‘I’jaam: An Iraqi Rhapsody’ by Sinan Antoon 

I’jaam offers a poignant glimpse into 1980s Iraq under Saddam Hussein through the eyes of a prisoner. As part of the rich tradition of prison literature, it vividly captures Iraqi life under constant surveillance and the resilience of a community striving to escape torture. In this oppressive environment, only writing that “serves the cause of the Leader and the military establishment” is permitted. Thus, writing in defiance of this regime becomes an act of resistance. The imprisoned protagonist—an admirer of the famous Iraqi poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, whose work is considered subversive in Saddam’s Iraq—uses writing as a means of survival.

This intimate portrayal also serves as a crucial window for Western policymakers, providing insight into the lives of those in the region who bear the brunt of their policy decisions. Often treated as collateral damage or mere casualties in the pursuit of a greater good, the populace—be it in Iraq, Gaza, or Sudan—deserves to be better understood to shape policies with human rights in mind.

—Manal Fatima is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

‘Killing a King: The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel’ by Dan Ephron

In Killing a King, Dan Ephron recounts the two years between the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington and the murder of Yitzhak Rabin on a Tel Aviv street, juxtaposing the Israeli prime minister’s final acts with those of his murderer, Yigal Amir. Rabin’s murder came at a time of intense internal political debate in Israel over its future relationship with Palestine, feeding into existing divisions and making it a highly consequential moment in the country’s history. This retelling by Ephron helps explain the divisions in Israel that led to that fateful moment and how they linger today.

—David Maloney is the program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. 

‘Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books’ by Azar Nafisi

Reading Lolita in Tehran is an intimate and captivating look through Azar Nafisi’s lived experiences of revolutionary Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the formation of a clandestine book club, and eventual emigration. The memoir also delves into historical reversals, the loss of rights, and the plight of women across the country. Despite receiving its fair share of criticism since its 2003 publication, the book is arguably more relevant today, two years on from the beginning of the Women, Life, Freedom movement, offering readers an account of the early period of the Islamic Republic and the legacy of Iranian women’s struggles to regain the freedoms lost. And for those who love literature, the author—a professor of Western literature—delves deep into some of her favorite writers, including Vladimir Nabokov, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Jane Austen, and Henry James.  

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘Syrian Dust: Reporting from the Heart of the War’ by Francesca Borri

A raw and powerful account of the Syrian war by Italian correspondent Francesa Borri, Syrian Dust provides a compelling personal account of events in Aleppo and surrounding areas from the chemical attacks of August 2013 through the following months. Borri hides with dozens of terrified civilians, scavenges to survive, meets with officials, observes the development and fracturing of warring parties, and provides a human lens for an inhumane time. Syrian Dust provides a view from inside the conflict itself—focusing on the human realities for a conflict and region so often discussed from 30,000 feet.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operation and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. 

‘The Sheltering Sky’ by Paul Bowles

My favorite read this Summer (thus far) has been The Sheltering Sky by Paul Bowles. While written over seventy years ago, its themes, structure, and language seem surprisingly contemporary. The story follows a young American couple and their third-wheel friend who initially appear to be stereotypical wealthy “travelers, not tourists,” the kind of self-regarding intellectuals that pride themselves on their cultural openness but still disparage any local accommodations that don’t meet their standards. Over time, however, it becomes clear that exploring foreign lands is a convenient way for each to avoid their responsibilities, including to each other, much less confront their underlying alienation. As they travel through French-controlled North Africa—mainly Algeria—moving farther into the continent, their repeated efforts to escape their existence into environments that they don’t understand produces catastrophic results.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘No One Prayed Over Their Graves: A Novel’ by Khaled Khalifa

No One Prayed Over Their Graves was the last novel by Syrian writer and poet Khaled Khalifa before passing away in Damascus in 2023. The author is the Victor Hugo of the Arab World, known for his poignant realism, his vivid depiction of “Les Misérables” of subaltern Syria, and his criticism of the Baathist regime. The novel recounts the story of Christian and Muslim friends, Hanna and Zakariya, from a village near Aleppo in 1907 and how their lives were altered after a massive flood leveled their homes, businesses, and places of worship, and took the lives of their loved ones. The book that was long-listed for the 2023 National Book Award for Translated Literature is also a sweeping tale of religious diversity, coming of age, and class mobility in the hubbub of Aleppine society at the turn of the twentieth century. This novel was a particularly emotional read for me, as Khaled was a personal friend, and a living witness of the socio-political hardships and transformations in modern-day Syria that he immortalized in lush and elastic storytelling in novels like In Praise of Hatred, No Knives in the Kitchens of This City, or Death Is Hard Work.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

The post Summer isn’t over. Here’s our recommended reading list. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

The post Dispatch from the Paris Olympics: The African sports movement is about to take off, if leaders help fuel it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction. 

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Can citizens’ assemblies help counter a rising populist tide in the West? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post The Mattei Plan is an opportunity for North Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in National Interest: The Assassination Attempt on Donald Trump and the Threat to Democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s prayer breakfast challenges Kremlin claims of religious persecution appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 2003 US-led invasion, which led to the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein, presented an opportunity to rebuild Iraq’s educational system. While there were initial efforts to revitalize schools and universities, the ongoing violence and political instability hindered sustained progress. Corruption, sectarian strife, and the absence of coherent education policies exacerbated the challenges. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) severely disrupted the educational system in areas under its control. Despite these hurdles, there were pockets of progress, particularly in the autonomous Kurdistan region, which began to chart its course for educational reform.

Today, with 60 percent of Iraqis under the age of twenty-five, the nation’s education system is at a critical juncture. The young population represents both a tremendous opportunity and a daunting challenge. High unemployment rates and inadequate educational facilities threaten to undermine the potential of youth contributing to the country’s rebuilding efforts. The lack of investment in modern educational infrastructure and the disconnect between educational outcomes and labor-market needs are stark.

For instance, according to a 2021 IREX report, only 22 percent of university graduates find jobs in their field of study within three months of graduating. This highlights the critical need for a more responsive education system that meets the market’s needs. According to the World Bank, 2 million Iraqi children are deprived of education, presenting a significant challenge for their future prospects. In addition, literacy rates remain alarmingly low, especially among women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recognized the urgency of addressing these issues. The cabinet has developed Vision 2030, which prioritizes enhancing and adapting education to support economic diversification. This unprecedented framework aims to align Kurdistan’s educational system with international standards, while fostering a workforce capable of driving economic growth across sectors. A key element of this vision is establishing the Kurdistan Accrediting Association for Education (KAAE), a national accreditation body designed to bridge the educational gap and propel the region into the twenty-first century.

Because standardization can serve as leverage for reform, the KAAE seeks to establish standards to ensure that educational institutions in Kurdistan and Iraq meet rigorous quality-assurance requirements. By promoting best practices and fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement, the KAAE, as a twelve/fifteen-year project, aims to support the government in establishing sound policies for educational quality, making it more relevant to the needs of the economy and society. This initiative is crucial for modernizing Kurdistan’s education system and enabling it to catch up with global advancements, as it is for Iraq and the broader region when used as a model.

Strategic investment in education

Effective implementation of the KAAE’s quality-assurance standards necessitates leveraging the expertise and experience of the international community in building the capacity of academic institutions. The United States and Iraq have a framework agreement that identifies education as a cornerstone of bilateral relations as part of the broader cultural cooperation between the two countries. It is now time to translate this agreement into action. Strengthening this partnership can have far-reaching reverberations beyond education, fostering economic development, political stability, and social cohesion. While the United States has invested significantly in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has been disproportionately allocated to the security sector. According to the Military Times, the United States has spent nearly $2 trillion on military operations in Iraq. Even a fraction of this amount, 1 percent, would have a transformational impact if directed toward educational initiatives.

Investing in Iraq’s education system offers a unique opportunity for the United States to not only support a key ally but also address the root causes of instability in the region. The United States can help build the foundation for a stable and prosperous Iraq by directing resources toward educational reform. This investment would both strengthen US public diplomacy and promote the values of democracy and human rights, which are integral to long-term peace and security. Such support includes establishing partnerships between US schools and universities and their Iraqi counterparts to implement the quality-assurance standards the KAAE sets. These partnerships could focus on building capacity and mentorship, embedding student-centered learning in curricula, and creating continuous assessment and evaluation strategies. Because the Kurdistan region has already established the KAAE, this could serve as a pilot model for Iraq as a whole, with the goal of replicating the body in other parts of Iraq.

Countries like Singapore and South Korea provide valuable lessons in how education can drive national development. Both nations have transformed their economies through substantial investments in education, focusing on skills development and innovation. For example, South Korea’s emphasis on technology and vocational training has made it a global industry leader. Similarly, Singapore’s education system, known for its rigor and focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), has produced a highly skilled workforce that drives the country’s ongoing economic success.

By supporting similar models in Iraq, the United States can help foster an education system that not only equips young Iraqis with the skills and qualifications the local market and economy need, both today and in the long term, but also cultivates critical thinking and innovation. This approach aligns with the US strategy of promoting regional stability through economic development and education.

The role of education in peace and security

Enhancing education in Iraq is not just about economic growth; it is a crucial element of peacebuilding. Education fosters understanding, tolerance, and critical thinking, which are essential for mitigating conflict and promoting social cohesion. A well-educated populace is better equipped to participate in democratic processes and contribute to the nation’s development. By investing in education, Iraq can build a more inclusive society in which young people are empowered to contribute positively to their communities.

For Iraq, education is more than a policy priority; it is a pathway to peace and prosperity. The United States can play a critical role in achieving such prosperity. By leveraging initiatives like the KAAE and drawing on successful global models, Iraq can transform its education system, paving the way for a brighter future. This investment is not just about building schools; it is about building a nation with a capable and empowered citizenry.

The United States and the international community can seize this opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a stable and prosperous Iraq, promoting a region where education empowers young people as agents of positive change.

Dr. Honar Issa is the secretary of the Board of Trustees at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK). He also serves as chair of the Middle East Peace and Security Forum.

The post Investing in Iraq’s education will contribute to its revival appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This article presents the structure of the Syrian electorate: who the voters are, how many voters are there, and why credible projections are so elusive. In theory, the constitution guarantees all Syrian citizens voting rights—with consequential caveats built into the electoral and nationality laws.

Syrian citizens obtain their status through their father, as defined by the Nationality Law of 1969, but cannot obtain it through their mothers. Syrian women also cannot pass citizenship to their husbands. Yet, there are shortcuts to Syrian citizenship—the Syrian interior minister has significant authority to grant citizenship through facilitated or exceptional naturalization processes.

The Syrian opposition claims the government is altering demographics and voting preferences by granting citizenship to foreigners fighting in the conflict. There are no reliable reports about the number of foreigners granted citizenship since 2011, but the issue is politically significant and Syrians are keenly aware of the Lebanese case. This matter is especially relevant for ethnic Kurds, who have historically been denied their citizenship rights. On the opposite side, the right to vote in assembly elections has been extended to the military since 2016, but this has only fueled suspicions of vote manipulations.

The laws include a few other categories of potentially problematic restrictions, but it is unclear whether they significantly impact the electorate’s structure. For example, those convicted of a “felony or dishonorable misdemeanor or that which shakes public trust” and those “mentally ill in a manner that affects his eligibility” are excluded from the electorate. However, the Syrian diaspora is the largest group of Syrians excluded from the elections. While the diaspora has the right to vote in the presidential election, that right is not extended to the assembly elections. This is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254, which recommends diaspora participation in elections.

If given the right, how many Syrians in the diaspora could vote? For that matter, how many Syrians in total would have the right to vote? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer that question credibly. The underlying reason for the speculative nature of the electorate’s size is that, despite being legally required to do so, the government does not register voters. Nor does it compile the voter lists. Evidence from previous elections clearly confirms that voter registration is nonexistent. In the 2020 and 2021 elections, there was no voter registration, polling committees did not have a voter list, instead they had blank forms to register voters as they approached the polls. Similarly, there was no evidence of voter-registration activities before this year’s elections.

So, where do the data about voters published by the government come from? According to statements by governmental officials, they come from the civil registry. However, in Syria this cannot be considered an accurate record of citizens. While the Assad regime used the administrative apparatus to control the population, it failed to create an orderly civil registry, even before the conflict. Since the conflict began in 2011, maintenance of the civil registry has been disrupted. Efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to preserve records might be crucial for those who will need to prove their civil status in the future, but these records are not reflected in the current version of the civil registry.

Official voter data are extremely scarce. Historically, the Supreme Judicial Election Commission only publishes overall voter numbers. These are virtually impossible to analyze, as no details are provided, and data are not even broken down by governorate. Governors or governorate-level commissions sometimes provide these randomly, but they are often rounded up by commissions without explanation.

The significant increase in the number of reported registered voters in 2020 is likely due to the change in how the number is calculated. In the pre-2020 elections, the election committees received a preliminary voters list extracted from the civil registry. They would then audit the list by removing and adding voters. Since the 2020 election, that process has been abandoned, and the number of registered voters simply reflects all the civil registry adult records.

When it comes to diaspora voters, the numbers are difficult to crunch. The Syrian population is estimated to range between 24–27 million, with 16–20 million Syrians in the country and 5–6.7 million outside the country. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan alone are hosting more than 5 million Syrian refugees. Using a conservative estimate, the Syrian voting-age population is about 60 percent, which would imply 14–16 million voters in the country and 3–4 million outside the country. That would be within the range of the 18 million voters claimed by the government. However, it is unclear how many live in the government-controlled areas, as the estimate of 9.5 million might not be reliable.

In contrast to the previous election, the government has not issued a single statement about the size of the electorate, no matter how incredible the numbers may be. A comparison of reports from various sources regarding the eight rounds of assembly elections starting in 1990 shows that turnout varies between 50–60 percent. Extrapolating this and applying it to the number of voters who voted in the 2020 elections, in theory, suggests that the total number of voters should not be more than 10 million, which is much smaller than the previously announced 18 million.

Is it possible that, in the pre-2020 elections, almost half of the Syrian electorate was missing from the voter lists? Or are the post-2020 election figures enormously inflated? The confusion over the true size of the electorate will certainly not be resolved in these elections. The Assad government is not investing in even minimal efforts to sort out the voter registry. If there is ever a chance to hold elections according to the standards set by UNSC Resolution 2254, voter-registration reform will be one of the most technically and logistically challenging aspects. Such reform would need to protect the right of Syrians inside and outside the country to vote, while also infusing a basic transparency standard into the electoral process.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post Syria’s inflated electorate is caused by phantom voters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For decades, the United States and Serbia have engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance. Recently, Serbian think tank representatives visited Washington, DC, for critical talks with US policymakers.

Their agenda? Navigating the complexities of Serbia’s democratic health and evolving foreign policy, including unpacking its shifting alliances with Russia and China, and how these relationships impact Serbia’s aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU).

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Where next for Serbian foreign policy? | A Debrief with Igor Bandovic and Nikola Burazer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hundreds of kilometers from Kyiv on the front lines of the war with Russia, the Ukrainian LGBTQI+ community is also present within the ranks of the military among Ukrainians of all ethnic backgrounds and religions defending the country. While calculating the exact number of LGBTQI+ soldiers is challenging, a 2023 article in Britain’s Daily Telegraph estimated that between two and seven percent of serving personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces are members of the LGBTQI+ community.

Some serve openly, sporting symbols such as a unicorn patch below the blue and yellow national colors of Ukraine on their military uniform. In many cases, they do so to demonstrate that, contrary to assertions from Russian propagandists and other opponents, LGBTQI+ Ukrainians are just as willing to defend their country as other Ukrainians.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The increasing openness in Ukraine toward issues of sexual orientation and identity stands in stark contrast to the deteriorating situation in regions of the country currently under Kremlin control. Throughout occupied Ukraine, the LGBTQI+ community faces the reality of draconian Russian legislation that often prevents them from defending their rights and sets the stage for serious human rights abuses.

According to Nash Svit, a Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organization, these abuses include public humiliation, torture, extortion, and sexual violence. The National LGBTQ Consortium in Ukraine has documented a similarly oppressive atmosphere of increased fear and violence in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and the Crimean peninsula following Russian occupation in 2014.

In Russia itself, LGBTQI+ individuals have long featured in the ever-growing category of scapegoated groups, where they are joined by representatives of the free media, civil society, and the country’s tiny anti-war opposition as proxy targets in the Kremlin’s campaign against the West. Scores of LGBTQI+ Russians have fled the country in recent years, citing a mounting climate of insecurity and oppression. Those who remain face routine discrimination along with threats to their livelihood and personal safety.

In line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasingly radical anti-Western rhetoric, last year Russia’s Supreme Court declared the “international LGBTQ movement” a terrorist and extremist organization. The Russian authorities have since used this ruling to convict Russians of displaying the rainbow flag, raid LGBTQI+ clubs, and brand LGBTQI+ activists as foreign agents.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Putin’s Russia has sparked debate across the border and helped persuade many in traditionally conservative Ukraine to reject homophobia. A June 2023 poll found that more than 70% of Ukrainians believe members of the LGBTQI+ community should have the same rights as any other Ukrainian citizen, representing a significant increase from prewar levels of social acceptance.

Despite indications of progress, significant challenges remain. While LGBTQI+ individuals can now serve openly in the Ukrainian military, many say they face difficulties not experienced by non-LGBTQI+ soldiers. Efforts are ongoing to secure equal partner rights, including the right of same-sex partners to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner in case of injury, and to receive the same state benefits for military service.

Amid the unprecedented trauma and turbulence of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the issue of LGBTQI+ rights remains on Ukraine’s political agenda and continues to gain traction. In 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged growing demand for recognition of same-sex civil unions. A year later, Ukrainian MP Ivana Sovsun formally introduced a bill on civil unions.

Current trends look set to continue. As Ukraine takes additional steps toward membership of the European Union, the accession process will include a growing focus on Ukrainian human rights legislation. This will include measures to bring Ukrainian law into line with EU standards, meaning the likely introduction of greater legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community is in many ways at the forefront of the struggle against Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian brand of Russian imperialism. From the LGBTQI+ soldiers on the front lines of the war to the activists pushing for social change in Kyiv, the community plays a vital role in Ukraine’s ongoing European integration and defense against the Kremlin’s anti-Western crusade.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Kyiv Pride event highlights changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The reformist faction has controlled major power centers in Iran, such as the presidency and parliament. However, despite their promises of “reform” and increased civil liberties, their rule was marked by bloody crackdowns, and Iranians are no longer fooled by such undeliverable and false promises.

Just months prior to Raisi’s death, Khatami—whose name and face have been blacked out from appearing in state media for supporting the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement—boycotted the March parliamentary election. That election was described by the Iranian Reformist Front, a coalition of reformist factions, as “meaningless, noncompetitive, and ineffective” because all reformists had effectively been disqualified. Yet, Khatami, the face of the bygone reformist era that aimed to democratize the country, still placed faith in a system and role he once described as no more than a “footman” to maintain the status quo that most Iranians—especially Iranian Gen Z—are disillusioned by and want gone, as evidenced by a poll conducted by Netherlands-based GAMAAN in February.

The reformist movement in the Islamic Republic has long been dead. Activist Bahareh Hedayat, who spent her life advocating for gradual change, confirmed it in a letter from Evin prison—where she continues to languish—at the height of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated in a March audio leak that the clerical establishment sought the movement’s “erasure.” (Despite his leaked comments, Zarif has now joined Pezeshkian’s campaign team because he believes in overriding loyalty to the Islamic Republic.)

The trajectory of the Islamic Republic in recent years makes it abundantly clear that there is no room for reform under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with principalists—up until Raisi’s death—leading all government branches: the presidency, parliament, and judiciary. This was no accident and engineered by Khamenei, who, with the help of the Guardian Council—a twelve-member vetting body in which six are appointed by him directly—is making every calculation with the Islamic Republic post-mortem in mind. The supreme leader’s vision is an Islamic Revolution 2.0, in which relatively young ultraconservatives take the helm of the country—a new cohort nicknamed the “super revolutionaries.” 

The Islamic Republic had two historically low-turnout elections: the 2021 presidential election—or “selection,” as many described it at the time—which was engineered to hand the presidency to Raisi with 48.8 percent turnout and the March 2024 parliamentary election, which gave 233 out of 290 seats to the principalists with 41 percent turnout, an outcome not much different from the 2020 election. Khamenei has always emphasized that the regime’s legitimacy stemmed from its popularity and always encourages citizens to vote to show that popular support.

Since the December 2017–January 2018 protests, protesters have vocalized that all factions are irredeemable, as evident by the chant: “Reformists, principalists, the game is over.” This is likely why one reformist was allowed to run: to stimulate a higher voter turnout to give the clerical establishment legitimacy, which it lacks domestically. However, the Islamic Republic does not lack legitimacy on the international stage, as it recommenced ties with its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors including Saudi Arabia, has joined the economic grouping known as BRICS and the more security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and has continued to attend international conferences such as the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Iranian elections are unpredictable, though Pezeshkian could slightly move the election needle, leading to a second round. Still, the average Iranian is not stirred by a man who uses Khamenei’s formal title and claims that he intends to follow “the general policies of the exalted supreme leader” —language not commonly used by reformists.

And while he seems to be hitting all the buzz-worthy topics such as reviving the defunct nuclear deal and speaking out against the so-called morality police’s latest crackdown on women and girls, the Nour initiative, Pezeshkian has not moved the public, as evidenced by one interview that was described as “boring.”

Pezeshkian has also co-opted the de facto Women, Life, Freedom protest anthem “Baraye” (For the sake of) by singer Shervin Hajipour in his campaign, using “For the sake of wanting a normal life” in an election poster and “For the sake of Iran” as a campaign hashtag. The song reference has angered many Iranians who haven’t forgotten how more than 550 protesters—including sixty-eight children—were killed during the uprising (and the more than 1,500 others in previous protests), as shown by the slogan, “A sea of blood divides us,” referring to the people and the clerical establishment. To many, Pezeshkian and other candidates are merely puppets, which was best highlighted by a viral meme of candidates’ faces superimposed on Khamenei. I’ve been repeatedly told that Iranians are so unenthusiastic about the upcoming election that boycotting is not even a serious topic of conversation, because many assume that is what the majority will do. Even a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) noted that 73 percent of Iranians didn’t follow the first presidential debate.

