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The Kremlin is cutting Russia’s last information ties to the outside world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 15 Aug 2024 20:02:49 +0000

On August 8, millions of Russian internet users found that they were no longer able to access YouTube. This disruption was widely interpreted as the latest step toward blocking the popular video sharing site in Russia, where it has served since 2022 as one of the last remaining platforms connecting Russian audiences to the outside world.

Russians first began reporting significantly slower YouTube loading speeds in the weeks preceding the August shutdown. Officials in Moscow claimed this was the result of technical problems, but the Kremlin has also recently signaled its mounting dissatisfaction with YouTube. In July, Russian media regulator Roskomnadzor called on Google’s CEO to restore over 200 pro-Kremlin YouTube channels that had been blocked for violations. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry has accused the platform of carrying out “the political directives of Washington.”

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The recent crackdown on YouTube is the latest milestone in a war against free speech in Russia that began when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. During the 1990s, the Russian media sector had briefly flourished amid unprecedented freedoms. One of Putin’s first major acts as president was to reverse this trend and reassert Kremlin control over Russia’s mainstream media.

The Russian authorities have continued to expand their campaign against the country’s shrinking independent media sector for much of the past two decades. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin moved to block or restrict major Western social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. These measures were imposed in parallel to Orwellian new restrictions banning any references to “war” and forcing Russian media outlets to refer to the invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation.”

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Recent steps to limit access to YouTube are seen as somewhat risky due to the video sharing platform’s status as the most popular social media site in Russia. Indeed, it came as no surprise when the apparent shutdown of YouTube sparked significant alarm and anger on Russian social media. Notably, no genuine alternative currently exists in Russia. The Kremlin has promoted similar domestic platforms such as VK Video and RuTube, but these options have not been able to rival the popularity or audience reach of YouTube itself.

There are additional indications that the Kremlin may now be seeking to strengthen its control over the information space and further cut Russia off from the outside world. On August 9, Roskomnadzor blocked access to Signal, a messaging app that allows for end-to-end encrypted communications. Reports also continue to circulate that the Kremlin is preparing to take similar steps against messenger platform WhatsApp.

Recent measures to prevent Russians from accessing YouTube represent the latest escalation in the Kremlin’s campaign to dominate the domestic information space and eliminate all independent media in today’s Russia. Over the past twenty-four years, Vladimir Putin has created a powerful propaganda machine that has proved instrumental in legitimizing his own increasingly dictatorial rule and mobilizing public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Popular social media platforms like YouTube remain outside of Moscow’s control and therefore pose a significant threat to the Kremlin censors. With Ukrainian troops now advancing inside Russia itself, it would seem that this threat can no longer be tolerated.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group.

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

3. What role can other countries in the region play?

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries.

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution.

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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The UN finally advances a convention on cybercrime . . . and no one is happy about it

Lisandra Novo — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 20:47:22 +0000

On August 8, a contentious saga on drastically divergent views of how to address cybercrime finally came to a close after three years of treaty negotiations at the United Nations (UN). The Ad Hoc Committee set up to draft the convention on cybercrime adopted it by consensus, and the relief in the room was palpable. The member states, the committee, and especially the chair, Algerian Ambassador Faouzia Boumaiza-Mebarki, worked for a long time to come to an agreement. If adopted by the UN General Assembly later this year, as is expected, it will be the first global, legally binding convention on cybercrime. However, this landmark achievement should not be celebrated, as it poses significant risks to human rights, cybersecurity, and national security.

How did this happen? Russia, long opposed to the Council of Europe’s 2001 Budapest Convention on cybercrime, began this process in 2017. Then, in 2019, Russia, along with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus, presented a resolution to develop a global treaty. Despite strong opposition from the United States and European states, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2019, by a vote of seventy-nine in favor and sixty against (with thirty abstentions), that officially began the process. Already, it was clear that the member states did not share one vision. Indeed, they could not even agree on a name for the convention until last week. What they ended up with is a mouthful: “Draft United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes.”

This exceedingly long name reveals one of the biggest problems with this convention: its scope. At its heart, this convention is intended to allow law enforcement from different countries to cooperate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime, which costs trillions of dollars globally each year. However, the convention covers much more than the typical cybercrimes that come to mind, such as ransomware, and includes crimes committed using technology, which reflects the different views as to what constitutes cybercrime. As if that were not broad enough, Russia, China, and other states succeeded in pushing for negotiations on an additional protocol that would expand the list of crimes even further. Additionally, under the convention, states parties are to cooperate on “collecting, obtaining, preserving, and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime”—which in the text is defined as a crime that is punishable by a maximum of four years or more in prison or a “more serious penalty,” such as the death penalty.

Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation.

In Russia, for example, association with the “international LGBT movement” can lead to extremism charges, such as the crime of displaying “extremist group symbols,” like the rainbow flag. A first conviction carries a penalty of up to fifteen days in detention, but a repeat offense carries a penalty of up to four years. That means a repeat offense would qualify as a “serious crime” under the cybercrime convention and be eligible for assistance from law enforcement in other jurisdictions that may possess electronic evidence relevant to the investigation—including traffic, subscriber, and even content data. Considering how much of modern life is carried out digitally, there will be some kind of electronic evidence for almost every serious crime under any domestic legislation. Even the UN’s own human rights experts cautioned against this broad definition.

Further, under the convention, states parties are obligated to establish laws in their domestic system to “compel” service providers to “collect or record” real-time traffic or content data. Many of the states behind the original drive to establish this convention have long sought this power over private firms. At the same time, states parties are free to adopt laws that keep requests to compel traffic and content data confidential—cloaking these actions in secrecy. Meanwhile, grounds for a country to refuse a cooperation request are limited to instances such as where it would be against that country’s “sovereignty,” security, or other “essential” interest, or if it would be against that country’s own laws. The convention contains a vague caveat that nothing in it should be interpreted as an obligation to cooperate if a country “has substantial grounds” to believe the request is made to prosecute or punish someone for their “sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”

Russia claimed that such basic safeguards, which do offer some protection in the example regarding LGBT activity as “extremist,” were merely an opportunity for some countries to “abuse” the opportunity to reject cooperation requests. Those safeguards, conversely, could also be abused by the very same states that opposed them. The Iranian delegation, for its part, proposed a vote to delete that provision, as well as all other human rights safeguards and references to gender, on the day the text was adopted. These provisions had already been weakened significantly throughout the negotiation process and only survived thanks to the firm stance taken by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, the European Union, Mexico, and others that drew a red line and refused to accept any more changes.

The possible negative consequences of this convention are not limited to human rights but can seriously threaten global cybersecurity and national security. The International Chamber of Commerce, a global business organization representing millions of companies, warned during negotiations that “people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge and skills necessary” could be forced “to break or circumvent security systems.” Worse, they could even be compelled to disclose “previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code.” Microsoft agreed. Its representative, Nemanja Malisevic, added that this treaty will allow “for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states” and for “malicious actors” to use a UN treaty to “force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information,” which could “expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets. Malisevic concluded that this “should terrify us all.”

Similarly, independent media organizations called for states to reject the convention, which the International Press Institute has called a “surveillance treaty.” Civil society organizations including Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, Human Rights Watch, and many others have also long been ringing the alarm bell. They continue to do so as the final version of the convention adopted by the committee has failed to adequately address their concerns.

Given the extent and cross-border nature of cybercrime, it is evident that a global treaty is both necessary and urgent—on that, the international community is in complete agreement. Unfortunately, this treaty, perhaps a product of sunk-cost fallacy thinking or agreed to under duress for fear of an even worse version, does not solve the problems the international community faces. If the UN General Assembly adopts the text and the required forty member states ratify it so that it comes into force, experts are right to warn that governments intent on engaging in surveillance will have the veneer of UN legitimacy stamped on their actions. Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation. Nor should they willingly open the door to weakening their own national security or global cybersecurity.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council specializing in law and technology.

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I was imprisoned and tortured by the Taliban for protesting gender apartheid in Afghanistan

Zholia Parsi — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 18:59:39 +0000

On August 15, 2021, Kabul fell to the Taliban. Zholia Parsi, who was in Kabul at the time, had spent fourteen years as a teacher before joining the last republican government of Afghanistan as a member of the Supreme Council for Reconciliation. After the Taliban took over, Parsi helped create the “Spontaneous Women’s Protest Movement of Afghanistan” to demonstrate against rising gender apartheid in her country. For this, the Taliban imprisoned and tortured her, a story she recounts below.

The last day I went to the office was August 15. On that day, I was dismissed from my job and told that the Taliban had entered the city. Out on the streets, the city was gripped with terror: people running everywhere, cars stuck in traffic, policemen removing their uniforms, and parents frantically trying to pick their children up from school and rush to their houses. When I finally got home, I found my daughters in despair and the neighbors hoisting a Taliban flag over their gates. Overnight our lives had changed.

It took me three days to venture outside after the Taliban’s military takeover. With a friend, I walked through the Shahr-e Naw neighborhood and posted on social media, encouraging other women to come out, so that the Taliban could not deny our existence. Nearly three weeks later, on September 3, I participated in the first protest at Fawara Aab, or “Water Fountain,” square in Kabul. As I published photos and videos on social networks, I began receiving messages from friends seeking to join. I created a WhatsApp chat group and, after adding those I trusted, we organized another protest the following day. This time, however, the Taliban were prepared and quickly suppressed our rally, beating people and firing tear gas into the air. Most protesters dispersed but some of us continued on to another location, growing along the way to include men and women from the public. We felt so energized we decided to organize more protests.

With no previous experience in organizing protests, I learned quickly that it was a lot of work. We began coordinating through the WhatsApp chat group I had started while also establishing media contacts and trying to get our voices heard inside and outside the country. At first, we were a loose coalition of many different protest groups, at least fifty, but soon we operated under one large umbrella group, united as a movement in our opposition against gender apartheid, tyranny, restrictions, and the exclusion of women.

I was held in solitary confinement in a damp room for nearly two months and routinely interrogated and tortured for a confession.

Taliban members responded to our growing protests with ever more suppression and violence. They knocked us to the ground, punched and kicked us, and destroyed our phones and property. Many of us were detained for days and subjected to threats and insults. Some were imprisoned and tortured for longer. Until I was kidnapped and imprisoned by the Taliban, I participated in thirty-eight protests against its oppressive apartheid regime.

Over time, Taliban intelligence infiltrated our organization, and the regime knew about our protests before they even took place. On September 19, 2023, I received a call alerting me that the Taliban had kidnapped a fellow organizer along with her husband and child, and warning me that I could be next. I fled my home that day, leaving my daughters with my mother for their safety. But when I secretly returned a week later to attend a funeral, I was accosted on my street by a man who shouted, “It’s her.” Within minutes, twelve Taliban military vehicles arrived. The men put a black hood over my head, forced me into a car, and took me to a police station with my hands tightly and painfully bound for hours.

On arrival, they pointed a gun at me and demanded the password for my mobile phone. I resisted at first but relented when they threatened to torture and arrest my children. They threw me into a room where I sat, worried for my fellow female protesters who were unaware that my phone was now in Taliban hands. Half an hour later, the person who arrested me entered the room with my son’s and daughter’s phones. When I saw my nineteen-year-old son’s unlocked phone, I realized that he too had been arrested and I collapsed to the ground.

I was held in solitary confinement in a damp room for nearly two months and routinely interrogated and tortured for a confession. They would show me videos of my son, wearing a prison uniform and growing weaker by the day. I later learned that he was also being held in solitary confinement. Twice during my imprisonment I was hospitalized, once due to severe pain and swelling, the other because I broke down after witnessing the suicide of a young boy who took his life after being tortured.

Still, I was lucky compared to other prisoners, who were subjected to whipping, electric shocks, and forced starvation. They didn’t torture me in these ways. Instead, they inflicted psychological torture, placing my room across from the men’s torture chamber where I lay awake listening to their screams for days. During my interrogation sessions, I was forced to sit upside down with my hands tied to the arms of the chair. At one session, I overheard the Taliban interrogators say, “If she is released, she will talk about this. After all, she is the leader of these movements.” I realized then that they were afraid of my voice, just as all apartheid regimes fear the voices of their citizens.

On the forty-fifth day, I was allowed to see my family for five minutes. They told me they had been searching for me and submitted endless petitions to the Taliban before the regime finally confirmed my detention. This was the first time I was allowed to see my imprisoned son, though only for five minutes.

About eighteen days later, I was returned to the general cells, where other women prisoners recounted their stories and those of other friends, including one who repeatedly tried to escape and fought fiercely every time Taliban soldiers took her for interrogation. She was eventually released after nine months.

I too was desperate for release and to see my family, but I never showed my despair to the prison guards. Even when they punched and kicked me—or worse, when they called my son “de caper zoi” (son of the infidel), I kept my composure. No one was willing to bail me out of prison because they feared becoming targets as well. Eventually, however, a former Taliban governor agreed to be my guarantor, and I was released into my family’s custody.

Although free, I was confined to my house, the streets of my city closed off to me. Taliban fighters kept a constant watch on me and my home. They also offered me a proposition: Spy for them, and I could live comfortably wherever I wanted in Afghanistan. Betraying my homeland and the freedom of its women was never an option for me.

Ultimately, I was forced to accept exile. Late one evening, I received an email notifying me of my transfer outside the country. I cried through the night, mourning the loss of my home and homeland. When I crossed the border out of Afghanistan, I screamed in anguish. I considered staying behind and secretly working under an assumed identity, but it was not a viable choice for my family.

I am now a stranger in a foreign land, without a home and without an identity. I count the minutes until I can return to Afghanistan and witness the fall of the Taliban. In exile, my greatest hope is that our protests, our sacrifices, our rebellions were not in vain.

Zholia Parsi is a member of the leadership of the “Spontaneous Women’s Protest Movement of Afghanistan” and was imprisoned and tortured by the Taliban for protesting against gender apartheid. This article was edited from an interview with Parsi by Nayera Kohistani and Mursal Sayas.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

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Belarus’s political prisoners must not be forgotten

Hanna Liubakova — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 17:32:28 +0000

As Belarus marked the fourth anniversary of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential election that sparked nationwide protects and a brutal crackdown, the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom all unveiled new sanctions targeting the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In a joint statement that was also signed by Canada, the three called on the Belarusian authorities to “immediately and unconditionally” release the country’s almost 1,400 political prisoners.

These steps are encouraging and indicate welcome Western awareness of the repression that continues to define the political climate in today’s Belarus. Nevertheless, there is still a sense that not nearly enough is being done by the international community to challenge the impunity enjoyed by Lukashenka and members of his regime.

These concerns were amplified recently when the largest prisoner swap between the Kremlin and the West since the Cold War went ahead without featuring any Belarusian political prisoners. Lukashenka himself was closely involved in the complex negotiations behind the exchange. The Belarusian dictator agreed to free German national Rico Krieger, who was being held in Minsk on terrorism charges, as part of efforts to convince the German government to release Russian secret service assassin Vadim Krasikov.

Many have questioned why prominent Belarusian pro-democracy leader Maria Kalesnikava, who had previously lived for many years in Germany, was not also freed as part of the trade. Kalesnikava was jailed amid nationwide protests following Lukashenka’s rigged 2020 election. One of the figureheads of the anti-Lukashenka protest movement, she has reportedly been suffering from deteriorating health for the past year and a half. Similar questions were also asked regarding fellow political prisoners Ales Bialiatski, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and Ihar Losik, a prominent blogger and journalist for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.

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Four years since the sham ballot that sparked the biggest protests of Lukashenka’s three-decade reign, he appears more comfortable than ever with the idea of holding large numbers of political prisoners as hostages. This must change. With no regime-linked Belarusians in Western custody who are anything like as valuable as Krasikov was to Putin, other approaches are clearly needed to increase the pressure on Lukashenka and convince him to release political prisoners.

Economic measures can be used to target the largely state-controlled Belarusian economy, but this is more likely to have an impact as part of a long-term strategy. One alternative approach would be to engage third parties such as China, which has considerable influence in Minsk. Earlier diplomatic efforts succeeded in securing the release of US citizen Vital Shkliarau, indicating that negotiations of this nature can yield results.

Finding the right formula to keep up the pressure on individual members of the Lukashenka regime is crucial. At present, comparatively few of those involved in repressive measures are subject to international sanctions. For example, I was recently sentenced in absentia by a Belarusian court to ten years in prison alongside nineteen other independent Belarusian analysts and journalists. The judge in our case has a history of handing down lengthy sentences to prominent opposition figures, but has yet to be sanctioned.

During the past four years, only 261 Belarusians have been placed on the EU sanctions list. While the work of sanctions teams is commendable, their capacity is limited. Past experience has also demonstrated how sanctions can be sabotaged, as was the case in 2020 when Cyprus was accused of blocking the introduction of new restrictions against Belarus. There is also room to improve cooperation between Western partners, with a view to developing a more unified approach to sanctions.

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Strikingly, the quantity of Belarusians currently facing Western sanctions is far less the almost 1,400 political prisoners in the country’s prisons. According to human rights groups, tens of thousands of Belarusians in total have been detained in recent years for political reasons. Behind these arrests and prosecutions stands an army of enablers including government officials, security personnel, and judges. The vast majority of these people have yet to be held accountable by the international community for their role in the repressive policies of the Belarusian authorities.

There are some indications that Western policymakers are looking to broaden the scope of sanctions and increase individual accountability. However, while the recent round of sanctions included new measures targeting officials responsible for regime propaganda, other representatives of the Belarusian state media received international accreditation to cover the Olympics in Paris.

The West already has powerful tools at its disposal that can realistically make Belarusian officials consider the consequences of their actions. Standard personal sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes go far beyond mere symbolism and are capable of creating problems that can have far-reaching practical implications in everyday life. However, more leverage is required in order to maintain the pressure on the regime and on the individuals responsible for specific abuses.

Looking ahead, the West needs to make the issue of political prisoners far more uncomfortable for the entire Lukashenka regime. There is no single solution to this problem; instead, a range of options should be explored including broad economic restrictions, personal sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Crucially, sanctions should be applied to thousands of officials rather than just a few hundred. The end goal must be to significantly raise the costs of the repressive policies pursued by Lukashenka and all those who enable his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

As sixteen of Putin’s prisoners come home, don’t forget the millions of hostages who remain

Mikhail Zygar — Fri, 02 Aug 2024 17:35:40 +0000

I never doubted that the United States would not abandon Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan in their time of need, but I did not expect their release to happen so quickly. My sources in Moscow did not believe that an agreement could be reached before the elections in November or even before the inauguration of the new US president next January.

I am very happy that some of the hostages, including Russian citizens who were captured solely because of their honesty and courage, have been freed. They stood against the war in Ukraine and fought for freedom. Until the moment they were released, I feared that some of them would end their lives in prison.

Who gained freedom thanks to these efforts?

One is seventy-one-year-old Oleg Orlov, a legendary Soviet human rights defender and one of the leaders of Memorial, an organization that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. Orlov publicly called the Putin regime totalitarian and fascist, and for this, he was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison this year.

There is also Sasha Skochilenko, a thirty-three-year-old artist from St. Petersburg. At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she made a small art performance in which she replaced price tags in a grocery store with anti-war slogans. For this, she was sentenced to seven years in prison. Her imprisonment posed a direct threat to her life: Sasha has a heart defect and bipolar disorder, and in the conditions of a Russian prison, she could have died.

Another example is the schoolboy Kevin Lik, who is now nineteen years old but was arrested while still a minor. He was accused of photographing military equipment and sending the photos to someone abroad. He was accused of state treason. Obviously, the Russian authorities themselves did not believe that a schoolboy could be a spy, and in the end, he was sentenced to only four years in prison, whereas in Russia, espionage usually results in much longer sentences. However, this is practically a child, and he was sentenced to four years in prison.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent activist and journalist whom Russian special services tried to poison, sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Ilya Yashin, probably the most famous opposition figure in Russia after Navalny’s death, sentenced to eight-and-a-half years.

Now Evan, Paul, Oleg, Sasha, Kevin, Vladimir, Ilya, and other hostages of Putin’s regime have gained freedom.

But even on such a day, I cannot stop thinking about the thousands of people who remain in Putin’s prisons. About the poet Zhenya Berkovich. About the politician Alexei Gorinov, who protested against the war from the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is now dying in prison. About Daniil Kholodny, an information technology specialist who was imprisoned for eight years for creating a website for now-deceased opposition leader Alexei Navalny. About thousands of other people.

I do not call them all “hostages” by chance.

I am sure that most people living in Russia feel like hostages. About twenty-five years ago, power in Russia was seized by a gang of terrorists led by Vladimir Putin. All these years, they have been terrorizing the country’s population, imprisoning people for any disobedience, teaching citizens to think that resistance is impossible and useless, doing everything to make Russians develop Stockholm syndrome. It is impossible to help all of them; it is impossible to exchange millions of people. But it is important to remember that thousands of hostages are sitting in Putin’s prisons. And over the years, Putin has successfully turned the whole country into a gulag. And many people feel like hostages, even if they are not behind bars.

Mikhail Zygar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russia’s only independent news television channel, Dozhd (TVRain). He was recently sentenced in absentia by a Moscow court to eight and a half years in prison for criticizing the Russian army.

A version of this article originally appeared on Zygar’s Substack, the Last Pioneer.

The post As sixteen of Putin’s prisoners come home, don’t forget the millions of hostages who remain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A violent crackdown has put Bangladesh at a crossroads

Ali Riaz — Fri, 02 Aug 2024 13:36:40 +0000

After eleven days of internet blackout, several days of continuous curfew, and a complete shutdown of offices, the Bangladesh government has started to ease some restrictions hoping that it has quelled the popular mobilization that has rocked the country since July 18. But protests have continued and students and people from various walks of life are now staging demonstrations across the country.

At least two hundred people have been killed and thousands more injured in protests that included law enforcement firing on protesters, as Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government face the most serious popular challenge of the past decade. Many Bangladeshis have been arrested, and cases against thousands of people have been filed.

Two weeks of heightened violence has left visible damage to property in cities across the country. Burned buildings stand as testimonies to anger and mayhem, but what remains unknown is the exact number of deaths, injuries, and missing. The extent of the lethal force used by members of law enforcement agencies is unprecedented in the history of the country, which has all too often experienced bouts of political violence since its inception in 1971.

Despite the claim of a gradual return to normalcy, an overwhelming number of police and soldiers are patrolling the streets of major cities, and a shoot-on-sight order is still in place for curfew violators. The government is on edge, economic activity has stalled, and many citizens are in a state of shock and uncertain about what will come next. For Bangladesh watchers, the question is whether Hasina has weathered the political storm or if the current situation is a larger tempest in the making.

How did it begin?

This episode of protest began in early July as peaceful student demonstrations demanding reform of the quota system in public service. This quota system, which reserved 56 percent of government jobs to various categories, was widely considered by students to be discriminatory and was allegedly used by the government as a means of patronage dispensation. The system was scrapped in 2018 after students launched a movement against it, but it was reinstated by Bangladesh’s High Court in June 2024. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court suspended the verdict, scheduling a hearing for August 6. However, students demanded that the system be reformed by enacting a law. The government insisted that there was nothing it could do while the issue is being litigated. The students felt that this was a stealthy way of reinstating the system.

The situation took an ominous turn after activists aligned with the ruling party swooped in on the demonstrators as they protested Hasina’s comments at a press conference on July 14. In that press conference, Hasina likened the demonstrators with collaborators of the Pakistani army during the war of independence in 1971. As the quota system reserves a percentage of government jobs for the descendants of war of independence veterans, Hasina portrayed opposition to the policy as demeaning to veterans. In the following days, the students organized street protests and called for a general strike, which was confronted with force by police and ruling party activists, leading to the deaths of some students. On July 16, the government closed all educational institutions for an indefinite period.

The situation further deteriorated on July 18, as thousands of protesters joined the students on the street; at least twenty-five people died throughout the country and various public buildings were set ablaze in the capital and elsewhere. The government stopped services. Then the government backtracked and offered to negotiate, but by then the protests had transcended the quota issue.

On July 19, demonstrations engulfed the entire country. The number of deaths, the extent of the spread of protests, and the ferocity of police response made it one of the worst days in the history of the country. Curfew was imposed, the military was called in, a shoot-on-sight order was issued, and internet and broadband services were completely shut down. Yet the violence continued for days, and the death toll continued to mount.

In the meantime, the government met a delegation of the agitating students, and the Supreme Court voided the High Court verdict, issuing guidance to drastically reduce the quota to only 7 percent. However, the government resorted to heavy-handed measures, including allegedly abducting six student leaders of the movement and detaining them without charges. While detained, the student leaders issued a video message on July 28 calling off the movement, but other leaders continued the organize protests.

A perfect storm?

The peaceful student protest transformed into an antigovernment upsurge because of simmering discontent among younger Bangladeshis, as well as in a large segment of the wider society. Economic and political disenfranchisement drove the youth. The economic growth they have heard about for a long time seems to have left them behind. They see very little prospect of a decent job while they witness unbridled corruption and the extravagant lifestyle of a new wealthy class. According to official accounts, unemployment among youth is 15.74 percent and at least 41 percent of youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are not in school, employed, or engaged in job training.

Bangladeshi youth were supposed to be the kingmakers in a free and fair electoral process, the role their predecessors played in the election of 2008. But that opportunity was taken away through fraudulent elections. The government’s disregard for their demands regarding quota reform was symptomatic of a system that cares little for them. Violence perpetrated by the student wing of the ruling party was the instigation that unleashed the anger within the student community.

As for the larger population, resentments originating from rampant corruption by the cronies of the ruling party, impunity enjoyed by party henchmen, utter disregard to the sufferings of the common people, and concentration of power at the hands of one person—Hasina—all came together.

While the regime has a support base, it is bereft of moral legitimacy due to rigged elections. Increasingly, the government also lacked performance legitimacy as the development narrative has been unraveling since summer 2022. Skyrocketing inflation and dwindling foreign reserves have put the government in a precarious situation. In the past decade, Hasina has increasingly relied on force, leading many international organizations, including the Varieties of Democracy Institute, to describe Bangladesh as an autocracy.

What is next for Hasina?

This week, the city streets in Dhaka were filled with cars and buses, and shops and offices are being opened once again. A semblance of normalcy may return in the short run. But the political ground has shifted, and the possibility of a return to the status quo is unlikely. As such, the country is standing at a crossroads.

The number of deaths and the extent of police actions have laid bare the fact that the ruling party and Hasina are entirely dependent on brute force. The upheaval appears to have shaken the regime’s sense of invincibility.

By creating a narrative that her government is facing “terrorists,” Hasina is trying to gain sympathy and tacit support from the international community, or at least their silence. The international community, however, should see through this charade and raise its voice against the gross violations of human rights by a regime that wants to stay in power without a popular mandate.

So, what’s next? Dubbed “Asia’s Iron Lady,” Hasina may double down on more persecution and arrests in an attempt to stem further unrest. This may lead to a closed autocracy in Bangladesh. Alternatively, as discontent continues to grow and demands for her resignation become louder, the country may erupt.

Ali Riaz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center and a distinguished professor at Illinois State University.

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Welcome home, Evan

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 22:08:16 +0000

I released the following statement today regarding the news of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich’s release from imprisonment in Russia:

We at the Atlantic Council are overjoyed and relieved that Evan has been released after 491 days of wrongful imprisonment in Russia. This is a great day for Evan, his family, and his colleagues at the Wall Street Journal, who worked tirelessly to secure his release. However, it doesn’t diminish our need to speak out against Russia’s crimes not only against Evan but against free speech more broadly.

As Almar Latour, Wall Street Journal publisher and Dow Jones CEO, said at the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards in May 2023, “Evan’s arrest is a symbolic reminder of the fight that we find ourselves in today. It’s autocrats versus the power of the pen—disinformation versus reliable information as the bedrock of free society.”

Latour’s point was underscored by those released with Evan: two other Americans wrongfully detained—journalist Alsu Kurmasheva and former US Marine Paul Whelan—as well as Russian political dissident and Pulitzer Prize winner Vladimir Kara-Murza, among others. In exchange, a contemptible lot, including a convicted murderer and several hackers and spies, was welcomed back to Russia by President Vladimir Putin.

Watch Latour’s full speech below:

Evan’s resilience and steadfastness are testament to the courage of journalists worldwide who take risks every day in service to freer societies. In partnership with Adrienne Arsht, the Atlantic Council has been proud to champion Evan’s cause through our “Reporters at Risk” series, which highlights those dangers and underscores the importance of supporting their critical work.

The Atlantic Council remains committed to press freedom and defending the safety of reporters at risk like Evan. As a twenty-five-year veteran of the Wall Street Journal, I welcome him home as a colleague. On behalf of the Atlantic Council, we commit ourselves to defending the freedoms he and reporters like him around the world represent.

