fallen in love with seawater desalination, a technology practiced mainly by Israel and nations in the Persian Gulf region. As FAO’s Slim Zekri told me, the production cost of one cubic meter of freshwater in the Persian Gulf is approximately $1. However, an insider in Iran revealed to me that the actual cost of freshwater production in the country exceeds $1.5. This is influenced, in part, by sanctions and the absence of a direct business relationship with Israel, which is the proprietor of Reverse Osmosis (RO) technology and the primary manufacturer of RO filters. The expense of transporting this water through a pipeline to central Iran, nevertheless, significantly escalates the overall cost to almost $5 per cubic meter.

The harmful impact of desalination plants is not often disclosed to the Iranian public. The hot brine is disposed of in the shallow Persian Gulf, leading to an environmental massacre. Many fish species have migrated from the extremely saline waters and coral reefs are experiencing bleaching and dying. In some circles, it has been said that the price tag of establishing this infrastructure and its pipelines is over $8 billion, and that it would produce a minimal amount of freshwater—approximately 4 BCM per year in 2044.

Iranian experts have developed cost-effective methods to manage flash floods and recharge aquifers by storing water underground, potentially saving at least 30 BCM annually at a cost of less than $8 billion. With an anticipated cost of nearly $500 per hectare for implementation, the execution of this project over a 14-million-hectare area would result in an expenditure of approximately $7 billion. Additionally, the resulting annual water storage capacity would surpass 40 billion cubic meters, even in a dry year. This approach would inspire a reverse migration among farmers and the reclamation of ancestral lands. Surveys suggest it can be implemented on nearly 8 percent of Iran’s land, providing water savings and flood protection while positively impacting microclimates.

Empowering farmers to establish floodwater management co-ops safeguards resources, mitigates destructive floods, and ensures water storage. The positive environmental impact of artificial recharge and spate irrigation, which would provide an extra 50 percent to Iran’s annual renewable water resources, stands in contrast to desalination’s minimal water addition and environmental drawbacks. Despite viable alternatives, regime insiders choose to sacrifice natural resources for a slight commission increase from an $8 billion project.

How can the United States help?

Compelling data underscores the dire situation facing millions of rural Iranians, pushing them to abandon their ancestral lands due to a substantial decline in groundwater resources. Projecting forward, if current climate conditions persist and water management remains inadequate, a mass exodus appears imminent. This demographic shift could significantly impact the United States’ interests and security concerns in the Middle East and beyond. In recognizing Iranians as potential allies, the United States could prioritize their well-being in alignment with its national interests. Transforming Iran’s water situation necessitates a fundamental shift towards a democratic system that values knowledge and encourages active public participation, departing from the prevailing top-down decision-making model.

The United States can help Iranians through technical assistance and knowledge transfer, capacity building and training, and supporting civil society as well as promoting climate change adaptation.

For Iranians, learning from Israeli water experts and the authorities who established Israel’s national water company (Mekorot) in 1937—a centralized body predating the nation’s formation by eleven years—is imperative. Such an entity should possess the capability to address the challenges posed by a changing climate, fostering resilience in Iran while concurrently navigating diplomatic intricacies related to shared water resources with neighboring nations. This approach aims to alleviate tensions and initiate regional cooperation within the Middle East and North Africa region. The United States has the ability to financially support the establishment of an organization like Mekorot situated outside of Iran. This organization, once operational, could initiate the implementation of modified water management methods, effectively alleviating damages resulting from the mismanagement of the Islamic Republic. Strategic intervention of this nature can contribute to achieving a state of relative stability following the possible decline of the Islamic Republic.

The pursuit of sustainable improvements in Iran’s water management requires a concerted effort toward capacity building in civil society and water-dependent sectors. American institutions, drawing on successful initiatives predating 1979, are well-positioned to play a pivotal role in this regard. Despite historical criticisms of Truman’s Point 4 Program and Iran’s adoption of the American “Hydraulic Mission,” a tailored sustainable development approach is crucial. Oversight by Iranian-American academics, who are well-versed in Iran’s environmental challenges, can ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives. Renowned figures in the agricultural and water sectors within the Iranian community can serve as exemplars, showcasing successful practices applicable to diverse regions in Iran. Disseminating knowledge through online training courses, television programs, and instructional animations demonstrating sustainable solutions can help diminish reliance on the authoritarian governance of the Islamic Republic. Foreseeing potential uprisings in Iran, particularly arising from water and environmental crises, emphasizes the need to promote democratic practices in the agricultural and environmental sectors. In early 2024, severe air pollution led to school closures in major cities, prompting protests in Ardekan and Arak against regional pollution linked to local and national industrial policies. The substantial decline in rainfall and snowfall heightens the imminent risk of severe water shortages in the upcoming spring and summer, which suggest a likely escalation in protests and instability based on historical trends.

The prevailing patriarchal system in Iran has hindered genuine democratic experiences, impeding accountability for officials and elites. In contrast, the US environmental management evolution, driven by civil society activism, led to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and pivotal legislation like the Clean Water Act. This empowered communities to influence projects, challenging top-down decision-making. The evolving social landscape in Iran provides an opportunity to transmit the experiences of American groups effectively. This would enable Iranians to envision impactful changes through civil means in their protests, aligning with the democratic values witnessed in US environmental governance.

Sharing knowledge builds trust and fosters cooperation and partnership between Iranians and Americans in alignment with US national interests, especially in the Persian Gulf region. While US institutions have shared rainfall and groundwater data with Iranian scientists, expanding these efforts is crucial. Disseminating valuable information to farmers, stakeholders, and shareholders in Iran is vital for informed decision-making and sustainable practices in water and environmental management. Addressing financial constraints for talented Iranian students is essential and would empower them to study under top Iranian-American academics, facilitating knowledge exchange on updated water management methods. This collaborative effort within academia has the potential to significantly impact water and environmental management in Iran, contributing to the preservation of natural resources.

In a warming climate with a deteriorating water situation, Iran confronts declining livelihoods due to the Islamic Republic’s poor management, prompting potential mass migration and instability. Despite Iranians’ inclination to engage with the United States, a human-made drought affects them. In the post-Islamic Republic era, Iranians require the United States to be a reliable partner to navigate challenges while respecting integrity and choices. This partnership, which is crucial for US national security, should begin sooner rather than later. Iranian experts are prepared to establish their Mekorot today and initiate planning for a new environmental system to address resource mismanagement.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-Canadian water issues analyst. He produces and hosts a weekly TV show addressing Iran’s water situation, broadcast on several satellite TV channels. Follow him on X: @nikahang.

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Ecuador has declared ‘internal armed conflict’ against criminal gangs. What’s next?

Isabel Chiriboga — Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:23:23 +0000

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa started the new year with a declaration of “internal armed conflict” against criminal groups, coupled with a sixty-day state of emergency. Earlier this week, two leaders of criminal groups—José Adolfo Macías Salazar, alias “Fito,” of the group Los Choneros, and Fabricio Colón Pico, alias “Capitan Pico,” from Los Lobos—escaped from prison. The escape was accompanied by a series of prison riots, car bombs, kidnappings, and criminal attacks on a television channel and a university in Guayaquil. The Noboa administration’s first steps to address the violence and turmoil have been positive, but this will be a long battle and one for which Ecuador urgently needs international support.

In December 2023, there had been a glimmer of hope. Ecuadorian Attorney General Diana Salazar carried out a large-scale investigation called Caso Metástasis. This operation exposed the extensive reach of criminal groups within the country’s state institutions, carrying out seventy-five raids and arresting more than two dozen individuals linked to organized crime across police forces, the military, the judiciary, and other state entities. The operation revealed the gravity of the problem and the extent of these groups’ reach and infiltration into Ecuadorian democracy. Days after the operation, Salazar declared that she had received multiple death threats from Pico. The leader of Los Lobos, who escaped from prison on January 8, is suspected of being one of the key players behind the assassination of former presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio.

Ecuador is now one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with a homicide rate of forty homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Noboa’s declaration of “internal armed conflict” allows for the mobilization of military forces to neutralize twenty-two crime groups in Ecuador. This declaration reveals the scale and complexity of the issue: The violent events that have haunted Ecuador in recent years surpass the traditional government-versus-criminal group battle, encompassing a larger fight for hostages, territory, and resources among criminal groups, with citizens often getting caught in the crossfire. Ecuador is now one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with a homicide rate of forty homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

The state of emergency will allow the Noboa government to focus more military resources toward taking on these groups. However, inevitably, more attention to one group will mean less attention to others, causing a domino effect of violence that the country is likely to continue experiencing in the short term. Although the decision to declare a state of emergency and engage in armed conflict was the right one to address the security crisis, it is also one that will not be sustainable for long. The Noboa government faces financial constraints and a fiscal deficit, making it challenging to sustain a massive military operation against the profitable illicit economies managed by these criminal groups. An important next step for the government will be to determine exactly how to finance and budget for this new reality.

The Noboa government should keep prison control as an immediate priority. To stop crime in any country, authorities must be able to investigate crimes and count on their prison system to work. When prison systems fail, they can become recruitment and command-and-control centers for criminal groups, making it even harder to combat them. The prisons become liabilities for the government. While Noboa’s proposal to build new maximum-security prisons is a step in the right direction, it will take time to materialize. In the interim, prioritizing intelligence sharing and ensuring that the armed forces have necessary equipment are crucial. Surprisingly, Ecuador’s fragmented National Assembly has united and issued a statement, offering police and military officials amnesty from future prosecution for using excessive force in supporting the crackdown on organized crime, particularly in correctional facilities. This demonstrates a collective effort to address the crisis at the national level.

Given the complexity of the issue and the absence of immediate actions to address its root cause, Ecuador will likely see a spike of violence in the short term as armed forces fight organized crime. In moments like this, the international community must move beyond speeches and mere statements of support. It must provide military equipment, intelligence sharing, capacity building, and enhanced protection of key figures such as Salazar and Noboa, recognizing that their well-being is integral to the preservation of Ecuador’s democracy.

When prison systems fail, they serve as recruitment and command-and-control centers for criminal groups.

The impact of Ecuador’s crisis is not confined within its borders; it has repercussions for neighboring countries and, indirectly, the United States. South America plays a crucial role in global affairs, particularly with the significant increase in migration flows from the region, now surpassing migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle. Criminal organizations are taking advantage of these increased flows and profiting from human trafficking and exploitation.

When societies and communities are infiltrated by fear, crime, and a lack of opportunity, citizens turn to familial economies and a dependence on profit from illicit work. Young adults who join criminal organizations often end up dead, maimed, or in jail, but they still choose to join because they consider that the cost of living their entire life in fear and poverty is much higher than as part of these groups. This change in perception and blurred morality is something the Noboa government needs to address with the help of international partners and organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. These organizations emphasize the importance of joint efforts that go beyond government-level cooperation to foster a comprehensive approach involving community leaders, civil society organizations, shelters, and schools.

For far too long, policymakers have focused on addressing illicit economies from the supply angle. It is imperative that they address the demand for illicit economies that fuel and finance these criminal enterprises, as well. By increasing costs at different parts of the supply chain and enhancing law enforcement and accountability that extends beyond the border, engaging in organized crime becomes riskier and less profitable. More importantly, the international actors who are significant drivers of demand for smuggling drugs, humans, and arms should collaborate to prosecute these organizations. Only then might governments be able to limit their survival in the long term.

The next couple weeks will be crucial in determining the democratic future of Ecuador. Each decision made by the government and its counterparts carries profound implications for the daily lives of citizens grappling with the consequences of organized crime’s deep infiltration in their country.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and is originally from Ecuador.

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Pavia quoted in Foreign Policy on migrants traveling through Tunisia

Atlantic Council — Thu, 07 Dec 2023 18:59:33 +0000

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Nusairat join CNN to discuss the situation in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Sun, 03 Dec 2023 17:02:13 +0000

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Alissa Pavia testifies to Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights

Alissa Pavia — Thu, 30 Nov 2023 17:33:00 +0000

Alissa Pavia, North Africa Initiative associate director, testified before the Alissa Pavia testifies to Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. Below are her prepared remarks on North Africa’s migration crisis.

Esteemed Senators,

By way of introduction, my name is Alissa Pavia and I am associate director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program in Washington, DC.

It is an honor to convene with you today to deliberate upon the pressing issue of the major refugee and migration flow affecting the Middle East and North Africa region. I will pay particular attention to the Mediterranean, as this region is a world hotspot for migration and often overlooked.

Chers collègues, je vous remercie pour cette invitation et pour attirant l’attention sur cette région souvent oubliée sur la scène mondiale.

While the world’s attention understandably gravitates towards the conflict between Israel and Hamas and the resultant humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.7 million Gazans, we must not overlook the broader issue of significant refugee and migration movements elsewhere.

There exist numerous other vulnerable populations forced to migrate due to dire circumstances in their homelands—groups all too frequently overlooked by the international community. I speak of those migrants and refugees who cross the Mediterranean annually, seeking refuge and a better future elsewhere, enduring perilous sea voyages that endanger their lives and those of their loved ones. Since 2014, over 22,000 individuals have been reported dead or missing at sea, rendering the Mediterranean route the most treacherous for global migrants.

Esteemed senators, migration is an ancient facet of human history, with people perpetually seeking better conditions beyond their homeland’s borders. Yet, certain compelling factors—the so-called push factors—drive mass migration, such as war, famine, poverty, climate change, and political persecution. African and North African nations grapple with these challenges, fostering conditions driving vulnerable individuals to embark on the perilous Mediterranean journey. The last decade has witnessed recurring surges in migration from North Africa to Europe, each cycle presenting distinct challenges and varied causes behind these forced displacements. The year 2023, in particular, marked another of these cyclical uptakes: migration from North Africa to Europe has surged threefold since 2022, leaving southern European nations scrambling for effective solutions to the migration quandary.

Efforts to comprehend the sudden uptick reveal a new migration origin in North Africa: Tunisia. While Libya traditionally held this mantle, Tunisia, particularly the port city of Sfax, has assumed prominence as a significant transit hub for vulnerable individuals from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the International Organization for Migration, this year, Tunisia witnessed a staggering 260 percent increase in departures compared with the previous year. Concurrently, the number of Tunisians seeking migration has similarly risen, signifying a renewed willingness among local Tunisians to leave their homeland.

While the reasons compelling migration deserve scrutiny, today, I seek not to dwell solely on these push factors. Instead, I implore your attention towards the dire conditions migrants face in North Africa, with a particular focus on Tunisia, given its current role as a migrant hotspot. Moreover, I aim to propose recommendations on how Canada can provide assistance.

Approximately 21,000 Sub-Saharan individuals—including migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees—are estimated to reside in Tunisia. However, since Tunisian President Kais Saied assumed office in 2019, the plight of these migrants has markedly worsened. A turning point for the worse occurred in February when President Saied made public remarks, echoing elements of Camus’ racist “great replacement theory,” accusing black African migrants of intending to alter the country’s demographic composition. Subsequently, migrants faced persecution, with many forcibly evicted from their residences and dismissed from their jobs.

Tensions between locals and migrants escalated further. Regrettably, the situation took a dire turn in July when Tunisian authorities rounded up 1,200 black African migrants from Sfax and forcibly expelled them, leaving them stranded for weeks in the deserts bordering Libya and Algeria. Having personally communicated with some of these affected individuals after my encounters with them during my visit to Tunisia earlier in the year, I received distressing videos, audio recordings, and voice notes pleading for aid, documenting an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The stranded migrants endured scarcity of food and water, with only the Tunisian Red Crescent permitted access. While approximately 600 migrants have been readmitted to Tunisia since then, the whereabouts of the remainder remain uncertain, with an estimated two dozen fatalities.

During this crisis, European leaders convened with President Saied to discuss curbing the influx of migrants reaching Europe’s southern shores. Shockingly, no mention was made of the stranded migrants, and an agreement was struck to financially support Tunisia’s coast guard in intercepting migrants. Once again, the international system witnessed a failure as ‘Team Europe’ inadvertently empowered Tunisia’s authoritarian leader, signaling that racism and human rights violations would not impede financial aid.

Senators, I recognize the considerable challenges each nation confronts in managing surges of irregular migration. However, your influence lies in ensuring that global lives receive humanity and dignity, safeguarding migrants and vulnerable communities through mechanisms supported and financed by many among us: multilateral institutions like the United Nations, bilateral agreements, and diplomatic and trade relations.

Although Tunisia might appear distant from Canada, concerns about migrant treatment in Tunisia and the Mediterranean significantly impact the international community. Mass displacements wreak havoc across nations, disrupting stability, and fostering tensions among countries. A rise in far-right populism often correlates with these mass displacements, leading to growing xenophobia towards migrants and refugees in Western countries.

Europe, a close ally of Canada, has faced significant challenges due to mass displacement, weakening its unity in the face of global issues. It’s in Canada’s best interest to prevent Europe from encountering such challenges as it would inevitably strain Canada-Europe relations. Moreover, Canada has crucial ties with Tunisia, funding pivotal development and counterterrorism projects. It’s imperative that Canadian taxpayer money doesn’t support criminal acts by Tunisia’s national guard.

Firstly, Canada should ensure that institutions operating in Tunisia work diligently to locate and repatriate stranded migrants. Both the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees bear responsibility for their welfare and repatriation.

Secondly, during bilateral discussions with Tunisia’s interior ministry and defense ministry, Canada must stipulate that assistance won’t be provided if it contributes to human rights abuses, such as forced expulsions of migrants.

Lastly, the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights should conduct a comprehensive study on humanitarian aid to Tunisia, reassessing whether the current president, Kais Saied, meets the criteria for state assistance.

Thank you for your attention.

The post Alissa Pavia testifies to Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Attempted airport pogrom highlights rising antisemitism in Putin’s Russia

Joshua Stein — Tue, 31 Oct 2023 20:50:05 +0000

An antisemitic mob stormed Makhachkala Airport in southern Russia’s Republic of Dagestan on October 29 intending to hunt down Jewish passengers on an incoming flight from Tel Aviv. This attempted pogrom was eventually thwarted by local law enforcement officials, but the scenes of murderous intent sent shock waves around the world while raising serious questions about the rising tide of antisemitism in Putin’s Russia.

Events in Dagestan unfolded against a backdrop of heightened international tension over the recent escalation of hostilities in Israel. Russia has adopted what many see as a pro-Palestinian position toward the crisis, further straining what was already a tense relationship with Israel. In recent years, Russia has rebuffed calls to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and has deepened its alliance with anti-Israel Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

On the eve of the recent unrest in Dagestan, Russia welcomed a Hamas delegation to Moscow in what was the group’s first high-profile foreign visit since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. Hamas officials reportedly vowed to give priority treatment to Russian citizens among the hostages seized in southern Israel, noting that Russia was “a closest friend.”

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Dagestan and the surrounding North Caucasus region have a long record of ethnic nationalism and religious extremism, especially following the import of Wahhabism in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conflicts between nationalist and religious extremist groups have plagued the region for years. This extremist influence was on full display during the storming of Makhachkala Airport.

The attempted pogrom also echoed the worst excesses of Russian nationalism, which has a history of antisemitism stretching back hundreds of years. The term “pogrom” itself can be traced to imperial Russia, which witnessed frequent outbreaks of deadly violence targeting Jewish communities. Meanwhile, the most notorious antisemitic forgery in history, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, originated in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century.

This legacy of antisemitic baggage is particularly important at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively promoting an aggressive brand of imperial nostalgia. Officially, modern Russia is a pluralistic state that celebrates its ethnic and religious diversity. Indeed, Putin has accused neighboring Ukraine of antisemitism and has framed the current invasion as a quest to “de-Nazify” the country. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, there is little evidence to support such assertions.

The groundless claim that Russia invaded Ukraine to combat Nazism is a transparent attempt to justify an old-fashioned war of imperial aggression. When confronted with the uncomfortable fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is himself Jewish, top Kremlin officials have retreated into the quagmire of antisemitic conspiracy theories. In May 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attempted to dismiss Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity by declaring that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.” More recently, Putin alleged that Zelenskyy had been deliberately chosen by the West as a Jewish puppet to cover up the “anti-human essence” of the Ukrainian state.

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There is antisemitism in Ukraine, of course, just as there is in all states. The real issue is whether extremist actors have inordinate political power, enjoy the support (or at least inaction) of the government, or the ability to coordinate large-scale violence. In Putin’s Russia, that may well be the case. Many see the recent attempted pogrom at Makhachkala Airport as a direct consequence of the antisemitic invective that has become increasingly normalized in the Russian public discourse following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In the nationalistic environment of wartime Russia, the country’s Jewish community has faced accusations from some quarters of being insufficiently supportive of the invasion. Senior Rabbi Berel Lazar has felt obliged to speak out against “vulgar antisemitism” that poses a “huge danger” to Russian Jews. In one particularly chilling incident, prominent Russian journalist Alexei Venediktov found a pig’s head with the word “Judensau” (German for “Jewish pig”) placed outside his apartment.

Russian Jews with close ties to the Kremlin have also become targets of antisemitic attacks. Russia’s most high-profile propagandist, Vladimir Solovyov, recently faced criticism that his media network employs too many Jewish staffers. When Solovyov’s colleague and fellow pundit Yevgeny Satanovsky, who is also Jewish, used strong language to accuse senior Russian Foreign Ministry officials of antisemitism and criticize the government’s policy on Israel, he was promptly dismissed.

These developments are fueling alarm among Russia’s remaining Jews and reawakening painful historical memories, while also sparking debate over the future security of the community. Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt was Chief Rabbi of Moscow for almost thirty years, but was forced to flee the country in March 2022 after refusing a request from state officials to publicly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He has since called on Russian Jews to leave the country.

“When we look back over Russian history, whenever the political system was in danger you saw the government trying to redirect the anger and discontent of the masses toward the Jewish community,” Rabbi Goldschmidt told The Guardian in December 2022. “We’re seeing rising antisemitism while Russia is going back to a new kind of Soviet Union, and step by step the iron curtain is coming down again. This is why I believe the best option for Russian Jews is to leave.”

Joshua Stein holds a PhD from the University of Calgary and is a researcher on antisemitism and ethics.

US Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has recently echoed Senator Graham’s sentiments. “No Americans are getting killed in Ukraine. We’re rebuilding our industrial base. The Ukrainians are destroying the army of one of our biggest rivals. I have a hard time finding anything wrong with that,” he commented on October 20.

McConnell’s arguments are certainly persuasive. However, in order to fully appreciate the true value of continued support for Ukraine, it is necessary to contemplate what would happen if Western military aid came to an end and Vladimir Putin succeeded in subjugating the country.

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The most immediate costs of a Russian victory would be felt by the Ukrainian population, of course. With much or all of Ukraine under Russian control, the war crimes already witnessed in occupied areas of the country would multiply. Tens of thousands would be executed or imprisoned, while millions would be subjected to forced deportation. These horrors would create major humanitarian challenges for the wider European community, with a massive new wave of Ukrainian refugees flooding across the border into the EU.

Vindicated and emboldened by victory in Ukraine, Putin would almost certainly seek to go further. The Russian dictator has already made clear that he sees the reconquest of Ukraine as part of a broader mission to correct the perceived injustice of the Soviet collapse and the fall of “historical Russia.” His next targets would most likely be Moldova, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. If the West proves unwilling or unable to stop Russia in Ukraine, there will be little to deter further aggression against smaller and more vulnerable former Soviet republics.

With NATO discredited by the fall of Ukraine, Putin would then be tempted to test the resolve of the alliance in a more fundamental manner by threatening the Baltic states. Would a demoralized and divided NATO go to war with a resurgent Russia over an isolated incident on the Estonian or Latvian border? If not, Putin would exploit this weakness. Failure to defend the territorial integrity of a NATO member state would spark the rapid unraveling of the entire alliance, plunging the whole of Europe into chaos.

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Even if the worst case scenario of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO could be avoided, a Russian victory in Ukraine would inevitably oblige Western leaders to boost defense spending to levels not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. This would require sums far in excess of the money currently being allocated to Ukraine. Outgoing US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Mark Milley recently warned that a Russian victory in Ukraine would lead to a potential “doubling” of defense budgets. Others have suggested the cost would be much higher, noting the need to establish and indefinitely maintain a dramatically increased military presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

While the direct financial and security costs of a Russian victory in Ukraine are already alarming, the geopolitical price would be even greater. The recent escalation in Israel is a direct consequence of the West’s indecisive response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion is seen to succeed, other authoritarians will be encouraged and international instability will spread even further. The entire world will face decades of insecurity marked by mounting militarism, mutual suspicion, and multiplying acts of international aggression. The opportunity cost to the global economy will be measured in the tens of trillions.

None of this is inevitable. On the contrary, it can all be avoided by providing Ukraine with the tools to defeat Russia. The Ukrainians are ready and able to do the fighting themselves; all they ask is for their international partners to stop dithering and deliver the necessary weapons without delay.

Opponents of continued military aid to Ukraine often say it is too expensive. In reality, it is infinitely cheaper than the alternative. They also claim supporting Ukraine risks provoking World War III, but in truth, nothing is more likely to provoke Putin than Western weakness.

With his genocidal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian dictator has burned his last remaining bridges and is now completely committed to confrontation with the West. He will not stop until he is stopped. The longer Western leaders delay, the higher the price they will pay.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Israel is joining the US Visa Waiver Program. Here’s what that means.

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:45:34 +0000

It’s the waive of the future. On Wednesday, the Biden administration announced that Israel will join the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Israelis will soon be able to visit the United States for up to ninety days without a visa. To be admitted, Israel had to extend reciprocal privileges to all US citizens without regard to national origin, religion, or ethnicity, which it committed to in July. In the past, some Palestinian Americans had been turned away from the country at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport and other ports of entry. The decision also comes a week after US President Joe Biden met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

As Atlantic Council experts explain below, the visa decision is intertwined with several issues of importance in the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Thomas Warrick: A victory for citizens of both countries

Tuqa Nusairat: ‘Inclusion concerns’ remain for Palestinian and Arab Americans

Shalom Lipner: A consequential success spanning multiple Israeli leaders

A victory for citizens of both countries

The US government’s decision, announced September 27, to admit Israel to the VWP is the result of years of hard security work by US and Israeli officials. Israel will now join the program, which will allow most Israelis to travel to the United States without a visa and will allow US citizens, even those of Palestinian or Arab heritage, to travel through Israel’s main airports. While admission to the VWP is not the most important challenge facing either the United States or Israel today, this represents a victory for citizens of both countries.

The 2022 Atlantic Council issue brief by Ruth Marks Eglash and Scott Lasensky explained the challenges that had to be overcome in building ties between US and Israeli security agencies that matched those the United States has with other visa waiver countries. The Atlantic Council’s February 2023 event explained why the final steps involving reciprocity and information sharing were among the most difficult.

The credit goes to the enormous amount of hard work by government officials and civic organizations in both countries. Much of this work received very little publicity except among experts and those involved. On the US side, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers deserve enormous credit for continuing to push through more obstacles than most outsiders realize. Credit also goes to the US Embassy in Israel and to ambassadors and other US diplomats for helping their Israeli colleagues through a series of changes that Israel had to make to its laws and screening practices.

Admission to the VWP is not a one-and-done process. Israel will continue to have to meet US requirements of reciprocity and information sharing that other VWP countries are also required to meet. But Wednesday’s announcement is the culmination of a lot of hard, unglamorous security work. A day of celebration is in order.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

Issue Brief

Oct 12, 2022

Fulfilling the requirements: Israel’s entry into the US Visa Waiver Program

By Ruth Marks Eglash and Scott Lasensky

A little-discussed, yet far-reaching issue on the US-Israel bilateral agenda is Israel’s long-running quest to join the United States’ Visa Waiver Program (VWP). In his first year and a half in office, US President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has elevated the issue, and efforts to achieve Israel’s entry are gaining momentum after remaining stagnant during the Trump presidency.

Israel Middle East

Inclusion concerns remain for Palestinian and Arab Americans

The primary hurdle to Israel joining the VWP was its reciprocal treatment for Americans attempting to enter Israel, as a requirement of entry into the program is to admit Americans into Israel without discrimination. Americans of Palestinian and Arab descent have long faced consistent challenges when trying to enter Israel, especially when they were destined for the occupied Palestinian territories. At land and air borders, they face unreasonable questioning and intrusive searches of electronic devices. They have often been denied entry with no justification.

Over the past couple months, I have heard stories from Palestinian and Arab Americans who have been able to take advantage of the trial period to visit relatives in the West Bank and holy sites in Jerusalem, which they were not able to do before as US citizens. Still, others faced the same challenges that existed before the trial period and will likely persist after Israel’s entry into the program. Some of those Americans who argue that Israel has yet to meet the necessary requirements have joined with the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in filing a federal lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State over “inclusion concerns” in the program. On Tuesday, the ADC posted on social media that “[c]redible reports and ADC’s own investigations have shown that Israel failed to meet all of the legal requirements for admission.”

Wednesday’s announcement is undoubtedly a win for Netanyahu’s extremist government, which has seen the largest domestic protests in Israel’s history and increasing international criticism over its judicial reforms, which critics argue are threatening the country’s democracy. The US government should instead be investing more political capital in putting pressure on Netanyahu’s government to address the multitude of policies that continue to discriminate against Palestinians, from the ongoing occupation and expansion of settlements into Palestinian territories to the unequal treatment Palestinian Americans face when attempting to enter the country.

—Tuqa Nusairat is the director for strategy, operations, and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

A consequential success spanning multiple Israeli leaders

This week’s admission of Israel into the VWP is being touted by Netanyahu as a second American feather in his cap, following on the heels of his recent (and much-awaited) meeting in New York with Biden. It does indeed deliver a consequential success—Israelis have long chafed at being refused entry into the exclusive VWP—but must also be viewed in a broader context. Efforts to promote Israel’s candidacy were shepherded by multiple officials, spanning Netanyahu’s tenure, but also those of former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. (Netanyahu, while serving as leader of the opposition, even obstructed progress on the issue, ostensibly to deny a signature achievement to his competitors.)

While Israel’s new status as VWP member stands to strengthen its relations with the United States, expectations that the doors may now be opened wider for compromise with the Palestinians—within the scope of a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia—should be tempered. The magnitude of the concessions being discussed between Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh comes into direct conflict with the objectives of Netanyahu’s hardline coalition partners to the extent that it could be impossible for him to consent and still maintain his hold in power.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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What’s behind the strengthening UK-Turkey partnership?

Ilayda Nijhar — Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:56:52 +0000

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has transformed how the country interacts with the rest of the world. In many ways, it has served as a catalyst to deepen bilateral relations with Turkey—particularly around trade and economic cooperation with Ankara.

As the United Kingdom seeks new opportunities to diversify its trade relations post-Brexit, it has recognized Turkey as a market of interest and as an integral partner. Most recently, following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reelection in May, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak took to Twitter, writing that he “[looks] forward to continuing the strong collaboration” between the United Kingdom and Turkey, “from growing trade to tackling security threats as NATO allies.”

Both countries have set about making their partnership even stronger, including by starting talks to renegotiate the existing UK-Turkey free trade agreement. But this strengthening partnership can be seen in several areas other than trade such as investment, migration policy, and defense cooperation, which builds on the strategic partnership that the UK government outlined in 2010.

Trade

As part of its strategy to diversify its trade partnerships, particularly searching outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has courted Turkey, labeling it as a target market. Turkey provides the United Kingdom with access to its own market, and it also serves as an entry point to other dynamic markets in Eastern Europe and the Middle East where the United Kingdom has additional strategic interests.

Following Brexit, Turkey and the United Kingdom set up an initial free trade agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 2021. The agreement aimed to maintain preferential trade relations (replacing the EU-Turkey customs union) as well as to enhance future bilateral trade relations. Over time, UK-Turkey trade grew, with trade totaling 23.8 billion pounds between March 2022 and March 2023—up more than 20 percent from the previous year when adjusting for price changes.

The decision announced on July 18 to renegotiate the existing agreement came after a review found several areas for improvement, notably regarding services, data, and the digital sector. Should an updated agreement that reduces trade barriers and tariffs be agreed upon, it could further deepen economic ties—and cooperation more broadly—between the United Kingdom and Turkey.

However, this effort to strengthen the UK-Turkey partnership will take time—it could take years to negotiate a new free trade agreement, and implementation will be complex. It will also require a willingness on both sides to compromise and find common ground. So far, it would appear that both the United Kingdom and Turkey are ready to engage accordingly. It is also unlikely that the free trade negotiations or the overall trajectory of bilateral relations would be impacted should there be a change in government in the United Kingdom.

Migration, security, and stability

In addition to growing trade relations, the United Kingdom and Turkey have increased their geopolitical cooperation. Both countries have collaborated on various diplomatic fronts and engaged in dialogue on issues relating to regional stability—particularly in relation to Iraq and Syria—as well as counterterrorism efforts.

The United Kingdom and Turkey have demonstrated strong bilateral cooperation on humanitarian and migration issues, most recently with rescue efforts following the earthquakes earlier this year. The refugee crisis resulting from the conflict in Syria has considerably affected both countries with higher migration numbers. Ankara and London have come together in an attempt to manage and address these issues and find ways to alleviate the risks associated with the crisis—such as domestic security concerns, strains on national resources, and social integration challenges.

Migration beyond the Syria context—specifically smuggling and illegal migration—has become a priority area for the United Kingdom since it exited the EU, prompting the passage of the 2023 Illegal Migration Act. Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population in the world, has been a strategic partner in managing the United Kingdom’s migration-related concerns. The UK government recently struck a deal with Turkey to disrupt people-smuggling gangs and tackle illegal migration. The willingness of the countries to sign an agreement that tackles a problem both countries are committed to confronting is a sign of their strengthening relationship. According to the UK government, the partnership will involve a “centre of excellence” in Turkey that will, among other things, increase intelligence-sharing between enforcement agencies. This builds on an existing partnership, which last year saw the UK Home Office provide over three million pounds in funding to Turkish border forces to help block a common route for migrants to reach the United Kingdom.

Investment and defense

The United Kingdom, as it seeks to diversify its project and partner portfolios post-Brexit, is taking on new investment ventures. Earlier in July, the UK government announced it would back a 680-million-pound loan guarantee for a new high-speed electric railway in Turkey designed to connect a few major cities via a lower-carbon route. The plans connect Mersin, Adana, Osmaniye, and Gaziantep; the latter three cities were significantly impacted by the earthquakes earlier this year.

Defense cooperation has also contributed to the deepening of UK-Turkey bilateral ties. The two partners have engaged in training and capacity-building efforts, joint military operations, and defense-related trade and technology exchanges; and in recent years, the UK defense industry has secured various deals with Turkish counterparts. Turkey has imported UK arms for several years (aside from a brief halt in new export licenses for arms sales to Turkey in late 2019 due to Turkish military activity in Syria; licensing resumed in 2021). Last year, the UK defense secretary met his Turkish counterpart and asserted that both countries share a long-standing defense partnership that builds on their increased cooperation.

Yet tensions have emerged when the United Kingdom and Turkey’s strategic and foreign-policy priorities diverge, for example in the case of Syria. Furthermore, Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019 raised concerns over trust in the partnership due to the potential security risks associated with compatibility issues with NATO defense systems. Competing security concerns, especially in relation to Turkey’s involvement across the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, have also contributed at times to complications for Ankara and London.

Nevertheless, UK-Turkey ties are growing stronger—and it is not just due to trade. The countries are working together to tackle deep-rooted issues such as illegal migration and smuggling, especially in relation to tightened immigration policies post-Brexit—and as risks continue to evolve globally, so too does defense cooperation between both countries, whose strategic and security concerns are closely aligned. If the United Kingdom and Turkey continue the same trajectory, their relations will go from strength to strength.

Ilayda Nijhar is a global risk analyst at ODI and a London Labour Councillor. Follow her on Twitter @ilaydanijhar.

The views expressed in this piece are solely those of the author.

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Belarus dictator weaponizes passports in new attack on exiled opposition

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 06 Sep 2023 23:25:00 +0000

Belarusian diplomatic missions will no longer issue new passports to Belarusian citizens residing abroad and will not renew expired personal documents, according to a decree signed by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka on September 4. Instead, Belarusian citizens living abroad will be required to return to Belarus in order to access passport services. The new regulations will also make it difficult for Belarusians residing outside the country to sell real estate or other assets.

These changes are being interpreted as a fresh escalation in Lukashenka’s campaign against Belarusians who left the country following the mass pro-democracy protests of 2020. Thousands fled Belarus in late 2020 and sought refuge elsewhere in Europe after suffering arrest or facing criminal charges for their involvement in a nationwide protest movement that aimed to overturn a rigged presidential election and bring 26 years of increasingly dictatorial rule to an end. Many of the current exile community also experienced human rights abuses while in custody including torture.

The cancellation of consular services now places exiled Belarusians in a precarious position. Unless they return to Belarus to renew expired passports, they could find themselves without their primary identification document and unable to access a wide range of essential services in their current countries of residence. However, returning to Belarus could result in arrest and prosecution in connection with their earlier involvement in anti-regime protects.

The leader of Belarus’s democratic forces, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has urged exiled Belarusians not to return to Belarus if they face the risk of persecution. She has promised to raise the issue with officials in countries where Belarusians reside, while also seeking to secure international recognition for an alternative passport initiative launched recently by the country’s opposition movement in exile.