Elections aside, Iranians are drowning in hopelessness, prompted by multiple unsuccessful cycles of protests aimed at ending the Islamic Republic; a dire economic situation caused by systemic mismanagement, corruption, and, in part, US sanctions; and the brutal clampdowns on dissent. The June 15 prisoner swap of two Swedish nationals for Hamid Nouri, an Iranian official who was convicted of war crimes for his role in the 1988 massacre of five thousand political prisoners, was just another instance that demonstrated to Iranians that they could not rely on the West to hold the Islamic Republic accountable. The only way out of this conundrum is if Iranians take their destiny into their own hands. And if one thing is certain, it’s that their destinies will not be determined by the ballot box.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

The post Don’t be fooled by the ‘reformist.’ Iran’s presidential election won’t bring fundamental change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Women and civil society are indispensable as first responders in the ongoing war. They must also be central to the planning, distribution, and oversight of funds in reconstruction efforts. As the German and Ukrainian governments recognized, the physical reconstruction of Ukraine needs to be paired with a comprehensive social, human-centered recovery. Women, who represent the majority of the highly educated and skilled workforce in Ukraine, are well-positioned to strengthen anti-corruption measures, modernize the energy sector, and drive Ukraine’s reform agenda. All of these components are essential for an effective recovery. In addition, these efforts can help Ukraine meet the conditions for its accession to the European Union (EU).

The record to date for women’s inclusion in recovery efforts has not been what it needs to be. Policymakers must continue to ensure that Ukrainian women leaders will have the opportunity to meaningfully and fully participate in Ukraine’s recovery. Ukraine can only recover if women and civil society are fully involved in its reconstruction.

Where do women fit in the Ukraine recovery agenda?

Held in Lugano, Switzerland, in July 2022, the first recovery conference resulted in the adoption of the “Lugano Declaration,” which includes guiding principles for Ukraine’s recovery process. At the 2023 conference in London, the EU announced the creation of a new Ukrainian facility that would provide a total of fifty billion euros to Ukraine over four years. From this total amount, thirty-nine billion euros will be allocated to the state budget to support macroeconomic stability. Another eight billion euros will go toward a special investment instrument that will cover risks in priority sectors. This year’s conference in Berlin aimed to attract private-sector investment in Ukraine, including in human capital. The agenda included the explicit goal of investing in women and youth. This was a positive development and should encourage international financial institutions and private donors to continue to invest in women-owned and -led businesses in Ukraine, as well as to train Ukrainian women to take on jobs in Ukraine’s critical sectors.

How to unleash Ukrainian women’s economic potential

Invest, train, and enable Ukrainian women. Women in Ukraine and elsewhere have traditionally had limited access to credit, markets, and training opportunities. They have also struggled to balance responsibilities in the workplace and their primary caregiver responsibilities. These challenges must be overcome if women are to fulfill their economic potential.

The World Economic Forum notes that one solution for improving women’s access to credit is to not necessarily demand collateral, because women often do not own private property. Moreover, many women (as well as men) in Ukraine have lost their homes and properties to the war, so providing property as collateral is not likely to be an option for them. Therefore, adopting alternative ways to determine women’s creditworthiness could encourage more women to apply for business loans.

Ukrainian women, with the support of Western companies and institutions, have already stepped up to launch their own startups. These should be scaled up. Since the start of Russia’s invasion, an increasing number of Ukrainian women have founded tech startups, benefitting from improved access to investors outside Ukraine, as well as programs sponsored by the EU, international organizations, and private companies. For example, VISA launched its “She’s Next” program in Ukraine in 2020, and it has since hosted gatherings where Ukrainian women presented their business proposals and received funding and training at business schools. More Western companies should team up with women-led Ukrainian nonprofits to create opportunities for funding female-led startups and give them access to education and training.

Train Ukrainian women to fill workforce gaps in critical sectors. Now is an important time to train Ukrainian women in two critical sectors that will play a key role in rebuilding Ukraine’s economy: finance and cybersecurity. Ukraine has consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe in Transparency International’s global Corruption Perceptions Index. Although Ukraine has made significant progress in the fight against corruption since 2014, it remains a problem and a concern for the United States and other foreign partners. The cost of complete reconstruction is currently estimated to be around $750 billion, but international donors are concerned about the potential misappropriation of funds put toward reconstruction.

Reform of its financial sector is essential for Ukraine to secure financial aid for reconstruction, as well as to meet the requirements for joining the EU. The urgent need for financial system reform coincides with women playing a much larger role in the financial system, both within the government and private sector. By transferring the knowledge of, for example, the best anti-money laundering (AML) practices to Ukrainian women, the West would create a generation of AML experts in Ukraine who are capable of detecting suspicious money flows and preventing corruption and money laundering within the Ukrainian financial system.

At the same time, equipping Ukrainian women with cybersecurity skills would help them defend Ukrainian banks and the financial system from Russian intrusions. Ukrainian banks were one of the primary targets of the cyberattacks that Russia initiated right before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. More recently, at the end of 2023, Monobank, one of the largest Ukrainian banks, reported a massive hacker attack. While the bank has not publicly attributed this attack to any specific threat actor, Russia has been suspected due to its history of backing cybercrime groups attacking Ukraine. The persistent threat of Russian cyberattacks against Ukrainian banks should be countered by training Ukrainian women in cybersecurity and digital forensics.

Ukraine’s partners and allies can learn from and build on existing work to train Ukrainian women in cybersecurity. For example, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research organized a project that trained Ukrainian women evacuees in Poland in cybersecurity and data analytics. The project was held from October 2023 to March 2024 and was funded by the government and people of Japan. Private companies have also launched similar initiatives. For example, Microsoft is working with nonprofit organizations in Poland to train Ukrainian women refugees to enter the workforce in cybersecurity. Such projects need to expand to include more partners and reach more Ukrainian women.

Investing in Ukrainian women is smart economics

Leveraging Ukraine recovery conferences and other global convenings to encourage Western investment in Ukrainian women corresponds with the United States’ existing strategy of providing economic incentives to allies—also known as positive economic statecraft. The EU, United Kingdom, and other Group of Seven (G7) members are already heavily invested in Ukraine’s success. Directing investment toward the female workforce will strengthen an already existing strategy of ensuring Ukraine has the resources to minimize economic dependence on Russia. Investment in Ukrainian women will create a multiplier effect for the economy. It is well-known that women often spend their income on education, healthcare, and nutrition—all of which raise the standard of living. This is a force that moves economies forward but is often sidelined.

Finally, Ukrainian women can fill in global workforce gaps, too. Training Ukrainian women in cybersecurity would help address the global cybersecurity skills crisis. Private companies and policymakers often note that the world does not have enough cybersecurity professionals. Meanwhile, Ukraine has a highly educated population, especially in technical subjects. Cyber-trained Ukrainian women could defend not only Ukrainian banks but also businesses and governments around the world.

As policymakers and private sector actors adopt strategies for Ukraine’s reconstruction, it is crucial that they fully leverage the potential of Ukrainian women and help establish the groundwork for an inclusive and sustainable recovery.

Melanne Verveer is the executive director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and a former United States ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues at the US Department of State.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former senior US Treasury official.

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In line with this legislation, a wide range of Ukrainian government officials will now be expected to reach a degree of English language fluency, while various state services will be made available in English. The law also envisages expanded English language educational opportunities, and support for the screening of English language movies featuring subtitles rather than dubbing.

Ukraine’s recent decision to grant the English language elevated official status reflects a much broader national transformation that has been underway since the country first regained independence more than three decades ago. This historic process has helped transform the Ukrainian linguistic landscape.

In 1991, Ukrainian was officially recognized as the only state language of the newly independent country. In practice, however, Ukraine remained deeply embedded within a Russian language culture inherited from the Soviet era. This informal empire extended from schools to popular culture, with generations of post-independence Ukrainians growing up in an information space that was still dominated by Moscow.

While old imperial ties remained strong, only the privileged few could afford to travel to most Western countries. Strict visa regimes acted as an additional barrier to engagement with the Western world until Ukrainians finally secured visa-free travel to the EU in 2017. Despite these obstacles, the popularity of English language studies in the decades following 1991 reflected Ukraine’s growing openness to the outside world.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Research indicates that demand for English language learning has increased significantly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. This interest in language skills may at first glance appear somewhat unexpected, given the enormous challenges facing Ukrainian society over the past two years. For many Ukrainians it makes perfect sense. In wartime Ukraine, studying English is an attractive route toward greater personal development that can also provide opportunities to boost the country’s defense and support integration into the wider European community.

The war with Russia has dramatically underlined the importance of the English language as a tool for international communication. At the most immediate and practical level, knowledge of English has been a huge asset for Ukrainian soldiers and commanders learning new skills and encountering new weapons systems for the first time. Indeed, it was striking to see English language fluency specifically cited as a key requirement during discussions with Western partners over plans to train Ukrainian pilots.

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The same linguistic logic has applied to non-military engagement with international partners at the governmental and nongovernmental levels. As Ukrainians have sought to develop new relationships and address complex wartime issues with officials and volunteers from dozens of different countries, English language skills have proven absolutely crucial.

This deepening dialog is very much a two-way street. While greater English language proficiency is proving important for Ukrainians in their engagement with the international community, it is also allowing foreign partners to learn more from the Ukrainian side. In the military sphere, for example, no other country is currently able to match Ukraine’s experience in modern warfare. Speaking the same language makes it far easier to share this experience and pass on important lessons to allies.

As Ukraine moves closer to the rest of Europe and continues to make progress toward the goal of EU membership, the role of the English language within Ukrainian society will only increase. The recently adopted law on the status of English reflects this reality, and should help create an environment that supports the country’s broader Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations.

For centuries, Russia has used language as a tool to suppress Ukrainian independence and impose an artificial imperial identity on Ukrainians. By officially embracing English as the language of international communication, Ukrainians now aim to support their country’s historic pivot away from Moscow and return to the European community of nations.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 11, 2024

Victory in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen Putin’s war machine

By Peter Dickinson

Victory in Ukraine would greatly strengthen Russia militarily, economically, and strategically, while severely weakening the West. Faced with such uniquely favorable circumstances, it is fanciful to suggest a triumphant Putin would simply stop, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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On June 11, IPSI/GCH nonresident senior fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in a South China Morning Post article regarding China’s relaxation of visa restrictions, which has attracted tourists back to the country following its COVID-19 lockdown. 

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

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This new peace initiative comes at a critical point in the Russia-Ukraine War. More than two years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there remains no end in sight to what is the largest European conflict since World War II. Instead, Vladimir Putin’s invading army is once again advancing, and has recently attempted to open a new front with a cross-border offensive close to Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv.

In parallel to these front line advances, the Russian military is also conducting in a nationwide bombing campaign that appears designed to terrorize Ukrainian civilians and force millions to flee their homes by making large parts of the country uninhabitable. Since the beginning of 2024, Russia has damaged or destroyed around half of Ukraine’s remaining energy generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts. Meanwhile, recent air strikes against civilian targets such as shopping centers have left dozens dead. This air offensive illustrates how the escalating costs of the conflict are being felt far beyond the battlefield.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The most immediate consequences of Russia’s invasion have been carnage and destruction on an unprecedented scale for twenty-first century Europe. Military losses on both sides have not been officially disclosed and remain hotly disputed, but are widely believed to be in the hundreds of thousands. A similar number of soldiers have suffered life-changing injuries.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have likely been killed during the invasion. Large numbers of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to Russia, including thousands of children. Many more have been abducted and remain missing. A long list of Ukrainian towns, villages, and entire cities have been reduced to rubble.

Even for those who have escaped physical injury or the loss of property, Russia’s invasion has often had a devastating impact. Almost everybody in Ukraine has lost a friend, acquaintance, or family member in the war. Experts are already warning that Ukrainian society must prepare to deal with major mental health challenges for decades to come.

The demographic situation is equally alarming. Around a quarter of Ukraine’s prewar population have been forced to flee their homes, becoming either internally displaced or leaving the country for the neighboring EU. This has led to a dramatic decline in Ukraine’s overall population. The longer the war continues, the less likely it becomes that Ukrainian refugees will return home.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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In areas such as education, the costs of Russia’s invasion are severe and will likely be long-lasting. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine ranked among the world’s most educated populations. However, ongoing hostilities now threaten this status. A generation of young Ukrainians have had their schooling and university studies disrupted or derailed entirely by the war. Inevitably, many have chosen to continue their studies abroad. The same is true for Ukrainian academics. This wartime brain drain represents a massive blow to Ukraine’s future.

The Ukrainian economy has displayed remarkable resilience over the past two years of full-scale war, but even this cannot disguise the harm done by Russia’s invasion. With almost twenty percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation or close enough to the front lines to make normal business activities impossible, many companies have had to relocate or cease operations entirely. Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has created further logistical problems, while also reducing export revenues and depriving the Ukrainian authorities of taxes.

Finally, with Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies focused on war-related priorities and as employment options become more limited, crime is becoming a mounting challenge. According to recent research, most Ukrainian organized crime groups have severed longstanding ties with their Russian counterparts, but remain active and continue to seek opportunities created by wartime realities.

From mental health and population decline to the economy and education, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian society that will be felt for generations to come. This should be at the forefront of people’s minds as they gather in Switzerland to discuss how to end the war and establish a sustainable peace for Ukrainians.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2024

Russia is winning the energy war and plunging Ukraine into darkness

By Elena Davlikanova

Electricity blackouts are the new normal in Ukraine as the country struggles to cope with the consequences of a devastating Russian air offensive that has destroyed around half of Ukraine’s wartime power-generating capacity since the start of 2024, writes Elena Davlikanova.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The terrible cost of Russia’s war is being felt far beyond the battlefield appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Why does the West not have a coherent victory plan? How long can Ukraine be expected to sustain the current war effort if the country only receives sufficient military aid to survive? Is the latest US aid package enough to secure Ukrainian victory? Is Europe doing enough to enforce sanctions, confiscate Russian assets, and supply advanced weapons systems like Taurus missiles? These are just some of the key questions Ukraine’s partners should be asking themselves in the coming weeks.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Putin’s Russia poses a direct threat to the global security system and to a sustainable peace in Europe. The outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine will define the future security framework on the European continent for decades to come. If the West provides Ukraine with the support it needs to win the war, this victory will secure peace not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe. Russian defeat could also spark a political transformation inside Russia and help undermine the country’s aggressive imperial ambitions.

The consequences of Russian success in Ukraine would be equally far-reaching. If the West continues to demonstrate weakness in Ukraine and supports calls for some kind of ceasefire or negotiated settlement, Russia will claim an historic victory and will become even more internationally aggressive. This aggression will not be limited to Ukraine, and will be targeted against the whole Western world.

Nor will the Kremlin be acting alone. On the contrary, Russian victory over the West in Ukraine would embolden the Alliance of Autocracies that has emerged in recent years, bringing together Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. While further Russian aggression is likely to focus on Europe, Putin’s fellow autocrats will be encouraged to embrace their own expansionist agendas elsewhere.

This is why the international community needs to accept that only Ukrainian victory can open the door to a sustainable peace, both for Ukraine and the wider world. Any attempt to reach a compromise peace agreement with Putin would not only hand Russia victory and allow Moscow to continue occupying entire regions of Ukraine; it would also be a dangerous repetition of the 1938 Munich Conference, which had such tragic consequences for the entire international community. The British and French leaders who agreed to hand Hitler part of Czechoslovakia in Munich also hoped they were securing peace. Instead, they were setting the stage for World War II. Europe cannot afford to make the same mistake again.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

At present, the West appears to be split into two main camps over the issue of how to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One camp recognizes the importance of Ukrainian victory for European security, and sees Russian defeat as its clear goal. These countries are committed to supporting the Ukrainian war effort and refuse to rule out sending troops to defend Ukraine if necessary.

The other camp favors a negotiated settlement and typically frames this readiness to compromise with the Kremlin as a desire for peace. Such posturing is intellectually dishonest. After all, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. However, Ukrainians understand that peace cannot be secured by offering territorial concessions to the Putin regime that would abandon millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation. They know that accepting a ceasefire without victory would make it impossible to hold Russia accountable for war crimes.

Crucially, Ukrainians also recognize that unless Putin is defeated, he will inevitably go further. Encouraged by the impunity of a ceasefire agreement, Russia would use any pause in hostilities to rearm and prepare for the next phase of its war against Ukraine and the West. This would create dangers similar to the threat faced by the Allies during World War II, when Churchill and Roosevelt warned against a premature peace and instead declared the goal of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. Today’s Western leaders must now recognize that offering Putin a ceasefire will not bring about a lasting peace. Instead, it will pave the way for more war.

Future Western support for Ukraine must be built around a clear and unambiguous commitment to Ukrainian victory. This is currently missing. When Western leaders and policymakers gather in the coming weeks, the need to work toward a Ukrainian victory should be at the very top of the agenda. Meanwhile, Ukrainians must continue to explain the difference between a temporary ceasefire and a lasting peace. In 2023, Ukrainian civil society experts did their part by developing their own vision, which was outlined in the Sustainable Peace Manifesto, describing the importance of bringing Russia to justice and providing Ukraine with unambiguous security guarantees.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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After more than ten years of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, it is time for Kyiv’s partners to learn the lessons of this war and avoid falling into further Russian traps. When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, it did so under a veil of deniability using so-called “little green men,” or Russian soldiers without insignia. A decade later, Russia is now openly waging the largest European invasion since World War II, and is supported by an alliance of fellow tyrannies who share the Kremlin’s goal of destroying the rules-based international order. Russia is now attacking Ukraine with Iranian drones and North Korean missiles, while receiving military supplies and vital economic support from China. If the West is unable to counter this growing threat, it will forfeit its position at the heart of the international security architecture and be replaced by the rising authoritarian powers.

In 2014, Western leaders were naive enough to expect a diplomatic solution to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It should now be painfully obvious that such hopes were unrealistic. Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine engaged in more than 200 rounds of negotiations with Russia, but this failed to prevent the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Even while talks continued, Russia made its genocidal intentions clear with relentless propaganda denying the existence of the Ukrainian nation and dehumanizing Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric has since been implemented in practice by Putin’s invading army, with well-documented massacres in places like Bucha and Izium, mass abductions and forced deportations, and the eradication of all symbols of Ukrainian national identity in areas under Russian occupation. While the international community sees what is happening in Ukraine, most remain reluctant to accuse Russia of genocide as this would oblige them to act. But turning a blind eye cannot change the fact that we are witnessing a genocide in the center of twenty-first century Europe.

Everybody understands what is needed for Ukraine victory. They know how much Western military assistance is required, and exactly which weapons should be delivered. Everybody knows what sanctions, tribunals, and security agreements are necessary in order to establish a sustainable peace. At the same time, the leaders of the democratic world have yet to address why they have so far shied away from policies that could facilitate Ukrainian victory. The answer is very simple: Western leaders are still heavily influenced by the twin fears of a possible Russian escalation and a potential Russian collapse. In other words, they are unable to commit fully to Ukrainian victory because they are afraid of Russian defeat. This is now the greatest single obstacle to a sustainable peace in Europe.

Perhaps the best advice for Ukraine’s Western partners comes from Pope John Paul II, who said “be not afraid” as he led the fight for freedom and democracy in Central Europe during the 1980s. Europe must now overcome its fears once again if it is to safeguard the freedoms that define the continent. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved at the expense of justice. European security will remain elusive if Putin is allowed to gain from his aggression and consolidate his genocidal occupation of Ukrainian lands.

With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Ukraine’s partners must finally acknowledge that European security depends on Ukrainian victory. The sooner they develop and implement a strategy to achieve this victory, the more lives will be saved. Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. Andrius Kubilius is a member of the European Parliament, former Prime Minister of Lithuania, and chair of the United for Ukraine global parliamentary network.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 27, 2024

Russia is bombing book publishers as Putin wages war on Ukrainian identity

By Maria Avdeeva

Russia’s recent targeted bombing of a major Ukrainian book publishing plant in Kharkiv is part of the Kremlin’s wider war against Ukrainian national identity, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy says his country’s allies fear the potential geopolitical consequences of Russian defeat, but Russian victory is a far more realistic and alarming prospect, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 23, 2024

Pride of Ukraine: Oleksandr Usyk’s historic victory boosts wartime morale

By Joshua Stein

Ukrainian boxer Oleksandr Usyk’s remarkable achievement in unifying the heavyweight division for the first time this century has provided war-torn Ukraine with a welcome morale boost, writes Joshua Stein.

Conflict Resilience & Society

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Factor Druk owner Serhiy Polituchy said the loss of the plant could reduce Ukraine’s overall printing capacity by as much as forty percent. Around one-third of all new books published in Ukraine last year were printed at the Kharkiv facility. “We are now trying to figure out what we can do in the short term to prevent the book publishing industry from collapsing,” commented Polituchy.

Thursday’s bombing followed a number of similar air strikes on publishing houses and print facilities in Kharkiv, which serves as the unofficial capital of Ukraine’s publishing industry. The Kharkiv printing presses accounted for more than eighty percent of new Ukrainian books on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over two years ago. The city remains the primary source of new books in wartime Ukraine.

As Russia has escalated its air war against Kharkiv since the beginning of 2024, the publishing industry has been repeatedly hit. In a single March attack, Russian missiles destroyed another of Kharkiv’s largest print facilities and a publishing house, killing five. Mykhailo Khrypak, who serves as commercial director at one of Ukraine’s biggest printing plants, says Russia is systematically attempting to destroy the country’s book publishing industry, and warns that production capacity will be difficult to restore.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

With Kharkiv desperately short of air defenses and located dangerously close to advancing Russian troops, the city’s remaining publishers are taking steps to ensure the safety of staff. Oleksandr Popovych, director of the Unisoft printing plant, has established a bomb shelter for his more than three hundred employees. Despite the recent escalation in attacks, he says he currently has no plans to relocate, pointing to the extreme difficulty of moving bulky printing equipment and relocating his highly skilled staff along with their families.

Ukraine’s domestic publishing industry has flourished over the past decade following the onset of Russian military aggression against the country in 2014. With the Kremlin openly weaponizing the Russian language to justify the invasion of Ukraine, demand for Ukrainian-language literature has risen to unprecedented levels. A new generation of Ukrainian authors has emerged, becoming part of a broader cultural renaissance that has also had a profound impact on the country’s music, fashion, and art scenes.

This trend has not proved popular in Russia, to say the least. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has made no secret of the fact that he bitterly opposes the consolidation of an independent Ukrainian national identity, which he views as a direct threat to Russia’s own imperial identity.

Putin is notorious for insisting Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). He published an entire essay in July 2021 denying Ukraine’s right to an independent existence. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” More recently, he declared that “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of the world.” According to Putin, occupied regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian lands.”

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Many believe Russia’s recent attacks on the Ukrainian book publishing industry are part of a coordinated Kremlin campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity that qualifies as genocide. Responding to the latest bombing, Yale historian Timothy Snyder said the targeted missile strikes were “an example of a larger genocidal policy.”

The evidence of Russia’s intention to extinguish Ukrainian national identity is overwhelming. In virtually every area of Ukraine occupied by Russia since February 2022, strikingly similar reports have emerged of efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian nationality. The Ukrainian language has been outlawed in schools and public spaces, with all symbols of Ukrainian statehood dismantled and removed.