Evan Gershkovich’s parents, Mikhail and Ella, meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Wall Street Journal Publisher Almar Latour, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht, and Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards, September 28, 2023.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Experts react: What to know about the release of Evan Gershkovich and others held by Russia

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:35:18 +0000

They’re coming home. On Thursday, Russia and the West carried out a massive prisoner swap in Ankara, Turkey, that saw Moscow free American journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, former US Marine Paul Whelan, and Russian political dissidents Vladimir Kara-Murza and llya Yashin, among others. In exchange, Western countries released eight Russian prisoners, including convicted Russian assassin Vadim Krasikov, who had been imprisoned in Germany. US President Joe Biden called the deal, which involved Germany, Poland, Turkey, Norway, and Slovenia, “a feat of diplomacy and friendship.” Below, our experts explain who was freed, the implications of their release, and what the prisoner exchange says about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s use of domestic oppression to gain leverage against the West.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

John E. Herbst: Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Mercedes Sapuppo: The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

Hanna Liubakova: German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

Brian Whitmore: This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Today’s news is a truly extraordinary event: a large prisoner exchange involving twenty-four captives in seven countries. Russia and Belarus released sixteen prisoners; and the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia sent eight back to Russia. Those released by Moscow include three Americans held essentially as hostages on trumped-up charges—businessman Whelan and journalists Gershkovich and Kurmasheva—and political prisoners Kara-Murza and Yashin. Belarus released Rico Krieger, a German convicted of “terrorism” in Belarus, who was sentenced to death but then pardoned by Lukashenka’s regime. The most notable prisoner released to Russia is Krasikov, a Kremlin operative who murdered a Chechen activist in Germany.

Two constants drove this deal. The first is Putin’s great interest in securing the release of Russian spies and provocateurs captured and jailed in the West. When he succeeded in trading American basketball player Brittney Griner for Viktor Bout with the United States in December 2022, Putin’s highest priority became the release of Krasikov from Germany. When Putin gave up Griner, he still had Whelan as a hostage for future trades with the United States. Then he added Gershkovich in March 2023 for additional trade bait and Kurmasheva this past spring. The second constant is the Biden administration’s interest in securing the release of all Americans unfairly detained by Moscow. After the Griner-Bout exchange, US efforts to secure the freedom of Whelan and then Gershkovich foundered on the refusal of Germany to include Krasikov—Putin’s prime objective—in any trade.

These constants alone do not explain this deal. The new factor was the arrest of Krieger in Belarus last fall. This gave Berlin a reason to consider releasing Krasikov. Germany’s willingness to do so likely set in motion a long negotiation that led to today’s news. The final deal also gave Putin back Russian operatives in Norway, Poland, and Slovenia; and provided an opportunity to free prominent Russian opposition figures Kara-Murza and Yashin.

It is notable that sixteen prisoners moved West and only eight east. But, as we know from the lopsided trade that sent 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war home in exchange for Putin-favorite Viktor Medvedchuk and others in the fall of 2022, there are times when Putin’s interest in a particular captive persuades him to make an uneven trade.

Still, Putin has the tactical advantage of being able to grab additional hostages from Americans and other Western visitors in Russia. One way for the West to reduce this nasty advantage would be to lower the evidentiary requirements for holding spies from Russia and other US adversaries.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

The news that Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, Whelan, Kara-Murza, and Yashin—along with other human rights activists and innocent civilians—have been released from Russia in a prisoner swap is historic. For those now free who were wrongfully detained on contrived and false charges and bravely endured the conditions of Russian detention, today is hugely celebratory. It is also a good day for their families and for all who have been advocating for their freedom, including the Biden-Harris administration. The swap released many who suffered unjustly and marks a positive day for independent media and press freedom.

The timing of this swap—and its scope—indicates that Putin thought it was time to cash out the bargaining chips that he had illegally collected to leverage against the West in the form of innocent Americans and Russian activists. However, it does not suggest that the Kremlin will pull back on its malign tactics of aggression against Ukraine as well as the United States and its allies, and Putin is by no means walking away empty-handed: Russia will welcome home convicted murderers, spies, hackers, fraudsters, and smugglers.

What this swap demonstrates on the Kremlin’s strategic front is a twisted and self-serving pragmatism that is unlikely to translate into a deescalation of Russia’s violence in Ukraine, nor into a new appreciation for international norms. Putin is still a war criminal, and he is still bolstering his autocratic alliances abroad. The drive demonstrated by global leaders and advocates pushing for the release of these unjustly detained journalists and activists should not be the end. Rather, it should be only the beginning of continued work to defeat Putin in Ukraine and deter his aggression, which includes the imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers being kept in harrowing conditions in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine.

—Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

The prisoner swap story between Russia and Western countries took an unexpected turn with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s involvement. Krieger, a German national sentenced to death in Belarus, was among the Western prisoners released in Thursday’s exchange. His case gained attention following his pardon on July 30. The unusual circumstances surrounding Krieger’s sentencing had sparked speculation that the Minsk regime was positioning itself for a high-profile prisoner exchange.

Shortly after the pardon, Lukashenka’s spokesperson indicated that Minsk was open to negotiations regarding Krieger, stating that various “proposals” had been made. This suggested that the pardon was a strategic maneuver to facilitate discussions with Germany. Krieger’s exchange demonstrated the Belarusian regime’s manipulative tactics, with speculation arising that he was swapped for Krasikov, a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assassin imprisoned in Germany.

Krieger was arrested in Belarus in October for allegedly acting as a mercenary and planting explosives. He appeared in a propaganda video, claiming he wanted to fight in Ukraine but was directed to a mission in Belarus. However, the inconsistencies in the video raise doubts about his claims.

The regime’s actions—capturing a foreigner, sentencing him to death, and then negotiating his release—resemble hostage-taking tactics. While Russia may have reclaimed some of its agents in part through Krieger’s exchange, Lukashenka seems to be sacrificing his relationship with Germany to support Putin’s interests. This mirrors Lukashenka’s previous concessions to Russia, including offering Belarusian territory for the invasion of Ukraine, despite his people’s opposition, or stationing Wagner Group troops in Belarus.

Amid these high-stakes negotiations, the plight of Belarusian political prisoners is often overlooked. Although eighteen political prisoners were released last month, an estimated 1,400 remain imprisoned, many urgently needing medical assistance.

—Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

The sweeping prisoner exchange that freed Kurmasheva, Gershkovich, Whelan, and others from Russian captivity was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, and the Biden administration deserves enormous credit for working with the United States’ allies to make it happen. And full disclosure, this one is personal. Two of the released hostages—Kurmasheva, a journalist with whom I worked for more than a decade at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Kara-Murza, a Russian dissident whom I have known for years—are close personal friends. The fact that sixteen hostages of Putin’s regime—including Americans, Germans, British nationals, and Russian political prisoners—are now free is cause for celebration.

That said, we should all use this occasion to reflect on what this prisoner exchange illustrates about the nature of Putin’s Russia. In order to get these hostages released, the United States and its allies needed to free actual criminals who were convicted after receiving the benefit of due process and fair trials in Western courts of law. Among these were a hitman, Krasikov, convicted of an assassination in Germany, and a cybercriminal, Roman Seleznev, who was convicted of bank fraud and identity theft in the United States. This is reminiscent of the United States securing the release of WNBA star and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner in exchange for convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout and swapping US Marine Corps veteran Trevor Reed for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko back in 2022.

One has to wonder, why does Putin want all these hitmen, cybercriminals, arms traffickers, and drug dealers released? And why is he willing to take Western hostages to do so? The answer is simple: The line between the government and the criminal underworld in Putin’s Russia is so thin that it is nonexistent. As I have argued in the past, the Putin regime is effectively a crime syndicate masquerading as a state. The correct metaphor for this prisoner exchange is not the storied Cold War-era swapping of Western and Soviet spies. Instead, it is the result of an unfortunately necessary hostage negotiation with a criminal and terrorist regime.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

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Reporters at risk: In honor of Evan Gershkovich

Leading journalists discuss risks facing foreign correspondents, resilience in reporting, and global press freedom.

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The case for chief gender officers in Caribbean states

Valentina Sader — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 13:51:46 +0000

In the Caribbean, small but significant progress has been made toward greater female representation in politics. But women and girls in the region still face significant gender inequities, ranging from unequal pay to gender-based violence. As the Caribbean prepares for elections in the next year in Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, gender mainstreaming—bringing a gender perspective into every aspect of the decision making and policy implementation processes—should be at the forefront of policymaking and proposals from both men and women leaders. Gender mainstreaming will take time and an array of measures. As an initial step, however, Caribbean countries should consider establishing the role of chief gender officer within their institutions. This leadership role can, for example, play a decisive role in coordinating approaches to gender-based violence.

Female political representation is important. According to 2023 data, only fifty-nine of the 193 member states of the United Nations had a woman head of state or government in their history. Against this backdrop, four countries in the Caribbean have had or currently have women leaders: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados. But representation still lags behind, with an average of 22 percent of ministerial portfolios and cabinet positions in the English-speaking Caribbean held by women. And according to World Bank data, only four Caribbean countries—Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Grenada—have 30 percent or more seats in national parliaments held by women.

At the same time, greater and more effective female political representation must go hand in hand with bringing gender equity perspectives into all aspects policymaking in ways that improve the lives of citizens. In the Caribbean, women and girls face significant vulnerabilities, and gender mainstreaming is needed to address them, in particular gender-based violence.

Chief gender officers can help ensure appropriate support, accountability, and sustainability of policies for victims of gender-based violence.

The Caribbean has one of the highest rates of gender-based violence in the world. According to UN Women data, 46 percent of women in the Caribbean have experienced at least one form of violence in their lifetime. Jamaica, for example, has the second-highest femicide rate in the world, while 55 percent of Guyanese women have experienced at least one form of violence, including intimate partner violence or nonpartner sexual abuse. And data on gender-based violence is often underreported.

To tackle gender-based violence through gender mainstreaming in policymaking, governments in the Caribbean should work closely with civil society organizations that focus on gender and gender-based violence. They should also work with victims of gender-based violence to understand the bottlenecks of the system and its inadequate responses. With this deeper understanding, governments can map out specific areas to improve support for women victims of gender-based violence.

Governments should also include chief gender officers in key government institutions, particularly within the judicial system and the police. Chief gender officers can help ensure appropriate support, accountability, and sustainability of policies for victims of gender-based violence. These officers should be appropriately trained to bring a gender-sensitive perspective to decision-making processes, and their authority and dedicated office to these issues can help to overcome institutional inertia.

In the legal sphere, these officers should revise and help update legislation through a gender lens, as a mechanism to avoid the perpetuation of laws and norms that might have pervasive negative consequences for women and girls. Within the police, chief gender officers can be trained to welcome and support victims of gender-based violence, helping them as victims instead of discriminating against them. Focus groups commissioned by the Atlantic Council in Jamaica and Guyana, for example, found a lack of trust that institutions, such as the police, can support women victims of gender-based violence. One Jamaican woman explained, “But sometimes you go to the police and the police take your statement and look at you and be like if you wear that then you don’t think the man is going to see you.”

Ensuring that women victims of gender-based violence feel heard and supported could lead to more accurate data on this issue, as underreporting is a significant challenge. This, in turn, could help governments gain a better understanding of gender-based violence and the policies and programs that can help solve it.

Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

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Ten years on, Yezidi cases expose a lack of corporate accountability in US genocide law

Charles Johnson — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 15:34:41 +0000

As August approaches, so does the tenth anniversary of the 2014 Yezidi genocide in Sinjar, Iraq—and with it, the question of accountability in US courts of law. Admittedly, the US government and legal system have been working to hold perpetrators of the genocide—members of the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—to account. These efforts include US Department of Justice (DOJ) cases against individuals and companies on charges of material support for terrorism. Conspicuously, though, there have been no charges seeking to hold any alleged perpetrators, nor their corporate enablers, to account specifically for genocide against Yezidis or other ethno-religious minority communities in Iraq and Syria.

The absence is significant, as accountability for genocide is an integral part of a surviving community’s healing. Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Yezidi survivor of ISIS enslavement, has spoken directly on the issue, stating, “Convictions of ISIS members for genocide are vital to our healing process; they let us know that the world has seen, and condemns, the efforts to eradicate the Yezidi people.”

Since 2016, the United States has made some progress in this regard with the State Department’s recognition of genocides in Iraq, Xinjiang, the Ottoman Empire, and Myanmar. But during the same period, US genocide law has failed to keep pace. While there are some logistical reasons for the lack of prosecutions—notably, the lack of direct perpetrators on US territory—the US justice system can instead pursue those otherwise complicit: corporations. However, alarming gaps in US genocide law shield corporations from accountability while denying comprehensive justice to victims and survivors.

Shortcomings in US genocide law and policy

In the US legal system, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act (codified under 18 US Code § 1091) constitutes most of the legal criminal bullwork aimed at genocide prosecution. The code mirrors much of the 1948 Genocide Convention’s language, prohibiting actions with the “specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.”

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In some ways, the law’s reach extends beyond the Genocide Convention’s scope, allowing authorities to hold corporations criminally liable for federal crimes, including genocide, committed by their employees, officers, or agents in their scope of employment. In contrast, the International Criminal Court, and even some countries, cannot hold corporations themselves accountable.

Despite this broader scope, the act remains poorly equipped to handle cases of genocide in general, let alone to prosecute corporations specifically. For instance, according to the Open Society Justice Initiative, the code’s wording renders the act less effective than the Genocide Convention. Possibly most damaging to the law’s breadth is the act’s (18 US Code § 1093) definition of “substantial part.” Where the Genocide Convention does not require “substantial” destruction in the first place, the act requires the destruction of “a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.”

US and international law also differ in defining the degree of mental harm constituting genocide. US code requires “the permanent impairment of the mental faculties…through drugs, torture, or similar techniques,” compared to the Genocide Convention’s broader protection of victims suffering “serious…mental harm.” Therefore, the code’s variation from international law substantially limits the recognized scope and qualifying acts of genocide.

Beyond wording, other legal factors continue to impede genocide prosecution. For example, temporal jurisdiction prevented prosecutors from bringing cases prior to the act’s passage in 1988, and the code only allowed for trying foreign nationals after the Genocide Accountability Act’s passage in 2007.

The issue of mens rea, or “mental state,” also poses a unique challenge to prosecutors seeking corporate accountability for genocide. Mens rea requires proof of express genocidal intent, but international interpretations of this requirement have remained vague and inconsistent. Mens rea under US law becomes even more complicated when introducing secondary liability, as some states’ caselaw interpretations require a complicit party to possess the same mens rea as the direct perpetrator, while other states’ caselaw does not. This divide reflects a broader international debate and complicates the legal considerations for possible US cases against corporations, potentially disincentivizing prosecutors.

But one of the greatest obstacles facing genocide prosecution is the lack of US policy prioritizing such cases. Genocide charges require political approval from the assistant attorney general of the Criminal Division of the DOJ, but little is likely to change without political support backing this approval. Gev Iskajyan, national grassroots director of the Armenian National Committee of America, acknowledged this fact in 2021, simultaneously praising President Joe Biden’s recognition of the Armenian genocide as “a fundamental step in that ladder to justice” and clarifying that true justice requires more substantive action from political leaders. Indeed, the lack of political support and accompanying legal obstacles have effectively dissuaded prosecutors from indicting anyone on genocide charges since the Genocide Convention Implementation Act’s passage in 1988.

Litigating the Yezidi genocide

Nowhere in recent litigation has this dissuasion been more apparent than with efforts to address corporate involvement in ISIS’s genocide against the Yezidi community. The genocide began on August 3, 2014, when ISIS launched a campaign in Sinjar, killing more than five thousand Yezidis and taking 6,800 more into captivity, where they faced brainwashing, physical abuse, and sexual slavery. ISIS did not achieve this persecution in isolation. The organization received material assistance and took advantage of lax oversight on social media platforms to further its genocidal program. Without criminal cases charging corporations with complicity in genocide—whether from lack of political will or the shortcomings of the law—American and Yezidi cases in the United States have instead used civil provisions that do not cover liability for genocide.

Legal cases against Lafarge, a French cement manufacturer, stand as an excellent example of this phenomenon. In 2022, as a result of a DOJ investigation, the company pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations. The company was ordered to pay $777.78 million in fines and forfeitures for cooperating with ISIS and al-Nusrah Front in exchange for a Lafarge factory’s security in Syria. Emboldened by the DOJ’s success, American Yezidis have since opened a similar civil suit based on Lafarge’s alleged violation of the Antiterrorism Act.

Undoubtedly, prosecuting the company under the United States’ expansive legal framework for terrorism is more likely to succeed than a case under genocide law. The DOJ has historically prioritized terrorism cases, creating more robust legislation and caselaw that prosecutors can draw from, and often more favorable provisions. For example, extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime of material support for terrorism is far-reaching, covering, e.g., an offense that “occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Furthermore, any effort to hold Lafarge accountable while obtaining funds for Yezidi victims and survivors is laudable. However, Lafarge knowingly and willfully continued illegal payments to an organization actively committing genocide, yet has not had to answer for these uniquely harmful acts.

As another example, a separate group of Yezidi activists is looking to hold WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accountable for the illegal slave trade of Yezidi women, which the activists allege occurred on the platforms. According to the group, these companies acted slowly and inconsistently in removing harmful material related to trafficking Yezidi women, which could be in violation of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017. However, legal experts have noted that certain provisions may shield these tech companies from civil liability through wide-ranging immunities. But even if the civil suit succeeds, the companies’ liability will only extend to sex trafficking, without acknowledging the fundamental role that slavery played in this genocide. The civil suit would bring prosecution closer to specific acts of genocide but, like the Lafarge case, would still fall short of addressing genocide directly.

Better accountability measures needed

The United States needs far better genocide accountability measures if justice is ever to follow recognition. On a legal level, several reforms could work in favor of such a pursuit. Removing the word “substantial” from the act’s current language, and expanding qualifying instances of mental harm, would help bring the law closer in line with general improvements to US genocide recognition.

Similarly, a law delineating the requirements for mens rea between perpetrators and collaborators would establish clearer responsibilities for corporations in dealing with a genocidal group. Legislation along these lines could become as effective as terrorism legislation, which seeks to define a similarly nebulous crime, to punish companies for enabling both terrorist organizations and governments committing genocide.

At the same time, and arguably more crucially, prosecutors need to pursue genocide cases. DOJ officials must be willing to bring charges under reformed genocide law, the assistant attorney general of the Criminal Division must approve these charges when they are brought, and lawmakers need to move beyond mere genocide recognition by calling for prosecution. Though legal amendments are not retroactive and cannot influence any cases related to the Yezidi genocide, conflicts with genocidal allegations rage on in Russia, Sudan, and the Gaza Strip. It is time for the US legal system to meet this reality.

Charles Johnson is a former Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. He is a senior at the University of Kansas majoring in history, political science, and religious studies.

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Lukashenka’s rhetoric toward Ukraine and the West has softened. His repression of Belarusians has not.

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 14:58:04 +0000

Last Friday, Belarus introduced a new visa-free regime allowing citizens from thirty-five European countries to stay for up to ninety days per year. This move is notable given the current tensions between the Belarusian regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the West.

The visa-free policy seems to be a strategic propaganda effort from Minsk to ease these tensions. Following new European Union (EU) sanctions in late June, Poland has significantly restricted the import of goods into Belarus by Belarusian individuals, while Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have banned cars with Belarusian license plates from entering their countries. These measures impact the people of Belarus, and against this backdrop, the visa decision is an attempt by Lukashenka and his regime to “demonstrate the openness and peacefulness of our country.”

In reality, Lukashenka is continuing his campaign of domestic repression, targeting Belarusians in exile (including the author of this article), and weaponizing allegations that neighboring countries are setting up camps to train militants intent on overthrowing his regime. On July 19, for example, the Minsk regional court sentenced German national Rico Krieger to death in Belarus on charges including an “act of terrorism” and the “creation of an extremist formation.” The regime is using Krieger as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Germany, showcasing its manipulative tactics. According to the human rights organization Viasna, at least thirty foreigners remain imprisoned in Belarus, and a Lithuanian citizen died in a Belarusian prison in March after being arrested at the border.

As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia . . . The author of this article is among those convicted.

Even so, expect more rhetorical shifts as the 2025 Belarusian presidential election approaches and as Belarus tries to alleviate the economic pressures it faces from Poland and the Baltic states for Minsk’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. For example, newly appointed Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with Poland, stating earlier this month that “the ball is on the Polish side.” This came after a slowdown in truck traffic at the Kazlovichy checkpoint on the Polish-Belarusian border on July 10.

Minsk accused Warsaw of halting the acceptance of Belarusian cargo. Poland has hinted at potentially closing its remaining border crossings with Belarus to counter Lukashenka’s hybrid tactics, the migration crisis that the regime helped engineer on the Polish border, and the imprisonment of journalist and Polish minority activist Andrzej Poczobut. The stabbing death of a Polish soldier by a migrant on the border in June prompted Polish President Andrzej Duda to discuss migration and economic cooperation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in late June, hoping that Beijing would exert its increasing influence on Minsk.

Recent developments may have influenced Lukashenka’s shift in rhetoric. These developments include threats from Poland and the Baltic states to close border crossings with Belarus, efforts to involve China in political pressure on Minsk, and new EU sanctions. Lukashenka now calls for “reciprocity” in diplomatic relations with Poland and Lithuania, a stark contrast to his comments in March. At that time, accompanied by his white Pomeranian, Lukashenka had inquired about the width of the Suwałki Corridor and told a commander, “You will have to confront the Baltic republics . . . And you will grab part of Poland.”

Lukashenka has also softened his rhetoric on Ukraine in recent days. June was a month of major rhetorical escalation between Belarus and Ukraine, as the Belarusian national intelligence agency accused Ukraine of amassing troops near the Belarusian border. This led to a sudden military readiness check in Brest and Homiel, including troop deployments to Belarus’s southern border and the establishment of new checkpoints. For weeks, Belarus’s Ministry of Defense warned of a Ukrainian threat, citing a drone interception and an explosives cache.

However, this escalation ended abruptly on July 13 when Lukashenka visited an air defense unit in Luninets, announced the resolution of border tensions, and ordered troop withdrawals. He appeared to resolve a crisis he had fabricated, saying that “we are not enemies for Ukrainians,” calling for urgent negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Some hoped for a real shift when, in early July, the regime freed eighteen political prisoners in a rare amnesty, nearly four years after Lukashenka’s crackdown on the opposition, following his announcements to release “seriously ill” prisoners. One of those released, Ryhor Kastusiou, who ran for president against Lukashenka in 2010, had been diagnosed with cancer. The names of the other released prisoners have not been disclosed. Both the United States and the EU welcomed these releases but urged the regime to free all remaining political prisoners.

While the release of some political prisoners is positive, many more are still incarcerated. An estimated 1,400 political prisoners are still being held in Belarus, hundreds of them in urgent need of medical assistance.

Belarus may continue to make gestures of goodwill to Ukraine and the West, but it’s crucial to differentiate between rhetoric and reality. Repression in Belarus continues. As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia to between ten and eleven-and-a-half years by a Minsk court. The author of this article is among those convicted.

The regime accused me of four criminal charges, including an attempt to seize power, joining an extremist formation, harming national security, and inciting social discord. The regime-appointed lawyer never responded to my messages and emails. I was denied the right to a fair trial and refused legal assistance.

The regime is engaged in repression against Belarusians in exile, targeting their families abroad. In Belarusian jails, many prominent political prisoners are held incommunicado, and even their families don’t know whether they are alive. If the Belarusian regime wants to show Ukraine and the West that it is interested in real change, then it must take real actions to stop its brutal campaign of terror and repression at home.

Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

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The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit

Sarah Dawn Petrin — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 12:12:53 +0000

Much of the NATO summit earlier this month was overshadowed by US domestic politics, but one issue did make significant and bipartisan, if underacknowledged, headway when allies met in Washington: the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. During the three-day summit, leaders from the United States and other NATO member states recognized recent gains, including allied militaries implementing inclusive strategies to adapt to women in the armed forces as a means of preparedness. They also welcomed the role of women in political leadership—and underscored its importance.

“Bringing women on board is not only a women’s rights issue. It brings benefits to the whole of society and to our collective security,” Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir said on the first day of the summit. “It’s not about waiting for the time when you can afford focusing on women, peace, and security, or gender equality for that matter, or empowering women,” she added. “You become stronger because you focus on those points, not when you afford them.”

Icelandic Foreign Minister Thordis Kolbrun Reykfjord Gylfadottir addresses the Women, Peace, and Security reception organized by the US Department of State, on July 9, 2024. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

WPS commitments at the Washington summit

The show of support for advancing the WPS agenda during the summit was not just rhetorical. It included concrete commitments, such as adopting a new NATO policy on WPS that is “fit for purpose” for the twenty-first century security environment. Several allies also committed to fund more than ten thousand uniforms and body armor sets for Ukrainian female servicemembers defending their country against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

If the Alliance is looking for something that increasingly earns bipartisan support in the United States, then it should look to the importance of women’s inclusion in national security strategies. In 2017, then President Donald Trump signed the first national law that took steps to institutionalize a United Nations mandate to make the security sector more inclusive of female leadership and more responsive to the needs of women and girls, including freedom from conflict-related sexual violence. In 1994, then Senator Joe Biden was an original cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act that year, and the Biden-Harris administration continues to make important reforms to the military code of justice on sexual assault in the military.

One of the highlights of the Washington summit was the announcement that as of 2024, twenty-three allied nations have met the commitment to spend 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense spending, a change that is applauded by both sides of the aisle in the United States. What is less known is how those fiscal commitments relate to national aspirations for a more inclusive force. According to the most recently published NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, released in 2020, twenty-seven members of the Alliance, including the United States, have national action plans on WPS. NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland, also have national action plans on WPS. Furthermore, twenty-five NATO nations reported an increase in female participation in the armed forces in the years before 2020. On average, 13 percent of allied forces were comprised of women that year.

In the Washington Summit Declaration, allies committed to integrate an ambitious WPS and human security agenda across all of NATO’s core tasks. NATO had previously committed to women’s meaningful participation in the security sector. But the new policy recognizes the conditions that make women’s leadership possible, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in decision making in national institutions.

The declaration also referred to the human security trends shaping today’s conflicts, including disregard for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, cultural property protection, and forced displacement that fuels human trafficking and irregular migration. These human security trends disproportionately affect women and girls, who make up more than half of the 117 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations. In Washington, the Alliance also renewed its commitment to international law and the fundamental norms of armed conflict, which distinguishes between military targets and civilians.

Lessons from Ukraine

Although NATO did not welcome Ukraine into the Alliance at the summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his closing press statement that it is a matter of when, not if, Ukraine will become a member. This followed NATO commitments at the summit to establishing a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO Security Assistance Training for Ukraine to increase Kyiv’s interoperability with the Alliance.

For the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown that the conduct of war involves more than military strategy. Providing security has become a whole-of-society effort, involving women in uniform and civilians providing support to the front lines. The evolving nature of conflict can blur the distinction between civilian and military action and change societal norms on what roles are appropriate for men and women. These dynamics are important for understanding the human domain, which is adaptive to evolving threats. Supporting female soldiers and addressing civilian harm caused by the war should be an integral part of NATO plans to train for the future operational environment and to secure peace in Ukraine.

The NATO Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for WPS, which has responsibility for a broader umbrella of cross-cutting human security policies, can continue working toward integrating lessons from the human domain in military training. While NATO continues to identify military lessons from the war in Ukraine, these lessons should also include concrete steps to protect civilians from air missile attacks, mitigate the use of sexual violence in conflict, and protect children against forced deportations to Russia. NATO can emphasize the lessons allies have learned about how to protect civilians in other conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, as it establishes new security cooperation training centers.

The war in Ukraine is a test case for whether the Alliance can help partner nations achieve stability and whether its actions are inclusive of the whole-of-society approach that has characterized the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. While volunteerism, patriotism, and the inclusion of women have sustained Ukraine’s war effort, the need to protect the civilian population from attack remains paramount.

Sarah Dawn Petrin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously advised the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute on integrating women, peace, and security and human security in US military operations.

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Putin accused of jailing US journalists as ‘bargaining chips’ for prisoner swap

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:14:45 +0000

On July 19, Wall Street Journal reporter and US citizen Evan Gershkovich was sentenced to sixteen years in Russian prison on espionage charges. The same day, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Alsu Kurmasheva, a journalist who holds dual American-Russian citizenship, was sentenced to six and a half years by a Russian court for supposedly spreading false information about the Russian military. Both trials took place largely behind closed doors under a veil of secrecy.

Gershkovich is the first US journalist to be convicted in Russia on charges of espionage since the Cold War. So far, the Russian authorities have not provided any credible evidence to support their accusations. Kurmasheva was convicted on a charge frequently used by the Kremlin to suppress unfavorable reporting on the realities of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The imprisonment of two US journalists marks a new escalation in the Kremlin’s confrontation with the West. Wall Street Journal publisher Almar Latour and editor Emma Tucker released a statement calling Gershkovich’s sentence “a disgraceful, sham conviction.” RFE/RL President and CEO Steve Capus deemed Kurmasheva’s conviction “a mockery of justice.”

US citizens Gershkovich and Kurmasheva are now facing the prospect of long prison sentences in extremely harsh conditions. An AP series published earlier this year described the “physical and psychological pressure, sleep deprivation, insufficient food, heath care that is poor or simply denied” and “dizzying set of arbitrary rules” that the pair are likely to encounter in Russian jails. Both journalists have already spent an extended period in pretrial detention.

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The Russian authorities have a long record of targeting journalists. These efforts have gained further momentum since February 2022 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin using draconian new legislation to silence anti-war voices and shut down any remaining independent Russian media outlets. In May 2024, the United Nations human rights office reported that the number of journalists imprisoned in Russia had reached an all-time high.

While the Putin regime is notorious for seeking to censor the media, that may not actually be the main motive in this case. Instead, there has been widespread speculation that the Kremlin ultimately aims to use Gershkovich and Kurmasheva as bargaining chips in negotiations with the US to secure the release of Russian citizens currently serving prison sentences in the West.

Putin is no doubt well aware that the United States will go to considerable lengths to free the two American journalists. Following Gershkovich’s conviction, the White House issued a statement that the US government has “no higher priority” than seeking the release and safe return of Gershkovich “and all Americans wrongly detained and held hostage abroad.”