“Denying passports to Belarusians abroad is yet another ploy by Lukashenka,” tweeted Tsikhanouskaya. “It’s not just the regime’s revenge against those in exile but also an attempt to pressure the democratic nations hosting them. Encouraging Belarusians to return is an obvious trap. We won’t fall for it.”

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There is no precise data available for the number of people who left Belarus over the past three years. Estimates vary significantly, while official figures do not differentiate between those who left Belarus as political exiles and others who have moved abroad since 2020 for professional or personal reasons.

The latest Eurostat report on migration to the European Union stated that Belarusian nationals received approximately 309,000 EU residency permits in 2022, representing almost 9% of all permits issued. Research by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe indicates that as many as half a million Belarusians may have left the country since 2020. It is reasonable to assume that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians could now potentially face difficulties as their passports come up for renewal.

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The new restrictions on consular services are not the first example of Lukashenka targeting exiled Belarusians. In early 2023, he introduced new legislation making it possible to deprive Belarusians living abroad of their citizenship if found guilty of “extremism.” Meanwhile, a number of opposition leaders have been tried in absentia, with Tsikhanouskaya receiving a 15-year prison sentence.

Belarusians in exile have also been prevented from exercising their democratic rights as citizens. During a controversial February 2022 referendum on changes to the Belarusian Constitution, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to open polling stations at Belarusian embassies, citing Covid-related safety concerns and staffing shortages. Instead, Belarusians residing abroad were encouraging to return to Belarus in order to cast their votes.

Nobody within the exiled Belarusian democratic opposition movement is under any illusions regarding the dangers of returning to their homeland. Human rights watchdogs have already raised the alarm over mounting instances of returning Belarusians being detained. In some cases, detainees have been forced to record video confessions admitting their involvement in pro-democracy protests.

For the past three years, Lukashenka has consistently sought to downplay the significance of Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy uprising while attempting to frame it as a foreign plot. He has publicly encouraged exiled citizens to return home and has even established a government commission to aid in the process. However, few appear ready to take him at his word. Instead, they view the recent ban on passport renewals as further confirmation that the Belarusian dictator still seeks to punish citizens who he earlier branded as “fugitives” and “traitors.”

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Figure 1.

The second difference, tightly linked to the first, relates to the speed of the current surge. During the previous “migrant crisis,” the surge took just a few months between 2013 and 2014. This time around, the increase in migrant departures from northern African shores has been several years in the making, slowly and steadily building up from April 2020 to today. As to the economic causes of the current increase in arrivals, it is not surprising that the surge started just a few months after the pandemic wiped out any hope for tourism receipts in 2020. This was especially important for a country such as Tunisia, which draws around 10 percent of its gross domestic product from tourism and related activities, with around 12 percent of its active population employed in the sector.

Another difference can be found in the composition of nationalities making up the current surge. In 2014-2017, close to 80 percent of all irregular migrant arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route included citizens of sub-Saharan African countries, mainly from western Africa. In contrast, between 2020 and the first half of 2022, migration patterns had “regionalized,” including a large share of Tunisians and Egyptians. It was clear, then, that irregular migration was being driven first by the “twin crises” of the pandemic, and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These forces acted as an economic double whammy for African economies, first (as seen) by hitting the tourism sector, and then through the Ukraine war by making energy and food prices skyrocket. The effects rippled across the continent like waves, and people living in closer proximity to points of departure in northern African countries were the first to arrive in Europe. As time passed, people living further away from the Mediterranean shores had time to reach them. This is why, from the second half of 2022 to today, the trend has reversed, so much so that in the first five months of 2023, more than half of the migrants that reached Italy having departed from Tunisia were citizens of the Ivory Coast (28 percent) or Guinea (another 23 percent), while Tunisians made up just 13 percent of the total.

In a way it seems like, in terms of nationalities, the last year is almost “back to square one.” But there is another difference compared with the period 2014-2017, and that is the existence of active entities that police the shores where most migrant crossings occur. During the previous migration crisis, when most migrants departed from Libya and the so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) had not been set up yet or had insufficient vessels, resources, or political commitment to carry out rescues/interceptions at sea, the Central Mediterranean Sea was predominantly populated by European actors and ships—be they merchant vessels, coast guard ships, or components of the civil fleet like nongovernmental organization (NGO) vessels. Since 2017, however, the Italian and European Union (EU) authorities have funded, trained, and empowered the LCG while assisting Libyan authorities in declaring the existence of their own Libyan search and rescue region, as well as setting up a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 2018. Accordingly, the proportion of migrants that has been stopped while trying to leave Libya and brought back to shore has risen from none in 2016, to 12 percent in 2017, and to 68 percent in 2019, reaching the highest level of thirty-two thousand irregular migrants brought back to Libya in 2021 (51 percent of total departures). At the same time, the Tunisian Coast Guard has continued to carry out rescue/interceptions itself, with a steady rise from thirty-five hundred interceptions in 2017 to twenty-three thousand in 2021 (more recently, the Tunisian Coast Guard reported over twenty-four thousand interceptions in just the first five months of 2023).

This trend, together with the sudden drop in irregular migrant departures from Libya in July 2017, lasting over three years before the start of the current surge, shows that enhanced cooperation among EU countries and official and unofficial actors in northern African countries that have a stake in the migrant smuggling business can significantly stem the irregular flow of persons. Of course, this is achieved at the cost of increasing the number of persons who are returned to unsafe countries (as the UN has defined Libya since at least 2016) or end up in brutal illegal detention centers (in Libya, estimates have grown from five thousand detained in January 2019 to close to ten thousand by the end of 2021), and exposing EU countries to a higher likelihood of being blackmailed.

Moreover, enforcement of border controls can ebb and flow. The Libya case shows this perfectly, as the LCG’s activities at sea have dropped consistently over the past year and a half relative to arrivals in Italy. In 2023 so far, the share of irregular migrants that has been rescued/intercepted by the LCG has dropped to 23 percent, less than half the 2018-2021 average. In Tunisia, a sudden drop in irregular departures in May and June compared with expectations (close to 70 percent lower arrivals than an ISPI short-term model for forecasting irregular arrivals had predicted) has been associated not just with worse-than-average weather conditions, but also with an increase in police raids in Sfax and other Tunisian towns along the coast that have been known to be heavily involved in smuggling activity. The fact that this drop in departures from Tunisia was observed just days after visits by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi has generated renewed interest on political agreements among countries from the two shores of the Mediterranean. Since Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Tunis on June 6, departures have risen but have remained subdued compared with the previous trend.

Policy responses: Adequate or insufficient?

What do recent trends teach us in terms of policy responses? First, they show the precarious nature of political-technical agreements to stem the flow of irregular departures from northern African shores. The sudden drop in departures from Libya in July 2017 held for years, allowing arrivals to Italy to drop from around 155,000 to 11,000 in twenty-four months. But the implicit agreement among Italy and a number of Libyan militias did not do much to reduce the “demand” for smuggling services among migrants who were already living in Libya or travelling to northern African countries. On the contrary, the drop in supply of migrant smuggling services in Libya opened up the possibility that Tunisian smugglers who were already providing a number of limited goods or services (such as sturdier iron boats) to smugglers in Libya could move up the “smuggling value chain” and start offering the full package as well.

It also teaches us about the flexibility of each smuggling route, as well as the need to understand each route’s specificities. For instance, it was only with the pandemic and its impact on tourism that Tunisian migrants started looking for smuggling services in much larger numbers. As soon as demand for smuggling rose, and the industry found its footing in Tunisia, it was only natural that it would start to provide the same services to sub-Saharan African nationals severely hit by the economic effects of the Ukraine crisis. This is exactly what happened in 2022: From the outside, the transition from Tunisian nationals to sub-Saharan Africans appeared to be seamless. Moreover, as the smuggling industry in Tunisia seems to be less led by specific households but rather a much more competitive business, it is less plausible to expect that irregular departures could be stopped by striking just a handful of deals with the right counterparts. Namely, both an increase in police raids and/or paying smugglers to stop providing their services are likely to bring only a respite from the issue, to eventually be replaced by other actors willing to offer the very same services.

Local contexts

To adequately respond to irregular migration across the Mediterranean, it is crucial to comprehend the ongoing domestic crises that North African countries are facing. Among the five countries comprising the continent’s northern shore (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Libya and Tunisia stand out as the most precarious and unstable. Consequently, there seems to be a clear correlation between instability and heightened migration.

Libya is still rocked by civil strife, split between the east, under Khalifa Haftar’s control, and the west, under the UN-backed interim government led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. The ongoing conflict has made it impossible for economic conditions to improve. With unemployment continuously on the rise (now close to 20 percent) and economic growth low and volatile, locals and non-locals have found other means to make ends meet. Migration is a lucrative business for local militias both to Libya’s east and west, while non-locals (Libya hosts nearly seven hundred thousand international migrants) flock to the shores attempting to reach Europe in search of better economic and humanitarian conditions. The ongoing civil war is bad for locals, but particularly bad for migrants who face discrimination and a lack of employment as a result.

Meanwhile, Tunisia’s perilous economic conditions and an uptake in anti-migrant sentiment have been important migratory push factors. Democratic backsliding has also been a key concern since President Kais Saïed froze parliament, sacked the prime minister (July 2021), and removed fifty-seven judges from office (June 2022), with more and more political opponents seeking refuge elsewhere and looking at Europe as a safe haven.

Conclusions

Europe is negotiating a deal worth almost one billion euros with Tunisia to curb the current migration flow. Yet, conditioning financial aid to a cessation in migration is a risky business that presents long-term challenges as well as ethical concerns. For one, it allows for the recipient country (in this case, Tunisia) to hold significant leverage on European countries and use migration flows as a bargaining chip for further demands. Instead, Europe could condition its aid to a more holistic package of requests, including a return to the rule of law and renewed efforts toward a democratic transition.

Moreover, it is essential for European countries, particularly coastal states, to abandon the counterproductive approach of consistently blaming nongovernmental actors that seek to improve search and rescue efforts in the Central Mediterranean. In Italy, the current government’s practice of sending NGO ships that have carried out a rescue to faraway ports that take three to five days to reach, and another three to five days to return to the search and rescue zone off the Libyan coast, unnecessarily shortens their operational period and raises their costs. It is crucial to acknowledge that clear and repeated findings have debunked the notion that search and rescue operations serve as incentives for migrants to depart from North Africa’s shores.

Lastly, unless European countries establish safe and lawful avenues for low-skill migrants to reach their intended destinations, the problem of irregular migration will persist, or even worsen, in the coming decades. Even if new legal avenues do not directly decrease irregular crossings, they could legitimately be used to justify negotiations on increasing the return rates of irregular migrants. The current dearth of legal routes instead serves as justification for origin countries not to accept returnees, and serves to only raise political and diplomatic tensions.

Matteo Villa is Senior Research Fellow at ISPI and co-heads the ISPI Data Lab

Alissa Pavia is Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program

In partnership with

ALL ESSAYS

Report Oct 7, 2022

The MENA region’s uneasy path towards reforms

By Karim Mezran, Valeria Talbot, Alissa Pavia, Lorenzo Fruganti, Eleonora Ardemagni, Andrew Farrand, Alessia Melcangi and Hafsa Halawa

Decade-old geopolitical transformations have impacted the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states’ efforts to implement socioeconomic reforms. More recently, the Ukraine war’s reverberations are also likely to affect the MENA countries’ paths towards such reforms.

Middle East North Africa

In-Depth Research & Reports Jul 12, 2022

Evolving MENA power balances: What is next for US engagement in the region?

By Karim Mezran, Valeria Talbot, Jonathan Panikoff, Sanam Vakil, Maha Yahya, Mark N. Katz, Gangzheng She, and Julien Barnes-Dacey

US President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s upcoming visit to the Middle East provides an opportunity to assess what role the United States will play in the Middle East and North Africa in the future. With the war in Ukraine further diverting US attention from the region, the big question is whether the region is entering a ‘post-US’ era.

Energy & Environment Middle East

Report Aug 29, 2022

North Africa’s transatlantic relations amid change and continuity

By Karim Mezran, Roberto Menotti, Alessia Melcangi, Emadeddin Badi and Alissa Pavia

The purpose of this report is to identify a potential role for Italy and its diplomacy to play in North Africa, in full agreement and collaboration with the United States and the other main European actors.

Italy Libya

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#AtlanticDebrief – What were the main takeaways from the EUCO summit? | A Debrief from Dave Keating

nlawler — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:13:48 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What were the main outcomes from the recent European Council summit? Why are European Council summits important? How did EU leaders come together to address the latest European issues from Russia’s war in Ukraine, de-risking from China, and migration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Ben Judah sits down with Dave Keating, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and France 24 Brussels correspondent, to discuss the developments from the summit and the main political debates.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What were the main takeaways from the EUCO summit? | A Debrief from Dave Keating appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia joins BBC World Service to discuss potential outcomes as EP’s committee visits Lampedusa for a search and rescue fact-finding mission.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:47:32 +0000

Original Source

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‘Any nationality just not Syrian’: Refugee deportations surge in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

Arwa Damon — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:11:25 +0000

“Bring me any nationality, anything, just not Syrian,” joked the Jordanian work permit processing official to Yousef, the Syrian man standing in front of him.

Yousef is not his real name. We’re not disclosing his identity nor additional details due to the precarious nature of his current circumstances. He has been in his profession for nearly ten years, operating an organization in Amman. Yousef’s career has been progressing remarkably. But none of that carries any weight in this instance.

“I’m sorry, there’s nothing I can do. No Syrians,” the official reaffirmed.

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?”

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death.

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door.

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new.

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity.

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night.

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time.

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them.

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib.

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 24 May 2023 21:26:30 +0000

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:
Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

On April 20, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the third Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). DHS calls the QHSR its “capstone strategy document,” setting out the short- and medium-term direction for the US government’s third-largest cabinet department. By law, the QHSR is a “review,” not a “strategy,” and so it devotes much of its ninety-two pages to a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments, more than a pure strategy would contain. With these caveats in mind, experts with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program read the 2023 QHSR and offered their assessment of its depth and importance for our latest scorecard.

Thomas Warrick

Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; director, Future of DHS Project

Given DHS’s size and the breadth of its missions—counterterrorism; law enforcement; cybersecurity; aviation, border, and maritime security; immigration; and infrastructure protection—the QHSR should be considered one of the most important strategic documents put out by a major US cabinet department. The QHSR, while subordinate to the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, should, in theory, be comparable to the Department of Defense (DOD) National Defense Strategy (NDS), which gets enormous attention in Washington and around the world.

The QHSR’s reality is rather different. No major news outlet covered the QHSR’s release on April 20. Only specialized news sites and a few others reported on it or on Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas’s speech the next day announcing the QHSR’s release along with DHS’s ninety-day “sprint” focusing on US nonmilitary vulnerabilities to China and establishing a DHS task force on uses and threats from artificial intelligence.

One reason for this lack of coverage may be that the QHSR, being a “review,” is more of a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments. Lists of accomplishments seldom make news in today’s contentious Washington political scene. While the QHSR should educate the public about what DHS does, the people who need educating the most about DHS are probably the least likely to read ninety-two pages of government prose, even with pictures. Nevertheless, the QHSR is an important strategic road map to where the Biden administration and Mayorkas want to go.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This QHSR is distinctive in three ways. First, it exists—the Trump administration did not release a QHSR during its four years between January 2017 to January 2021. While the Trump administration never produced a QHSR, it had a coherent—and divisive—approach to immigration and domestic terrorism, much of which was led from the White House, not DHS. Second, the Biden administration promised during the campaign and afterwards a break with many of the Trump administration’s homeland security policies, especially on immigration and domestic terrorism, and the QHSR makes this very clear. Third, this QHSR intentionally returns to the tone and structure of the two Obama administration QHSRs, released in 2010 and 2014, with three changes from the Obama QHSRs:

showing how the threat landscape has changed since 2014,
highlighting the importance of partnerships to the Biden administration’s and Mayorkas’s model of the homeland security enterprise, and
recognizing a new mission area for DHS: combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims.

DHS has long fought crimes of exploitation—this QHSR elevates the importance of this work and explicitly aligns DHS with the victims of such crimes. This will make it hard for future administrations to backslide from protecting exploited victims.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Just as the National Defense Strategy is primarily, though not exclusively, focused on military threats to the United States, the QHSR should bring equal focus and vigor on the nonmilitary threats to the United States. The third QHSR provides a good summary of today’s dynamic terrorism threats (both international and homegrown), the challenges and strains on what it calls our “broken” immigration system (Mayorkas goes so far as to call it “completely broken;” his critics would no doubt agree), cyber threats from criminals and hostile nation-states, crimes of exploitation, the threat from fentanyl and transnational organized crime, natural and man-made risks to critical infrastructure, and other challenges to homeland security. Of particular importance is elevating fentanyl, transnational organized crime, and crimes of exploitation to the strategic level—no longer are they issues of only crime. The third QHSR wants the United States to see these as strategic threats, requiring a more strategic response.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

A sound strategy needs to define what “victory” looks like. In DOD’s mission space, victory is understandable: the goal is victory in war, coupled with deterrence and maintaining the peace at all other times. It’s a lot harder to define the end state in homeland security, and this QHSR, like many national security strategies of previous administrations of both parties, often uses phrases like “preventing and mitigating active threats” and “continue advancing national efforts” that give the direction but leave the ultimate goal fuzzy. There are few concrete end states against which this QHSR’s success or failure can be judged, but this is not unique to this QHSR or this administration.

For example, no responsible counterterrorism strategy would publicly set itself the goal of “no successful terrorist attacks.” The difficulty of detecting lone violent extremists and their ability to get semiautomatic assault rifles, coupled with political realities in the United States, mean that the QHSR needs—rightly—to point toward other approaches like community programs (see QHSR numbered page 8) needed to reduce active shooter events well below their levels in recent years, which would be a worthy goal. In cybersecurity, the QHSR describes the many innovative programs that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has undertaken in the past two years, but mentions only at the end of the cybersecurity section (QHSR numbered page 35) the truly transformational National Cybersecurity Strategy’s effort to shift fundamental risks from end users to the tech companies that are best situated to build security into their hardware and software. This will fundamentally change the future of cybersecurity and is a worthy goal.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities?

The third QHSR, like its predecessors, makes clear which DHS components are responsible for which missions and lines of effort. Unlike DOD’s military services, which encompass different domains but serve a (mostly) unified strategic mission, DHS’s eight components are organized functionally, and thus contribute differently to the QHSR’s six mission areas:

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to aviation security (part of mission 1, counterterrorism and threat prevention).
CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to land border security (mission 2, border security, but also part of mission 1) and immigration (mission 3).
The US Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP to maritime security (part of missions 1 and 2).
CISA, ICE, TSA (for pipelines), USCG (maritime cybersecurity) and the US Secret Service (USSS) to cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime (mission 4).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and CISA to infrastructure protection and resilience (mission 5); however both CBP and USCG have a part of mission 5.
ICE, CBP, USSS, and USCIS to law enforcement (mission 6, combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims, but also part of other missions).

While this QHSR, like its predecessors (and like similar strategic summaries of DHS’s missions during the Trump administration), contains extensive descriptions of DHS activities, this QHSR proves the aphorism that—unlike DOD, where missions end when a war is over and the military pivots (for example) from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific—at DHS, missions never go away. In this respect, the “new” mission 6 of combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims is not at all new—it is the recognition of a mission DHS has had almost since its inception in 2003.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR is not a budget, but any DHS report on its missions raises the question whether DHS has the resources to succeed in those missions. Alignment between policy and resources is one of DHS’s greatest challenges.

After the October 2022 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in March 2023 that DOD’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget request was “the most strategy-driven request we’ve ever produced from the Department of Defense.” DOD is asking for $842 billion in FY 2024, $26 billion more than in FY 2023. A look at the China and Russia section of the NDS shows the link between DOD’s strategy and its budget request.

DHS cannot say the same thing about the third QHSR and DHS’s FY 2024 budget, which calls for a 1.1 percent increase over FY 2023. DHS officials understand this. The QHSR calls for more efforts and resources on cybersecurity; border and immigration security; community-based programs to prevent future mass shootings as happened in recent years in Uvalde, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and elsewhere; and to head off threats to critical infrastructure from natural causes and nation-state adversaries.

The third QHSR does not have to quantify the resources required to achieve its goals, but it has rightly laid out this secretary’s road map for where DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to do more. One of the third QHSR’s most important benefits should be to focus a much-needed debate—inside the administration and with the Congress and the American people—over whether the United States is spending enough on homeland security.

Brigadier General Francis X. Taylor (ret.)

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Overall, DHS’s QHSR sets forth a comprehensive review of the challenges facing the homeland security enterprise. The program initiatives outlined in the report, if successful, will improve the security posture of the homeland. There are some concerns about whether there is sufficient political and popular support for the initiatives outlined in the report. In addition, DHS should consider an annual review of outcomes that have resulted from its initiatives to give US citizens a sense of how effective the department has been in improving security of the homeland. This report is a good start but needs annual reiteration that reflects sustained improvement in the United States’ overall security posture.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The QHSR sets forth in clear detail the myriad of threats that face the homeland and the challenges for the homeland security enterprise to effectively address those threats. The world continues to evolve, as does the threat environment since the creation of DHS and this QHSR reflects the complexity of the threat environment and DHS’s initiatives to address that environment in new and innovative ways.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategic context of the QHSR is sound and does not underplay the seriousness and challenges of the threat that faces the homeland security enterprise. The emphasis on partnerships to meet the challenges is an important underlying principle for DHS. Never has it been more important for DHS to strengthen and broaden its partnerships as the threat environment continues to change.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The QHSR clearly defines the programs undertaken to address each mission area to address the threats that face the US homeland, but the mere implementation of programs does not ensure effective outcomes.

Clear lines of effort

There are clear lines of effort that are identified in the QHSR. The core mission areas are addressed effectively, but it is not clear that the programs initiated are yet effective in achieving the goals of DHS. Time will tell what outcomes are achieved and how effective DHS has been in mitigating the threats to the homeland.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR fundamentally outlines the challenges that DHS must address to keep the homeland safe. It is not clear that there are sufficient resources to execute this mission as outlined in the QHSR. Congressional support of these initiatives and funding will be critical to DHS’s success.

Seth Stodder

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Like any strategy or planning document produced by a federal bureaucracy, the report on the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review inevitably provokes some trepidation from a potential reader, as such documents produced by Washington bureaucrats rarely last five seconds in an email inbox and never touch a printer.

But in all seriousness, this year’s QHSR is somewhat of a page-turner. It is the first one since 2014—almost a decade. And what a decade it has been! ISIS and Al Qaeda, while still threats, have taken a back seat to AR15-wielding white nationalist extremists in the minds of counterterrorism professionals. The sense of operational control of the border that US officials felt they had in 2010 seems like a quaint bygone era, as compared to the massive challenges the United States faces today at the US-Mexico border. The cyber threats are much more varied, with the rise of catastrophic ransomware attacks and the drumbeat of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and our electoral system. Meanwhile, emerging technology presents opportunities and threats like nothing before—from the rising concerns about social media invasions of privacy, disinformation campaigns, and deep fakes, to the threat of quantum computing and the potentially civilization-altering challenge presented by artificial intelligence. Nation-state threats to the homeland from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have become far more serious since 2010. On the other hand, the ultimate challenge to the US homeland may be environmental, as the force and impact of global climate change and the likelihood of more deadly pandemics have become ever more severe.

The 2023 QHSR—and the evolving mission of DHS—aptly reflect the tectonic shifts happening in the global security environment overall and its implications for US homeland security. To be sure, the original five homeland security missions from the first QHSR Report in 2010 are still there: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security; (2) securing and managing US borders; (3) enforcing and administering US immigration laws; (4) safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. But so many of the characters in the play have changed, or assumed greater or lesser prominence.

Suffice it to say, DHS has its hands full—with a sprawling and ever-more important set of missions, all of which requiring close partnerships with other federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies, the domestic and global private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and the millions of Americans and other nationals who interact with DHS every single day. And this new QHSR ably reflects this massive and growing responsibility.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The key theme is the steadily evolving and, in some cases, radically changing and ever more complex threat picture, and the need for DHS and its components to evolve its missions and focus accordingly. This is expressed forcefully in the document. Unsurprisingly, most of the missions are the same—with one addition—as those stated in the previous QHSRs. But that does not necessarily warrant any effect on its score here as the missions of DHS and homeland security are what they are. Rather, it is the threat and broader strategic environment that has, in some cases, radically changed. And the 2023 QHSR articulates this extremely well.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The 2023 QHSR is extremely clear on the security environment facing the United States and, specifically, the US homeland. The QHSR also effectively nestles DHS and its six core missions neatly within the Biden administration’s broader strategic framework for the United States, as expressed in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and other key documents. The analysis here is sound, and it does not rest on any specious or unfounded assumptions—either about the threat or the missions and capabilities of DHS.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The 2023 QHSR clearly sets forth various goals, backed up with various vignettes and descriptions of ongoing or past programs, initiatives, and other actions reflecting efforts in furtherance of goals. That said, the goals are for the most part relatively vague (e.g., “DHS must be a leader in the responsible use and adaptation of emerging technologies” or “DHS remains committed to facilitating and expanding naturalization pathways for new Americans”), without specifying any particular measurable outputs against which one might assess success or failure. However, one could argue the point of how does one know when the border is actually “secure” or under “operational control,” or when the asylum system is processing claims “fairly” or “efficiently?” And, from a fiscal standpoint, is there a way of knowing when increasing budgets hit a point of diminishing returns—where an additional dollar invested in, say, detection equipment or in efforts against drug smuggling might be better invested elsewhere, such as public health or education? It is hard to clearly find measurable goalposts for these from the QHSR.

Clear lines of effort

The QHSR—and previous DHS documents—have outlined the key missions and lines of effort, and the DHS operational components and management offices have (for the most part) worked out relatively delineated areas of focus meant to maximize unity of effort within DHS, while minimizing interagency conflict and rivalry. As is the nature of this kind of beast, the QHSR does have a bit of the whiff of a laundry list (or lists) of various component activities and success stories (albeit clean laundry, thankfully), but the lists are placed within an intelligently articulated framework of clear priorities. Again, as discussed above, it is difficult to discern measurable outputs or where the signposts are toward achieving mission goals and objectives—but the lines of effort are clearly stated.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

This is somewhere between an unfair question and an incomplete one—in the sense that the QHSR is not meant to be a budgetary document, and indeed there is no sense here as to whether resources are remotely adequate to achieving the goals. Moreover, as noted above, some of the goals are so vague or total (e.g., “preventing labor exploitation”), that it is hard to assess—judging solely from the QHSR—exactly how these goals might be achieved, how success or progress toward the goals could be measured, or at what point diminishing returns might be reached for additional spending. So, it’s hard to grade this one—but it surely isn’t a perfect score.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

This article is part of the Future of DHS Project by the Forward Defense program with financial support from Deloitte.

It’s broken: The humanitarian response is keeping Syrians in a loop of helplessness

Arwa Damon — Wed, 03 May 2023 10:50:15 +0000

“They want us to stay dependent and helpless,” says Zuhair al-Karrat, a general surgeon and health director in Idlib, a city in northwest Syria. “We’ve been saying for twelve years we don’t want humanitarian handouts. We want development projects, we want early recovery projects, we want factories.”

The “they” is the outside world: the United Nations (UN), the United States, other Western nations, Turkey—countries that call themselves “friends of Syria” but have their own interests at the core of their Syria policies. It’s also Russia, Iran, and the Arab nations that are “normalizing” relations with Damascus.

I know this region well, having traveled there countless times as a senior correspondent for CNN. But this trip in March, after the earthquakes that decimated this region, was different. I was not there just to observe; I was on a humanitarian mission with my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance, or INARA. Greater insight into the aid world and how it functions has worsened my frustrations. I found myself muttering repeatedly, “It’s broken. This isn’t right.”

It has been well over a decade since the first of Syria’s displaced settled in these hills and fields in northwest Syria. They were the residents of Jisr al-Shougour, bombed in June of 2011. Each time I visit, I recall meeting those first arrivals stretching canvas between olive trees for shelter, and the young girl I met sleeping out of the back of her family’s van, telling me they had just come for a few days. Over time, the population swelled with those who fled Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus, and elsewhere.

The population in Idlib province has more than tripled since people first took to the streets twelve years ago, from under one million to more than three. Hospitals and schools were bombed and not rebuilt. Factories ceased to function or are now in regime territory, meaning the job opportunities and products are inaccessible for those in the rebel-held northwest of the country. Some fields are planted, but many remain unsown. There is potential but no opportunity.

Every year, as has been the case for more than a decade, there are pleas for more funding for food baskets, for winterization campaigns with images of little faces shivering in subzero temperatures. Every year, funding efforts fail to meet their targets and those pleas go unheeded. Fair or not, the prevailing sentiment in Idlib is that UN agencies responsible for shelter want to keep the population in tents.

INARA in partnership with Kids Paradise provided Ahlam al-Ahmad and her family with hygiene kits, childrens toys, clothing, and food after their tents flooded. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

A little boy plays in muddy and sewage-filled waters at a camp in Syria. There are growing concerns about the spread of diseases such as cholera. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

Ahlam al-Ahmed stands among what she and her family have been able to salvage from the floods. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

The author at a camp INARA set up in partnership with Syria Forum for those who lost their homes in the earthquake. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

I met Ahlam al-Ahmad as she slogged through knee-deep mud. Floods had just ravaged her small camp on the edge of agricultural fields in Idlib, the water so powerful it swept away everything in some of the tents, drowning clothes, kitchenware, mattresses, blankets, small stores of rice, potatoes, and jars of lovingly prepared Ramadan stuffed vegetables.

Like hundreds of thousands here, she was displaced by war, running away with nothing but the clothes she had on. It has been all but impossible for her family to get back on their feet, to rebuild even the smallest fraction of what they lost.

“Why do we live here?” she asks rhetorically. “It’s for work. We women work in the fields, it’s the only thing available.”

“I mean we had sorted ourselves out, sort of,” she continues, her voice cracking as she points to what they were able to salvage from the muck. It took her family years to achieve this meager progress—an existence in three tents, one of which acts as the kitchen. But even with four of them working the fields, they couldn’t afford a home with walls—not when their labor yields just three dollars a day. And there is such a yearning for walls.

Adults yearn to lean back against a wall, while many young children don’t even know what it is to live within a stable structure.

Moving beyond an emergency response

Spiraling inflation, coupled with rising global prices, has pushed this population even deeper into poverty. And yet last year the UN barely met half of its funding goal for Syria. The argument has long been that funding the sorts of projects that would allow greater autonomy for the northwest region—such as building proper shelters, factories, and schools—was too risky, what with the incessant and unpredictable Russian and Assad regime bombing campaigns.

However, for more than three years now the battle lines have remained stable, and the skies no longer buzz with fighter jets raining death and destruction. Yet the humanitarian framework around Idlib is still viewed through the prism of emergency response. That needs to change.

Aside from the emergency response to the recent earthquake, the bulk of funding opportunities for projects in Syria are for small-scale development—efforts such as vocational training and microgrants—and civil engagement interventions. These activities provide little help to the population. Instead, they permit outside players to claim that they support development.

Civil engagement is important and can bring together inspiring minds, but it’s a fruitless exercise based on donor desires and not realities on the ground. “You can’t expect someone who is tunnel-focused on mere survival, on the next meal, to be able to have the mental capacity to focus on anything else. That is how they keep us weak,” explains Hasan al-Moussa, a Syrian friend of mine active in the humanitarian and development space.

Vocational training and microgrants are important, but they need to be significantly scaled up to have a real impact.

At the same time, there is division among the UN Security Council members not just over cross-border access, but also over whether the focus should be on emergency, early recovery, or development. The emergency cycle that northwest Syria has been stuck in for more than a decade is creating dependency and perpetuating poverty, ignorance and disillusionment, and even that response is falling short of the needs. Early recovery and development projects, which would lay the framework to break the cycle, are too few, too small, too short term. The pattern of the current approach is paralyzing the population in a state of helplessness.

On the ground, the bleak situation can feel almost deliberate, an attempt to keep the population unemployed and uneducated. Just enough comes in for outside officials to point to certain projects and make themselves look good, but nowhere near enough to break the cycle of dependency. More money needs to be put into funding projects that create large-scale job opportunities and access to education for those who have none.

Helping the people of Syria will take moral courage that has long been lacking, and it will take—for once—those who hold the purse strings and power over northwest Syria to put their own politics and interests aside. People deserve the chance to regain agency over their own lives. That is the real humanitarian thing to do.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Russia’s invasion highlights the need to invest more in Ukrainian studies

Oleksandra Gaidai — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 16:44:06 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need for greater international investment in Ukrainian studies. However, this discussion does not always take into account the realities of wartime Ukraine.

While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

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Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

One of the essential tools at Turkey’s disposal to tackle these daunting challenges and to design a more sustainable, resilient recovery is impact investing. These are “investments made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return,” according to the Global Impact Investing Network, targeting a spectrum of returns depending on the type of capital and instruments used. As Turkey’s Impact Investing Advisory Board stated in a report published shortly before the earthquakes, urban resilience—which will need to be a priority following this disaster—will benefit from “innovative, sustainable capital allocation and commercial value generation” with an impact focus. Thankfully, the local impact investing ecosystem has been taking root to enable this.

Impact investing can also aim to create self-reliance for refugees and internally displaced people through “refugee lens” investing, which is a framework to qualify and track investments developed by the Refugee Investment Network (RIN), where I work with enterprises and investors focused on impact.

Forced displacement cuts across at least thirteen of the seventeen SDGs around the world, according to RIN. Actively investing in displaced populations leads to new and sustainable solutions. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, that could include supporting the thousands of refugee-owned small businesses in the earthquake region, providing microfinance to local farmers and artisans, or facilitating tech-based remote employment. The goal is to increase displaced people’s livelihoods, financial inclusion, and continued skills development (especially to respond to workforce losses due to the earthquake), thus leading to equitable economic and social revival. Funding the communities and employers around the country that welcome the displaced will also be important.

Having value chains focused on supplier diversity, economic inclusion, and job creation will also help this cause. The public and private sectors can strengthen community resilience by prioritizing local and displaced suppliers affected by the disaster, including social enterprises and cooperatives employing and supporting vulnerable communities through “social procurement.” For instance, Innovation for Development (i4D), a local economic development organization, aims to connect three hundred local producers from the earthquake-affected region with buyers to ensure business continuity and new contracts.

In international trade, proponents of a “Turkiye Compact” call for trade concessions from the European Union, United States, and Canada to incentivize the private sector to hire both Syrian refugees and locals in Turkey with the goal of boosting the local economy and improving social cohesion. According to a United Nations Development Programme feasibility study conducted prior to the earthquakes, such a policy could create 284,000 new jobs (including 57,000 jobs for refugees) and boost exports by 3 percent, primarily of labor-intensive agricultural, processed food, and textile products. Furthermore, local enterprises participating in the Turkiye Compact would become attractive investment opportunities given their tangible impact on displaced communities through employment and sourcing.

Finally, Turkey’s vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem is more crucial than ever. Accelerators, specialized funds, and growing communities of practice can nurture innovative, impact-driven ventures for earthquake-affected communities and create inclusive solutions. Examples so far have included a waste management start-up facilitating food aid, e-commerce solutions enabling microentrepreneurs, online mental health platforms offering therapy to survivors, and tech innovations in rescue and relief, among many others. Additionally, catalyzing entrepreneurship by underserved communities, especially those experiencing intersectional disadvantages, such as the refugee women entrepreneurs featured in an Atlantic Council documentary last year, will create new pathways to self-reliance.

Bringing all of these solutions together and amplifying their impact through the resources of the global impact investing community, local partnerships, and blended financing—with guarantees, concessional loans, or grants to attract private investments, for instance—will yield tremendous, complementary results.

With such a comprehensive toolbox, it will be possible to rebuild better after this terrible disaster and create more inclusive economies and resilient communities.

Selen Ucak is a social impact professional working at the intersection of private sector and international development. She currently leads a global community of refugee-led and refugee-supporting businesses and social enterprises at the Refugee Investment Network, as well as serving as a consultant on additional projects.

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Anti-war Russians struggle to be heard

Christopher Isajiw — Thu, 06 Apr 2023 18:12:04 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Putin regime has worked hard to present the impression of overwhelming Russian domestic support for the war effort. This has involved everything from celebrity endorsements and relentless pro-war coverage in the Kremlin-controlled mainstream Russian media, to online flash mobs and carefully choreographed mass rallies in central Moscow.

Meanwhile, a ruthless clampdown has made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for dissenting voices to be heard. Nevertheless, opposition figures continue to question the true levels of public backing for the invasion, while insisting that large numbers of Russians are either opposed or indifferent. The real situation within Russian society is certainly far more complex than the Kremlin would like us to believe, but today’s suffocating atmosphere means there is little reason to expect an increase in visible anti-war activity any time soon.

Officially at least, Putin’s approval rating has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion just over one year ago. According to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Russian President’s rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023. The same source indicates consistently high levels of support for the invasion of Ukraine, with over 70% of respondents expressing their approval in every single survey conducted throughout the past thirteen months.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

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One of the earliest indications that Kazakhstan would not align with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine was the decision in spring 2022 to cancel the country’s traditional World War II Victory Day celebrations. The cancellation was an unambiguous rebuff to the Putin regime, which has placed the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany at the heart of modern Russian national identity and expects regional leaders to demonstrate their loyalty via reverence for the Soviet war effort.