Meanwhile, Russian occupation forces work with local collaborators to detain community leaders and anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian, including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, military veterans, and cultural figures. Thousands of people detained in this manner are unaccounted for. Those who remain are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship and threatened with the loss of access to essential services such as healthcare.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Kremlin is going to great lengths to indoctrinate Ukrainian children and rob them of their Ukrainian heritage. Large numbers of Russian teachers have been brought to occupied regions to manage the indoctrination process in Ukrainian schools, while tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and sent to reeducation camps. This is a textbook act of genocide, according to the UN’s own 1948 Genocide Convention.

The actions of Putin’s army in Ukraine are very much in line with Russian imperial tradition. For centuries, generation after generation of Russian rulers sought to suppress Ukraine’s statehood aspirations and prevent the emergence of a separate Ukrainian nation. This insistence that Ukrainians be made to accept an imperial Russian identity was perhaps best expressed in a notorious mid-nineteenth century tsarist decree stating that the Ukrainian language “never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

Kharkiv’s Slovo Building is a particularly striking symbol of these efforts to eradicate Ukrainian culture. Designed and constructed in the 1920s to host prominent Ukrainian writers, it was home to many of the country’s leading authors and poets who were later killed by the Soviet authorities. Today, they are known as the “Executed Renaissance.”

The efforts of successive Russian tsars and Soviet commissars failed to extinguish the Ukrainian desire for a country and an identity of their own. Putin’s own war on Ukrainian national identity is now proving similarly counter-productive. From poetry to pop music, contemporary Ukrainian culture is experiencing a golden age amid the horror and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Indeed, as news of Russia’s recent air strikes spread, it was no surprise to see various fundraising initiatives quickly emerge in support of the country’s beleaguered publishing industry. Putin may be able to burn Ukrainian books and bomb Ukraine’s printing presses, but his imperial crusade to erase Ukrainian identity is destined to fail.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 16, 2024

Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

By Maria Avdeeva

The mood in Kharkiv is a mix of anger, anxiety, and defiance as Ukraine’s second city prepares to defend itself against a new Russian offensive, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy says his country’s allies fear the potential geopolitical consequences of Russian defeat, but Russian victory is a far more realistic and alarming prospect, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 14, 2024

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

By Mercedes Sapuppo

The appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new Defense Minister is a clear sign that Putin preparing the country for a long war with Ukraine and the West, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia is bombing book publishers as Putin wages war on Ukrainian identity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past decade, the number of Ukrainian military veterans has expanded dramatically. Prior to the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, approximately half a million Ukrainians had served in the military campaigns underway in the east of the country since 2014. Over the past two years, this figure has mushroomed. Ukraine’s Ministry of Veteran Affairs has estimated that up to five million Ukrainians may be eligible for veteran status by the end of the war.

In 2024, Ukraine allocated approximately $350 million to support veterans and their families through the Ukrainian Veterans Fund. Nevertheless, there has been considerable criticism over the use of this funding. In a survey of Ukrainian army veterans conducted earlier this year, many said they believed veterans were not having their post-service needs met and required better access to support.

Current Ukrainian legislation offers benefits to veterans such as housing provisions. A range of support is also available for those with disabilities incurred during wartime service and for family members of service personnel. However, critics say there is significant confusion over the availability of support, and complain of inconsistencies along with a frequent lack of funding. In practice, many veterans say they are unable to access the care they need.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The current healthcare struggles of Ukrainian veterans resonate with the US veteran community, which continues to face similar struggles with post-service mental health issues. Like their Ukrainian counterparts, large numbers of American veterans deal with PTSD, depression, and anxiety.

According to a recent survey, nearly one in four American veterans are diagnosed with at least one mental health disorder following military service. This statistic illustrates the widespread nature of mental health concerns among veterans everywhere, and gives an idea of the sheer scale of the challenge facing the Ukrainian authorities.

Ukraine may be able to learn from US experience in the provision of support for military personnel. US veterans can call upon a more structured support system under the Department of Veteran Affairs. However, this approach is not always effective, with veterans often encountering long wait times, bureaucratic hurdles, and a shortage of healthcare providers adequately trained in military cultural competence. This last point is crucial; research has highlighted that more than three-quarters of veterans find it extremely important to receive care from providers who they feel understand them and can treat them appropriately.

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The challenges Ukraine faces in providing the necessary support for the country’s veteran community echo the issues encountered in the United States and elsewhere. Ukraine currently struggles with underfunded and understaffed mental health services. These shortages mean that even when veterans take the appropriate steps to seek help, the necessary resources may not be available or might come too late.

Another issue is lack of financial support. While healthcare is a major concern for Ukrainian veterans, access to financial resources is also critical for general well-being. When surveyed earlier this year, more than half of veterans indicated that they struggled to remain financially secure.

A further significant barrier to effective mental health treatment in Ukraine is the lack of providers with a good understanding of military culture. Ukrainian veterans often comment that their experiences are misunderstood by the medical professionals who are treating them, leading to misdiagnosis and ineffective treatments.

The stigma associated with mental health issues in Ukraine is an additional issue, particularly due to the emphasis on “toughness” and “strength” within military communities. This can lead to veterans failing to acknowledge their struggles and refusing to seek the help they need and deserve.

Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach that includes increased funding for mental health services, enhanced training in military culture for healthcare providers, and an active approach to challenging the narrative around mental health, especially in relation to Ukraine’s military and veteran communities. The task of addressing the stigma attached to mental health is something the wider community can participate in, as Ukrainians seek to create a more compassionate environment for the country’s defenders.

Claire Szewczyk is a digital content coordinator for Hill & Ponton. She formerly worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 23, 2024

President Zelenskyy’s term is over but he’s still a legitimate wartime leader

By Elena Davlikanova

Kremlin attempts to question the legitimacy of Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy due to the end of his official term in office ignore the obvious impossibility of holding elections amid Europe’s biggest invasion since World War II, writes Elena Davlikanova.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 16, 2024

Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

By Maria Avdeeva

The mood in Kharkiv is a mix of anger, anxiety, and defiance as Ukraine’s second city prepares to defend itself against a new Russian offensive, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy says his country’s allies fear the potential geopolitical consequences of Russian defeat, but Russian victory is a far more realistic and alarming prospect, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine faces long-term mental health challenges among veteran community appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fast-forward to May 20. Millions in and out of Iran, including in Syria and the Gaza Strip, publicly rejoiced when President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and several provincial officials.

Since news emerged of Raisi’s helicopter crashing in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province on May 19, people from different backgrounds were glued to their smartphones, anxiously waiting for hours to hear official confirmation of his death, which finally arrived almost fourteen hours later. As Iranians waited, social media were flooded with memes and jokes, and people dancing and drinking in celebration.

A horrible public speaker with a Persian-language Wikipedia page dedicated to his spoonerisms, sixty-three-year-old Raisi never received a proper academic education beyond the sixth grade and was a low-ranking cleric with no charisma. However, after winning the engineered 2021 presidential race that recorded the lowest participation rate in the Islamic Republic’s history, Raisi was promoted overnight to an “ayatollah doctor” by the state media.

His star began rising in 1979. Soon after the Islamic Revolution, when he was nineteen, Raisi was appointed prosecutor of two major cities, Karaj and Hamedan. He was later transferred to Tehran and assigned to the “death commission” that in 1988 extrajudicially executed thousands of political prisoners and dumped their bodies in unmarked mass graves. His role in the mass executions earned him the nickname “the Butcher of Tehran.”

A yes-man with blood on his hands, Raisi married Jamileh, the daughter of influential cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda, a close ally of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At the same time, his absolute loyalty was rewarded with wealth. He was appointed as head of Astan Quds Razavi, a corrupt and currently sanctioned financial empire in charge of preserving the gilded shrine of the eighth Shia saint Imam Reza in Mashhad, the second most populated city in Iran.

In 2019, Khamenei appointed Raisi as judiciary chief, a role in which he oversaw a violent crackdown, including the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of peaceful dissidents and rights defenders. Amnesty International has documented that the judiciary under his watch granted “blanket impunity” to security forces to unlawfully kill hundreds of men, women, and children and subject thousands of people to mass arrests and torture during nationwide protests in November 2019.

During Raisi’s short-lived presidency, the Islamic Republic faced the gravest domestic existential threat in its history: the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that rocked the country for months and shocked the supreme leader. The regime, with Raisi’s full support, responded to the uprising with brute force, killing hundreds, arresting tens of thousands, and executing at least nine. According to the United Nations, the response amounted to crimes against humanity.

Despite his role in crimes against humanity, Raisi’s celebrated death will have no bearing on the Islamic Republic’s policy. Other than rubber-stamping death and destruction for his own gain, as an absolute opportunist who threw his lot with Khamenei, Raisi’s political life amounted to nothing.

Rubber-stamp president

Since ascending to the throne as supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei has fended off rivals, including former presidents, with house arrest, media silence, banishment from elections, and even alleged assassination. In Raisi, he found an under-educated conformist who practiced absolute subservience, allowing the ayatollah to consolidate his control over all branches of power and secure his legacy with zero resistance.

In Iran, the office of the presidency amounts to nothing but being a “footman,” in the words of two-term former President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Unlike his predecessors, Raisi had no say over Iran’s foreign policy, regional expansionism, or nuclear program. With his death, the supreme leader’s hand will keep the regime on course toward acquiring a nuclear weapon and exporting terror abroad. There will also be no change in the oppression of women and other marginalized groups.

As per the Islamic Republic’s constitution, a presidential election must be held fifty days after Raisi’s death. The interior ministry has already announced June 28 as election day. Raisi assumed office as president in 2021 and was expected to bag an easy reelection in 2025. The rushed race for his seat will create infighting, and possibly put the Islamic Republic on its back foot.

However, even that would not impact the regime’s foreign and nuclear policy, which the supreme leader tightly controls. The Islamic Republic has historically responded to periods of chaos and uncertainty by projecting power abroad. A shift in nuclear policy, a deal with the United States, or a détente between Israel and Hamas would not serve that purpose.

Furthermore, Khamenei has already signaled that he is determined to stay course despite Raisi’s death. During a speech hours before official confirmation of Raisi’s death on May 20, Khamenei calmy proclaimed, “Be reassured people that there will be no disruption in works of the nation.”

At the same time, Raisi’s death has removed a potential contender for inheriting the mantle of supreme leadership after the expected demise of eighty-five-year-old Khamenei. As per the constitution, the Assembly of Experts will fill the position, which again is tightly controlled by Khamenei. According to Reuters, Raisi’s name was already crossed off as a contender some six months ago in light of his incompetence and sagging popularity, reconfirming warnings that the future leader can’t be accurately predicted—that the contenders list is constantly shifting, and the game is far from over.

Hope for change

While regime insiders fight over Raisi’s blood-soaked inheritance and “tear each other limb from limb,” the festivities continue among the people.

Afsaneh Yousefi, whose son Pejman Fatehi was executed alongside three other political prisoners in January, danced to Kurdish music.

Sisters Mahsa and Roya Piraei, whose mother was killed by security forces during the 2021 uprising, clinked drink glasses with smiles sparkling in their eyes.

Clad in a white and blue dress, Mansoureh Behkish, who lost six family members during the 1988 executions, danced with her hair flying in silver tufts.

Esmat Vatan Parast, who lost eleven members of her family in 1980s executions, told Radio Farda, “Yes, the Islamic Republic is still in power, but I wish that the remaining [officials meet a similar fate] so people of Iran can breathe. I wish for a day that the Islamic Republic becomes a thing of the past, that our land is wiped of any sign of these monsters…have faith, our Iran will be liberated.”

And in Raisi’s home city of Mashhad, a young woman with her hair flying free, in defiance of mandatory hijab rules, scribbled on a wall with spray paint,  “Khamenei will be next.”

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post The ‘Butcher of Tehran’ is dead. It won’t change a thing. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the years following the start of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian authorities were able to conduct multiple presidential and parliamentary elections that were consistently rated as free and fair by international democracy watchdogs. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, this is no longer possible.

The key issue is security. In order for any election to take place in Ukraine, the authorities must be able to ensure the safety of millions of voters and thousands of election officials at polling stations and election commissions across the country. That is clearly out of the question at present, particularly in light of Russia’s record for repeatedly targeting civilians. This also rules out the presence of international election observers.

It is even more difficult to imagine how the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men and women currently serving in the armed forces could participate in a wartime ballot, both as voters and as candidates. Russia would certainly view any gatherings of voting soldiers as priority targets. “It would be unfair if those defending our land were denied the opportunity to vote,” commented President Zelenskyy in March.

Security concerns are also one of the key factors that make it impossible to stage anything resembling a normal election campaign. With election rallies and public meetings of any kind at high risk of being bombed by Russia, the campaign would largely have to take place online. This would fall well short of Ukraine’s established democratic standards, while also creating an inviting environment for Russian interference.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It is hard to see how Ukraine could hope to overcome the huge administrative challenges created by the displacement of millions of Ukrainian citizens following the Russian invasion. There are currently believed to be approximately six million internally displaced people in Ukraine. Enabling them to vote would require a huge effort to update voter registers. This would likely raise all manner of additional questions regarding issues such as official and temporary addresses.

Meanwhile, at least five million Ukrainians are currently residing outside Ukraine as refugees, half of whom are eligible to vote. Existing voter registration procedures for Ukrainians living abroad are not designed to accommodate such large numbers, while Ukraine’s embassies and consulates would be unable to cope with so many voters. Without the participation of Ukrainian refugees, any wartime election would fail to meet basic democratic standards.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Recent research indicates that Ukrainian society recognizes the impracticality of wartime elections and is broadly supportive of the government’s decision to postpone any national votes until the security situation improves. A February 2024 poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the International Republican Institute found that 67 percent of Ukrainians opposed holding presidential elections amid Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There is also a consensus among Ukraine’s rival political parties that elections should wait until after the war. In November 2023, all parliamentary factions endorsed a memorandum backing the postponement of presidential and parliamentary votes until the end of hostilities. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society agrees, with more than 100 organizations releasing a joint statement in September 2023 rejecting the idea of wartime elections.

While there is virtually no indication of any appetite for wartime elections inside Ukraine itself, Russia and its allies are expected to continue pushing the notion of Zelenskyy’s alleged illegitimacy in the coming months. Indeed, some of the most prominent Kremlin-friendly figures in Congress have already begun promoting this narrative as part of ongoing efforts to argue against further US support for Ukraine.

Ukraine is not the first country to delay elections due to wartime conditions, of course. For example, During World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill repeatedly postponed the country’s scheduled general election, but nobody accused him of undermining the democratic legitimacy of the British parliament.

Ukrainians have impeccable democratic instincts, having staged two separate pro-democracy revolutions in the past twenty years. Indeed, the current war is in part a struggle to defend the country’s democratic identity against Putin’s authoritarian imperialism. At the same time, Ukrainians are sufficiently sensible to understand that the idea of holding elections amid the largest European invasion since World War II is absurd.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 16, 2024

Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

By Maria Avdeeva

The mood in Kharkiv is a mix of anger, anxiety, and defiance as Ukraine’s second city prepares to defend itself against a new Russian offensive, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy says his country’s allies fear the potential geopolitical consequences of Russian defeat, but Russian victory is a far more realistic and alarming prospect, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s soccer stars aim for Euro 2024 glory amid Russian invasion

By Mark Temnycky

The Ukrainian national soccer team heads to Euro 2024 in Germany this summer hoping to provide their war-weary compatriots with a much-needed morale boost, writes Mark Temnycky.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post President Zelenskyy’s term is over but he’s still a legitimate wartime leader appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

The post How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 14, the ruling Georgian Dream party passed the controversial “foreign agents” bill, which will oblige organizations that receive more than 20 percent of funding from abroad to register with the government or face fines. Despite claims to the contrary, this law resembles Russia’s own foreign agents legislation far more than the US Foreign Agents Registration Act.

EU officials responded to the news from Tbilisi by suggesting adoption of the legislation could hamper Georgia’s bid to join the European Union. “The EU stands with the Georgian people and their choice in favor of democracy and of Georgia’s European future,” commented the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell. US officials have also voiced concern over the issue.

Georgian Dream officials appear unmoved by these appeals. Indeed, critics say the passage of the foreign agents law is part of intentional efforts to derail the country’s Western integration and bring Georgia back into the Kremlin orbit. They claim the legislation is intended to suppress civil society in the lead-up to parliamentary elections in October, and note that Georgian authorities are now adopting tactics that closely mirror Russia’s own efforts to stamp out domestic dissent and silence opponents.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As unprecedented numbers have taken to the streets of Tbilisi to protest the country’s turn toward Moscow, the Georgian authorities have sought to crush protests with heavy-handed policing, including beatings, tear gas, and water cannons. Journalists and elected officials have been among those on the receiving end of violence.

In a further echo of tactics widely employed in Putin’s Russia, individual members of Georgia’s political opposition and activists have been assaulted in apparently targeted attacks that have taken place far from the protests. Others have been subjected to threatening phone calls and additional forms of harassment.

Meanwhile, the Georgian authorities are accused of copying the longstanding Russian practice of stage-managing pro-government rallies designed to distract attention from protests and create the illusion of popular support. One rally in late April featured thousands of public sector workers who had apparently been bussed into the Georgian capital from around the country and instructed to attend.

The rhetoric coming from Georgian Dream officials in recent weeks has increasingly resembled the anti-Western narratives and conspiracy theories favored by the Putin regime. In thinly veiled attacks on Georgia’s Western partners, Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the unofficial leader of Georgian Dream, has decried civil society organizations as “pseudo-elites” controlled by patrons abroad, and has accused them of attempting to instigate revolution in Georgia. These allegations are virtually indistinguishable from Vladimir Putin’s complaints regarding so-called “color revolutions.”

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Officially, the Georgian authorities deny they are seeking to turn the country away from the path of European integration and reject claims of a pro-Kremlin agenda. Indeed, Ivanishvili continues to insist Georgia is currently closer than ever to joining the EU. The ruling party’s careful rhetoric around Georgia’s European choice is understandable given that 81% of Georgians support EU membership. However, the fact that Georgian Dream moved forward with the foreign agents law despite condemnation from the EU and large-scale public protests has severely undermined the credibility of the government’s claims.

Georgian Dream officials say the foreign agents law is intended to ensure transparency and prevent undue foreign influence in the country, but critics remain unconvinced. They argue that the legislation will be used as a tool to suppress civil society, and point to the chilling role similar legislation has played in Russia. If it comes into force, many fear the law will strengthen the ruling party’s grip on power ahead of Georgia’s coming elections and set the stage for a more authoritarian form of government.

If Georgian Dream is able to secure a convincing result in the October ballot, Ivanishvili has already outlined plans for a strict “political and legal condemnation” of his party’s domestic opponents. In light of the mounting violence against opposition figures and pro-democracy protesters in Tbilisi in recent days, such statements must be taken seriously.

Hundreds of thousands of Georgians have joined protests this spring in an emphatic display of support for the country’s European future, but the struggle looks likely to continue throughout the coming months. The Georgian government has already demonstrated its readiness to employ Kremlin tactics. The question now is how far they are willing to go.

Lucy Minicozzi-Wheeland is a master’s student in Regional Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia at Harvard and a Research Assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 14, 2024

Putin expands invasion as outgunned Ukraine waits for Western weapons

By Mykola Bielieskov

Russia has opened a new front in the invasion of Ukraine with a cross-border offensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region as Putin seeks to capitalize on a window of opportunity before fresh Western aid reaches Ukrainian front line troops, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert May 9, 2024

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

By Peter Dickinson

Putin’s one tank victory parade reflects the catastrophic scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and is a reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, the Russian army is far from invincible, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 7, 2024

Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing

By Maria Avdeeva

Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, is struggling to survive amid a campaign of relentless Russian bombing that aims to make the city unlivable, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Georgia’s government uses Kremlin playbook to consolidate grip on power appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One overarching aim of the vision is to diversify the economy and, in doing so, to create new opportunities for work and investment at all levels—for both large-scale projects and small ventures. Changing the status of women has been a critical marker of change and success over the past eight years. In that time, the participation rate of women in the labor market, now around 35 percent, has exceeded the initial goal. Women working in new sectors are supported by various active labor-market policies and new laws to facilitate their work. 

The Vision 2030 midway annual report features photos of women working alongside men across sectors, highlighting their importance in driving the economy forward. More than one million commercial registrations are owned by women—representing 45 percent of registered companies—and women held 43.7 percent of leadership roles. Government officials and analysts have openly celebrated this momentum, which continues to progress positively.

While these advancements are welcome and worthy of celebration, it will be necessary to ensure that women have the financial know-how to grow in their careers and manage their new ventures effectively to achieve a sustainable level of empowerment, especially in an environment where traditional gender roles of male breadwinner and female caretaker have persisted for so long. Financial literacy is necessary for women who have managed to launch their own companies and who balance formal employment with other demands. Still, it remains true that women who remain on the fringes of the formal economy can face barriers to inclusion.

Financial inclusion ensures that those who demand funds recognize how to access them and ensure that the supply of funds is accessible, leading to a level of liquidity that can enhance growth and reduce poverty or an overreliance on state support. Since the launch of Vision 2030, economic developments have pushed women to be more independent and in control of their finances. Reforms to social welfare created more pathways out of poverty by replacing blanket subsidies with targeted support and new policies related to social insurance, social assistance, and the labor market.

However, these changes will initially benefit those who are younger and more digitally connected. The expansion of e-government and the crackdown on corruption have linked all kinds of payments to bank accounts, including salaries and alimony payments. Furthermore, small companies are required to issue e-invoices, and economic growth is driving out smaller commercial outlets that cater to those who might not be linked online to the formal economy through bank accounts. A 2018 King Khaled Foundation study reported that up to 6.9 million adults, 28 percent of the kingdom’s adult population, were “unbanked,” and 56 percent were women. Because property ownership is guaranteed to women by sharia law, bank accounts are available and accessible to women. A 2019 report in Alsharq al-Awsat highlighted that 20 percent of all bank deposits went into women’s accounts, an amount greater than $53 billion. Thus, women with lower levels of education and socioeconomic status are the ones who tend to be left behind due to cultural norms and low financial literacy—meaning that women resort to saving through informal channels and have limited awareness of the benefits of learning how to manage their money.

At the macro level, the kingdom’s economic reform policies are focused on facing economic shocks and ensuring sustainability and growth. This is also important on a micro level, as individuals must manage emergencies and income shocks through enhanced financial literacy. This will enable citizens to accumulate wealth and contribute to economic growth through increased savings and more measured spending. Improvements in financial literacy tend to be motivated by various factors, including overall economic growth and global competitiveness. Saudi Arabia’s National Savings and Financial Literacy Strategy outlines key objectives to improve financial literacy, including a target to address the low household savings rate of 1.6 percent. Globally, 10 percent is considered the minimum level for ensuring long-term financial independence.