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Speculation about a potential prisoner swap has swirled ever since Gershkovich was first detained in 2023. Typically, Russia only engages in prisoner exchanges once suspects have been convicted and sentenced. This has led some analysts to suggest that the relative speed of the two recent trials could indicate the Kremlin’s desire to proceed with an exchange in the near future.

Moscow will likely demand a high price for the release of Gershkovich and Kurmasheva. This may include handing over Vadim Krasikov, a Russian secret service colonel who is currently serving a life sentence in Germany for gunning down a Chechen dissident in a Berlin park in 2019. Sentencing Krasikov in 2021, a Berlin court called the killing “a state-ordered murder.”

US Senate Foreign Relations Chair Ben Cardin said Gershkovich’s trial and conviction were “stark reminders of the lengths to which tyrants like Putin will leverage innocent people as bargaining chips, stifle free speech, and suppress the truth.” While many now expect a prisoner swap to take place sooner rather than later, the targeting of US journalists in this manner highlights the Kremlin’s retreat from international norms and underlines the potential dangers facing any Western nationals who choose to visit Putin’s Russia.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

How Tunisia’s upcoming presidential elections will erode its democracy

Alissa Pavia — Wed, 17 Jul 2024 18:04:11 +0000

President Kais Saied of Tunisia, who was elected in 2019, has called for new elections this October. While a victory might seem to legitimize his presidency, the West should not be deceived. The upcoming elections are unlikely to be free and fair, due to ongoing crackdowns on opposition leaders and critics, persistent human rights violations, and the consolidation of power across all three branches of government. These elections will likely enable further consolidation of power and undo more than a decade of progress in building democratic institutions. What was once deemed the only success story of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings seems to be becoming yet another disappointment.

Elected on an anti-corruption platform in 2019, President Saied initiated consolidating powers in 2021 by unilaterally dismissing then Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and freezing parliament with military support. Saeid subsequently rewrote Tunisia’s constitution to extend his presidential powers and granted himself the authority to unilaterally dismiss magistrates after he dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council. Parliamentary elections he called for had a turnout of just 11.2 percent after opposition parties boycotted them, resulting in the election of mostly unaffiliated politicians close to him. In 2022, Saied extended his control over the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) by granting himself the power to appoint and dismiss its members, nullifying the ISIE’s independence from the executive. With virtually all branches of government now under his direct or indirect control, President Saied has eliminated internal obstacles and monopolized all checks and balances, paving the way for an unchallenged run in October. Consequently, Freedom House downgraded Tunisia’s score from “free” to “partially free,” indicating there is broad consensus among members of the international community that Saied’s actions are illegitimate.

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In addition to controlling all branches of government directly or indirectly, Saied is cementing his power grab by clamping down on opposition party members, critics, independent media outlets, and civil society. Over the past year, Saied has imprisoned and threatened most opposition candidates. Two of the ten presidential candidates are currently behind bars, while four face prosecution, including Rached Gannouchi—the leader of the main opposition party, Ennahda—who was imprisoned last year on charges of “conspiring against the state” and will remain in prison for at least another three years. Civil society is also facing unprecedented repression, with a draft law currently under revision by Tunisia’s parliament to limit foreign funding streams into the country. Critics and journalists are jailed daily over dissenting opinions, escalating a clampdown on the country’s freedom of expression and emanating fear among critics, enabling the president to run uncontested.

Saied’s legitimacy is also hindered by his continued mistreatment of minorities—including black African migrants and Jews—which has drawn international criticism and led to the violation of international norms. A mass grave with the bodies of sixty-five migrants was recently discovered on the border between Tunisia and Libya, sparking condemnations of Tunisia’s mishandling of sub-Saharan migrants arriving in the country. Saied publicly showcased his antagonism toward black African migrants when, in March 2023, he claimed migrants were threatening Tunisia’s demographic composition, citing the highly controversial “great replacement” theory. A wave of violence against migrants ensued, with many of them losing their jobs and risking their lives. Reports of unlawful mass expulsions toward Algeria and Libya began to emerge, showcasing a well-thought-out strategy by state apparatuses in direct violation of international law, hindering the nascent democracy and Saied’s overall legitimacy.

The local Jewish community, now comprising only 1,500 people, has also felt uneasy and under threat after Saied claimed the devastating floods that hit Libya in September 2023 were a product of the “Zionist movement.” His comments came only months after a terrorist attack occurred in the city of Djerba, each year visited by thousands of Jewish pilgrims, that was believed to have antisemitic motives. More recently, with the outbreak of the Gaza war, several synagogues were lit on fire in signs of protest, elevating the Jewish community’s concerns about its safety. There is little indication of the government taking any action to safeguard the rights of Tunisia’s remaining Jews, raising questions about Saied’s overall motives and his willingness to safeguard minorities.

Saied’s continued clampdown on opposition, his mistreatment of minorities, and his overall control over the three branches of government will allow him to run unopposed in the upcoming polls. While the elections may seem like a legitimate democratic exercise, the context in which they are held is nothing short of an authoritarian regime, whose control over the state apparatuses is becoming more and more evident. This erosion of democratic norms undermines Tunisia’s hard-won democratic gains and is pushing the country further into autocracy.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council.

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I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:48:25 +0000

At the beginning of July, I was one of twenty internationally-based Belarusian academics, analysts, and journalists to be sentenced in absentia by a court in Minsk on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and taking part in an extremist group.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Iraq remains a fertile ground for messianic doctrines and often irrational eschatological dogmas due to a mixture of deeply engrained Mesopotamian mythological legacy, pronounced esoteric beliefs associated with the dominant Twelver Shiism creed, and the many minority religious beliefs in the country linked to Gnosticism, such as Mandaeans, Kakais, Shabak, and Kasnazani Sufi order—communities that all still practice ancestral hermetic and mystic rituals.

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These peculiar incidents—along with the flourishing of tens of other doomsday sects led by self-claimed prophets, charlatans, and characters with a Messiah complex—should be understood as a social phenomenon in the context of a collectively traumatized post-invasion Iraqi society. Repetitive conflicts since 2003 have caused political unrest, sectarian unrest, fragmented state structures, and a suppressed Tishreen social movement—a youth-led protest movement between 2019 and 2021 condemning corruption and asking for less foreign interference—and might offer explanations for why so many Iraqis are plunging into the abyss of obscure metaphysical beliefs after seemingly losing hope in the physical realm.

Despite its apparent resilience and openness to a future with ambitious economic reforms and infrastructure projects, Iraq still suffers from invisible fractures affecting the core of its society. A 2007 national survey revealed that nearly 60 percent of the population experienced traumatic events with next to no access to psychological support—these numbers don’t even take into consideration the ordeal caused by conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Additionally, the World Health Organization warned about the soaring number of suicide attempts among young Iraqis in 2020.

A savior in a beanie and an Atlantis for the Shia

The United Kingdom, which hosts an important community of Arab refugees and expatriates, is the site of the hours-long live broadcasts by Sheikh Yasser al-Habib. From his headquarters in southern London, the exiled Kuwaiti cleric has been collecting live donations for the purchase of three islands amounting to $3 million, which he will allegedly transform into a sovereign homeland for all Twelver Shia individuals willing to relocate to the promised idyllic Atlantis. The project, announced earlier this year, will be designed in accordance with the sheikh’s religious preachings, and will aim to prepare for the savior’s return from his millennium-long occultation.

Another Iraqi-born doomsday sect, the Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light—a syncretic faith mixing psychedelic consumption, New Age beliefs, soul reincarnation, ancient Egyptian gods, and space aliens—also calls the United Kingdom home. The movement, formally known as the Black Banners, is currently based in Manchester, where an old orphanage converted into a temple is adorned with a marble statue of a man from Basra called Ahmed al-Hassan al-Yamani, who had proclaimed himself the vizier of the Mahdi amid the chaos that followed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

This religion took a new turn when an Egyptian associate of Hassan, Abdullah Hashem, appeared in a black beanie during the pandemic, claiming in a hall full of devotees to be the final Mahdi, prophesizing the political demise of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, and condemning the persecution of the movement’s activists across the world. It remains unclear how these movements fund their large-scale events and media presence.

This is but the tip of the iceberg. In recent years, many baffling figures have risen to fame, like Abu Ali Shaibani—a former Iraqi secret services officer and herbalist based in Lebanon, who accurately predicted the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces—who claims to be the equivalent of a trumpet of Armageddon in the Bible. Other famed charlatans include Diaa Abdu Zahrae al-Garaoui, killed on a farm in Zargha with hundreds of his followers by US coalition forces in 2007 after conspiring to assassinate top Hawza clergy in Najaf. The leader of Jund al-Samaa (“the Soldiers of Heaven”)—Iraq’s own Jim Jones—claimed to be a 1,400-year-old dormant embryo from Imam Ali and his spouse Fatima Zahra, who rose to become the Mahdi.

A larger MENA phenomenon

It is important to note that this phenomenon is part of a larger messianic resurgence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the past two decades. Cases of self-proclaimed end-of-day prophets emerge every other day on social media, such as an amusing Lebanese fortuneteller “sent from the heavens to save humankind,” who appeared two years ago. However, only a few become full-fledged religious leaders, such as the controversial Yemeni Naser Mohamed, a tribal leader from Marib, or his compatriot Hassan al-Tuhami, who was arrested and tortured by the Houthis with his followers.

This tendency created an entire ecosystem of social media content creators and famed prime-time television clairvoyants like the Egyptian-Lebanese Leila Abdelatif. This new army of influencers interprets the holy scriptures, tracks the signs of the end of days against current regional conflicts like the Gaza war, and projects apocalyptic Islamic protagonists on modern-day political leaders like Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, or Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Interestingly, similar trends are observed regarding Israel and the Gaza war, fueled by certain Haredi Jewish groups and their US Christian right allies, and by the dichotomous biblical rhetoric promulgated by members of the Israeli government, a coalition that more secular analysts describe as “messianic.” Following the terror generated by the October 7, 2023, attacks, several Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, described the conflict as a holy war between “the sons of lights, and the sons of darkness.” (Though it’s unclear if these statements are mere allegories or discursive tactics used to appeal to an increasingly religious Israeli society.) Another internet and media sensation to follow is the Texas red heifers associated in the scriptures with the building of the Third Temple in Jerusalem and the advent of the Jewish Messiah. As certain far-right Jewish and Christian activists call for conducting a purification ritual using the ashes of the Angus cows on the Temple Mount, where al-Aqsa Mosque stands today, Hamas leadership made a salient declaration associating the ritual with the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks.

Historically, messianic movements in the MENA region are symptomatic of profound social and economic malaise and are a form of subaltern resistance by frustrated citizens opposing the existing tyrannic political and theological structures. Many messianic leaders even brought immense change and shifted the course of entire empires—like Mahdi ibn Tumart, the founder of the Moroccan Almohad dynasty, or the early Ismaili Fatimid rulers in Tunisia and Egypt. Others were less fortunate, like Juhayman al-Otaybi and his failed 1979 coup d’état in Mecca. Nonetheless, in a region where the borders between the natural and supernatural remain blurred, it is extremely worrisome and premonitory of greater regional upheaval to observe an unprecedented doomsday fever and a high concentration of messianic groups—probably the most important since Prophet Mohammad and Jesus of Nazareth.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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Israeli officials are accused of weaponizing starvation in Gaza. Here’s what you need to know.

Alana Mitias, Yousuf Syed Khan — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 13:52:49 +0000

On May 20, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan announced his request for arrest warrants against senior Hamas leaders and Israeli officials, including Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during and since Hamas’s attack against Israel on October 7, 2023.

At the core of the charges against Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are allegations that the two were part of a “common plan” to use “the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” in Gaza—a war crime. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is seeking charges for various crimes against humanity associated with the crime of starvation, including extermination and/or murder, persecution, and “other inhumane acts.”

This moment is especially significant for the ICC because—despite evidence indicating its commission in past and ongoing conflicts—the war crime of starvation has never before been prosecuted at the international level. The lack of precedent has until now made prosecutors hesitant to venture into untrodden legal territory, thus rendering the crime “an issue that floats at the periphery of [war crimes] prosecutions.” Given the prevalence of civilian starvation in armed conflict—particularly as a result of urban siege warfare—the decision by the ICC’s pretrial chamber in this matter could help shape international practice for identifying the war crime of starvation and associated starvation crimes, and create a clearer pathway to accountability for victims.

The recently alleged crimes, however, are not the first accusations that Israeli leaders have employed starvation tactics in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Since Gallant’s order for a “complete siege” of Gaza on October 9, the United Nations (UN), human rights organizations, and Khan himself have warned that the closure of border crossings, restriction of essential supply transfers, severing of water and electricity, attacks on humanitarian aid convoys, and the killing of Gazans gathering to receive aid could constitute starvation crimes. Just last month, the UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Palestine released a report finding that through the siege of Gaza, Israeli officials have “weaponized the withholding of life-sustaining necessities” including food, water, electricity, fuel, and humanitarian assistance.

Israeli officials have consistently denied allegations that they are restricting aid deliveries to Gaza, instead citing diversion and black-market resale of aid by Hamas as primary causes of the hunger crisis. Hamas did recently manage to divert and temporarily seize a shipment of aid delivered through Jordan—the “first widespread case of diversion that we have seen” in Gaza, according to US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller. Officials have also accused UN agencies, including the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme, of bottlenecking aid distribution and exacerbating the conflict. Israel has further claimed that UNRWA is complicit in aid diversion and maintains the agency’s alleged links to Hamas.

What happens next?

The OTP’s requests now lie with a pretrial chamber of the ICC, which will review the applications and determine whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the parties “committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”

To meet the “reasonable grounds” standard, the application should outline the crimes alleged, a “concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes,” and a summary of the evidence supporting the belief that an individual is responsible for those crimes. However, Khan has said that the OTP’s investigation and applications regarding Gaza have sought to exceed an even higher standard of proof—in his words, a standard of “realistic prospect of conviction.” It is probable that the prosecutor imposed a higher standard than what is required to ward off criticisms of bias from Israel and its allies, who have previously threatened the court and questioned its legitimacy.

Although Israel is not a member of the ICC, the Palestinian Authority’s 2015 accession to the Rome Statute allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated by Palestinian nationals—including Hamas fighters—and those crimes occurring at least partly on Palestinian territory, including those committed or ordered by Israeli officials. The decision of a pretrial chamber in February 2021 further affirmed ICC jurisdiction over Palestinian territory, including Gaza. This same principle enables the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in Ukraine despite Russia not accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC.

It also bears noting that the war crime of starvation initially only applied when committed in the context of an international armed conflict (IAC), and Palestine has not ratified the Rome Statute’s 2019 amendment extending the crime to encompass non-international armed conflicts. Khan, with the support of a report by a panel of international law experts, reasons that the war is an IAC due to Israel’s use of force or status as an occupying power in Gaza. The pretrial chamber may only opt to issue arrest warrants for the war crime if it determines that there is in fact an IAC underway between Israel and Palestine.

Should arrest warrants be issued against Netanyahu and Gallant, all states party to the ICC will be obligated to arrest and surrender them to the court. While it remains to be seen if states will actually comply with the order, statements from France, Belgium, Germany, and Slovenia have affirmed their support for the ICC since the requests were submitted.

What does the law say, and how does it apply to Gaza?

The weaponization of hunger is considered one of the oldest methods of warfare, but its recognition as a war crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction is relatively new.

More than twenty years after its prohibition in two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the crime of starvation was codified under the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) renders “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” a war crime, so long as perpetrators intentionally deprive civilians of “objects indispensable to their survival,” or OIS.

To prove the war crime of starvation, it must be shown that a perpetrator indeed deprived civilians of OIS—such as “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works”—a non-exhaustive list defined in the Geneva Conventions. Directives by Israeli officials to impede aid delivery, and the razing of agricultural areas and cutting off fuel or water sources could suffice in this regard. Although recent reports have spurred debate over whether the situation in Gaza technically qualifies as a famine, such a determination is not required for the war crime to attach. It is not necessary to prove that the conduct in question resulted in civilians’ deaths or suffering—solely demonstrating that a perpetrator took action to deprive civilians of indispensable objects is enough.

However, it is required to prove two elements of intent: that the perpetrator intended (1) to deprive civilians of OIS and (2) “to starve civilians as a method of warfare.” Without the aid of prior case law, the threshold for satisfying the second element is uncertain. Must perpetrators aim to weaponize starvation specifically, or are acts that would foreseeably starve civilians sufficient?

In favor of the latter interpretation, the so-called default intent standard in the ICC Statute likely indicates that this second element may be established if a perpetrator took actions knowing that civilian starvation could result or was aware it would occur “in the ordinary course of events.” Under this understanding of intent, proving that Netanyahu and Gallant were virtually certain that civilians would starve without humanitarian aid deliveries, along with the severing of water and electricity to Gaza, could help establish intent.

What is the wider significance?

Already, the ICC has made a pivotal move in recognizing the need for accountability for starvation crimes. As UN-backed documentation from recent and ongoing conflicts in Yemen, South Sudan, and Myanmar has shown, the weaponization of food remains a pervasive feature of armed conflict. Notably, actions taken in the laying of sieges—as seen in Aleppo, Madaya, Eastern Ghouta in Syria, the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and Mariupol—exhibit increasing overlap with starvation tactics.

Khan’s application for arrest warrants here opens the door for further efforts to investigate and charge the war crime of starvation, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity associated with starvation. Regardless of whether a trial ultimately results, a potential issuance of charges alone could help clarify the contours of the crime and create a clearer pathway to accountability for victims from other contexts.

Alana Mitias is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Yousuf Syed Khan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Several of his most visible legal contributions have centered on starvation-related crimes, including leading the drafting of the first ever report by a UN-mandated mechanism on starvation as a method of warfare.

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Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare

Olha Fokaf — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:58:08 +0000

The bombing of Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital in Kyiv on July 8 has sparked a wave of global condemnation, with US President Joe Biden calling the attack a “horrific reminder of Russia’s brutality.” Meanwhile, others have noted that this latest airstrike was not an isolated incident. “Once again, Russia has deliberately targeted residential areas and healthcare infrastructure,” commented France’s representative at the UN.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

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The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

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According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s prayer breakfast challenges Kremlin claims of religious persecution

Steven Moore — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:50:38 +0000

On June 29, more than eight hundred participants from fifteen countries representing a dozen different religious denominations gathered in the historic heart of Kyiv for Ukraine’s annual National Prayer Breakfast. The day before the breakfast, two Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Father Ivan Levytsky and Father Bohdan Geleta, had been released from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange brokered by the Vatican Diplomatic Corps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the priests back to Ukraine in a speech that drew tears.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

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Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

The Kremlin’s crimes will continue to escalate until Russia is defeated

Serhiy Prytula — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 20:04:56 +0000

Almost two and a half years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Kremlin still retains the ability to shock with the scale of its crimes. On July 8, the targets were Ukrainian children. Not just any children, but kids being treated for cancer, whose daily lives were already full of fear and pain.

The exact number of dead and wounded as a result of Russia’s targeted missile strike on the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in central Kyiv has not yet been confirmed. Nor is it possible to calculate the death and suffering that will result from lack of treatment due to the partial destruction of what is Ukraine’s biggest pediatric clinic.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, large numbers of distressed and in some cases injured children lined the pavement around the ruins of the wrecked hospital, many still attached to drips. Providing them with the specialized medical support they so urgently require will now be extremely difficult.

Doctors were also among the victims. Those killed in Monday’s missile strikes included thirty year old Svitlana Lukyanchuk, a nephrologist from Lviv. Svitlana was an orphan who overcame challenging personal circumstances to qualify as a doctor. She dedicated herself to saving children’s lives, but will never now experience the joy of motherhood herself.

Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8. One such attack could potentially be attributed to human error or explained as a tragic mistake. Three targeted attacks on the same day suggests a deliberate Russian strategy to destroy Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure, just as the Kremlin has already targeted and destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Moscow appears intent on making large parts of the country unlivable.

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It is no doubt hard for many outside observers to fully appreciate that such horrors are taking place in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. After all, just three years ago, it would also have been difficult for most Ukrainians to believe such things were possible. Sadly, that is no longer the case.

As a result of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukrainians have been confronted by an astonishing array of war crimes that recall the worst excesses of bygone eras. Entire cities have been reduced to rubble. Hundreds of thousands have been killed, abducted, or subjected to forced deportation. Large numbers of vulnerable children have been sent to Russian indoctrination camps and robbed of their Ukrainian heritage. In regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian identity have been ruthlessly erased.

The evidence of Russian war crimes is now so overwhelming that the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin himself and many of his most senior officials. Nevertheless, the nightmare continues. A genocide is being live-streamed to the watching world, but Western leaders choose not to call it by its name for fear of being obliged to act.

Today’s Russia did not become a rogue regime overnight. On the contrary, the crimes we are now witnessing reflect unresolved historic issues that have been allowed to fester since the early days of Putin’s reign. Unlike all other European empires, post-Soviet Russia never rejected imperialism and was not forced to confront the crimes of the imperial era. This has allowed for a revival of Russia’s imperial identity and has helped fuel a sense of impunity that directly paved the way for the invasion of Ukraine.

Rather than address the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia, the Western world has consistently sought to avoid confrontation. When a newly anointed Putin crushed Chechnya, Western leaders chose to look the other way. After he invaded Georgia, they scrambled to reset relations and return to business as usual.

Inevitably, this approach only emboldened the Kremlin. The West’s weak response to the 2014 seizure of Crimea led directly to Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine. When this, too, failed to produce a decisive reaction, the stage was set for today’s full-scale invasion.

Even now, Western policy remains defined by a reluctance to provoke Putin, with Western leaders hopelessly preoccupied by fears of escalation. This has left Ukraine unable to adequately defend itself, while encouraging Russia to escalate further. As a result, we are now closer to a major global war than at any time for a generation.

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It is delusional to think Russia can be stopped by appeasement, concessions, or compromise. Any ceasefire would merely provide the Kremlin with a pause to rearm before resuming the campaign to wipe Ukraine off the map entirely.

Nor are Putin’s imperial ambitions limited to Ukraine alone. He has repeatedly portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as part of a sacred mission to correct the historical injustice of the Soviet collapse and “return” historically Russian lands. If Putin achieves his goals in Ukraine, he will inevitably look to press home his advantage and “reclaim” other countries that were once part of the Russian Empire. The list of potential targets is long and includes Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, and Moldova. The only way to guarantee their security is by defeating Russia in Ukraine.

Western leaders now have a simple choice: They can provide Ukraine with the support necessary to defeat Russia, or they can prepare to face the Russians themselves in the near future. With every day of delay, the cost of stopping Putin grows. At the moment, it is the Ukrainians alone who are paying this terrible price. However, until Russia is beaten, nobody in the West can take their security for granted. Instead, the threat will only increase.

Ten years ago when the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began, a cautious Putin deployed Russian soldiers without identifying insignia in an attempt to mask his aggressive actions. A decade later, he is now bombing children’s hospitals in the center of a European capital city while his priests and propagandists preach holy war against the West. Clearly, he will not stop until he is stopped.

Vladimir Putin represents the greatest threat to European peace since Adolf Hitler. Today’s generation of Western leaders should recall the lessons of that earlier era before it is too late. They must reject the appeasement of the 1930s and embrace the mantra of “never again” that rose from the ashes of World War II. Until that happens, the Kremlin’s crimes will continue to escalate.

Serhiy Prytula is a Ukrainian volunteer fundraiser and founder of the Prytula Charity Foundation.

An Iranian war criminal’s freedom has a detonating impact on the universal jurisdiction project

Shadi Sadr — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 14:19:20 +0000

Universal jurisdiction, a principle granting a state jurisdiction over crimes against international law even when those crimes occur outside its territory, is rapidly flourishing in law and in practice. In recent weeks, a new law in Germany has precluded the invocation of functional immunity in proceedings for international crimes, regardless of the accused’s rank, while a French court sentenced three Syrian officials in absentia to life imprisonment for war crimes. However, the transfer of a convicted Iranian war criminal by Swedish authorities—under the welcoming gaze of European Union (EU) officials—has raised serious questions about political influence on international accountability and the effectiveness of justice mechanisms that involve substantial taxpayer funding.

On June 15, Hamid Noury, an Iranian national who Swedish courts sentenced to life in prison for war crimes and murder, was released and returned to Iran. This marked the first and only universal jurisdiction case related to atrocity crimes in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noury was arrested in November 2019 at Arlanda Airport in Sweden, and was subsequently tried by the Stockholm District Court over ninety sessions held in 2021–2022. He was found guilty for his role in the massacre of thousands of political prisoners in Iran in the summer of 1988, in what became known as the 1988 massacre, and the appeals court confirmed his sentence in December 2023. Noury’s release was arranged as part of a prisoner swap, during which Iranian authorities freed two Swedish nationals who had been held hostage, according to the unofficial admission of Iranian authorities.

There have been other incidents in which the foreign accused were returned to where they committed crimes for trial purposes.

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Rwanda’s requests to European governments for the return of genocide suspects so they can be brought to justice are an example. There have also been numerous cases of foreign hostages being used as pawns to free individuals detained for or convicted of terrorism, narcotics, or other offenses. However, this was the first time someone convicted of core international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—in a case of universal jurisdiction was transferred back to the same country where they previously enjoyed absolute impunity, only to enjoy it again.

This troubling move was a reaction by the Swedish government to the Islamic Republic’s policy of detaining foreign or Iranian dual nationals and using them as pawns to gain leverage in its dealings with Western countries. Not only was it a slap in the face to the victims, but it also created dangerous precedents that will have a long-lasting, damaging impact on the core purpose of the universal jurisdiction principle—and, more importantly, on the expansion and frequency of its application.

Rooted in the post-World War II trials and recognized by multiple treaties—including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1984 Convention against Torture—the principle of universal jurisdiction is increasingly codified in national legislation. Given the horrific nature of these crimes, humanity as a whole cannot tolerate their remaining unadjudicated. The principle of universal jurisdiction enables national courts in third countries to address atrocity crimes committed abroad, holding perpetrators criminally liable and helping to prevent impunity. One of the most essential purposes of applying the principle of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute those who enjoy impunity in countries where the crimes occurred.

It should be noted that international crimes are often committed by state actors under state policies or plans, meaning that victims cannot expect proper accountability as long as the state in question remains in power. In other words, if the state where the crimes were committed is able or willing to exercise its jurisdiction, other countries generally do not invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators. Similarly, if a person is convicted under universal jurisdiction, and the country where the crime occurred later undergoes a democratic transition, that person can be extradited to the country where the crime was committed to continue serving their sentence. Noury’s return to Tehran was met with a warm welcome by officials, featuring a red carpet, numerous flowers, and a press conference—nothing similar to the reception typically given to a convicted individual who is supposed to serve life in prison.

Setting aside the question of why Sweden pursued universal jurisdiction in the first place if there was no confidence that it would not retreat after facing backlash, it appears Sweden utilized an article (Chapter 12, Article 9) in its constitution that allows the government, “by exercising clemency, to remit or reduce a penal sanction.” Many other countries have similar laws or legislation permitting the transfer of foreign convicted criminals to serve their sentences in their home countries. The Swedish authorities’ decision to use this legislation after a long and costly criminal proceeding, which resulted in a conviction for atrocity crimes, could set a precedent for future cases concerning crimes committed not only in Iran, but in other countries. This approach could jeopardize the very essence of universal jurisdiction and significantly demotivate prosecutors from investigating crimes committed in countries such as Iran, Russia, and China, which have active hostage policies. What would be the point of initiating criminal proceedings and investing millions of taxpayer money if the outcome could potentially leave citizens in dreadful custody situations for months or even years, result in a diplomatic catastrophe, and ultimately deliver an international criminal back to a state that welcomes them warmly?

The international community has correctly identified immunity as a significant obstacle in the fight against impunity, and has moved toward prohibiting or limiting its application in cases involving atrocity crimes. In the same vein, amnesty provisions are considered to “be interpreted as contrary to states’ commitments under international law” in relation to core international crimes. The practice of transferring foreign convicted criminals who have committed atrocity crimes to their home countries, knowing they will be granted some form of clemency or otherwise released from the remainder of their sentences, should also be recognized as a major barrier to accountability.

There is a significant risk that the transfer of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury could lead to similar cases unless the international community addresses its detonating effects on the universal jurisdiction project. The only way to prevent such a paralyzing, contagious impact is to prohibit the transfer of those convicted of atrocity crimes to governments that have previously failed to prosecute them and are unlikely to enforce the sentences properly.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on X: @shadisadr.

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Sapuppo and Magid in Just Security: Death Toll Climbs in Ukraine With Russia’s `Double-Tap’ Strikes

Atlantic Council — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 12:00:00 +0000

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Daragahi joins wbur on Blinken calling on Hamas to accept the ceasefire deal

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 19:00:22 +0000

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Daragahi joins NPR to discuss Netanyahu and the new ceasefire deal

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:59:45 +0000

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Lipner quoted in Jewish Insider on waning American support for Israel

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:59:30 +0000

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Lipner mentioned in Daily Kos on Israel losing American support

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:59:27 +0000

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins Middle East Policy Council to discuss Blinken’s meeting with Netanyahu

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:59:21 +0000

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Alkhatib joins TV2.no to discuss how Israel ensures Hamas’ survival

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:59:05 +0000

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Alkhatib joins France24 to discuss Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

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Warrick referenced in Politico on why so many “day after plans for Gaza amount to no plan at all

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:58:53 +0000

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Panikoff joins Bloomberg TV to discuss Israeli forces freeing four hostages

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:57:44 +0000

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Alkhatib in The Free Press: Israel Killed 31 of My Family Members in Gaza. The Pro-Palestine Movement Isn’t Helping.