This snub was followed by an even more direct and public fallout in June 2022. While sharing a stage with Putin at a flagship annual economic forum in Saint Petersburg, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that he would not recognize Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most eye-catching indication of Kazakh public support for Ukraine has been the “Yurt of Invincibility” initiative, which has seen a number of traditional Kazakh yurts set up in Ukrainian towns and cities in recent months to help Ukrainians cope with electricity blackouts caused by Russian bombing of the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Organized by the Kazakh business community and backed by private donations, the yurt initiative has proved highly popular among Ukrainians while sparking considerable anger in Russia. However, Kremlin attempts to elicit an official response from the Kazakh authorities were politely declined, with Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stating there was “nothing to explain.”

It is not hard to imagine why the appearance of “Yurts of Invincibility” across Ukraine struck such a nerve in Russia. Manned by activists offering free electricity and internet access along with hot drinks, the yurts represent a humane response to the inhumanity of Russia’s brutal invasion. In a very real sense, these traditional Kazakh abodes serve as symbols of post-colonial solidarity between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

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Russian discontent over the critical Kazakh response to the invasion of Ukraine has led to attacks on Kazakhstan from Russian officials and in the country’s Kremlin-controlled information space. Since the start of the invasion, pundits on Russia’s notoriously inflammatory political talk shows have begun speculating over the possibility of future Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan. During a November 2022 episode of prominent regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show, one commentator declared: “the next problem is Kazakhstan.” He went on to claim that “the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine.”

These provocative statements were echoed by Russian Ambassador to Kazakhstan Alexei Borodavkin, who warned in December 2022 that “radical nationalist tendencies” were becoming more and more visible in Kazakhstan, before suggesting Russia was ready to “help” the Kazakh authorities address this issue.

The Russian Ambassador’s comments were particularly provocative as they closely mirrored the kind of language used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. This played on longstanding Kazakh fears that Moscow may attempt to exploit the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which is concentrated in northern regions of the country bordering the Russian Federation.

Suggestions that ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan are somehow oppressed have sparked a bitter response from many Kazakhs, who pride themselves on their tolerant attitude toward Russia and their respectful approach to the shared inheritance of the imperial past.

Unlike other post-Soviet states, Russian remains an official language in today’s Kazakhstan. The country also accepted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization into the Russian military in late 2022. Critics say this welcoming stance makes a mockery of Kremlin propaganda claims about a rising tide of Russophobia in today’s Kazakhstan.

The past year has witnessed historic shifts in allegiances and attitudes across the entire post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russian imperialism has prompted countries throughout the region to question the nature of their own ties to the Kremlin and seek geopolitical alternatives capable of countering Russian influence.

In Kazakhstan, the invasion has amplified anti-imperial sentiment and enhanced existing decolonization processes. These trends look set to gain further momentum in 2023. Geography alone dictates that Kazakhstan cannot realistically hope to cut all ties with Russia, but there is no escaping the fact that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has seriously undermined Russian influence in a country where all roads once led to Moscow.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

Turkey and Syria’s devastating earthquakes send a reminder to the world: Don’t leave Syrians behind

Pınar Dost — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:18:52 +0000

Three weeks after devastating earthquakes rattled across Turkey and northwest Syria on February 6, the US House of Representatives approved a resolution mourning the more than 55,000 people who lost their lives (with more than 48,000 of those deaths taking place in Turkey).

The bill, passed by a bipartisan 412-2 vote, was introduced by Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia as well as co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on US-Turkey Relations and Turkish Americans.

The bill is important for several reasons.

First, it represents a friendly hand extended in support to Turkey from an institution whose Turkey-related actions usually consist of warning or admonishing the country or its government—and whose tone has reflected strained relations in recent years.

Second, the bill is a reminder of the forgotten circumstances of Syrians in the Syrian opposition-held northwest. Before the earthquakes, over 4.5 million people in northwest Syria—including 2.9 million internally displaced people—already faced precarious situations after more than a decade of war, cold, and disease. The earthquakes made support for them even more urgent.

While rescue teams and assistance from all over the world arrived quickly in Turkey, it took many days for rescue teams and help to access Syria’s northwest—the part of the country most damaged in the earthquake. The aid that was dispatched immediately following the earthquake, including at least two dozen shipments of disaster relief aid, was sent to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus and none reached opposition-controlled areas in northwest Syria in the first week.

Third, against that backdrop, the bill is also a warning to the Assad regime. It accuses the regime of “cynically exploit[ing] the disaster to evade international pressure and accountability, including by preventing the United Nations from providing assistance through multiple border crossings between [Turkey] and Syria.” The bill also calls upon the Biden administration to use diplomatic tools “to open all [Turkey]-Syria border crossings for United Nations assistance”; and calls for an oversight mechanism “to ensure that United States-funded assistance is not diverted for the benefit of the Assad regime.”

Finally, the bill signals that the United States is watching the region’s geopolitical currents closely, at a time when Russia in particular is trying to stitch together an understanding between Turkey and Syria.

A history of politicized aid

The humanitarian response in Syria has been politicized and exploited throughout the war by the Assad regime and its supporters. Already in 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2165—which set the legal framework for the UN to deliver cross-border humanitarian aid from four crossings on Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey—highlighted that the body was “deeply disturbed by the continued, arbitrary, and unjustified withholding of consent to relief operations and the persistence of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Syria, in particular to besieged and hard-to-reach areas.” Over the years, Russia’s attempts at the UNSC to limit cross-border aid and thus legitimize the Syrian regime’s territorial control have led to a continuous reduction in the number of allowed crossings. Eventually, in July 2020, only the Bab al-Hawa crossing from Turkey was renewed.

Following the earthquake, this sole crossing was not used for three days due to damaged roads and logistical problems, and the UN only started using other crossings following the Assad regime’s approval—even though some observers, as well as members of the UN-appointed commission of inquiry, believe the UN did not need the green light from Damascus. The post-earthquake relief work also revealed the UN’s tangled relations with the regime.

According to UN data, at least 148 cities and towns in northwest Syria have been affected by the earthquakes. The region is divided into territories governed by the regime: the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).

While a 2020 ceasefire in Idlib saved many lives and brought relative calm to the region, the stability has been hampered several times mainly because of infighting among SNA factions and HTS’s attempts to expand its area of influence. In many cases, these incidents resulted in Turkey attempting to mediate among groups or in the Turkish army intervening to end the violence and bring the groups all to their assigned areas, as was the case last October. Therefore, Turkey’s intervention was limited to maintaining the status quo.

In the weeks after Assad agreed to open two more crossings to facilitate the delivery of aid, many countries and UN agencies provided truckloads of aid to the region. The UN launched a call for $397 million in aid support for Syria, while US Secretary of State Antony Blinken—during his first official visit to Turkey on February 19—toured the earthquake-hit areas around Hatay Province. He also visited Incirlik Airbase, met US search and rescue teams, and announced an additional $100 million in aid for the recovery, bringing total US assistance in response to the earthquake to $185 million.

Moves on the region’s chessboard

The United States and Turkey have been at odds with each other in Syria as the United States has supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in its fight against the Islamic State in Syria, while also pushing back on Iran and dealing with Assad and Russia.

The SDF is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG): the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is recognized by the United States and the European Union as a terrorist organization and which Turkey has been fighting for almost forty years. That’s why Turkey has launched three operations in northern Syria to create a “safe zone” in the region with the aim of securing its borders and enabling Syrians in Turkey to voluntarily return to Syria.

Turkey has been signaling its intent to launch another incursion into northern Syria since May 2022, and the United States, Russia, and Iran have all publicly declared their objection to such an attempt. Russia instead has been trying to mediate between Turkey and Syria for the normalization of ties between the two countries.

In December 2022, Turkish, Syrian, and Russian defense ministers and intelligence chiefs met in Moscow, the first ministerial-level meeting between Turkey and Syria in over a decade. The United States and the Syrian opposition, including the Syrian Interim Government and HTS, are against a normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime. Following the talks in December, demonstrations took place in various opposition-held cities in the Aleppo and Idlib governorates to protest the Turkish rapprochement with the regime.

During a recent visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Ankara, the Turkish foreign minister announced that the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran (who was invited after expressing resentment about not being included) would meet in Moscow. A meeting scheduled for March 15 was then postponed for “technical reasons” following a meeting the day before between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Assad in Moscow on the twelfth anniversary of the anti-regime uprising.

It’s clear that the earthquake has helped Assad politically and financially.

Assad’s say over border crossings, and therefore his control over these territories, has effectively been recognized by the UN. He got a 180-day exemption to Syria sanctions for disaster aid from the United States, even though US sanctions never targeted humanitarian assistance in the first place. And he received international assistance and political support, including in the form of visits by foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan.

However, none of those visits would be as important as Turkey fully normalizing relations with the regime, which would be a strategic gain for Assad and his supporter, Putin.

It is unclear whether Erdoğan is engaging in a political maneuver ahead of upcoming elections this May to save face with an electorate that, while divided over many issues, is seemingly united in their opposition to Syrian refugees staying in Turkey. Normalization with Assad would facilitate the return of Syrians to their country. Turkey is the world’s largest refugee-hosting country and hosts 3.6 million Syrians alone.

While the US bill mourning the lives lost in the earthquakes rightly recognized “[Turkey’s] continuing support to Syrian refugees in [Turkey] and in northwestern Syria,” it is worth highlighting that any deal between Syria, Turkey, and others trying to mediate (including Iran and Russia) seems not only unrealistic in the near future (because of the parties’ conflicting expectations) but also unproductive for Turkey, the future of Syria, the Syrians in the northwest, and the Syrians in Turkey.

It is clear that both Syrians in the northwest of their country and in Turkey will need continuous humanitarian support in the coming year. The earthquake has brought the forgotten fate of Syrians and of Syria to the forefront of the US agenda in the region. They must not be forgotten again.

Pınar Dost is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

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Beyond the US-Mexico border: Destination of final goods, environmental impact, and future scenarios for border relations

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 20:12:06 +0000

Three complementary analyses to a two-part US-Mexico border report.

A joint analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, the University of Texas at El Paso’s Hunt Institute for Global Competitiveness, and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.

Analysis 1

US-Mexico commerce: Tracking the final destination and Mexico’s fiscal benefit with greater border efficiency

By Edgar David Gaytán Alfaro, John Gibson, Mayra Maldonado, Jason Marczak, Roberto Ransom, and Ignacia Ulloa-Peters

This report determines the value and final destination of northbound commercial trade flows. Based on limited data, it finds that 45 percent of trade entering the United States remains in border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, or Texas), while 55 percent is distributed to other regions across the United States. It also evaluates the tax revenue collected by Mexico’s six border states (Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora, Tamaulipas) stemming from increased efficiencies at the border. Read our report to find out more about the top 5 receiving states, as well as the economic impact that different regions across the United States would experience following a 10-minute reduction in wait times.

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Analysis 2

Our border environment, water, and air pollution

By The Hunt Institute for Global Competitiveness, University of Texas at El Paso

This environmental impact analysis evaluates the impact idling vehicles have on water and air pollution across the US-Mexico border. Reduced wait times can significantly reduce particulates in the air and water, which currently pose a significant threat to the health of people living in border communities. To find out more about the potential reduction in pollution following decreased wait times, read our report or view our infographic.

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View Report infographic

Analysis 3

Border 2033: Three scenarios for the United States and Mexico

By Peter Engelke, Deputy Director of Foresight, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative; and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council

Foresight scenarios help us tell stories about how the future might unfold and are intended to stir imaginative thinking. In this report, we portray three scenarios of a world that might exist ten years from now in 2023 based upon uncertainties in the United States and Mexico’s relationship today. More specifically, we hypothesize what the US-Mexico relationship would look like if 1) there is little to no change in the manners that the United States and Mexico engage, 2) fears over border security leads to an increasingly hardened border, and 3) Mexico and the United States increase collaboration on border issues. Find the full report below.

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Read our two-part US-Mexico Border report

Report Sep 27, 2022

The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation

By Alejandro Brugués Rodríguez, John Byrd, Noé Arón Fuentes Flores, David Gaytan, John Gibson, Camila Hernández, Mayra Maldonado, Jason Marczak, Jorge Eduardo Mendoza Cota, Roberto Ransom, and Ignacia Ulloa

Improvements in border management and the adoption of new technologies at the US-Mexico border have the potential to enhance border security and generate economic benefits for the United States and Mexico through expedited flows of goods and people.

Economy & Business Latin America

Report Feb 17, 2023

The transformative power of reduced wait times at the US-Mexico border: Economic benefits for border states

By Alejandro Brugués Rodríguez, Noé Arón Fuentes Flores, David Gaytan, John Gibson, Mayra Maldonado, Jason Marczak, Jorge Eduardo Mendoza Cota, José Ángel Moreno, Roberto Ransom, and Ignacia Ulloa-Peters

Atlantic Council’s new data shows that a mere 10-minute reduction in wait times – without any additional action – can create thousands of Mexican jobs, grow the gross domestic product (GDP) of several Mexican states, and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in new spending in the United States.

Economy & Business Inclusive Growth

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One year, eight world-changing numbers. Quantifying Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:11:51 +0000

One year ago, Russian troops streamed over the borders of Ukraine in the dead of night in an attempt to swiftly seize the country and topple its government. Instead they met with remarkable Ukrainian resistance and the rallying of Ukraine’s international allies to its defense, thwarting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. It is hard to calculate the suffering, destruction, and global upheaval caused by the conflict, which has evolved into a brutal war of attrition with no end in sight. But there are some eye-opening numbers that help tell this story. To mark one year since Putin’s full-scale invasion, experts from across the Atlantic Council have identified the figures they believe best illustrate all the ways this war has shaken the world.

108,000

Approximate amount of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, in square kilometers

Many analysts see Russia’s failure to topple Kyiv as a sign of Russian weakness. They argue that Washington and Brussels need not worry about Russia’s threat to NATO because Russia’s military is weaker than we thought. These data tell a different story: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows that Moscow—which controls roughly 108,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian land, according to Institute for the Study of War data analyzed by the New York Times—is capable of seizing and occupying territory on its border the size of two Baltic states. Estonia’s total territory is about 45,000 square kilometers, while Latvia checks in at 64,000 and Lithuania at 65,000. The Russian military is potentially strong enough to cause World War III and break NATO. These are the data that keeps US European Command planners and vulnerable Eastern flank NATO allies up at night.

—Matthew Kroenig is the senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

8 million+

Refugees from Ukraine recorded in Europe since the start of the war

Russian atrocities in Ukraine over the past year have caused untold disaster and spurred the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe in nearly eighty years. The Kremlin has launched unrelenting assaults on civilian infrastructure, culminating in the deaths of civilians and permanently damaging energy facilities. Meanwhile, over fifty thousand allegations of war crimes have emerged from recently liberated Ukrainian cities, including harrowing reports of mass graves, torture in detainment camps, and the utilization of sexual assault as a weapon of war.

As a result, Europe has opened its doors to more than eight million refugees fleeing from Ukraine for their safety. While the prevailing belief is that large, Western European countries have led Europe’s efforts to counter Russia’s aggression, Central and Eastern European countries bear the brunt of refugee waves coming from Ukraine—due to both their proximity and already established Ukrainian diaspora communities. Nearly one-third, or 2.5 million, of total refugees from Ukraine in Europe have settled in countries included in the United Nations’ Refugee Response Plan (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia), while Poland has settled the greatest number of refugees at over 1.5 million and has seen over eight million refugees cross its border seeking safety since the start of the war (though six million have also returned to Ukraine).

Looking at the refugees taken in as a proportion of national population, Estonia, Montenegro, and the Czech Republic top the list, while some larger countries such as France and the United Kingdom fall toward the bottom. As Ukraine’s closest neighbors, Central and Eastern European countries have served on the front line of Europe’s greatest refugee crisis in generations and are likely to continue doing so as the war enters its second year.

—Kristen Taylor was a Young Global Professional at the Europe Center in the fall of 2022 and is a master’s student at American University. Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

Nearly 90%

Reduction in Russia’s piped natural gas export volumes

Russia’s piped natural gas export volumes have shrunk from four hundred to five hundred million cubic meters (mcm) per day to around sixty mcm per day, one year after Putin unleashed his bloody war of choice on Ukraine and an energy assault on Europe, Moscow’s biggest energy consumer at the time. Neither is going as planned.

While oil and gas are vital for Russia’s state budget, Moscow leans heavier on oil exports for revenue and gas exports for geopolitical leverage, which Putin unleashed by abruptly stopping supplies to multiple nations in Europe in order to discourage support for Ukraine. But by cutting supplies, Moscow also cut itself out of the European market as nations adjusted to the massive curtailment—albeit at a hefty price. Much of the market share will be challenging or impossible to recover, regardless of the war’s outcome, as European buyers commit to long-term contracts with alternative suppliers and invest in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure to bring gas to areas previously monopolized by Russian exports.

However, a full decoupling from reliance on Russian gas is far from complete. New projects must come online to fill the supply gap in the long term, and the allure of discounted Russian exports could tempt some regions in Europe to take in gas from the Kremlin after the war. Additionally, Russian LNG exports to Europe increased in 2022—an important trend for European nations to observe as they work to unburden themselves from dependance on an unreliable producer.

Nevertheless, Putin accelerated Europe’s preexisting diversification efforts with his energy blackmail and, ironically, without Western sanctions on Russian methane. Moscow will never again supply 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Global Energy Center.

60.2%

Amount of Russia’s forecasted 2023 budget deficit reached by January

Moscow’s budget deficit in the month of January alone is more than half of its planned deficit for the entirety of 2023. Looking at the below graph, you’ll see a clear surge in Russia’s budget deficit in December. While December spending in Russia is usually high, January remained far into negative territory at a loss of 1.8 trillion rubles. Why the mismatch with Moscow’s predictions?

It’s because the 2023 budget is calculated based on oil revenues coming in at sixty dollars per barrel—the same value that the Group of Seven (G7) nations set as its price cap on December 5—but prices have since dropped well below that mark. With income shrinking, and heavy costs of the war to bear, Russia’s budget deficit is likely to widen past its own 2023 estimate of 2.9 trillion rubles.

—Sophia Busch is a program assistant at the GeoEconomics Center.

52.5%

Proportion of Russia’s tank arsenal destroyed

Prior to last February’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was estimated to possess around 3,330 operational tanks. After one year of fighting, open-source intelligence has visually confirmed that Russia has lost over 1,700 tanks, or just over 50 percent of its pre-war total operational stocks. One estimate suggests that the total lost could be over 70 percent, given that not all losses are accessible to open-source intelligence. Russia is estimated to have around 17,000 additional tanks in storage, ranging from early Cold War-era T-55s, T-62s, and T-64s to more recent T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s, however the condition of these stored tanks is unclear.

—Jeffrey Cimmino is an associate director in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Countries with domestic accountability responses to Russia’s invasion

The response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and the 68,321 crimes of aggression and war crimes registered by Ukraine—has included rapid international action to ensure accountability. Ukraine tops the list with domestic investigations and trials, advocacy to establish a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression, and work to establish a claims commission. However, other countries have followed suit with domestic processes including criminal investigations, targeted sanctions designations, and asset seizures, as well as coordinated efforts through a joint investigative team and the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force.

This is an atypical amount of legal action. This is partly due to practical reasons: Ukraine has an incentive to cooperate with other jurisdictions, and countries close to Ukraine are likely to have refugees who can provide evidence and perpetrators arriving on their territory. However, there are also known double standards in global access to justice—there is less clamor for international action when the perpetrators are from politically well-connected Western countries or part of intractable conflicts—which are considered likely to be a contributing factor to a reported lack of support for certain measures from the Global South. These accountability efforts will shape international legal precedent as they progress, but authorities should also ensure that they become the norm and serve to expand the options available to all atrocity victims.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Number of countries in a new nonaligned movement

On March 2, 2022, in an emergency special session following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly advanced resolution ES-11/1 demanding full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. A total of 141 countries voted in favor of the resolution, including many of the world’s democracies. Thirty-five countries, from China and India to Iran and South Africa, abstained. Five countries— Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria—voted against it.

Seven months later, the General Assembly voted again to condemn Russia’s invasion and not recognize Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory. The votes remained largely unchanged, with only two additional countries voting in favor (a total of 143) of a weakened resolution, thirty-five abstentions, and the same five no’s. (Several countries missed the vote in both cases.)

Both votes show that the international community overwhelmingly stands together to rebuke Russia’s invasion. But such little movement in vote numbers and member groupings—after nearly a year of an increasingly brutal and illegal war, human-rights abuses and apparent war crimes, and massive disruptions to the global economy—suggests that the world is roughly divided into three blocs. The first is a collection of countries, encompassing many members of the free world, that stand together to defend international law and order when it is most under threat. The second is a new nonaligned movement of countries that, for varied political or strategic reasons, choose to hedge or stay out of the fray completely. The third is an “axis of autocracies” that act to disrupt or displace the rules-based order.

These groups are of course not exact or exhaustive. Many states who voted in favor of both resolutions are not free or democratic or may not be supportive of more punitive steps to punish Russia, such as sanctions. Still, how countries have voted on these resolutions displays a real fact of today’s global order: Countries are increasingly coalescing into democratic and autocratic blocs when responding to international issues, with some remaining non-aligned.

—Danielle Miller and Imran Bayoumi are assistant directors with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative.

50 billion euros

Monetary value of assistance sent to Ukraine by the EU and its member states since the start of the war

Despite the Kremlin’s bet that its war of aggression would isolate Ukraine from Europe, the European Union (EU) and its member states have responded with unity of purpose by sending immediate and continued aid to Ukraine.

An estimated 12 billion euros of this assistance was dispatched in the form of military aid, which accounts for both the 3.6 billion euros the EU has contributed via the European Peace Facility and bilateral donations from twenty-four EU member states. European partners not only sent a major wave of this military assistance immediately after Russia’s initial incursion but have also sustained donations throughout the year since—progressively sending heavier and longer-range weaponry—suggesting growing trust in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and an increasing realization that Ukraine is the front line for the defense of Europe overall.

Meanwhile, an estimated 1.7 billion euros has taken the form of humanitarian aid, which has provided food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other basic needs to nearly fourteen million people in Ukraine. The European Commission has coordinated this unprecedented operation under the auspices of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, standing up logistical hubs in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to direct aid into the country. Lastly, as the challenge of Ukraine’s physical and institutional reconstruction looms ahead, the EU has provided 7.2 billion euros in macro-financial assistance—with an additional 18 billion euros of loans approved by the European Council in December 2022—and is sending other financial support through the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

—Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

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Gadzala Tirziu in The New York Sun on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s role as “Europe’s gatekeeper”

sodal — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 16:56:33 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On February 9, Scowcroft Center Nonresident Senior Fellow Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu published a piece in The New York Sun on the role of Italy’s new Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, in securing Western European borders. To curb the entry of migrants, the Meloni administration has recently taken measures to complicate migrant-aid services, such as the work of charity ships that ferry migrants across the Mediterranean.

“Without much too fanfare… she has taken to fashioning Italy as Europe’s gatekeeper amid what is becoming an intractable migrant crisis — one exacerbated by Russia’s growing influence in Africa.”

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

Fellow

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Africa Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Economy & Business Technology & Innovation

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Experts react: How the world should respond to the devastating earthquake in Turkey

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 16:17:52 +0000

This post was updated at 4:40 p.m. ET on Monday.

A 7.8-magnitude earthquake in southeastern Turkey on Monday, followed by a large aftershock, killed thousands and caused widespread devastation in both Turkey and Syria. As locals pick up the pieces and aid groups rush in, how can the international community help? What will the impact be for a region already reeling from a decade-long war and refugee crisis? Our experts on Turkey and the wider region deliver the answers.

Yevgeniya Gaber: Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

Borzou Daragahi: The widespread damage could have been avoided

Rich Outzen: With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

Eser Özdil: Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

The tragedy has mobilized Turkey’s allies to join together in solidarity. More than forty-five countries have already extended their condolences and offered help to Turkey. In Ukraine, where people know well how it feels to wake up to the shouts of those trapped under the rubble of leveled buildings, many have joined a campaign to garner assistance to those affected in the devastating earthquake, while political leadership expressed readiness to send a large group of rescue workers to Turkey to assist in the crisis response. Ukrainians’ hearts and prayers have been with Turkey today.

With so much happening in the region, it is important to make sure that the cost of human lives is not depreciated, people’s deaths do not become mere figures in statistics, and necessary lessons are learned. There is also a risk that the devastating consequences of the earthquake, just months ahead of critical elections, will be used for political manipulations and information operations—both internally and externally. Just hours after the tragedy, Russian Telegram channels and think tanks have published similar messages urging Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to take this opportunity to renew direct talks with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, claiming this would be a good time for a coordinated Turkish-Russian-Syria response. This was followed by a phone conversation between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the same time, there are an increasing number of social media posts sharing conspiracy theories on the possible “man-made” character of the catastrophe, allegedly aimed at weakening Turkey after rising tensions with its Western allies. These malign efforts to influence public perception about the tragedy should be taken seriously.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Previously she was a foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The widespread damage could have been avoided

If just one building collapses in a known earthquake zone, it is a tragedy. If dozens across several major cities collapse, it signals a preventable tragedy. Turkey vowed to implement changes to its building practices following the tragic 1999 Kocaeli province earthquake that left seventeen thousand dead. It instituted new construction rules and implemented mandatory earthquake insurance for all buildings. Architects and urban planners have been warning for years that the rules are not being followed strictly enough. This is an issue that cuts across Turkey’s partisan divide and needs much greater public scrutiny ahead of the May 14 elections.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and an Istanbul-based journalist writing for the Independent.

With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

These devastating earthquakes have killed at least two thousand people and injured over eight thousand according to Monday’s reporting, with totals likely to rise. Turkey, unfortunately, has experience with severe earthquakes and has sophisticated emergency-response mechanisms. Yet there will be a need for technical assistance from neighbors and allies for time-sensitive tasks such as extricating people trapped under damaged and collapsed buildings. Azerbaijan, Israel, many European countries, and others have offered the rapid deployment of teams for this sort of work. It is worth remembering that millions of Syrian refugees live in southern Turkey, and there is a role for European donors as well as the Turkish government to help Syrians who live alongside Turkish neighbors in the affected area, but also across the border in northern Syria, which has also seen widespread destruction.

Sympathetic and supportive messages from across the region, including Athens, remind us that tragedies can also create a sense of solidarity in times of crisis. There may be some softening of heretofore tense regional relations in the aftermath and during the recovery process.

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Turkey is once again faced with the devastating effects of an earthquake, this time epicentered on Kahramanmaraş, in the southeastern region of the country. The earthquake also affected highly populated cities including Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Antakya, Adana, and Malatya. It is cold in the region at the moment, and all kinds of humanitarian aid are needed. Although Turkey has extensive experience in dealing with similar natural disasters, any support from other countries will make a difference in the field. History has shown us many times that a common struggle in natural disasters such as earthquakes can make positive contributions to the development of relations between countries. I think that countries that show solidarity with Turkey will also improve their bilateral relations.

—Eser Özdil is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the founder and managing director of GLOCAL Group Consulting, Investment, and Trade.

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Biden just tightened US migration policy. Can he calm the surge at the border?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 05 Jan 2023 22:44:23 +0000

On Thursday, US President Joe Biden announced that the United States will more swiftly remove unauthorized immigrants, expanding a pandemic-era restriction known as Title 42. Meanwhile, Biden expanded the use of a special authority to allow in up to thirty thousand migrants per month from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela, so long as they have a US sponsor. We asked our experts what’s behind the policy shifts from the White House and what happens next.

1. Why did Biden expand the parole program to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti?

Putting in place the tools for a more orderly asylum process at the US-Mexico border is pivotal with the surge in encounters. Today’s announcement of an expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Haitians will hopefully help to dissuade asylum seekers from risking their lives to make the trek north.

In October and November 2022, more Cubans (sixty-five thousand) and Nicaraguans (fifty-five thousand) arrived at the southwest border than in fiscal years 2020 and 2021 combined. The twelve thousand Haitian arrivals in those two months amount to one fifth of their total fiscal 2022 arrivals.

But people won’t stop leaving while they have little hope for a better life in their own countries. That is the case in Cuba (where inflation is soaring and repression escalating), Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua (where democratic freedoms no longer exist), Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela (with its own soaring inflation and repression), and gang-controlled Haiti. So border policies must be accompanied by new US and partner country strategies to improve livelihoods in these migrants’ countries of origin. And the United States must hold those like Ortega accountable for his actions to weaponize migration by doing things such as lifting the visa requirement for Cubans in order to more easily facilitate passage to the United States.

But the border is about more than migration. It is a vital source of commerce that promotes the creation of US jobs. Our recent work shows that just a ten-minute reduction in border wait times could have a $5.4 million annual impact on the US economy and create nearly nineteen thousand jobs in Mexico. Greater commerce translates into greater security as well. Economic growth creates jobs, making it less desirable to leave home. It is absolutely achievable to have a border that is more secure and more efficiently promotes commerce. That should be the goal.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. What impact will this have at the border?

Biden’s visit to the border ahead of the North American Leaders Summit next week is an important step toward the amelioration of a crisis that has long afflicted the US-Mexico border. Smart border policies that streamline crossing processes not only benefit issues around migration, but also help decongest communities that are regularly choked by vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

Initiatives such as the New Migration Enforcement Process for Venezuelans have already decreased the percentage of attempted migrant crossings by nearly 90 percent. The expansion of such programs to additional groups could have similar effects, thus alleviating burdens on the health care and sanitation industries, among others.

Additionally, as border agencies utilize their resources to confront surges in pedestrian traffic, wait times for vehicles exponentially increase. Subsequent carbon emissions deteriorate the air quality around ports of entry, directly affecting the health outcomes of local communities. Further, vehicles waiting in line for miles constrict local mobility, hindering residents’ ability to travel back and forth between school, work, hospitals, and more.

It is important to keep people at the center of border policy, and initiatives that aim to enhance secure and efficient crossings should be celebrated by not only the United States and Mexico but the region as a whole.

—Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

3. Will Biden’s plan work?

The Biden administration’s announcement that it will surge resources to the southwest US border and speed up processing for asylum applicants is a most welcome response to the extraordinary surge of people from troubled countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Nothing will satisfy some critics, but those who support security, economic prosperity, values, and the US history of welcoming refugees from troubled lands should see today’s announcement as good news.

One absolute essential is the need for additional resources and personnel to make this plan work. The administration needs to send Congress an urgent supplemental budget request and to invoke some of the president’s extraordinary authorities to get additional personnel at the border to achieve the goal of making definitive, binding determinations of asylum eligibility in days, not weeks. The administration needs additional resources to (1) integrate legitimate asylees and their families to make important social and economic contributions to US society or (2) return ineligible people to a place of safety under existing laws. The administration and Congress now need to put forward the resources needed to satisfy US values, security, and prosperity. This would be historic, and it is achievable.

—Thomas Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

4. What should happen next?

The American people have a right to expect secure borders. Crucial to this is a fair, orderly, and efficient process for those seeking to come and for determining who may stay. Unfortunately, the United States’ current system is utterly broken, and this is particularly true of the asylum system—weighed down by a 1.6 million-case backlog, with each case taking years to resolve. This has encouraged thousands with marginal claims to make dangerous journeys to the US border every month, expecting that the United States will not only let them in but also allow them to stay and work during the years it will take for their asylum claims to be resolved.

The measures announced today by Biden are the latest in a series of efforts aimed at gaining control over this untenable situation—establishing orderly processes for those with legitimate asylum claims; providing opportunity for those desiring to escape repressive or criminal regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Haiti; and working with Mexico and other nations to strengthen enforcement against those choosing not to use these legal processes and, instead, trying to sneak in.

These are excellent steps, but band-aids. Congress needs to get involved—not only to provide the resources and legal fixes needed to expedite the resolution of asylum claims and better secure the border, but also to reform the immigration system more broadly, giving lawful status to those who have been here a while, expanding lawful channels for those wanting to come, and creating more efficient mechanisms for employers to hire the workers the US economy needs. Biden and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas deserve great credit for muddling through with the limited tools they have, but to truly get control of the border, Congress needs to put politics aside and fix the broken system.

—Seth Stodder is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and a former assistant US secretary of homeland security for borders, immigration, and trade policy.

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Agachi interviewed by Politico on the biggest unexpected threats to the United States

Anca Agachi — Wed, 14 Dec 2022 09:30:00 +0000

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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As Putin retreats in Ukraine, he is also losing Kazakhstan

Kamila Auyezova — Wed, 30 Nov 2022 21:16:20 +0000

Russia’s carefully choreographed political talk shows are notorious for their anti-Ukrainian invective, but in late November the target was Kazakhstan. “We must pay attention to the fact that Kazakhstan is the next problem, because the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine,” commented one pundit on the prime time Evening with Vladimir Solovyov show. Russian officials subsequently criticized this thinly veiled threat, but many observers noted that in the tightly controlled world of Kremlin propaganda, such sensitive statements are unlikely to have been made without some form of prior approval.

The incident highlights rising concern in the Kremlin as the invasion of Ukraine continues to erode Russia’s position elsewhere in the former Soviet Empire. The most prominent shift since the onset of the invasion has been in relations with Kazakhstan, which has demonstrated its desire to distance itself from an increasingly isolated Moscow and pursue a more assertive multi-vector foreign policy with closer ties to China, Turkey, and the West.

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Kazakhstan has traditionally been one of Russia’s closest allies. Due to a combination of factors such as common history, security cooperation, economic integration, and one of the world’s longest shared borders, there is little chance of a complete collapse in bilateral ties. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has adopted a principled position in relation to the current war and has underlined that it does not approve of Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made his position particularly clear during the annual Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in June. Seated on stage alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tokayev declared that Kazakhstan had no intention of recognizing the independence of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics in eastern Ukraine. The move was widely seen as a very deliberate and very public snub to Putin and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Tokayev’s comments in Saint Petersburg came following a series of moves signaling Kazakhstan’s decision to step away from Russia. Since the invasion began in February, Kazakhstan has chosen to abstain rather than back Russia during a number of key UN votes on the war. The Kazakh government has also vowed to strengthen energy cooperation with Europe at a time when Putin was hoping to use his stranglehold on oil and gas supplies to pressure European leaders into abandoning their support for Ukraine.

In a highly symbolic move, Kazakhstan canceled the country’s annual Victory Day celebrations in May. This gesture angered many in Moscow, where official reverence for the Soviet role in World War II is regarded as an indication of continued political loyalty to Russia.

As the invasion of Ukraine has escalated, so has the critical rhetoric from Kazakh officials. When hundreds of thousands of Russians fled to Kazakhstan in September in order to avoid mobilization into the Russian army, Tokayev vowed to provide humanitarian assistance. In a stinging rebuke, he said most of the fleeing men had been forced to leave Russia due to the “hopeless situation” in the country, before condemning Putin’s attempts to annex four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces.

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As Russian influence recedes, Kazakhstan is moving forward with a more assertive foreign policy of its own. In recent weeks, this has seen the Chinese and German leaders both visiting the Central Asian country. On November 11, Tokayev participated in the Summit of the Organization of Turkic States in neighboring Uzbekistan, where he again stressed the importance of strictly observing the UN Charter. In a further blow to Moscow, Kazakhstan has already begun to enhance the Trans-Caspian international transport route, which bypasses Russia and travels through China, Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and on to Europe via Turkey.

Russia is likely to fall further behind as other countries take advantage of Putin’s rapidly unraveling invasion of Ukraine to gain influence in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is now actively strengthening ties with two of Russia’s main Eurasian competitors, China and Turkey. During a May visit to Ankara, Tokayev signed an agreement on deepening security sector cooperation and joint development of military drones.

China is likely to emerge as the biggest winner from the shifting geopolitical balance of power in Central Asia, with Beijing understandably keen to emphasize its support for Kazakhstan. During a September visit to the Kazakh capital, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke of China’s “strong support to Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”

Looking ahead, Kazakhstan faces the challenging task of maneuvering between the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon. Russia looks set to remain an important power in Central Asia and a key partner for Kazakhstan, but Moscow will now longer be able to dominate the region as it once did. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has already led to historic changes in Central Asia and sparked a push by Kazakhstan to pursue a more independent foreign policy.

For now, there is no question of Kazakhstan adopting an adversarial approach to Russia or choosing to side exclusively with Moscow’s rivals. Any such moves could have potentially disastrous consequences for the country’s security and independence. However, it is increasingly clear that as a result of Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion, Russian influence in Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asia region is in decline and has receded to levels not witnessed for over a century.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

Francis M. O’Donnell — Mon, 07 Nov 2022 21:09:44 +0000

Nine months is enough time to bring a human being to birth, but it is apparently not long enough for Russian President Vladimir Putin to realize the folly of his war against Ukraine. Instead, it is becoming increasingly clear that no meaningful settlement will be possible as long as Putin remains in power. The international community must therefore seek pathways to a lasting peace with a future post-Putin Russia.

For many decades, the USSR and subsequently the Russian Federation played a major role in advancing humanity’s progress. In sharp contrast to his predecessors, Vladimir Putin is now leading Russia away from that legacy and is transforming the country into a pariah state. Russian acts of hostility are global in scale and include everything from waging war in Georgia to the subversion of domestic politics throughout the West. Since the unprovoked attack on Ukraine began in 2014, the Putin regime has embarked on a further diplomatic frenzy that has increasingly alienated Russia’s erstwhile closest friends and foreign partners.