While economic growth might be the overarching national motivation, international organizations are building programs that seek to empower individuals as well. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have worked with individual countries to enhance financial literacy at the population level through targeted national programs, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed guidelines to support participating countries in improving financial literacy.  

In tandem, economic reforms in the kingdom have sparked increased engagement with different financial tools. Because women and minorities tend to have lower financial literacy globally, often compounded by other factors such as limited educational backgrounds and socioeconomic status, these segments of society are usually the targets of financial-literacy programs. The most successful programs, such as the Khazna program launched by the Riyadh-based women’s charity, Al-Nahdha, are designed with such attitudes and challenges in mind.

Launched in 2017, Khazna aims to address the gap in financial literacy by targeting low-income women who are the financial decision-makers in their households. The curriculum stresses ways to save, reduce consumption, budget, and, above all, reduce debt. Khazna has expanded and evolved through feedback loops after each cohort goes through training. It is successful because it considers the communal family structures, the enduring stigma attached to women-led households, and the cultural obligations of generosity and giving. Other programs target women with varying levels of socioeconomic status and are led by banks and different government institutions.

Financial literacy is essential for social inclusion. Khazna is expanding to offer entrepreneurial training, beginning with key information about businesses and ending in a business plan that fills a gap in the market, with a community angle that ensures allyship and support.

As the number of women joining the formal economy within Saudi Arabia continues to grow, it will be important to build programs that circumvent the global traps of severe pay gaps, male-dominated decision-making, and implicit biases that favor men. This can happen if programs begin early as part of a joint effort within the national curriculum, and through community initiatives that bring together industry experts and educators as part of a lifelong approach to literacy. 

While Khazna is one such example, funding for more programs that achieve the targets of the National Savings and Financial Literacy Strategy is key. This must expand beyond basic budgeting to include enhanced literacy on financial security and more complex issues such as home ownership and financial products that offer varying long- and short-term savings and investment opportunities. The programs must also consider women’s diverse backgrounds and the psychological barriers associated with managing money. True empowerment will come from increased agency and decision-making; for working Saudi women, this must be enhanced through elevated financial independence. Any successful program must be tailored to the needs of different categories of women so everyone can share a slice of the development pie.  

Hanaa Almoaibed is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a research fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. Follow her on X: @hanaaalmoaibed.

The post Saudi women are learning financial literacy and it’s helping the country grow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 24, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s X (formerly Twitter) English-language page already opined, “They say, ‘Why are you supporting Palestine?’ Today, the entire world is supporting Palestine. People are supporting Palestine in the streets of Europe, in Washington, and in New York.” In a speech on Teachers’ Day, Khamenei said the US attack on “non-violent and non-destructive” student protests “shows that the US is an accomplice to the Zionists.”

With a well-known knack for making comical claims, Iranian authorities went on to declare that suspended students in the United States could come to Iran and study on government-sponsored scholarships. “Iran’s universities are in a good place in international rankings and expelled American students in any field could come and use them,” a deputy science minister said.

An editorial in Javan, a mouthpiece for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), opined that the protests showed that “the American democracy is only a lie.” The editorial went on to claim that the US police response to the protests has been much worse than the Iranian police response to the 1999 pro-democracy student uprising—without mentioning the fact that at least seven students were killed by security forces there. 

Iranic TV, an outlet tasked with monitoring Western outlets and producing clips that can be used for propaganda purposes, highlights alleged differences in how US media covers student protests in the United States and those in Iran.

The sheer volume of these productions is quite something. Dansehjoo, an outlet run by a student wing of the IRGC, has produced dozens of news reports and video clips on police actions at various US universities under the general label “the American Student Uprising” and with headlines such as “the violence of US military against students.” Telegram channels linked to the IRGC then help spread such clips widely.

Ironically, when opponents of student protests in the United States link them to Tehran, the regime tries to use that to its benefit. Thus, when Anti-Defamation League Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jonathan Greenblatt claimed that some student groups were “campus proxies” of Tehran, his remarks were widely featured in Iranian state media.

Taking the argument further, another IRGC outlet claimed that the protests of today were taking place thanks to an open letter Khamenei published in 2015, addressing “the Youth in Europe and North America” following the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris.

But whatever claims the Iranian leadership makes, they are unlikely to be accepted by many Iranians who are well aware of the persistent repression meted out by the regime against students, women, and other Iranians. In fact, while Iranians disagree among themselves about the precise position to be taken in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many seem to be united in ridiculing Tehran’s unlikely claims in favor of students.

Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran, put a simple question to the “hardline outlets” that are writing about the US protests: “How many Iranian protesters have been killed and many how had their eyes hit by shot shells?”

The Islamic Republic’s behavior is especially jarring because the past few weeks have seen an uptick in repression. Units of the so-called morality police have an increased presence in Tehran and other cities, brutally arresting many women on accusations of improper veiling and closing down cafes where mandatory veiling rules are not observed.

Mostafa Faghiqi, a senior journalist who runs a centrist news outlet in Tehran, noted the closure of four such cafes in front of a university in Tehran and satirically wrote, “Now that these cafes are closed, the university management can comfortably focus on the illusion of getting protesting American students to come study here. For now, our own Iranian students can sit on the steps or on the ground in front of their university.”

To remind the regime of its brutality, many Iranians have been sharing images on social media of the brutal arrests of students during the 1999 movement. One of the major organizers of that attack was Baqer Qalibaf, then with the IRGC, who is now the speaker of parliament. Some users recounted how students were defenestrated out of their dormitories in an act of brutal violence. An X user said the fact that perpetrators of 1999 crimes would now speak of “worry for American students” was “the joke of the century.”

An Iranian feminist activist expressed her disbelief at the flag of Lebanon’s Iran-backed militia Hezbollah being used by a US student, remembering that in 1999 “our students were taken from their dormitories.” Another user recounted more recent crimes of the Islamic Republic toward students: blinding medical student Mohsen Jamali; imprisoning Said Madani, chair of the University of Tehran’s sociology department and Bahareh Hedayat, a leading student activist; and firing Ali Sharifi Zarchi, a professor at Tehran’s elite Sharif University who was critical of the regime.

Conversely, the regime’s hardline position against Israel and its backing of Palestinian terror groups seem to have little support among the Iranian people, least of all among youth and students. On May 6, when regime supporters tried to raise the Palestinian flag in a football stadium in northern Iran, fans responded with the vulgar chant: “Take that Palestinian flag and shove it up your a–.” A similar slogan was chanted during a game in October 2023, right after Hamas’s attacks on Israel. Even anti-regime activists who are pro-Palestinian have complained about how little activity there is in support of Palestine in Iranian universities. While there have been solidarity protests in support of US students in various countries around the world, such regime-staged efforts in Iran have produced meager results. Pictures published from such gatherings around Iran show that most consist of only a dozen people, some of whom appear to be university administrators rather than students.

The Islamic Republic will surely try to use the shocking images coming out of US universities to its benefit, but few Iranians will fall for its stale propaganda. No matter what the state-run hardline outlets publish or broadcast in Iran, Iranians remember the domestic repression they’ve seen with their own eyes—not just in 1999, but over the decades.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar. He is the author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions and What Iranians Want. Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

The post The Islamic Republic claims to support US student protests, but it crushed its own student uprising appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are still plenty of reminders that Kharkiv remains home to over a million people. Freshly planted flowerbeds bloom in bright spring colors. Downtown traffic is still sometimes congested, with delivery boys on bikes and scooters weaving their way through jams of taxi drivers, private cars, and public transport. Supermarkets and many small businesses remain defiantly open, while municipal workers emerge to diligently clear up the mess after each new explosion. But there is no mistaking the menace of sudden death and destruction that now hangs over the city.

Located just thirty kilometers from the Russian border, Kharkiv is Ukraine’s most vulnerable major city and has been on the front lines of the war for more than two years. Russia’s initial blitzkrieg attack on Kharkiv in early 2022 was repelled, with Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive then pushing Putin’s invading army further away from the city. However, since the beginning of 2024, Kharkiv has become the principle target in a new Russian offensive which aims to take advantage of Ukraine’s mounting ammunition shortages and lack of air defenses.

Bombings are now a daily occurrence. Russia employs a mix of weapons including everything from ballistic missiles and drones to vast quantities of long-range glide bombs that are steadily destroying the city from a safe distance. These attacks target residential neighborhoods and critical civilian infrastructure in what appears to be a calculated campaign to make the entire city unlivable.

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Amid the constant threat of bombing, Kharkiv residents continue to display the kind of remarkable resilience that is now synonymous with Ukraine. The city’s Makers coffee chain is a good example of this dogged determination. The chain has actually expanded since the start of the war, doubling its presence in Kharkiv from two outlets to four, while also opening a new branch in the front line city of Kupyansk. Dmytro Kabanets, the twenty nine year old owner of the chain, believes it is vital for local residents to have a sense of community. “The feeling of not being alone is invaluable. People need to know there are others ready to lend a hand, both emotionally and practically,” he says.

Despite this upbeat attitude, he admits staying in business in today’s Kharkiv is becoming more and more difficult. The windows of the chain’s flagship coffee shop are boarded up as a precaution against further bomb damage. Due to Russian attacks on the city’s energy infrastructure, electricity supplies are a major challenge for all local businesses. After both of Kharkiv’s biggest power plants were destroyed in March, the city has experienced rolling blackouts. The rumble of generators has become a background feature of everyday life, with restaurants offering “generator-friendly’ menu items that require minimal power to prepare.

Many analysts believe Russia’s objective is to depopulate Kharkiv ahead of a summer offensive that will aim to seize the city and deliver a decisive blow to Ukrainian resistance. Rumors of looming encirclement and evacuations swirl around on social media, often fueled by Russian disinformation. For now, there is no indication of a mass exodus from Kharkiv, but the strain and trauma of recent months are forcing residents to make hard decisions.

Yevhen Streltsov, who runs the city’s Radio Nakypilo, says everyone approaches the issue of whether to stay or go in a highly personal manner. Some residents are bracing themselves for a repeat of the artillery barrages that rocked Kharkiv in the first months of the war. Others say they will only leave if the city is under direct threat of Russian occupation. “The situation is tense, but there is no panic,” he says, noting that he and his team are determined to continue their mission of broadcasting to the local population.

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For some Kharkiv residents, the stress has already become too much. Exhausted and emotionally drained by months of Russian bombardment, they are heading westward to Kyiv or beyond. Many are leaving their homes for the second time, having returned to Kharkiv after initially fleeing the city in the first days of the invasion.

Inevitably, the outflow of people is having an impact on the local economy. Revenues at the Makers coffee chain have dropped by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Across Kharkiv, companies are reluctantly shutting down as people move their families to safety, with some businesses being put up for sale. Many of the city’s public spaces now feel eerily empty, especially once evening arrives.

It is still far too early to write Kharkiv off. While more and more residents are understandably seeking to escape the horrors of daily bombing, many remain determined to stay put. The population is clearly declining, but it remains nowhere near the lows witnessed during the early months of the invasion, when only around 300,000 people remained in the city.

If Russia does launch a serious campaign to capture or encircle Kharkiv in the coming months, this would represent by far the Kremlin’s most ambitious undertaking since losing the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. The Ukrainian army will fight hard to defend the country’s second city, and they will be supported by a still sizable local population. Given the considerable difficulties Russia has encountered in seizing much smaller towns such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, it is far from certain that Putin’s invading army currently has the offensive capabilities to take Kharkiv.

As the summer campaigning season approaches, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine is rising and requires urgent international attention. Kharkiv is now the focal point of Russia’s entire invasion and is in desperate need of increased air defenses. This is the only way to prevent it from becoming the largest in a long line of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by the Russian military.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 29, 2024

Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv

By Maria Avdeeva

Russia is deploying disinformation alongside bombs as it seeks to demoralize Kharkiv residents and depopulate Ukraine’s second city, writes Maria Avdeeva.

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UkraineAlert May 3, 2024

UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

By Peter Dickinson

UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron has confirmed that Ukraine can use British weapons to attack Russia as Western leaders continue to overcome their fear of provoking Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert May 7, 2024

Putin cannot be allowed to use chemical weapons in Ukraine with impunity

By Emma Nix

After years of Ukrainians sounding the alarm over Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons, the US Department of State has now substantiated these claims, writes Emma Nix.

Arms Control Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in The National Interest: Nationwide Campus Protests Shock and Appall appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s new mobilization law is the latest step in ongoing efforts to reform the military recruitment process and meet the unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing invasion. Although Ukrainian losses remain undisclosed, there is clearly a pressing need to replenish the ranks of the military, while also allowing current service personnel to be rotated out of front line positions or demobilized.

Ukrainian military officials initially stated that the goal of the new law was to mobilize an additional 500,000 people. This figure has since been reduced to an unspecified but significantly lower number. Prior to the full-scale invasion, around 250,000 people served in the Ukrainian military, but thanks in large part to a massive surge in volunteers following Russia’s invasion, this force swelled to around 880,000 troops. Together with the National Guard and other formations, there are now believed to be approximately one million Ukrainians in uniform.

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Ukraine’s mobilization bill was subject to approximately 4500 amendments, underlining the complexity of the issue. The final version focused on regulating the process of identifying and registering potential conscripts, reviewing eligibility for mobilization, and revising penalties for evading service. Key points include the introduction of an online registry for recruits and the lowering of the age for draft eligibility from 27 to 25.

In line with the new regulations, men of military age will now be obliged to update their registration details within 60 days of the law entering into force, either at regional offices or via an online portal. They will be required to carry their military registration documents and present them upon request or when applying for a passport. Meanwhile, penalties for evading mobilization remain relatively mild. These include modest fines and the potential revocation of drivers licenses.

The new mobilization law does not extend to military-age females. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had earlier stated his opposition to obligatory military service for women. While they are not subject to conscription, many Ukrainian women do choose to enlist in the armed forces voluntarily, with approximately 60,000 currently serving in a variety of positions including front line roles.

To further boost the mobilization process, the Ukrainian army plans to open a network of 27 new recruitment centers in the coming months in major cities across the country. These centers will function as advisory and information hubs, providing guidance to those interested in joining the armed forces and allowing candidates to choose which unit they prefer to serve in. The first recruitment centers have already opened in Lviv and Zaporizhzhia. Initial reports are positive and indicate this modern approach to military service could help address some of the key concerns among potential recruits.

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Most of the criticism leveled at Ukraine’s new mobilization law has focused on the removal of earlier provisions regarding demobilization. Initial drafts envisaged the demobilization of military personnel after 36 months of service, and the rotation of those serving on the front lines for over six months. However, these clauses were taken out of the legislation at the last minute following appeals from Ukraine’s military leadership, who argued that they would weaken Ukraine by facilitating the withdrawal of the country’s most experienced military personnel without providing sufficient trained replacements. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is now working on a separate law to handle the demobilization issue.

While opinion remains divided over the fairness and effectiveness of Ukraine’s new mobilization law, few would argue that the country urgently needs to address manpower issues within the armed forces. Many analysts cite troop shortages as one of main challenges facing the Ukrainian military, along with insufficient weapons and ammunition deliveries from the country’s Western partners.

Russia does not currently appear to be encountering any such problems. In recent weeks, Ukrainian commanders have reported that their forces are now outnumbered by as many as ten to one at certain points along the front lines of the war. This overwhelming superiority in numbers is enabling Russia to advance on the battlefield despite suffering consistently high casualty rates.

With Russia’s initial blitzkrieg invasion now transformed into a war of attrition, the Kremlin aims to avoid a politically risky second wave of mobilization and maintain a steady stream of volunteers by offering a range of cash incentives for new recruits, including extremely high salaries and generous financial support for the families of servicemen. Recent reports indicate Russia is aiming to sign up hundreds of thousands of additional troops in the near future amid preparations for a major summer offensive.

Ukraine is now racing against the clock to strengthen its military before Russia’s summer offensive can get fully underway. The recent breakthrough in Washington DC regarding desperately needed US military aid will boost these efforts, as will the new mobilization law. However, with no end in sight to Russian aggression, Ukraine must also find long-term solutions to the country’s lack of new recruits and the thorny issue of demobilization.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine. Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 15, 2024

Organizing for victory

By Ben Hodges

In the escalating struggle against Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China, The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military, writes Ben Hodges.

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UkraineAlert Apr 25, 2024

New US aid package is not enough to prevent Russian victory in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

This week’s US aid package for Ukraine provides the country with a vital lifeline in the fight against Russia but Western leaders must adopt a more long-term approach if they want to stop Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Apr 29, 2024

Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv

By Maria Avdeeva

Russia is deploying disinformation alongside bombs as it seeks to demoralize Kharkiv residents and depopulate Ukraine’s second city, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s new mobilization law leaves demobilization issue unresolved appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 2, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS News commented on the public safety factors in President Biden’s comments about student protests for Palestine on university campuses.

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Samantha Vinograd

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Vinograd on CBS about President Biden’s comments on university campus protests for Palestine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The region has an urgent need to prepare for the scope of climate change. Many of the region’s countries rely on tourism to drive economic growth, with ten of the world’s twenty most tourism-dependent economies residing in the Caribbean. When hurricanes roll through the region, damaging infrastructure and halting flights, the tourism industry halts as well, diminishing economic prospects. Most Caribbean countries face the brunt of the Atlantic hurricane season, which is producing stronger and more frequent tropical storms. At the same time, most of the region’s populous cities are coastal, making sea level rise a threat to homes and the day-to-day functions of society. Further, changing precipitation patterns and higher average temperatures result in agricultural degradation and more acidic oceans, decreasing crop yields in rural areas and limiting fishery supplies.

While the entire region faces daunting consequences from climate change and related natural disasters, women and girls face disproportionate effects across four areas.

First, women and girls are “especially vulnerable to sexual violence and coercion” in the wake of a natural disaster, according to the United Nations Population Fund. This risk includes and extends beyond domestic violence, which is known to spike in crisis situations, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic in Trinidad and Tobago. Disproportionate risks mount, the World Bank notes, “in the face of uprooted housing and traditional support structures, disrupted access to services, and both structural and social obstacles to accessing food, relief, supplies, and latrines.” A lack of privacy and security in shelters is problematic, especially for young and teenage girls.

Second, women are responsible for a greater share of caregiving for families and households. After Hurricane María knocked out the power grid in Puerto Rico and made potable water scarce, it was women who bore a greater burden in doing the cooking, laundry, and cleaning to keep households going. Moreover, across multiple climate change events, when schools close, women with school-age children are often unable to return to work or attend school themselves.

Third, Caribbean women tend to work in the informal economy, including small-scale businesses and the hospitality sector, both of which are adversely affected by tropical storms. Storms can damage crops and roads, making it difficult to get produce to markets, while also leaving restaurants, shops, and hotels closed for days, affecting incomes.

Finally, women often have unequal access to finance, capital, and other assets, which can affect their resilience after a disaster. In addition, as governments finance the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure after natural disasters and fortify existing structures, there are fewer resources devoted to the education and health sectors—both of which are integral to providing care to and lifting family responsibility burdens from women.

Caribbean governments and regional partners must factor in the disproportionate challenges facing women and girls at the earliest stages of climate resilience and adaptation policymaking. Policy designs should incorporate government funding or subsidies dedicated to women-owned businesses adversely affected by climate change. Historically, Caribbean women face barriers to accessing finance and capital to start or invest in their businesses. Limited track records in operating a business relative to men and frequent climate events increase the risk profiles for women-owned firms. Here, governments can work with regional institutions like the Caribbean Development Bank to level the playing field for women-owned firms by providing grants to businesses in climate-affected sectors, like hospitality and agricultural work.

Further, resources can and should be dedicated to women-owned firms that are physically affected by climate events and to create shelters where at-risk women and girls can stay after natural disasters to limit spaces where gender-based violence can occur. This should include shelters that can care for children and allow working parents to return to their jobs to offset the disproportionate costs borne by women resulting from family responsibilities.

Involving women in policy designs also includes making them part of the decision-making process. Only women and girls can provide first-hand information to contextualize policies and streamline resources that address the unique challenges they face due to climate change. One way to do this is to incorporate perspectives from gender-focused civil society organizations.

Civil society organizations are uniquely intertwined with the realities of each country at national and subnational levels, allowing them to understand the day-to-day challenges facing women and girls across different communities. Governments can work with civil society organizations to ensure that policies are not blanket approaches but are bottom-up in nature, so that each community of women and girls receive the resources and attention they require. Regular consultation with these groups, particularly in the advent of hurricane season, during rainy seasons, and in the lead-up to drier months can provide real-time insights into the types of government resources that should be devoted to women and girls.

Given that the Caribbean is a heterogeneous region, with different climate events affecting different countries, it is essential for policy design and decision making to be country-specific as well as gender inclusive to best serve local populations. Climate change does not have to result in increasing gender inequity in the Caribbean—as long as the voices and interests of women and girls are incorporated in policy design and resource allocation in regional planning to combat climate change.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow for the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

This article is part of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s partnership with the UN Women Multi-Country Office–Caribbean.

The post Climate change doesn’t have to result in greater gender inequity in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Kremlin’s goal is to make Kharkiv “unlivable” and force a large percentage of its approximately 1.3 million residents to flee. Moscow hopes this will demoralize Ukraine and pave the way for the city’s capture by Russian forces during a widely anticipated summer offensive in the coming months.

Putin is not relying on missiles and drones alone to do the job of depopulating Kharkiv. In recent months, Russia has also unleashed an elaborate information offensive that aims to fuel panic and uncertainty among the city’s embattled population via a combination of aggressive propaganda and destabilizing disinformation.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 25, 2024

New US aid package is not enough to prevent Russian victory in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

This week’s US aid package for Ukraine provides the country with a vital lifeline in the fight against Russia but Western leaders must adopt a more long-term approach if they want to stop Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Apr 24, 2024

A decentralized power grid can help Ukraine survive Russian bombardment

By Yuri Kubrushko

Russia is attempting to depopulate large parts of Ukraine by bombing the country’s power grid. Ukraine’s best chance of survival may lie in a more decentralized energy sector, writes Yuri Kubrushko.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Spreading corruption on the Earth” is a charge revolutionary courts in Iran have historically used against dissidents, including those extrajudicially killed during mass executions of the 1980s—known as the 1988 massacre—and people who were arrested in relation to the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

Salehi is best known for creating protest songs that spoke out against the oppressive Islamic Republic policies that were the focus of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising prompted by the death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022.

The open-source information identified below has been preserved and analyzed through the ​​Iranian Archive, a joint effort led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) and Mnemonic, and a coalition of open-source investigation experts at the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and the Azadi Archive. The archive forensically preserved more than two million pieces of digital evidence recording serious human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Woman, Life, Freedom movement protesters to support future accountability efforts related to human rights violations in Iran.  