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Lipner in Foreign Affairs: Israel Is Losing America

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:57:28 +0000

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More senior Russian officials join Putin on war crimes wanted list

Andrii Mikheiev — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 19:31:45 +0000

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has this week issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Russian army chief Valeriy Gerasimov for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the invasion of Ukraine. Both men face charges related to the bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure during the first winter of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Shoigu and Gerasimov are the latest in a series of senior Kremlin officials including Russian President Vladimir Putin to be targeted with criminal charges relating to the invasion of Ukraine.

The ICC first opened proceedings into Russia’s invasion in March 2022. One year later, arrest warrants were issued for Putin himself and the Russian President’s human rights ombudsman, Maria Lvova-Belova, over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian officials say thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion, with many adopted into Russian families or sent to camps where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to erase their Ukrainian identity. This may qualify as an act of genocide, according to the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute.

In March 2024, the ICC announced new arrest warrants for Russian Air Force long range aviation chief Sergei Kobylash and Russian Black Sea Fleet commander Viktor Sokolov in connection with the bombing of Ukraine’s power grid. ICC prosecutors aim to charge the Russian commanders with the alleged commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity because they say the bombing campaign was part of a state policy of widespread attacks on the civilian population.

This week’s warrants represent a significant step forward in efforts to hold Russia legally accountable for crimes committed in Ukraine. The latest suspects are top Russian military officials and key figures alongside Putin in the leadership of the invasion. Both Gerasimov and Shoigu would be potential suspects in a future prosecution for the crime of aggression. However, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over this crime, while plans to establish a special tribunal remain at the early stages.

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News of the arrest warrants for Shoigu and Gerasimov was welcomed in Ukraine, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling the ICC decision “a clear indication that justice for Russian crimes against Ukrainians is inevitable.” At the same time, there is little prospect of Russian leaders standing trial in The Hague any time soon.

All member countries of the ICC are expected to hand over suspects to the court, but Russia is not a member. Predictably, Russian officials have denounced the court’s latest warrants as part of a “hybrid war” being waged against the country. Ukraine is also not a member of the ICC but has granted the court jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes committed since the start of Russia’s invasion.

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While it remains unlikely that the ICC will be able to enforce its arrest warrants, the charges do have potential practical implications including restrictions on international travel. Indeed, concerns over possible arrest for war crimes are believed to have been instrumental in convincing Putin not to attend last summer’s annual BRICS summit in South Africa. If Shoigu and Gerasimov had any plans to travel internationally, they may now be forced to rethink.

It is also significant that the latest charges include allegations of crimes against humanity. While there is no such thing as an official hierarchy of international crimes, it is generally accepted that crimes against humanity are more serious offenses than war crimes and incur graver penalties. This may help Ukraine to consolidate support for Kyiv’s peace initiatives, while also strengthening international efforts to bring Russia to justice for crimes committed during the invasion.

Russia’s bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid has been a particular focus for ICC investigators. This year’s arrest warrants address the period from October 2022 to March 2023, which saw the first campaign of intensified attacks. However, the bombing has continued, with Russian missile and drone strikes during the first half of 2024 damaging or destroying around half of Ukraine’s remaining power-generating capacity.

This destruction has left Ukraine facing a possible humanitarian catastrophe during the coming winter months. Officials are currently warning that the civilian population may be restricted to six hours of electricity per day at a time when temperatures typically fall well below freezing for extended periods. This underlines the urgency of challenging Russian impunity and demonstrating that senior Russian officials will be held responsible for crimes committed in Ukraine.

Andrii Mikheiev is a lawyer at the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory.

The pardoning and release of a convicted Iranian war criminal is a crime

Lawdan Bazargan — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 10:20:34 +0000

The recent decision by the Swedish government to pardon Hamid Noury, a convicted war criminal involved in mass executions, and to return him to Iran in a prisoner exchange on June 15, sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching consequences. This exchange, involving the release of Swedish diplomat Johan Floderus and dual national Saeed Azizi, highlights the Islamic Republic of Iran’s use of “hostage diplomacy” to achieve its aims.

This exchange has been an agonizing personal blow. Since 1981, when my brother Bijan Bazargan, a college student, was arrested, my family fought tirelessly for his release, clinging to the belief that supporting a political group or distributing pamphlets should not merit a ten-year sentence. In the summer of 1988, my brother was secretly executed, and his body was never returned—making him one of the countless forcibly disappeared.

After years of activism, conferences, and gatherings to expose the horrors of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, Noury’s arrest felt like the hard work of those decades had finally paid off. It was the first time a perpetrator had been held accountable, and this opened a small window of hope. But when the Swedish government pardoned Noury, I was overwhelmed by a sense of betrayal and fury.

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Although this decision saved two innocent people from Iranian jails, it was a mockery of justice. It emboldened a terrorist regime that uses hostage diplomacy to achieve its goals. Noury returned to a hero’s welcome in Iran, with flowers and a red carpet, surrounded by dozens of reporters. He mocked the families of the victims on television, laughing at our pain and the entire justice system. This prisoner swap deeply undermines trust in the international justice system, promotes the desire for revenge and vengeance, and breeds chaos and despair.

While Noury committed war crimes and murder, Floderus had merely traveled to Iran to visit friends and sightsee, and Azizi had gone to Iran to take care of his property’s water leakage. The gross imbalance in this exchange is alarming. How can a state justify swapping individuals detained under dubious circumstances for a man convicted of heinous crimes against humanity?

The case against Hamid Noury

Noury was convicted of war crimes and murder for his role in the 1988 massacre of political prisoners; he was assistant to the deputy prosecutor of Gohardasht prison in Karaj near Tehran. This event saw thousands extrajudicially executed on the orders of founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s fatwa ordered the executors to make decisions “based on prison records and [the] simple question, whether prisoners believed in the Islamic regime or not.” He also instructed them “not to hesitate or show any doubt or be concerned with details…and be most ferocious against infidels,” a reference to political prisoners who did not want to repent and accept the regime’s version of religion and ideology.

On November 9, 2019, during his visit to Sweden, Noury was arrested at Stockholm Airport under the principle of universal jurisdiction. His trial was significant because it was one of the first times someone was held accountable for the 1988 massacre.

Survivors and victims’ families endured an arduous legal battle, participating in ninety-three district court sessions and twenty-two appellate court sessions, while facing constant lies and ridicule from Noury. Throughout the trial, the former official frequently turned his back on the plaintiffs, mocked them, and used derogatory language to demean them. His family exacerbated the situation by filming the plaintiffs and labeling them terrorists who deserved to die.

In 2022, Noury was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the 1988 massacre. At the time, his trial and subsequent conviction in Sweden were celebrated as significant steps for international justice.

However, his return to Iran in a political exchange undermines these achievements, and potentially emboldens other rogue regimes globally.

Injustice is served

On May 29, the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson proposed a draft law to the Legislative Council to expedite the transfer of prison sentences to and from Sweden, aiming to increase the number of convicts serving sentences in their home countries. Plaintiffs were alarmed by this development and began strategizing ways to oppose the amendment, which is set to take effect on July 1, 2025. While preparing for that fight, they were blindsided by the sudden pardon and release of Noury, who was sent back to Iran.

Sweden’s decision to use an existing law to pardon Noury and send him back to Iran raises several legal and ethical questions. The law allows the government to pardon or mitigate a criminal penalty for “exceptional reasons.” However, the legality of applying this law to someone convicted of war crimes is highly dubious. International norms and laws suggest that individuals accused of war crimes should not be eligible for pardons. War crimes are generally considered so egregious that they fall outside the scope of typical criminal acts that might be mitigated or pardoned under domestic laws.

Additionally, as part of his conviction, the Swedish court had ordered Noury to pay reparations to the plaintiffs. Although the amount was symbolic, it represented a debt owed to the victims—some of whom are Swedish citizens. The government should have considered this obligation before deciding to release Noury. Ignoring this debt disregards the justice system’s recognition of the harm caused to the victims and their families.

The public reaction to Noury’s release has been overwhelmingly negative. His release has also created profound disappointment among Iranians and disbelief in international norms and human rights laws. It was already challenging to discuss justice, accountability, and transitional justice, given the Islamic Republic’s forty-six-year history of committing atrocities. These include the chain murders of intellectuals and writers inside Iran during the 1990s, the crushing of the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, the killing of a reported 1,500 protesters during November 2019 (known as “Bloody November”), the killing, blinding, arresting, and torturing of protesters during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and continued transnational repression. The Swedish government’s decision adds to the demands of victims’ family members for retribution and revenge.

This decision—which undermines the principles of accountability and justice the international community has strived to uphold—sends a dangerous message that even those convicted of the most grave human rights abuses can evade justice through political maneuvering.

It also potentially encourages the hostage-taking policies of Russia, Venezuela, and terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and leaves behind numerous foreigners and dual citizens, including at least three Swedish nationals. Hostage diplomacy gives brutal regimes political leverage, allowing them to extract concessions, sanctions relief, or the release of their own imprisoned nationals. Each successful negotiation sets a precedent, suggesting that detaining foreigners can lead to diplomatic engagement and tangible benefits, thereby encouraging the continuation and expansion of these tactics.

This release has left numerous foreigners and dual citizens in imminent danger of execution in Iran—including Swedish national Ahmadreza Jalali, whose death sentence has already been issued. Excluding them from these negotiations sent a clear message that they are not as important as a European diplomat. This decision underscores the need for a more comprehensive approach to international hostage negotiations that value all human lives equally.

Noury’s pardon despite his war crimes conviction risks further emboldening the Islamic Republic. It undermines the independent judiciary system, signaling to other regimes that such serious crimes might not face significant consequences. The Swedish government must be transparent and explain why it made such a decision.

The fight for justice is far from over, and the families of the victims of the Islamic Republic’s atrocities, along with human rights advocates worldwide, continue to call for accountability and the end of impunity for crimes against humanity. The global community must stand firm in this endeavor, ensuring that justice prevails and that the security and dignity of all individuals are upheld.

Lawdan Bazargan is a former political prisoner, human rights activist, and family member of one of the victims of the 1988 prison massacre in Iran. As a member of Victims’ Families for Transitional Justice, she advocates for justice and explores the profound grief of those seeking accountability for the atrocities committed.

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Sweden released an Iranian war criminal. Here’s how activists and rights defenders reacted.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 10:00:50 +0000

On June 15, Sweden released convicted war criminal Hamid Noury and repatriated him to Iran in exchange for the freedom of European diplomat Johan Floderus and a second Swedish citizen, Saeed Azizi, both of whom were arrested in Iran on bogus “national security” charges.

In 2022, a Stockholm court sentenced Noury, an Iranian official, to life in prison for his role in the 1988 prison massacre. According to Amnesty International, between July and September 1988, the Islamic Republic “forcibly disappeared and extrajudicially executed thousands of imprisoned political dissidents in secret and dumped their bodies, mostly in unmarked mass graves.”

Amnesty International had celebrated Noury’s sentencing, calling it an “unprecedented step towards justice for crimes committed in Iran” and saying it sent an “unequivocal, and long overdue, message to the Iranian authorities that those responsible for crimes against humanity in Iran will not escape justice.” But Noury has escaped justice—at least for now.

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Taking hostages has been the Islamic Republic’s vehicle of choice for exfiltrating its agents of terror arrested in Europe and elsewhere. In 2022, BBC Persian’s lead investigative journalist, Hossein Bastani, produced an in-depth report titled “Exfiltrating Regime Agents from Europe.” The report detailed how the Islamic Republic and its proxies wreaked havoc across Europe, and manipulated presidential candidates and election results in France, to strong-arm European governments and secure the release of agents responsible for the assassination of dissidents.

Reacting to Noury’s release, Bastani reshared the report, calling on Iranian activists to revise how they perceive Western powers’ “human rights redlines.”

In the eyes of the Islamic Republic, hostage deals lead to a simple conclusion: “By taking their citizens hostage, it is possible to force Western politicians to do things they claim they would never do, especially since decisions of politicians can be swayed by [public pressure and] election contests. This is while the [Western governments] are dealing with a regime whose policies in this regard are not bound by public opinion”—and it can act with absolute impunity.

Top Islamic Republic officials have never shied away from threatening the world with hostage taking. For instance, while running for president in 2021, Mohsen Rezai, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said, “As a soldier, I vow if the United States even just look at Iran as a military target we will take hostage 1,000 Americans and they will have to pay billions of dollars for releasing each of them.”

Former hostages speak up

Barry Rosen was the press attaché at the US embassy in Tehran when Islamist militants stormed the compound on November 4, 1979. Along with dozens of other Americans, he was held hostage for 444 days until their release in January 1981. The rise of the Islamic Republic in 1979 had heralded a new age of state-sponsored terrorism, and Rosen was among its first victims.

“I refuse to call the release of Hamid Noury a ‘prisoner exchange,’” he told me. “This was an absolute disgrace, especially since the Swedish government did not push for the release of Ahmad Reza Jalali,” a Swedish-Iranian scientist who was arrested in April 2016 while visiting Iran for an academic conference. Falsely charged with espionage, Jalali has been sentenced to death.

Kylie Moore-Gilbert, an Australian-British academic, was invited to a conference in Iran in 2018. When she was leaving the country, Moore-Gilbert was detained by security forces, falsely charged with espionage, and held hostage for two years until November 2020. She was released in exchange for three Iranian nationals convicted of terrorism in Thailand in connection with the 2012 Bangkok bomb plot, as part of a simultaneous terror campaign targeting Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia.

“Anyone in the Iranian opposition who continues to expect that the West will come to their aid in their quest to shake off the Islamic Republic’s decades-long repression is buying into an illusion,” Moore-Gilbert told me. “As these hostage deals have shown, the West is largely impotent in the face of the regime’s malign behavior. Iranians have nobody to rely on other than themselves.”

Rage and resilience

Those who had lost loved ones in the 1988 massacre were angered and heartbroken at the news of Nouri’s release. Others pointed out the false “moralistic” pontification of observers who censured Iranians for celebrating the death in a helicopter crash of President Ebrahim Raisi, nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” for his role in the mass executions of the 1980s.

“Human rights is a circus in the West, and we are the exotic clowns. Western governments will clap us on when it suits them, but when the music dies, it’s business as usual,” an Iranian woman who has dedicated the past five decades of her life to the realization of human rights in Iran told me. She preferred to remain anonymous to protect her safety.

This frustration was echoed by Fariba Balouch, a human rights defender focused on the persecution of the Baluch ethnic minority in Iran. “The Islamic Republic has been in the business of hostage taking for four decades, and the primary target has been the people in Iran,” she told me. “We have been arrested, tortured, and executed; our families taken hostage to silence us. However, we are still standing.”

Despite showing resilience in the face of oppression and threats against Balouch and her family, she also voiced frustration at the international community appeasing the Islamic Republic “through bending backward in the face of their hostage taking,” highlighting how Western powers and the United Nations even offered condolence messages for the death of President Raisi, despite his role in the 1988 massacre.

Balouch said, “The Islamic Republic’s increased hubris and impunity manifest in the plots it has hatched assassination and abduction of journalists and human rights defenders in Europe and the US.”

She warned Western powers that “if the international community does not act now, this regime’s empire of terror will affect more innocent people around the world.”

While voicing frustration, most human right defenders and legal minds working on Iran still believe in their path and the struggle.

Leading human rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar told me, “Hamid Noury is nothing but a dead man walking. Yes, his release and repatriation have marred the face of justice. However, it was not only him who was convicted in court. Thanks to the efforts of Iranians and the independent Swedish court system, his fair trial also unveiled the Islamic Republic’s war crimes.”

While prominent Iranian human rights defender Atena Daemi told me, “This was not the first time that Western governments prioritized short-term interests over human rights and justice. This is not the first time that they have indulged in appeasement when facing the Islamic Republic’s extortion, coercion, and hostage taking. In light of this reality, the people in Iran, who are fighting for freedom, who have time and again suffered from false promises of Western governments, have realized that they should not hope for Western support for the liberation of Iran.”

The staff attorney at the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), who prefers to remain anonymous to protect their security, also believes there is no time for despair.

“The release of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury is terrible,” she said, “but we should not see it as a devastating defeat for accountability.”

She added, “Noury’s trial was a significant victory, as it established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the occurrence of war crimes by the regime for the first time. Feeling frustrated and defeated is easy but not productive. Persistence pays. We need to strategize for future cases and learn valuable lessons here.”

Frontline defender and teacher Diako Alavi, who left Iran recently after facing persecution for his involvement in the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, argues that a missing piece in overthrowing the Islamic Republic and putting an end to its terror and hostage taking is “establishing institutions that can replace the regime when it is toppled. The onus is on democratic forces that aim to topple this oppressive regime. Before that certain day arrives, we need institutions that would preserve and protect the flow of life post-Islamic Republic.”

Gissou Nia, founder and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council, argued that it would be a mistake rooted in shortsightedness for countries to see Noury’s release as a reason not to undertake more robust accountability efforts. “They should instead invest better in the rule of law and establish mechanisms for holding hostage takers accountable,” she said. “There is a lack of understanding over what the problem is and how to best deal with it. The hostage situations are being treated as an ad hoc piecemeal problem when in reality it is part of a much larger pattern.”

Fighting the Islamic Republic is an uphill battle. Those who are on the frontlines and gaze into the darkness of this regime’s terror and oppression need to constantly fortify their spirits against both despair and false hope. Yes, world powers will continue negotiating with the Islamic Republic and make shortsighted concessions that will endanger not only the future of Iran but also global security. However, the fight for the liberation of Iran is not over—at least for Iranians.
Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

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How to stop governments from trafficking people

John Cotton Richmond — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 14:26:25 +0000

Common images of human trafficking often focus on pimps compelling their victims into commercial sexual exploitation or criminal networks targeting migrants seeking a better future. But what about when the trafficker is not an individual criminal, corporation, or cartel, but instead is a government? The United Nations (UN) estimated in 2022 that governments are trafficking at least 3.9 million people on any given day. These victims of state-sanctioned human trafficking constitute 14 percent of today’s estimated modern slavery victims.

On Monday, the US State Department released a new report that shines perhaps the strongest light yet on foreign governments’ human trafficking offenses.

Which governments are traffickers?

In 2019, the US Congress mandated that the State Department identify which governments have a policy or pattern of human trafficking. The new 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) marks the fifth year the State Department has declared that governments exploit people in forced labor and sex trafficking.

Over the last five years, the State Department has identified thirteen countries engaged in this human rights violation, and nine governments have been on the list for all five years. In the 2024 TIP Report, thirteen countries are listed as traffickers, including China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Sudan earned a spot on the list for the first time.

It should surprise no one that governments are trafficking people. For most of recorded history, monarchs, czars, emperors, sultans, pharaohs, chiefs, and other tyrants advancing their empires, governments, and central committees have driven the slave trade. Today, these trafficking patterns vary by country.

China: In China, the government forces Uyghurs to work in commercial facilities in Xinjiang and compels laborers in its Belt and Road Initiative around the world. China’s unapologetic embrace of slavery caused a unanimous US Senate to pass the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, known as UFLPA, which bars the importation of slave-made goods into the United States.

Cuba: The fact that Cuba rakes in eight billion dollars annually from its Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) is stunning. What is worse is that Cuba forces medical workers into the program, and the government siphons off the workers’ earnings. Cuban victims have sued PAHO in US federal courts, and Cuba has drawn condemnation from the international community. At the State Department rollout event for the 2024 TIP Report, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conferred a “Trafficking in Persons Hero Award” to Maria Werlau, an activist fighting back against Cuba’s record of trafficking.

Eritrea: In Eritrea, the government forces the poor and vulnerable into extended terms of compelled government service. Those with resources and connections can avoid government-forced labor.

Turkmenistan: The government of Turkmenistan continues the old Soviet practice of forcing individuals to harvest cotton. The reforms by its neighbor Uzbekistan, which drastically reduced state-sanctioned forced labor in the cotton harvest—from 2.5 million victims in 2007 to eradicating forced labor in 2022—provide a helpful comparison. While Uzbekistan’s reforms have caused the Cotton Campaign and major fashion brands to lift their self-imposed ban on Uzbek cotton, the government of Turkmenistan has refused to use free, market-based laborers in its cotton harvest.

Typical interventions do not apply

The UN provides an estimate of 3.9 million state-sanctioned trafficking victims, and the TIP Report lists the offending countries. Yet, the world needs a plan to address this aspect of the human trafficking crisis. When dealing with individual traffickers or organized crime, the typical interventions include encouraging countries to increase victim identification, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. To care for survivors, governments and civil society organizations must provide tailored services that appreciate the trauma traffickers inflicted. None of these interventions make sense when the government is the bad guy. It is absurd to ask Afghanistan or Burma to investigate itself or to hold itself accountable.

The path forward

Those focused on foreign policy and the plight of those whom governments abuse must find a new path forward. Interventions that may work to incentivize governments to cease enslaving people include:

Transparency and reporting: Exposing these abuses globally could motivate some countries to abandon forced labor. The TIP Report itself, along with other government and civil society reports, is an effort to shed light on these abuses.

Banning tainted products: Several countries are attempting to block slave-made goods from entering their markets. The United States, for example, relies on the Tariff Act and the new UFLPA. The European Union is poised to enact a new law banning all products made with forced labor from its markets this year.

Sanctions: Countries can target individuals, companies, or other governments by imposing financial penalties, freezing assets, or refusing visas for engaging in forced labor. Global Magnitsky Act sanctions focus on human rights violators; the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act restricts Iran, North Korea, and Russia’s movement of money; and the TIP Report’s Tier 3 sanctions focus on countries that are not making significant efforts to meet antitrafficking minimum standards. While the effectiveness is debatable, many agree that the more narrowly targeted the sanctions, the more likely these efforts are to produce change.

Private sector incentives and disincentives: The private sector is often more agile than bureaucrats striving for change. The large fashion brands that pledged not to use Uzbek cotton made a significant impact when a reform-minded leader took to the helm of Uzbekistan’s government. Likewise, companies operating or sourcing from a country can engage in commercial diplomacy by building coalitions and using their investment to demand reforms. While public justice systems are central to stopping criminal traffickers, addressing state-sanctioned human trafficking requires foreign policy and advocacy solutions. The millions of people oppressed by their governments need people of goodwill to create new initiatives that shift exploitative government policies into processes that bring freedom.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served as the US ambassador to monitor and combat trafficking in persons from 2018 to 2021. Follow him on X, formerly Twitter, @JohnRichmond1.

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Kyiv Pride event highlights changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine

Aleksander Cwalina — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 21:38:28 +0000

On June 16, members of Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community and allies gathered in central Kyiv to celebrate the first Pride March in the Ukrainian capital since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The event highlighted changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine as the country stands defiant against Russia and embraces a European future.

Hundreds of kilometers from Kyiv on the front lines of the war with Russia, the Ukrainian LGBTQI+ community is also present within the ranks of the military among Ukrainians of all ethnic backgrounds and religions defending the country. While calculating the exact number of LGBTQI+ soldiers is challenging, a 2023 article in Britain’s Daily Telegraph estimated that between two and seven percent of serving personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces are members of the LGBTQI+ community.

Some serve openly, sporting symbols such as a unicorn patch below the blue and yellow national colors of Ukraine on their military uniform. In many cases, they do so to demonstrate that, contrary to assertions from Russian propagandists and other opponents, LGBTQI+ Ukrainians are just as willing to defend their country as other Ukrainians.

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The increasing openness in Ukraine toward issues of sexual orientation and identity stands in stark contrast to the deteriorating situation in regions of the country currently under Kremlin control. Throughout occupied Ukraine, the LGBTQI+ community faces the reality of draconian Russian legislation that often prevents them from defending their rights and sets the stage for serious human rights abuses.

According to Nash Svit, a Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organization, these abuses include public humiliation, torture, extortion, and sexual violence. The National LGBTQ Consortium in Ukraine has documented a similarly oppressive atmosphere of increased fear and violence in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and the Crimean peninsula following Russian occupation in 2014.

In Russia itself, LGBTQI+ individuals have long featured in the ever-growing category of scapegoated groups, where they are joined by representatives of the free media, civil society, and the country’s tiny anti-war opposition as proxy targets in the Kremlin’s campaign against the West. Scores of LGBTQI+ Russians have fled the country in recent years, citing a mounting climate of insecurity and oppression. Those who remain face routine discrimination along with threats to their livelihood and personal safety.

In line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasingly radical anti-Western rhetoric, last year Russia’s Supreme Court declared the “international LGBTQ movement” a terrorist and extremist organization. The Russian authorities have since used this ruling to convict Russians of displaying the rainbow flag, raid LGBTQI+ clubs, and brand LGBTQI+ activists as foreign agents.

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The oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Putin’s Russia has sparked debate across the border and helped persuade many in traditionally conservative Ukraine to reject homophobia. A June 2023 poll found that more than 70% of Ukrainians believe members of the LGBTQI+ community should have the same rights as any other Ukrainian citizen, representing a significant increase from prewar levels of social acceptance.

Despite indications of progress, significant challenges remain. While LGBTQI+ individuals can now serve openly in the Ukrainian military, many say they face difficulties not experienced by non-LGBTQI+ soldiers. Efforts are ongoing to secure equal partner rights, including the right of same-sex partners to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner in case of injury, and to receive the same state benefits for military service.

Amid the unprecedented trauma and turbulence of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the issue of LGBTQI+ rights remains on Ukraine’s political agenda and continues to gain traction. In 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged growing demand for recognition of same-sex civil unions. A year later, Ukrainian MP Ivana Sovsun formally introduced a bill on civil unions.

Current trends look set to continue. As Ukraine takes additional steps toward membership of the European Union, the accession process will include a growing focus on Ukrainian human rights legislation. This will include measures to bring Ukrainian law into line with EU standards, meaning the likely introduction of greater legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community is in many ways at the forefront of the struggle against Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian brand of Russian imperialism. From the LGBTQI+ soldiers on the front lines of the war to the activists pushing for social change in Kyiv, the community plays a vital role in Ukraine’s ongoing European integration and defense against the Kremlin’s anti-Western crusade.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukraine’s peace summit offers solidarity but no breakthroughs

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 18 Jun 2024 19:06:16 +0000

Over the weekend of June 15-16, almost one hundred representatives of countries from around the globe and several international organizations gathered in Switzerland for a Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Described by some commentators as “the largest diplomatic effort” in Ukraine’s history, the summit was designed to rally international support for the Ukrainian vision of a peaceful, sustainable, and just settlement to the war sparked by Russia’s invasion.

While the event produced some encouraging signals and shone a light on how Russia’s invasion affects the broader international community, it did not produce any major diplomatic breakthroughs. Instead, the summit represented a small but significant step forward in what looks set to be a far longer peace process.

The absence of many leading nations from the Global South did much to weaken the summit’s potential impact, suggesting that Ukrainian diplomats still have much work to do at the bilateral level. Significantly, key participating countries including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia chose not to sign the official summit communique supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Since 2022, these countries have all been hesitant to back Ukraine or openly condemn Russia’s invasion.

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The event in Switzerland came during a period of intense diplomatic activity for Ukraine. On the eve of the peace summit, G7 leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan financed by interest on Russian assets that remain frozen in Europe and the US. On the sidelines of the G7 meeting, the US and Ukraine signed a landmark ten-year bilateral security agreement. During the peace summit itself, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was also able to hold bilateral meetings with a number of leaders from Global South nations including Argentina, Chile, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Ukraine came to the summit hoping to galvanize international support for President Zelenskyy’s ten-point peace plan. In particular, Kyiv officials sought to emphasize the importance of advancing nuclear safety, protecting food security, releasing prisoners of war, and returning Ukrainian children abducted by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. In a broader sense, the event also aimed to keep ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine in the international spotlight.

Ultimately, seventy-eight countries signed the final communique recognizing that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must serve as the basis for any future peace agreement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sought to downplay expectations regarding the event, noting that peace could not be achieved in a single step. The summit was not a peace negotiation because Putin is not serious about ending the war, she commented. “He is insisting on capitulation. He is insisting on ceding Ukrainian territory, even territory that today is not occupied by him. He is insisting on disarming Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to future aggression. No country would ever accept these outrageous terms,” stated von der Leyen in reference to a rival peace plan unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the Swiss summit.

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Russia did not receive an invitation to participate in the peace summit. Crucially, China also chose not to attend. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested Putin had asked China to turn down Ukraine’s invitation. In the build-up to the event, President Zelenskyy also accused Beijing of working to discourage others from attending Ukraine’s peace initiative. Meanwhile, a number of participating countries from the Global South spoke in Switzerland of the need to involve Russia in any future peace process.

While the Kremlin’s apparent spoiling tactics failed to derail Ukraine’s peace initiative entirely, Russian influence did nevertheless loom large over the Swiss summit and is clearly still a significant factor. China’s decision not to back the event was arguably even more important, with many observers arguing that Beijing’s stance succeeded in preventing the emergence of a more global consensus on the path toward peace in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the participation of numerous countries regarded as being on good terms with the Kremlin underlined the potential of this peace initiative, with the likes of Qatar, Hungary, and Serbia all signing the final communique. While some had hoped for a more meaningful outcome, this modest progress should be enough to convince Kyiv officials and the country’s partners that additional diplomatic efforts in this direction are worthwhile and may yet produce results.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Razing the dead: Contextualizing IDF cemetery desecration in Gaza

Charles Johnson — Fri, 14 Jun 2024 14:38:21 +0000

As Israel’s war in Gaza continues, CNN uncovered a pattern of cemetery desecration throughout the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) military advance into the Gaza Strip. The article highlights two satellite images depicting an unspecified Shajaiya cemetery, with the first image showing an aerial view of tombstones dotting either side of a small road. With a click, these tombstones disappear, revealing an image of blown-out buildings and razed earth. Contrasting narratives arise between these images, with enormous implications for how military personnel, policymakers, and the public interpret the conflict and its security and humanitarian ramifications.