Yet just four years ago, Russia was party to a UN Security Council resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict which recognized for the first time the intrinsic link between hunger and conflict. Russia now behaves in stark defiance of these principles. On four separate occasions this year, the UN General Assembly has resoundingly rebuked Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and unwarranted and egregious violations of UN norms. Russia has been suspended from the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe, and has lost its seat on the Governing Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

In a March 2022 resolution, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva agreed to establish a commission to investigate violations committed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A subsequent resolution examined the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from the invasion. This led to a report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine addressing events during late February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions of northern Ukraine.

Evidence continues to mount indicating tens of thousands of war crimes committed by Russian forces acting under command responsibility, as distinct from occasional rogue elements. This evidence includes official statements, actions, and systemic politically-driven campaigns with clear genocidal intent, including widespread ethnic cleansing, deportations, and repeated large-scale missile and artillery targeting of civilian populations and vital civilian infrastructure.

For a comparatively minor territorial gain, Putin has sacrificed Russia’s reputation and socio-economic well-being. Even worse, the ricochet effects have also surged around the world creating food and energy insecurity, escalating inflation, and widespread impoverishment. There would never have been a good time for such willful misadventure, but coming in the wake of the Covid pandemic, the timing could hardly be worse.

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The increasing mendacity of the Putin regime is now so severe that members of the elite cannot even trust each other, with key figures close to the Kremlin engaging in public attacks on the leadership of the Russian military. As battlefield failure and international isolation continue to erode Putin’s authority, his entire model of government is now under threat. Russia’s prospects today are the dimmest they have been since World War II, with a range of possible dangers now emerging including deepening internal divisions and the potential collapse of the country.

While it is important to rule out any interference in the internal governance of the Russian Federation, the West can and should call for full compliance with Russia’s international obligations to defend the human rights and legitimate aspirations of Russian citizens. At this stage, the inclusion of Russian local governments and municipalities in the global effort to tackle climate change and pandemic recovery could be an opener to the de-concentration or leveling of power. When President Trump pulled the US out of the Paris Accord on Climate Change, several US states and municipalities strengthened their commitment to it.

We may already be witnessing the early warning signs of a degradation in the Russian state as sanctions and military defeats take their toll and warlords like Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov openly question Putin’s leadership of the war. Members of the Russian elite need to take stock of this decline and move beyond today’s misguided imperialism with a view to harnessing the energies of Russian society and thoroughly reforming the country’s institutions.

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The real Russia is deeper and richer than today’s stolen billions in assets and the forfeited lives from Putin’s genocidal wars against the country’s neighbors. The real Russia, including its repressed civil society and talented Russian communities around the globe, can strive to optimize broad-based outcomes that uplift the people of Russia and enhance their lives whilst restoring international partnerships and global respect. This will only be possible through the openness, transparency, and accountability of elected leaders divorced from the power of money, media, and mania. Multiple networks of Russians abroad need to coalesce around a reform agenda that looks to a post-Putin Russia and ushers in a new era of benign leadership that puts the well-being of the Russian people before the narrow predatory interests of the country’s current kleptocratic leadership.

The international community should therefore focus their attention and resources not only on enabling Ukraine to win the war but also to encourage a process of reconciliation and convergence that unites all the various and often conflicting elements of the Russian opposition both internally and in the diaspora. This would not be unprecedented. It was the unifying of the Serbian opposition that led to the overthrow of Milosevic regime.

A recognition of the dilemmas and internal stresses that Russia is facing, as distinct from but in addition to the harm caused to Ukraine and the world at large, warrants attention at the forthcoming G20 summit. The stifling of civil society and dissent has deprived the people of Russia of their rightful freedom of expression. Despite various Russian opinion polls indicating majority support for the invasion of Ukraine, this cannot be credibly authenticated. By its behavior and utterances alone, the Kremlin has disqualified itself from international relations. It is time for world leaders to acknowledge that a change of tack in Moscow is essential.

In order to advance toward the goal of peace, the international community must act to help empower alternative Russian voices. The global networks, institutions, and methods that can enable capacity for mediation and negotiation in conflicts around the world, are a vital resource to foster engagement with Russian civil society, which is largely silenced internally but not abroad, and can also be approached virtually at the local level. Getting Russian civil society to converge on peaceful alternatives and a different narrative than the Kremlin’s is the key to de-concentrating political power in Russia and incubating real participatory reform. It may also be the best way to achieve a sustainable peace.

Ambassador Francis M. O’Donnell (Ret.) is the former UN Representative in Ukraine (2004-2009)

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Accommodating such large numbers of Ukrainian refugees is placing enormous strains on existing public resources. For example, around 185,000 new Ukrainian students joined Polish primary schools at the start of the new academic year in September.

A number of right-wing European politicians have already attempted to exploit mounting refugee-related concerns. So far, these efforts have largely failed to gain traction. Nevertheless, attacks on refugee accommodation and assaults on individual Ukrainian refugees highlight the potential dangers. Meanwhile, some EU citizens hosting Ukrainian refugees in their homes are beginning to ask how much longer their assistance will be required.

As energy prices skyrocket and inflation soars throughout the European Union, Ukrainians may find current programs under threat due to potential public frustration. Support may be cut as governments reconsider their spending in the face of economic crisis and as populist politicians seek scapegoats.

There are already some indications of wavering support toward Ukrainian refugees. In summer 2022, Bulgaria suspended its housing accommodation program. The Bulgarian authorities stated lack of gratitude displayed by Ukrainians as the primary decision for the shift in policy, before reinstating the program following international criticism.

In September, the leader of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, Friedrich Merz, accused Ukrainian refugees of “welfare tourism,” stating that refugees were taking advantage of German social services. Even Poland recently announced a change to its Ukrainian refugee policy, with refugees required to cover a part of living costs for collective accommodation.

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With Russia now plotting to fuel an escalation in the refugee crisis, Western leaders need to be prepared. The world’s wealthiest countries must open their doors and their wallets to ensure that solidarity with Ukraine does not flag during the coming winter months.

First and foremost, this means accepting more refugees. Larger countries, especially the United States, have vastly greater logistical capacity, resource flexibility, and physical space available to host Ukrainian refugees and lessen the constraints on smaller states in Central Europe.

So far, the United States has only committed to accepting up to 100,000 refugees. According to the UNHCR, France has accepted 105,000 Ukrainian refugees or just 154 for every 100,000 citizens compared to Estonia’s total of 60,980 Ukrainian refugees or 5,033 per 100,000 citizens. As often occurs during refugee crises, countries with lesser capacity to address the situation end up hosting the most refugees. Transatlantic partners should prove their commitment by addressing this imbalance.

It is also necessary to expand aid to countries that have accepted the most refugees per capita. At the onset of the war, humanitarian funding went only to the five countries bordering Ukraine that were originally listed in the UNHCR’s Regional Refugee Response Plan. This excluded countries which accepted a comparatively large number of refugees relative to their population such as the Czech Republic and Estonia, creating greater resource divides in areas not covered by the initial aid package scenario. While the UNHCR’s plan now includes other countries and transatlantic partners have provided additional funding, current levels of financial support remain insufficient.

Every refugee crisis is unique. While the moral and ethical imperatives of humanitarian assistance certainly apply in the present case, they are also joined by an ominous political calculus. Refugee fatigue is an opportunity for Russia to sow division between European countries and undermine Western support for Ukraine. With a challenging winter season now fast approaching, the democratic world would do well to find a renewed and expanded commitment toward refugee admittance and resettlement.

Kristen Taylor is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a graduate student at American University.

Poll: 86% of Ukrainians want to fight on despite Russian terror bombing

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 25 Oct 2022 19:55:06 +0000

In Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine, rolling power blackouts are now the new normal. With Russia’s terror-bombing campaign of civilian targets and critical infrastructure currently in its third week, the Ukrainian government has been forced to limit electricity and impose regular cutoffs in order to preserve energy amid damage to around 40% of the country’s power grid.

Vladimir Putin hopes that by destroying Ukrainian infrastructure and depriving the civilian population of essential services such as heating, water, and electricity, he can break Ukraine’s will to resist and force the Kyiv authorities to accept a peace deal on Moscow’s terms. So far, there is little sign of that happening. Instead, Ukrainians are responding to Russia’s terror tactics with the kind of resolve that has characterized the country’s war effort ever since the invasion began eight months ago.

A new nationwide poll released this week underlined the current mood of defiance across the country. Conducted on October 21-23 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the survey found that 86% of respondents supported the continuation of Ukraine’s military counteroffensive and rejected negotiations despite Russia’s escalating airstrikes against civilian targets.

This latest data point provides an indication of attitudes in Ukraine as Moscow’s terror-bombing campaign reached the two-week mark. It mirrors a number of earlier surveys which have consistently identified little Ukrainian appetite for any territorial concessions to the Kremlin.

This determination to stand up to Russian aggression was perhaps best articulated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in an iconic September 11 social media post addressed to the Russian leadership in which he underlined just how far Ukraine was prepared to go in order to achieve an historic break with Russia. “Do you still think we are “one people”?” asked Zelenskyy. “Do you really think you can scare us, break us, force us to make concessions? Don’t you understand who we are and what we stand for? Read my lips: Without gas or without you? Without you. Without light or without you? Without you. Without water or without you? Without you. Without food or without you? Without you.”

This rousing Churchillian rhetoric has been accompanied by generous helpings of the good humor that Ukrainians have become renowned for over the past eight months. Ukraine has emerged as something of a social media superpower since the start of the Russian invasion, with the country’s ability to embrace dark humor in even the most desperate of situations striking a chord among international audiences. As the lights have gone out in recent weeks, many have quipped that the move will backfire on the Kremlin and lead to a baby boom, resulting in many more Ukrainians at a time when Putin is so desperately trying to destroy the nation.

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There is nothing funny about Russia’s intentions, of course. Kremlin officials and regime proxies make no effort to disguise the fact that their bombing campaign is an attempt to render Ukraine uninhabitable and force millions of citizens to flee the country. For the past month, government officials and other prominent pundits have regularly appeared on Russia’s carefully choreographed state TV political talk shows to express their support for targeted attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to demand an expansion of airstrikes.

The current offensive represents a dramatic escalation in Russia’s invasion at a time when Moscow already stands accused of committing genocide in Ukraine. Russian troops have reportedly engaged in systematic human rights abuses and mass executions throughout areas under Russian occupation, while tens of thousands of civilians are believed to have been killed when Putin’s forces reduced Ukrainian port city Mariupol to rubble during the early months of the war.

Meanwhile, Russian occupation authorities have allegedly subjected more than a million Ukrainians including thousands of children to forced deportation while eradicating all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and identity in areas under their control. The forced deportation of children is classified as genocide under international law.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba argued on October 22 that the current wave of airstrikes against civilian targets was further evidence of Russian genocide in Ukraine. “Deliberate strikes on Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure are part of Russia’s genocide of Ukrainians,” he posted, noting that the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention specifically refers to “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

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Despite a chorus of international condemnation, Russia shows no signs of ending its airstrike offensive. The key question now is whether Ukraine can repair its battered civilian infrastructure quicker than Russia can destroy it. Much will also depend on the willingness and ability of Ukraine’s international partners to deliver new air defense systems capable of protecting Ukrainian skies. However, even in a best-case scenario, military experts warn that no air defenses are impregnable, with some missiles and kamikaze drones always likely to get through.

The coming months will be yet another test of Ukrainian resilience. With Russia unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is now seeking to terrorize the civilian population into surrender.

At present, this brutal plan looks to be one of the Russian dictator’s many miscalculations. Time and again, his apparent failure to understand the true nature of the Ukrainian nation has led him to take self-defeating steps that have merely served to deepen the increasingly bitter divide separating Ukraine from Russia. Putin’s terror tactics are now visibly strengthening Ukraine’s resolve to defy him.

Despite the mounting hardships caused by the Kremlin’s blackout blitz, most Ukrainians remain optimistic about the prospects of ultimately defeating Putin’s invasion. This comes as no surprise. After all, attacks on civilian infrastructure have minimal military value and are unlikely rob Ukraine of the battlefield initiative or transform the fortunes of Russia’s demoralized and decimated army. Nevertheless, with each new wave of bombings, the price of Ukrainian victory will increase further and more horror will be inflicted on the civilian population.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Livia Godaert (@liviagodaert): Nonresident fellow at the Europe Center
John M. Roberts: Nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center
Hameed Hakimi (@hameedhakimi): Nonresident senior fellow at the South Asia Center

Breaking down the agenda

The 42-year-old Sunak, a former chancellor of the Exchequer, was the runner-up to Liz Truss in this summer’s Conservative Party leadership race. Livia says that based on Sunak’s record, we can expect “a pretty hard line on immigration and refugee policies,” combined with a “push for greater economic and trade diplomacy.”
Livia also predicts that Sunak’s United Kingdom will remain a stalwart NATO ally and keep up the support for Ukraine. But what’s “less predictable” is how he will handle the “dark-money problems” caused by Russians and other kleptocrats investing in London.
In the same vein, Livia adds, “Sunak took a hard line against China during the campaign this summer, but this geopolitical stance may conflict with a greater push for foreign investment and trade.”
Those challenges, however, pale in comparison to the country’s ongoing post-Brexit “identity crisis,” Livia says. She argues that the Sunak government’s long-term goal should be to clearly articulate its vision for Britain’s place in the world and invest in the country’s “soft power.” The country can be a player in global debates on climate change, technology, and more, she says, “but thought leaders and decision makers won’t engage with the United Kingdom if they think they won’t be heard, or if they don’t see the country as a serious partner.”

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First test

Expect Sunak to “push for a further decoupling from the single market and the European Union,” Livia tells us, including ditching the Northern Ireland protocol and instituting data reforms.
At the same time, John describes Sunak as an “economic and financial realist” who may try to improve trade relations with the continent but would face headwinds from the “wing of the Conservative Party that objects to anything other than a pure and total Brexit.”
The first test comes as early as tomorrow, when Parliament will debate a bill that would effectively reverse some 2,400 EU regulations at the end of next year—on matters ranging from workers’ rights to televising the Olympics.
“The UK business community is by and large horrified at the prospect of the chaos that dropping all these laws will mean,” John tells us. “Canceling the bill would obviously improve Britain’s trade prospects with the EU, but the hard-line right wing of the Conservative Party would block any such effort.”

Race and politics

People overseas may view the United Kingdom’s first prime minister of color as groundbreaking, but “the Asian and minority ethnic groups have a more complicated relationship with leaders such as Sunak,” Hameed tells us.
In recent years, a slew of British politicians from minority groups have risen through the ranks—including London Mayor Sadiq Khan, former Home Secretary Priti Patel, and former Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng—but there has been no real progress on solving the disparities in wealth and health faced by British people of color. “It is difficult to measure the significance of their rise beyond progressive optics,” Hameed says.
He adds that for Sunak, who attended Oxford and Stanford and married the daughter of an Indian billionaire, “his politics and leadership are likely to be defined more by his extremely privileged upbringing in Britain—and the collective wealth he enjoys with his wife—than by any presumed solidarity on the basis of his ethnic background.”

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Vladimir Putin has little reason to celebrate on his seventieth birthday

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 07 Oct 2022 12:16:50 +0000

Vladimir Putin marks his seventieth birthday on October 7 but the Russian ruler has little reason to celebrate. For much of his 22-year reign, Putin has been credited with rejuvenating Russia and returning the country to the forefront of world affairs following the humiliations of the 1990s. However, his decision to invade Ukraine has made him personally toxic and left Russia more internationally isolated than ever. In less than one year, Putin the Great has become Putin the Pariah.

Few could have envisioned this turn of events on February 24 when Putin launched his attack on Ukraine. Most observers in Russia and the West confidently expected Ukrainian resistance to collapse in a matter of hours, allowing Moscow to install a Kremlin-friendly puppet in Kyiv. This was to be Putin’s greatest achievement, correcting what he and millions of Russians fervently believed to be the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Unfortunately for Putin, Ukraine fought back. The courage and determination displayed by the Ukrainian nation during the tumultuous first days of the invasion won the admiration of the watching world and transformed international perceptions. A conflict that Putin had sort to portray as a “Special Military Operation” to address legitimate Russian security concerns was now widely recognized as a brutal and entirely illegitimate war of imperial conquest.

Russia’s battlefield fortunes have continued to deteriorate ever since. Putin’s army was beaten in the Battle of Kyiv and forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces then fought his troops to a standstill in eastern Ukraine and have since achieved stunning counter-offensive successes on both the eastern and southern fronts. Moscow has suffered staggering losses including tens of thousands of soldiers and dozens of commanders. The once vaunted Russian military has become a laughing stock, its tanks towed away by Ukrainian tractors and its frequent retreats disguised as “goodwill gestures.”

This has taken a heavy toll on morale. Fleeing Russian troops have abandoned so many vehicles and arms depots that Moscow is now officially Ukraine’s main weapons supplier. With large numbers of Russian troops simply refusing to fight, Putin was recently forced to introduce draconian new penalties for deserters while also announcing Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. It not clear whether these desperate measures will enable Putin to stop the rot within his army. International sanctions make it difficult for Russia to replace the vast amounts of equipment lost or expended in Ukraine, while many question the military value is poorly trained and demoralized conscripts against the increasingly well-armed and superbly motivated Ukrainians.

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Putin’s woes are not limited to the battlefields of Ukraine. His rapidly unraveling invasion has also gravely undermined Russia’s international standing. Countries throughout Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence have been encouraged by the poor performance of the Russian military and are now openly defying the Kremlin.

Kazakhstan has sided with the West over the war and is at the same time drawing closer to China. In the southern Caucasus, Russia has been exposed as toothless amid a new flareup in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Baltic states have emerged as key champions of the Ukrainian cause and have imposed tough entry restrictions on all Russian citizens, while even Kremlin-dependent Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has resisted Russian pressure to join the invasion. At this stage, it looks like Ukraine will become the graveyard of Putin’s imperial ambitions.

The Russian dictator’s efforts to divide the West have also backfired. Transatlantic cooperation has been reinvigorated by the invasion of Ukraine, while Europe has responded to Moscow’s energy blackmail by slowly but surely moving to end its dependence on Russian oil and gas. Worst of all, NATO has expanded on Russia’s doorstep, with both Sweden and Finland abandoning decades of neutrality and applying for membership of the military alliance.

Even Putin’s traditional partners appear to be getting cold feet. The Chinese and Indian leaders have both recently expressed their concerns over the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, while only a handful of fellow pariah nations are currently prepared to stand with Russia during voting at the United Nations.

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Putin’s current plight is all the more striking as it is almost entirely self-inflicted. His well-documented obsession with Ukraine has clearly clouded his judgment and led him into a series of disastrous decisions that have undone the progress made during the early years of his reign. This obsession is rooted in Putin’s conviction that the emergence of a genuinely independent Ukraine is an historical aberration that poses an existential threat to Russia itself. Haunted by the Soviet collapse, he is convinced that the consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine will act as a catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s imperial retreat.

Despite his best efforts to contain the conflict within Ukraine, there are signs that instability is indeed coming to Putin’s Russia. For now, the Russian public is largely voting with its feet. An estimated 700,000 Russians fled the country in the first two weeks following the announcement of mobilization. However, there are also indications of a mounting protest mood, particularly in poorer regions such as Dagestan where ethnic minorities have already suffered disproportionate losses during the first seven months of the invasion.

More worryingly for Putin, there is growing evidence of infighting among the Kremlin elite. In recent days, key regime loyalists such as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and the founder of the mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have launched highly unusual public attacks on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian military commanders leading the Ukraine invasion.

This rising tide of discontent is also evident on Russian state television. The carefully choreographed political talk shows that dominate Russia’s mainstream media are widely viewed as a barometer of the mood within the Kremlin. For months, the regime’s favorite propagandists remained upbeat about the war. However, the tone has become noticably darker in recent weeks following Russia’s bruising defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson sectors. At present, the critics are focusing their fire on the military. However, if Moscow’s battlefield losses continue to mount, it is surely only a matter of time before the Russian public acknowledges that the problem is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Ukraine attempts to encircle Lyman; civilian convoy hit in Zaporizhzha

Putin illegally annexes Ukrainian territory

On September 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, effectively incorporating all of southeastern Ukraine into Russia. “There are four new regions of Russia,” he told the assembled audience at the Kremlin, and insisted that annexing the regions was “the will of millions of people.” After a brief history lesson in which he lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “catastrophe,” he called for Ukraine to accept a ceasefire. Putin was open to negotiating a settlement, he continued, but added that he would defend the newly annexed territories “by all means available.” In reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons, he said the US “created a precedent” for their use when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Prior to the annexation ceremony, Reuters and the Guardian reported Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov discussing how Russia would “’de jure’ incorporate parts of Ukraine which are not under the control of Russian forces into Russia itself.” Russia would therefore consider Ukrainian attacks on annexed areas that Russia does not even control as an attack on Russia itself.

Response to today’s developments have been swift. UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace declared on Twitter, “The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine.”

The UK will never recognise Russia’s illegal annexations in Ukraine. Russia doesn’t even control some of these oblasts. The truth is Russia is losing in Ukraine and their incompetent Generals are sending thousands to their deaths to please President Putin’s imperialist fantasy.
— Rt. Hon Ben Wallace (@BenWallace70) September 30, 2022

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas lambasted the move as a “land grab” and put the annexation into stark geographic terms:

Let’s look at the magnitude of Russia’s illegal annexation. Russia will announce that around 20% of Ukraine’s territory is annexed to Russia. It is the size of 108 800 km2 – this is comparable to Austria and Belgium combined. Or Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Or 30% of Germany. Or the size of the Republic of Korea. If you add Crimea to it, the territory is comparable to three Belgiums and the Netherlands combined. And around 40% of Germany.

And let’s call things with the right names. Russia tries to rewrite the map of Europe. It’s a land grab. It’s theft. Putin hopes to add legitimacy to his invasion with this step. The international community will never recognize it.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas

US President Joe Biden also condemned Putin’s annexation move. “Make no mistake: these actions have no legitimacy,” he said in a statement. “The United States will always honor Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.”

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Ukraine attempts to encircle Lyman; civilian convoy hit in Zaporizhzhia

Russian and Ukrainian analysts on Telegram are predicting that Lyman could fall into Ukrainian control, as Ukraine continues its efforts to encircle the Russian-controlled city. A Ukrainian armed forces spokesman told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the encirclement of Lyman is “nearing its completion.” There are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces are attempting a pullback from the city.

It’s a death trap pic.twitter.com/WhFUcMMFLQ
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 30, 2022

In recent days, Russian army shelling was most active in the front areas of the front near Bakhmut and Pokrovsk. In the Bakhmut area, Toretsk and Svitlodarsk came under fire. There is a Ukrainian breakthrough reported in Stavky, the liberation of Yampil which reportedly fell under Ukrainian control on this morning, and a blockade of Drobysheve, which is important for the Russian defense of the city.

Outside of Zaporizhzhia, a missile struck a civilian convoy of residents attempting to relocate. Initial reports from the scene suggest a death toll of more than two dozen people, but at the time of writing had not been confirmed.

The news from the front comes against the background of the Kremlin’s announcement to annex four more areas of Ukraine after self-styled referendums condemned by Ukraine and the West as a sham. It is worth noting that Russia does not fully control any of the four regions it has decided to annex. Although most of Luhansk remains under Russian control, Moscow only controls 60 percent of Donetsk. The capital of the southern region of Zaporizhzhia is under the control of Ukraine’s government while the frontlines in Kherson remain unstable.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington DC

Russian men resist mobilization across the country

Against the backdrop of Ukrainian pressure on the front lines in the Donbas, signs of resistance in the Russian Federation against the announced mobilization continue to emerge. Authorities detained an individual after an arson incident took place at the military enlistment office in Uryupinsk. At least fifty-four arson incidents have been document documented in recent weeks, according to Russian independent media outlet Mediazona.

On September 26, a Russian man lit himself on fire at a bus station in Ryazan while yelling he didn’t want to take part in the Ukraine war. In another incident that same day, a commander was killed at a military enlistment office in eastern Russia. A video emerged of a Russian man opening fire and killing the commander in the city of Ust-Ilimsk, who was also the head of the local draft committee.

Meanwhile, the number of Russians attempting to leave the Russian Federation has increased since Putin declared a partial mobilization. The Finnish Border Guard, for instance, reported an increase of 37 percent on September 24 compared with the previous weekend at the immigration checkpoints Salla and Raja-Jooseppi in Lapland. Further south, where Finland has several cross-border roads to Karelia and the St. Petersburg region, traffic was reportedly higher. A total of 38,444 Russian citizens entered Finland at land border checkpoints last week, the Border Guards stated. Considering the mass exodus from Russia, Novaya Gazeta reported that 261,000 men had left the country since mobilization, according to the FSB; most had fled to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. Especially dire is the situation on the Georgian border, where the Russian army even established mobile barricades to stop those of military age from departing the country. Several outlets reported that Russian authorities could close the border for military-aged men as soon as this week. These reports also suggested that Putin will make the final decision on a departure ban and the possible introduction of martial law prior to addressing both chambers of parliament today.

Some Russian officials are going even further to convince more recruits. Kirill Kabanov, a member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, proposed to depriving residents from Central Asia of Russian citizenship if they refuse military service. This proposal would also affect people who had received citizenship within the last ten years, as well as their immediate family, thus raising the possibility that they would be stripped of their citizenship.

Russian Muslims announced protests against the mobilization on September 30 after Friday prayers. They also planned to express solidarity with Dagestan, whose population was among the first to protest earlier this month. In recent days, over 100 people have been arrested during protests in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, and tensions between residents and security forces continue to rise. Arrests were also reported in the Republic of Tuva following local protests.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia-based Facebook operation targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine messaging revealed

In August 2022, the DFRLab discovered a network consisting of six inauthentic Facebook pages purchasing ads to promote posts about Germany’s impending energy crisis and called for the lifting of sanctions on Russian gas imports. An independent review of these assets by Meta, along with others separately identified by German media, led to the discovery of a much larger network consisting of 1,633 accounts, 703 pages, twenty-nine Instagram profiles, and one Facebook group. These assets promoted Kremlin interests beyond Germany, also targeting France, the UK, Italy, Ukraine, and Latvia.

It was “the largest [network] of its kind we’ve disrupted since the war in Ukraine began,” Meta said in its report.

The network exhibited an overarching pattern of targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine narratives and expressions of support for Russian interests. It manifested multiple indicators of previous Russian influence operations, including the amplification of pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukraine or anti-Western narratives; the paid promotion of content; calls for action on petition sites and other forms of audience engagement; amplification across multiple languages reflecting inaccurate and non-native grammar; impersonating real people or institutions or creating fake ones; and generating names with detectable patterns.

The timing and narratives of the posts coincided with policy decisions made by the targeted countries pages regarding the war in Ukraine. For example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz went to Canada for talks about liquified natural gas supplies on August 21, 2022. On August 22 and 23, five pages in the network posted a cartoon portraying Europe as a character named “Dr. EuroReich,” who is seen cutting Russian gas to a patient representing Germany’s economy. Similarly, in June 2022, France completed its first delivery of Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. At the end of that month, four pages posted an image of the howitzer and suggested that France was getting itself involved in war crimes allegedly committed by Ukraine.

Meta concluded that the network originated in Russia and spread out across multiple platforms beyond Facebook and Instagram. It spent the equivalent of about $105,000 in advertising on Facebook and Instagram, primarily in US dollars and euros.

Some of the Facebook pages within the network posted links to websites of Russian origin, as well as links spoofing the domains of legitimate media organizations, including Bild and Welt in Germany, 20minutes in France, ANSA in Italy, RBC in Ukraine, and the Guardian in the UK. EU DisinfoLab, together with the Swedish non-profit foundation Qurium Media Foundation, were able to identify fifty-six spoofed domains that were part of the network.

Read the full report

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin spins quotes from the Western leaders to blame the US in Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline explosions

Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), demanded on her Telegram channel that US President Joe Biden “answer whether the United States realized its threat on September 25 and 26, 2022, when an emergency occurred on the three lines of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, which is tentatively qualified as a pipeline rupture, suggesting that they were blown up.” Zakharova referred to a press conference on February 7, 2022, when Olaf Scholtz visited the White House. During the that meeting, President Biden said, “If Russia invades, that means tanks or troops crossing the — the border of Ukraine again, then there will be — there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2.” After a journalist asked to clarify on how exactly the US will stop Nord Stream 2, which is under German control, Biden said, “We will — I promise you — we will be able to do it.”

Zakharova took out the video fragment of the press briefing and posted it on her Telegram. The post garnered more than 850,000 views, 85 shares to other Telegram channels and chats, 3,6000 forwards and 492 comments, according the TGStat.ru, a Telegram analysis tool.

Screenshot of Maria Zakharova’s Telegram post’s engagement data retrieved from TGStat.ru (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via TGStat)

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German right-wing political party, used Facebook advertisements to promote the video fragment with Biden suggesting that the US might be behind the attack.

Screenshot of Facebook ad paid by AfD and translated to English from German by Google translate. (Source: Meta Ad Library)

Zakharova also used a tweet by Radek Sikorski, the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, now Member of the European Parliament, in which he posted the bubbling surface of the Baltic Sea and wrote, “Thank you, USA.” Sikorski’s Tweet was amplified by the Russia’s MFA on Twitter to further suggest US involvement in the gas pipelines’ disruptions.

Screenshot of Russian MFA’s quote tweet of Radek Sikorski’s tweet. (Source: @mfa_russia/archive)

Sikorski later deleted this tweet but left another tweet celebrating the gas leak. Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, attempted to explain that what Sikorski might have meant was thanking the US for warning that such gas pipeline explosions might happen. Previously, on September 28, 2022, Spiegel, the German mainstream media outlet, wrote that the CIA warned Germany about possible attacks on the gas pipelines.

Russian gas deliveries to Western Europe through Nord Stream 1 pipeline were among the Kremlin’s leverage over sanctions put on Russia after Russia invaded Ukraine. On September 5, 2022, Russian state-owned Gazprom company shut down Nord Stream 1 due to “necessary repairs.” Nord Stream 2 was never in use, as Germany decided to freeze the project amid Russia’s recognition on two breakaway regions in Eastern Ukraine. Putting both pipelines out of order does not change much for Western European countries in terms of gas supply, while the Kremlin has lost direct access to a large part of the European gas market.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Thousands of Russian citizens flee to neighboring Georgia, raising security concerns among Georgian civil society

Putin’s partial mobilization order on September 21 has led to a second wave of mass exodus from Russia. Tens of thousands of Russian citizens have left the country. According to statistics published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, up to 79,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia between September 17–26, out of which 53,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia since September 21, after the mobilization announcement in Russia. This is the second large wave of Russian influx in Georgia. The first wave followed shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24 and peaked in summer. Between March and August, up to 800,000 Russian citizens entered Georgia. The visa-free regime was introduced by the previous Georgian administration. The Georgian Dream-led government has expanded the visa-free stay in the country from ninety days to one year.

Footage emerged on social media platforms depicting thousands of Russian citizens trying to cross the border with Georgia at the Upper Lars border crossing. Maxar Technologies published satellite imagery from September 27 depicting a sixteen kilometer traffic jam near the Lars border checkpoint. The Insider also published drone footage of long lines near the border crossing.

Our latest #satelliteimagery, from today, Sept 27, along the #Russia – #Georgia border and the extensive (~16 km in length) traffic jam approaching the Upper #Lars border checkpoint (lat/lon: 42.768, 44.631) as well as the Lars border crossing (lat/lon: 42.740, 44.627). pic.twitter.com/chG2ZzJYT6
— Maxar Technologies (@Maxar) September 27, 2022

What is going on in front of the Upper Lars border crossing: drone footage
Many kilometer traffic jams, drivers wait in front of the border for 40-50 hours. Scuffles keep sparking from time to time in the queue pic.twitter.com/1EReyhhyHs
— The Insider (@InsiderEng) September 26, 2022

The latest influx of Russian citizens has raised concerns among civil society actors and democracy activists in Georgia. On September 28, activists held a protest rally near the Georgia-Russia border demanding closure of the checkpoint. Citizens also started to mobilize on Facebook. A Facebook group called “ჩავკეტოთ ლარსის გზა“ (“Let’s block the Lars road”) was created on September 27 and garnered 9,300 members in two days. The group has already organized two events on Facebook to demand the closure of the Lars checkpoint.

The Georgian Dream-led government has not been responsive to the situation. Earlier in August, Georgian Dream party chairperson Irakli Kobakhidze accused opposition parties, media, and civil society actors of holding “xenophobic” and “chauvinistic” attitudes towards Russian citizens. On September 27, the Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri stressed that about 60 percent of Russian entrants had already left the country. “Russians have always entered Georgia…why should this become a problem today?” – he added.

On Telegram, the increase in mentions of “Ларс” (Lars) following Putin’s September 21 “partial” mobilization announcement peaked on September 27, with 4,502 mentions and up to 88 million views.

Screengrab from a TGStat query showing the increase of mentions (gray) and reach (blue) of “Ларс” (Larsi) following Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization.” (Source: DFRLab via TGStat)

Various Russian Telegram channels and groups with “Lars” in their titles have been growing audience and garnering engagement. The groups include “ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ” (Upper Lars chat), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia), ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС (Upper Lars ), among others. The subscribers of the channels and groups have been sharing information about where to get products, water, and petroleum; advertising the private services of transportation from Russia to Georgia; posting images and videos of people crossing Georgian border; and giving various tips to each other.

For instance, ВЕРХНИЙ ЛАРС ЧАТ | ГРУЗИЯ (Upper Lars chat | Georgia) had around 11,000 members at the end of August; by late September the number reached 36,000.

Screengrab from TGStat showing the participants number growth (top) and number of messages (bottom) in the Telegram group Upper Lars chat . (Source: EtoBuziashvili/DFRLab via TGStat)

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

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Putin threatens to increase attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure

Victor Kevluk — Tue, 27 Sep 2022 22:27:41 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin made global headlines on September 21 by threatening to use nuclear weapons if Ukrainians refuse to end their resistance to his invasion and continue to liberate Russian-occupied regions of their country. There has subsequently been much debate over whether Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is genuine or merely an attempt to intimidate the Western world into abandoning its support for Ukraine.

Many observers believe that a less publicized threat made one week earlier offers a clearer indication of Moscow’s likely next steps. Speaking on September 16 during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan, Putin noted a recent series of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and warned of more to come. “Just recently the Russian armed forces hit some sensitive targets. Let’s consider these to have been warning strikes. If the situation develops further in the current direction, our response will be more serious.”

The strikes Putin was referencing to included missile attacks on Ukrainian power stations in Kharkiv, Zmiiv, Pavlograd, and Kremenchug on September 11-12, which left parts of the Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia regions temporarily without water and electricity. Two days later on September 14, Russia struck a dam at the Karachuniv Reservoir close to Kryvyi Rih, causing fears over possible flooding and disruption to local water supplies.

Attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure are not new and have been taking place regularly since the Russian invasion began on February 24. Nevertheless, the coordinated nature of the recent airstrikes indicates a change in tactics. This can also be seen on Russia’s Kremlin-controlled federal TV channels, which have recently began to actively promote the idea of destroying Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

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Calls for a new campaign against civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine have emerged following the Russian army’s humiliating retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September. The rapid pace of Ukraine’s advance and the comprehensive nature of Russia’s collapse sent shockwaves through Moscow. For the first time, many Russians began to understand that they may be witnessing the early stages of an historic defeat. This appears to have further radicalized opinion in the Kremlin, leading to open demands for war crimes targeting the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russia’s actions are in clear violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that established international legal standards for humanitarian treatment in war. However, with UN investigators already confirming that Russia has committed war crimes in Ukraine, an isolated and cornered Putin seems ready to entertain increasingly drastic measures in order to prevent his faltering invasion from unraveling further.

A Russian campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would have thousands of potential targets to choose from including everything from power stations and energy supply networks to water, internet, rail, and transport hubs. Any attacks that succeeded in disrupting the supply of food or medicines could have a devastating impact on whole regions, especially if timed to coincide with the coldest periods of the coming winter season.

The targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure poses obvious and significant challenges to the country’s population. While some elements of infrastructure are protected, many possible targets are highly vulnerable to attack. This could lead to significant loss of life and may also trigger a new wave of refugees as Ukrainians seek food and shelter in neighboring EU countries.

Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is thought to be particularly at risk from Russian attack. Russia is well aware of Ukraine’s excessive dependence on energy imports as well as the country’s issues with inefficient energy use. Attacks targeting energy supply could plunge entire cities into darkness and spark panic among the civilian population, with negative consequences for a whole series of different sectors.

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With the winter heating season fast approaching, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must waste no time as they prepare for Russian attacks on every element of the country’s civilian infrastructure. Likewise, ordinary Ukrainians should take measures in anticipation of possible coming disruption to basic services in the months ahead.

In military terms, this means enhancing and expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The best way to thwart Russian attacks is by preventing missiles from reaching their targets. Ukrainian leaders have been consistently requesting more air defense systems since before the Russian invasion began. Putin’s stated plans to target civilian infrastructure should now add a sense of urgency to these calls.