Below is a summary of the open-source investigation about Salehi, which is part of a broader report being carried out through the SLP, Iranian Archive, and UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center. The report analyzes key incidents of violence carried out by the Islamic Republic during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and is due out this fall. 

Salehi’s arbitrary arrest and detention were highlighted in the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), a United Nations-mandated body tasked with investigating alleged human rights violations committed in the context of the protests that began on September 16, 2022. His arrest was identified as a key incident of large-scale repressive measures taken by the Islamic Republic authorities to silence artists and writers during the protests. 

Importantly, the FFMI found that such arrests and imprisonment are happening as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians in Iran and amount to crimes against humanity. While Salehi’s case is highlighted, it is important to remember that this is happening all over Iran and continuing to harm lives to this day.  

The following is a timeline detailing the persecution of Salehi for the crime of defying the Islamic Republic’s authoritarian rule in a peaceful manner through his art. The document is based on open-source research with a focus on material published by Iranian state media, including forced confessions of Salehi aired by state television. Although the material is laced with state propaganda and false accusations against Salehi, the details can be used to display the violence he endured and the illegality of judicial procedures.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Iran’s state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), reported on October 30, 2022, that Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi was arrested. The same day, in a video report shared by the judiciary’s official outlet, Mizan News Agency, Salehi was accused of “planning and organizing” protests in collaboration with “diaspora leaders” and “threatening” security forces. The video included a collage of Salehi’s social media posts and a photo purporting to show him in daylight after his arrest, blindfolded and in a vehicle.

The video report was produced by IRIB “interrogator journalist” Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour, who was sanctioned by the United States for her role in soliciting and broadcasting “hundreds of forced confessions of Iranian, dual national, and international detainees in Iran.”

First video

On November 2, 2022, the Young Journalists Club (YJC), a media body affiliated with the IRIB, released a short clip showing Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face, saying: “[I’m] Toomaj Salehi. I said that I’m sorry. I said that I tell ‘you as a friend that you should run away.’” The video starts with a short clip of an already-deleted social media post by Salehi in which he tells security forces to desert their posts and “run away” instead of oppressing people.

IRIB later used the video in a report that described Salehi as “one of the leaders of recent riots” and “instigating sedition online.” The report was broadcast on November 2, 2022, and was posted on the IRIB website two days later. IRIB reporter Atefeh Godini produced the report.

• The video shows Toomaj Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face.
• He touches the side of his head as if in pain. 
• Apparently anticipating more beatings, he raises his hand in front of his face.
• The location is not clear. The video is recorded in the open and during dark hours. A tree can be seen in the background.

Second video

On December 6, 2022, Iranian state media including the government-run daily Iran published a new video titled “Toomaj Salehi: I apologize to the society for the violence I caused.”

The video opens with doctored segments of a music video of a rap song by Salehi published in October 2022, in which he criticized the regime for its corruption and oppression. In the track, Toomaj says that he “rises up from the bottom” of society and is defying the “head of the pyramid” responsible for the oppression. The video released by state media includes three segments in which Salehi speaks.

The first segment shows a part of Salehi’s face with him saying, “I wrote that. There is a copy of its text,” an apparent reference to the lyrics.

Then, overlaid on muted videos of him, a voice similar to Salehi’s can be heard saying, “Music can beget violence.”

In the third segment, Salehi appears to say, “This was my mistake. I apologize to you for that,” pointing to the interrogator/interviewer in the room, “and to society for producing violence. I wish I could…I can only apologize now. I wish I could produce the counterpoint to [the music].”

The video released by state media heavily references Salehi’s October 2022 music video “Faal [Fortune].” 

The video released by state media is recorded from multiple angles with the camera moving, apparently using a camera trolley. Shots recorded from above imply that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio, and the cuts and edits also suggest that it was made through a long production process.

Video released by state media

The hand of a man adorned with an Aqeeq ring pushes a paper toward Salehi. The markings on the paper are similar to those on papers used for writing confessions.

Faal music video

In the music video, Salehi gives the other person a piece of paper to take notes on what he is saying and, he raps, to “pass them up.”

In the video released by state media, Salehi is shown drinking from a white cup similar to the one shown in the music video.

In the music video, Salehi reads the regime’s coffee-cup fortune (“Faal” in Persian).

The video released by state media even mimics the camera motions used in Salehi’s music video.

The steady camera motions in the video published by state media suggest the use of a camera trolley.

The video published by state media also includes overhead shots, implying that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio.

All the cinematic techniques used imply that the video was recorded over a long process in which Salehi might have been forced to repeat dictated lines. The long production process and heavily doctored material also indicate that he could have been asked questions unrelated to the case, and his responses were manipulated and edited to convey a message that the regime prefers.

Statement after release

Toomaj Salehi was released from Isfahan Central Prison on November 18, 2023, on bail. On April 21, 2023, judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed he was released on bail and added that Salehi’s sentence was being reviewed per an order from the Supreme Court.

On November 27, 2023, the YouTube account that releases music produced by Toomaj Salehi posted a video of him after his release from jail. The channel has been releasing Salehi’s music as early as October 18, 2020, based on the oldest post available on the account published on that day.

In the fourteen-and-a-half-minute video, Salehi describes his time in custody and explains his forced confession. His description of his ordeal includes, but is not limited to, the following statements.

• Malign actors are trying to “assassinate [his] character.” Salehi pointed to state media reports that he “confessed” and “snitched” on others. “Whom did I have to snitch on? What did I have to confess to? Everything I’ve done has been on your phones [and public]. I wasn’t hiding anything to confess to.”
• “I was severely tortured at the time of my arrest. They broke my arms and my legs. They were hitting my face and my head, so at first I tried to cover myself with my hands, and they broke my fingers.”
• Salehi also says that he was given a shot in the neck at the time of his arrest. “One of the other political prisoners told me that the injection they gave me in my neck was most likely adrenaline so I wouldn’t pass out so that I would be conscious during the time they were torturing me so I would feel the pain fully.”
• “About confessions, I didn’t even hand over [access to] my social media accounts.”
• Salehi points out that during his detention, whenever he raised the issue of the illegality of the security officers’ behavior, “they would laugh and say ‘what law? We can and we do whatever [we want].’”
• Before Salehi’s release from jail, the judge, Morteza Barati, and his case officer met with him demanding access to his social media accounts, which he refused. (Security forces often seize social media accounts of political prisoners before their release and condition their release on bail on their not using social media.)
• Some anonymous social media accounts with apparent ties to the state pointed to his apparent physical health after his release on bail, arguing that his being tortured was “fake news.” Reacting to those comments, Salehi said, “Four months ago, when I was transferred from [detention center of the] Intelligence [Ministry] to prison, they wouldn’t say that. My bones were broken a year and a month ago. They have naturally healed by now.”
• In the video, Salehi points out that he did not receive proper medical care for the broken bones, that he cannot walk properly and limps, and that walking is sometimes painful for him. He also complained about chronic pain in his hands.
• “The Intelligence Ministry has produced and released a video in which it appears that I am apologizing to the interrogator. I didn’t say that. I wasn’t talking to the interrogator. I was interviewed there for nine hours. I have made one or two gaffes. The person asked me a question, for example asking me ‘If right now, the mother of such and such person who went out [to protest] because of you and is now in prison, was sitting before you, what would you tell her?’ And they have edited [my response] in a manner that it appears that I am apologizing to him, which is ridiculous.”
• Salehi says that he has filed a complaint about the torture he endured during his detention.
• In the video, Salehi says that he was held in “solitary confinement for 8–9 months” and subjected to “white torture” on top of the “physical torture in the beginning” after his arrest. (White torture is sensory deprivation.)
• He also said that the Intelligence Ministry had “ordered the prison chief to make conditions worse” for him because he had “filed a complaint against them.”

Timeline

Toomaj Salehi was born December 3, 1990. He is from Iran’s Bakhtiari ethnic minority. His father was a political prisoner for eight years.

Previous Arrest—September 13, 2021

Toomaj Salehi was arrested on September 13, 2021, at his home. He was charged with “insulting the Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and “propaganda against the regime,” under Articles 514 and 500 of the Islamic Penal Code. The BBC’s Persian service reported at the time that he was sentenced to six months in jail and an unreported fine. The court suspended the sentence for one year. On September 21, 2021, Salehi was released on bail.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Salehi was arrested again on October 30, 2022. In an interview with Mizan News Agency, the official outlet of Iran’s judiciary, Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Seyed Mohammad Mousavian listed Salehi’s charges as “propaganda against the regime, cooperation with hostile states, and establishing an illegal group with the intention of disrupting national security.” Mousavian added, “The accused played a key role in instigating riots and inviting and encouraging the recent mayhem and riots in Isfahan Province and in the city of Shahinshahr.”

Charges—November 27, 2022

Chief Justice of Isfahan Province Asadollah Jafari told Mizan: “Toomaj Salehi has been charged with spreading corruption on the Earth by spreading lies in a way causing major losses, propaganda against the regime, establishing and managing illegal groups with the intention of disrupting national security, cooperating with a hostile government against the Islamic Republic, spreading lies and disturbing the public mind through cyberspace, and inciting and encouraging people to commit violent acts.”

Alleged death sentence—July 5, 2023

The semi-official Tasnim News Agency reported that Salehi “had been sentenced to death, but his sentence was reduced to imprisonment.”

The alleged sentence was not announced by the judiciary—as is customary—or Salehi’s lawyer. At the time, it raised questions about the credibility of Tasnim’s report and whether the news was part of the regime’s psychological warfare against protesters.

Prison sentence—July 12, 2023

Jafari said that Salehi was sentenced to seventy-five months (six years and three months) in prison. He also received a two-year ban on leaving the country, a two-year ban on music-related activities, and a requirement to attend “workshops, courses and life skills classes” held by the judiciary’s crime-prevention department. Jafari added that Salehi’s pending six-month jail sentence from 2021 will also be implemented.

Torture complaint—October 29, 2023

On October 29, 2023, Salehi’s account on X (formerly Twitter), which is run by his social media manager from outside Iran, wrote that he had filed a complaint against the director of the Intelligence Ministry’s branch in Isfahan province and the officers responsible for his case over “torture and illegal behavior during [his] illegal detention.”

The complaint lists the illegal conduct of security officers, including the following.

• Salehi’s place of residence was illegally raided. Security officers climbed the wall and did not provide an arrest warrant. Two other residents of the building were also arrested without a warrant. The personal vehicle of Salehi’s father was seized without a warrant.
• “Violent arrest, beating, torture, and verbal abuse for twelve hours (from 3:00 AM on October 30, 2022 to 3:00 PM of the same day) in a place outside the city while blindfolded and even filming these inhumane actions, some of which were broadcasted by IRIB.”
• Beating leading to
  • a fracture of the right leg;
  • a fracture of the fourth finger on the left hand;
  • severe damage to both eyes; and
  • fractured ribs.
• Officers failed to transfer Salehi to the prosecutor’s office within the legal timeframe or hand him over to the detention center, and failed to provide medical care in time.

The statement also adds that Salehi was arrested in Gerd Bisheh, a village in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province by officers of the  Isfahan branch of the Intelligence Ministry.

Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, posted a photo of the official complaint on Instagram on December 2, 2023.

Release on bail—November 18, 2023

Salehi was eventually released from prison on November 18, 2023 on bail. Judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed on April 21, 2023, that Salehi has been released on bail and added that the Supreme Court had called for his sentence to be amended as well.

Arrest—November 30, 2023

The government-run IRNA news agency reported that Salehi was arrested again on November 30, 2023, in the northern city of Babol in Mazandaran province. 

The judiciary’s Mizan also wrote, “Toomaj Salehi was arrested on the charge of publishing lies and disturbing the public mind after publishing some false and undocumented comments online.” 

Isfahan Chief Justice Jafari told Mizan that, in the case of Salehi, “all procedures, including arrest, interrogation, and investigation, have been carried out according to the law.”

Death sentence—April 24, 2024 

On April 24, 2024, Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, told the Tehran-based Shargh Daily, “Branch One of Isfahan Revolutionary Court, in an unprecedented move, has not implemented the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 2022 case of Toomaj Salehi.”

According to Raeisian, Branch One of Revolutionary Court of Isfahan has called the Supreme Court “ruling ‘advisory’ and emphasizing the independence of the lower court has accused Toomaj Salehi of ‘spreading corruption on the Earth’ and sentenced him to the highest punishment, death.”

This ruling is unprecedented. The recent ruling of the lower court is in direct conflict with an earlier ruling from the same court, as per directions from the Supreme Court. Amid reports of Salehi being sentenced to death in July 2023, the case was initially appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court called on the lower court to drop some of the initial charges. This led to Salehi being sentenced to seventy-five months in prison and his release on bail in November 2023. 

Recently, the lower court re-assumed jurisdiction and, despite the prior ruling, Salehi was sentenced to death. This court, a “revolutionary court” with deep ties to the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus, determined that Salehi was responsible for the “extensive spread of corruption on the Earth,” and thus, death was appropriate.

Salehi’s lawyer also noted that the current ruling, along with the death sentence, has designated “additional punishments” for Salehi, including a two-year ban on traveling abroad and producing music.

Raeisian also noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that Salehi should benefit from “amnesty.”

On the same day, semi-official Mehr News, which is linked to the state-run Islamic Propagation Organization, confirmed that Salehi has been “sentenced to death for spreading corruption on the Earth.” It added that the sentence can be decreased to “long imprisonment and additional sentences” if Salehi and his lawyers appeal. There has been no accountability for the arbitrary detention and forced confession of rapper Toomaj Salehi. 

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

Andrea Richardson is the senior legal researcher for investigations at the Human Rights Center. 

The post Everything you need to know about Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi and his death sentence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 18, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas S. Warrick was mentioned in a Cipher Brief article releasing an open letter to the Senate. Signed by a group of former senior national security officials, this letter urged the reform of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, adopting The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act of 2024 (H.R. 7888 or RISA). The national security surveillance program allows the collection of communications of non-Americans abroad, without a warrant, by US government officials for foreign intelligence purposes.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Thomas Warrick mentioned in The Cipher Brief about an open letter to the Senate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kyiv Oblast and the US state of Washington recently took a major step in this direction. In March 2024, Washington State Governor Jay Inslee and his Kyiv Oblast counterpart Ruslan Kravchenko signed the first Sister State Agreement between a US state and a Ukrainian region.

Washington’s Sister State Agreement with Kyiv Oblast is emblematic of the benefits that robust subnational diplomacy can provide. In Ukraine’s case, subnational diplomacy creates opportunities to highlight the strengths of Ukraine’s many diverse regions. Strong local and regional partnerships can also be maintained regardless of the changing political winds that envelop national capitals.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The recently signed agreement with Kyiv Oblast was not the start of Washington State’s efforts to support Ukraine. Since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Washington has provided a powerful example of the role regional governments can play in responding to global events.

In March 2022, Governor Inslee directed state agencies to begin reviewing and severing ties with Russian state institutions and companies. In the initial weeks of the invasion, local nonprofits worked together with the state’s Ukrainian diaspora community to organize the delivery of 32 tons of medical supplies to Ukraine. During 2022, Washington State officials allocated nearly $20 million to support the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

According to the Seattle Times, more Ukrainian refugees have arrived in Washington State over the past two years than any other US state. This warm welcome owes much to the state’s vibrant Ukrainian-American community, according Geoffrey Potter, director of international relations and protocol for Governor Jay Inslee. He says the new Sister State Agreement and Washington’s other efforts to support Ukraine are “an expression” of the way local residents with Ukrainian roots have become an integral part of the Washington community.

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Ukraine’s honorary consul in Seattle, Valeriy Goloborodko, believes the Sister State Agreement will pave the way for closer ties and can help “further relationships between academics, industries, and regional governments for the benefit of the people.” Meanwhile, Potter notes a number of common interests linking the Kyiv region and Washington including clean energy, forestry, and the aerospace industry.

As wartime Ukraine looks ahead toward the challenges of recovery and reconstruction, subnational diplomacy can open up a range of new business opportunities. Major Washington State-based business brands including Boeing and Microsoft are already active in Ukraine. The state’s many small businesses are also playing an important role in strengthening ties. In Tacoma, Washington-based SAFE Boats is currently outfitting eight patrol boats destined for Ukraine’s navy. BRINC Drones, based in Seattle, is supplying drones for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression.

At a time when the issue of vital military aid for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic US political tensions, grassroots relationships can help individual Ukrainian regions bypass the kind of obstacles that might otherwise hamper progress at the national level. With this in mind, Ukraine’s regional leaders and their counterparts across the globe should now be seeking to develop stronger subnational ties that can solidify relationships for the long term.

Washington State’s agreement with Kyiv Oblast offers an attractive model that others can follow, both in the US and beyond. In Goloborodko’s view, the recently signed Sister State Agreement “is a way to show leadership in supporting democracy.” The initiative is the first of its kind for a US state, but Potter is “pretty sure” it will not be the last. “We’re forging a model for what a meaningful, substantive collaboration looks like,” he says.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

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Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid

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Officials in Kyiv are calling on partners to urgently supply Patriot systems as Russia capitalizes on Ukraine’s weakening air defenses to methodically destroy the country’s power grid, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Ukraine’s allies divided over drone campaign targeting Russian refineries

By Giorgi Revishvili

Ukraine’s expanding campaign of drone strikes on Russian refineries has inflicted significant damage on Putin’s oil and gas industry while also revealing divisions among Ukraine’s allies, writes Giorgi Revishvili.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Grassroots diplomacy can help unlock international support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Millions of Ukrainians have served in the country’s armed forces since the onset of Russian aggression ten years ago. This large pool of veterans has the potential to transform Ukraine’s political landscape. Military veterans can bring a range of qualities to Ukrainian politics including patriotism, pragmatism, accountability, and an acute awareness about the costs of corruption. Crucially, Ukraine’s military veterans also enjoy unprecedented levels of trust among their compatriots.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, a number of Ukrainian MPs and local officials have joined the military. Their experiences will inevitably influence their future political activities and may result in increased attention to issues including national security and the rights of veterans. However, these serving politicians are likely to form a small percentage of the military veterans active in postwar Ukrainian politics.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are currently defending their country against a threat that most view as existential. With Russia openly denying Ukraine’s right to exist and erasing all traces of Ukrainian identity in areas currently under Kremlin control, the stakes could hardly be higher. This experience is transforming Ukraine and producing an entire generation of Ukrainians defined by the courage and sacrifices of the struggle against Russian aggression.

Many of Ukraine’s military veterans will seek to continue serving the nation in the postwar environment. They will be driven by a profound sense of duty and by a deeply felt desire to build a Ukraine that will honor the memory of their fallen comrades. These veterans will be highly sought after by Ukraine’s existing political parties, but they also have the potential to become a potent political force in their own right.

The single greatest political asset Ukraine’s military veterans possess is the trust of their fellow Ukrainians. In a country where faith in the political classes is notoriously low, military veterans enjoy an enviable reputation for trustworthiness. One recent survey conducted in March 2024 found public levels of trust for different categories of veteran ranging from 84 to 96 percent. In contrast, a January 2024 poll found that 75 percent of Ukrainians distrust state officials.

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An influx of military veterans into the political arena would not necessarily create a more militarized Ukraine. Instead, it would likely enhance democratic accountability while also bringing valuable practical experience along with patriotic judgment that prioritizes the national interest. This has long been the case throughout the democratic world, where military veterans have frequently pursued political careers. For example, almost 20 percent of currently serving Congress members in the US come from military backgrounds.

The Ukrainian authorities should now be looking to create the conditions for more military veterans to play a role in building the country’s future. This means safeguarding their rights and status, while making sure they and their families enjoy maximum government support. State programs, private grants, and international initiatives should offer veterans free education. Efforts should also be made to improve employment opportunities, including initiatives to hire veterans in public service positions.

In light of the major challenges Ukraine will continue to face for many years to come, including the twin threats of further Russian aggression and economic instability, the active engagement of veterans in Ukrainian politics is more crucial than ever. Their proven commitment to serving their country, coupled with their firsthand knowledge of the realities of war, make them highly qualified to lead Ukraine.

From Dwight Eisenhower to Charles de Gaulle, there are many examples in modern history of military men who have gone on to become pivotal political figures in the democratic world. In many ways, it would be entirely natural if Ukraine’s own evolution as a European democracy follows a similar path.

Ukrainian policymakers need to recognize the potential of the country’s military veterans and provide them with opportunities to take on leadership roles in the political arena. This will allow Ukraine to tap into the wealth of talent, dedication, and experience that veterans can offer, while also strengthening the country’s democratic institutions and rebuilding public trust in the political classes.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Further reading

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By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

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In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s veterans can transform the country’s postwar political landscape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Churches often issue decrees stating official positions on key issues, but rarely do these proclamations involve calls to violence or territorial ambitions. Russia is mentioned 53 times in the 3000-word document, underlining the very clear focus on the Russian state’s earthly interests. “From the spiritual and moral point of view, the Special Military Operation is a Holy War, in which Russia and its people are defending the single spiritual space of Holy Russia,” the document states, using the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree goes on to stress Ukraine’s status as part of the wider “Russian World,” while underlining the need to extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Following the conclusion of the current war, it states, “the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter Russia’s exclusive zone of influence. The possibility of a political regime hostile to Russia and its people existing on this territory must be completely excluded.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The sentiments expressed in this recently approved document expand on previous statements made by Patriarch Kirill since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church has frequently asserted that Ukrainians and Russians are “one nation,” and is widely viewed as a key ideological supporter of the war. Kirill’s comments have led to widespread criticism, including a warning from Pope Francis to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.”

The new decree positions Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of a larger spiritual struggle against the West, which it accuses of having “fallen into Satanism.” This is strikingly similar to the ideological arguments favored by Islamist radicals, who have long sought to portray the United States and other Western nations as “Satanic” as part of efforts to justify their extremist agenda. In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, numerous senior Kremlin officials have sought to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential fight with Western “Satanism.” In a further chilling echo of the Islamist doctrine, Patriarch Kirill has also claimed Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine would have their sins “washed away.”

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The Russian Orthodox Church’s endorsement of language more typically associated with religious extremism should come as no surprise. After all, the entire Russian invasion of Ukraine has been framed as a crusade from the very beginning. Following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin compared the occupied Ukrainian peninsula to Temple Mount and spoke of its spiritual importance to the Russian nation. He routinely insists Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has labeled Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The recent confirmation of a holy war against Ukraine and the West comes at a pivotal point in Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since February 2022, Putin’s invading army has been unable to overcome Ukrainian resistance or break the country’s will to defend itself. With little current prospect of a decisive military breakthrough, the Kremlin is now turning increasingly to terror tactics, including a sharp escalation in the bombing of Ukrainian cities and the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian power grid.