Cemetery desecration and Gaza

Responding to CNN’s identification of sixteen such scenes from around Gaza, the IDF offered two explanations. First, the organization explained the military necessity for the operations, accusing Hamas of using cemeteries for military purposes, an accusation the Israeli military has levied before. In 2007, an Israeli airstrike destroyed Sheikh Radwan Cemetery. Accounts of the strike varied, but an IDF spokesperson pinned the destruction on “secondary explosions” caused by a Hamas arms dump and rocket-launching site nearby. The IDF also provided video evidence of an alleged Hamas rocket launch from an unnamed cemetery during the 2014 Gaza War. In response to these attacks, the IDF shelled cemeteries in Gaza City and Rafah. While CNN could not confirm the alleged usage in the current conflict, Amnesty International has traced Hamas’s consistent use of human shields to 2007, bolstering the IDF’s claims.

Challenging this explanation, some legal analysts have noted that an attack targeting a cemetery would not be automatically legal under international law. Furthermore, the IDF also stands accused of using cemeteries for military operations. CNN discovered a makeshift road for IDF vehicles cutting through a bulldozed cemetery, and Scripps News provided evidence of this practice at multiple locations, with advance teams clearing graves as IDF vehicles approached to allow for quicker passage through the cemeteries. CNN also found indications at other sites that the IDF has used Palestinian cemeteries as staging grounds, “leveling large swaths and erecting berms to fortify their positions.”

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The IDF’s second claim addresses the ongoing Israeli hostage crisis in Gaza. The IDF stated that its mission to find and return the estimated forty-three bodies of deceased Israeli hostages necessitates the exhumation of various sites, including Palestinian cemeteries.

Contrasting the IDF narrative are several reports demonstrating that the IDF improperly handled Palestinian bodies in those cemeteries. In the process of extracting corpses, the IDF reportedly damaged tombstones and left body parts exposed. Moreover, according to one Palestinian doctor, the IDF did not record information about the bodies’ identities or locations while exhuming, posing challenges for officials and Palestinian families trying to claim their dead. Instead, reports show that the Israeli government verified that the bodies did not belong to Israeli hostages and then returned the 180 exhumed Palestinian corpses to southern Gaza, where they now wait in mass and anonymous graves for DNA testing and repatriation.

Cemetery desecration and history

Cemetery desecration is not a new phenomenon, having featured in several conflicts and genocides over the past century. Indeed, the IDF’s first explanation for attacks on cemeteries fits into a pattern of militant tactics in a couple of Middle East conflicts.

In the 2003 Battle of Najaf, al-Mahdi troops in Iraq used Wadi al-Salaam (Valley of Peace), the world’s largest cemetery, as cover to wage war on US forces. More than a decade later, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) began employing a similar tactic, constructing eighteen cemeteries around southwest Turkey and allegedly using the sites as bases and hideouts to further their fight against the Turkish government. In response, Turkey ordered the sites’ demolition, culminating in government attacks on the cemeteries in 2015.

However, the IDF’s alleged treatment of cemeteries outside of direct conflict with Hamas is also noteworthy, given cemetery desecration’s well-established place in the history of genocide. Cemetery desecration and genocide are so intimately linked that Raphael Lemkin, coiner of the term “genocide,” even recommended outlawing the practice in early drafts of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Great Britain and France ultimately rejected the inclusion, largely due to their engagement in cultural genocide as part of colonial projects. Still, the political decision does not diminish the fundamental role cemetery desecration has played in genocide.

For instance, white settlers in the United States frequently desecrated Indigenous burial grounds in a centuries-long campaign of cultural destruction and ethnic cleansing. Likewise, Nazis desecrated and destroyed countless Jewish cemeteries during the Holocaust, often using headstones as construction materials in a blatant effort to excise both Jewish people and Jewish heritage from occupied German territories.

Desecrating Muslim cemeteries in genocide is also nothing new. In the lead-up to the Srebrenica genocide, Bosnian Serbs inflicted mass atrocities against Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim community, including the destruction of thirty-five Muslim cemeteries. Similarly, in China’s genocide of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, the government has leveled nearly one hundred cemeteries in what the Uyghur Human Rights Project has labeled a “cultural genocide.”

Cemetery desecration and peace

The parallels between cemetery desecration in these historical examples and the current conflict are cause for considerable concern. Hamas is likely using cemeteries for military purposes, and Israel has the right to respond in line with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. However, the alleged IDF practice of razing these sites for military operations, as well as the destructive exhumations of Palestinian bodies without diligent cataloging, is unacceptable and demands further attention.

The conflict in Gaza highlights the dire need to revisit colonial-era shortcomings in understanding and addressing the crime of genocide. Humanitarian organizations will—and should—prioritize living individuals suffering from conflict. But helping the living is not mutually exclusive with preserving the lineage and history tying a community to a conflicted territory.

When the IDF razes Gazan cemeteries, it also razes Palestinian heritage, culture, and claims to the land. This fact is often lost in conversations about long-term security and postwar peace. Ending a conflict goes beyond merely fighting militants in a graveyard to gain one strategic position after another. Israel implicitly acknowledges this fact in vocalizing its mission to reclaim all Israeli hostages, both living and deceased. But any path toward an enduring peace will require not only security for the living, but also assured dignity for the dead.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. He is a junior at the University of Kansas majoring in history, political science, and religious studies.

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Sanctioning the ICC over Israel is a strategic misstep for the US

Ibrahim Al-Assil — Thu, 13 Jun 2024 18:52:35 +0000

In late May, the Joe Biden administration announced its opposition to sanctions that Republicans in Congress are promoting against International Criminal Court (ICC) officials in reaction to the ICC prosecutor’s decision to file applications for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant concerning the Gaza war. Earlier this month, on June 4, the US House of Representatives passed a bill to impose sanctions against the ICC. While the US-ICC relationship is historically complicated, the possibility of sanctioning the court is strategically futile and undermines long-term US interest in an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. The Biden administration should maintain its position.

The decision by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to seek arrest warrants against a head of state who enjoys support from the West is unprecedented. While the United States has never been a member of the ICC, it participated in the negotiations that led to the court’s creation. In the subsequent years, the United States actively supported—or at least did not impede—the court’s investigation and prosecution of international atrocity crimes in Darfur, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, and recently, Ukraine.

During the Donald Trump administration, however, the United States was hostile to the ICC. In 2020, President Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions and travel restrictions on ICC officials involved in investigating alleged war crimes by US personnel in Afghanistan. Then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described the ICC as “an unaccountable political institution masquerading as a legal body.” Although the ICC investigations in Afghanistan remained ongoing in 2021, the Biden administration revoked these sanctions, signaling a shift in policy and a more cooperative stance toward the court. In that same statement, Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted that the administration still disagrees with the ICC investigations in Afghanistan and during the Gaza war and called to reform the court to “achieve its core mission of serving as a court of last resort in punishing and deterring atrocity crimes.”

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The United States’ most recent admonition of the ICC over its allegation that Israeli leadership has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity has legal and political dimensions. Legal experts, such as Gissou Nia and Elise Baker of the Atlantic Council, argued that the OTP’s decision to request warrants is legally and jurisdictionally sound. Politically, however, US support for the ICC is more complicated, particularly in this case. The reason for this is twofold: first, protection of US military personnel and, second, protecting US allies from ICC prosecution, both now and in the future. The argument around protecting US personnel implies that the United States has something to hide, echoing Russia’s anti-ICC stances. Interfering in the work of the court on behalf of US allies also echoes the behavior of Russia and China, which notoriously stepped in to protect Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad from the ICC in 2014.

President Biden has emphasized the importance of a rules-based international order, consistent with the US support for the ICC’s warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. However, Biden’s vision for a rules-based world has been widely criticized due to what appears to be unconditional support for Israel in Gaza. If the administration chooses to sanction the ICC, it would display inconsistency and undermine Biden’s efforts to distinguish his administration from those of Barack Obama and Trump, both of whom were criticized for fluctuating foreign policy stances and values. With that, the United States would concede to Russia and China that great-power competition would be based on their values of selective interference and legal reasoning, not acclaimed, consistent US values.

The existence of the ICC benefits the United States by helping maintain order in an increasingly unstable world. As the world moves into the second quarter of the twenty-first century, with great-power competition involving China and Russia as a major theme, many middle powers are finding more space to avoid pressure by hedging their alliances. This hedging allows these middle powers greater latitude to resist any US efforts against domestic or regional conflicts. Isolated ideological regimes like those in Syria and North Korea do not need to meet economic demands to survive; their legitimacy comes from their authoritarian control and mafia-like rule of society.

In contrast, middle and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) must remain connected to the world. They will take seriously the risk of being targeted by the ICC if the court is allowed to operate effectively. However, these countries are not members of the ICC, and the lack of prosecution against their governments and others for alleged atrocities limits the ICC’s ability to influence their behavior and casts doubt on its credibility. By sanctioning ICC officials, the United States forfeits a potential deterrent against human rights violations and sets a dangerous precedent for nations seeking Chinese or Russian protection from future ICC prosecutions.

On a strategic level, Biden’s support for Israel aligns with his support for other allies like Ukraine and Taiwan. However, this conflict is distinct and multilayered. In part, it is a war between Israel and Hamas but Israel is also fighting Iran-led Axis of Resistance proxies in the region. On these two layers, the Biden administration should continue to offer Israel the support it needs to defend itself. But this is not the whole image or what this conflict is all about. There are other crucial layers, including the historical conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. This layer should be treated differently and, in this circumstance, the administration can and should carve out a space in its policy that does not protect Netanyahu and Gallant. It is widely recognized that this conflict cannot be resolved through military means alone—a sentiment Biden has acknowledged.

Regardless of whether Biden sanctions the ICC, Netanyahu will likely become a lame duck on the international scene, as countries might avoid inviting him due to the ICC’s announcement. This includes France and Germany, which backed the legitimacy of the OTP announcement. This has played out before. Despite Putin’s global clout and close ties to South Africa, a fellow member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), he couldn’t travel to attend the summit hosted by Johannesburg in August 2023. South Africa, a member of the ICC, initially criticized the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin, with its minister of justice citing “inconsistency” in the court’s work. President Cyril Ramaphosa also tried to get an exemption from the ICC to avoid arresting Putin if he attended the summit. In the end, however, South Africa complied and urged Putin not to attend.

The ICC is not perfect. It has faced legitimate criticism regarding the politicization of its cases and the OTP’s failure to pursue cases against certain perpetrators of atrocities, such as the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran or Syria’s Assad, even in instances where the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over their crimes—and despite many requests to do so. However, it remains a multilateral institution born from the US-led world order, aiming to hold individuals accountable for core international crimes. Supporting the ICC, or at minimum not undermining it, is ultimately in the US interest, as is promoting justice and adherence to international law.

By restraining itself from being hostile to the ICC, the Biden administration demonstrates a much-needed consistency, reinforces the rules-based order that the president champions, and enhances US credibility on the global stage. Ultimately, this aligns with core US interests in promoting global stability and upholding the principles of international law. This will also help the administration focus on what truly matters: ending the war, returning the hostages, and pushing for a two-state solution to resolve the conflict.

Ibrahim Al-Assil is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X: @ibrahimalassil.

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Intentionally vague: How Saudi Arabia and Egypt abuse legal systems to suppress online speech

Dina Sadek, Layla Mashkoor, Iain Robertson, Andy Carvin — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 11:00:00 +0000

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Egypt and Saudi Arabia are weaponizing vaguely written domestic media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws to target and suppress dissent, opposition, and vulnerable groups. Political leaders in Egypt and Saudi Arabia often claim that their countries’ judicial systems enjoy independence and a lack of interference, a narrative intended to distance the states from the real and overzealous targeting and prosecution of critics. Such claims can be debunked and dismissed, as the Egyptian and Saudi governments have had direct involvement in establishing and implementing laws that are utilized to target journalists and human rights defenders.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia were selected as case studies for this report because of their status as among the most frequently documented offenders in the region when it comes to exploiting ambiguously written laws to target and prosecute journalists, critics, activists, human rights defenders, and even apolitical citizens. The two countries have consolidated power domestically, permitting them to utilize and bend their domestic legal systems to exert control over the online information space. Punishments for those targeted can involve draconian prison sentences, travel bans, and fines, which result in a chilling effect that consequently stifles online speech and activities, preventing citizens from discussing political, social, and economic issues.

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia enacted media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws with ambiguous language and unclear definitions of legal terms, allowing for flexible interpretations of phrases such as “false information,” “morality,” or “family values and principles.” The laws in both countries also loosely define critical terms like “terrorism,” thereby facilitating expansive interpretations of what constitutes a terrorist crime. Further, anti-terror laws now include articles that connect the “dissemination of false information” with terrorist acts. This vague and elastic legal language has enabled the Egyptian and Saudi regimes to prosecute peaceful citizens on arbitrary grounds, sometimes handing out long prison sentences or even death sentences, undermining respect for the rule of law in the two countries.

This report explores the development of media, cybercrime, and counterterrorism laws in both countries, and demonstrates through case studies how Saudi Arabia and Egypt weaponize the laws to prosecute opposition figures and control narratives online. This report examines the relationship between criminal charges tied to one’s professional activities or online speech and how those charges can trigger online smear campaigns and harassment. In cases that involve women, gender-based violence is often used to harm a woman’s reputation. Though a direct correlation between judicial charges and online harassment cannot be ascertained, these case studies suggest that dissidents are likely to face online harm following legal persecution, even after they are released.

The terrible cost of Russia’s war is being felt far beyond the battlefield

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 19:48:34 +0000

Delegates from around 160 countries will gather in Switzerland on June 15-16 as the country hosts a Summit on Peace in Ukraine. The goal of the two-day event is to develop a “common understanding” on a possible path toward a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

This new peace initiative comes at a critical point in the Russia-Ukraine War. More than two years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there remains no end in sight to what is the largest European conflict since World War II. Instead, Vladimir Putin’s invading army is once again advancing, and has recently attempted to open a new front with a cross-border offensive close to Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv.

In parallel to these front line advances, the Russian military is also conducting in a nationwide bombing campaign that appears designed to terrorize Ukrainian civilians and force millions to flee their homes by making large parts of the country uninhabitable. Since the beginning of 2024, Russia has damaged or destroyed around half of Ukraine’s remaining energy generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts. Meanwhile, recent air strikes against civilian targets such as shopping centers have left dozens dead. This air offensive illustrates how the escalating costs of the conflict are being felt far beyond the battlefield.

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The most immediate consequences of Russia’s invasion have been carnage and destruction on an unprecedented scale for twenty-first century Europe. Military losses on both sides have not been officially disclosed and remain hotly disputed, but are widely believed to be in the hundreds of thousands. A similar number of soldiers have suffered life-changing injuries.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have likely been killed during the invasion. Large numbers of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to Russia, including thousands of children. Many more have been abducted and remain missing. A long list of Ukrainian towns, villages, and entire cities have been reduced to rubble.

Even for those who have escaped physical injury or the loss of property, Russia’s invasion has often had a devastating impact. Almost everybody in Ukraine has lost a friend, acquaintance, or family member in the war. Experts are already warning that Ukrainian society must prepare to deal with major mental health challenges for decades to come.

The demographic situation is equally alarming. Around a quarter of Ukraine’s prewar population have been forced to flee their homes, becoming either internally displaced or leaving the country for the neighboring EU. This has led to a dramatic decline in Ukraine’s overall population. The longer the war continues, the less likely it becomes that Ukrainian refugees will return home.

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In areas such as education, the costs of Russia’s invasion are severe and will likely be long-lasting. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine ranked among the world’s most educated populations. However, ongoing hostilities now threaten this status. A generation of young Ukrainians have had their schooling and university studies disrupted or derailed entirely by the war. Inevitably, many have chosen to continue their studies abroad. The same is true for Ukrainian academics. This wartime brain drain represents a massive blow to Ukraine’s future.

The Ukrainian economy has displayed remarkable resilience over the past two years of full-scale war, but even this cannot disguise the harm done by Russia’s invasion. With almost twenty percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation or close enough to the front lines to make normal business activities impossible, many companies have had to relocate or cease operations entirely. Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has created further logistical problems, while also reducing export revenues and depriving the Ukrainian authorities of taxes.

Finally, with Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies focused on war-related priorities and as employment options become more limited, crime is becoming a mounting challenge. According to recent research, most Ukrainian organized crime groups have severed longstanding ties with their Russian counterparts, but remain active and continue to seek opportunities created by wartime realities.

From mental health and population decline to the economy and education, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian society that will be felt for generations to come. This should be at the forefront of people’s minds as they gather in Switzerland to discuss how to end the war and establish a sustainable peace for Ukrainians.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Shekufe Bar — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 16:18:04 +0000

“People of Iran are held hostage…I want to specifically talk about Toomaj Salehi, a singer who faces execution because of his artistic creation…do not allow the Islamic Republic to do this to its own people,” said Iranian director Mohammad Rasoulof during his Cannes speech on May 25.

Just a week before his Cannes debut, the internationally acclaimed filmmaker fled Iran on foot after being handed an eight-year sentence and other judgments for clandestinely making his latest movie, The Seed of the Sacred Fig. That film, which defies mandatory hijab restrictions and uses the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising as a backdrop, went on to win the Special Jury Prize at the 2024 Cannes Film Festival.

In recent weeks, the Iranian government’s unprecedented punitive measures against Rasoulof and dissident rapper Toomaj, as he is known to his followers, have ignited widespread controversy, sparking condemnations from civil rights and human rights bodies alike.

These recent decisions have set new precedents in the history of a regime notorious for its draconian punishments.

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Rasoulof’s sentencing was the harshest ever imposed on a filmmaker in the history of the Islamic Republic, topping the six years given to fellow director Jafar Panahi. Meanwhile, the death sentence issued by Iran’s judiciary for Toomaj marks an unprecedented decision against a singer.

Open criticism of the regime is what both artists have in common.

To observers, the Islamic Republic’s generic enmity toward artists is now an open secret. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and his coterie firmly believed from the start that to cement theocratic governance, cultural reform is indispensable. Soon after, artists faced bans and expulsions over the “un-Islamic” nature of their profession and any open disapproval of the new order.

The censorship hit the music and film communities particularly hard. Before the revolution, these industries had flourished in Iran’s liberal climate during the 1960s and 1970s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

For more than four decades, artists in these fields have been under renewed pressure. At least two prominent directors died suspiciously: Kiyumars Pourahmad in April 2023 and Dariush Mehrjui and his spouse, Vahideh Mohammadifar, in October of the same year. There have also been reports of artists diagnosed with autoimmune diseases after prison release, such as actress Taraneh Alidoosti and filmmaker Mostafa al-Ahmad. Combined with the handing down of exceptionally long terms or capital punishment to artists in the past year, this translates into an anti-art revenge campaign in response to the Women, Life, Freedom uprising.

The sustained support from film-industry professionals and musicians during popular uprisings in Iran—notably during the disputed 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement and throughout the Women, Life, Freedom movement—has positioned artists and celebrities as a thorn in the side of the regime, something intelligence agents and authorities have shown they will not tolerate.

According to reformist newspaper Shargh, within just two months after the Women, Life, Freedom uprising kicked off in 2022, nearly one hundred artists were sentenced or banned from working and leaving the country because of comments in support of the protests and defiance of mandatory hijab rules.

In October 2023, the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture imposed acting bans on at least twenty prominent actresses, including Alidoosti, the star of Asghar Farhadi’s Oscar-winning film The Salesman. The women had either posed without hijab on social media or openly supported the protests.

Exile and boycott

The Women, Life, Freedom uprising marked the culmination of a long-running regime face-off with artists, with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and intelligence authorities spearheading the confrontation.

The escalating repression has led to many artists choosing self-exile, with Rasoulof a recent example. Indeed, of the twenty-person ban list, nearly half now reside outside Iran. This trend is part of an ongoing exodus of artists fleeing widespread censorship since the 1979 revolution.

Many independent artists who remain in Iran have suspended their activities due to working bans or personal reluctance to engage in the current oppressive political climate, which has only gotten worse since the popular uprisings began in September 2022.

The artistic community’s concerted boycott of the state-sponsored Fajr Artistic Festivals—annually held by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to commemorate the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution—over the past two years highlights that these artists might never return to the scene as long as stifling cultural policies and hijab restrictions remain.

Oscar-winning filmmaker Farhadi’s refusal to make a movie in Iran under mandatory hijab in cinema indicates this decisive shift. He revealed the decision in an interview with French newspaper Le Monde in early 2024.

Despite this, artistic productions have not come to a standstill in Iran. Pro-regime artists and those who have never questioned authorities continue to work.

Such projects are often funded by two major media producers in Iran: the state broadcaster known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Owj Arts and Media Organization, the arts and production body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These state-owned entities currently monopolize hundreds of smaller media outlets and production firms, and also monitor the activities of independent media companies. IRIB and Owj productions are primarily used to spread regime propaganda.

The Owj Arts and Media Organization has strategically taken over Iran’s media-production landscape through an expanded and intricate network of connections with broadcaster IRIB and security and cultural authorities. With an estimated budget of $2 million in 2024, it funnels cultural money into various visual genres. High-profile and controversial Owj productions include the television spy series Gando, an Iranian version of the Israeli show Fauda, and musical theater Esfandiyar’s Seven Labors, based on the seminal Persian epic poem the Shahnameh.

Breaking free of long-standing taboos

Amid the boycotting of state-sponsored art by independent artists and the funneling of cultural budgets to state propaganda, a small yet burgeoning group of independent artists have pushed the boundaries of moviemaking from inside Iran.

Showing women without hijab and physical contact between men and women have been unbreakable taboos in post-revolution Iranian cinema. Yet, in the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, a batch of Iranian movies—made inside Iran without observing mandatory hijab and other restrictions and without obtaining a license from the authorities—were screened at the 2023 Cannes Film Festival, and received acclaim from Iranian and international audiences. Me, Maryam, the Children and 26 Others by Farshad Hashemi and Terrestrial Verses by Ali Agari and Alireza Khatami received overwhelmingly positive reviews.

Since then, other internationally acclaimed dramas, such as My Favorite Cake directed by Maryam Moghaddam and Behtash Sanaeeha, and Rasoulof’s The Seed of the Sacred Fig, have openly traversed the Islamic Republic’s long-standing red lines and strict dress codes.

The homegrown push could be seen as an evolution of underground art, a method of creation long used to depict prohibited subjects within Iran. However, it has never been as public and transgressive as it has now become.

It could be argued that the independent artists’ intentional disengagement from all forms of state-related art, powered by the emergence of a new generation of taboo breakers in Iranian cinema, exposes the failure of regime strategies to threaten and impede Iran-based dissident artists.

Unsurprisingly, the Islamic Republic’s restrictive measures have only spurred Iranian artists to resist pressure, open radical fronts, and fundamentally subvert the ideological restrictions on artistic independence and creation that have been enforced since the 1979 revolution.

Shekufe Bar is a journalist who writes about art, culture, and society.

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A high-level official’s conviction opens the door for progress on women’s rights in Kazakhstan

Margarita Assenova — Wed, 05 Jun 2024 17:52:15 +0000

The trial of former Kazakh Economy Minister Kuandyk Bishimbayev for murdering his wife, Saltanat Nukenova, has shaken Kazakh society and fascinated Kazakhstan’s neighbors. On May 13, Bishimbayev was found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. The court proceedings were the first to be live-streamed in the country’s history.

The details of the Bishimbayev trial enthralled and outraged the public. In November 2023, Bishimbayev recorded himself beating and humiliating Saltanat over the course of eight hours. Some of the assault was caught on a restaurant’s CCTV cameras. Nobody alerted the police about the beating, and the restaurant’s staff were threatened into silence. Bishimbayev’s cousin helped him cover up the murder and failed to call an ambulance, for which he was sentenced to four years in prison. Bishimbayev was previously convicted in March 2018 and sentenced to ten years in prison for corruption, but he was later pardoned. His murder trial, which began in late March, was a watershed moment for the country, in which a member of the once untouchable elite was subjected to the scrutiny of an increasingly active civil society and the discipline of a stronger rule of law.

The closely followed case has helped mobilize women’s rights groups, invigorate civil society, and reenergize the managed modernization and reforms promulgated under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Human rights groups have welcomed the progress but said more needs to be done to address the serious problem of domestic violence in the country. According to a United Nations (UN) study, more than four hundred women are killed every year by domestic partners in Kazakhstan. And according to MediaNet International Center for Journalism, a Kazakh nongovernmental organization, 60.2 percent of women aged fifteen to forty-nine report having been physically abused by their partner at least once in their lifetime.

A reinvigorated movement

Saltanat’s murder triggered an unprecedented mobilization of Kazakhstan’s women and civil society groups and sparked a movement similar to #MeToo and #BonoboSisterhood. Saltanat’s tragic death transformed her into a symbol, birthing a social media campaign featuring numerous videos of her laughing and dancing. These videos put a face and a name on the type of crime that often leaves the victim anonymous, with the hashtag #ЗаСалтанат (#ForSaltanat) exploding on social media.

This reinvigorated movement for women’s rights comes as the government has taken a series of important actions to combat domestic abuse. In December 2023, Tokayev signed a decree outlining Kazakhstan’s Action Plan on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the first such initiative in more than thirty years of independence. “This action plan aims to promote gender equality, combat any forms of domestic violence, enhance the performance of the criminal justice system, and prevent torture and ill-treatment,” wrote Tokayev on the social media website X. The document expanded on the 2021 National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which promotes human rights, gender equality, and a life free from discrimination for women and girls, but also included measures to address rule of law problems.

On April 15, a month before the verdict in Bishimbayev’s trial, Tokayev signed a bill into law adopted by Kazakhstan’s parliament earlier that month, dubbed “Saltanat’s Law.” The law aims to enhance legal protections against domestic violence by criminalizing battery and the intentional infliction of light bodily harm committed “against an individual in a helpless condition or financially or otherwise dependent on the perpetrator.” These forms of abuse had been decriminalized and reclassified as administrative offenses in 2017 under then President Nursultan Nazarbayev, limiting the sanctions to fines and community service. Now, criminal penalties have been reinstated: Causing minor harm to health can carry up to two years of imprisonment, while battery can result in fifty days of incarceration. The law also made it mandatory for the police to investigate abuse against women and children, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs was directed to establish a specialized unit to combat domestic violence. The US State Department commended Kazakhstan for recriminalizing domestic violence, calling the law a “very important step in protecting survivors.”

The long road ahead

Nevertheless, the problem of domestic violence and gender discrimination remains widespread in Kazakhstan and throughout Central Asia. The criminalization of domestic violence has been on the agenda of all five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) for several years, especially since cases of partner abuse increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, gender discrimination is prevalent in the region, with more than 90 percent of women facing gender bias as defined by the UN’s Gender Social Norms Index—encompassing politics, education, economics, and physical integrity. Kazakhstan fares somewhat better than its neighbors in that, according to the UN, it has the highest proportion of women in Central Asia who do not face gender bias. But this percentage is still in the single digits.

Central Asia’s progress is more noteworthy when compared with its neighbors. Afghanistan’s Taliban resurgence has been horrific for women, while the Iranian women’s movement has been violently suppressed by clerics in Tehran. Russia, Kazakhstan’s northern neighbor, decriminalized domestic abuse in 2017 and subsequently stopped publishing reliable statistics about it. In fact, official statistics on domestic abuse in Russia vastly underestimate the number of cases compared to independent investigations, as the Russian police can now turn down women who seek help restraining their violent husbands and refuse to record and investigate these cases.

In contrast, Kazakhstan has taken decisive steps to build on its 2009 Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and criminalize acts of domestic abuse. The Kazakh police are now mandated to investigate reports of domestic violence, even if the victim has not contacted the authorities, based on witness testimony and video recordings. They are also obligated to investigate cases of violence against women and children reported in the media, including on social media.

But there is still much work to be done to combat gender discrimination and domestic abuse in Kazakhstan. The next step should be to explicitly make domestic violence a stand-alone offense in the criminal code. This law should encompass physical, sexual, and economic violence, as well as psychological abuse and stalking. And once this law is on the books, it will be important to ensure its effective implementation and enforcement. This will also require work on changing public attitudes, particularly among men, on the right of every woman to feel safe in her home and among her relatives.

The recent progress in the fight against gender discrimination and domestic abuse in Kazakhstan has been difficult to achieve and was long overdue, but the country is moving in the right direction. Outrage over Bishimbayev’s murder case helped lead to a new law and a greater public awareness of domestic abuse that could lay the groundwork for further reforms to ensure the safety of women in Kazakhstan. Hopefully, this will be Saltanat’s greatest legacy.

Margarita Assenova is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC, and co-author with Janusz Bugajski of Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks.