Cyber security must also be strengthened. Russia has previously demonstrated that it can disable vital infrastructure via cyber attacks. Such tactics are likely to be used in conjunction with airstrikes.

Ukraine must seek to increase energy efficiency and find alternative sources of energy supply in anticipation of possible disruption. Strategic reserves should be built up and preparations put in place to repair any damage. Encouragingly, drills are already taking place at key energy infrastructure objects.

Local authorities should consider establishing well-stocked community hubs offering warmth, electricity, and access to basic supplies such as food, water, and medicines in the event of massive infrastructure failure. Individual Ukrainians can take similar precautionary measures for their own households, and may also wish to stock up on specific items including torches, candles, canned food, and warm winter clothing.

Attempts to destroy Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure represent the latest escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow is now prepared to openly attack both military and non-military targets in order to achieve its goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing Ukrainian national identity. All the indications are that Ukraine will face an historically challenging winter of hardships as Russia seeks to break the country’s will to resist. It is vital that the necessary preparations are put in place without delay.

Victor Kevluk is an analyst at the Center for Defence Strategies in Kyiv.

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh must increase diplomatic pressure in Gulf countries, build on-the-ground bureaucratic infrastructure there, and improve labor laws and standards in their own countries. These changes, some of which have already been successfully deployed by origin countries such as the Philippines, would dramatically benefit South Asian migrants in the Gulf.

Increase diplomatic pressure

Under the kafala system, workers are subject to highly uneven power dynamics as their employers gain control over their employment and immigration statuses. Such exploitation is pervasive at the institutional level, and combating its effects will require the highest level of diplomacy.

South Asian countries sending migrant workers can begin by ramping up their diplomatic presence in Gulf countries and harnessing all sources of diplomatic leverage. The Philippines has utilized multiple diplomatic tools to protect its citizens: establishing strong diplomatic missions in the Gulf and banning workers from migrating to some Gulf countries (and only lifting the bans after signing agreements and memoranda of understanding, or MOU, with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia guaranteeing protections for migrant domestic workers from the Philippines).

India has signed similar MOUs with Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, with a specific focus on domestic workers. Pakistan has likewise signed MOUs with Qatar and the UAE, but neither agreement explicitly mentions domestic workers or their rights. As domestic work is a highly feminized field, migrant women domestic workers (MWDWs) are especially susceptible to exploitation and abuse under the kafala system. Therefore, all three of these South Asian countries should sign an MOU explicitly addressing domestic-worker rights with each Gulf country with which they already have a migrant-worker MOU. And finally, given their significant migrant-worker populations in Saudi Arabia, both Pakistan and Bangladesh must also work toward signing MOUs with the Kingdom to solidify high-level commitments to ensuring the welfare of migrant workers.

To bolster their MOUs, South Asian countries should consolidate their diplomatic weight and strategic approaches by consulting with one another. For example, the Colombo Process and similar institutions gather countries—including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—to discuss common goals between sending countries, share effective strategies, and ultimately commit to protecting migrant workers abroad. Since joining the Colombo Process, South Asian member countries have revamped legislation surrounding migrant workers such as Bangladesh’s Overseas Employment Policy, Sri Lanka’s National Labour Migration Policy, and India’s Emigration (Amendment) Rules. Increased engagement with these interactive institutions can significantly help improve migration regulations and future diplomacy with Gulf countries.

Build infrastructure in destination countries

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh should establish comprehensive bureaucratic-support systems in Gulf countries so that once migrant workers arrive to their destinations, they have reliable access to services such as employment-contracts verification and legal assistance, and even a safe haven in times of distress. The Philippine Overseas Labor Office offers such services to its migrant workers, whether documented or not, throughout the Gulf—and also provides cultural programming to foster a sense of community among workers and connect them to their host countries’ cultures.

In contrast, India’s embassies and consulates are the main source of support for migrant workers in the Gulf. But many Indian migrant workers are not aware of the services offered by their embassies, nor do they feel the current offerings adequately serve their needs in times of distress, especially when their sponsors take their identification papers. Countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have overseas labor and employment divisions within their governments, but their physical offices are only located in sending countries and thus can only provide limited aid once workers are actually abroad.

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are all lacking a robust bureaucratic presence in the Gulf. With services (and awareness of them) lacking, South Asian countries must revamp their support systems and the methods through which services are promoted. Governments should also seek out partnerships with existing migrant-worker community spaces in the Gulf, such as places of worship. Building up on-the-ground aid, with physical spaces for support, can exponentially improve the lived experiences of migrant workers.

Improve laws and standards in sending countries

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh must also build stronger systems at the point of departure, where South Asian migrant workers are often recruited through informal and under-regulated channels. Brokers, agencies, and other private intermediaries can charge both workers and employers sky-high prices for visas, flights, and post-arrival services. On top of this disjointed recruitment system, migrant workers are often not provided with adequate orientation about their rights and services available to them abroad before traveling to their destination countries. Despite these disadvantages, however, many migrant workers still prefer to work with private intermediaries due to perceptions that government-associated channels are inefficient.

Rather than restricting migrant workers to government-associated channels, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh should draw recruiting agencies into public-private partnerships. For example, in the Philippines, any hiring through a private-recruitment agency must be certified by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration before the worker can depart the country. Using similar regulating recruitment tactics and practices while retaining the established recruitment networks can help South Asian countries eliminate redundancies in the system managing migration without sacrificing migrant workers’ safety and wellbeing.

Of course, it is not solely the responsibility of sending countries to guard against injustices occurring under the kafala system; Gulf countries must also work to remove the all-too-common practices allowed under this system that amount to modern-day slavery. But India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh shouldn’t wait. Beyond improving their own economies to make them equitable for those who have no option but to go abroad, South Asian countries should immediately improve policies specifically for migrant workers both at home and in destination Gulf countries. These steps cannot be taken in isolation, either: It is essential that these countries adopt all of these measures together to amplify their impact on the lives of South Asian migrant workers.

Elaine Zhang is a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

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Shahid quoted in BehanBox: Navigating statelessness: How laws fail Bangladeshi trafficking survivors in India

Atlantic Council — Thu, 01 Sep 2022 16:29:00 +0000

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Plitsas in the Daily Signal on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan

Atlantic Council — Fri, 19 Aug 2022 12:52:19 +0000

original source

On August 15, Alex Plitsas was quoted in the Daily Signal on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan one year after the US withdrawal. He also commented on the merits of the “Afghan Adjustment Act,” a bill that was introduced to assist Afghans evacuated to the United States.

Last year, the United States brought about 74,000 Afghans over during the airlift, and they were brought here most often under humanitarian parole – a category that lets them stay for no more than a maximum of two years

Alex Plitsas

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Alex Plitsas

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan Crisis Management

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Shuja Nawaz in Dawn: What went wrong in 1971?

Atlantic Council — Sun, 14 Aug 2022 17:30:00 +0000

original source

The post Shuja Nawaz in Dawn: What went wrong in 1971? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pakistan at 75: Learning from history to chart a better future

Uzair Younus and Ilhan Niaz — Fri, 12 Aug 2022 14:10:19 +0000

As it celebrates seventy-five years of independence, Pakistan today “requires a change in political thinking across the political class,” especially if the country is to chart a better future towards a hundred years of independence, says historian and author Dr. Ilhan Niaz. The alternative, he warns, may result in the “liquidation of the country” from which the elite political class draws their resources and identity.

Dr. Ilhan Niaz, chair of the history department at Quaid-i-Azam University and author of The State During the British Raj: Imperial Governance in South Asia 1700-1947 has extensive experience studying the long history of South Asia and the legacy of the British Raj on the Indian subcontinent.

In this interview with Uzair Younus, Director of the South Asia Center’s Pakistan Initiative, Niaz discusses the role of the political class and Pakistan’s long historical trajectory into what he denotes a “decaying orbit.” He showcases that the crisis in Pakistan is fundamentally a crisis of identity—in terms of modernity versus Islam and democracy versus authoritarianism.

Here are some key takeaways from the interview:

The struggle between modernity and religion

According to Niaz, the struggle for Pakistan and the creation of a separate Muslim homeland is rooted in a modernist discourse that argued Muslims failed to keep up with the knowledge, science, military arts, and the ideological and political developments that had swept through the western world.

However, after independence, he notes, the struggle for “Muslim modernism” as an approach to governance and organizing society withered away at an intellectual, administrative, social, and economic level.

As such, Niaz argues that the history of Pakistan since 1947 is “an amalgam of a kind of regression towards primordial identities” that attempts to pack together elements of modernity in a religious discourse. Ultimately, “this crisis of our world view,” he notes, is the source of many of Pakistan’s problems since 1947.

Pakistan’s great tragedy

Throughout Pakistan’s history there have been many key inflection points that shaped its trajectory. According to Niaz, this led Pakistan to a situation where even though Pakistani leaders have been well advised by their advisors or civil servants, the short-term goals of the political class—which consists of politicians, judges, military officers, and bureaucrats—have led to “unwise decisions” that continue to overshadow and overpower decisions that would have been better for the country in the long-term.

Ultimately, he argues, this is “Pakistan’s great tragedy.” The current trajectory was avoidable, especially considering that countries which started off in a worse position than Pakistan—and “inherited far worse from their colonial masters”—have done much better.

Military bureaucracy: A legacy of British colonial rule

The dominance of military elites in Pakistan did not start with colonial rule, but rather goes back to the Mughal empire and other smaller and less successful kingdoms. However, Pakistan did disproportionately inherit a large military class from the British.

This military class in Punjab and partly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Niaz adds, remains a “very strong source of support not only for military rule, but also for other types of authoritarian tendencies and experiments” that civilian leaders have opted for from time to time. In this regard, he argues that while the “authoritarian constituency” as a social group was something Pakistan inherited from the British, authoritarian tendencies in the region go back hundreds of years.

The situation today is as grim as it seems

While elite Pakistanis would like to believe that the country’s current situation is not as bad as it seems, that Pakistan has survived much worse, and that it will come out “alright” on the other side, Niaz showcases that this view is highly limited and flawed.

He argues that Pakistan survived Partition, the mass migration, and war with India over Kashmir because those crises were met with effective responses. The idea that Pakistan was “alright” after the 1971 crisis with East Pakistan is simply unimaginable. The impact of that loss left a chronic set of political, economic, and administrative problems that Pakistan continues to tackle to today.

Ultimately it is essential to realize that while there is no doubt Pakistan deserves credit for having staggered through seventy-five years, “Pakistan is running out of countries to fall behind,” says Niaz.

Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan’s governance structure

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first governor-general, envisioned Pakistan as a parliamentary democracy with a relatively strong central government that would implement reforms necessary to modernize the country.

Pakistan, Niaz adds, has “paid an enormous price” for its continued attempts to tamper with the basic understanding of a parliamentary democracy. He argues that this debate surrounding Pakistan’s governance structure has produced a “very toxic political competition” where political elites spend the majority of their time with “unconstructive political conflicts” while the rest of the population, and their needs, remain neglected.

Silver linings and hope for the future

Looking back on the past seventy-five years, one source of pride and inspiration is Pakistan becoming a nuclear power. According to Niaz, the nuclear program gave Pakistan “a strategic weight” which continues to go well beyond what the country’s economic indicators otherwise merit.

Regarding hope for the future, he contends that it lies with the youth. Whether it is the athletes that succeed without any government support or students in universities, the youth of Pakistan is no longer waiting for the government’s support to make things better in the country. And, this desire of the people is perhaps why Pakistan continues to function and, to some extent, have any social and economic stability.

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#BritainDebrief – What future for Hong Kong? | A Debrief from Nathan Law

Ben Judah — Wed, 27 Jul 2022 20:42:58 +0000

What future for Hong Kong?

As the 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong is marked by the ascension of John Lee to the position of Chief Executive, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Nathan Law, a Hong Kong democracy activist currently in exile in London. Was the current repression in Hong Kong inevitable under the Chinese Communist Party, or under Xi? How have Britain and the United States aid in the plight of Hong Kong against this repression? How has the UK’s visa offer to the majority of the population benefited Hong Kongers’ attempts to flee the territory?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Russian War Report: Ukraine uses HIMARS effectively to hit Russian ammo dumps

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 08 Jul 2022 18:13:01 +0000

Security

Ukraine uses HIMARS effectively to hit Russian ammo dumps

Tracking Narratives

Kremlin outlets amplify footage of Lysychansk residents greeting Russian troops

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels amplify fake Bild video claiming self-propelled German howitzer captured

Kremlin media “predicts” disintegration of NATO and EU despite plans of expansion

Polish right-wing political party launches campaign targeting Roma people from Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channel linked to inauthentic Facebook assets from Côte d’Ivoire

Ukraine uses HIMARS effectively to hit Russian ammo dumps

At the beginning of the month, the Biden administration announced it was sending a small batch of M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. This decision was long awaited on the Ukrainian side, which lacked precision artillery systems that are able to hit Russian targets deep behind the frontlines. The first videos of HIMARS on the battle front appeared online as early as July 4.

Despite the limited numbers of HIMARS currently available to Ukraine, the impact on the field can already be felt. At the moment, Ukraine operates nine HIMARS; upon receiving the systems, Ukrainian military started systematically targeting Russian ammunition storage facilities behind the frontlines.

During the past week, a number of ammunition dumps were reported to be on fire all over the occupied Ukrainian territory. On July 4, Ukrainian diplomat Olexander Scherba claimed the system was already making an impact. Three days later, videos of a bombardment of the Donetsk Kamaz truck center started appearing online. Allegedly, this was the location where Russian troops were keeping their ammunition supplies in Donetsk.

https://twitter.com/PierreDBorrelli/status/1545030128807411712

The video of a Kamaz center in Donetsk on fire. (Source: @PierreDBorrelli/Archive)

DFRLab analysis of recent satellite imagery concludes that the Kamaz truck center was indeed damaged between July 2 and July 4. Due to a lack of visible damage among surrounding buildings, this was likely a precision weapon attack, such as newly acquired HIMARS.

Comparison of July 2 and July 4 satellite imagery on Planet.com. Satellite imagery reveal complete destruction of the Kamaz center in Donetsk, occupied Ukraine (marked in blue). (Source: Planet.com; coordinates on Google Maps)

Equipment that was believed to have been used in parades organized by the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic was also destroyed, according to the recently surfaced photos. Another hit on an alleged ammunition storage facility in Donetsk was reported on July 5 and July 7; at the time of publishing, satellite imagery to verify these claims is unavailable.

Additional reports of targeted Russian ammunition dumps include July 2 in Popasna, July 4 in Snizhne and Yakovlivka, July 5 in Kadiivka, July 6 in Makiivka, as well as other locations.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, DFRLab Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin outlets amplify footage of Lysychansk residents greeting Russian troops

Kremlin propaganda media outlets and social media accounts published numerous videos showing residents of Lysychansk greeting Russian armed forces upon upon entry into the city on July 3. The official Telegram and VK accounts of Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechen Republic, published videos with people hugging Kadyrov’s soldiers and thanking them for humanitarian aid and “liberating” them. Yuri Podolyaka, a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian blogger, amplified videos by both Kremlin-controlled media outlets like RIA Novosti, and independent western media outlets like France 24 showing some residents of Lysychansk happy with Russian troops entering the city and condemning Ukrainian troops. Other VK accounts that used pro-Kremlin letter Z as their avatar image or in their name also posted videos with elderly women from Lysychansk blessing Russian military and hugging them after coming up from a basement. Another popular video posted by the Operativnye Svodki Telegram channel showed a girl showing her pro-Kremlin drawings of Russia’s flag and the letters ZOV saying “she knew that [Russian troops] will come.”

While the footage is legitimate, the sentiment can be found among the small fraction of Lysychansk residents who chose to stay behind and not evacuate the city. There were 93,340 residents in Lysychansk as of January 1, 2022, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economics. On June 29, Unian.net, a Ukrainian news agency, cited Sergey Gaidai, chairman of the Luhansk Regional Military Administration, saying that 15,000 still people remained in the city. On July 5, BBC Russian service reported that only 10,000 people remained in now-occupied Lysychansk; he same number of Lysychansk residents was mentioned by the Kremlin-controlled MK.ru on July 2.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels amplify fake Bild video claiming self-propelled German howitzer captured

Multiple pro-Kremlin media claimed that Russians knocked out a Germany-provided PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer and captured it for further study. All the articles referenced German media Bild as the source, but failed to provide a direct link to the material. The story was debunked by the Ukrainian fact-checking organization StopFake after it determined that Bild had not reported anything on the claim and had only published material on how Ukrainians started using those systems. StopFake also cited a German journalist who tried to find any confirmation but concluded it was Russian disinformation. To date, no evidence of a captured PzH 2000 has been provided by any verifiable source.

However, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel MediaKiller published a short clip with German subtitles claiming that a Bild video confirmed the system’s capture. While the footage mixes random clips of various military munitions with German subtitles on top of it, it does not provide any evidence of a PzH 2000 being captured. The DFRLab searched for videos published by Bild and could not find anything corresponding to Russia’s claims. Furthermore, the video amplified on Telegram does not follow Bild’s visual style and is far shorter than Bild’s usual social media videos. Finally, the text on the video contains mistakes, like the usage of the German definitive article ‘die’ twice in a row, which is a highly unlikely mistake for German news outlet.

The video was amplified by multiple pro–Kremlin channels, some of which claimed that it signals that the West is tired of “pointless” support of Ukraine. One of those channels is a personal channel of Alexey Pushkov, a former Russian senator of the Perm region.

The screengrab of the falsified Bild video featuring two definitive articles “die” in a row (Source: MediaKiller/archive)

It is not the first time MediaKiller has published faked video posing as reputable media. Previously, the channel promoted a fabricated BBC video that blamed Ukraine for shelling the Kramatorsk train station.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Kremlin media “predicts” disintegration of NATO and EU despite plans of expansion

Kremlin-owned media outlets attempt to sow division among NATO and EU member countries by claiming that some members are willing to leave the alliances, and that the organizations are planning to remove them. These narratives come after both organizations have initiated plans to expand: NATO allies have signed accession protocols for Sweden and Finland, while the EU has granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and recognized Georgia’s “European Perspective.”

The Kremlin media outlets reported that in Turkey, the Vatan political party has launched a campaign to leave NATO. The outlets cited the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, a well-known pro-Russian platform in the country. Vatan is a fringe pro-Russian party that has been calling on the Turkish government to recognize Crimea as Russian territory.

According to Kremlin media, Vatan launched a large-scale campaign in major cities of Turkey on withdrawing the country from NATO. The articles claimed that an anti-NATO stance is important for the economic future of Turkey, and added that “citizens are actively signing the appeal.” In 2017, the DFRLab investigated how the Vatan party, bots, and Kremlin media were promoting #LetsLeaveNATO hashtag on Twitter that was trending on Turkish Twitter at the time. While Lenta.ru published the same article on the possibility of Turkish exit, the outlet also published a separate article claiming that NATO itself wants to force Turkey out the alliance. According to the second piece, NATO would want to remove the country because of Ankara’s “overly independent and categorical policy” and because “Turkey can destroy NATO from within.”

Russian websites predicted the disintegration of European Union along with NATO. Additional Kremlin-owned outlets also claimed that France might leave the European Union soon. According to the outlets, President Emmanuel Marcon’s “failure in parliamentary elections” increases the chances of holding the referendum in France on leaving the EU.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Polish right-wing political party launches campaign targeting Roma people from Ukraine

On June 24, Przemyśl city councilmember Marcin Kowalski posted on his Facebook page that “hordes of Ukrainian Roma” had started to arrive in the city, allegedly brought to Poland on purpose in order to obtain a Polish identification number and receive financial aid from Poland as Ukrainian refugees. His post asserted that most of the Roma coming to Poland were women with small children; after filling out formal documents in Poland, he said, they planned to return to Ukraine and wait there to receive Polish state aid in their Polish bank accounts. In his post, Kowalski asked the Polish government whether they considered the potential for fraud while adopting a law for providing assistance to Ukrainian refugees in March, 2022. He alleged that he had been helping Ukrainian people ever since the war erupted, but he cannot indifferently watch how people used loopholes in this law.

Kowalski’s post was featured in articles published by far-right and regional local online media outlets, including Kresy.pl, wkraju24.pl, Dzieje się na Podkarpaciu, Ziemia-Przemyska and Lega Artis law firm. Posts about “hordes of Roma people from Ukraine” was shared in thirty Facebook groups and pages on June 24 and 25, garnering more than 900 interactions.

On June 27, the far-right National Movement party which currently has five members in Poland’s parliament, launched a campaign on Facebook claiming that Roma people were extorting social benefits intended for Ukrainian refugees. According to the campaign, “The government’s refugee aid policy turned into an immigration policy,” and its incompetence has allowed unentitled people to receive aid. The Facebook posts also contained banners with text repeating messages from Marcin Kowalski’s original Facebook post and asserted that Poland’s current immigration policy must be stopped. The DFRLab found that banner was posted on forty Facebook pages and public groups, garnering 880 interactions between June 27 and July 7.

A collection of Facebook posts published by National Movement’s assets on Facebook as part of its anti-Roma campaign. (Source: CrowdTangle)

On June 30, Marcin Kowalski posted on Facebook that his previous post about Roma people reached almost 100,000 users, and that he had received messages and calls from many sources, including reporters from TVN TV. But he wrote with disappointment that Polish lawmakers did not pay enough attention to this story and only Paweł Szramka, member of Polish parliament from the Polish People’s Party, had taken it into consideration. Kowalski published a screenshot of a request sent by Paweł Szramka to the Polish Ministry of Family and Social Policy. The request quoted Kowalski’s Facebook post and asked whether the ministry intended to tighten existing legislation in order to curb misuse of state refugee benefits.

Despite his claims, Kowalski’s post does not provide any evidence that Roma people are returning to Ukraine after registering for Polish government aid. A spokesperson for Poland’s social insurance agency ZUS stated that ZUS verifies the legal stay of Ukrainian citizens in Poland, both at the stage of granting benefits and during the period when they receive social aid. Moreover, ZUS has access to various state registers, including a special register of Ukrainian citizens made by the Border Guard, to verify the status of refugees. If people from Ukraine with refugee status leave Poland for longer than one month, they lose benefits offered by Polish state. Thus it is unlikely that anyone, Roma or otherwise, would continue to receive aid from Poland if they returned to Ukraine. The Central Council of Roma People in Poland wrote on Facebook that Kowalski’s post nurtures stereotypes against Roma and the organization would take legal steps in response to his post.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland.

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channel linked to inauthentic Facebook assets from Côte d’Ivoire

A new investigation by the DFRLab has determined that a Facebook user in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire created a network of sockpuppets and duplicate profiles used to operate Facebook pages and at least one private group with over 62,000 followers to spread anti-Ukraine content and promote pro-Kremlin narratives in French.

One inauthentic profile was called “Igor Kadyrov” and used a picture of Chechen General Magomed Tushayev as its profile picture. Another shared content from Sputnik and encourage followers to subscribe to RT France.

Notably the Facebook assets were also used to promote a Telegram channel entitled “Marigo News – Opération ZOV.” The channel, which has gained over 11,600 followers in less than three months, appeared to be copying content directly from another channel called “Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны” (“Operation Z: War Reporters of the Russian Spring”) and auto-translating it from Russian into French. Although it is not the official channel of the pro-Kremlin propaganda website RusVesna, “Operation Z” contains links to RusVesna in the channel description, and the official RusVesna Telegram channel frequently shares content from it.

The French version of RusVesna content was spread across Facebook and to Twitter accounts that have subsequently been suspended.

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

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Katz quoted in GZero on whether NATO should address migration from the Moroccan border

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 Jun 2022 22:02:00 +0000

ORIGINAL source

The post Katz quoted in GZero on whether NATO should address migration from the Moroccan border appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Croatia’s remarkable national journey is a source of hope for Ukraine

Vladyslav Rashkovan — Sun, 19 Jun 2022 18:16:42 +0000

I recently had a fascinating chat with my colleague, Darjan Milutinovic. We discussed a country fighting for its freedom at a time when its independence was denied by a far more powerful neighbor. This adversary launched a full-scale invasion with a much larger army and occupied a quarter of the country while destroying entire cities and committing war crimes. People experienced mass murder, torture and rape, with citizens herded into camps. The country’s economy collapsed but the people fought on, buoyed by a strong vision of a brighter future.

This sounds exactly like Ukraine’s current experience, but it is actually the story of Croatia in the early 1990s.

In 1991, Europe’s biggest conflict since WWII erupted in the Balkans when the Yugoslavian military invaded Croatia after it declared independence. Serbia opposed the secession and sought to claim Croatian lands populated by ethnic Serbs. After an initial attempt to occupy Croatia failed, a self-proclaimed Serbia-backed entity was established within Croatia occupying 26% of the country.

In 1995, Croatia launched two major offensives and regained control over the occupied regions of the country. Despite this success, the cost of the conflict was huge. From a pre-war population of four million, around 15,000 civilians and soldiers were killed or missing. More than half a million people were displaced. Economic losses were equally severe, with GDP falling by half during the first year of the conflict alone. Meanwhile, infrastructure damaged was estimated at approximately EUR 250 billion, or five times Croatia’s annual GDP.

In every single category, these figures are strikingly similar to the costs inflicted on Ukraine during the first four months of today’s ongoing Russian invasion.

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Since the end of the Balkan Wars, Croatia has made huge progress. It has undergone a transformation from war-torn country to a high-income EU member state and, after Slovenia, is now the most developed country in the region.

The celebration of Croatia’s Statehood Day this year coincided with a historic milestone for Croatia; the European Commission (EC) and the ECB published a Convergence Report which concluded that Croatia is the only non-euro EU country ready to implement the EURO from 2023. The EC also concluded that Croatia no longer suffers from macroeconomic imbalances and can be excluded from the Macro Imbalances Procedure (MIP). Croatia is now expected to join the Schengen zone and become an OECD member in the near future.

Reaching this point was not easy. For a quarter of a century, Croatian governments have had to tackle challenges including rebuilding the country, establishing a sensible monetary regime, and handling successive economic crises. Through it all, Croatia’s strong commitment to EU integration has served as a guiding light that has helped steer the country toward more prosperous times.

The parallels between Croatia’s earlier predicament and Ukraine’s current plight are immediately apparent. Both countries were forced to fight for their freedom, identity and independence against a more powerful neighbor. Thankfully, today’s Ukraine also shares the same sense of national unity and solidarity that proved so crucial in Croatia’s earlier success.

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Croatians have enormous empathy for Ukraine’s suffering because it is so painfully familiar. Indeed, this emotional bond has been evident ever since Russian aggression against Ukraine first began with the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Croatia has provided humanitarian and military aid, with individual Croatians volunteering to help defend Ukraine.

While Ukrainians are very grateful for all this material and moral support, we believe Croatia offers something even more precious: hope. Croatia’s national journey is a source of inspiration for all Ukrainians. It tells us that victory over a far stronger adversary is possible. It gives us reason to believe that occupied lands can be liberated and reintegrated. And it allows us to look with growing confidence toward a future within the European family of nations.

Ukrainians expect to receive EU candidate nation status in the coming days, but nobody in Ukraine is under any illusions over the difficulties that lie ahead. The war with Russia is far from over. Ukraine is fighting not only for its independence but for its very existence. Once this existential threat is overcome, Ukraine must then meet the demanding criteria for EU membership. This historic process may take time, but the journey made by Croatia gives us hope and inspiration.

Vladyslav Rashkovan is Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund.

The vice-president noted that the European Union (EU) is changing its regulatory framework while at the same time building capacity. Specifically, he mentioned that the Commission has proposed two complementary directives: the Network Information Systems Directive and the Critical Infrastructure Directive. In addition to regulatory changes, the Commission has EU teams with experts to protect the institutions themselves and to work with member states on cybersecurity.
The vice-president outlines two concerns that the EU is facing: lack of trust in the institutions by member states as well as a lack of a talent pool with sufficient domain expertise.
Lastly, the vice-president applauded the efforts of Ukraine not only for its military operations but also its cybersecurity efforts, with successes achieved with the help of the EU and the United States.

New challenges for migration and asylum

“The French presidency is working very actively now on a draft agreement on the bulk of the pact asylum proposals. And I’m very confident that they will make it. But I also understand that the situation we’re having now, and with the Ukrainian [refugees] in the European Union, is also a de facto accelerator.
Margaritis Schinas

With almost six million Ukrainian refugees having escaped to other European countries, the vice-president elaborated on the blanket protections that offer access to the job market, education and health systems, and residence permits across the EU. He mentioned that the EU is currently working to create a system of validating the qualifications of Ukrainian refugees in Europe.
When asked about the different approach to the refugee crisis now and in 2013, the vice-president noted that geography and timing account for it, and reiterated that the principles of asylum in the EU remain the same.
Lastly, he mentioned that the Commission is working on a proposal for legal migration, with member states being ready to move forward with the idea once there is an agreement on the EU Migration Pact.

Where US-EU cooperation is headed

“Of course, the issues of international crime, migration, [and] cyber are at the heart of our cooperation, but we proposed, two weeks ago, a new initiative to fight child sexual abuse online, which is necessary, on which we would need the cooperation of the US government, but also the platforms—the companies.”
Margaritis Schinas

While in Washington, the vice-president is meeting with US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas to discuss transatlantic cooperation on various issues with a special focus on this new initiative to fight child sexual abuse. The EU will need the support of the digital platforms for this effort, and the technology companies seem open to the idea.
This issue is especially important to the EU since 70 percent of such content is hosted on EU servers. The challenge, however, is difficult to address since this is first time the Commission is venturing into issues of privacy and encryption following passage of EU privacy laws. He underlined that a transatlantic approach to this issue is crucial.

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Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center partners with State Department for US-Mexico border study

Angela Chavez — Fri, 03 Jun 2022 12:00:00 +0000

New research will examine the impact of enhanced technology on the US-Mexico border in line with US goals to create more secure and efficient borders

Washington DC – June 3, 2022 – The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center today announced a new partnership with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Hunt Institute for Global Competitiveness at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), and Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) in Tijuana to enhance security and economic growth in the United States and Mexico. This year-long partnership will include an economic impact study of improved US-Mexico border management practices and tools, among other impact analyses about the security and environmental impacts of these technologies.

“As companies look at nearshoring and as global supply chains are being reconfigured to adjust to new commercial and geopolitical realities, the US-Mexico border is quickly becoming all the more critical for the economic competitiveness of both countries. With new technologies deployed, a more efficient, transformed border has the power to expedite legitimate trade and travel and reduce commercial bottlenecks while simultaneously improving border security. This new partnership will provide timely insights on steps that can be taken to improve the lives of millions along the border and beyond,” said Jason Marczak, Senior Director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Mexico’s role as the United States’ largest trading partner, with over $661 billion in total trade between the countries in 2021, makes safe and efficient borders a shared priority for both nations. President Joseph R. Biden reinforced the importance of secure borders with increased detection and screening capabilities during his first State of the Union address. The high volume of movement of goods and people at the border, combined with current inefficiencies in border management practices, often leads to extensive wait times and the over-use of scarce management resources. The introduction of new technology-focused border management practices could positively impact the lives of millions of people in the United States and Mexico by creating safer and more efficient borders. This project will detail the economic, security, and environmental benefits that would stem from investing in a 21st century US-Mexico border.

“We are two nations with a shared future. If we want that future to be brighter, we need to modernize our border infrastructure, strengthen our cooperation on border security, and ensure the more efficient flow of goods, services, and lawful travelers,” said Ambassador Ken Salazar, United States Ambassador to Mexico.

In addition to the economic impact study, the Atlantic Council, the Hunt Institute, and COLEF will produce three short publications specifically focused on foresight, security, and the environment. The consortium will also host a series of consensus-building activities such as roundtables, consultations, and focus groups with stakeholders from the public, private, and civil society sectors in the United States and Mexico.

“As a research organization within UTEP, the Hunt Institute is intimately aware of both the economic possibilities of binational cooperation and the potential impediments to that cooperation posed by border security. Border management has direct economic impacts on national economies, not just within border communities. The Hunt Institute is excited to collaborate with the Atlantic Council and COLEF to generate widespread support for the economic benefits of enhanced screening procedures at the US-Mexico border,” said Mayra Maldonado, Executive Director of the Hunt Institute for Global Competitiveness at the University of Texas at El Paso.

The project will deliver new insights into the economic, security, and environmental impacts of enhancing detection and screening capabilities at the US-Mexico border to inform policy decisions that will determine the shared future of our countries for years to come.

“The commercial partnership between Mexico and the United States takes place within a very competitive economic regional framework. As we look to the future, the economic performance of both countries will be strengthened as more sectors participate in cross-border trade and as the benefits of US-Mexico commerce reach further into all parts of Mexico, in addition to northern border areas,” said Dr. Edgar David Gaytán Alfaro, Coordinator of the Master’s Program in Applied Economics and researcher in the Economic Studies Department at Colegio de la Frontera Norte.

Please email inquiries to achavez@atlanticcouncil.org

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Support a holistic migration strategy

Andrew Selee and Diego Chavez-González — Tue, 31 May 2022 22:40:47 +0000

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Colombia hosts one of the largest displaced populations in the world, roughly 1.8 million Venezuelans, who have fled their country due to political conflict, economic turmoil, and the partial breakdown of the healthcare system.¹ Most of these displaced migrants arrived after 2017, when the underlying push factors accelerated. Another half-mil- lion Colombians living in Venezuela have returned simultaneously. More than two million Venezuelans have crossed through Colombia in transit to other countries, with Haitian, African, and Asian migrants increasingly moving through Colombia toward the United States. Their arrival has turned Colombia, once a country with few immigrants but many nationals living abroad, into an immigrant society.

Two elements have been particularly innovative in Colombia’s response to Venezuelan displacement. First, the country offered temporary, long- term legal status to Venezuelans arriving in the country before January 31, 2021. This decision was a first-of-its-kind move in Latin America and pro- vides a long-term path to permanent residence for a population increasingly likely to stay. In contrast to many countries receiving large-scale dis- placed peoples, Colombia has chosen to integrate Venezuelan migrants into the local labor market, education system, and national life instead of relying on the international community to shelter, feed, and care for those arriving.

Second, this approach has been an all-of-government effort directed by the presidency rather than a single agency or set of agencies. In many other cases, governments have implemented short-term legalization programs, but often with contradictory signals from different parts of government on whether the migrants are welcome.² The Colombian government has made it clear that it is the official government policy to receive, recognize, and integrate all Venezuelans who arrive. Most local governments have also engaged in this effort, and all political parties have sought to avoid politicizing the question of Venezuelan immigration, even if some individual politicians haven’t always toed the line.

The Colombian response represents an act of solidarity with people from a neighboring country, and a strong element of pragmatism, given Colombia’s real limitations to restrict irregular entries from Venezuela and the need to know who is entering and staying in Colombia. There is a realization that the arrival of so many Venezuelans will eventually produce economic benefits. At the same time, actual adjustment costs need to be paid upfront, including emergency services, implementing regularization campaigns, and, most importantly, expanding education, healthcare, and other services to deal with a rapidly growing population. The international community has helped defray some of these costs, but others are being borne by Colombian taxpayers in the short term.

Colombia’s emergency response evolves

Initially, no one could have imagined the number of Venezuelans who would eventually cross Colombia’s border. At first, in 2017, the Colombian government issued a temporary two-year stay permit, the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (Special Stay Permit or PEP), to Venezuelans who entered the country legally through official ports of entry. Other regularization programs followed for those who had entered without registering, and by November 2020, Colombia had regularized the status of 707,000 of the 1.72 million Venezuelans in the country.³ However, the measures never fully kept up with the demand, and the requirement to renew the PEP every two years created bureaucratic backlogs.

Finally, the government decided in February 2021 to conduct an even more ambitious effort by offering a ten-year stay permit to all Venezuelans who were already in the country, regardless of their legal status. The new permit, the Permiso de Protección Temporal (Temporary Protection Permit or PPT), sought to cover all Venezuelans who had entered the country by January 31, 2021, and would be available during the next year for those who entered Colombia legally from Venezuela. The PPT permit allows access to services and employment and creates a pathway for recipients to transition to permanent residence with time already spent in the country counting toward the five-year residency requirement.⁴

The Colombian government also offered a TarjetadeMovilidadFronteriza (Border Mobility Card or TMF) to Venezuelans living in the border region, allowing them to cross the border freely. This mechanism was introduced to dissuade migrants from moving to the country’s center by providing a border permit to allow access to emergency health services, education, and work.⁵

Also, all children born in Colombia of Venezuelan parents are citizens, even though Colombia’s constitution usually does not allow this unless the parents are legally domiciled in the country. The Colombian government got around this limitation by enacting a presidential decree, Primero la Niñez(Children First), noting its obligations under the International Convention on Statelessness of 1961.⁶

Since 2019, it has been made clear that all Venezuelans are eligible to enroll in primary, secondary, and tertiary education.⁷ Emergency medical assistance is also open to all, regardless of immigration status. However, Colombia’s healthcare system is not universal, making the incorporation of recent migrants into the healthcare system more complex; many are not yet affiliated.⁸

Despite these efforts to incorporate Venezuelan migrants through legal documentation and access to education and basic healthcare, according to a 2021 study, 97 percent of Venezuelan nationals in Colombia worked in the informal economy, compared to only 48 percent of Colombian citizens.⁹ A key obstacle to accessing the formal labor market has been credential recognition. Many Venezuelans arrive in Colombia with strong qualifications and professional experience but find it difficult to get their educational and professional credentials recognized, limiting their job opportunities while depriving Colombia of essential skills. Streamlining the credential recognition process would help Venezuelan migrants and the Colombian economy, which needs doctors, dentists, engineers, and teachers.