By defining the invasion in explicitly spiritual terms, the Russian Orthodox Church hopes to whitewash the war crimes being committed in Ukraine and encourage more ordinary Russians to volunteer. Moscow’s recent declaration of a holy war also sends an unmistakable message to anyone in the West who still believes in the possibility of striking some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. While Putin initially sought to justify the invasion as a pragmatic response to the growth of NATO, it is now apparent that he views the war as a sacred mission and will not stop until Ukraine has been wiped off the map of Europe.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv, Ukraine. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russian Orthodox Church declares “Holy War” against Ukraine and West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The proposed legislation would oblige civil society organizations receiving more than 20% of annual funding from sources outside Georgia to openly state that they are “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” They would be required to register as foreign agents and subjected to extensive additional reporting requirements. Organizations that fail to do so could face large fines.

Critics say the bill is very similar to Russia’s draconian foreign agents legislation, which is widely seen as a tool for the Kremlin to target potential dissidents and silence civil society. The similarities between the law proposed by the Georgian authorities and restrictions already in place inside Russia helped fuel large-scale protests in Tbilisi last year, with many denouncing what they termed as the “Russian law.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Renewed efforts to pass last year’s foreign agents bill have sparked fresh debate over Georgia’s future. Opposition groups see the return of the draft law as a further indication of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s intention to steer the country away from Europe and toward Russia. The move comes just months after Georgia achieved a major breakthrough by securing official EU candidate nation status in December 2023.

EU officials voiced “regret” that Georgia’s foreign influence legislation was once again under consideration despite being “unconditionally” withdrawn last year. “Transparency should not be used as an instrument to limit civil society’s capacity to operate freely,” read an EU statement. “We encourage the political leaders in Georgia to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with the stated objective of joining the European Union, as supported by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens.”

The United States also voiced its concerns over the reappearance of the contentious foreign agents law. The largely unchanged draft legislation “undermines Georgia’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and risks pulling Georgia off its European path,” commented US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller.

When officials from the ruling Georgian Dream party first proposed new legislation to curb foreign influence in February 2023, the backlash was so strong that the draft law was ultimately withdrawn from consideration. Thousands rallied against the bill in Tbilisi, leading to clashes with police that generated global headlines.

Criticism also came from a range of international human rights watchdogs. “The foreign agent bill seeks to marginalize and discredit independent, foreign-funded groups and media that serve the wider public interest in Georgia,” commented Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia Director for Human Rights Watch.

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The reintroduction of the foreign agents law ahead of parliamentary elections in October casts a shadow over Georgia’s democratic progress. Critics say this renewed push to pass legislation virtually identical to last year’s abandoned bill is part of the Georgian Dream party’s efforts to silence opponents. They accuse the Georgian authorities of backsliding on the core values underpinning the country’s declared goal of securing a democratic, European future.

These concerns reflect fears over Russian influence. Despite widespread public opposition to Russia’s role in the country, the Georgian Dream party has long faced accusations of seeking to foster closer ties with the Kremlin. Russia continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of Georgia, and has recently announced plans to construct a major naval base on the Black Sea coast in Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia region.

Over the past two years, the Georgian authorities have responded ambiguously to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Georgia has refused to join international sanctions or restrict trade with Russia, while Georgian PM Irakli Garibashvili echoed the Kremlin in May 2023 by claiming NATO enlargement was one of the main reasons for the war in Ukraine. Georgia also recently relaunched direct flights to Russia.

In the coming weeks, Georgia’s revived foreign influence legislation is expected to be reviewed by a parliamentary committee. A new round of protests against the law has already begun in the capital, and could serve as a focal point for opponents of the current authorities. The further passage of the law will reveal much about the Georgian Dream party’s grip on power, while also providing an indication of the country’s future geopolitical trajectory.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Georgia launches new push to adopt Russian-style foreign agent law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 4, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Francis X. Taylor was interviewed by his alma mater’s magazine about his experiences as a black student, the difficulties he overcame at Notre Dame, and how it prepared him for a career as a brigadier general and commander of the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations.

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On April 4, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulous was interviewed on MSNBC about the Israeli airstrike that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers and provided insight into what may have gone wrong.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Polymeropoulos interviewed on MSNBC about Israeli air strikes and aid worker casualties appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarusians have been part of the Ukrainian struggle against Russian aggression since 2014, when dozens joining the volunteer battalions that emerged in response to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. When Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in Febuary 2022, Belarusians responded by forming their own battalion and naming it after Kastus Kalinouski, a nineteenth century Belarusian national hero who led an uprising against imperial Russia.

This Belarusian battalion has since expanded to become a regiment, with representatives claiming as many as 5,000 volunteers. Belarusian troops have taken part in some of the biggest battles of the war including the fighting around Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Bakhmut. The Kalinouski Regiment now has its own recruitment and training structures, and has acquired a considerable arsenal of military equipment. While casualty figures are not publicly disclosed, there are reports of more than 40 Belarusian volunteers killed while defending Ukraine, with the total number likely to be significantly higher.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The presence of so many Belarusians fighting alongside the Ukrainian military has long been a source of concern for Belarus’s pro-Kremlin dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Speculation over the potential dangers posed by Belarusian fighters in Ukraine has intensified in recent weeks amid a series of cross-border raids conducted by Russian volunteer units entering Russia from Ukrainian territory. Many are now asking whether Ukraine’s large Belarusian contingent may mount similar border zone operations inside Belarus.

For now, there is no sign of any plans for offensive activity along the Ukrainian border with Belarus. Instead, there are indications that Ukraine’s political and military leaders would rather avoid any escalation in the confrontation with Minsk at a time when they are fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

In an October 2023 interview, Ukrainian Military Intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov spoke favorably of Lukashenka’s ability to prevent his country from becoming a direct participant in the Russian invasion. This caused considerable disquiet among the Belarusian pro-democracy opposition, with many viewing it as a signal of renewed readiness in Kyiv to deal with the Lukashenka regime.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Despite the absence of any offensive operations against Belarus, Lukashenka clearly views the Belarusians fighting in Ukraine as a serious threat to his own regime. He is well aware that many Belarusian volunteers regard victory in Ukraine as a stepping stone toward the overthrow of the current pro-Russian authorities in Minsk. Unsurprisingly, volunteer fighters face criminal prosecution if caught inside Belarus. Some family members have also reportedly been detained by the Belarusian authorities.

Lukashenka has good reason to be wary. His position has been precarious since 2020, when nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election threatened to topple his regime until Kremlin intervention and a brutal crackdown enabled him to cling onto power. While there is only relatively limited cooperation between the domestic population and Belarus’s exiled pro-democracy opposition, the danger of renewed protests remains.

Some Belarusians have accused the country’s exiled opposition of not doing enough to confront the Lukashenka regime. Leaders of the Kalinouski Regiment have urged opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to play a more active role in efforts to mobilize support for the regiment and increase assistance for Belarusians fighting for Ukraine.

There are some indications that the Kalinouski Regiment may have political ambitions of its own. The regiment has strengthened ties with the Cyberpartisans hacktivist group, which is a member of the Belarusian opposition’s Coordination Council. In January 2024, Kalinouski Regiment leaders announced plans to visit 12 European cities to meet Belarusian supporters. While in Warsaw, they spoke of their interest in developing a “political track.”

The Kalinouski Regiment is playing a significant role in Ukraine’s armed struggle against Russian imperialism and its leaders clearly have ambitions to eventually liberate their own country. However, the regiment is currently far too small to challenge the Lukshenka regime on its own.

Meanwhile, there is little sign of any Ukrainian appetite to expand the war. On the contrary, the absence of cross-border raids and the softer tone adopted in recent months by some in Kyiv hints at a more pragmatic approach toward ties with Belarus. Until this changes, the Kalinouski Regiment may keep Lukashenka awake at night, but it is unlikely to orchestrate his downfall.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s Belarusian volunteers create headaches for Putin ally Lukashenka appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 18, 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, the European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya Civil Society Network launched the Syria Strategy, an intensive process of engagement with subject matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis. This process will incorporate Syrian experts, Syrian civil society, and Syrian stakeholders at every step. The launch event coincided with the anniversary of the Syrian uprising and included three panels, featuring Special Envoys for Syria from three governments, notable scholars working on the country, and the Syria Strategy project leadership.

Welcome remarks 

William Wechsler, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, kicked off the event with the opening remarks, noting that Syria does not receive enough attention given the country’s importance to the region and the continued suffering under President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The partnership between the Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya therefore aims to produce a realistic, implementable strategy for the United States and its allies to address the country’s current crises, explained Wechsler. 

Ayman Asfari, chairman of Madaniya Civil Society Network, then discussed the network’s goals and the continued need for strategic engagement to promote a sustainable solution to Syria’s challenges. Madaniya seeks to harness the vibrant civil society developed during the initial uprising in 2011 by providing a platform for over 200 Syrian civil society organizations to reclaim political agency over the Syrian civic space, noted Asfari. In this way, he said, Syrian civil society is at the forefront of mitigating the impacts of the protracted conflict. The United States and its European partners must work with Syrians to pave the way for principled policy solutions along the lines of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, he added. 

Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State, concluded the opening remarks with a recorded address. The situation in Syria is deteriorating, as deadly bombardment campaigns continue in the country’s north, human rights abuses continue, and over 155,000 people remain arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared, according to Leaf. “With the war in Gaza, [the United States] is committed to ensuring Syria itself does not get pulled into a regional conflict that only increases human suffering,” Leaf said. Furthermore, “despite Russian and regime intransigence,” the United States still supports political solution along the lines of UNSCR 2254 as well as the work of the Constitutional Committee to achieve these goals for Syria. However, the Assistant secretary warned that the Arab League’s decision to normalize relations with Syria threatens any potential progress, as the United States hopes to use normalization as an incentive for credible steps toward protecting human rights and improving humanitarian conditions in the country. “The United States remains committed to expanding humanitarian access, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and promoting accountability for the Assad regime’s human rights abuses.” Leaf also emphasized that initiatives like the Syria Strategy Project are essential to these goals, informing the administration’s decision-making and policy direction while searching for a path toward peace. 

Panel one: High-level panel discussion 

The first panel focused on specific governmental approaches to engaging with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in pursuit of political and humanitarian solutions to Syria’s current crises. Elizabeth Hagedorn, State Department correspondent for Al-Monitor, moderated the discussion between Ethan Goldrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs with the US Department of State; Brigitte Curmi, Special Envoy for Syria with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Stefan Schneck, Special Envoy for Syria with the German Federal Foreign Office. 

A transactional approach to peace 

Goldrich began the conversation by discussing the status quo in Syria’s political landscape as well as the importance of a unified approach to pressuring the Assad regime to the negotiating table. Currently, the regime is looking to rehabilitate its image and normalize relations with Arab neighbors without engaging in any meaningful reform. Indeed, the Arab League’s decision to normalize with Syria complicates efforts to force concessions from Damascus, he stated. However, he explained that the United States remains committed to working with partners like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to hold Assad’s regime accountable while reaching a path toward peace and stability. 

Curmi emphasized that this approach must include concrete steps toward reform in line with UNSCR 2254. She stressed the importance of directing the regime toward meaningful reform to ensure the international community’s ability to solve Syria’s political crisis. Schneck agreed on these points, adding that internal support for the regime is very weak, forcing Assad to rely on untrustworthy partners like Iran and Russia. The international community must be prepared for a sudden change to the status quo and any accompanying opportunity to enable political reform in Syria. 

While a sudden shift in events is always possible given Syria’s volatile history, a slower process toward political reform is much more likely. Goldrich explained that the United States has placed stock in such an approach, designing flexible sanctions and executive orders to accommodate any progress the Syrian government makes in addressing concerns over human rights abuses. Curmi and Schneck likewise noted that French and German opposition to the regime was not purely ideological. A step-for-step approach has been on the table for years, but substantive change will only come about after Syria legitimately alters its behavior, they concluded. Such changes are unfortunately less likely after the recent rapprochement between Syria and the Arab League. 

Roadblocks to reform 

Goldrich also pointed to Russian behavior as a challenge in making progress in Syria. Over the past two years, Russia has prevented the Constitutional Committee, which aims to make progress toward UNSCR 2254, from convening. Therefore, according to Schneck, the issue is not the peace process itself but rather the actors’ unwillingness to enter the negotiations. Curmi said this behavior should not discourage the parties from advocating for greater efforts to connect Syrians in different regions of the country as well as in the diaspora. 

While not a perfect solution, the panelists agreed that pursuing UNSCR 2254 is a better approach to improving the current humanitarian situation in Syria than normalization. Arab states opting to normalize relations have benefited little from the decision, and the situation has encouraged the Syrian government to maintain its strategy of extracting concessions while offering none in return, they added. 

Sanctions and humanitarian aid 

The panelists aligned on the need to maintain sanctions. They acknowledged that their sanctions programs are having negative effects on the people of Syria and reiterated the need for measures targeting only the regime and its enablers. The envoys affirmed that sanctions must avoid hampering humanitarian efforts. However, the delegates stressed that the regime will not likely change its treatment of Syrians without outside pressure. Furthermore, the regime’s frequent complaints about Western sanctions demonstrate that the measures are having an effect, explained the speakers.  

On humanitarian aid, the panelists did diverge slightly in their approaches to the crisis. According to UN estimates, 16.7 million people in Syria require humanitarian aid, due to both the Syrian civil war and the devastating earthquake that hit northwestern Syria in 2023. Goldrich highlighted the more than $1 billion in aid delivered to the region in response to the earthquake, in addition to the $16.8 billion spent by the United States since the onset of the political crisis. He also invoked the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Syria General License 22, which authorized large amounts of aid to be delivered to liberated and non-regime-controlled areas of Syria, concomitantly bringing American investment to the region. 

Curmi noted a difference between the French and American approaches responding to Goldrich’s last point. France has a fixed annual budget for Syria, and this funding goes toward work in all areas of the country in contrast to the US focus on non-regime areas. Curmi explained that this approach is to ensure Syrians do not suffer unnecessarily for Assad’s actions. Similarly, Schneck affirmed the need to continue early recovery aid to lay the groundwork for sustainable solutions in the region. 

Panel two: 13 years of conflict: A regional and international perspective

The second panel contextualized the Syrian situation amid regional and global developments and explored why the crisis remains relevant today. Mona Yacoubian, Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion between Natasha Hall, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute;and Vali Nasr, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

“A festering wound”

Hall led off by observing that Syria is routinely neglected by the international community at its own peril. She compared the crisis in the country to a festering wound that can become septic at any time, and stressed negative developments there rarely remain within Syrian borders. President Bashar al-Assad benefits from this chaos by perpetuating the narrative that he is the only one who can solve the problems at hand—problems for which he is also responsible. The regime now utilizes humanitarian aid and refugees as policy levers to negotiate with its neighbors and the West, all while collecting billions of dollars each year through the Captagon trade, according to the panelist. Hall asserted that Assad has created a successful playbook for other authoritarians, who have adopted the model of securing a great power protector and then shattering norms with impunity. The United States remains staunch in its use of aid and sanctions in lieu of a more robust strategy for addressing the regime. The situation remains volatile, but Washington should not miss its current chance to provide preventative care to the wound, she added.

Nasr followed by explaining Iran’s evolving role in the crisis and how the effects of the war in Gaza are reverberating in Syria. He affirmed that Iran continues to play a central role in the country’s set of interrelated conflicts and that Iranian involvement in the wider region also elevates Syria’s importance. Beyond protecting Assad, Tehran understands that Syria is an additional front to pressure the United States and Israel. Iran and Hezbollah have moved to fill the vacuum left by Russia as it focuses on Ukraine, and by gaining a foothold in Latakia they can now project influence into the Mediterranean, according to him. Nasr also highlighted that the risk of an Israeli-Iranian escalation would rise if Tehran’s succeeded in its efforts to dislodge the United States. Syria is also a theater for US-Turkey and US-Russia confrontations; the country is more integrated into global issues than is generally acknowledged. Consequently, Washington requires a strategy for navigating its engagement in Syria and preventing the country from becoming the epicenter of a regional war, he explained.

Katulis then spoke on the evolution of geostrategic threats surrounding Syria. He listed several global impacts that originated from the Syrian conflict: authoritarian leaders mimicking tactics used by the Assad regime; worsening violence against civilians in other conflicts; the weaponization of refugees; rampant use of disinformation; and growing disillusionment with proactive foreign policy among elements of the American left and right. Katulis noted that the current project pushes back on the indifference toward Syria that has settled over some policy circles, as well as the notion that the United States cannot constructively shape the situation any longer. He expressed hope that the project will generate new ideas to turn negative trends in a new direction.

Correcting course and deepening engagement

Hall then gave her thoughts on how policymakers and scholars in Washington can reframe discussions about Syria and develop new solutions. The United States and its partners are currently “treading water” rather than acting proactively and missing opportunities to negotiate with individual actors while the wider conflict is gridlocked. Other neglected areas that could benefit from more engagement include promoting resilience in non-regime areas and mitigating water insecurity in the northeast. Hall concluded by spotlighting regional efforts to advance negotiations on Gaza and predicted that a similarly unified attempt at step-for-step with Syria could bring about progress.

Nasr underscored the need for Washington to identify its interests in Syria and pinpoint why the outcome of the war matters; a pivot toward a new mission could redefine the US footprint there altogether. Meanwhile, if the United States continues to neglect the situation it could very well be pulled back in the future. Katulis suggested a more diplomacy-forward US strategy for the crisis to ameliorate regional frustration at American inaction. Deeper discussions are especially needed with countries bordering Syria. He cited US leadership on the Ukraine conflict as an example of how attentive engagement can build coalitions.

Hall agreed with her co-panelists on the need for more multilateral cooperation on Syria policy, pointing to energy and water as issues where the United States and its partners could do more. Nasr felt that the disproportionate US effort spent countering Iranian influence in Syria is evidence of a disconnect between Washington’s stated aims in countering ISIS and its priorities on the ground. He reiterated that there is a legitimate argument for an American presence in the Middle East but that it must be properly translated into action. Katulis added that as think tank analysts approach Syria with a fresh perspective, even touchy topics regime change or other forms of power transition should be reevaluated.

Panel three: The Syria Strategy: Outlining the way forward

The final panel served as an introduction to the mission and goals of the Syria Strategy Project. Sawsan Abou Zainedin, CEO of Madaniya Civil Society Network, moderated the conversation between Qutaiba Idlbi, Director of the Syria Project at Atlantic Council; Charles Lister, Director of the Syria and Counter-Terrorism Programs at the Middle East Institute; and Marie Forestier, Senior Advisor at the European Institute of Peace.

Building a new strategy

Idlbi recounted how the project arose from Western, regional, and Syrian stakeholders’ frequent inquiries about the US strategy for Syria, and a pervasive sentiment among American policymakers that they had tried everything they could. The Syria Strategy project seeks to form a realistic and implementable strategy to both improve conditions in Syria in the short term and shape a sustainable solution to the crisis in line with UNSCR 2254. He went on to explain how the project will bring together experts, policymakers, and stakeholders to work on a series of subproblems in hopes of producing a workable, holistic proposal by March 2025. Another goal is for the project to function as a sounding board for policymakers to test ideas and offer their own feedback, he explained.

Lister addressed the project’s emphasis on Washington as its intended audience. American buy-in is needed in order to make progress on the Syrian crisis; US involvement galvanizes European support and is a remedy to Arab states’ frustration with their own engagement efforts. There is currently no shortage of ideas on Syria, but the actors proposing them lack unity of purpose, or at least the perception of unity, according to him. Lister also explained that Syrian experts and activists form the core of the Syria Strategy and Washington will be just one of many governments involved in the project. The process is designed to be highly consultative and responsive to feedback, creating a “living” project.

Forestier underscored the need for European involvement as well. The project is necessarily transatlantic, as while US leadership on Syria remains critical, Washington cannot be expected to lead alone. Aligning Europe and the United States increases the chances of success of the wider project and will revitalize Syria policy in European foreign policy circles as well. The European Union (EU) remains a significant donor of humanitarian aid in Syria but has not updated its strategy since 2017, resulting in recent dissent among member states. A common strategy born from a Syrian-owned process could be the common ground needed for the EU to rebuild consensus, she said.

Lister then unpacked the duality of the project’s mission, under which Syrians must own and drive the process but ultimately produce a strategy that external actors will buy into. The project leadership realizes that any plan assembled by the international community but not agreeable to Syrians will be dead on arrival, creating an impetus to engage with de facto authorities throughout the country—including interlocutors from the regime. The leadership also recognizes that resolution will not come quickly and thus envision two timelines for the project: a shorter-term one predicated on improving day-to-day conditions across all of Syria, and a longer-term one producing a sustainable resolution to the crisis. Critical to both is the reestablishment of connectivity among the different parts of Syria, such as by official trade and transit.

Challenges and opportunities

Idlbi contextualized the project’s efforts within wider regional developments, such as Arab states’ normalization efforts with the regime. Diplomatic engagement remains one of the only remaining policy levers for regional states to work with Syria. However, the readmission of Syria to the Arab League is widely considered to be a failure owing to a lack of better behavior by Assad. He reiterated that US involvement on the Syria file is not only crucial to effecting change but also a necessity if Washington wants to avoid being dragged back into Syria on worse terms in the future. The United States spent billions of dollars to stop ISIS, and the investment needed to curb another crisis may well be even more. Working toward a solution to the conflict also requires treating its symptoms as well, such as restoring basic services and returning children to school, according to him.

Forestier differentiated the Syria Strategy from other consultative projects by the extremely wide scope of stakeholders it hopes to engage. Throughout the process, the project leads intend to solicit feedback from all major players in Syria, regional governments, and global powers, ensuring that policy recommendations are vetted by different actors. Lister acknowledged that not all issues lend themselves to consensus, with sanctions expected to be an especially contentious topic. However, the goal remains to take in a range of different perspectives and approach disparate ideas with an open mind.

Regarding the recent anti-normalization bill passed by the US House of Representatives, Idlbi stressed that the most impactful sanctions regime placed on Syria is the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act passed in 2003. Sanctions should comprise just one of many tools to form a strategy for shaping conditions in the country. He also recentered the importance of UN involvement and the project’s engagement with the UN Special Envoy for Syria. Lister then outlined the limitations of Syria’s allies and the opportunities they create to change the status quo. He asserted that while Assad could fall back on Russian and Iranian military support from the outset of the civil war, neither government is willing to bail Syria out of its worsening economic situation; a unified approach by the international community to engaging with Syria could thus leverage Damascus’s predicament to pressure it toward constructive reforms.

The post Launching the Syria Strategy Project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One such project is our effort to establish an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund. Over the past year, we and our Syrian partners have conducted dozens of consultations with Syrian civil society to develop a framework for the fund, which were used to draft a white paper on the concept for decision makers in country capitals and within international organizations. In February, we were thrilled to see the framework implemented into the European Parliament’s report recommending that the European Council, European Commission, and European External Action Service work to establish such a fund.