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Arbit join Bloomberg’s Balance of Power to discuss difficulties of getting humanitarian aid into Gaza

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:22:16 +0000

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Arbit joins Bloomberg TV to discuss the ICC’s seeking of arrest warrants for Israeli leaders

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:22:12 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in The Independent on Russia using Iranian drones to bomb Ukranian civilians

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:20:23 +0000

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Panikoff joins Channel News Asia to discuss ICC prosecutor’s arrest bid

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:20:18 +0000

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If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius — Thu, 30 May 2024 21:01:22 +0000

In the coming weeks, the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, the G7 Summit in Italy, the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, and the jubilee NATO Summit in Washington DC will all offer opportunities for the international community to reinforce its support for Ukraine. These high-profile events should also serve as a chance to take stock. With no end in sight to Russia’s genocidal invasion, Kyiv’s Western partners must define the endgame of their support for Ukraine. Is it Ukrainian victory or merely Ukrainian survival?

Why does the West not have a coherent victory plan? How long can Ukraine be expected to sustain the current war effort if the country only receives sufficient military aid to survive? Is the latest US aid package enough to secure Ukrainian victory? Is Europe doing enough to enforce sanctions, confiscate Russian assets, and supply advanced weapons systems like Taurus missiles? These are just some of the key questions Ukraine’s partners should be asking themselves in the coming weeks.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Putin’s Russia poses a direct threat to the global security system and to a sustainable peace in Europe. The outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine will define the future security framework on the European continent for decades to come. If the West provides Ukraine with the support it needs to win the war, this victory will secure peace not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe. Russian defeat could also spark a political transformation inside Russia and help undermine the country’s aggressive imperial ambitions.

The consequences of Russian success in Ukraine would be equally far-reaching. If the West continues to demonstrate weakness in Ukraine and supports calls for some kind of ceasefire or negotiated settlement, Russia will claim an historic victory and will become even more internationally aggressive. This aggression will not be limited to Ukraine, and will be targeted against the whole Western world.

Nor will the Kremlin be acting alone. On the contrary, Russian victory over the West in Ukraine would embolden the Alliance of Autocracies that has emerged in recent years, bringing together Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. While further Russian aggression is likely to focus on Europe, Putin’s fellow autocrats will be encouraged to embrace their own expansionist agendas elsewhere.

This is why the international community needs to accept that only Ukrainian victory can open the door to a sustainable peace, both for Ukraine and the wider world. Any attempt to reach a compromise peace agreement with Putin would not only hand Russia victory and allow Moscow to continue occupying entire regions of Ukraine; it would also be a dangerous repetition of the 1938 Munich Conference, which had such tragic consequences for the entire international community. The British and French leaders who agreed to hand Hitler part of Czechoslovakia in Munich also hoped they were securing peace. Instead, they were setting the stage for World War II. Europe cannot afford to make the same mistake again.

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At present, the West appears to be split into two main camps over the issue of how to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One camp recognizes the importance of Ukrainian victory for European security, and sees Russian defeat as its clear goal. These countries are committed to supporting the Ukrainian war effort and refuse to rule out sending troops to defend Ukraine if necessary.

The other camp favors a negotiated settlement and typically frames this readiness to compromise with the Kremlin as a desire for peace. Such posturing is intellectually dishonest. After all, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. However, Ukrainians understand that peace cannot be secured by offering territorial concessions to the Putin regime that would abandon millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation. They know that accepting a ceasefire without victory would make it impossible to hold Russia accountable for war crimes.

Crucially, Ukrainians also recognize that unless Putin is defeated, he will inevitably go further. Encouraged by the impunity of a ceasefire agreement, Russia would use any pause in hostilities to rearm and prepare for the next phase of its war against Ukraine and the West. This would create dangers similar to the threat faced by the Allies during World War II, when Churchill and Roosevelt warned against a premature peace and instead declared the goal of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. Today’s Western leaders must now recognize that offering Putin a ceasefire will not bring about a lasting peace. Instead, it will pave the way for more war.

Future Western support for Ukraine must be built around a clear and unambiguous commitment to Ukrainian victory. This is currently missing. When Western leaders and policymakers gather in the coming weeks, the need to work toward a Ukrainian victory should be at the very top of the agenda. Meanwhile, Ukrainians must continue to explain the difference between a temporary ceasefire and a lasting peace. In 2023, Ukrainian civil society experts did their part by developing their own vision, which was outlined in the Sustainable Peace Manifesto, describing the importance of bringing Russia to justice and providing Ukraine with unambiguous security guarantees.

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After more than ten years of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, it is time for Kyiv’s partners to learn the lessons of this war and avoid falling into further Russian traps. When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, it did so under a veil of deniability using so-called “little green men,” or Russian soldiers without insignia. A decade later, Russia is now openly waging the largest European invasion since World War II, and is supported by an alliance of fellow tyrannies who share the Kremlin’s goal of destroying the rules-based international order. Russia is now attacking Ukraine with Iranian drones and North Korean missiles, while receiving military supplies and vital economic support from China. If the West is unable to counter this growing threat, it will forfeit its position at the heart of the international security architecture and be replaced by the rising authoritarian powers.

In 2014, Western leaders were naive enough to expect a diplomatic solution to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It should now be painfully obvious that such hopes were unrealistic. Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine engaged in more than 200 rounds of negotiations with Russia, but this failed to prevent the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Even while talks continued, Russia made its genocidal intentions clear with relentless propaganda denying the existence of the Ukrainian nation and dehumanizing Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric has since been implemented in practice by Putin’s invading army, with well-documented massacres in places like Bucha and Izium, mass abductions and forced deportations, and the eradication of all symbols of Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russian occupation. While the international community sees what is happening in Ukraine, most remain reluctant to accuse Russia of genocide as this would oblige them to act. But turning a blind eye cannot change the fact that we are witnessing a genocide in the center of twenty-first century Europe.

Everybody understands what is needed for Ukraine victory. They know how much Western military assistance is required, and exactly which weapons should be delivered. Everybody knows what sanctions, tribunals, and security agreements are necessary in order to establish a sustainable peace. At the same time, the leaders of the democratic world have yet to address why they have so far shied away from policies that could facilitate Ukrainian victory. The answer is very simple: Western leaders are still heavily influenced by the twin fears of a possible Russian escalation and a potential Russian collapse. In other words, they are unable to commit fully to Ukrainian victory because they are afraid of Russian defeat. This is now the greatest single obstacle to a sustainable peace in Europe.

Perhaps the best advice for Ukraine’s Western partners comes from Pope John Paul II, who said “be not afraid” as he led the fight for freedom and democracy in Central Europe during the 1980s. Europe must now overcome its fears once again if it is to safeguard the freedoms that define the continent. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved at the expense of justice. European security will remain elusive if Putin is allowed to gain from his aggression and consolidate his genocidal occupation of Ukrainian lands.

With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Ukraine’s partners must finally acknowledge that European security depends on Ukrainian victory. The sooner they develop and implement a strategy to achieve this victory, the more lives will be saved. Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. Andrius Kubilius is a member of the European Parliament, former Prime Minister of Lithuania, and chair of the United for Ukraine global parliamentary network.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:46:05 +0000

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Lipner quoted in The Globe and Mail on Israel’s shrinking support internationally

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:46:02 +0000

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Aboudouh quoted in Al-Monitor on Israel’s Rafah offensive and the strain on Israel-Egypt relations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:45:35 +0000

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Plitsas joins Face the Nation to discuss attempts to get a US service member’s mother out of Gaza

charlesjohnson — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:45:17 +0000

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Aboudouh for Chatham House: Egypt is holding its nerve over the Rafah operation. But its restraint shouldn’t be taken for granted

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:41:48 +0000

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Sudan is an abject disaster. Is anyone listening?

Benjamin Mossberg — Tue, 28 May 2024 15:27:35 +0000

In the year since civil war broke out, fighting in Sudan has left more than eight million people displaced—a number far greater than the displacement in Gaza and nearly on par with Ukraine. The war has killed and wounded more than thirteen thousand in the city of El Geneina alone, with the true cost in human lives simply unknown. The reports of war crimes by both parties to the conflict and the deliberate targeting of civilians because of their ethnicity are the stuff of nightmares.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

Ukraine faces long-term mental health challenges among veteran community

Claire Szewczyk — Thu, 23 May 2024 20:11:53 +0000

Far away from the front lines of the country’s ongoing war with Russia, growing numbers of Ukrainian veterans are facing up to the psychological aftermath of their military service. These mental health challenges include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. Given the sheer numbers involved, there are serious concerns over Ukraine’s ability to address this issue effectively.

Over the past decade, the number of Ukrainian military veterans has expanded dramatically. Prior to the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, approximately half a million Ukrainians had served in the military campaigns underway in the east of the country since 2014. Over the past two years, this figure has mushroomed. Ukraine’s Ministry of Veteran Affairs has estimated that up to five million Ukrainians may be eligible for veteran status by the end of the war.

In 2024, Ukraine allocated approximately $350 million to support veterans and their families through the Ukrainian Veterans Fund. Nevertheless, there has been considerable criticism over the use of this funding. In a survey of Ukrainian army veterans conducted earlier this year, many said they believed veterans were not having their post-service needs met and required better access to support.

Current Ukrainian legislation offers benefits to veterans such as housing provisions. A range of support is also available for those with disabilities incurred during wartime service and for family members of service personnel. However, critics say there is significant confusion over the availability of support, and complain of inconsistencies along with a frequent lack of funding. In practice, many veterans say they are unable to access the care they need.

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The current healthcare struggles of Ukrainian veterans resonate with the US veteran community, which continues to face similar struggles with post-service mental health issues. Like their Ukrainian counterparts, large numbers of American veterans deal with PTSD, depression, and anxiety.

According to a recent survey, nearly one in four American veterans are diagnosed with at least one mental health disorder following military service. This statistic illustrates the widespread nature of mental health concerns among veterans everywhere, and gives an idea of the sheer scale of the challenge facing the Ukrainian authorities.

Ukraine may be able to learn from US experience in the provision of support for military personnel. US veterans can call upon a more structured support system under the Department of Veteran Affairs. However, this approach is not always effective, with veterans often encountering long wait times, bureaucratic hurdles, and a shortage of healthcare providers adequately trained in military cultural competence. This last point is crucial; research has highlighted that more than three-quarters of veterans find it extremely important to receive care from providers who they feel understand them and can treat them appropriately.

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The challenges Ukraine faces in providing the necessary support for the country’s veteran community echo the issues encountered in the United States and elsewhere. Ukraine currently struggles with underfunded and understaffed mental health services. These shortages mean that even when veterans take the appropriate steps to seek help, the necessary resources may not be available or might come too late.

Another issue is lack of financial support. While healthcare is a major concern for Ukrainian veterans, access to financial resources is also critical for general well-being. When surveyed earlier this year, more than half of veterans indicated that they struggled to remain financially secure.

A further significant barrier to effective mental health treatment in Ukraine is the lack of providers with a good understanding of military culture. Ukrainian veterans often comment that their experiences are misunderstood by the medical professionals who are treating them, leading to misdiagnosis and ineffective treatments.

The stigma associated with mental health issues in Ukraine is an additional issue, particularly due to the emphasis on “toughness” and “strength” within military communities. This can lead to veterans failing to acknowledge their struggles and refusing to seek the help they need and deserve.

Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach that includes increased funding for mental health services, enhanced training in military culture for healthcare providers, and an active approach to challenging the narrative around mental health, especially in relation to Ukraine’s military and veteran communities. The task of addressing the stigma attached to mental health is something the wider community can participate in, as Ukrainians seek to create a more compassionate environment for the country’s defenders.

Claire Szewczyk is a digital content coordinator for Hill & Ponton. She formerly worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The trial focuses on crimes committed against two French-Syrian nationals, a father and son who were disappeared by Syrian authorities in 2013, detained and tortured at the Mezzeh military airport detention facility, and ultimately killed by Syrian authorities. Three suspects are on trial—Ali Mamlouk, who was the head of Syria’s National Security Bureau; Jamil Hassan, the former director of Syrian air force intelligence; and Abdel Salam Mahmoud, who previously led investigations at the Mezzeh military airport detention center.

The charges brought against the officials are for numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, and enforced disappearance. These represent crimes that Syrian authorities systematically carry out in detention facilities across Syria. In particular, the trial will focus on violations by Syrian air force intelligence and its detention center at the Mezzeh military airport, which is where some of the most grave crimes have been committed in Syria, including murder, severe torture, and sexual violence.

The trial is happening in Paris because the victims are French nationals, and France is one of the few countries that allows trials in absentia. These types of trials are very important because they help combat impunity. In a situation like Syria, where senior officials won’t leave the country as long as Assad and his regime remain in power, there is no opportunity to arrest the highest-level perpetrators. Holding a trial for their crimes, even if they are not present, can provide a sense of justice to the victims of their crimes. Some officials will never be tried in person, and in absentia trials provide the only way to ensure legal accountability for their crimes. Without in absentia trials, many victims would be prevented from seeking justice.

2. Have similar trials taken place?

This is the first trial of senior Syrian regime officials. Trials for crimes in Syria have occurred in Germany and other countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction. However, these countries all require the perpetrator to be present in the country in order for the trial to take place. As a result, the trials that have taken place so far have focused on low- or mid-level officials. These cases are important for accountability. However, the responsibility of these lower-level officials is very different from the responsibility of senior officials.

We know that from the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the three suspects on trial in Paris were responsible for giving orders and giving a green light for other officers under them to commit crimes in detention facilities and elsewhere. This trial is examining the role of the highest-level perpetrators who are directly connected to Assad and are among his small inner circle. This trial will establish the systematic method of the crimes and the responsibility of Syrian leaders and institutions, who were representing the Syrian state and Assad regime in carrying out their crimes.

3. How does this trial fit into the broader attempts to hold Assad’s regime accountable?

This trial is the result of years of Syrian and international civil society organizations supporting witnesses and survivors, collecting documentation and evidence, and advocating for accountability. Syrians have been working for justice and accountability for more than thirteen years now, since the revolution in 2011. In this time, Syrian and international civil society have gathered a lot of evidence and established the truth on violations throughout the conflict. Some of the evidence includes the Caesar photos, regime documents collected by the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, reports by the United Nations (UN) Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, and the work of the UN International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism on Syria. There have been around eighty trials for crimes in Syria held in European and other countries, against suspects linked to the Syrian regime and nonstate actors, including the Islamic State. This is a lot of trials, but it is not sufficient or satisfactory given the crimes that have been committed.

After thirteen years, Assad is still in power, and results from accountability processes are not so tangible. Compared to the crimes that have been committed—atrocities and massacres, resulting in millions of victims who are still suffering—there has been very little accountability.

This trial of senior officials, highlighting systematic crimes, will help close some of the gaps and will be a big step on the path to accountability. We know the path will be long. But this trial will give a big push toward accountability. It will remind the international community of the gravity and scale of crimes that have been committed in Syria, and the need for accountability for victims and survivors, and for the future of Syria.

During the four days of trial, the court will review the evidence openly, in front of the public and the media. It will provide an opportunity to remind the world of what has happened in Syria and what is still going on. It will also be a reminder of why accountability and a political solution are important for Syrians and why these steps are a precondition for peace. The accountability work being done now will help prepare for the future and transitional justice.

4. What is the potential impact of this trial if the defendants aren’t present?

This trial is so important for victims and survivors, and for Syrians in general, the majority of whom have been impacted in one way or another by the conflict. The trial will help establish the truth. It will provide a legal record, with evidence that has been examined and proven, of crimes that have been committed and people who are responsible. The trial will help establish which people—which perpetrators—should not and cannot be acceptable leaders for the future of Syria.

The trial will also help raise the Syria cause on the international agenda and remind countries that are supporting normalization with the Assad regime of the nature and cruelty of his regime. It will help remind the international community that his regime is not accepted by many Syrian people and show why a political transition is so important for Syrians. The trial will help remind everyone of the demand for a political transition, and why it must happen.

5. What are the next steps for accountability for Syria?

There should be more arrest warrants for suspects. Even if it’s not possible to try perpetrators in their presence, there should be arrest warrants and trials held in absentia. Even the issuance of arrest warrants is an important step, as this only happens after the conclusion of a long investigation, supported by significant evidence and lengthy examinations. Arrest warrants can offer some preliminary proof that these individuals are responsible for grave international crimes. They can help for the future of Syria by making clear to Syrians and the international community who cannot be a part of Syria’s future.

I hope that this trial and other accountability proceedings can help convince democratic countries that the Assad regime will never change, that it cannot change and be transformed to a democratic state, that those in the Assad regime are criminals, and that they should not be a part of any future government in Syria.

The United States, European countries, and the UN can do a lot more to support a democratic future for Syria. Right now, they are supporting the Assad regime indirectly by contracting with individuals and entities linked to the regime, including sending millions of dollars to the Syria Trust for Development, which is run by Bashar al-Assad’s wife, and other organizations linked to human rights violators. I hope this will change and that donors will implement better practices for vetting contractors to ensure this money does not end up funding the regime. On top of that, democratic countries must put a real strategy in place to support the Syrian people and push for a democratic transition in government. Trials like this one in Paris—the evidence they present and the violations they highlight—help demonstrate why this is necessary and hopefully encourage further action.

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The ‘Butcher of Tehran’ is dead. It won’t change a thing.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Thu, 23 May 2024 14:31:19 +0000

In June 1989, glasses of wine were raised in our Tehran home when the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died. A hushed party had brought together friends and comrades, all of them ex-political prisoners, who by sheer chance had survived the mass executions of the 1980s. Similar parties were held across Iran. The next day, however, a specter of fear haunted all public spaces, with people being fired from jobs even for laughing at jokes unrelated to Khomeini’s death.

Fast-forward to May 20. Millions in and out of Iran, including in Syria and the Gaza Strip, publicly rejoiced when President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and several provincial officials.

https://twitter.com/mahsa_piraei/status/1792220356830212566

Since news emerged of Raisi’s helicopter crashing in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province on May 19, people from different backgrounds were glued to their smartphones, anxiously waiting for hours to hear official confirmation of his death, which finally arrived almost fourteen hours later. As Iranians waited, social media were flooded with memes and jokes, and people dancing and drinking in celebration.

A horrible public speaker with a Persian-language Wikipedia page dedicated to his spoonerisms, sixty-three-year-old Raisi never received a proper academic education beyond the sixth grade and was a low-ranking cleric with no charisma. However, after winning the engineered 2021 presidential race that recorded the lowest participation rate in the Islamic Republic’s history, Raisi was promoted overnight to an “ayatollah doctor” by the state media.

His star began rising in 1979. Soon after the Islamic Revolution, when he was nineteen, Raisi was appointed prosecutor of two major cities, Karaj and Hamedan. He was later transferred to Tehran and assigned to the “death commission” that in 1988 extrajudicially executed thousands of political prisoners and dumped their bodies in unmarked mass graves. His role in the mass executions earned him the nickname “the Butcher of Tehran.”

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A yes-man with blood on his hands, Raisi married Jamileh, the daughter of influential cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda, a close ally of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At the same time, his absolute loyalty was rewarded with wealth. He was appointed as head of Astan Quds Razavi, a corrupt and currently sanctioned financial empire in charge of preserving the gilded shrine of the eighth Shia saint Imam Reza in Mashhad, the second most populated city in Iran.

In 2019, Khamenei appointed Raisi as judiciary chief, a role in which he oversaw a violent crackdown, including the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of peaceful dissidents and rights defenders. Amnesty International has documented that the judiciary under his watch granted “blanket impunity” to security forces to unlawfully kill hundreds of men, women, and children and subject thousands of people to mass arrests and torture during nationwide protests in November 2019.

During Raisi’s short-lived presidency, the Islamic Republic faced the gravest domestic existential threat in its history: the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that rocked the country for months and shocked the supreme leader. The regime, with Raisi’s full support, responded to the uprising with brute force, killing hundreds, arresting tens of thousands, and executing at least nine. According to the United Nations, the response amounted to crimes against humanity.

Despite his role in crimes against humanity, Raisi’s celebrated death will have no bearing on the Islamic Republic’s policy. Other than rubber-stamping death and destruction for his own gain, as an absolute opportunist who threw his lot with Khamenei, Raisi’s political life amounted to nothing.

Rubber-stamp president

Since ascending to the throne as supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei has fended off rivals, including former presidents, with house arrest, media silence, banishment from elections, and even alleged assassination. In Raisi, he found an under-educated conformist who practiced absolute subservience, allowing the ayatollah to consolidate his control over all branches of power and secure his legacy with zero resistance.

In Iran, the office of the presidency amounts to nothing but being a “footman,” in the words of two-term former President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Unlike his predecessors, Raisi had no say over Iran’s foreign policy, regional expansionism, or nuclear program. With his death, the supreme leader’s hand will keep the regime on course toward acquiring a nuclear weapon and exporting terror abroad. There will also be no change in the oppression of women and other marginalized groups.

As per the Islamic Republic’s constitution, a presidential election must be held fifty days after Raisi’s death. The interior ministry has already announced June 28 as election day. Raisi assumed office as president in 2021 and was expected to bag an easy reelection in 2025. The rushed race for his seat will create infighting, and possibly put the Islamic Republic on its back foot.

However, even that would not impact the regime’s foreign and nuclear policy, which the supreme leader tightly controls. The Islamic Republic has historically responded to periods of chaos and uncertainty by projecting power abroad. A shift in nuclear policy, a deal with the United States, or a détente between Israel and Hamas would not serve that purpose.

Furthermore, Khamenei has already signaled that he is determined to stay course despite Raisi’s death. During a speech hours before official confirmation of Raisi’s death on May 20, Khamenei calmy proclaimed, “Be reassured people that there will be no disruption in works of the nation.”

At the same time, Raisi’s death has removed a potential contender for inheriting the mantle of supreme leadership after the expected demise of eighty-five-year-old Khamenei. As per the constitution, the Assembly of Experts will fill the position, which again is tightly controlled by Khamenei. According to Reuters, Raisi’s name was already crossed off as a contender some six months ago in light of his incompetence and sagging popularity, reconfirming warnings that the future leader can’t be accurately predicted—that the contenders list is constantly shifting, and the game is far from over.

Hope for change

While regime insiders fight over Raisi’s blood-soaked inheritance and “tear each other limb from limb,” the festivities continue among the people.

Afsaneh Yousefi, whose son Pejman Fatehi was executed alongside three other political prisoners in January, danced to Kurdish music.

"Khamenei will be next," a young woman writes on the wall in Mashhad, a bastion of Islamic Republic where Iran regime President Raisi hailed from. pic.twitter.com/hj3wEkPYbk
— Khosro K Isfahani (@KhosroKalbasi) May 20, 2024

Sisters Mahsa and Roya Piraei, whose mother was killed by security forces during the 2021 uprising, clinked drink glasses with smiles sparkling in their eyes.

Clad in a white and blue dress, Mansoureh Behkish, who lost six family members during the 1988 executions, danced with her hair flying in silver tufts.

Esmat Vatan Parast, who lost eleven members of her family in 1980s executions, told Radio Farda, “Yes, the Islamic Republic is still in power, but I wish that the remaining [officials meet a similar fate] so people of Iran can breathe. I wish for a day that the Islamic Republic becomes a thing of the past, that our land is wiped of any sign of these monsters…have faith, our Iran will be liberated.”

And in Raisi’s home city of Mashhad, a young woman with her hair flying free, in defiance of mandatory hijab rules, scribbled on a wall with spray paint, “Khamenei will be next.”

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

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How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa

El Mehdi Boudra — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:34:53 +0000

A decade ago, Cabo Verde, a predominantly Christian country, restored its Jewish cemeteries under the patronage of a Muslim leader, King Mohammed VI of Morocco. This vibrant example of Africa’s historical, cultural, and religious diversity was celebrated on March 6, when an assembly of Jews, Christians, and Muslims gathered in Praia, the country’s capital, to commemorate years of efforts to conserve an essential aspect of Cabo Verde’s past. This achievement transcends a single community and embraces a larger vision of Cabo Verdean society. The Jewish cemeteries are now not merely materialized memories but pivotal platforms for fostering interfaith dialogue and, by embodying the spirit of unity in diversity, have become beacons of inspiration for generations.

The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

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In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

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‘There are Evans everywhere’

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 18 May 2024 13:25:03 +0000

It’s a bad time for press freedom—which underscores that it unfortunately also is a very good time for the type of autocracies that are most determined to douse free speech.

So, it was a poignant moment at the PEN America Literary Gala, which I attended Thursday evening in New York, when Almar Latour, Dow Jones CEO and Wall Street Journal publisher, spoke about how the long-sought release of his reporter Evan Gershkovich from Russia’s dreaded Lefortovo Prison matters “on a macro level.”

“The grim reality is that there are Evans everywhere,” said Latour, who is also an Atlantic Council board member. “Journalists around the world face increasing resistance and hostility for just trying to do their jobs.”

More than a hundred journalists and photojournalists were killed in the past year, mostly in Gaza and Ukraine, and more than three hundred others were imprisoned for their work by one autocratic regime or another. Through our “Reporters at Risk” events, the Atlantic Council has worked to raise these issues for policymakers and the public. So too has Latour, who listed the names of many of the journalists behind bars, and he included Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong media tycoon and pro-democracy advocate charged with endangering Chinese national security with his weapon of truth. One of the evening’s awardees sits in a Vietnamese prison for her critiques of state repression, the writer Pham Doan Trang.

It would have been easy in an evening that honored the music legend Paul Simon—who played his “American Tune” on acoustic guitar just a few feet away from me—to lose the singular and symbolic importance of one reporter’s imprisonment.

With talk show host Seth Meyers as MC, with Malcolm Gladwell and other authors as presenters and speakers, and with PEN America at the center of controversies over whether Israeli and Palestinian free speech are created equal, one might, for a moment, forget Evan.

Amid the noise and glitter and controversy, however, there was a bigger story to be told. I scribbled down on my napkin Latour’s closing quote: “Russia may be an ocean and a continent away, but the distance between authoritarianism and a free society is measured by the strength of a free press.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

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Aboudouh quoted in The National News on Xi’s attempt to bring Macron into China’s peace efforts in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:20:39 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The New York Times on campus protests and Hamas

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:20:30 +0000

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Alkhatib mentioned in Breitbart on campus protests

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:20:26 +0000

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Arbit joins Bloomberg to discuss Biden’s Rafah arms stance

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:20:20 +0000

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins BBC to discuss the political ramifications of student protests against the war in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:16:47 +0000

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Lipner quoted in The New York Times on Biden’s pause on weapons to Israel

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:16:25 +0000

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Lipner joins KNX News Los Angeles to discuss Israel’s next offensive of its war in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:16:22 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in South China Morning Post on US decision to withhold weapons supplies to stop Israeli assault on Rafah

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:13:13 +0000

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Pankioff joins Bloomberg’s Balance of Power podcast to discus Israel, ceasefire talks, and Rafah

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:08:08 +0000

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Bakir in John Menadue’s Public Policy Journal: How Israel relies on up to 1,000 Australians and other foreign fighters to carry out its war crimes

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 19:08:02 +0000

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Alkhatib for The Times of London: I lost 31 relatives to Israeli attacks in Gaza. But I blame Hamas too

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 May 2024 18:49:56 +0000

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Gender parity in MENA diplomacy and its impact on peace

Charles Johnson — Mon, 13 May 2024 18:11:16 +0000

On Thursday, April 25, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship hosted a panel discussion on the vital role Arab women ambassadors play in shaping the field of diplomacy, both in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and globally.

The conversation was moderated by Lynn Monzer, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and featured H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States of America; H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi, Ambassador of the Republic of Tunisia to the United States of America; and H.E. Amal Mudallali, former Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (UN).

Deciding on diplomacy

H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah initiated the conversation by sharing insights from her background in journalism, where she encountered diverse mindsets through storytelling. This experience highlighted her natural diplomatic skills, as navigating complex systems and creating sustainable solutions in business mirrored key aspects of diplomacy. These experiences and insights logically paved the way for her career in diplomacy.

Similarly, H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi transitioned from an initial aspiration to become a physician to recognizing the diplomatic field as another form of healing. In her view, diplomacy involves listening to those in distress, diagnosing societal issues, and crafting viable solutions, thus paralleling the healing processes in medicine.

Like Al-Sabah, H.E. Amal Mudallali started in journalism, with ambitions centered on reporting at the UN. After achieving this, she ventured deeper into politics, eventually serving under two Lebanese prime ministers and later as the Ambassador of Lebanon to the UN. She emphasized the critical role of male allies in politics, where men predominantly hold power but greatly benefit from women’s collaborative and problem-solving skills.

In addition to winding career paths, all three diplomats agreed on the importance of a robust support system for success in diplomacy. Bessassi thanked her parents and husband specifically for the strength, independence, and commitment necessary to work in the diplomatic field. Echoing the sentiment on support systems, Mudallali highlighted her grandmother’s empowering role during her upbringing. She also stressed the crucial need for political backing, citing the potential difficulties and injustices faced without such support. Al-Sabah, similarly, underscored the significance of a nurturing ecosystem for achieving success. For her, the focus is on contributing back to this ecosystem and the broader community, often through mentoring other women, providing support, advice, and honest guidance on their professional journeys.

Navigating the field’s challenges

Bessassi then turned to the challenges facing women in diplomacy. She noted that despite Tunisia’s rich history of influential women leaders, gender parity remains elusive. This disparity is underscored by prevailing gender stereotypes that still hinder women’s effectiveness in all fields, including diplomacy. Bessassi argued against the perception that empathy—a trait often associated with women—is a weakness. Instead, she illustrated how empathy enhances diplomatic efforts by fostering consensus and compromise, bringing more people into the fold while working toward peace and cooperation.