Colombia’s migration decision on the global stage

The other essential ingredient needed to continue deepening the integration process for Venezuelan migrants is public buy-in. Colombian political and social leaders have consistently tried to include average citizens in their efforts to welcome Venezuelans, but this is challenging in a society already divided along ideological, regional, and ethnic lines. September 2020 polling shows that more than one-third of Colombians believe facilitating migrant integration benefits Colombia more broadly, but most Colombians are less certain.¹⁰

Changing this perception is critical for getting the necessary public sup- port to integrate migrants and ensure that current efforts survive changes in government at a national and local level. Doing so will be even more challenging during pandemic recovery since people often feel they are competing over scarce resources and jobs and have had fewer opportunities to forge social connections during intermittent lockdowns. To achieve ambitious policy reform, the public must believe its best interests are being served and that there is a sense of common purpose between migrants and host communities.

This necessitates investing in basic public services, ensuring that schools, hospitals, and housing stock expand in cities hosting large numbers of Venezuelan migrants so migrants and native-born Colombians benefit equally. Some pushback against new arrivals has nothing to do with the migration itself but with the precarious nature of public services that were already overtaxed before Venezuelans arrived en masse.¹¹

But ensuring a mutual sense of purpose between Colombians and Venezuelans also requires building new narratives about Colombian society that emphasize why and how Colombia has responded by receiving and integrating Venezuelans and how they share a common future.¹² The current administration—and many local political and social leaders—have been adamant about finding a future together, but there are also increasing voices of hostility toward the Venezuelans living in Colombia, especially on social media and in local politics.

The international community can play a vital role in supporting Colombia’s efforts to integrate Venezuelan migrants in tangible and intangible ways. Among the most crucial international endeavors have been concessional loans from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, which have supported infrastructure development, healthcare access, and housing in parts of the country with significant immigration. However, moving from concessional loans to preferential interest rates and other mea- sures to support Colombia as a recipient of the hemisphere’s largest refugee and migration crisis would be a smart next step.

The Regional Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, which supports a regional response to the displacement crisis, has been a vital source of support for a range of initiatives from improving education access to combating xenophobia. And behind all these initiatives, the US government has been a particularly important partner, channeling funding and political support into these undertakings.

The US and Colombian governments have also worked closely on a broader regional strategy to promote safe, orderly, and regular migration across the hemisphere. The October 2021 ministerial summit hosted by Colombian Foreign Minister Marta Lucía Ramírez and US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Bogotá was a critical step toward building a broader shared understanding of migration across the hemisphere, as was the April 2022 ministerial in Panama that followed. The main points of those two meetings—how to integrate migrant populations and create legal pathways that generate order in future migration movements—speak directly to Colombia’s current challenges.

The key question is how to ensure that Colombia’s commitment to integrating a large displaced population leads to positive gains for the country overall, not only in its international reputation and bilateral relationships but also in the everyday lives of Colombians. It is critical for the policy of the last two administrations to remain state policy as administrations change. This will require the ongoing commitment of the Colombian government and strong and consistent support from the international community. As a result, Colombia’s solidarity with displaced Venezuelans will also depend, at least in part, on the solidarity of other countries around the world. Here, no country could play a bigger role than the United States. Using its lever- age within financial institutions and its resources, it could help Colombia expand its education system, healthcare access, and infrastructure to incorporate the arrival of Venezuelan migrants and make sure that host communities benefit in the process.

In-Depth Research & Reports May 31, 2022

Prioritize internally displaced people

By Elizabeth Ferris

The history of internal displacement in Colombia, government responses, and the impact of the 2011 Victims Law and 2016 peace agreement provide the foundation for understanding recent challenges—and possible solutions— to continued and new displacements.

Colombia Latin America

In-Depth Research & Reports May 31, 2022

Build on shared global priorities

By Carolina Barco

As we celebrate the bicentennial of the US-Colombia relationship, we should focus on what lies ahead. Now is the time to develop new approaches and responses that will lead to more just, prosperous, and inclusive societies that can rebuild trust and confidence in our governments, democracies, and the ideals of freedom and the rule of law.

Colombia Latin America

In-Depth Research & Reports May 31, 2022

Construct the road ahead together

By Senator Ben Cardin

The US alliance with Colombia is rooted in our shared values of democracy, transparency, and accountability. We can celebrate this year’s bicentennial by reinvigorating bilateral, bipartisan, and bicameral support for the US-Colombia partnership to ensure our region’s stability and continued prosperity.

Colombia Latin America

May 26, 2022

Allies: Twenty-seven bold ideas to reimagine the US-Colombia relationship

As the United States and Colombia celebrate 200 years of diplomatic relations, it is time to think boldly and creatively about the future of this strategic partnership.

Learn more

1 Only Turkey (and perhaps soon Poland) hosts a larger displaced population. Regarding Venezuelan displacement, see Andrew Selee and Jessica Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy: An Innovative Approach to Displacement,” International Migration, No. 60 (2022): 113-131, https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/imig.12839. Updated figures on the number of Venezuelans in Colombia (and other countries), compiled by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, can be found at www.r4v.info.

2 Andrew Selee and Jessica Bolter, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, February 2020). There have been similar whole-of-government approaches from Argentina and Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, but the numbers of arrivals compared to the overall population are a fraction of Colombia’s. The signals have been mixed across different government agencies in other countries receiving large numbers of displaced Venezuelan migrants, including Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago.

3 Selee and Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy,” 119-120.

4 Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Diego Chaves-González, “What Comes Next Now that Colombia Has Taken a Historic Step on Migration,” Migration Policy Institute, February 2021, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/colombia-historic-legalization-what-next.

5 Although the government discontinued using this permit in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this measure issued 5.2 million TMFs to Venezuelan nationals. Still, it is hard to determine how many of these holders remain in Venezuela, how many regularized their status under the PEP or PPT schemes, or how many transited to other countries. Selee and Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy.”

6 This decree allowed the National Registry of Civil Status to grant Colombian nationality to all children who had a Venezuelan parent and were born in Colombia as of August 19, 2015. This measure later evolved into a law expanding its validity for two more years.

7 Government of Colombia, “Welcome, Integrate and Grow, Colombia,” 2020: 92. Before 2019, one of the main challenges of integrating students into the education system was the documentation barrier. Migrants without legal status could not access or move through the different levels of education. The government established detailed instructions for Colombian educational establishments to overcome this obstacle. For Venezuelan students without a valid passport or foreign identity card—a requirement needed for taking the state exams or validating their high school diploma—the government passed a resolution that allowed them to do so.

8 There are two different healthcare regimes: subsidized and contributory, which have consistently remained restricted for migrants. Data from Colombia on access to public health insurance is limited, but official numbers from 2021 found that 60 percent of Venezuelan migrants did not have health insurance, and three out of four with health insurance were taking part in the subsidized regime since many migrants are not part of the formal economy, which would allow them to access the more robust contributory healthcare regime.

9 Diego Chaves-González, Jordi Amaral, and María Jesús Mora, Socio economic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees: The Cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,and Peru (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, July 2021), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/socioeconomic-integration-venezuelan-migrants-refugees.

10 Proyecto Migración Venezuela, “Diferencias regionales en la percepción de los Colombianos hacia los migrantes,” Fall 2021: 5, https://s3.amazonaws.com/semanaruralvzla/documentos/1609184052_boletin_16_de_percepcion_regionalpdf.

11 Selee and Bolter, An Uneven Welcome.

12 Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Haim Malka, and Shelly Culbertson, How We Talk about Migration: The Link between Migration Narratives, Policy, and Power (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, Rand Corporation, National Immigration Forum, and Metropolitan Group, 2021).

The post Support a holistic migration strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is one of the 21st century’s worst war crimes

Paul Niland — Wed, 25 May 2022 01:10:47 +0000

The Battle of Mariupol is over and Russia is busy proclaiming the liberation of the city. In reality, Mariupol has been murdered. This formerly bustling metropolis of almost half a million people now lies on the brink of extinction, pummeled into submission by a vicious campaign of Russian annihilation. The estimated 100,000 remaining residents of Mariupol find themselves reduced to living among the rubble without medicines, running water or electricity.

With Russia in control of the city, there is no way of knowing the final death toll or assessing the true scale of the catastrophe that has befallen Mariupol. During the final weeks of the fighting, Mariupol Mayor Vadim Boychenko estimated more than 20,000 civilians had been killed and noted that this was twice the number of deaths recorded in the entire two-year Nazi occupation of the city during WWII. “Putin is a bigger evil than Hitler and we must stop him,” commented Boychenko.

Global audiences have grown used to the apocalyptic scenes in Mariupol and are no longer shocked by the destruction of an entire city. In order to grasp the full extent of Putin’s crime, it is vital to remember Mariupol as it was before the outbreak of war.

Mariupol was always a special city with a diverse population included a large ethnic Greek community. Located on the Azov Sea in southern Ukraine, it was warm and sunny for most of the year. Though the air was thick from the heavy industry located in the heart of Mariupol, local residents tended to be proud of their city and fiercely loyal.

War first came to Mariupol in spring 2014 when Moscow attempted to seize control of the surrounding Donbas region during the initial stages of the ongoing eight-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The city was taken over by Russian forces but this occupation proved mercifully brief.

Following liberation, Mariupol gained in significance as the largest city in the Donbas still under Ukrainian control. Located just a few kilometers from the front lines of the simmering conflict with Russia, it became an administrative and economic focus as well as a showcase for the higher living standards and greater personal freedoms offered by Ukraine.

While regions of eastern Ukraine under Russian occupation withered and stagnated, Mariupol flourished. This city was a mirror providing a stark contrast to the atrophy of the Russian-controlled parts of the Donbas. After 2014, Mariupol welcomed a shiny new office of government interaction where people could go to marry and register births without the suffocating and corrupt old-style bureaucracy that Ukraine used to be famed for. Hipster cafes and bars popped up across town, along with sleek co-working spaces and IT hubs. A new highway linked the city to neighboring regions in southern Ukraine.

Mariupol was also a beneficiary of Ukraine’s successful decentralization reforms. The move towards giving local communities more say over how they live their lives and spend their budgets created genuine political competition between people who wanted to serve their communities and not just plunder them. This was strikingly different to the authoritarian model of paternalism promoted in Russia and Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine.

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Though almost every single building in Mariupol has now been razed to the ground, it is the people who really matter. The personal stories of Mariupol residents deserve to be heard.

By chance, I recently met some refugees who had made it out of the city. Together with a friend, we helped a family of three during the very last stage of their 1200km journey to temporary shelter in western Ukraine. The mother explained how she had escaped Mariupol with her 12-year-old daughter and 11-year-old son. They had made their way across Ukraine together, carrying their few most precious possessions with them including religious icons and a favorite teddy bear.

These survivors used the single word “hell” when attempting to describe what they had lived through in Mariupol. Once they had arrived at their accommodation and completed the check-in process, the mother came to the realization that she had finally brought her children to safety. Overcome with emotion, she let a few tears go before composing herself again. Similar scenes have been repeated countless times over the past few months. This is happening in Europe in 2022.

Those who made it out of Mariupol safely have wept tears of relief for their survival and tears of grief for those they left behind. They are also mourning the death of their hometown. The Mariupol you now see on your TV screens is a crime scene where tens of thousands of civilian lives have been extinguished.

This is not the Mariupol that survivors remember. Their memories are of a beautiful and vibrant place with a strong sense of community where families worked hard to build their dreams. As the location of one of the largest steelworks in Europe, the city was home to some very hard people who routinely did dangerous work and deserved to be respected. This traditional toughness was one of the reasons why Mariupol was defended so valiantly, despite the Russian terror unleashed upon it.

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The Kremlin propaganda machine is now attempting to portray the destruction of Mariupol as a Russian victory. Instead, the long defense of Mariupol against overwhelming odds should be remembered as a powerful example of the Ukrainian heroism that has captured the world’s imagination.

The Ukrainian troops who held the vast Azovstal industrial complex for months did so knowing that they faced almost certain death or captivity. They fought on anyway, safe in the knowledge that their stand was pinning down whole units of the Russian army which would otherwise be unleashed elsewhere in Ukraine.

Mariupol must also be remembered as one of the worst crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century. The atrocities committed by Russian troops throughout Ukraine have horrified global audiences and have sparked an international war crimes investigation along with accusations of genocide. Even in this grim context, Mariupol stands out. Putin ordered the destruction of the city despite knowing hundreds of thousands of civilians were unable to flee.

The calculated nature of the onslaught was most immediately apparent in the targeted bombing of Mariupol Drama Theater, which was being used as a makeshift shelter by over 1,000 civilians. Despite large lettering placed on the ground outside the theater spelling out the word “CHILDREN,” Russia hit the building with a devastating and deliberate blast. Current estimates indicate that around 600 civilians were killed in that one attack alone.

Mariupol was destroyed in order to send a chilling message to all Ukrainians of the fate awaiting anyone who refuses Putin’s invitation to join the so-called “Russian World.” The fact that Mariupol was an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking city that had traditionally backed pro-Kremlin political forces only appears to have hardened Putin’s resolve to punish the city for its defiance.

After Mariupol, there can be no more illusions regarding the possibility of a compromise peace with Putin. A city that was once marked by the smells of heavy industry and seaside breezes is now enveloped in the stench of decomposing bodies trapped beneath the rubble. Unless Putin is decisively defeated, more towns and cities across Ukraine will suffer the same fate. The next city in line for such devastation is Severodonetsk in Luhansk Oblast. Others will surely follow. After Mariupol, no European leader can claim they were not forewarned.

Paul Niland is the Founder of Lifeline Ukraine.

Tracking narratives

Polish far-right influencers and Russian media capitalize on Warsaw murder to spread anti-refugee narratives

Media

Russia plans to launch pre-installed app store on smartphones

International reactions

Russian-occupied South Ossetia sets date for referendum on Russian unification

Telegram channels and youth groups rally against Riga following Victory Day controversy

Russian forces use incendiary munitions in Mariupol

New photo and video evidence suggests that the Russian military continues to use incendiary and cluster munitions against Ukrainian forces. A video released on May 15 shows the Azovstal plant in Mariupol being shelled by what appears to be incendiaries.

Azovstal plant being shelled by what appear to be incendiary munitions. (Source: @faceofwar/archive)

The DFRLab analyzed the footage and found the strike targeted the western section of the plant.

Geolocation of the shelling of the Azovstal plant. The green color marks the industrial chimneys, while the orange marks the structures by the lagoon. (Source: @faceofwar/archive, top; GoogleMaps, bottom)

While warfare experts speculated on social media that the shells used in the bombardment were white phosphorus, it is more likely that Russian 9M22S incendiary munitions from Grad multiple launch rocket systems were used. The 9M22S shells are a more conventional incendiary munition that use a thermite mixture. These munitions have previously been used during the war in Ukraine. The same 9M22S munitions were also reportedly used in the eastern Ukrainian city of Izyum earlier this week. Meanwhile, a report from Ukrainian media suggests the city of Mykolaiv was also targeted by cluster munitions.

Hexagonal incendiary munitions photographed in the village of Novoiakovlivka on April 19, 2022 (top) are reported to be the same munitions used against the Azovstal plant. Visually, these munitions explode in a similar pattern, as seen in the video of the Azovstal bombing (bottom). (Source: armamentresearch.com/archive

On May 15, the Security Service of Ukraine released what it reported to be an intercepted phone call in which a Russian soldier confirmed using weapons that are banned by international treaties. “Phosphorous bombs, cluster munitions – they have allowed us to use everything that is banned,” he said in the recording.

Transcript of an intercepted phone call from a Russian soldier. (Source: @mdimitri91/archive)

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Polish far-right influencers and Russian media capitalize on Warsaw murder to spread anti-refugee narratives

On May 8, a Polish man in Warsaw was stabbed to death. A few days later, a graphic recording of the incident appeared online, filmed by an unidentified witness who spoke Ukrainian. Polish far-right actors, social media accounts, and Russian pro-Kremlin media outlets capitalized on the incident to push anti-Ukrainian sentiments.

Polish media outlet Oko.press reported that while the murder happened on May 8, claims accusing the murderers of being Ukrainian refugees didn’t emerge until four days later. The claims began circulating after Warsaw police released photos of the suspected perpetrator. The Twitter account @otwieramy complained that Polish media did not report that the perpetrators were “drunk foreigners speaking in Ukrainian.” The Twitter account also alleged that the victim’s family was pressured not to reveal the attackers’ nationality.

Right-wing Polish journalist Wojciech Sumlinski claimed without evidence that a group of Ukrainians “tortured a young boy in the center of Warsaw.” This is not the first time Sumlinski has accused refugees of being violent. The DFRLab previously reported on Sumlinski’s March 1 tweet that falsely claimed a group of “Arab-looking” men had attacked a pregnant Polish woman on a train. That claim was later amplified by the far-right political party Confederation, with members inciting violence against non-Ukrainian refugees in eastern Poland.

Piotr Panasiuk, a Confederation party member who ran for parliament in 2019, claimed without evidence that the perpetrator of the crime in Warsaw was a Ukrainian army defector who had escaped into Poland. Grzegorz Braun, the leader of the Confederation party, asserted during a press conference on May 13 that opening Poland’s borders to uncontrolled migration and mass displacement had resulted in negative social and political consequences. According to Braun, nobody in Warsaw was safe anymore.

Russian media outlets also amplified rumors about the Warsaw murder. News Front and EurAsia Daily asserted that a group of drunk Ukrainian migrants stabbed a Polish citizen because he interfered in their attempt to sexually assault a woman. The EurAsia Daily article quoted Katarzyna Sokolowska, chairwoman of the Polish organization Wołyń Pamiętamy (”We Remember Volhynia),” who claimed that Polish authorities were pressuring the family of the Polish victim, who died “at the hands of Ukrainian migrants.” The DFRLab has previously reported on an anti-Ukraine campaign launched on Facebook by Wołyń Pamiętamy prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On May 13, Warsaw Police announced they were still investigating the crime but said that there was no evidence indicating that the perpetrators were citizens of another country.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia plans to launch pre-installed app store on smartphones

On May 25, Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development and the social networking company VK plan to launch a beta version of the RuStore, the Russian analogue of the Google Play store. Their goal is to include the Russian app store to come pre-installed on Android phones in the country.

The Kremlin has begun developing domestic smartphone services in response to Western sanctions. VK, which owns the social media platform VKontakte, is developing the domestic app store without government funds, according to Maksut Shadayev, Minister of Digital Development.

This week, the Russian ministry proposed a law titled “On a Single Application Store,” which would allow the RuStore to be included on the list of software required to be pre-installed on smartphones and tablets in Russia. According to the draft law, the Russian government will identify app developers who will be required to add their apps to the RuStore. The proposed law also states that these actions will “counter sanctions from foreign states.”

Russian anti-virus software developer Kaspersky Lab will manage the app store “in order to prevent malicious applications from getting into RuStore,” Russian media reported.

No information is available on whether the RuStore will work on iOS systems.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington, DC

Russian-occupied South Ossetia sets date for referendum on Russian unification

The Russian-occupied Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia will hold a referendum on joining the Russian Federation on July 17, 2022. The decree was signed on May 13 by the outgoing separatist president Anatoly Bibilov. “We are going home, we are heading to Russia,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. The referendum will ask voters, “Do you support the unification of the Republic of South Ossetia and Russia?”

The referendum has already led to tensions with some Russian politicians. State Duma Member Konstantin Zatulin, first deputy chairman on the parliamentary committee for Russian nationals living outside the country, said Bibilov’s referendum was “not very appropriate.” Noting the fact that Bibilov was about to leave office, he added, “If you lose elections, then the newly elected president should call a referendum.”

Anatoly Bibilov lost to Alan Gagloev, leader of the Nykhas party, during the second round of the presidential elections on May 8. Gagloev is set to take office on May 24. According to Civil.ge, Gagloev has expressed doubts about whether Bibilov coordinated his decision with Moscow. “I fully support the idea of reunification of divided Ossetian nation within the united Russia,” he said. “But the question is whether it is the moment in history when we should issue a decree on calling a referendum and forcing it to happen…In 2014, referendums on reunification were held in the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics without Russian approval. Eight years have passed, and they have not yet achieved their goal.”

Gagloev added that he will take further steps “in compliance with international legal norms, consultations, and implementation of agreements with the Russian Federation.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Telegram channels and youth groups rally against Riga following Victory Day controversy

Tensions between Latvia and Russia are on the rise after the city of Riga voted to demolish a Soviet monument and arrested pro-Kremlin supporters at an annual Victory Day gathering. In response, pro-Russian Telegram channels have rallied behind one of the arrested individuals, with posts garnering hundreds of thousands of views. Pro-Kremlin youth organizations in Russia also launched flash mobs to protest the actions in Riga. Read more in the DFRLab’s latest update on the controversy.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Russian forces use incendiary munitions in Mariupol appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran Initiative event on the Taliban was mentioned in Politico’s National Security Daily newsletter

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 May 2022 17:58:00 +0000

original source

The post Iran Initiative event on the Taliban was mentioned in Politico’s National Security Daily newsletter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – Which Western leaders have done enough for Ukraine? A Debrief from Kira Rudik

Ben Judah — Mon, 09 May 2022 00:52:14 +0000

Which Western leaders have done enough for Ukraine?

As international support for Ukraine remains steady in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviews Kira Rudik, member of the Ukrainian Parliament and leader of the Voice Party, about which of Ukraine’s allies have helped the most. Why does Ukraine view British Prime Minister Boris Johnson so positively? Why isn’t US President Joe Biden viewed as favourably in Ukraine despite consistent US military aid to Ukraine? How does Ukraine view French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Former staff

Ben Judah

Former Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BritainDebrief – Which Western leaders have done enough for Ukraine? A Debrief from Kira Rudik appeared first on Atlantic Council.

D’Anieri in the Hill: “The false promises of Biden’s Ukrainian refugee program”

Atlantic Council — Thu, 05 May 2022 18:09:00 +0000

Original Source

The post D’Anieri in the Hill: “The false promises of Biden’s Ukrainian refugee program” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – Are sanctions on Russia working? A Debrief from Ambassador Daniel Fried

Ben Judah, Daniel Fried — Sun, 01 May 2022 22:24:06 +0000

Are sanctions on Russia working?

As the chances of Europe imposing a full oil and gas embargo on Russia are becoming increasingly likely, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviews Ambassador Daniel Fried, former US Coordinator for Sanctions Policy (2013-2017) for #BritainDebrief on how sanctions on Russia are impacting the Kremlin’s war chest, the Russian economy and third countries. How unprecedented is targeting the Russian central bank? What is the long view on Russia sanctions?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Former staff

Ben Judah

Former Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BritainDebrief – Are sanctions on Russia working? A Debrief from Ambassador Daniel Fried appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine War Diary: “You can never really get used to the air raid sirens”

Vitaly Sych — Sat, 30 Apr 2022 17:11:11 +0000

Now in its third month, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stunned the world and sparked the biggest international security crisis of the twenty-first century. Beyond the headlines, the war has plunged an entire nation of more than 40 million Ukrainians into a barely imaginable world of grief, fear and chaos. Leading Ukrainian media personality Vitaly Sych has kept a war diary recounting his experiences and observations during the past two terrifying and heroic months as Ukrainians have adjusted to the new realities of Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion.

UKRAINE WAR DIARY: PART I

When my wife hurriedly woke me up in the early hours of Febuary 24 and I first looked out of the window, I could not believe my eyes. The familiar panoramic view from our apartment on the twentieth floor overlooking the Dnipro River was now dotted with huge columns of black smoke. Our entire building was shaking from explosions as missiles rained down on the outskirts of Kyiv.

The unthinkable had happened. Even though we all knew Russia had amassed a huge army on the Ukrainian border, I remained convinced until the very last moment that it was all a geopolitical bluff. Like so many Ukrainians, I could not believe anyone would launch a full-scale military invasion in the center of Europe. Such things simply did not happen anymore. Not in 2022.

I grabbed my phone and was immediately confronted by footage of Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaiming the start of a “special military operation” in Ukraine. His speech was completely unhinged and full of wild historical distortions. “This is war,” I said to my wife.

For weeks I had downplayed her concerns about a possible war, often while gently teasing her and making sarcastic remarks. Despite my apparent confidence, my wife had remained unconvinced. She kept the tank of the car full, evening purchasing and filling an extra petrol canister. She packed changes of clothes and personal documents for all the family and bought lots of dry food. I thought this was over the top and said so. Sadly, she turned out to be right.

The day had barely begun, but it was already time to get our eight-year-old twins Peter and Anna out of the city. We had read numerous reports from the British and US intelligence services describing in detail how Russian security forces had compiled kill lists of Ukrainian journalists, activists, and politicians hostile to Moscow who were to be rounded up and executed during the initial stages of the occupation. My wife and I knew my name must be somewhere on those lists.

A brief look at my Facebook profile or a glance through the magazine I manage would be enough to get me into trouble with the Russians. My magazine’s last cover page before we were forced to suspend publication due to the war had featured Putin alongside senile Russian dictators Lenin and Stalin. All three were portrayed in wheelchairs styled to invoke a well-known Soviet photo of Lenin’s last days. The headline read “Kremlin Madhouse.” This was entirely in keeping with the spirit of the publication. It was clearly unwise for us to stay in Kyiv.

We picked up my wife’s mother and tried but failed to leave town. By 9am, all roads leading out of the Ukrainian capital were at a standstill. A massive exodus was underway as terrified Kyivans looked to escape the city and head west away from the advancing Russian tanks.

After a couple of hours spent hopelessly stuck in traffic we gave up and went home, only to learn that the Russians were already trying to land troops at Gostomel Airport, which is located in the Kyiv suburbs to the northwest of the city. It was obvious that we had to evacuate urgently. This time we chose the southern highway instead of the jammed western route. As we moved slowly toward the city limits, jet fighters roared low above our heads. I still don’t know whether they were Russian or Ukrainian planes. Eventually, we managed to exit Kyiv.

We headed to Vinnytsya where my mother lives. A 250-kilometer trip that typically takes three hours took us 10 hours. We drove mostly along godforsaken backroads that would normally be empty except for the odd tractor or perhaps even a horse and cart. But today these roads were jammed with caravans of cars ranging from simple hatchbacks to luxury jeeps. It seemed as though half of Ukraine was on the move, carrying their worldly belongings with them.

My wife cried the whole way. With good reason, she thought we might never be able to go home again. We had left our entire lives behind us in a matter of minutes; our apartment, our house near Kyiv that we had spent so long saving up for, our jobs, everything.

We could not even take our beloved cat with us, who can barely cope with the one-hour trip out to our summer house and would have been unable to handle the long and stressful escape in a crowded car. Thankfully, we were able to save our cat by mailing our apartment keys to neighbors who now make sure he is well fed and cared for. During those first nightmare moments of the war when we were forced to make life-changing choices in an instant, the most difficult decision of all was the one to leave our cat.

It soon became clear that we had made the right decision as our journey evolved into a three-day marathon with six people crammed into one car. By midnight we reached my mother’s apartment in Vinnytsya. It was the first time we had felt relatively safe since that horrible day had dawned.

After a brief stopover, we decided to take my mother with us and head further west. The journey from Vinnytsya to Lviv is normally a five-hour drive but it now took more than three times as long. At some point during the night we lost our navigation signal while passing through a forest and found ourselves in complete darkness. As we tried to get our bearings, a nearby airbase was struck by a Russian missile. It was the kind of scene you expect to see in a horror movie and it will remain forever imprinted on my mind.

We eventually reached Lviv. By this point, I was completely exhausted. I had been driving for more than 24 hours and was running on pure adrenaline. Stress had robbed me of my appetite and I had barely eaten anything since leaving Kyiv.

The last leg of our journey still lay ahead and was perhaps the hardest. I had to get my family to the border but I would not be leaving Ukraine with them. Due to the imposition of martial law in the hours following Russia’s invasion, I could not exit the country. No Ukrainian men aged eighteen to sixy could. And to be frank, I would not have gone even if it had been possible. All of my male workmates and lots of female colleagues had stayed behind, some of them even remaining in Kyiv. I would never have forgiven myself if I had left.

After a short sleep in Lviv, we began exploring our chances of getting to the border. Poland is less than eighty kilometers from Lviv, but crossing into the EU in the first days of the war was no simple matter. All of the checkpoints were completely jammed with people and the delay times were insane. At some crossings, cars were advised that they could be waiting for up to a week.

We checked the train station and it looked like Kabul before the arrival of the Taliban, with women and children screaming and trying to squeeze onto trains departing for Poland. Many families had simply abandoned their suitcases on the platform.

This scene was enough to convince us against taking the train. Instead, we decided to head south toward the Slovak border where, according to reports, queues were significantly shorter. This last stretch took me a further 16 sleepless hours, with our journey regularly broken up by document checks at the many paramilitary block posts that had sprung up like mushrooms in those first few wartime days.

The plan was to get my family over the border into Slovakia where friends of friends would pick them up and drive them to Bratislava. From there, they would fly to Dublin. My sister is married to an Irishman and was waiting for them in the Irish capital.

After more than three days of almost non-stop driving that felt like three weeks, we finally reached the border. Our farewells were mercifully short. As we kissed and hugged our goodbyes, I had no idea if I would ever see my family again. They crossed into Slovakia and were finally safe. A week later, The Irish Times would publish an article about my family’s escape headlined “Now we have a chance to cry.”

I remained on the Ukrainian side of the border. I was now alone. Like everyone else still in Ukraine, I was facing a future of grave uncertainty. I returned to Lviv and my wartime life began.

UKRAINE WAR DIARY: PART II

“Are you still alive?” read the text message from my colleague and radio show partner Serhiy Fursa. I immediately understood that the noise which had woken me up minutes before was the sound of Russian ballistic missiles. I peered out of my window and saw smoke rising from somewhere in the downtown area of Lviv. Five Russian missiles had hit the city, leaving seven dead and dozens wounded. Serhiy said he actually watched three of the missiles from his balcony but failed to take a video.

This was the third Russian airstrike on Lviv, a city close to the EU border that is generally regarded as safe. “Are we still going to do our radio show today?” I asked Serhiy. “Why not?” he replied. So we did. Since settling in Lviv during the early days of the war, we have already broadcast more than 40 episodes of the show. We go on air every day, always around lunchtime.

My accommodation in Lviv is an apartment rented by a colleague of mine who is a partner in the investment banking firm that owns our media house. All of the partners in the company, including the Czech owner, have relocated to Lviv. Even though his Czech passport would have allowed him to leave Ukraine, he decided to stay with his people.

We soon learned that we had been very lucky to get an apartment for just the two of us. Others have had to cram four or five into a single apartment as internally displaced people from across Ukraine have flooded into Lviv. As a result, the city is now packed full and finding available accommodation is next to impossible. We have even begun to joke that we shouldn’t invite any colleagues over to our flat in case they stop talking to us when they see our luxurious living conditions.

There are only two problems with our flat. The first is actually more of an inconvenience. I have to share a bed with another man. We have bought separate pillows and blankets, of course. But the fact remains that I’ve been sleeping with a man for more than a month. Life will never be the same again!

The other problem is more significant. As with all real estate, location is the most important feature. And in our case, this is definitely a problem. The apartment we are renting is close to a huge military base and the local headquarters of the Ukrainian intelligence service. This makes it an obvious target for Russian missiles.

The threat of Russian airstrikes is no longer hyperthetical. Indeed, the ambassador of Kazakhstan was living just a few blocks away until recently but was advised by his security team to move out of the neighborhood. This apparent danger is a source of amusement to locals. When they find out where we live, they joke that our landlord should actually be paying us. To make matters worse, the apartment is on the top floor of the building. A prime location indeed!

The military base next door has an outdoor area with all sorts of old Soviet-era military equipment on display. There are tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers dating back to WWII and the Cold War. Given the often poor quality of Russian intelligence and satellite imagery, we wonder whether they might mistake these museum exhibits for the real thing and launch an airstrike. Such speculation would once have been amusing but it is now no longer funny.

After several deadly Russian missile attacks that killed dozens of Ukrainian soldiers, the Ukrainian military has introduced new protocols. When the sirens go off in the city, hundreds of military personnel with Kalashnikovs stream out of the military base next to us and disperse in order to make sure there are no concentrations of soldiers in any one place. They then hang out for hours on end in nearby parks and residential yards.

Air raid sirens come every day and every night, often at about three or four in the morning. You can hear the sirens throughout the city. It is ubiquitous and sticks in your head like the beat of a bad pop song. After a few hours, the second siren indicates that the danger has passed. I still can’t distinguish between the two. If you miss the first one because you are asleep, you think the second one is the start of an air attack. Sometimes we have to ask each other: is this the first or second siren?

To liven things up even more, my apartment mate has downloaded an application that notifies him of airstrikes with a tremendous alarm. He jumps up in bed and obviously I cannot avoid also hearing it. After that, nobody can sleep. Digital technology is not always helpful.

Living under the constant threat of Russian airstrikes is a chilling experience. The missiles themselves are accompanied by the distinct smell of death. Even though the Russians insist they only target military infrastructure, in reality they often hit civilian targets and kill ordinary Ukrainians.

In Syria, Russia fired a total of about 100 missiles over a five-year period. In Ukraine, the Russian military launched more than 1,500 missiles during the first month and half of the war alone. Some were launched from Belarus. Others were shot from bombers over the Black Sea. Their range leaves nobody in Ukraine immune. Nowhere in the country is truly safe.

Everybody in Lviv seems to have grown used to air raid sirens. I was out jogging in the park one morning when the siren sounded. It had almost no visible effect. Parents continued strolling with children and old people remained engrossed in their conversations on park benches. One elderly lady turned to her granddaughter and said calmly but firmly, “Don’t worry. We’ll be fine.”

I can’t help thinking that this sense of calm is false. We won’t be fine. In truth, you can never really get used to the air raid sirens. The first thing I’d like to do when this war is over is go somewhere abroad where I will not have to hear any airstrike warnings at all.

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UKRAINE WAR DIARY: PART III

The first days of the war were incredibly tough professionally as I attempted to somehow keep our media holding from collapsing. I lost contact with colleagues and had no idea whether they were being bombed in Kharkiv or were somewhere on the road trying to evacuate their families. Some people simply disappeared. Others struggled to cope with the emotional stress of the situation and were unable to work. One of our most prominent colleagues suffered a breakdown and began publishing crazy fake posts on social media.

I eventually had to accept that I could not help everyone and decided to focus on sustaining our operation and supporting as many colleagues as possible. Without exception, the war has been a personal crisis for all of us.

About a week after the war begin, the dust began to settle and we were able to get an idea of where we might be heading as a media organization. Nothing was straightforward. Our star reporter was sheltering from Russian airstrikes in Kyiv’s metro system. Our weekend editor was stuck in Kharkiv under heavy bombardment and we temporarily lost touch with him. Thankfully, we later learned he had survived.

The head of our English-language operation, a Scotsman, had to evacuate his family to Glasgow. This meant that responsibility for English-language coverage fell to a young Ukrainian editor who was also busy trying to help her grandmother cope in an apartment with poor wifi connection on Kyiv’s left bank.

Our financial and IT reporters had joined the Ukrainian army. Our chief designer and political editor weren’t planning to join the army but were drafted in Lviv when they arrived with their families. Our two most prominent radio presenters joined the territorial defense force in Kyiv. The procedure for signing up in wartime was so simple that they merely had to appear with their IDs in order to receive a Kalashnikov.

For a while, I feared we would not have enough people to run our company. Despite having been one of the largest news organizations in Ukraine on the eve of the war, it looked like we might not survive.

Then things stabilized. Or at least, we achieved as much stability as is possible during wartime. The Russians turned out to be far less sophisticated that everybody had expected and failed to knock out the Ukrainian internet. Dozens of our team reached safe places with decent internet connections in western Ukraine. Despite facing unfamiliar and often highly challenging living conditions, we gradually got back to work.

For obvious reasons, we ceased publication of our weekly magazine. Colleagues who normally focused on topics like sports, tech, auto news, entertainment and science were asked to forget about their previous lives and strengthen our war coverge. We went into 24/7 mode, pumping out non-stop content during night shifts and over weekends in Ukrainian, Russian and English.

We were soon producing 300 news items per day and ranking among the top two most visited sites in Ukraine. In March, our audience skyrocketed and reached 25 million unique users along with around half a billion page views.

In recognition of this success, we became the target of a major Russian cyber-attack. Despite being under physical Russian bombardment in Kyiv Oblast at the time, our chief programmer managed to get us back online. He was also able to upgrade our cyber security to levels that have prevented any repeat cyber-attacks.

While we cranked up our online coverage to a wartime tempo, we relocated part of our radio equipment to Lviv and organized an improvised new studio in a shopping mall where we were given two rooms free of charge. Before the war, our FM radio covered 44 major cities across Ukraine. This number has been slightly reduced by the Russian habit of taking down our transmitters in occupied Ukrainian cities like Kherson and Melitopol. Nevertheless, we continue to broadcast to more than 30 cities as well as via YouTube and online.