We have also seen promising progress in the ongoing campaign to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the United Nations (UN) Sixth Committee’s draft crimes against humanity treaty. On March 8, International Women’s Day, we cohosted a high-level panel event in New York City about gender apartheid in Afghanistan and the momentum behind efforts to codify the crime under international law. The event featured a remarkable line-up of experts, including Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai and UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls Chair Dorothy Estrada-Tanck. In the week leading up to the event, I joined a delegation of our team members in traveling to several country capitals in Latin America to gather support for the campaign. You can read more details about the trip and other campaign efforts below.

Additionally, the Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran released a report to the UN Human Rights Council which found that security forces committed crimes against humanity during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. To support future accountability for these violations, we partnered with Mnemonic to launch the Iranian Archive, which has preserved open-source digital information identifying these violations. 

As always, we at the SLP are incredibly grateful for your continued support. If you have any ideas about what we should be working on or thoughts on our initiatives, we welcome your feedback.

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Our team, in partnership with Syrian civil society and SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Joumana Seif, has been working to establish an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund. Over the past year, the SLP team and its Syrian partners have conducted dozens of consultations with civil society to develop a framework for a victims fund and met with representatives of governments and international organizations to brief them on the concept.

The proposed framework for the Syria Victims Fund would rely on significant monetary judgments and fines that states are collecting linked to violations in Syria—fines, penalties, and forfeitures for sanctions violations and international crimes committed in Syria. Rather than retaining those funds and essentially profiting off violations in Syria, States should deposit Syria-linked funds into a central location and direct the funds to better support victims of international law violations in Syria.

In February, the European Parliament adopted a report recommending that the European Council, European Commission, and European External Action Service work to establish such a fund for victims of international law violations in Syria, financed by “monetary judgments, sanctions, fines and penalties, forfeiture orders . . . and other revenue.” The report further recommends that European Union (EU) member states then carefully design a fund “in full cooperation with the families of the victims.”

Learn more about the Syria Victims Fund

Just Security has launched a blog series discussing the concept of a Syria victims fund. Read our experts’ contributions:

Joumana Seif: “It’s Time to Establish a Syria Victims Fund”

Elise Baker and Nushin Sarkarati: “No State Should Profit from Violations in Syria. Instead, Direct Monetary Recovery to Victims.”

Celeste Kmiotek and Sameer Saboungi: “The US Recovered Over $600 Million in ISIS-Linked Funds–They Should Go to Syrian and Iraqi Victims”

Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp and Alyssa Yamamoto: “Applying Ukraine Precedent, DOJ Should Use Funds Forfeited from Lawbreakers in Syria to Assist Victims”

International Women’s Day panel event

On March 8, the SLP, in partnership with the International Peace Institute and the Malala Fund, hosted a high-level panel event in New York City about the urgent need for legal recognition of gender apartheid in Afghanistan. The discussion addressed the deteriorating rights of girls, women, and individuals of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in Afghanistan and the momentum around efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid under international law, including in the potential UN crimes against humanity treaty. This event was cosponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace & Security, and the Permanent Missions of Malta and Mexico.

The panel featured Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai, Afghan activist and expert Nayera Kohistani, New York Law School Professor and anti-apartheid jurist Penelope Andrews, and UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls Chair Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, and was moderated by CNN International Correspondent Jomana Karadsheh.

If you were unable to join us live, you can watch the event playback here. 

Briefings in New York City and Washington, DC

In January, the SLP hosted a series of briefings on the gender apartheid codification effort in New York City and Washington, DC, during which the SLP’s Senior Legal and Policy Advisor Alyssa Yamamoto and Strategic Legal Advisor for Gender Justice Akila Radhakrishnan were joined by a panel of experts including the SLP Senior Legal Advisor Sareta Ashraph, Penelope Andrews, Christina Hioureas, SLP Gender and Policy Advisor Metra Mehran, and Paloma van Groll. In Washington, the group met with representatives of several think tanks, US government bodies, and EU embassies. In New York, the delegation hosted closed regional briefings for Latin American and Caribbean countries and EU and other Western countries.

Advocacy in Latin America

Earlier this month, Gissou Nia, along with Akila Radhakrishnan and SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Nizar El Fakih, traveled to country capitals in Latin America to discuss human rights, gender justice, and other issues impacting Iran and Afghanistan. The group met with high-level representatives of the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia to urge their support for both codifying gender apartheid in the UN Sixth Committee’s draft crimes against humanity treaty and extending the mandate of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran by voting in favor of an upcoming UN Human Rights Council resolution.

Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a press release about the group’s meeting with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Gloria de la Fuente, which you can read here.

Following the release of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s report to the UN Human Rights Council finding crimes against humanity, including for gender persecution committed over the course of the protests following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, the SLP and Mnemonic in partnership with a coalition of international organizations announced the launch of the Iranian Archive. The archive preserved over one million vulnerable digital artifacts recording serious human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Woman, Life, Freedom movement protestors.

The Iranian Archive is intended to support future investigations and accountability proceedings. The SLP and Mnemonic are partnered with The Promise Institute for Human Rights at UCLA Law, UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International‘s Digital Verification Corps, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and the Azadi Archive. 

In January, SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow and Uyghur human rights lawyer Rayhan Asat traveled to Geneva to attend the interactive dialogue for China’s 2024 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process through which the UN Human Rights Council assesses the human rights records of all UN member states according to a rotating schedule of cycles.

Since the UPR takes place only every five years, its interactive dialogue presents a significant opportunity for member states to make specific and measurable recommendations to China in light of the ongoing repression of the Uyghur community and the Chinese government’s disregard for previous critiques of its human rights record. In July, Asat submitted a comprehensive report to the UPR Working Group on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, followed by a New Atlanticist piece about the contents of the report and the need for member states and US officials to hold China accountable for its abuses.

While in Geneva, Asat met with representatives of twenty-two member states to encourage their participation in the interactive dialogue. In the meetings, she presented them with a briefing paper outlining China’s violations against the Uyghurs, the findings of relevant UN human rights bodies, and suggested recommendations to be made to China during its review. Ultimately, more than twenty member states took a strong stance against China’s human rights record during the session.

In February, the SLP published its latest report, “The far reach of justice: Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran Accountable in European courts.” The report explores the options available to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable through the national judicial systems of seven European states by using their universal jurisdiction frameworks.

Report

Dec 22, 2023

How to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable in European courts

By Gissou Nia, Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo, Alyssa T. Yamamoto

While there are no viable domestic routes toward accountability within Iran, national judicial systems in other states present an alternative path to justice. This report examines prospects for initiating prosecutions against IRI perpetrators in European jurisdictions.

Human Rights International Norms

Throughout Europe, states have adopted universal jurisdiction provisions, which allow them to prosecute acts that constitute core international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—even if the crime was committed in a different state by and against foreign nationals. The countries covered in the report—Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—were selected due to several factors, including the strength of their universal jurisdiction frameworks and frequency of use; their robust caselaw and policies for prosecuting atrocity crimes committed extraterritorially; the size of Iranian expatriate communities in these countries, especially those fleeing persecution and violence; and the possibility of travel by Iranian officials to these jurisdictions.

This report details what each country’s universal jurisdiction provisions entail, how proceedings are initiated, and what victims’ rights are protected. It also gives an overview of each state’s relevant jurisprudence to date, analyzing the legal, practical, and political viability of future cases involving Islamic Republic of Iran violations, including in light of the country’s diplomatic relationship with Iran. Finally, it provides regional and country-specific recommendations to facilitate more cases against Islamic Republic of Iran perpetrators and to strengthen universal jurisdiction frameworks more broadly.

On February 14, the SLP hosted a hybrid event about the crucial role women and their testimonies play in pursuit of justice and accountability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The panel featured Dalal Mawad, award-winning Lebanese journalist and author of All She Lost: The Explosion in Lebanon, the Collapse of a Nation and the Women Who Survive; Mai El-Sadany, executive director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; and Haydee Dijkstal, an international human rights lawyer and SLP nonresident senior fellow.

The discussion was moderated by Patricia Karam, a nonresident senior fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, and touched on a variety of issues, including possible responses to gender-based and sexual violence, the role of independent media in accountability efforts, and legal mechanisms protecting the rights of women and girls.

Public Event Wed, February 14, 2024 • 1:00 pm ET

Justice and accountability in the MENA region: The importance of women’s stories

A panel discussion about the crucial role women and their testimonies play in the pursuit of justice in accountability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Human Rights International Norms

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Metra Mehran

Gender and Policy Advisor

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan Civil Society

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Azadah Raz Mohammad

Legal Advisor

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan Civil Society

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Mark Klamberg

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

English European Union

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Ivan Horodyskyy

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Eastern Europe English

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The post Strategic Litigation Quarterly Newsletter: It’s time for a Syria Victims Fund. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) response to allegations of rights abuses emerging from the country less than two months into the protests, the forming of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI) in November 2022, marked a significant step towards holding violators accountable and providing a voice to those silenced by the government. The council tasked the FFMI to specifically investigate allegations of human rights abuses perpetuated during protests that escalated following Amini’s death by examining evidence and documenting potential human rights violations to ensure accountability.

On March 18, the FFMI presented its current findings, revealing the extent of the atrocities and confirming fears that these were not isolated incidents but crimes against humanity executed under a veil of impunity at the highest levels of the Iranian state. The FFMI’s investigations revealed that Amini’s arrest was not only arbitrary but also led to her death due to physical violence while in custody. This pointed to a clear violation of her right to liberty and personal security, squarely placing the responsibility on the state for her demise. The authorities’ failure to conduct a timely, effective, and transparent investigation into Amini’s death, coupled with their concerted efforts to distort the truth, further underscored the systemic disregard for international human rights norms.

With 551 confirmed deaths and countless crimes, the FFMI’s report revealed systematic rights violations of liberty and physical security, painting a stark picture of indiscriminate arrests and detentions. The comprehensive suppression extended to extreme measures, including the torturing of protesters being held in detention facilities where acts of barbarity indicative of systematic abuse were sanctioned at the highest levels. Amidst this grim scenario, gender persecution stood out, with Iran targeting women, girls, and gender equality advocates, constituting a particularly vile form of these crimes and abuses. The harrowing accounts of sexual and gender-based violence being wielded as tools of repression illustrate a chilling disregard for human dignity and fundamental rights. Such practices, especially the targeted abuse of children and vulnerable groups like LGBTQI individuals, further highlight the government’s exploitation of societal prejudices to compound the suffering of its victims. Additionally, the FFMI’s report underlines that a significant number of these atrocities occurred in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic and religious minorities, thus highlighting the disproportionate impact on these communities.

Further to this, investigators established that executions of several protesters following summary proceedings without fair trial and due process guarantees violated the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment and amount to unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of their right to life. They concluded that prosecutors and judges, “particularly in the revolutionary courts,” were responsible for myriad violations, including prosecutions for violations of discriminatory laws, in particular mandatory hijab laws, the conviction of protesters on vaguely formulated charges, and sentences to corporal punishments (lashings) and death for acts not considered to be either crimes or capital offenses under international law. The absence of fair trial guarantees—including the right to defense, the right to be heard by an impartial tribunal, and the prohibition of the use of coerced confessions—reveals a legal system weaponized against perceived enemies of the state. Furthermore, the treatment of these individuals before their executions, marked by documented cases of torture and denial of access to family or legal representation, exacerbates the gravity of these human rights abuses. Additionally, the FFMI’s revelations about the state’s actions to obscure the truth, intimidate and punish defense lawyers, and unjustly target journalists and media workers also underscore a deliberate strategy to suppress dissent and silence any voices that dare to speak out against the government’s conduct.           

The FFMI explicitly links serious human rights violations to specific state institutions and actors, deepening the accountability landscape within Iran’s governmental structure. It asserts that “various branches of the [s]tate’s security forces participated in the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, resulting in unlawful killings and injuries, most notably by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij forces, and the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Faraja), including its special forces (yegan-e vijeh).” Notably, the FFMI also confirms that high-level authorities “encouraged, sanctioned, and endorsed violations of human rights” through statements justifying the acts and conduct of the security forces engaged in a disinformation campaign” against protesters. They find that “authorities at the highest level of the [s]tate participated in, aided and abetted, or otherwise contributed to the violations, or knew or consciously disregarded information about their commission and failed to prevent and punish them”: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, of the Basij forces, of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the head of the judiciary, and many others.  

This damning indictment against such a broad swath of Iran’s security apparatus and judicial system underscores the systemic nature of the human rights abuses reported. By detailing the specific roles played by various state institutions and actors, the FFMI highlights the widespread and coordinated efforts to crush dissent and spread fear among the populace. The clarity with which the FFMI outlines the direct involvement of security forces and intelligence agencies in human rights violations signals an unambiguous call for accountability, emphasizing the need for a global response to address these grave breaches of international law.

While these revelations are critical, they represent only the surface of a deep-seated crisis that continues to unravel. However, the FFMI’s current findings are merely the inception of a long, intricate justice and reform process. The council is now faced with a pivotal decision—whether or not to extend the FFMI’s mandate for an additional year.

The case for extension

The need for the FFMI’s mandate to be extended for an additional year lies in the gravity and scope of these findings and the ongoing and escalating atrocities documented since the initial report. With human rights violations persisting unabated, the extension is imperative for several reasons:

• Sustained documentation and accountability: An extended mandate would enable the FFMI to continue systematically establishing the facts about the events that took place during the surge of protests that unfolded in 2022, reinforcing the international community’s commitment to accountability and justice.
• Comprehensive investigation: With more time, the FFMI can conduct further in-depth investigations, particularly into events that have occurred beyond the scope of the initial report. A detailed and comprehensive understanding is crucial for formulating effective international responses and support mechanisms for the victims.
• Engagement with a broader stakeholder base: Extending the mandate would allow the FFMI to engage with a wider range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations, victims and their families, and defectors. This would ensure a more inclusive and accurate portrayal of the violations and their impact.
• Overcoming challenges: The FFMI’s work has been hampered by challenges in accessing information and a lack of cooperation from the Iranian government. An additional year could provide strategic avenues to overcome these obstacles, possibly opening new channels for dialogue and investigation.
• Global human rights commitment: Extending the FFMI’s mandate affirms the global commitment to human rights. It sends a clear message that the international community stands in solidarity with the victims and will persist in holding perpetrators accountable.

Critics of the FFMI’s extension might cite financial constraints, diplomatic tensions, or potential infringements on sovereignty. However, these arguments falter when weighed against the imperative of upholding fundamental human rights and ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity. The cost of inaction—measured in human lives and the erosion of international legal norms—far exceeds the logistical and diplomatic challenges presented.

The FFMI’s groundbreaking work has peeled back the layers of repression and impunity that have long shielded perpetrators of human rights violations in Iran. Extending its mandate is not just a strategic necessity but a moral imperative. In the face of systemic injustice, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to human rights, justice, and accountability. The victims of Iran’s oppressive government deserve no less than a concerted effort to continue the pursuit of justice, leveraging every tool at our disposal to ensure their stories are told, their dignity restored, and their oppressors held to account.

Rose Parris Richter is the executive director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

Azadeh Pourzand is the spokesperson and community director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

The post It’s morally imperative that the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran be extended. Here’s why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two years ago, one of the key catalysts driving Ukraine’s reform agenda has been the June 2022 move to grant the country EU candidate status. When announcing this decision, the European Commission set Ukraine seven key reform goals to meet before official EU membership negotiations could begin. Priorities included reforms related to the rule of law, particularly the reform of crucial judicial bodies such as the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ).

While significant progress has been made toward implementing these reforms, major challenges persist. For example, although new procedures have been introduced governing the selection of judges to the country’s Constitutional Court, there are still concerns regarding the appointment of politically compromised candidates. As Ukraine continues its judicial reform efforts, it is imperative to infuse these endeavors with renewed energy.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Looking ahead, a primary focus should be on reforming Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which plays a crucial role in the country’s judiciary. In spring 2023, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office uncovered evidence of a $2.7 million bribe involving the president of the Supreme Court. However, in the wake of this corruption scandal, three-quarters of Supreme Court judges appointed another judge as the new president of the court despite serious integrity concerns.

NGOs and members of the Ukrainian judiciary have proposed a two-step approach to Supreme Court reform featuring the vetting of sitting judges and implementation of a new selection process with the involvement of international experts. This format has been endorsed by the European Commission. Reforming the Supreme Court is widely recognized as an essential step toward strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and enhancing protection for investors.

Another reform priority is establishing the High Administrative Court (HACU), following the liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) in December 2022. The DACK was widely accused of judicial misconduct. It wielded substantial power, overseeing cases involving municipal authorities and central executive bodies in the Ukrainian capital, but had become tainted by successive corruption scandals. To safeguard the integrity of HACU judges and prevent future allegations of corruption, it is vital to implement a selection process with the meaningful involvement of independent international experts, similar to the successful model used to establish the High Anti-Corruption Court.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Reform of Ukraine’s legal education system is also indispensable for the success of the country’s judicial reforms. The judicial system currently suffers from a significant shortage of personnel, underscoring the need for a robust legal education system. Detrimental practices include the training of lawyers by traditional universities and law enforcement institutions. These institutions educate one-third of all legal professionals and receive about half of state funding allocated for legal education. However, rather than promoting critical thinking, students often encounter a curriculum and environment that stresses obedience.

Critics argue that this approach fails to instill the necessary professional skills. Additionally, graduates from law enforcement academies typically exhibit lower levels of specialist knowledge compared to university graduates. The EU highlighted its concerns regarding legal education in the Ukraine Accession Report 2023, stressing the necessity of addressing this issue by separating the training of lawyers in universities and law enforcement academies. G7 countries have also raised this issue.

Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression depends heavily on continued international support. Kyiv’s partners therefore have considerable leverage when it comes to maintaining the country’s reform momentum. With this in mind, it is crucial for Ukraine’s international allies to link continued financial assistance with the implementation of reforms. The effectiveness of this approach can be seen in the progress made between summer 2022 and late 2023 on the reform goals identified by the EU.

The EU has already outlined its additional reform recommendations. It would also be helpful to establish concrete reform requirements from G7 countries and connect these directly to aid. By linking financial support to specific reform targets, Ukraine’s international allies can make sure critical reforms are implemented and the country continues to move in the right direction. The need to maintain Ukraine’s reform momentum is another strong argument in favor of confirming further direct US budget support as part of future aid. This will provide vital leverage while bolstering Ukraine’s resilience and encouraging the authorities in Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms.

The road ahead is extremely challenging, but Ukraine can still emerge as a regional beacon of democracy, Euro-Atlantic security, and the rule of law. This will require the unwavering support of the country’s Western partners. To achieve this goal, future aid should be tied to a steadfast Ukrainian commitment to advance reforms without concessions. This can help shape the kind of future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2024

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have yet to grasp the true scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are in danger of suffering an history defeat, warns the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s partners should link wartime aid to continued reform progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 15, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was featured in Times Radio discussing raids launched by Anti-Kremlin militias.

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Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post Braw featured in Times Radio on raids launched by Anti-Kremlin militias appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Thu, March 7, 2024 • 2:00 pm ET

Courage to seek justice: Addressing the unjust political imprisonment of women

The Atlantic Council and the Department of State’s Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues co-host a discussion with the 2024 International Women of Courage award recipients.

Belarus Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia Political Reform

The unjust imprisonment of women affects far more than those detained and their families, warned Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US representative to the United Nations.

“It’s devastating for entire communities,” she explained. “It hollows out civil society. It creates a culture: a culture of fear. It squashes hopes for a democratic future.”

Thomas-Greenfield spoke at an event last week cohosted by the Atlantic Council and the US Secretary of State’s Office of Global Women’s Issues designed to amplify the voices of women who have survived unjust imprisonment or other human-rights abuses.

“We all must do more to familiarize ourselves with the stories and with the facts regarding political prisoners, including women political prisoners,” said Geeta Rao Gupta, ambassador-at-large at the Office of Global Women’s Issues. “We must help give voice to those who remain unjustly behind bars and those whose voices are stifled.”

The event, moderated by Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Jenna Ben-Yehuda, gathered three recipients of the US State Department’s 2024 International Women of Courage Award to share their experiences and highlight the need for international support. Below are their stories.

Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello: Why it is now “very difficult” for prisoners

• Roque, a Cuban political dissident and human-rights activist, talked about her experiences working with political prisoners and their families. “I cannot even distinguish which is worse, being imprisoned or being a relative of a prisoner,” she said.
• Speaking from Cuba—having been blocked from traveling to the United States by the Cuban government since 2018—she added that the economic crisis there, which has led to severe shortages of food and other supplies, has made the situation “very difficult” for prisoners.
• Roque herself has spent decades protesting against the Cuban government and was imprisoned twice. She now provides support to political prisoners. “I believe that being with them, even in thought, is something that will help them,” she said.

Fariba Balouch: “Pay attention” to minority groups and hold Iran’s regime responsible

• Balouch, a London-based Iranian human-rights activist, recounted how—when she lived in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province—she had escaped an abusive marriage. She said she was “afraid to speak up about that” at the time, but then realized that, as women, “we have to raise that awareness.”
• Balouch said that she felt it was her “duty” and “responsibility” to speak up for women in Sistan and Baluchestan Province; she also said that she had to make a “difficult choice” between being a mother and lifting the voices of marginalized people around her. “I decided to go with the people’s voice,” she said.
• Balouch explained that in Iran, being a woman political prisoner comes with a lot of harassment. But “if you’re representing an ethnic minority,” she said, “that even doubles your problems and challenges.” As for being an activist: “That would make it even triple.”
• She added that even once Baloch women leave Iran, they—and their families—continue to face similar threats and other pressures. She explained that she has received threats and that her son and her brother are currently imprisoned in Iran—her son was detained after having traveled to visit Balouch in the United Kingdom.
• Balouch called upon the international community to support women activists and their families and to “pay attention” to minority communities “so the Islamic Republic of Iran knows that it has a responsibility” to ensure that no Baloch is killed in prison.

Volha Harbunova: This is a “global crisis”

• Volha Harbunova, a Belarusian human rights defender, recounted how she fled Belarus after being released from prison and was later appointed the representative for social issues in the Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet, the government-in-exile led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. She called upon Belarusians who have fled and live outside of the country to keep up communication with people inside the country who face repression. The Lukashenka regime “doesn’t want [us] to have that communication,” she said. “They want to isolate us. They want to stop that solidarity.”
• Harbunova argued that violence against women is a “global crisis,” which she said has recently been made clear by the rape and killing of a Belarusian refugee in Poland.
• Harbunova recalled having faced psychological torture and violence after being imprisoned by the Lukashenka regime. She also noted that political prisoners are restricted from accessing medical care, food, and hygienic products—and that they are not allowed to communicate with family or their attorneys. LGBTQI+ people in prison, she added, often face more severe sexual violence. “The issue of political prisoners is a humanitarian issue; it’s a matter of life and death,” Harbunova said. “We really need help in securing the release of those prisoners.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

The post Three activists offer a window into life behind bars for unjustly imprisoned women around the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How much will Putin ‘win’ by?