The underrepresentation of women in global diplomacy was further addressed by Al-Sabah, who pointed out that women make up only 21 percent of ambassadors worldwide. She emphasized the importance of improving representation and noted that the participation of women on the panel, along with other women ambassadors in the United States from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauritania, represents significant progress in altering public perceptions about women in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed these concerns with specific examples from the United Nations, where women’s representation has been backsliding; the number of women UN representatives decreased from 52 in 2020 to 46 today. She linked this trend to a global phenomenon such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as countries have become more brazen in rejecting previously held norms such as equal gender representation. She also noted the decrease in women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2020, women represented 23 percent of negotiators in active peace processes, dropping to 16 percent in 2023. Based on analysis of real-world peace processes, agreements between negotiators are much more likely to be reached when women have a strong influence on the negotiations.

Al-Sabah added that 2023 saw a 50 percent increase in war-induced violence against women, reinforcing the necessity for women’s voices in peace negotiations. This backslide in gender representation, Mudallali argued, demands urgent attention and action in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focuses on women, peace, and security.

Bessassi acknowledged these recent challenges nut also emphasized the power of collective effort among women ambassadors, which has the potential to catalyze global change. Mudallali shared this sentiment,expressing her feeling of responsibility to do everything possible to elevate women, believing that these challenges require structured, codified solutions. Al-Sabah concluded by underscoring the importance of integrating advocacy into diplomacy to empower women effectively. In Kuwait, for instance, the government established the Department of Human Rights within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in part to address women’s empowerment. Internationally, too, organizations with similar aims must work together to implement Resolution 1325 to ensure countries adhere to international principles of women’s empowerment. For young women in the MENA region and beyond, seeing women in these roles not only offers a glimpse of what is possible but also instills hope and inspiration.

The future of diplomacy

Building on the theme of hope, Al-Sabah discussed a significant shift toward civic diplomacy following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, with women taking on an increased role in this space. She highlighted the courageous efforts of journalists like Shireen Abu Akleh, Plestia Alaqad, and Hind Khoudary who have used their personal cameras and cellphones to broadcast their voices are around the world. Al-Sabah stressed the urgent need for greater protection of journalists in Gaza and around the world, who face harassment and life-threatening dangers in their line of work.

Continuing the conversation, Bessassi emphasized the increasing importance of multilateralism now more than ever in addressing global challenges. She called for consistency in the international community’s approach, as the international community’s engagement on issues like the war in Gaza must avoid “double standards” to effectively address challenges in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed the sentiments of her colleagues, concluding the panel with a call for strong advocacy for peace. She pointed out that recent global tensions have shifted the focus from collaboration to competition. By supporting women in diplomatic roles, Mudallali argued, societies will not only lift but also enhance their prospects for achieving lasting peace.

The way forward

Over a century since the first appointment of a women ambassador in 1920, women remain severely underrepresented in the predominantly male diplomacy sector. As of 2023, women account for only 20.54 percent of ambassadors worldwide, a decrease from 23 percent in 2020. The disparity is even more pronounced in the MENA region, where women make up just 10 percent of ambassadors, the lowest regional rate globally, highlighting a significant challenge for women in MENA diplomacy.

Despite these daunting numbers in MENA, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has increased its proportion of women ambassadors by 5.5 percent between 2018 and 2023, reaching 12.5 percent. Additionally, a recent Arab Barometer report has shown a marked decrease throughout the MENA region over the past decade in the belief that men are better political leaders than women, suggesting growing acceptance of women in political and diplomatic roles.

However, effectively capitalizing on these openings requires systematic and sustained support. Algeria serves as a cautionary tale where a 2011 gender quota led to increased opposition to women in political leadership due to the absence of systemic improvements or societal readiness for such changes. Conversely, Tunisia witnessed an increase in openness toward women political leadership after the implementation of a similar quota and was further bolstered by President Kais Saied’s appointment of Najla Bouden Romdhane as the first female prime minister in the MENA region. These moves demonstrate that political backing and continued support of women is a crucial component to increasing women’s representation at both the political and diplomatic levels.

In addition to national efforts, international initiatives are crucial. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in preventing violent conflicts, is particularly significant. Supporting this resolution could significantly legitimize women’s roles in conflict mediation. This is supported by data showing that peace negotiations involving women are 35 percent more likely to last for at least fifteen years. Therefore, in the midst of shifting attitudes, a global drive for greater women participation in diplomacy, and the myriad conflicts necessitating peace negotiations, reform toward gender parity in diplomacy is as pressing and timely as ever for the MENA region.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

Explore the WIn Fellowship

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

May 3, 2024

2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Abercrombie-Winstanley quoted in City Journal on DEI policies

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:22:11 +0000

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Bakir quoted in The New Arab on Qatar’s role as mediator in the war on Gaza

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:21:29 +0000

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Aboudouh quoted in Middle East Eye on Hamas and Fatah officials meeting in China for unity talks

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:21:20 +0000

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Aboudouh quoted in NewsCop on China hosting Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:21:03 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Israellycool on Gazans speaking out against Hamas

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:20:10 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The Times of Israel on Palestinian desire for Hamas to accept ceasefire deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:20:02 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The Guardian on student protests and Palestinian statehood

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:19:57 +0000

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Bakir in Middle East Eye: War on Gaza: How Israel relies on foreign fighters to carry out its war crimes

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:18:13 +0000

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Alkhatib in Newsweek: 30 Years and Thousands of Lives Too Late, Hamas Considers Compromise – Opinion

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:17:45 +0000

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Arbit joins Bloomberg Television to discuss a potential Israeli invasion of Rafah

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 May 2024 19:58:45 +0000

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins BBC News to discuss the Israeli government’s response to Biden administration pressure

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 May 2024 19:56:44 +0000

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Alkhatib in The Atlantic: What I’ve Heard From Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 May 2024 19:54:19 +0000

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Lipner in Haaretz: Israel Will Pay the Price if Netanyahu Doesn’t Resolve Disputes With U.S. on War in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 May 2024 19:54:03 +0000

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Ukraine’s new mobilization law leaves demobilization issue unresolved

Elena Davlikanova, Kateryna Odarchenko — Thu, 02 May 2024 20:32:42 +0000

Ukraine’s new mobilization law will come into force later this month as the country seeks to resolve mounting problems over wartime service in the Ukrainian military. Despite months of political debate and multiple revisions, many observers remain unconvinced by the version of the law that was finally approved by the Ukrainian Parliament and signed by President Zelenskyy on April 16. Crucially, it fails to address the topic of demobilization for the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who have been serving since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion more than two years ago.

Ukraine’s new mobilization law is the latest step in ongoing efforts to reform the military recruitment process and meet the unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing invasion. Although Ukrainian losses remain undisclosed, there is clearly a pressing need to replenish the ranks of the military, while also allowing current service personnel to be rotated out of front line positions or demobilized.

Ukrainian military officials initially stated that the goal of the new law was to mobilize an additional 500,000 people. This figure has since been reduced to an unspecified but significantly lower number. Prior to the full-scale invasion, around 250,000 people served in the Ukrainian military, but thanks in large part to a massive surge in volunteers following Russia’s invasion, this force swelled to around 880,000 troops. Together with the National Guard and other formations, there are now believed to be approximately one million Ukrainians in uniform.

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Ukraine’s mobilization bill was subject to approximately 4500 amendments, underlining the complexity of the issue. The final version focused on regulating the process of identifying and registering potential conscripts, reviewing eligibility for mobilization, and revising penalties for evading service. Key points include the introduction of an online registry for recruits and the lowering of the age for draft eligibility from 27 to 25.

In line with the new regulations, men of military age will now be obliged to update their registration details within 60 days of the law entering into force, either at regional offices or via an online portal. They will be required to carry their military registration documents and present them upon request or when applying for a passport. Meanwhile, penalties for evading mobilization remain relatively mild. These include modest fines and the potential revocation of drivers licenses.

The new mobilization law does not extend to military-age females. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had earlier stated his opposition to obligatory military service for women. While they are not subject to conscription, many Ukrainian women do choose to enlist in the armed forces voluntarily, with approximately 60,000 currently serving in a variety of positions including front line roles.

To further boost the mobilization process, the Ukrainian army plans to open a network of 27 new recruitment centers in the coming months in major cities across the country. These centers will function as advisory and information hubs, providing guidance to those interested in joining the armed forces and allowing candidates to choose which unit they prefer to serve in. The first recruitment centers have already opened in Lviv and Zaporizhzhia. Initial reports are positive and indicate this modern approach to military service could help address some of the key concerns among potential recruits.

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Most of the criticism leveled at Ukraine’s new mobilization law has focused on the removal of earlier provisions regarding demobilization. Initial drafts envisaged the demobilization of military personnel after 36 months of service, and the rotation of those serving on the front lines for over six months. However, these clauses were taken out of the legislation at the last minute following appeals from Ukraine’s military leadership, who argued that they would weaken Ukraine by facilitating the withdrawal of the country’s most experienced military personnel without providing sufficient trained replacements. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is now working on a separate law to handle the demobilization issue.

While opinion remains divided over the fairness and effectiveness of Ukraine’s new mobilization law, few would argue that the country urgently needs to address manpower issues within the armed forces. Many analysts cite troop shortages as one of main challenges facing the Ukrainian military, along with insufficient weapons and ammunition deliveries from the country’s Western partners.

Russia does not currently appear to be encountering any such problems. In recent weeks, Ukrainian commanders have reported that their forces are now outnumbered by as many as ten to one at certain points along the front lines of the war. This overwhelming superiority in numbers is enabling Russia to advance on the battlefield despite suffering consistently high casualty rates.

With Russia’s initial blitzkrieg invasion now transformed into a war of attrition, the Kremlin aims to avoid a politically risky second wave of mobilization and maintain a steady stream of volunteers by offering a range of cash incentives for new recruits, including extremely high salaries and generous financial support for the families of servicemen. Recent reports indicate Russia is aiming to sign up hundreds of thousands of additional troops in the near future amid preparations for a major summer offensive.

Ukraine is now racing against the clock to strengthen its military before Russia’s summer offensive can get fully underway. The recent breakthrough in Washington DC regarding desperately needed US military aid will boost these efforts, as will the new mobilization law. However, with no end in sight to Russian aggression, Ukraine must also find long-term solutions to the country’s lack of new recruits and the thorny issue of demobilization.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine. Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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Don’t look away: The Taliban’s mistreatment of women has global ramifications

Samira Abrar — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:54:11 +0000

The Taliban’s well-documented oppression is more than just a problem for the women and girls of Afghanistan. The country’s misrule is a signal to the world that gender-based discrimination can be ignored—even condoned. This perpetuates impunity and poses a grave risk of normalizing extremists. It’s time for those who built the international human rights system to step up and defend it.

Despite initial promises of moderation and a pledge to the United Nations (UN) when the group seized power in 2021, the Taliban has swiftly restored oppressive policies reminiscent of its previous rule in the late 1990s.

In less than three years, the Taliban has issued more than fifty edicts and directives imposing strict measures to bar women from participation in public and political life. These measures include restricting women’s access to education, employment, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, access to public spaces, health care, and access to justice.

A UN experts report said the situation may amount to “gender apartheid,” with the Taliban “governing by systemic discrimination with the intention to subject women and girls to total domination.”

Violations of international law

As reported by the UN Human Rights Council, the Taliban significantly restricts women’s participation in society and denies them avenues for seeking justice and redress. Women who speak out against these restrictions or advocate for their rights face severe consequences, including harassment, violence, imprisonment, and death. The Taliban also targets women activists, professionals, and both men and women who are supporters of women’s rights, viewing them as threats to their authority. The situation has deteriorated further in the past few months, as evidenced by recent extrajudicial arrests and forced disappearances. There has also been an alarming increase in gender-related killings (femicide).

The Taliban’s gender apartheid policies deliberately violate international legal frameworks to which Afghanistan is still bound, perpetuating a cycle of gender-based discrimination and brutality. International law on the protection of women’s rights is unequivocal. It emphasizes the fundamental responsibility of governing authorities to promote and safeguard the rights of women in all aspects of their lives.

The International Bill of Human Rights—which is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—guarantees the right to equality and nondiscrimination. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women explicitly prohibits gender-based discrimination, obligating state parties to ensure gender equality in all spheres of life. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) criminalizes gender persecution as a crime against humanity under article 7.

The ICC’s 2022 Policy on the Crime of Gender Persecution broadens the scope of targeted individuals beyond direct members of a particular group to include that group’s sympathizers and affiliates. This inclusive stance is particularly relevant for Afghanistan. In schools that ban girls, staff—including male teachers—who teach girls can also be targeted. Similarly, journalists are targeted and face persecution for their coverage of violations of women’s basic human rights. Such incidents, which fall under the ICC’s purview, highlight the interconnectedness of gender-related issues and the diverse ways individuals can be affected by gender-based persecution.

The Taliban’s capital and corporal punishments target women more often than men. Despite Afghanistan’s ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Taliban persists in brutally treating and punishing women. Taliban punishments, ranging from public floggings to executions, demonstrate a deliberate effort to instill fear and maintain control over women’s lives, flagrantly violating the Convention against Torture.

When the Taliban shields perpetrators from accountability, including insulating its own system, it further perpetuates a cycle of violence. Under the current regime, documentation of human rights abuses has become nearly impossible. The Taliban’s restrictions on international and local human rights organizations and media, including censorship and intimidation tactics, have severely hindered their ability to document and report these violations. The absence of comprehensive reporting on human rights abuses under the Taliban not only obscures the true extent of the violations but also allows perpetrators to act with impunity.

The broader international significance

The ongoing violations perpetrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly on women, have sparked diplomatic condemnation from the international community. However, this condemnation exposes a deeper issue: the weakening consensus among members of the international community on how to effectively respond to such crises. One of the primary risks associated with this trend is the normalization of the extremists. Engaging with the Taliban and normalizing relations without meaningful concessions on human rights encourages the Taliban and other repressive regimes, signaling that they can flout international norms with impunity.

This impunity gravely undermines more than two decades’ worth of efforts to achieve justice, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban has not only refused to acknowledge its past atrocities but also enjoys impunity for its current actions.

The continued impunity not only denies justice to women survivors but also sends a dangerous message that violence against women can be tolerated and even condoned, with far-reaching implications. The denial of education and participation in public life hinders the development and empowerment of women and girls, perpetuating cycles of poverty, inequality, and marginalization. It also undermines fundamental principles of justice and human rights, eroding trust in the ability of international institutions to provide justice and accountability. This lack of accountability also enables the Taliban to spread extremist ideologies, creating a nurturing environment for conflict and terrorism, with dire implications for regional stability.

What the international community can do

Considering the dire situation in Afghanistan, the UN should take a lead role in establishing robust accountability mechanisms. This may entail creating an independent investigative body to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international law.

The UN should also change its approach to the Taliban. Instead of engaging with the regime without conditions, the UN should work with regional and global partners and directly with the Afghan people, including civil society, to develop a unified strategy that prioritizes women, human rights, and security, rather than legitimizing a regime that promotes oppression and instability. Taliban leaders’ rigid ideology means dialogue with them is futile. Moreover, targeted sanctions and travel bans on Taliban leaders should be imposed. The UN can leverage its authority and resources to coordinate efforts among member states and ensure a unified approach to the crisis within the organization.

At the same time, the international community can use diplomatic engagement to exert pressure on the Taliban to respect international human rights standards. Diplomatic recognition, aid, and other forms of cooperation should be conditioned on tangible improvements in human rights and accountability.

Human rights organizations outside Afghanistan play a crucial role in amplifying the voices of Afghan women and advocating for their rights. These organizations should mobilize support for Afghan civil society groups and grassroots organizations, particularly those championing human rights and women’s rights. By collaborating with local activists and providing resources, these organizations can help promote accountability and protect vulnerable populations—particularly women.

Samira Abrar is human rights activist currently working in the field of immigration law in the United States.

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Everything you need to know about Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi and his death sentence

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani and Andrea Alice Richardson — Fri, 26 Apr 2024 17:25:02 +0000

On April 24, a revolutionary court in Iran sentenced dissident rapper Toomaj Salehi to death on charges of “spreading corruption on the Earth.” In July 2023, the same court had sentenced him to seventy-five-months in prison on the same charges but released him on bail for a short time in November 2023. The death sentence appears to be the regime’s response to Salehi publicly speaking about the torture he endured during his detention, while out on bail.

“Spreading corruption on the Earth” is a charge revolutionary courts in Iran have historically used against dissidents, including those extrajudicially killed during mass executions of the 1980s—known as the 1988 massacre—and people who were arrested in relation to the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

Salehi is best known for creating protest songs that spoke out against the oppressive Islamic Republic policies that were the focus of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising prompted by the death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022.

The open-source information identified below has been preserved and analyzed through the Iranian Archive, a joint effort led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) and Mnemonic, and a coalition of open-source investigation experts at the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and the Azadi Archive. The archive forensically preserved more than two million pieces of digital evidence recording serious human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Woman, Life, Freedom movement protesters to support future accountability efforts related to human rights violations in Iran.

Below is a summary of the open-source investigation about Salehi, which is part of a broader report being carried out through the SLP, Iranian Archive, and UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center. The report analyzes key incidents of violence carried out by the Islamic Republic during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and is due out this fall.

Salehi’s arbitrary arrest and detention were highlighted in the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), a United Nations-mandated body tasked with investigating alleged human rights violations committed in the context of the protests that began on September 16, 2022. His arrest was identified as a key incident of large-scale repressive measures taken by the Islamic Republic authorities to silence artists and writers during the protests.

Importantly, the FFMI found that such arrests and imprisonment are happening as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians in Iran and amount to crimes against humanity. While Salehi’s case is highlighted, it is important to remember that this is happening all over Iran and continuing to harm lives to this day.

The following is a timeline detailing the persecution of Salehi for the crime of defying the Islamic Republic’s authoritarian rule in a peaceful manner through his art. The document is based on open-source research with a focus on material published by Iranian state media, including forced confessions of Salehi aired by state television. Although the material is laced with state propaganda and false accusations against Salehi, the details can be used to display the violence he endured and the illegality of judicial procedures.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Iran’s state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), reported on October 30, 2022, that Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi was arrested. The same day, in a video report shared by the judiciary’s official outlet, Mizan News Agency, Salehi was accused of “planning and organizing” protests in collaboration with “diaspora leaders” and “threatening” security forces. The video included a collage of Salehi’s social media posts and a photo purporting to show him in daylight after his arrest, blindfolded and in a vehicle.

The video report was produced by IRIB “interrogator journalist” Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour, who was sanctioned by the United States for her role in soliciting and broadcasting “hundreds of forced confessions of Iranian, dual national, and international detainees in Iran.”

First video

On November 2, 2022, the Young Journalists Club (YJC), a media body affiliated with the IRIB, released a short clip showing Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face, saying: “[I’m] Toomaj Salehi. I said that I’m sorry. I said that I tell ‘you as a friend that you should run away.’” The video starts with a short clip of an already-deleted social media post by Salehi in which he tells security forces to desert their posts and “run away” instead of oppressing people.

IRIB later used the video in a report that described Salehi as “one of the leaders of recent riots” and “instigating sedition online.” The report was broadcast on November 2, 2022, and was posted on the IRIB website two days later. IRIB reporter Atefeh Godini produced the report.

The video shows Toomaj Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face.
He touches the side of his head as if in pain.
Apparently anticipating more beatings, he raises his hand in front of his face.
The location is not clear. The video is recorded in the open and during dark hours. A tree can be seen in the background.

Second video

On December 6, 2022, Iranian state media including the government-run daily Iran published a new video titled “Toomaj Salehi: I apologize to the society for the violence I caused.”

The video opens with doctored segments of a music video of a rap song by Salehi published in October 2022, in which he criticized the regime for its corruption and oppression. In the track, Toomaj says that he “rises up from the bottom” of society and is defying the “head of the pyramid” responsible for the oppression. The video released by state media includes three segments in which Salehi speaks.

The first segment shows a part of Salehi’s face with him saying, “I wrote that. There is a copy of its text,” an apparent reference to the lyrics.

Then, overlaid on muted videos of him, a voice similar to Salehi’s can be heard saying, “Music can beget violence.”

In the third segment, Salehi appears to say, “This was my mistake. I apologize to you for that,” pointing to the interrogator/interviewer in the room, “and to society for producing violence. I wish I could…I can only apologize now. I wish I could produce the counterpoint to [the music].”

The video released by state media heavily references Salehi’s October 2022 music video “Faal [Fortune].”

The video released by state media is recorded from multiple angles with the camera moving, apparently using a camera trolley. Shots recorded from above imply that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio, and the cuts and edits also suggest that it was made through a long production process.

Video released by state media

The hand of a man adorned with an Aqeeq ring pushes a paper toward Salehi. The markings on the paper are similar to those on papers used for writing confessions.

Faal music video

In the music video, Salehi gives the other person a piece of paper to take notes on what he is saying and, he raps, to “pass them up.”

In the video released by state media, Salehi is shown drinking from a white cup similar to the one shown in the music video.

In the music video, Salehi reads the regime’s coffee-cup fortune (“Faal” in Persian).

The video released by state media even mimics the camera motions used in Salehi’s music video.

The steady camera motions in the video published by state media suggest the use of a camera trolley.

The video published by state media also includes overhead shots, implying that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio.

All the cinematic techniques used imply that the video was recorded over a long process in which Salehi might have been forced to repeat dictated lines. The long production process and heavily doctored material also indicate that he could have been asked questions unrelated to the case, and his responses were manipulated and edited to convey a message that the regime prefers.

Statement after release

Toomaj Salehi was released from Isfahan Central Prison on November 18, 2023, on bail. On April 21, 2023, judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed he was released on bail and added that Salehi’s sentence was being reviewed per an order from the Supreme Court.

On November 27, 2023, the YouTube account that releases music produced by Toomaj Salehi posted a video of him after his release from jail. The channel has been releasing Salehi’s music as early as October 18, 2020, based on the oldest post available on the account published on that day.

In the fourteen-and-a-half-minute video, Salehi describes his time in custody and explains his forced confession. His description of his ordeal includes, but is not limited to, the following statements.

Malign actors are trying to “assassinate [his] character.” Salehi pointed to state media reports that he “confessed” and “snitched” on others. “Whom did I have to snitch on? What did I have to confess to? Everything I’ve done has been on your phones [and public]. I wasn’t hiding anything to confess to.”
“I was severely tortured at the time of my arrest. They broke my arms and my legs. They were hitting my face and my head, so at first I tried to cover myself with my hands, and they broke my fingers.”
Salehi also says that he was given a shot in the neck at the time of his arrest. “One of the other political prisoners told me that the injection they gave me in my neck was most likely adrenaline so I wouldn’t pass out so that I would be conscious during the time they were torturing me so I would feel the pain fully.”
“About confessions, I didn’t even hand over [access to] my social media accounts.”
Salehi points out that during his detention, whenever he raised the issue of the illegality of the security officers’ behavior, “they would laugh and say ‘what law? We can and we do whatever [we want].’”
Before Salehi’s release from jail, the judge, Morteza Barati, and his case officer met with him demanding access to his social media accounts, which he refused. (Security forces often seize social media accounts of political prisoners before their release and condition their release on bail on their not using social media.)
Some anonymous social media accounts with apparent ties to the state pointed to his apparent physical health after his release on bail, arguing that his being tortured was “fake news.” Reacting to those comments, Salehi said, “Four months ago, when I was transferred from [detention center of the] Intelligence [Ministry] to prison, they wouldn’t say that. My bones were broken a year and a month ago. They have naturally healed by now.”
In the video, Salehi points out that he did not receive proper medical care for the broken bones, that he cannot walk properly and limps, and that walking is sometimes painful for him. He also complained about chronic pain in his hands.
“The Intelligence Ministry has produced and released a video in which it appears that I am apologizing to the interrogator. I didn’t say that. I wasn’t talking to the interrogator. I was interviewed there for nine hours. I have made one or two gaffes. The person asked me a question, for example asking me ‘If right now, the mother of such and such person who went out [to protest] because of you and is now in prison, was sitting before you, what would you tell her?’ And they have edited [my response] in a manner that it appears that I am apologizing to him, which is ridiculous.”
Salehi says that he has filed a complaint about the torture he endured during his detention.
In the video, Salehi says that he was held in “solitary confinement for 8–9 months” and subjected to “white torture” on top of the “physical torture in the beginning” after his arrest. (White torture is sensory deprivation.)
He also said that the Intelligence Ministry had “ordered the prison chief to make conditions worse” for him because he had “filed a complaint against them.”

Timeline

Toomaj Salehi was born December 3, 1990. He is from Iran’s Bakhtiari ethnic minority. His father was a political prisoner for eight years.

Previous Arrest—September 13, 2021

Toomaj Salehi was arrested on September 13, 2021, at his home. He was charged with “insulting the Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and “propaganda against the regime,” under Articles 514 and 500 of the Islamic Penal Code. The BBC’s Persian service reported at the time that he was sentenced to six months in jail and an unreported fine. The court suspended the sentence for one year. On September 21, 2021, Salehi was released on bail.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Salehi was arrested again on October 30, 2022. In an interview with Mizan News Agency, the official outlet of Iran’s judiciary, Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Seyed Mohammad Mousavian listed Salehi’s charges as “propaganda against the regime, cooperation with hostile states, and establishing an illegal group with the intention of disrupting national security.” Mousavian added, “The accused played a key role in instigating riots and inviting and encouraging the recent mayhem and riots in Isfahan Province and in the city of Shahinshahr.”

Charges—November 27, 2022

Chief Justice of Isfahan Province Asadollah Jafari told Mizan: “Toomaj Salehi has been charged with spreading corruption on the Earth by spreading lies in a way causing major losses, propaganda against the regime, establishing and managing illegal groups with the intention of disrupting national security, cooperating with a hostile government against the Islamic Republic, spreading lies and disturbing the public mind through cyberspace, and inciting and encouraging people to commit violent acts.”

Alleged death sentence—July 5, 2023

The semi-official Tasnim News Agency reported that Salehi “had been sentenced to death, but his sentence was reduced to imprisonment.”

The alleged sentence was not announced by the judiciary—as is customary—or Salehi’s lawyer. At the time, it raised questions about the credibility of Tasnim’s report and whether the news was part of the regime’s psychological warfare against protesters.

Prison sentence—July 12, 2023

Jafari said that Salehi was sentenced to seventy-five months (six years and three months) in prison. He also received a two-year ban on leaving the country, a two-year ban on music-related activities, and a requirement to attend “workshops, courses and life skills classes” held by the judiciary’s crime-prevention department. Jafari added that Salehi’s pending six-month jail sentence from 2021 will also be implemented.

Torture complaint—October 29, 2023

On October 29, 2023, Salehi’s account on X (formerly Twitter), which is run by his social media manager from outside Iran, wrote that he had filed a complaint against the director of the Intelligence Ministry’s branch in Isfahan province and the officers responsible for his case over “torture and illegal behavior during [his] illegal detention.”

The complaint lists the illegal conduct of security officers, including the following.

Salehi’s place of residence was illegally raided. Security officers climbed the wall and did not provide an arrest warrant. Two other residents of the building were also arrested without a warrant. The personal vehicle of Salehi’s father was seized without a warrant.
“Violent arrest, beating, torture, and verbal abuse for twelve hours (from 3:00 AM on October 30, 2022 to 3:00 PM of the same day) in a place outside the city while blindfolded and even filming these inhumane actions, some of which were broadcasted by IRIB.”
Beating leading to
- a fracture of the right leg;
- a fracture of the fourth finger on the left hand;
- severe damage to both eyes; and
- fractured ribs.
Officers failed to transfer Salehi to the prosecutor’s office within the legal timeframe or hand him over to the detention center, and failed to provide medical care in time.

The statement also adds that Salehi was arrested in Gerd Bisheh, a village in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province by officers of the Isfahan branch of the Intelligence Ministry.

Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, posted a photo of the official complaint on Instagram on December 2, 2023.

Release on bail—November 18, 2023

Salehi was eventually released from prison on November 18, 2023 on bail. Judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed on April 21, 2023, that Salehi has been released on bail and added that the Supreme Court had called for his sentence to be amended as well.

Arrest—November 30, 2023

The government-run IRNA news agency reported that Salehi was arrested again on November 30, 2023, in the northern city of Babol in Mazandaran province.

The judiciary’s Mizan also wrote, “Toomaj Salehi was arrested on the charge of publishing lies and disturbing the public mind after publishing some false and undocumented comments online.”

Isfahan Chief Justice Jafari told Mizan that, in the case of Salehi, “all procedures, including arrest, interrogation, and investigation, have been carried out according to the law.”

Death sentence—April 24, 2024

On April 24, 2024, Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, told the Tehran-based Shargh Daily, “Branch One of Isfahan Revolutionary Court, in an unprecedented move, has not implemented the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 2022 case of Toomaj Salehi.”

According to Raeisian, Branch One of Revolutionary Court of Isfahan has called the Supreme Court “ruling ‘advisory’ and emphasizing the independence of the lower court has accused Toomaj Salehi of ‘spreading corruption on the Earth’ and sentenced him to the highest punishment, death.”

This ruling is unprecedented. The recent ruling of the lower court is in direct conflict with an earlier ruling from the same court, as per directions from the Supreme Court. Amid reports of Salehi being sentenced to death in July 2023, the case was initially appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court called on the lower court to drop some of the initial charges. This led to Salehi being sentenced to seventy-five months in prison and his release on bail in November 2023.

Recently, the lower court re-assumed jurisdiction and, despite the prior ruling, Salehi was sentenced to death. This court, a “revolutionary court” with deep ties to the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus, determined that Salehi was responsible for the “extensive spread of corruption on the Earth,” and thus, death was appropriate.