I started a daily radio show in tandem with a well-known investment banker and blogger who also relocated to Lviv. He speaks Ukrainian and I speak Russian on air. Our idea was not just to analyze key events but to support our audience. Working on the assumption that listeners already knew the most recent headlines and were aware of any bad news, we figured we would focus on positive developments such as Russia’s economic woes, international support for Ukraine, and signs of internal divisions in Moscow.

We are not fools and understand the gravity of the situation. At the same time, we want to provide a glimmer of hope and also some much needed humor. Russia’s top officials and propagandists are all legitimate targets and there is certainly no shortage of good reasons to ridicule them.

Air raid sirens can be very disruptive when you’re trying to do a live radio broadcast. Every time the sirens start up, the shopping mall shuts down and everyone runs to the shelter. We eventually decided to stay put and continue our broadcasts. The alternative would be to leave our radio frequency blank for hours on end.

Ukrainians seem to appreciate what we’re trying to do. Our YouTube audience grew fivefold in just one month, even though we have no cameras in the studio and only offer an audio stream.

The single most rewarding episode of our wartime broadcasting experience came from Bucha, the Kyiv suburb where Russian forces committed war crimes that shocked the world. One old lady emerged following the liberation of Bucha and recounted how she had spent weeks in a basement listening to nothing but our radio station. When she met our reporter, she hugged her and burst into tears. This tale alone made all our efforts seem worthwhile.

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UKRAINE WAR DIARY: PART IV

When I first arrived in Lviv in the last days of February, the city looked and felt like it was on the verge of an apocalypse. This usually vibrant hub of tourism, culture and history had become a ghost town. The streets were empty while only a few of Lviv’s famed cafes and bars remained open. There was a ban on alcohol sales and all shops were closed except for food stores and pharmacies.

Despite this eery quiet, Lviv was by then already packed with refugees from Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. I often ran into acquaintances from the capital including restaurateurs, bankers, and fellow journalists. It felt as though we had all become part of a new chapter in Erich Maria Remarque’s classic WWII refugee novel “The Night in Lisbon.”

The many members of this displaced tribe tended to spend most of their time on the phone trying to help friends and family who were still under bombardment or stuck in occupied regions of the country. I was no exception.

My eldest daughter, Masha, who is twenty-six, was trapped in Kyiv with her boyfriend. By the time they had decided that they needed to leave the city, it was too late. Evacuation had become too dangerous. Their home district in the north of the city was the scene of shelling and street battles as Russian troops sought to advance into the heart of Kyiv.

Masha spent a week in a basement hiding from Russian bombs. She would call me regularly, crying and sharing reports about Chechen forces who were said to be closing in on Kyiv. The Chechens would soon enter the city and rape all the women, she said. As we later learned, these fears were justified. But at that point, I was more interested in trying to calm her down by telling her that the Chechens had already suffered catastrophic losses in Bucha, including the death of their most notorious general. This was also true. One week later, Masha and her boyfriend were eventually able to leave the city and head south. It was a huge personal relief for me. Millions of Ukrainians were not so fortunate.

Even though Lviv didn’t experience anything like the problems in Kyiv, food did become scarce. Buckwheat, rice and pasta were the first to disappear as people prepared for the worst and stocked up on long-lasting foodstuffs. I must admit that I was partly to blame, purchasing enough food for an entire month. Supply chains for things like chicken and dairy products also soon broke down, leaving shoppers with little to choose from except the most expensive brands of tea, coffee, delicacies and cookies. With all the empty shelves in the stores, it started to feel a little bit like going back to the USSR.

During the early weeks of the war, many people in Lviv feared that Putin would convince Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to join the invasion and launch an offensive into the Volyn region. This would bring the war right to the borders of Lviv. Despite at least four separate warnings of an imminent invasion, the Belarusians still haven’t ventured into Ukraine. Lukashenka is certainly a monster but he is not a complete idiot, it would seem. He also has access to reliable data on the sheer scale of Russian losses in Ukraine due to the fact that many Russian casualties have been brought back across the border to Belarusian hospitals and morgues.

When not doing my radio show, I found myself sharing an office with investment bankers who had also moved to western Ukraine from Kyiv. Like millions of their fellow Ukrainians, these finance professionals followed frontline military developments closely online and cheered the destruction of each successive Russian military convoy.

Monitoring Russian losses quickly became the most popular form of wartime entertainment for Ukrainians. The idea of deriving pleasure from footage of military carnage and dead soldiers would have seemed perverse or even obscene just weeks earlier, but graphic content now circulated in large quantities through a growing number of telegram channels, often accompanied by black humor. Many women discovered that they also enjoyed looking at such grim images.

You wouldn’t expect this kind of behavior from a healthy person during peacetime. But everything changes after you’ve read hundreds of reports about children bombed, ordinary Ukrainians executed and women gang-raped, especially when the crime scenes are so familiar and the victims are personal acquaintances.

The endless accounts of Russian atrocities have taken their toll on Ukrainians in many ways. Almost everyone I know has trouble sleeping. There is also much fury and hunger for revenge. One of our radio hosts asked listeners what they would do if presented with a button that could instantly kill all Russians, including friends and relatives. He was half-joking, of course, but was also honest enough to admit that he would personally press the button without hesitation. The general consensus among listeners seemed to be that such an opportunity would be tempting.

During our radio discussions, we also pondered the question of how much blame could be attached to ordinary Russians. Had they given Putin a mandate for the war and the mass murder of Ukrainians, or was it all his personal responsibility? After the first few weeks of the war, this debate became redundant when independent polls indicated that more than 80% of Russians supported the war.

Of course, it is difficult to find entirely objective opinion polls in a totalitarian country. But the figures emerging out of Russia as the war progressed were entirely in line with a wide range of anecdotal evident suggesting that a clear majority of Russians backed the invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainians are also well aware that it was not Putin who personally bombed Kharkiv or executed civilians in Bucha. These crimes were committed by Russian servicemen who received their orders from Russian officers. They could have refused but they chose not to.

My wife’s sister lives on Moscow. She moved there when she was 16 and is now a Russian citizen. She and her husband were terrified when the war began. They were ashamed and called many times to offer words of support. They followed news of the war closely and knew all the details about the horrors taking place in Mariupol, Kyiv and Kharkiv. This demonstrated once again that talk of Russians living in an information vacuum is wishful thinking. If the average Russian wants to access accurate information about the war, they can do so easily.

Three weeks into the war, my sister-in-law’s fourteen-year-old daughter came home from her Moscow school and asked whether it was true their country was killing children in Ukraine. They answered that yes, it was true, but asked her not to tell anyone. By then, the old Stalinist tradition had returned to Russian schools, with teachers asking kids what their parents were saying at home about the war and reporting any criticism to the authorities.

The reality is that the Russian public does not want to know the truth. The lies they are fed by the Putin regime make them feel good and they are afraid to leave their comfort zone. For years, highly emotional propaganda on Russian TV has fueled imperialistic sentiments among the Russian public while dehumanizing Ukrainians. Many Russians now simply refuse to believe information about atrocities in Ukraine and dismiss the overwhelming evidence of war crimes as fake. I am not at all surprised by such attitudes. It is extremely difficult to admit that you’ve been so comprehensively misled by your own leaders and convinced to support a criminal war.

Millions of extended Russian-Ukrainian families have been divided by the conflict. A former classmate of mine from Chelyabinsk, a Russian city in the southern Ural Mountains, moved to Ukraine many years ago. He recently tried to explain the realities of the war to his mother back in Russia. She refused to listen and declared that everything he said was fake. “Am I fake, too?” he asked. They have not been in contact since.

UKRAINE WAR DIARY: PART V

My taxi driver yesterday was Serhiy from Mariupol. He and his family had managed to leave the devastated Ukrainian port city just before the Russians encircled it. He had since become a taxi driver to make a living. Mariupol is not just a global news headline. It is a vast and unfolding human tragedy that casts a pall of sadness and terror over all Ukraine. If there is a hell on earth right now, it is Mariupol.

So it was only natural that I wanted to talk. Serhiy said 95% of residential buildings in the city, including his own, had been destroyed. Around 100 people among his personal acquaintances had been killed. He said that most of the information he had came from survivors, both those still trapped inside Mariupol and the lucky ones who had managed to escape. As he recounted these horrors, I was struck by the lack of emotion. Maybe he had become apathetic or didn’t want to offload the burden of his pain onto me.

What astonished me most of all was his plan to return home and rebuild Mariupol. “As long as it remains in Ukraine,” he added. I know plenty of people who have serious emotional reservations about going back to cities that have suffered much less destruction than Mariupol. His experience moved me deeply, but there was little I could offer him except a generous tip.

Russia has good reason for pushing so hard to take Mariupol. Putin desperately needs some kind of success for domestic consumption ahead of Victory Day on May 9. The annual celebration of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany plays a central role in modern Russian mythology. This year’s holiday must be marked by a new triumph.

There is another less obvious but equally important reason why Russia is determined to seize Mariupol at all costs. The Kremlin simply cannot afford to let the world see what it has done to the city. Current estimates indicate a death toll of between 10,000 and 30,000 civilians during the two-month siege. In other words, the destruction of Mariupol dwarfs the atrocities committed in Bucha and is likely one of the biggest war crimes in Europe since WWII.

At the other end of Ukraine, life has returned to Lviv. The city’s population has grown by 30% since the start of the war. Shops and movie theaters are now open once again. The alcohol ban has been partially lifted with everything available except for hard liquor. As a result, restaurants and bars are full. The crowds are cosmopolitan and often include lots of foreign journalists as well as people who have relocated to Lviv from across Ukraine.

During the weekends, the shopping mall that serves as the Lviv base for our radio station is absolutely full of people. The main indication that life is still far from normal remains the ubiquity of air raid sirens. Most shoppers would probably be happy to stay, I imagine, but due to wartime regulations all stores close and everyone must take cover.

I have recently received news that my summer house north of Kyiv in the village of Nova Bogdanivka was pillaged by Russian soldiers. I invested so much of my time and energy there renovating, building a summer terrace, and planting a garden. It is also a home where my family spent most of our weekends and nine whole months during the height of the Covid pandemic. At least the Russians didn’t burn it down.

Nova Bogdanivka was on the frontline and was the scene of heavy fighting for a month. I learned about all the developments there from a Telegram channel that united all residents of our 250-house community. When the war began, most of us left for other parts of Ukraine or for the relative security of nearby Kyiv. A handful of residents stayed behind in the village. During the fighting, they were forced to hide in basements to survive and were very cautious about discussing their situation in case any of the details somehow leaked out and reached the Russians.

At some point, a village resident published a photo of my neighbor’s SUV dotted with bullet holes. His son recognized the car in the photo and begged everybody in our Telegram group for help. It was a terrifying moment. Nobody could do anything and everybody knew it was our neighbor. Later we learnt he had died.

On reflection, our village was actually lucky. One resident was killed and all of our houses were looted by Russian troops or “orcs” as they are universally referred to in our Telegram group. The neighboring village was far less fortunate. Every third house was completely destroyed by heavy artillery. The fate of this neighboring village became the subject of a harrowing feature-length report by independent Russian news site Meduza detailing multiple murders and rapes by Russian troops. Relatively speaking, we have nothing to complain about.

My neighbors from Nova Bogdanivka have begun uploading photos from their security cameras to our messenger group. It turns out that the Russians stole anything they could carry from carpets and vacuum cleaners to used clothes and kitchen cutlery. Some of them filled up suitcases with stolen items. I can understand why a soldier might decide to steal money or jewelry, but why would anyone want to take somebody else’s clothing or knives and forks?

“The second army in the world,” as my neighbors sarcastically describe the Russians, turned out to be a bunch of impoverished bums. Nova Bogdanivka residents who managed to talk to the invaders discovered that most came from the poorest regions of Russia including the North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far East. Some of them admitted that they had only previously seen asphalt roads on TV. Whether he intended to or not, Putin has conducted a “special operation” to show the whole world the poverty and degradation of the Russian military and modern Russian society as a whole.

I have not yet learned the full extent of the damage to our house. It is still too early to check as the retreating Russians left mines and booby traps throughout the village. I don’t know when we will be able to go back, but I am already terrified by the thought of our eight-year-old twins Peter and Anna going for a walk in the village or just playing in our garden. I fear this lingering sense of dread will be with us for many more years to come.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site (NV.ua). This war diary was originally published in the German language by Die Zeit newspaper.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 21 Apr 2022 11:42:00 +0000

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Asat mentioned in iNews on Saudi Arabia’s deportation of Uyghur migrants to China

Atlantic Council — Wed, 20 Apr 2022 20:13:00 +0000

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UN: Ukraine refugee crisis is Europe’s biggest since WWII

Julian Vierlinger — Wed, 20 Apr 2022 15:32:36 +0000

As the war in Ukraine approaches the two-month mark, the UN has reported that over five million Ukrainians have now fled the country, making it Europe’s biggest refugee crisis since World War II. Over half of these refugees have crossed the border into neighboring Poland. With no sign of an end to the conflict and more refugees expected amid a major new Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine, it is vital to scale up and improve the coordination of aid efforts at the border.

The current response in the border regions of Subcarpathia and Lublin is largely grassroots-based. Volunteers from a diverse set of local and international initiatives are doing an invaluable job of keeping refugees safe, warm and fed. Local mayors and government officials are providing infrastructure such as shelter, transportation, water and energy. Coordination is ad hoc and largely informal.

While most arrivals only remain in the border area for a matter of hours or a maximum of a few days, the sheer size of the influx is putting a serious strain on local capacities. The type of caretaking required in the border region also produces its very own set of challenges that local responders are often understaffed and underequipped to meet.

There are four key issues for the international community to address that can help improve the situation.

Firstly, it is vital to disburse funding promptly and locally. There currently appears to be a serious disconnect between those receiving funds and the people actually in the field. This is likely due to the heightened sense of urgency among those working day-to-day with refugees, while those at more of a distance are inclined to adopt a business as usual approach.

During the time it takes to push information about local needs up the ladder, field operations suffer shortages. Those on the front lines of the aid effort also have a clearer view of requirements and need the capacity to respond directly. It is therefore imperative to cut red tape and enable prompt disbursal of funding at the local level.

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Second, international actors and organizations must also become active where local committees lack networks and institutional firepower. If given adequate funding to fill equipment and infrastructure gaps, local operations will likely be able to surmount immediate local challenges. However, there are systemic problems where international actors and organizations need to intervene and coordinate.

One such problem is evacuation and transportation. At present, this is taking place via a loosely connected pool of volunteers and Polish public servants, sometimes together with officials from receiving countries. A large share of refugees travel from reception centers to final destinations by private volunteer vehicles. There is no system in place to ensure their safe arrival at destination.

As the vast majority of refugees are women and children, this represents a blind spot that is vulnerable to exploitation by human traffickers and similar criminal groups. It is imperative to expand official transportation services and regulate volunteer travel options. For example, a system could be set up to oblige volunteer drivers to transport refugees to Red Cross offices that confirm safe arrival and the availability of local care.

Similarly, a more professional approach is necessary for the evacuation and relocation of highly vulnerable people such as unaccompanied minors, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities. At a minimum, a clear and easily operable Poland-wide scheme must be set up to handle such cases. Ideally, this system should cover relocation across Europe.

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Thirdly, local responders need immediate staffing support at the national and international levels. As the war drags on, the number of volunteers available to local initiatives will decrease. Accordingly, important gaps will arise in unexpected ways, as the current lack of central coordination makes it difficult to know which tasks are critical and who fulfills them.

There is no doubt that key volunteer positions will eventually have to be filled by salaried staff and professionals. However, local government and senior local organizations such as the Polish Red Cross will not be able to fill these positions by themselves even if given adequate funding. This is largely due to conditions on the local labor market.

In light of recruitment challenges, it is imperative for international organizations to dispatch qualified staff directly to local initiatives until permanent arrangements are possible. Ideally, these dispatched staffers would also represent the communication link between international organizations and local initiatives.

Fourth, International organizations in the field must interact better when setting up operations and realize their role in coordinating the international response. There is currently a systemic lack of coordination between actors in the field.

Field-based operations look to larger organizations such as the IOM, UNHCR, WHO and UNICEF for guidance. However, there appears to be a fair amount of dissonance between these organizations themselves when it comes to who plans to do what, where, when and with whom. This adds an unnecessary layer of complexity to local operations and distracts from the task of coordinating efforts, filling gaps in operations, and communicating with the international community.

Similarly, communication is currently unsatisfactory between local organizations active in the border region, those active in Ukraine, and the Polish and Ukrainian states. The same international actors should join forces in streamlining information flows to allow for more proactive and efficient operations.

At present, the fact that the crisis response is organic is both a blessing and a curse. Without it, this initial phase of population movement would have been catastrophic. Nevertheless, organic crisis responses are limited in scope and duration.

As the crisis moves forward, volunteers will tire and funds will run out. Shocks such as local disease outbreaks have already severely tested local capacities and may do so again. Significant surges in border crossings caused by the renewed Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine will challenge and possibly overrun current capacities. It is high time for the international community to act together towards the goal of creating synergies between the resources already in the field and those waiting for deployment.

Julian Vierlinger is a researcher and PhD Candidate at the European University Institute. For the last month he has been volunteering with the Polish Red Cross at the Ukrainian border.

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Asat in Foreign Policy: China’s Transnational Repression Gets Saudi Backing

Atlantic Council — Thu, 14 Apr 2022 13:46:00 +0000

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Plaks in the National News on Russian exiles

Atlantic Council — Wed, 30 Mar 2022 15:32:00 +0000

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On March 30, Forward Defense nonresident fellow Irina Plaks was quoted in an article in the National News titled “West urged to ‘back brain drain from Russia’ by taking in dissenters.” Plaks asserts that the West can (and should) benefit from highly-skilled Russian exiles and should utilize their expertise.

A low-cost policy option with a high impact on Russia, welcoming high-skill immigrants would dent Russia’s economy and stifle its burgeoning technology and defence industries.
Irina Plaks

Fellow

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Plitsas in CT Insider on Ukrainian evacuation

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Mar 2022 16:28:00 +0000

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On March 29, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Alex Plitsas was quoted in an article in the CT Insider titled “Fairfield vet coordinates evacuations, supply deliveries for Ukraine.” Plitsas continues to aid Ukrainian refugees’ journey to the United States and has coordinated the donation of ballistic armor from police departments to support Ukraine’s war effort.

Because people [Ukrainians] are, in many cases, able to travel across those European borders, there’s not as many people who need rescuing.
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Pavel in NBC News on Biden’s trip to Poland

Atlantic Council — Fri, 25 Mar 2022 19:09:00 +0000

Original Source

On March 25, Atlantic Council senior vice president and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security director Barry Pavel was quoted in an NBC News article titled, “Biden travels to Poland as the country struggles with Ukrainian refugee influx.” In the article, Pavel emphasizes the importance of Biden’s recent trip to Poland amidst the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

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Qaddour mentioned in Politico National Security Daily on her testimony at the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Syria’s humanitarian situation

Atlantic Council — Tue, 15 Mar 2022 18:08:00 +0000

original source

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Ukraine’s exodus escalates as millions more prepare to flee Putin’s invasion

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 15 Mar 2022 12:25:11 +0000

Many Ukrainians first heard the explosions of Russian missiles on the news or via online video footage. But as Putin’s war continues to escalate, the horrors of the conflict have moved closer and closer to families living in more isolated towns and villages across Ukraine.

These families are now making agonizing decisions about whether to remain together in their homes or send women and children abroad to avoid Russian atrocities against the civilian population and Moscow’s increasingly indiscriminate bombing campaign. Over three million have already fled the country. As the invasion advances, millions more are expected to seek sanctuary in the EU.

One particularly traumatic aspect of the war has been the separation of Ukrainian families as men aged 18-60 stay to fight Russian forces while women and children flee abroad or elsewhere in Ukraine. This results in heart-wrenching conversations around dinner tables and in text message groups about when to leave and where to go.

Tragically, the bombing and shelling of large cities like Kharkiv and Mariupol by Russian forces have robbed many citizens of these choices. While large numbers of Kyiv residents evacuated as quickly as they could when Russian forces first bombarded the city on February 24, those in eastern Ukraine have at times been forced to remain in place as Russian troops attack. The Russian military’s encirclement of Mariupol has left the city without food, water, electricity and heating for over a week while Moscow’s forces have relentless bombed civilian targets including the city’s maternity hospital.

The situation in small towns and cities across Ukraine is uneven, prompting millions of Ukrainians to make impossible choices. Many towns far from strategic military points have so far fared better than large cities but this may not last. Ukrainians outside of major urban centers are now being forced to wonder if fleeing their homes makes sense when the war is still some distance away.

Evacuating from a small town or village poses challenges of its own. Despite a major push by President Zelenskyy and his government to improve roads, transportation infrastructure away from major urban areas often remains poor. It is difficult enough to leave one’s home in wartime. This becomes even harder when bumpy roads and bombed out bridges slow down your journey, making you a potential target for Russian forces.

The cold logic of war also means that the Ukrainian government is more likely to allocate forces to protecting major cities and strategic military chokepoints. As heroic as the Ukrainian military has been in defending the country, scarce resources mean it cannot defend every town and village.

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Family situations also weigh on Ukrainians’ evacuation calculus. Lera, a nineteen-year-old student living in Warsaw, says her family’s ties to their home in Odesa Oblast have complicated their decision to evacuate. “My parents don’t want to leave our town because my grandmothers live with them, and it will be very difficult for them to flee. My parents also don’t want to leave the house they built with their own hands and have lived in for over 20 years.”

For others, the stresses of war and the desire to keep families together prompted them to leave. After living in a makeshift bomb shelter in her apartment building basement for three days, Elena, a translation freelancer from Zhytomyr Oblast, says she decided that “my children shouldn’t have to suffer this much. I had to make the very difficult decision to move my family abroad.”

It can be difficult for individuals already living abroad to convince their family members to leave. “Russia destroyed my parents’ business. And now they are discussing whether to stay at home or flee,” says Andrii, a university student in Poland originally from Vinnytsia Oblast. “I have insisted that they flee Ukraine immediately. But I understand this is their decision. Just imagine never going back to your hometown because you don’t have a home anymore.”

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Many also fear what life would look like under Russian occupation. Ukrainians who have lived near the line of contact in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region know this all too well. “At this point, we know that the development of the region under Russian control stopped at its 2014 level. This is a fact,” says Irina, a mother who recently fled her home in Donetsk Oblast 10 kilometers from the line of contact. Russian occupation in Donbas has bred instability, violence and repression. Ukrainians are loathe to see their homes terrorized by the same forces.

Fortunately, citizens in more isolated areas of Ukraine have taken in their fellow Ukrainians hoping to escape from the senseless violence of the Russian invasion. Internally displaced people from large cities have made their way south and west and have found shelter. Newcomers help pitch in by setting up territorial defenses, preparing medical kits for soldiers, and making homemade camouflage. The war has indeed brought compassion and unity to the fore among Ukrainians, which may help explain why the country has so effectively slowed Russian advances.

Ukrainians would like to see the country’s Western partners match these qualities with increased arms supplies. Putin’s forces are increasingly turning their attention to vulnerable civilian targets including towns without sophisticated air defense systems. To guard against these terror tactics, the West should urgently provide Ukraine with greater anti-air and anti-tank capabilities.

While Western policymakers dither in calibrating military and humanitarian support, Ukrainians will continue to make difficult choices about their futures and the lives of their loved ones. It would be a relief for millions of Ukrainians if the country’s small cities and towns avoid the worst of Putin’s invasion. But the country desperately needs peace, says Lera. “We all want to lead peaceful lives without missiles flying over our heads. Doesn’t my country deserve that?”

Andrew D’Anieri is an Assistant Director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. From 2019-2020, he served as a Peace Corps volunteer in southern Ukraine. Find him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

The relatively low cap on the number of annual H-1B temporary visas—65,000 plus 20,000 for those with advanced degrees—can make it difficult for startup companies to hire new personnel in their fast-growing businesses or for international students to remain in the United States. Moreover, restrictions on H-1B immigration have caused multinational companies eager for talent to hire US-educated foreign scientists and technologists at their foreign affiliates when these individuals cannot attain H-1B visas for employment in the United States. In these situations, the other countries where the affiliates are located reap the benefit. Many of the companies facing the most difficulty in obtaining H-1B visas for their employees are concentrated in highly H-1B-dependent and R&D-intensive sectors operating offshore tech service sectors. In most cases, the affiliates to which the new hires are sent are in Canada, India, or China.

Without more skilled immigrants, US businesses run the risk of not being able to expand and remain competitive in the global economy.

Distinct from nonimmigrant foreign workers with H-1B visas, another important avenue for immigrants coming to the United States has been as international students. A quarter of the “unicorn” founders in the NFAP study originally enrolled in top US universities. Like foreign jobseekers requiring a work visa, international students have faced hurdles in the past few years. In 2018, the Trump administration reduced the duration of student visas from five years to one. Even more harmful was President Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, which many experts believe dampened international students’ interest in studying in the United States (while raising parental fears for their children’s safety). “After years of phenomenal expansion starting in the mid-2000s, enrollment growth [of international students at US universities] slowed to less than 1 percent by 2019-2020.” Arguably, the pandemic—which led to a halting of immigration for a time—took a bigger toll on the number of international students coming to the United States than Trump’s anti-immigrant policies. Some 2 million fewer working-age immigrants are living in the United States today than in 2019. Pandemic restrictions also caused “a staggering 15-percent decline in international students in the 2020-21 academic year.” Fortunately, enrollment partially rebounded in fall 2021 with a 4-percent increase over last year’s earlier level. If enacted by Congress, proposals to reduce the number of Chinese students coming to US shores could substantially affect US universities because the Chinese comprise the largest group of foreign students in the United States, approximately 30 percent.

Going forward, the economic damage to universities from lowered enrollment could be substantial. International students represented nearly 60 percent of all student population growth in 2000–2018. Today, with a declining youth population in the United States, the concurrent drop in the number of international students studying at US universities will be an extra burden on academic budgets. Many science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) PhD programs depend on international students for their survival. A pre-pandemic study found that 70.3 percent of all full-time graduate students in electrical engineering; 63.2 percent in computer science; 60.4 percent in industrial engineering; and more than 50 percent in chemical, materials, and mechanical engineering, as well as in economics, were international students. If US immigration law is not overhauled to attract more international talent to study in the United States, university funding will not only decrease, but US innovation will stall as well. A World Bank report warned that any reduction in the number of “foreign graduate students” could significantly reduce US innovative activities; conversely, the report assessed that a 10-percent increase in the number of foreign graduate students would raise patent applications by 4.7 percent, university patent grants by 5.3 percent, and non-university patent grants by 6.7 percent. Although the United States remains a top destination for international students, other countries are increasingly competing for such students, particularly those in the STEM field. In trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada has opened additional pathways for enticing older graduates with work experience and others who are French-speakers to apply for permanent residency. Australia—another popular destination for Indians and others—offers permanent residency possibilities for postgraduates, although the process is considered more complex than in Canada. Germany, which has an active program for attracting and retaining highly skilled workers in areas experiencing shortages, is providing a fast track to permanent residency for both international graduates (after two years) and those recruited for their skills (four years). With such competition, US complacency could spell a slow decline in attracting the best and brightest.

Why now?

Trump cited the hardships suffered by American workers who lost their jobs because of the pandemic as justification for suspending new work visas. Today, unemployment is low, and companies are facing a new crisis in trying to fill vacancies: too few skilled workers for the number of jobs. Shortages exist at all levels: lower-skilled workers are in high demand in the agriculture, construction, hotel, restaurant, and hospitality sectors.

Even before the pandemic, tech-skilled workers were scarce. A New American Economy report found that “computer-related jobs . . . made up 69.6 percent of all foreign labor requests in FY 2020, a slight increase from FY 2019 despite the COVID-19 pandemic.” Despite lingering criticism that foreign workers threaten to take jobs away from Americans, “The unemployment rate for computer- and mathematics-related occupations was 2.3 percent. By 2020, that had only increased by 0.7 percentage points, to 3.0 percent. By March 2021, the unemployment rate for workers in these occupations was 1.9 percent, lower than it was before the pandemic.” Computer and highly skilled mathematics-based jobs have traditionally been filled in high proportions by immigrants on H1-B and other temporary worker visas. Business groups, such as the US Chamber of Commerce, assess that the need to increase immigration is urgent. Without more skilled immigrants, US businesses run the risk of not being able to expand and remain competitive in the global economy. Angering many traditional Republican supporters, US Chamber of Commerce CEO Suzanne Clark, has, in fact, called for “doubling the number of legal immigrants.”

Despite sharp partisan differences, public views of immigrants have shifted toward greater acceptance, according to a mid-2021 Pew Research Center survey. The share of people who see being Christian and being born in the United States as critical for being “truly American,” Pew found, “has significantly decreased between 2016 and November 2020.” Moreover, this has been the case regardless of a respondent’s party leaning, although less so for Republicans.

How to make it happen

Most every immigration reform has been controversial and has required a modicum of bipartisanship to secure passage. While the post-COVID recovery, tight labor market, and growing worries about competitiveness with China on technology make today a propitious moment for reform, the sharp partisan divide in Congress, as well as the upcoming midterm elections, make even limited legislative efforts parlous. The Biden administration still has some means to address the tech-worker shortage and the declining number of international students coming to the United States and could lay the groundwork for more substantial immigration reform over the long term.

Short-Term Expedients: The Biden administration downplayed H-1B visas in its original Citizenship Act in favor of increasing the number of green cards from 140,000 to 170,000, exempting STEM doctoral candidates. Biden hoped to make H-1B visas less attractive to employers, while promoting the chance of permanent residency, which has traditionally been more appealing to students and workers. The Citizenship Act, which included these changes, has stalled, prompting the administration to expand the types of degrees qualifying for STEM recognition and to allow STEM graduates to remain in the country for up to 36 months. University officials have commended the executive measure, which will help them re-attract the world’s STEM talent.

Under the House’s COMPETES Act, holders of doctorates in certain STEM fields would be exempt from numerical caps on green cards, regardless of whether they earned their degree in the United States or abroad. Whether those provisions will survive the reconciliation process is unclear: the bill’s Senate counterpart contains no analogous STEM immigration provisions and, to become law, at least 10 Republican senators would need to support it to avoid a filibuster.

The Biden administration should consider asking Congress to raise the cap on the number of H1-B visas. The base number of 65,000 was set more than 30 years ago, in 1990, and the additional 20,000 visas for advanced-degree-holders from US universities was added in 2006. Last year’s (FY 2021’s) H1-B lottery attracted more than 300,000 candidates, representing a 12-percent increase from FY 2020. Raising the cap is not unprecedented: it was raised to 115,000 in 1999–2000 and to 195,000 in 2001-2003. Encouraging more temporary visas can help keep the channel open for needed skilled immigrants in case the provisions favoring STEM PhD candidature for green cards in the COMPETES Act fail. Even if those provisions were enacted, more technically skilled workers would be required than those with PhDs. Expanded H-1B visas would provide such an avenue for a wider spectrum of highly skilled workers to come to the United States.

Needed Long-Term Solution: Close observers of the immigration debates on Capitol Hill believe that Democrats should invest more in building a consensus because there have been potential opportunities to forge common ground with Republicans. In March 2021, the House passed two bipartisan immigration bills to legalize the so-called DREAMers (individuals living in the United States illegally, but who first came to the United States as minors) as well as farmworkers. Nine Republicans joined Democrats to pass the Dream and Promise Act by a vote of 228-197. The Farm Workforce Modernization Act also passed, by a vote of 247-174, backed by 30 Republicans.

The need for immigration reform is more pressing than ever. During the past decade and a half, demographers, economists, and other experts have grown increasingly worried about the declining birth rate and accelerating aging in the United States. Many had believed that the United States, with its large number of immigrants—who typically have higher birth rates than native-born Americans—would not see its birth rate decline so precipitously. The United States’ birth rate is now more in line with the low birth rates found among US allies and partners in Europe and Asia. Meanwhile, since 2008 the birth rates for immigrant groups in the United States have also dropped. In 2020, according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the general fertility rate in the United States was about 56 births per 1,000 women—the lowest rate on record and about half of what it was in the early 1960s. Moreover, the decline in birth rates is seen across all measured racial and ethnic groups. Births dropped by 4 percent among white, black, and Latina women; 9 percent for Asian women; 3 percent for Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders; and 7 percent for Native American and Alaska native women.

Beginning in 2030, immigration is projected to overtake natural increase as the principal driver of US population growth, according to the US Census Bureau. In the absence of any immigration, the US population would stagnate, if not decline starting in 2030. With no population growth, the United States could experience permanently lowered economic growth; this is already occurring in rural counties, whose populations are shrinking. Not only is there a strong argument to allow an increased number of immigrants, but there is also a need to attract immigrants with special skills that could help the United States sustain its competitive edge. Conservative Republicans have been particularly vociferous in calling for skills-based immigration, which could help form the basis for a compromise on other issues that Democrats support—and Republicans largely oppose—such as providing a pathway for the United States’ 11 million undocumented immigrants to obtain citizenship.

The question is: how long does Washington want to wait to reform US immigration policies? The year 2030—when the US population could begin to decline—is only eight years away, and the last major reform of US immigration law was in 1990. Congress needs to better understand the demographic implications of inaction and consider the effects of a shrinking population on the United States’ ability to compete globally. With public attitudes becoming more accepting of immigrants, the Biden administration should begin educating the public on the demographic and economic future awaiting the United States if its immigration policies are not reformed soon.

Photo by Go Nakamura. Migrants seeking asylum in the US from India, walk to turn themselves in to the US border patrol after crossing the border from Mexico at Yuma, Arizona, US, January 23, 2022. REUTERS

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Amb. Fried interviewed in Bloomberg’s Balance of Power podcast on the Ukrainian refugee crisis

sbusch — Mon, 07 Mar 2022 21:52:00 +0000

Listen to the interview here

The post Amb. Fried interviewed in Bloomberg’s Balance of Power podcast on the Ukrainian refugee crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Quel avenir pour le Sahel?

Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith — Mon, 07 Mar 2022 19:44:57 +0000

Télécharger le rapport complet

To read the English version of this report, click here.
Un enregistrement du lancement de rapport est disponible ici.

La donne démographique dans la région et ses retombées à l’horizon de 2045 2045

Le Sahel – soit, dans le cadre de cette étude, la région au sud du Sahara qui s’étend du Sénégal au Tchad en y incluant les douze états septentrionaux de la Fédération nigériane appliquant la charia — est dans une impasse démographique. Loin de produire un « dividende », la croissance rapide d’une population dont le profil d’âge est très jeune et dont le taux de fécondité reste très élevé submerge la capacité des états à produire des biens publics en quantité nécessaire. Cette donne démographique ralentit, voire bloque la croissance économique ; elle limite le progrès social et obère l’urbanisation par l’extension des bidonvilles. Au fil des décennies, ces conditions, qui se renforcent mutuellement, ont sapé la légitimité des gouvernements centraux et rendu les états de la région vulnérables à la propagation d’un populisme islamique radical et, plus généralement, à l’instabilité.

La période 2040-2045 est l’horizon temps de cette étude. D’ici à là, du fait du profil d’âge très jeune de leurs populations (quatre sur dix Sahéliens ont moins de quinze ans), les états de la région devront se doter de nouvelles infrastructures, augmenter la productivité agricole et élargir le marché du travail de façon à pouvoir répondre aux besoins pressants de cohortes de jeunes adultes toujours plus nombreuses qui, d’année en année, rivaliseront pour des emplois rémunérateurs au sein d’une main d’œuvre déjà largement sous-employée. En même temps, les gouvernements devront maintenir la sécurité collective. Leurs efforts pour y parvenir, quand bien même ils seraient sous-tendus par la meilleure volonté et une parfaite expertise, ne pourront s’approcher de leurs objectifs qu’à condition de s’attaquer en priorité à l’entrave majeure au développement, à savoir les taux de fertilité persistant à des niveaux très élevés.

S’ils veulent sortir de l’impasse actuelle, les gouvernements sahéliens devront réorienter une partie importante de leurs efforts de développement et moyens financiers vers des politiques et programmes visant à améliorer la condition féminine : en prévenant les mariages et grossesses précoces chez les adolescentes, en promouvant l’éducation des filles et en garantissant la pleine participation des femmes dans tous les secteurs publics et privés, à commencer par les lieux de travail. Car l’amélioration tous azimuts de la condition féminine est la condition sine qua non pour l’avènement de familles de taille plus réduite et aux membres mieux instruits. Or, l’insurrection djihadiste dans la région complique la mise en œuvre, en toute sécurité, de programmes promouvant les femmes, du moins en dehors des grandes villes sous le contrôle des gouvernements ; elle comporte aussi le risque que les bailleurs de fonds extérieurs du développement, notamment l’Union européenne et les États-Unis, se désengagent de la région pour ne plus chercher qu’à contenir de l’extérieur — à l’instar de ce qu’ils font déjà en Somalie — la menace djihadiste et la pression migratoire montante au Sahel.

Un forum de débat associé : perspectives politiques et projets régionaux

Pour prolonger Bette étude et ouvrir le débat à d’autres expertises, initiatives et projets menés dans le Sahel, le Conseil Atlantique a demandé à l’ONG américaine Organizing to Advance Solutions in the Sahel (OASIS), dédiée à l’accélération de la transition démographique dans la région, d’inviter à collaborer des experts ouest-africains en santé publique et en éducation. Dans une série de débats organisés à cette fin, ces professionnels ont confronté leurs idées quant aux mérites des approches politiques actuelles et des projets en cours dans la région, ainsi que des obstacles rencontrés et de leurs recommandations en la matière. Sous le titre « Accélérer la transition démographique », le synopsis de ces consultations est accessible ici. Par ailleurs, une note d’accompagnement d’OASIS dresse le tableau de l’aide internationale en matière de santé reproductive et pour l’éducation des filles dans le Sahel. La version intégrale de cette note, dont les principales informations ont été intégrées dans la présente étude, peut être consultée via le lien que voici.

Photo: Yvonne Etinosa.

Les résultats en un coup d’œil

Le profil d’âge d’une population et la « fenêtre démographique ». Pris dans leur ensemble, les pays du Sahel abritent parmi les populations les plus jeunes du monde. Qui plus est, selon la projection moyenne de fécondité de la Division de la population des Nations Unies (ONU), aucun pays sahélien ne devrait atteindre au cours des vingt à vingt-cinq années à venir — soit la période couverte par le présent rapport — la « fenêtre démographique », c’est-à-dire une période propice à la croissance économique et au développement du fait d’un profil d’âge favorable de la population (on parle à ce propos aussi de « dividende démographique »). Au cours des soixante-dix dernières années, c’est dans cette « fenêtre » — qui s’ouvre à partir d’un âge médian d’une population entre 25 et 26 ans — que d’autres pays ont généralement atteint des niveaux de développement moyens supérieurs (correspondant à cette catégorie de revenus, telle que définie par la Banque mondiale, et les niveaux plus élevés d’éducation et de survie des enfants qui y sont associés). D’ici à 2045, seuls la Mauritanie et le Sénégal s’approcheront de cette « fenêtre démographique », à en croire la projection actuelle de l’ONU à faible taux de fécondité — le scénario le plus optimiste de la série standard de la Division de la Population.

La croissance démographique. Les démographes de l’ONU estiment que la population totale des six états du Sahel est passée de près de 21 millions d’habitants, en 1960, à environ 103 millions en 2020, soit presque un quintuplement en soixante ans. Pour le nord du Nigéria, leurs estimations aboutissent à une trajectoire de croissance similaire, avec près de 78 millions d’habitants en 2020. Les populations combinées des six pays du Sahel et du nord du Nigéria devraient ainsi passer de l’estimation actuelle — 181 millions d’habitants — à une fourchette comprise entre 370 millions et 415 millions d’habitants en 2045. Une grande partie de cette croissance sera le résultat de l’actuel profil d’âge très jeune de ces populations et de l’élan démographique qui en résulte (en anglais, on parle à ce propos de age-structural momentum ou population momentum).

La baisse de la fécondité. Les taux globaux de fécondité de la région varient actuellement entre 4,6 enfants par femme au Sénégal et en Mauritanie et des taux de pré-transition démographique — plus de 6,5 enfants par femme — au Niger et dans les douze états du nord du Nigéria. Dans tout le Sahel, les taux de procréation chez les adolescentes restent extrêmement élevés, et la taille de la famille perçue comme étant « idéale » est généralement égale ou supérieure à la fécondité réalisée. Dans le passé, jusqu’aux séries de données de l’ONU en 2010, les projections de baisse de fécondité de la Division de la Population pour les pays du Sahel se sont toujours avérées trop optimistes. Cependant, des enquêtes locales plus récentes indiquent que la version actuelle de sa projection de fécondité moyenne n’est pas hors de portée. Ce scénario prédit qu’entre 2040 et 2045 la fécondité diminuera pour atteindre entre 4 et 3,4 enfants par femme dans la plupart des états du Sahel, et près de 4,7 au Niger. Il y a déjà des écarts significatifs dans l’utilisation de contraceptifs modernes et entre les modèles de procréation chez les femmes rurales au Sahel et les femmes urbaines plus instruites. Mais ces différences ne sont pas encore aussi prononcées qu’en Afrique de l’Est ou en Afrique australe, où la baisse de la fécondité est plus avancée et se poursuit à un rythme plus rapide.

La santé maternelle et infantile, ainsi que l’éducation des filles. Alors que la mortalité infantile a constamment diminué au Sahel, un enfant sur dix meurt encore avant l’âge de cinq ans au Mali et au Tchad. Par ailleurs, selon des estimations récentes de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), plus de 40 pour cent des enfants de moins de cinq ans présentent un retard de croissance au Niger et au Tchad. Toujours selon l’OMS, le taux de mortalité maternelle au Tchad est le deuxième plus élevé du monde, tandis que la Mauritanie, le Mali et le Niger figurent parmi les vingt pays de la planète où la grossesse et l’accouchement sont les plus dangereux. Au Tchad et au Niger, seule une fille sur cinq en âge de l’être est en réalité inscrite dans un établissement d’enseignement secondaire ; ailleurs dans la région, le taux net de scolarisation des filles ne dépasse pas 40 pour cent dans le secondaire. Partout, les mariages d’adolescentes restent le principal obstacle à l’augmentation de leur niveau d’éducation.

L’autonomie et les droits des femmes. En dépit des conseils prodigués par des professionnels locaux de la santé et les exhortations des agences de l’ONU, les gouvernements sahéliens successifs n’ont, jusqu’à présent, pris aucune disposition effective pour faire appliquer les lois déjà existantes qui permettraient de réduire les mariages d’adolescentes, d’éliminer l’excision, de protéger les femmes contre les mariages forcés, de restreindre la polygamie ou, encore, de donner aux femmes des droits égaux de succession et la garde de leurs enfants en cas de séparation conjugale ou de veuvage. Alors que les défenseurs des droits des femmes considèrent que ces mesures sont indispensables pour faire évoluer les préférences vers des familles plus restreintes et mieux éduquées, les dirigeants craignent un retour de flamme politique. L’ampleur de la résistance organisée — comme, par exemple, lors des manifestations d’organisations islamiques au Mali en 2009, qui ont fait reculer les droits des femmes — a même convaincu certains professionnels du développement que, dans plusieurs états du Sahel, la seule voie de changement actuellement ouverte passe, à moyen terme, par un soutien financier accru à l’éducation des filles, aux réseaux des soins de santé pour les femmes et aux organisations de la société civile qui luttent pour l’égalité des femmes.

L’agriculture. Malgré le changement climatique, la hausse des températures locales et le récent ralentissement de l’expansion des terres cultivées, la croissance de la production céréalière a, depuis 1990, dépassé le rythme de la croissance démographique dans la région, qui est de l’ordre de 3 pour cent par an. Cependant, en raison de récoltes erratiques sur des terres exploitées de façon peu productive, de conflits armés et d’un grand nombre de personnes déplacées, les états de la région sont restés tributaires d’une aide alimentaire importante. Alors que l’irrigation par les eaux souterraines est susceptible de prendre de l’ampleur, les effets combinés de la croissance démographique future, du réchauffement climatique continu, de l’insurrection persistante et de la sécheresse périodique dans le Sahel rendent l’autosuffisance alimentaire très improbable dans un avenir prévisible.

Le pastoralisme. Après trois décennies d’augmentation relativement régulière des précipitations dans certaines parties de la région, le nombre de têtes de bétail (ajusté en fonction des différences de taille des espèces) a considérablement augmenté depuis les années 1990. Pourtant, les zones de pâturage les plus productives ont diminué parce qu’elles ont aussi été mises à contribution par des populations croissantes d’agriculteurs dans les zones plus arides. En même temps, le nombre des détenteurs de droits de pâturage a été multiplié et la végétation des zones convoitées s’est sensiblement dégradée, au point où la moins bonne qualité du fourrage a précipité le passage des bovins aux moutons et aux chèvres. Dans tout le Sahel, les agro-écologistes ont noté l’émergence de ce qu’ils appellent des systèmes de production « néo-pastoraux », lesquels se caractérisent par de riches propriétaires de grands troupeaux absents du terrain, la prolifération d’armes légères mais sophistiquées et, sur place, une sous-classe pastorale paupérisée et politiquement marginalisée qui est de plus en plus vulnérable à la radicalisation.

La sécurité. Depuis 2009, le Sahel fait face à des insurrections islamistes en pleine expansion. Cette tendance est susceptible de s’aggraver étant donné qu’aucun état de la région ne devrait atteindre, d’ici à 2045, la « fenêtre démographique » qui, selon les modèles fondés sur l’analyse du profil d’âge d’une population, inaugure une baisse substantielle du risque de conflits non-territoriaux (ou révolutionnaires) persistants. D’après ces modèles, les conflits en cours au Mali, Burkina Faso et Niger, ainsi qu’au Tchad et dans le nord du Nigéria sont ainsi statistiquement susceptibles de se poursuivre, à un certain niveau, pendant les vingt-cinq années à venir. Ce qui retardera d’autant l’amélioration de la condition féminine dans la mesure où, contrairement aux insurrections d’inspiration marxiste dans l’Asie du Sud-Est et en Amérique latine au cours de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, la présence djihadiste dans les zones rurales du Sahel limite les progrès de l’éducation des femmes, leur autonomie et la fourniture de services de planification familiale..

L’urbanisation. Dans les six pays francophones du Sahel, la population urbaine — en croissance rapide — représente actuellement environ un tiers de la population et devrait s’approcher de la moitié d’ici à 2045. Les investissements dans le logement ont permis de réduire sensiblement la proportion des personnes vivant dans des bidonvilles, mais ces efforts ont été dépassés par une croissance urbaine telle qu’en chiffres absolus, la population des bidonvilles dans la région a presque doublé depuis 1990. À mesure que les opportunités génératrices de revenus se font rares dans les secteurs de l’agriculture et de l’élevage, les espoirs des hommes jeunes reposent sur le marché du travail urbain et les possibilités d’éducation susceptibles de les rendre aptes à l’emploi. Toutefois, l’emploi dans le secteur formel de l’économie demeurera l’exception rare dans la région, et l’urbanisation rapide continue ne manquera pas de poser de nouveaux problèmes de logement, d’accès à l’eau potable et à l’énergie, d’assainissement, de santé publique et de sécurité. Pour relever ces défis, les gouvernements locaux et les bailleurs de fonds étrangers devraient investir massivement dans l’aménagement urbain afin de stimuler les transitions vers une plus grande autonomie des femmes et vers des familles plus réduites, mieux nourries et mieux éduquées. Ce faisant, ils ouvriraient aussi de meilleures perspectives pour trouver un emploi en ville.

La migration. Entre 1990 et 2015, plus de 80 pour cent des flux migratoires à partir des six pays francophones du Sahel ont abouti au-delà des frontières de la région. Au cours de cette période, six migrants sur dix ayant quitté le Sahel se sont installés ailleurs en Afrique, alors que les quatre autres sont partis en Europe, en Amérique du Nord ou vers d’autres destinations. Le Sénégal et le Nigéria ont été les principales portes de sortie vers l’Europe et l’Amérique du Nord. À ces flux migratoires se sont ajoutés, dans la période 2015-2020, d’importants flux de réfugiés du fait de l’escalade des conflits dans le bassin du lac Tchad ainsi qu’au Mali, Niger et Burkina Faso. Pour les jeunes Sahéliens réduits à la précarité aussi bien dans les zones rurales pratiquant l’agriculture de subsistance que dans des bidonvilles, la sécheresse épisodique, les conflits persistants et les difficultés économiques durables représentent des facteurs d’incitation au départ. Dans cette partie aride et peu développée du monde, la taille de la population est importante au regard des ressources disponibles — d’où une pénurie de facteurs d’attraction pour rester sur place. La croissance démographique ne cesse de grossir les rangs des personnes dont les moyens de subsistance sont marginaux et qui pourraient être poussées à partir en cas de désastres naturels ou politiques pour aller chercher de meilleures opportunités ailleurs.

Modèles d’une transition accélérée

Ce rapport met en exergue les voices empruntées par trois états qui, par des politiques et programmes non-coercitifs, ont réussi à accélérer leur transition démographique en baissant leur taux de fécondité et en transformant le profil d’âge de leurs populations: la Tunisie, le Botswana et le Bangladesh. Bien que ces pays diffèrent géographiquement, culturellement et économiquement des pays sahéliens, les points de départ démographiques étaient similaires et sont comparables avec la situation actuelle dans les pays sahéliens. En effet, dans les trois états cités en exemple, l’âge médian de la population était inférieur à vingt ans (ce qui correspond à une pyramide d’âge très élargie à la base) et l’indicateur synthétique de fécondité se situait entre six et sept enfants par femme. Par ailleurs, mention est également faite des politiques et programmes en cours pour changer la donne démographique en Éthiopie, au Rwanda, au Kenya et au Malawi.

La Tunisie. Dans ce pays d’Afrique du Nord, la sortie accélérée de la transition démographique doit beau- coup au leadership inspiré de Habib Bourguiba, le pre- mier président de la Tunisie. Il a fait passer un ensemble de réformes favorables aux femmes, notamment des lois obligeant les parents à envoyer leurs filles à l’école, relevant l’âge légal du mariage, interdisant le port du voile et la polygamie, réduisant le pouvoir des imams locaux, autorisant les femmes à travailler en dehors de leur foyer, leur donnant plein droit à l’héritage, faisant du divorce un processus judiciaire et mettant en place dans tout le pays des centres de planification familiale volontaire.

Botswana. D’emblée, le professionnalisme des soins mis à disposition et leur coût abordable ont été les éléments-clés de l’effort de ce pays en matière de santé reproductive. Proposés gratuitement depuis 1970, les services de planification familiale ont été intégrés aux soins de santé maternelle et infantile dans tous les établissements de santé primaire locaux. En outre, le Botswana est l’un des rares pays d’Afrique subsaharienne où le taux de scolarisation des filles dans l’enseignement secondaire dépasse celui des garçons. Le Botswana a partagé avec les pays du Sahel le défi initial des taux élevés de mariages et de grossesses précoces. Mais sa bonne gouvernance et son utilisation judicieuse de ses rentes minières (diamantifère, notamment) le distingue de la plupart des pays du continent.

Le Bangladesh. La remarquable transformation démographique de ce pays est due à une administration sanitaire dévouée. Celle-ci a su mobiliser des dizaines de milliers d’agents de santé communautaires et de bénévoles en faisant équipe avec une organisation non-gouvernementale locale, le Comité pour le Progrès Rural au Bangladesh (BRAC). Elle a également utilisé à bon escient les fonds d’aide et les produits de santé apportés par les donateurs étrangers. Lancée en 1975, cette approche, soutenue par une campagne de communication en matière de santé publique à l’échelle du pays, a contribué à déclencher la demande de nouvelles méthodes de contraception à long terme (par exemple, des injectables et des implants), l’élargissement au niveau national du programme des travailleurs de village et la mise en place d’une chaîne d’approvisionnement en matière de santé publique.

Programmes ailleurs en Afrique. Forts du soutien de leurs dirigeants politiques et en s’inspirant des expériences en Asie et en Amérique latine, les programmes de santé reproductive en Éthiopie, au Rwanda, au Kenya et au Malawi ont gagné une grande visibilité et des soutiens importants de la part des bailleurs de fonds étrangers. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, une meilleure attention prêtée à l’éducation des filles, les efforts organisés pour accroître les droits des femmes en matière de procréation et leur participation politique, de même qu’une communication efficace en matière de santé publique, ont amélioré l’efficacité de ces programmes ciblant, à la fois, la santé maternelle et infantile ainsi que la planification familiale. Toutefois, d’importants problèmes de prestation de services et d’acceptation des contraceptifs modernes subsistent dans chacun de ces pays où les taux d’abandon de la contraception sont élevés et les écarts dans l’utilisation des contraceptifs restent grands entre les ménages ruraux à faible revenu et les familles urbaines plus riches.

Photo: Doug Linstedt.

Scénarios

Dans des situations de crise et d’incertitude, bâtir des scénarios d’avenir aide à réduire le champ des possibles et à déceler des éventualités peu visibles qui pourraient prendre les décideurs au dépourvu. Ces futurs fictifs permettent aux analystes de s’écarter des trajectoires d’événements les plus attendus et d’explorer d’autres possibilités sans avoir à imaginer des discontinuités ou à expliquer des enchaînements d’événements complexes qui, au cours de l’histoire, ont parfois conduit à des surprises. Dans un souci didactique de concision, notre étude présentera les trois scénarios suivants sous la forme de dépêches d’agence de presse (évidemment fictives mais plausibles), des coups de projecteur sur la situation du Sahel au début des années 2040

Du pareil au même. Lors d’un sommet interrégional tenu en 2043, l’Union Européenne (UE) et l’organisation des états sahéliens conviennent d’une nouvelle convention quinquennale sur la migration. L’accord contrôle et limite les flux de migrants en provenance et à travers le Sahel en échange d’une forte augmentation de l’aide financière de l’UE à la région. Ce scénario repose sur l’hypothèse que les inscriptions des filles à l’école ont continué à augmenter dans le Sahel et que l’utilisation de contraceptifs modernes y a lentement progressé en s’étendant des zones urbaines en plein essor aux villes de province, puis dans les villages. Cependant, les gouvernements n’ont guère mené d’actions soutenues pour renforcer les droits des femmes ou atténuer l’ordre patriarcal, qui tolère, entre autres, les mariages et grossesses précoces. En même temps, au nom d’une gouvernance islamique, les états du Sahel ont institué des compléments de revenu en espèces pour les mères à la maison, à la fois pour maintenir les femmes au foyer et pour leur offrir une relative indépendance financière. Par ailleurs, ces états ont mis en commun leurs ressources militaires afin de mieux contenir les groupes djihadistes, qui sont restés actifs, notamment, dans les zones rurales du Sahel.

La percée. Également en 2043, un sommet des états sahéliens regroupés au sein du G7 Sahel débat, sur la base d’un rapport parrainé par l’ONU, du retour- nement de situation en matière de santé reproductive dans plusieurs de ses pays membres et des progrès significatifs enregistrés dans d’autres. Un représentant local du Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population (UNFPA) présente les résultats d’une grande enquête démographique et sanitaire. Il en ressort qu’au Sénégal et au Burkina Faso, l’indicateur synthétique de fécondité est passé sous la barre des trois enfants par femme, et que même le Niger semble emboîter le pas à la région dans sa marche vers une baisse de la fécondité. Des enquêtes locales menées dans plusieurs grandes villes du Sahel révèlent que la fécondité y est déjà proche du seuil de remplacement de deux enfants par femme et que l’afflux dans les maternités, ainsi que la taille des classes d’école, ont considérablement diminué. Mais, du fait de l’accroissement continu de la population (dû à l’élan démographique qui résulte de son profil d’âge très jeune), de la hausse des températures, de mauvaises récoltes périodiques et de la violence sporadique des djihadistes, les importations de céréales et l’aide alimentaire restent des éléments essentiels pour la sécurité alimentaire au Sahel.

Le décrochage. Lors d’une session du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en 2043, le Représentant spécial pour le Sahel du Secrétaire général appelle à une action internationale d’urgence pour faire face à une crise multiforme dans la région. Il décrit la faillite de plusieurs états sahéliens et les luttes territoriales entre seigneurs de la guerre. Il cite notamment la détérioration des conditions de sécurité dans le pays haoussa tant au Nigéria qu’au Niger, où des groupes djihadistes prophétiques ont proliféré et, dans certains cas, assis leur autorité politique. Il relève également que les aérodromes dans le Sahel sont devenus des plaques tournantes pour toutes sortes de trafics, y compris d’êtres humains. Il interpelle le Conseil de sécurité au sujet du Niger en proie à une famine d’une ampleur comparable à celle, catastrophique, du début des années 1980. Or, cette fois, ce pays doit nourrir une population de près de soixante millions d’habitants, au lieu des 7 millions à l’époque. Ce défi est d’autant plus grand que la porte d’entrée régionale qu’est le Sénégal pour l’aide alimentaire et d’autres formes d’assistance humanitaire est tout juste entr’ouverte, le gouvernement sénégalais n’étant guère coopératif, pas plus pour l’acheminement de secours que dans la lutte contre la migration illégale vers l’Europe.

Recommandations

Pour les donators d’aide internationale au Sahel, cette étude contient une recommandation d’ordre général: au cours des vingt à vingt-cinq années à venir, les transitions démographiques dans la région devraient comporter au moins une ou deux réussites exemplaires pouvant servir de réservoir d’expertise locale et de modèles pour la mobilisation communautaire susceptibles de se propager ailleurs. Le Sénégal semble être le meilleur candidat à l’accueil d’un tel effort concerté. Parmi les pays enclavés du Sahel, c’est peut-être encore le cas du Burkina Faso, à condition que ses zones rurales retrouvent paix et sécurité. Au Niger, au Mali et au Tchad, les interventions les plus efficaces seront sans doute celles qui améliorent la situation des femmes, développent à grande échelle les infrastructures dans les villes et forment des agents de santé suffisamment dévoués pour qu’ils acceptent de travailler dans les périphéries urbaines et les camps de réfugiés où les demandes d’éducation, de planification familiale et d’autres services de santé reproductive sont généralement élevées. Voici aussi les recommandations plus spécifiques de notre étude:

Mettre à profit l’urbanisation. Les gouvernements de la région devront redoubler d’efforts pour améliorer le niveau d’éduca- tion des filles et, avec le concours des bailleurs de fonds étrangers, augmenter considérablement les dépenses consacrées à la planning familial et aux autres services de santé reproductive. Ils devront par ailleurs élever le statut administratif de la planification familiale au rang de responsabilité ministérielle et renforcer sa visibil- ité par des campagnes d’information. De surcroît, les administrations chargées de l’éducation nationale et Dans ces villes en expansion, il sera également impératif que l’éducation des filles et la planification familiale sur une base volontaire, ainsi que des services de santé maternelle et infantile, se mettent en place, et que les femmes y aient un accès de plein droit aux emplois, tant dans le secteur privé que public.

Renforcer l’éducation des filles et la planification familiale. Les gouvernements de la région devront redoubler d’efforts pour améliorer le niveau d’éduca- tion des filles et, avec le concours des bailleurs de fonds étrangers, augmenter considérablement les dépenses consacrées à la planning familial et aux autres services de santé reproductive. Ils devront par ailleurs élever le statut administratif de la planification familiale au rang de responsabilité ministérielle et renforcer sa visibil- ité par des campagnes d’information. De surcroît, les administrations chargées de l’éducation nationale et de la santé publique devraient éliminer les obstacles bureaucratiques, traditionnels et religieux à la scolarisa- tion des filles et permettre un accès facile et abordable aux services de planification familiale aux personnes mariées aussi bien que célibataires. La mise à dispo- sition de ces services devrait être décentralisée pour être accessible dans les quartiers urbains comme dans les foyers ruraux ; à ce titre, des agents de santé villa- geois et des cliniques mobiles paraissent particulière- ment bien adaptés aux conditions sahéliennes. Il serait également utile que des organisations professionnelles de la santé créent une bibliothèque en ligne pour ren- dre accessibles des exemples de réussite locales dans les domaines de l’éducation des filles — leur éducation sexuelle et en matière de santé reproductive — et du planning familial.

Travailler avec des chefs religieux et politiques, ainsi que d’autres personnalités publiques; impliquer et informer les hommes. L’utilisation plus générale de contraceptifs modernes est souvent liée à des prises de position publiques de la part de chefs religieux, qui jugent le planning familial compatible avec la foi. Par ailleurs, des études récentes accréditent l’idée que les programmes qui informent et impliquent les hommes et s’appuient sur le soutien de dirigeants locaux ont les plus grandes chances de réussite dans le Sahel. Enfin, depuis des décennies, les communicants de la santé y travaillent déjà avec des producteurs de télévision et de radio, ainsi qu’avec des artistes — en particulier des acteurs connus de feuilletons ou talk-shows populaires — pour mieux diffuser des messages de service public concernant la santé maternelle et infantile, la nutrition, l’éducation sexuelle, le VIH/Sida, les droits des femmes ou le planning familial.

Renforcer les droits des femmes. Dans le Sahel, de grands progrès peuvent être accomplis en protégeant les filles et les femmes contre de multiples formes de discrimination et de violence, et en renforçant leurs droits dans le cadre du mariage. Cet effort commence par l’application des lois nationales déjà existantes, qui interdisent l’excision, les mariages forcés et le mariage précoce, avant l’âge de dix-huit ans. Une fois mariées, les femmes devraient avoir le droit d’obtenir un recours contre la violence conjugale, de demander le divorce et de se voir confier la garde des enfants en cas de séparation, de divorce ou de décès du conjoint. Les femmes devraient aussi jouir d’un plein droit de recours en justice et d’un traitement égal devant les tribunaux aux affaires familiales gérés par l’État ; elles ne devraient pas rester tributaires des jugements rendus par des tribunaux religieux et traditionnels, qui n’ont généralement pas su les protéger, pas plus que leurs enfants, contre des préjudices physiques, psychologiques et économiques. Là où la résistance politique a fait reculer les efforts législatifs visant à accroître les droits des femmes (comme, par exemple, au Mali, comme déjà indiqué), le soutien qui est leur apporté par des coopératives ou des organisations professionnelles ou éducatives peut ouvrir des voies alternatives aux femmes sahéliennes pour accéder à une plus grande autonomie et à des fonctions dirigeantes.

Apporter des services aux minorités marginalisées. Les ministères de la santé et de l’édu- cation devraient veiller à ce que les minorités marginalisées, quel que soit leur isolement géo- graphique ou culturel, bénéficient de leurs pro- grammes de planning familial ou en faveur d’une meilleure éducation des filles et du renforce- ment des droits des femmes. Les expériences antérieures dans d’autres parties du monde portent à croire que les disparités régionales, socio-économiques, ethniques ou de caste en matière de fécondité tendent à se solidifier en des inégalités difficiles à effacer et génératrices d’animosités et de tensions politiques.

Promouvoir des efforts au bénéfice des femmes dans tous les projets de développement ou d’équipement. Qu’ils soient gouvernementaux, privés ou financés par des bail- leurs de fonds étrangers, tous les projets de développement ou d’équipement au Sahel, dans le domaine agricole ou d’autres secteurs économiques, devraient contenir des clauses pour promouvoir une meilleure instruction des filles et des femmes, pour leur aménager un accès plus facile aux services de santé reproductive et pour renforcer leurs droits et leur indépendance financière. Aucun projet soutenu par des donateurs internationaux ne devrait permettre aux pouvoirs publics, partis politiques ou chefs religieux ou traditionnels d’entraver l’émancipation des femmes.

Gérer les tensions autour du partage des res- sources entre agriculteurs et pasteurs. Dans une région aride de plus en plus peuplée, l’avenir des moyens de subsistance agricoles et pastoraux dépendra du développement de l’irrigation, de l’intensification de l’agropastoralisme (soit une intégration plus poussée des utilisations agricoles et pastorales des terres) et de l’accès aux marchés urbains. En vue de ce futur plus peuplé, les gouvernements sahéliens devraient limiter le nombre des grands propriétaires de troupeaux de bétail ne résidant pas sur leurs terres de pâturage, protéger les pâturages de l’empiètement par des agriculteurs et aider les éleveurs à lutter contre le vol de bétail. En parallèle, les pouvoirs publics devraient favoriser l’industrie agro-alimentaire de transformation génératrice de valeur ajoutée, promouvoir la coopération entre agriculteurs et éleveurs et améliorer les moyens de transport et voies d’accès aux marchés urbains.

Protéger les acquis du développement par des investissements dans la sécurité locale. Des groupes djihadistes tendent à se multiplier dans le Sahel et à étendre leur emprise. De ce fait, les poches géographiques où des responsables locaux et une majorité de la population soutiennent l’éducation des filles et le renforcement des droits des femmes deviennent les cibles de choix des militants armés. Aussi, ces communautés locales et leurs dirigeants devraient-ils bénéficier d’une protection spéciale par la police ou les unités antiterroristes.

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Report

Nov 4, 2021

What future for the Western Sahel?

By Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith

The Western Sahel is in a demographic impasse. To work their way out of this dilemma, Sahelian governments must shift a significant part of their development focus and funding to policies and programs aimed at preventing adolescent marriages and childbearing, promoting girls’ education, securing women’s participation in public- and private-sector workplaces, and achieving small, healthy, well-educated families.

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Asat quoted in Radio Free Europe on asylum-seeker from China fleeing Ukraine amidst Russian invasion

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Plitsas in Voice of America on Afghan evacuation

Atlantic Council — Wed, 02 Mar 2022 15:14:00 +0000

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On March 2, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Alex Plitsas was cited in an article in Voice of America titled “US Urges Taliban to Allow Free Passage of Afghans.” Plitsas estimates that 10,000 Afghans have escaped the Taliban in the last six months and that NGOs have spent approximately $100 million in the evacuation process.

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Qaddour quoted in the New York Times on correlations between Middle Eastern and Ukrainian refugee crisis

Atlantic Council — Sat, 26 Feb 2022 14:18:00 +0000

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Qaddour joins What Are You Going To Do With That to discuss the experience of being an immigrant and her lessons from policy and research

Atlantic Council — Thu, 17 Feb 2022 14:53:00 +0000

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Evacuating noncombatants from Ukraine will be a mess. The West needs to ditch the blame game this time.

Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 16 Feb 2022 16:46:39 +0000

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are among the most complex non-lethal operations the United States carries out. They call on US military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and homeland-security capabilities to swiftly get civilians away from an active war zone or natural disaster to safety—prioritizing US citizens and those of allies.

Scenes of displaced Americans, allies, and refugees fleeing a possible further Russian invasion of Ukraine will cause outrage and heartbreak. As we saw with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan last August, some in the news media and political partisans will cast blame on their favorite political punching bags.

This would be wrong.

The Biden administration has been planning for the consequences of an offensive since November. But as a national security professional who was involved in most US NEOs over the past twenty years, I can confidently state: Even with the best planning in the world, a Russian invasion of Ukraine, if it happens, will result in images of chaos on cable news and social media. But it’s crucial to keep in mind that this chaos is the responsibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Somewhere between seven thousand and thirty thousand Americans are currently in Ukraine, and although they’ve been told to leave immediately—because US forces will not evacuate them if Russia moves in—many will likely stay until the tanks start rolling, if previous NEOs are a guide. The United States has sent six thousand troops to Poland to help receive Americans and others who make it that far.

Within hours of any Russian missiles landing and tanks crossing the border, a mass migration will begin. Many Ukrainians will head west, likely in harsh winter weather, toward western Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Most people will have only the clothes they wear and what they can carry or fit into a car. Airports will shut down, roads will be jammed, and supplies of gasoline and diesel will dry up. Some drivers will have no choice but to abandon their vehicles by the roadside, and food deliveries will stop.

None of this chaos is unique to an evacuation from Ukraine. But it will be more challenging than previous evacuations for five reasons.

First, a Russian military operation will shut down Ukraine’s airports, especially if it includes, as Atlantic Council experts predict, precision long-range missile attacks. If any airports remain open, Putin would probably be unwilling to shoot down a US evacuation flight during a Russian offensive, but recklessness cannot be ruled out. Therefore, most people will try to travel overland.

Second, winter weather complicates humanitarian operations. Snow and mud cause civilian vehicles to get bogged down more than military ones. Most previous NEOs happened in desert countries or in the summer, such as during Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. If temperatures stay below freezing, those fleeing outdoors face health hazards which people in temperate climates do not. That not only endangers people’s health but also threatens deliveries of water and other necessities.

Third, Russian cyberattacks, which will occur in concert with a ground offensive, are likely to shut down much, if not almost all, of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Water treatment plants could falter, electricity could be cut, and millions of people would be forced to shelter in place if they don’t head west.

Fourth, Russia’s clearly documented disinformation campaign could sow disunity among Western partners in an effort to slow or limit the Western response. In the United States, Russian disinformation could force the administration to spend time getting sufficient congressional support for assistance efforts. Meanwhile, the reluctance of some European countries to help Ukrainian refugees could leave many in dire straits—or force the Ukrainian government to expend scarce resources on internally displaced people instead of defending Ukrainian territory from invading Russian troops.

Fifth, the United States has suffered a brain drain of expertise when it comes to NEOs. Operations of the scale required to get thousands of Americans out of eastern Poland are relatively rare. Many of the most experienced US diplomats and planners left during the Trump administration, when their expertise was disparaged, and many felt pressured to quit.

There’s still much the United States can do to take care of its citizens and reduce the widespread suffering of a potential Russian invasion. Humanitarian aid will need to flow generously to millions of Ukrainians whose livelihoods will be torn away until they can re-establish themselves. The world’s refugee assistance funds are already low as a result of addressing the needs of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, as well as war-torn Yemen. Any parts of Ukraine not under Russian assault or occupation—for example, around the western city of Lviv—could serve as Ukrainian government distribution points for that aid.

Otherwise, we are looking at the prospect of tent cities in eastern Poland until thousands of refugees can be assimilated elsewhere. Those populations should be relocated as quickly as possible, because while a Russian occupation of Ukraine can be reversed, it will not be reversed overnight.

For its part, United States will need to accept its own share of refugees, as it has done many times before. Indeed, history shows that the American experience is enriched by refugees escaping oppression to find freedom.

Another vital step for the United States and the West is to show unity against Russian aggression. Astonishingly, some current and former US officials and media figures seem unaware that by blaming anyone other than Putin for this chaos, they’re actually playing into Russia’s disinformation campaign. Somewhat ironically, Vladimir Lenin himself is believed to have written about Westerners who “will close their eyes” to “reality and will thus transform themselves into men who are deaf, dumb and blind.”

A Russian invasion of Ukraine will test Western resolve and values, including the coordination of a necessary humanitarian response. But the Russian disinformation campaign is an equally important test: Western leaders and the public need to understand that in a further invasion of Ukraine, Putin—and no one else—would be to blame for any chaos that follows.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior advisor with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice. Prior to joining the Council, he was the deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

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The Afghan refugee crisis: How to resurrect the global refugee resettlement coalition

Rory Stewart — Tue, 15 Feb 2022 17:00:00 +0000

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Six months after the fall of Kabul, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated at an alarming rate. The threat of famine and economic collapse looms over the entire country. Consequently, many Afghans are fleeing both these appalling conditions and the oppressive Taliban that now control the country.

However, Afghan asylum seekers will be facing difficult circumstances even after they leave their country. The global resettlement order remains severely atrophied after the refugee crisis of the mid-2010s, leaving it unable to face the challenge in a rise in Afghan refugees or for other future refugee crises. As the humanitarian tragedy in Afghanistan intensifies, a new global refugee resettlement coalition has to be formed to address the escalating refugee crisis.

The primary objectives of this report, written by Rory Stewart, Senior Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute and former UK development minister, are to:

outline the ways in which states have already attempted to respond to the Afghan refugee crisis
discuss realistic and measured ways to address the refugee crisis without undermining border security
improve transatlantic and global coordination in reinvigorating standards on refugee resettlement across the world.

This report outlines how the refugee resettlement coalition can be restructured. Beginning with the United States, United Kingdom, and coalition of likely EU member states (such as France, Germany, Benelux, and the Nordic countries), these countries can resettle approximately 320,000 refugees annually. This would happen if each country committed to taking in 0.05% of their respective populations each year: 33,026 for the United Kingdom, 166,400 for the United States, and 120,000 for the likely coalition of willing EU member states.

The report also explains how the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly since the fall of Kabul, why Afghans are leaving their home country in increasing numbers, and why the international community must reinvigorate the global resettlement coalition to address this crisis and future refugee crises.

Event Recap Feb 3, 2022

Event recap: Women’s role in the future of Afghanistan

By Atlantic Council

On January 19, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the US-Afghan Women’s Council co-hosted a conversation on women’s role in the future of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Civil Society

SouthAsiaSource Feb 1, 2022

Afghanistan needs a political roadmap to reduce economic hardship

By Omar Samad

Afghans in general are aware that inside the country the Taliban are in the driver’s seat, but the vehicle cannot go far without having other major constituencies onboard as part of a new social contract.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Dec 13, 2021

Afghanistan is about to collapse. Here’s what the US must do about it.

By John F. Campbell, Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, James Dobbins, Hugo Llorens, P. Michael McKinley, John Nicholson, Ronald E. Neumann, Richard Olson, David Petraeus, and Earl Anthony Wayne

Eleven former US ambassadors and commanders issue an urgent warning to Washington and its allies.

Afghanistan Civil Society

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Cooper in Inkstick: Planning for a Ukrainian refugee crisis

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Feb 2022 14:08:00 +0000

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On February 11, Cooper was published in Inkstick advocating for the creation of a comprehensive Ukrainian refugee strategy. In light of the potential for millions of Ukrainians to become refugees if war breaks out, Cooper argues that the West needs to be ready to assist with humanitarian aid.

“Refugee resettlement is a complex process, particularly at the potential scale of millions of refugees, but it is doable with proper planning and coordination between the countries and organizations involved. While the United States is protected by geography from the immediate consequences of war in Ukraine, it has an opportunity to help Ukrainians and its European partners by being proactive in its approach to a refugee crisis. Doing so will help to prevent severe problems further down the road.”

More about our expert

Former staff

Evan Cooper

Former Junior Fellow, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Africa National Security

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Warrick joins NBC News to discuss the Afghan refugee crisis and the SIV program

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Feb 2022 20:25:00 +0000

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