Salehi’s lawyer also noted that the current ruling, along with the death sentence, has designated “additional punishments” for Salehi, including a two-year ban on traveling abroad and producing music.

Raeisian also noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that Salehi should benefit from “amnesty.”

On the same day, semi-official Mehr News, which is linked to the state-run Islamic Propagation Organization, confirmed that Salehi has been “sentenced to death for spreading corruption on the Earth.” It added that the sentence can be decreased to “long imprisonment and additional sentences” if Salehi and his lawyers appeal. There has been no accountability for the arbitrary detention and forced confession of rapper Toomaj Salehi.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

Andrea Richardson is the senior legal researcher for investigations at the Human Rights Center.

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Russian bombardment of Ukraine’s power grid may force millions to flee

Olga Aivazovska, Andriy Savchuk — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 15:28:47 +0000

In October 2022, the Kremlin launched what was then the most comprehensive bombing campaign of the war. For the next five months, waves of Russian missiles and drones struck Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure on an almost daily basis. The attacks aimed to break Ukraine’s resistance by making life as unbearable as possible for tens of millions of Ukrainian civilians.

At the time, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov openly stated that Ukraine could “end the suffering” of the civilian population by fulfilling Russia’s demands. Instead, the Ukrainian authorities worked with the country’s partners to improve air defenses and import large quantities of electricity generators. Ukrainians endured a dark and often terrifying winter, but the country survived.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has recently issued arrest warrants for high-ranking Russian military officials on suspicion on committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with the winter 2022-23 bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. However, this has not prevented the Kremlin from embarking on a new air offensive against Ukraine’s power grid and other essential infrastructure targets across the country. Once again, Russia appears intent on depopulating entire regions of Ukraine.

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In March 2024, large-scale Russian bombing of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure resumed with a series of massive barrages involving drones and a variety of missiles. Russian military planners appear to have learned from the mistakes of Moscow’s earlier bombing campaign; instead of focusing on the Ukrainian electricity grid’s transmission systems, this new wave of airstrikes has concentrated on energy generation infrastructure.

The results have been devastating. Within a matter of weeks, Ukraine has lost many of its most important thermal power plants and key hydroelectric plants. Major cities including Kharkiv and Odesa have experienced periodic blackouts and prolonged disruption to energy supplies. Experts believe it will take years to repair damaged facilities and replace equipment.

Russia has been able to achieve such success by exploiting the growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses due to extended political deadlock in the US over critical military aid. With Ukrainian air defense crews forced to ration dwindling supplies of interceptor missiles, Russia has been able to hit and destroy high-value targets such as the biggest power plant in the Kyiv region. With further US aid now expected, Ukrainians may soon see a marked improvement in the country’s air defenses. However, the clock is ticking and Russian attacks continue.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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By making large parts of Ukraine unlivable for the civilian population, Russia hopes to create a new wave of Ukrainian refugees. Analysis of the winter 2022-23 bombing campaign indicates that Russian attacks on the Ukrainian power grid did lead to an increase in the number of people exiting Ukraine for the safety of neighboring EU countries.

Unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defense systems and ammunition from the international community, there is a very real danger that millions of Ukrainians will be forced to flee their homes in the coming months. If that happens, many would be likely to join the millions of Ukrainians who have already left the country for the European Union since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Russia’s depopulation tactics have serious consequences for Ukrainian morale and for the country’s wartime economy. Research has found that economically active Ukrainians are the most likely to leave as a result of persistent bombardment. Many Ukrainian companies are already finding it increasingly difficult to fill vacancies, especially in labor-intensive sectors of the economy.

Meanwhile, fresh influxes of Ukrainian refugees would create challenges for the country’s European partners, who have already accommodated extremely large numbers of Ukrainians since 2022. A major new wave of refugees could create social tensions and undermine political support for Ukraine within the EU. This potential for destabilization is also very much part of the Russian strategy.

Depopulating entire regions of Ukraine will pave the way for new Russian advances, while also weakening Ukraine’s wartime economy and making it more difficult to preserve the country’s independence. The resulting surge in Ukrainian refugees could also have a range of negative consequences for Kyiv’s partners in the EU.

It is clear that both Ukrainian and Western leaders have a vital interest in protecting the country against Russia’s new air offensive. In the short term, this means delivering sufficient air defenses to guard cities and critical civilian infrastructure against Russian bombardment, while also providing the necessary equipment to repair Ukraine’s battered energy infrastructure. News of a recent breakthrough regarding US aid is encouraging, but all of Ukraine’s allies need to contribute to the strengthening of the country’s air defenses.

Ultimately, the international community must hold Russia’s military and political leaders accountable for war crimes against the civilian population. However, the wheels of international justice turn notoriously slowly, while Ukraine’s needs are urgent.

Olga Aivazovska is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory (ICUV) and head of the board at Civil Network OPORA. Andriy Savchuk is a data analyst at Civil Network OPORA.

Hospitals, businesses, and homeowners are now scrambling to secure generators and other alternative power sources in anticipation of further blackouts, with children forced to study online or in makeshift underground classrooms. For now, most Kharkiv residents appear intent on staying put. However, if the situation does not improve in the coming months, there may be a mass exodus ahead of the winter season. Indeed, many fear that without enhanced air defenses, conditions inside the city could become intolerable much sooner.

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The destruction of Kharkiv would certainly be a major war crime, but it would be far from unprecedented. On the contrary, the methodical depopulation of Ukraine’s second city would be very much in keeping with the destructive tactics employed by Russia ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two years ago.

From Mariupol to Bakhmut, the Russian military has reduced a long list of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble as it has slowly steamrollered forward along the largely static front lines of the war. Although it is not possible to accurately determine casualty figures in areas currently under Russian occupation, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone.

While the Kharkiv region has been the worst hit, the recent escalation in Russian bombardments has impacted the whole country, with attacks on the power grid in particular creating unprecedented challenges for the entire Ukrainian energy sector. This appears to be the result of extensive planning in Moscow, with Russian military officials learning important lessons from the failure of their winter 2022-23 energy infrastructure bombing offensive.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, Russia has began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” the CEO of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

The timing of the current bombing campaign also suggests Moscow is looking to take advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses. With a vital aid package held up in the US Congress for more than half a year, the Ukrainian military is currently suffering from a wide range of shortages, leaving front line commanders and air defense crews with no choice but to ration dwindling supplies of ammunition.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine’s main port city and international maritime gateway, Odesa, has been heavily targeted in recent months. Attacks on residential areas in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of northern Ukraine have also accelerated noticeably. In early April, a massive barrage of missiles succeeded in penetrating Ukraine’s depleted air defenses close to the country’s capital, destroying the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. “Why? Because we had zero missiles. We ran out of all missiles,” a clearly exasperated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told PBS NewsHour.

Ukrainian officials are now urgently appealing for extra air defenses to help counter Russia’s bombing campaign. So far, the response has been muted, with only Germany confirming plans to hand over a Patriot system. Others, such as the Netherlands, have offered to purchase Patriot systems on behalf of Ukraine. While these steps are welcome, much more needs to be done to protect Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s infrastructure.

Many analysts believe improved air defenses are not enough and argue that in order to effectively counter Putin’s terror-bombing tactics, Ukraine must be given the necessary long-range weapons to target Russian launch sites. However, this would require Ukraine’s partners to overcome their well-documented fear of escalation and reverse a longstanding ban on the use of Western weapons for attacks inside Russia. At present, there is little sign of that happening.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has already issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Russian military officers over the 2022-23 bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, but this is of little comfort to the beleaguered Ukrainian population, who know it will be years before they see even symbolic justice served. Meanwhile, the current bombing campaign continues to gain momentum. This new air offensive is far more ambitious than Russia’s earlier efforts, with the apparent end goal of rendering entire Ukrainian regions uninhabitable.

Unless Ukraine’s air defenses are dramatically upgraded in the near future, the country will face a humanitarian catastrophe that could potentially define the future course of the war. Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine decisively on the battlefield, but his bombing campaign may yet succeed in breaking Ukrainian resistance by forcing millions of civilians to flee their blacked out homes and ruined cities.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

US House resolution: Russian abduction of Ukrainian children is genocide

Kristina Hook, Christopher Atwood — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 01:04:43 +0000

For the past month, the Russian military has targeted Ukraine’s civilian population and energy infrastructure with some of its largest nationwide missile and drone attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion just over two years ago. These bombardments underscore the urgency of a renewed push in the United States to pass a stalled military aid package for Ukraine.

Members of the US House of Representatives recently demonstrated that they understand what is at stake and are well aware of the crimes being committed by Russia in Ukraine. On March 19, the US House overwhelmingly passed a resolution “condemning the illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation” by a 390-9 margin.

Russia’s systematic and coordinated abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine has attracted global condemnation, and has led to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Russian government official Maria Lvova-Belova. Following in the footsteps of American allies in Europe, the recently adopted US House resolution signals a major bipartisan US policy shift in labeling and shaming Russian perpetrators.

Although nonbinding, the House’s condemnation officially formalizes individual remarks made by Congressional Representatives indicating that Russia is conducting a campaign of genocide in Ukraine. Specifically, this super-majority of Representatives, including key leaders like Speaker Mike Johnson, affirmed that Russia’s abduction, transfer, and forcible adoption of Ukrainian children is “contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and amounts to genocide.”

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By invoking the UN Genocide Convention, the House’s resolution stresses the severity of Russian crimes in Ukraine. Critically, it also denotes the resulting legal obligations to prevent and punish further genocidal acts against Ukrainians. In other words, Congress has finally recognized what countless experts and advocates have been asking them to acknowledge for much of the past two years.

As a principal author and a key contributor on two independent legal inquiries into the question of Russian genocide in Ukraine published by the New Lines Institute (Washington, DC) and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (Montreal, Canada), we applaud the House’s unequivocal language regarding these crimes and resulting legal obligations.

Our investigations have detailed the Kremlin’s escalating violence against the Ukrainian population over the past two years. Russia’s most recent actions targeting the civilian population fit into a broader pattern of genocidal objectives evident throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, prominent Russian media personalities closely tied to the Kremlin continue to advocate for the eradication of Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Amid mounting international efforts to hold Russian perpetrators to account for crimes taking place in Ukraine, it is important to stress that the central duty of the UN Genocide Convention is prevention rather than punishment. This implies active steps from signatories to ensure that further crimes are not committed and to keep Ukrainian children safe from abduction.

At the same time, the stark reality remains that no genocide has even been stopped in a courtroom. While accountability is vital for surviving victims, international legal processes often take decades and lack the enforcement mechanisms required to decisively end genocides in real-time. Instead, the duty to stop a genocide in motion falls squarely on every country that has ratified the Genocide Convention.

Human rights advocates are currently racing against the clock to locate Ukraine’s missing children and end the daily deportations that continue in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Once Ukrainian children are seized, experts have traced the Kremlin’s efforts to hide these young victims, while subjecting them to frightening surveillance and camps designed to eradicate their Ukrainian identity. The resolution adopted by the US House of Representatives in March confronted this issue squarely, declaring that “the Russian Federation is attempting to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children.”

Numerous survivor testimonies confirm that the best genocide prevention mechanism in Ukraine today is a fully-equipped Ukrainian army with staunch Western backing. Ukrainian officials know this all too well. With their troops now forced to ration ammunition amid growing supply shortages, they are urgently appealing for the international military aid they need to save their nation.

While the recent US House of Representatives resolution’s clear articulation of Russia’s genocidal crimes in Ukraine is a step in the right direction, Western leaders must follow such statements with the necessary actions. It is vital for Congress, along with the rest of the US government and governments around the world, to act without further delay and enact policies worthy of Ukraine’s courage and sacrifice. History is watching, and so is Vladimir Putin.

Kristina Hook is Assistant Professor of Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Christopher Atwood is a specialist on Eastern Europe and the Head of the Advisory Board at the Souspilnist Foundation.

Secretary Chuck Hagel and Former United States Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. will discuss the role of US leadership in a changing world, hosted in partnership with the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Politics & Diplomacy

To grapple with today’s headline-making global turmoil, policymakers must have a strong grasp of history, argued former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and former US Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.

The two former officials reflected on the history of the United States’ leadership in the world on April 4 at the 2024 Chuck Hagel Forum in Global Leadership, hosted by the Atlantic Council and the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO).

“There is a reason why the United States led in organizing a post-World War II world order,” Hagel explained, pointing to a postwar realization that isolationism wouldn’t secure the country—and to the US network of allies and partners. “If we did not have those relationships, we couldn’t have our bases; we couldn’t have our troops in certain areas of the world.”

While the United States has led in creating today’s world order, Holder warned Americans that “our democracy is at risk.” Below are highlights from the conversation—moderated by Jody Neathery-Castro, associate vice chancellor for global engagement at UNO—which touched upon the war in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, and racial justice in the United States.

Risks in Ukraine

Holder explained that the United States winning the Cold War has led to an era of “unparalleled prosperity and peace,” but “that is all at risk by not coming to the support of Ukraine.”
“How we react in this matter is being observed by despots and strongmen and dictators,” Holder warned. Hagel agreed, saying that the war in Ukraine poses a security threat for countries far beyond Europe, as China and North Korea continue to watch and learn—and evaluate whether the West can hold its resolve.
Hagel said that some Americans don’t seem to understand the danger of letting Russian President Vladimir Putin exert his will and argued that the consequences of failing to support Ukraine are dangerous. “It will force all nations of the world, especially our partners . . . not to trust us.” Holder agreed, saying that sowing doubt in the minds of allies will allow dictators to “probe” and find new capitals from which they can “extend their influence.”
In national security, “there cannot be politics,” Hagel said.

The urgency for peace in the Middle East

Holder said that Hamas needs to be held accountable for its October 7 terrorist attack in Israel, and the group must release the hostages it took. At the same time, while Israel has the right to defend itself, he said “the tactics” being used by the Netanyahu government are “extremely disturbing” and do not “serve the interests of Israel in the long term.”
Hagel argued that the course Israel is on now “can’t continue,” and he warned that the way the war is unfolding is engendering global criticism not only of Israel but also of the United States. He said regional and outside partners need to facilitate peace between Israel and the Palestinian territories. “You’ve got to start it somewhere, and the United States is the only country that can help do that.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Iranians sacrificed their lives to share videos of regime violence. Now there’s an online archive for the world to see.

Cameran Ashraf — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 14:16:32 +0000

My radio alarm clock woke me up on June 12, 2009 to the news that millions of Iranians had taken to the streets to protest the fraudulent outcome of the presidential election. I listened momentarily, rolled over, and hit the snooze button.

When I got to work at my information technology (IT) job that day, I read news about the protests that became known as the Green Movement, prompted by the sham reelection of hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For weeks, Iranians poured into the streets of major cities wearing green—the color of reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi—and chanting and holding signs that read, “Where is my vote?”

At the time, the Atlantic called it “the first major world event broadcast almost entirely via social media.” Caught by surprise, the clerical establishment scrambled to censor the internet by blocking websites or deliberately slowing connection speed. It was a historical moment and showed that the internet could be a medium of hope for dramatic social and political change.

As a young Iranian-American man struggling with his half-Iranian identity after growing up with the anti-Iranian hate crimes and discrimination of the 1980s, the protests were a lightning bolt to my heart. People who looked like me were not chanting, “Death to America,” but instead calling for democratic values that I held dear—ones that were in my Iranian immigrant father’s heart as he fled to the United States after the 1979 revolution with my pregnant American mother. The Green Movement changed how I saw myself, and I felt a deep call to get involved in the Iranian people’s quest for freedom. That is why in 2009 I helped co-found Access Now, one of the largest human rights organizations dedicated to defending digital rights.

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During the Green Movement, I quickly learned how to develop and distribute proxy servers to allow Iranians uncensored internet access to tell their stories. This work gathered a group of young activists to support the protestors with whatever tools and expertise they needed, and required shifts of eighteen hours per day. The servers were used by tens of thousands of Iranians daily, and websites that were defended from being taken down by the regime—reaching five million Iranians per day, or more than 25 percent of the entire country’s internet users—were the main news sources for Western media outlets covering the ongoing protests. Tools were developed to defend hundreds of key journalists and activists inside Iran sharing news and video. These elements became the foundations of Access Now.

But one project stayed close to my heart: video archiving. The clerical establishment was trying to erase protest videos, while activists were removing videos for fear of persecution. History was being erased as quickly as it was being made. In response, I downloaded thousands of videos filled with violence, hope, tears, and joy, which were converted to mobile formats and redistributed across the country, where they were downloaded by more than three million Iranians.

In 2022, when Mahsa Amini was murdered by the so-called morality police for “violating” mandatory hijab rules, I gathered a small group of colleagues and friends and together we downloaded thousands of videos to ensure that the Women, Life, Freedom uprising led by women would not be erased. This became the Azadi (freedom) Archive, created in September 2022 and later joined by an international archival coalition led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and Mnemonic, with the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, the University of California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The newly renamed Iranian Archive now holds more than one million videos and contributed to the investigation carried out by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), which unveiled a report in March detailing how the Islamic Republic committed crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations against Woman, Life, Freedom protesters. On March 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to renew the mandate of the FFMI, giving it more time to strengthen its significant findings and ensure the effective preservation of evidence for use in legal proceedings, including the significant photo and video shared throughout the protests.

The world’s tragedies deserve justice and to be remembered. Iranians who risked their lives to share images of protest violence did so with the hope that information would get out and the world would respond to the Islamic Republic’s atrocious human rights violations. Even now, thousands of videos are uploaded by brave activists from around the globe every day—but without a systematic and funded approach to preservation, the opportunities for accountability, remembering, research, and memorialization are lost.

The global coalition of universities, nonprofits, and companies committed to archiving and preserving videos is making that vision a reality by working together through the nonprofit Iranian Archive to preemptively capture, store, catalog, and tag digital content in a way that can be used by researchers, lawyers, and human rights defenders in the future.

The birth of this global archival coalition signals to Iranian activists and citizen journalists that their sacrifice to share information with the world will not be erased online. It also upholds the best that the internet has to offer, despite increasing “enshittification,” and makes a meaningful contribution to social justice and human rights online and offline.

It’s been fifteen years since the international community realized the importance of digital activism due to the 2009 Green Movement. It must not wait another fifteen years before it develops a robust and comprehensive approach to archiving and preserving video to support justice and human rights movements across the world.

Cameran Ashraf is co-founder of international human rights and technology organization AccessNow, human rights scholar, and NGO human rights leader.

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Russian Orthodox Church declares “Holy War” against Ukraine and West

Brian Mefford — Tue, 09 Apr 2024 13:10:18 +0000

The Russian Orthodox Church has approved a remarkable new document that spells out the Kremlin’s intention to destroy Ukraine while also making the ideological argument for a broader confrontation with the Western world. The decree was issued during a March 27-28 congress of the World Russian People’s Council, which is headed by Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill. It calls the invasion of Ukraine a “Holy War” with the explicit aim of extinguishing Ukrainian independence and imposing direct Russian rule.

Churches often issue decrees stating official positions on key issues, but rarely do these proclamations involve calls to violence or territorial ambitions. Russia is mentioned 53 times in the 3000-word document, underlining the very clear focus on the Russian state’s earthly interests. “From the spiritual and moral point of view, the Special Military Operation is a Holy War, in which Russia and its people are defending the single spiritual space of Holy Russia,” the document states, using the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree goes on to stress Ukraine’s status as part of the wider “Russian World,” while underlining the need to extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Following the conclusion of the current war, it states, “the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter Russia’s exclusive zone of influence. The possibility of a political regime hostile to Russia and its people existing on this territory must be completely excluded.”

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The sentiments expressed in this recently approved document expand on previous statements made by Patriarch Kirill since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church has frequently asserted that Ukrainians and Russians are “one nation,” and is widely viewed as a key ideological supporter of the war. Kirill’s comments have led to widespread criticism, including a warning from Pope Francis to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.”

The new decree positions Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of a larger spiritual struggle against the West, which it accuses of having “fallen into Satanism.” This is strikingly similar to the ideological arguments favored by Islamist radicals, who have long sought to portray the United States and other Western nations as “Satanic” as part of efforts to justify their extremist agenda. In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, numerous senior Kremlin officials have sought to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential fight with Western “Satanism.” In a further chilling echo of the Islamist doctrine, Patriarch Kirill has also claimed Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine would have their sins “washed away.”

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The Russian Orthodox Church’s endorsement of language more typically associated with religious extremism should come as no surprise. After all, the entire Russian invasion of Ukraine has been framed as a crusade from the very beginning. Following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin compared the occupied Ukrainian peninsula to Temple Mount and spoke of its spiritual importance to the Russian nation. He routinely insists Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has labeled Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The recent confirmation of a holy war against Ukraine and the West comes at a pivotal point in Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since February 2022, Putin’s invading army has been unable to overcome Ukrainian resistance or break the country’s will to defend itself. With little current prospect of a decisive military breakthrough, the Kremlin is now turning increasingly to terror tactics, including a sharp escalation in the bombing of Ukrainian cities and the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian power grid.

By defining the invasion in explicitly spiritual terms, the Russian Orthodox Church hopes to whitewash the war crimes being committed in Ukraine and encourage more ordinary Russians to volunteer. Moscow’s recent declaration of a holy war also sends an unmistakable message to anyone in the West who still believes in the possibility of striking some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. While Putin initially sought to justify the invasion as a pragmatic response to the growth of NATO, it is now apparent that he views the war as a sacred mission and will not stop until Ukraine has been wiped off the map of Europe.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv, Ukraine. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

On March 20, the ADL issued a statement confirming the authenticity of the recording. The statement adds that the comments were made “during a public Zoom call.” The ADL and Greenblatt himself have previously called on social media platforms to introduce more robust mechanisms for countering hate and harassment. The recent statement from the organization concludes, “These calls-to-action have not included an outright ban of the platform.”

After the recording went viral in March, Tehran Times editor in chief Mohammad Sarfi boasted on X (formerly Twitter) that it was released “exclusively by Tehran Times” in November 2023, arguing that it shows that his daily is “ahead of world developments.”

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The conspiracy theory blaming Israel for the proposed TikTok ban has been repeated by the state media in Iran. Hassan Abedini, the top presenter of the state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), also alleged that the ADL was behind the TikTok ban and wrote on X, “Zionists control freedom of speech in the West.”

Iran’s Young Journalists Club News Agency, run by the state broadcaster, called the possible ban an “assault on freedom of speech.” Ultraconservative Raja News called the 2023 TikTok hearing an “outright inquisition.” Still, it continued using the possible TikTok ban to justify online censorship in Iran, arguing that access to “cyberspace is a security matter.”

China and Iran, bastions of free speech

With the possible US TikTok ban generating buzz around the globe, the United States’ free-speech credentials have come under fire from states infamous for their oppression of domestic free speech, Iran and China.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has released a 3,600-word statement that “expose[s] what ‘free speech’ is according to the United States” and concludes by accusing the US of “[relying] on lies to weave ‘the emperor’s new clothes,’ and how it smears others to maintain its hegemony.”

Unsurprisingly, the statement fails to mention that Beijing has imposed draconian restrictions on the country’s 900 million internet users, pervasive state surveillance, and other abhorrent human rights violations, from suppressing freedom of speech and assembly to committing genocide against the Muslim-majority Uyghur ethnic group.

The statement also doesn’t mention China’s record on upholding freedom of expression at home. Through the Golden Shield Project—launched in 1998 and often called the “great firewall of China”—the regime’s Ministry of Public Security has restricted what content people can access in the country. The regime currently blocks almost all major online platforms, including Google, YouTube, X, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook.

The Tehran Times has also been very concerned about “violations” of free speech in the United States. It has celebrated the “myth of online freedom in [the] US” fading and has accused the United States of waging “social media warfare” and a “propaganda war” against the Islamic Republic.

However, the same outlet has vehemently justified Iran’s weeks-long state-imposed internet shutdown in 2019, which came in response to nationwide protests that were used as cover for security forces to kill 1,500 protesters. It has argued that the government was left with no option but to fully cut people in Iran off from the world to prevent “misuse of the Internet by the outside agencies who [sought] instability in the country” and were “engineering a crisis in Iran.”

The paper’s parent agency, Mehr News, has also actively defended online censorship in Iran, arguing that “online spaces are controlled in developed countries,” has cheered on security forces for cracking down on “networks promoting corruption” (referring to content on modeling or modern lifestyles), and also justified the too-common mass arrest of citizens for defying sharia laws and exercising their basic rights.

The news agency has also been on the frontline of promoting propaganda from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), calling social media the “primary venue of infiltration by the enemies,” presumably the United States and its allies. Furthermore, Mehr has celebrated the Islamic Republic’s troll farms and social media influence campaigns operating in conjunction with IRGC digital operations and hacking campaigns by the likes of Charming Kitten and the IRGC’s Cyber Army.

Iron veil and enlightenment jihad

While the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine criticizes the United States for its “violations” of free speech online, the clerical establishment has shown time and again that the Internet has no place in Khamenei’s vision for the country. The regime’s response to the age of information has been an iron veil.

The eighty-four-year-old ayatollah has repeatedly described social media as a “weapon” and consistently voiced opposition to Iranians having “unbridled” access to the Internet. Over the years, his regime has also repeatedly used internet shutdowns to quell protests. Currently, all major social media platforms are banned in Iran, including YouTube, X, Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok.

Freedom of press and freedom of expression receive similar treatment, as the regime is one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists. During the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the regime arrested at least eighty journalists and twenty-two thousand protesters.

The clerical establishment’s war on freedom of speech has intensified since February 2022, months before the nationwide protests that shook the foundations of the Islamic Republic. At that time, Khamenei declared “enlightenment jihad” against the “enemy”—presumably the United States and its allies. He argued that the adversaries are waging “hybrid warfare” against “Islam and the Islamic Republic,” deploying their “media empire” and social media in an “onslaught to distort and destroy” the clerical establishment in Iran. He argued that the Islamic Republic must take the war to the “enemy” through “enlightenment jihad.” Heeding Khamenei’s direct order, the regime has flooded the internet with bots, trolls, and sock puppets, targeting dissenting voices and taking its colorful influence campaigns at home and abroad to another level.

Interestingly, TikTok has been one of the platforms of choice for the Iranian clerical establishment to export its poison. An account named jahadtabiin2 (“enlightenment jihad” in Persian) with twenty-one thousand followers posts tacky videos promoting the Islamic Republic’s ideology, speeches by the supreme leader, and propaganda against Iranian dissidents. The regime has also recruited TikTokers glorifying the clerical establishment and its top men, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed four years earlier via a US drone strike in Iraq.

While it imposes an iron veil separating people in Iran from the rest of the world, the regime is quick to cry wolf when its top officials face the slightest setback on social media for violating platform guidelines.

In February, Meta banned Khamenei from Instagram and Facebook over his repeated violations of Meta’s “dangerous organizations and individuals policy,” which includes promoting organizations backlisted by the United States, including the terrorist group Hamas.

In response, Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, a member of the powerful Guardian Council, which is controlled by the supreme leader and has veto power over the parliament, wrote on X that the move “reveals [the] true face of so-called advocates of freedom of expression,” a right that, according to him, “has been taken hostage by [the] West.”

Ironically, all three leading social media platforms—Facebook, Instagram, and X—are banned in Iran for everyone except regime supporters and officials, who have been given access to an uncensored Internet.

Khamenei maintains an active presence on X, sharing Holocaust denial to his one million followers on the platform and calling for a “final solution” against Israel.

Ayatollah’s TikTok solution

Iran bans the use of all internationally popular social media platforms. However, the ban against TikTok was presumably enforced with help from the Chinese-owned service, at least until September 2023.

Unlike other social media platforms, people in Iran could not access TikTok even using censorship-circumvention tools (like virtual private networks) as long as they had an Iranian SIM card in their phones. This restriction has apparently been removed.

This implies that TikTok actively identified Iranian SIM cards and banned users. Both the restriction and its apparent end do not bode well for people’s rights to freedom of speech and privacy in sight of the Islamic Republic’s preexisting collaboration with China in fields of surveillance and censorship, which is opaquely listed as part of the twenty-five-year Iran-China deal signed in 2021.

However, people in Iran, especially Generation Z, are tech savvy and resourceful when circumventing restrictions. That is why there have always been TikTokers inside the country. To use the service, some removed their SIM cards before opening the app or had a second device (a smartphone or tablet) without a SIM. They then masked their Internet Protocol (IP) address and location with circumvention tools to get on TikTok.

The second group used unofficial TikTok “forks,” modified versions of the original app released by unknown programmers. The TikTok forks used in Iran are suspiciously named TikToker_IR, a naming style popular with state-affiliated tech companies. In the past, Iranian security forces have developed and published forks of popular banned applications like Telegram, embedding surveillance capabilities in the apps and breaching users’ privacy.

However, in September 2023, TikTokers in Iran observed a change in the enforcement of the ban. Since then, users have been able to access the app without removing their SIM, and only need to use a VPN. This can also be part of the regime’s recent shift to introducing more alternatives to “Western” social media platforms by either curbing limits on apps owned by Tehran’s allies or—as was proposed by the powerful Supreme Council of Cyberspace, controlled by Khamenei—introducing forks for popular banned apps like Instagram with embedded surveillance and censorship capabilities.

From behind the digital iron veil in Iran and the great firewall of China, the two regimes have joined forces, weaving a web of propaganda and conspiracy theories to fight against TikTok regulation in the United States. But for now, with other Western powers such as Canada and the United Kingdom possibly following suit, the fate of the app is in balance around the globe.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

The post Tehran cooked up a conspiracy theory blaming Israel for US TikTok ban appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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