Putin and his regime have ensured that this year’s Russian presidential election is a carefully stage-managed affair. There are four candidates who have been allowed on the ballot, including Putin. Putin’s three challengers offer nothing but an unenergetic and unthreatening alternative to the current regime. Despite the multiplicity of parties and candidates, all are handpicked members of the loyal opposition, all support Russia’s deadly war on Ukraine, and none offers a real challenge to Putin.

There are potential opposition candidates, but most are now in prison, in exile, or barred from running. For example, Boris Nadezhdin, a previously pliant politician who then defined his campaign by opposing Russia’s war on Ukraine, was prohibited from appearing on the ballot. Election authorities claimed that there were “irregularities” in the list of signatures he submitted.

Putin has preserved many of the trappings of democracy over his more than two decades in power, but he has entirely hollowed out its contents. Putin is employing the vast resources of the state to guarantee his reelection, while providing a veneer of democracy.

This year is the fifth time Putin has faced the ballot box in a presidential election. No serious observer expresses any doubt as to who will win this election, but doubt remains as to his margin of victory. In 2018, when he faced seven opponents on the ballot, Putin received 77 percent of the vote. Reports indicate that officials are aiming for a record high result for Putin, and Peskov mused in August that “Mr. Putin will be reelected next year with more than 90 percent of the vote.” Will Russian authorities follow through on Peskov’s prediction and finally pull back yet another layer of Russia’s democratic veneer? Such a result wouldn’t reflect the will of the people, but it might better reflect the nature of Putin’s regime, which has become only increasingly authoritarian.

When will Russians vote?

For the first time, voting for the Russian presidential election will be conducted over the course of three days. Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who was prohibited from competing in the 2018 election after his conviction on trumped-up charges and who died in prison just weeks before this year’s election, called on supporters to turn out to vote at a specific time—noon on Sunday, March 17—to show the strength of the opposition to the Kremlin in a way that could not be altered or falsified by authorities. Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, repeated the call to supporters after his death.

Navalny’s supporters are no stranger to this kind of quiet activism. When I was in Vladivostok in 2018, I ran into a Navalny supporter outside of a polling place in a residential neighborhood of the city. She wasn’t protesting, but monitoring the conduct of the vote. That activity would be commonplace in a liberal democracy, but in Russia it is dangerously subversive. When I told her I couldn’t answer her poll, she pointedly asked me “What are you afraid of?” She wasn’t afraid of the ramifications of her activism, but clearly knew many fellow Russians who were. For me, it wasn’t fear, but my US citizenship, that prevented me from responding.

The dangers of refusing to play along with the Kremlin’s election theatrics are well-known to all. On March 12, Navalny’s former chief of staff, Leonid Volkov, was the victim of an attack outside his home in Vilnius that Lithuania’s intelligence agency says was likely “Russian organized.” The attackers smashed his car windows, sprayed tear gas inside, and beat Volkov with a hammer.

As was shown during Navalny’s funeral, the mere act of gathering in a manner unsanctioned by the state can be a powerful visual in Russia, even when those gathered lack the banners and signs of a typical protest. Notably, the crowds who coalesced to honor Navalny’s memory chanted anti-Putin and antiwar slogans as they marched to his gravesite. In spite of the risks, might supporters repeat those scenes outside polling places across the country at noon on Sunday?

What turnout will authorities claim?

In the lead-up to the election and over the course of the three days of voting, officials throughout the Russian Federation will go to great lengths to boost turnout. Regional leaders have good reason to put in the extra effort, as they will have to provide explanations to Moscow if their region’s turnout falls short.

In past elections, authorities have attempted to instill confidence in the process by livestreaming the voting and vote-counting process in polling places across the country. Widespread irregularities reported in past Russian elections confirm that any such confidence is misplaced. And now, the introduction of online voting has provided authorities with an additional tool to manipulate turnout figures.

How will the world react?

Despite the lack of any real competition or debate about Putin’s policies, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine looms large over this election. In a move decried by Kyiv and its international partners, Russia will conduct elections in the regions it occupies and illegally claims to have annexed in Ukraine. The vote is widely viewed as a test of Putin’s total control over Russian society and of his ability to mobilize the country to redouble Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. Left unchallenged, Putin will be emboldened to pursue his goals not only domestically, but also against Ukraine and across the globe.

It can be expected that Putin’s coterie of authoritarian allies will congratulate him on his reelection, but the degree to which other global leaders denounce the results or stay silent will be an important barometer of their countries’ attitude toward Moscow. In 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously cited “serious concerns” after the Russian parliamentary elections of that year. In 2012, President Barack Obama called to congratulate Putin on his reelection, as did President Donald Trump in 2018. It’s unlikely that such a call will be repeated between President Joe Biden and Putin in 2024, but the example Washington sets in denouncing the results will be an important element to watch as other governments react.

Will there be any signs of protest?

While these elections might share a passing resemblance to the litany of elections that will be held in 2024 in the world’s established liberal democracies, Putin’s presidential election will not share any of the true elements that make those elections free and fair.

Elections reflect how modern regimes exist only through the consent of the governed. In authoritarian regimes, rigged elections are a stark reminder of how that consent is coerced. Putin surely remembers the protests that erupted in Serbia after a rigged election in 2000, in Georgia in 2003, and in Belarus in 2020. He will also recall the protests that erupted at home in 2011 after the fraudulent Russian parliamentary elections of that year. Amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, Putin and his regime are pulling out all the stops to avoid a repeat of that history. The measure of their success will be the silence of the streets.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post What to watch in Russia’s stage-managed presidential ‘election’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 5, after weeks of speculation over when the presidential election might be scheduled, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) announced that the vote will be held on July 28. Both the timing of the announcement and the election date were no coincidence. March 5 was the anniversary of the death of Hugo Chávez, strongman Nicolás Maduro’s predecessor and founder of the ruling United Socialist Party, and July 28 is his birthday. Venezuela’s Unitary Platform opposition coalition now faces the difficult task of coming up with a united strategy ahead of the election in which the deeply unpopular Maduro will have an unfair systematic advantage–and the symbolism of the announcement shows Maduro has no shame in letting that be known.

The clock is ticking. According to the electoral timetable announced by the CNE, the opposition has until March 25 to register a candidate in the election. While it can name a placeholder to buy time and reserve a slot on the ballot, the name of the candidate that will appear on voting day must be finalized by April 20.

María Corina Machado, the winner of the opposition primary held five months ago, remains banned from participating in the presidential election. While the Barbados Agreement that the government signed in October 2023 with the opposition announced the creation of a “procedure” to review bans on interested candidates, the Maduro-friendly Supreme Court has doubled down on Machado’s ban. The CNE’s own website makes clear that she is banned from participating in any elections until 2036.

In the face of this reality, there are competing views on the way forward for Venezuela’s opposition. Machado has publicly rejected the government’s ban and insisted at campaign events around the country that she will run anyway. However, reports began surfacing since late in 2023 that she is more flexible in private and would be open to naming a successor if she ultimately could not run. Her public position remains firm, however, and at an Atlantic Council event on February 26, she acknowledged that she is holding her cards close to her vest. Although she said that she remains committed to “the electoral route,” she refused outright to reject the possibility of calling for abstention. Yet polls suggest an electoral boycott, such as the ones the mainstream opposition organized in the 2018 presidential election, would be deeply unpopular. According to a recent survey by the independent Caracas-based pollster Datincorp, 70 percent of Venezuelans say that if her ban remains in place, then Machado should name an alternate candidate to run instead.

In addition to being unpopular, calling for an electoral boycott would likely exacerbate divisions within the Unitary Platform that have long simmered under the surface. While some elements of the opposition coalition have rejected any talk of a substitute candidate, others have hinted that they will move to a “plan B” with or without Machado. The opposition governor of Barinas state, who himself won a deeply unfair election after the previous opposition winner had been banned from taking office, said in January: “Our position has always been clear, we are not going to stop for her [Machado], we will choose among all of us a new candidate, to be the president of all Venezuelans.” There have been reports that some members of the coalition are calling for Zulia state governor Manuel Rosales to be named as the alternate candidate.

The apparent willingness of some coalition members to field a candidate essentially guarantees that someone from the Unitary Platform will run for president in the July 28 election. The only question is whether it will be a united front. However reticent Machado may be to accept the idea of a substitute, it is almost certain that she would not endorse one who attempts to go around her back. And given her overwhelming popularity—Datincorp suggests she would beat Maduro by 40 points in a head-to-head match—Machado’s backing is essential for any replacement to stand a chance on July 28. With the deck stacked against it, the opposition needs every vote.

That leaves only one viable choice: Find a consensus candidate that has the full backing of the entire opposition spectrum, starting with Machado herself. This is easier said than done, but there is a way to ensure that a “plan B” scenario respects the outcome of the opposition primary and harnesses Machado’s popularity at the same time. In Venezuela, like in the United States, the vice president is next in the line of succession. Unlike the United States, however, candidates for vice president do not appear on the ballot. The position is appointed directly by the chief executive. Machado could, in theory, support a placeholder candidate—or a series of placeholder candidates, in the case that they face bans as well—with the understanding that this trusted individual would name her as vice president upon winning, and then resign from office. This would trigger new elections, or it would allow the vice president to assume the role of head of state if the resignation occurred in the last two years of the term.

This strategy would allow Machado to cement her image as not just a candidate, but as the leader of a broad and diverse majority of Venezuelans working to restore the country’s democratic institutions. Working alongside a renewed Unitary Platform coalition, she could energize and mobilize Venezuelans across the country, creating the best opportunity that the opposition has had in years to overcome an electoral system designed to work against them. The Datincorp poll shows that just 15 percent of Venezuelans would vote for Maduro, in line with other surveys which find that an extraordinary 85 percent of the country believes a change in government is necessary.

Even then, victory is far from guaranteed. At least four representatives of Machado’s campaign have been detained across the country in recent weeks, and rights groups say there are more than 250 political prisoners in Venezuela. This includes Rocío San Miguel, a well-known civil society activist whose arbitrary detention has sparked international condemnation. The government closed twelve radio stations across seven states last year, and the independent press faces an environment of constant censorship and repression. While the CNE has said it will invite credible electoral observers such as the European Union and the Carter Center to oversee the vote, the terms of these observation missions would have to be carefully negotiated. At this stage, it is entirely clear that Venezuela’s authoritarian reality will present the opposition with an uphill battle.

The path forward is narrow, and the opportunity is slim. But if the opposition can get behind a single candidate who can run in the election, the Venezuelan peoples’ overwhelming consensus against Maduro could be enough to—finally—bring democratic change.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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On March 1, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulous was interviewed about the recent Gaza aid convoy incident and reflected upon the worsening humanitarian crisis in the region.

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Throughout 2023, Russia continued its various crackdowns to prevent its citizens from being exposed to content the Kremlin perceived as undermining its war efforts. The most significant development occurred during the June 2023 Wagner mutiny, which appeared to come as a complete surprise to the Kremlin. On June 23, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin declared war on the Russian Ministry of Defense in a post to Telegram, where he and the Wagner Group maintained a robust online presence. Prigozhin publicly touted his actions and aims via the messaging app over the course of several days, including a highly critical June 22 post claiming that Russia had failed to articulate its reasons for the war.

The Russian government struggled to limit the spread of Prigozhin’s messages. It tried to restrict information about Prigozhin on Russian social media and search engines during the crisis, eventually shutting access to websites linked to the Wagner Group. Despite Russian internet regulator Roskomnadzor blocking access to the affected internet resources, the websites continued to publish articles critical of the Ministry of Defense following the revolt, targeting Russian officials such as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Soon after the failed revolt, Prigozhin dissolved his Patriot Media Group, with independent Russian media reporting that the Kremlin was looking for a new owner for the media assets.

On Telegram, Russian pro-war channels were somewhat divided in their support to the Russian government and Wagner. A DFRLab analysis of pro-war channels found that a majority of them were consistent in their sentiment, regardless of whether they supported or opposed the revolt or tried to foster unity between both sides. In other instances, Telegram channels wavered over who to back or how to react, leaving them more or less adrift until it was clear that Prigozhin’s mutiny had failed.

Russian state-controlled media reacted to the mutiny in two phases, first attempting to discredit Prigozhin, and then shifting to not mentioning him in their news coverage. Kremlin channels showed footage reportedly displaying Russian special forces raiding Prigozhin’s villa and office, discovering piles of cash, weapons, a helicopter, and falsified passports. State media coverage also brought up his criminal history and implied that he was motivated by greed, a distinct change from generally fawning coverage prior to the mutiny; for example, Kremlin propagandists including Vladimir Solovyov previously praised Prigozhin and participated in Wagner recruitment videos.

Erasing Prigozhin

After a period of media coverage discrediting Prigozhin, the Kremlin attempted to erase him from collective memory. According to an examination of Russian TV transcripts by the nonprofit GDELT Project and the New York Times, “Prigozhin virtually disappeared from the airwaves. On most days between July 13 and Aug. 22, his name was not mentioned at all on any of the four leading state-controlled channels.” The same news report noted that following Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash, Russia’s power elite competed over his assets. The assets included the paramilitary group as well as his media empire, including the election-meddling “troll factory” in Saint Petersburg that played a significant role in Russia’s efforts to undermine democratic institutions globally.

Russia also continued to increase its efforts to censor and surveil domestically. For example, Roskomnadzor launched an internet surveillance system called Oculus that reportedly identifies content online that the Kremlin considers undesirable or unfavorable. According to the Russian outlet RIA Novosti, the system “recognizes images and symbols, given scenes and actions, and analyzes text in photos and videos” and detects “extremist themes, calls for massive illegal events, suicide, pro-drug content, LGBT propaganda,” among other topics. A massive Roskomnadzor data leak by the Belarusian activist group Cyberpartisans in November 2022 suggested that the agency was running a project named “Vepr,” which was tasked with determining the true identity of any internet user who is deemed to be spreading false information or engaging in illegal activity. The leak indicated that the agency was censoring anti-war social media posts and using a bot farm to spread official Russian narratives.

Another set of leaks investigated by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty showed that Russia and China had cooperated on censorship and internet control methods.
Roskomnadzor continued to block VPN services in 2023. In May of that year, VPN users received notification of a blockade of the OpenVPN protocol, which some VPN providers use. In July, Putin signed a law mandating that websites offering guidance on how to evade internet blocks in Russia be added to Roskomnadzor’s Unified Register of Prohibited Information, which allows authorities to block websites domestically.

Meanwhile, Russian independent outlet Holod reported that the Kremlin had instructed traditional and online Russian media to stop referring to Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s president. According to Holod, Kremlin officials asked outlets not to mention his official title and to use the phrase “Zelenskyy’s regime” when covering him. In 2022, similar instructions encouraged Russian media to minimize the damage done to the Kerch Bridge and portray the Russian army’s pullback from Kherson in a less negative light.

In the face of mounting casualties and a reluctant populace, the Kremlin also attempted to boost its fighting forces in Ukraine by digitizing conscription and creating an online system to punish individuals who ignore conscription notices sent to their Gosuslugi account, which Russians use to access public services. Authorities now have the right to suspend a person’s driving license and prohibit them from selling private property if they do not show up for service.

Exploiting online influencers

The Russian war in Ukraine has become a significant factor in cultural and political discourse around the world. Russian messaging has successfully leveraged divisions within Western society driven by skepticism, populist movements, isolationist politics, and demands for greater economic sovereignty. In numerous instances, political parties from the far right and far left that typically are on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum have found common cause with Putin’s demands for a peace agreement on terms favorable to Russia.

Along with populist leaders sympathetic to Russia, like Viktor Orban in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, and Sahra Wagenknecht in Germany, Russia successfully exploits so-called “useful idiots” in the West—intellectuals and influencers who downplay Russia’s regional ambitions while blaming the West and NATO expansion for causing the war.

Among the various trends throughout 2023 has been the surge in narratives favorable to Russia on X, formerly known as Twitter, which became a notable vector for Russian propaganda in the West following the purchase of the company by Elon Musk and a group of fellow investors. Numerous factors led to this shift, including massive staff reductions in Twitter’s trust and safety team, removal of state media labels for RT and other Kremlin-controlled channels, and an inversion of its “blue checkmark” verification system that now allows anyone to “verify” themselves and receive a checkmark for a monthly fee.

Blue checkmark policy change boosts Russian propaganda on X

X introduced the new system in April 2023. Dubbed X Premium, the program grants paying customers additional privileges such as higher algorithmic visibility and fewer restrictions on the number of tweets posted per day. X stated that the changes were designed to reduce fake news and untrustworthy accounts; in practice, however, researchers have documented numerous instances of X accounts with blue checkmarks amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives about Ukraine, reaching millions of users on the platform.

In one example uncovered by the DFRLab and BBC Verify, X Premium accounts amplified the Russian TikTok campaign accusing former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov of purchasing luxury goods. On July 18, 2023, a blue checkmark X account named @Resist_05 published a video of a French villa alongside claims that Reznikov had purchased it as a wedding present for his daughter for €7 million. The video garnered over 2.3 million views, 31,000 likes, and 18,000 retweets, despite featuring a fact-checking community note challenging the allegation. The villa narrative spread across X in multiple languages, posted on several occasions by other blue-checkmark accounts.

Screenshots of a blue checkmark account republishing false allegations that a former Ukrainian defense minister had allegedly purchased a villa in Cannes, France, for his daughter. The false allegation first surfaced on Russian TikTok accounts. (Source: @BPartisans/archive)

The DFRLab also identified at least two blue checkmark accounts that disseminated unsupported claims alleging that Latvia and Estonia had launched a large-scale drone attack against Russia, when the attack had originated in Ukraine. On the night of August 29, 2023, several Russian regions including Bryansk, Moscow, Ryazan, Kaluga, and Orlov were struck by drones, with Russian media reporting that Russian defense systems had intercepted most of the drones. The attack destroyed four Russian Il-76 transport aircraft at Pskov International Airport and struck a nearby oil depot.

Narratives subsequently emerged in Russian news outlets and on Telegram pointing fingers at Latvia and Estonia. Pro-Russia Telegram channels disseminated screenshots from Yandex Maps, displaying distances from the alleged launch locations in Estonia and Latvia. X Premium accounts @ElephantCivics and @MyLordBebo shared similar messages with another map graphic, claiming that the drones originated from beyond Lake Peipsi, which straddles the border between Estonia and Russia.

Screenshot of X Premium account @MyLordBebo disseminating unsupported claims that Estonia was to blame for August 2023 drone attacks on Russia. The drone attacks originated from Ukraine. (Source: @MyLordBebo/archive)

The BBC collected additional cases of X accounts with blue badges disseminating false and misleading information about Russia’s war in Ukraine. On June 26, 2023, some X Premium accounts claimed that Russian soldiers had discovered so-called “baby factories” in Ukraine where “young children are grown for child sex brothels and organ harvesting.”

In another example, “US Civil Defense News,” an X account with a blue badge, claimed that Ukrainian fighter jets had accidentally launched a missile attack on Kramatorsk, Ukraine, and hit military barracks housing foreign soldiers and mercenaries. The account claimed that the “casualties are still being counted and will be very hard due to NATO attempts to cover their troops in Ukraine!” In a subsequent thread, the same account shared an image purportedly from leaked Pentagon documents that supposedly confirmed the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine. In reality, a Russian rocket struck a pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, resulting in the deaths of eleven people, including four children. There is no evidence to support the claim that Ukraine launched the missile, nor is there any indication that it struck military barracks housing NATO troops.

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With the events of 2020 still very much in mind, Lukashenka was clearly anxious to prevent any kind of renewed public mobilization. The February 25 vote took place amid a series of increased security measures including reports of Interior Ministry forces deployed near polling stations. Belarusian state media concealed the identities of election commission members and obscured the faces of some candidates during election coverage. Many polling stations reportedly lacked curtains on individual booths, while newly introduced restrictions on photography made it difficult to record evidence of protest votes “against all.”

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The election was widely dismissed as illegitimate by members of Belarus’s democratic opposition and Western officials. On the eve of the vote, activists hacked more than 2000 display screens in public spaces across Belarus and were able to broadcast an address by the country’s exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who branded the election a “senseless farce” and urged members of the public to stay home. Meanwhile, the election was widely condemned internationally, with the United States calling the vote a “sham” held in a “climate of fear.”

The Belarusian authorities initiated a crackdown on activists and their families during the election campaign, conducting home searches and detaining hundreds of people, according to human rights groups. In the month prior to the vote, legal proceedings were initiated against 20 Belarusian researchers and journalists (including this author) on charges of “conspiracy to seize power.” With Belarus’s last remaining pro-democracy political parties dissolved last year, only four parties were allowed to take part in Sunday’s vote. The pro-Lukashenka Belaya Rus party, which was registered in 2023, reportedly garnered a considerable amount of seats in the lower chamber, alongside a number of prominent pro-Russian activists and regime loyalists.

The draconian measures adopted ahead of Sunday’s vote may at first glance seem somewhat excessive, especially when considered in light of the ruthless crackdown on all opposition that had already taken place in Belarus over the past three-and-a-half years in the aftermath of the country’s 2020 pro-democracy protests. However, Lukashenka is clearly aware that many Belarusians remain discontented and fears a possible repeat uprising. By staging a loyalist election with no room for even symbolic opposition, he sought to demonstrate stability and reaffirm his grip on the country. This message was meant for domestic audiences and also for his patrons in the Kremlin.

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Last weekend’s highly orchestrated vote was in stark contrast to events in 2020, when a disputed election led to prolonged protests that erupted across Belarus before being forcefully suppressed in a brutal crackdown that saw tens of thousands of people detained amid widespread claims of human rights abuses including torture. In the aftermath of the protests, civil society organizations and independent media outlets were shuttered, while thousands of activists fled the country. Many who remained ended up in prison. In mid-February 2024, opposition activist Ihar Lednik became the fifth Belarusian political prisoner to die in jail since 2020, according to human rights watchdogs.

Belarus’s recent parliamentary elections took place in a climate of heightened political tension due to the ongoing Russian invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Lukashenka is widely seen as Putin’s junior partner in the invasion, having allowed Russian troops to use Belarus as a launch pad for the initial offensive into northern Ukraine in February 2022. The Belarusian dictator sought to justify the stifling atmosphere surrounding Sunday’s vote by claiming the country was under threat from “hybrid Western aggression.”

Sunday’s carefully choreographed vote was a dress rehearsal for next year’s far more significant Belarusian presidential election. As anticipated, Lukashenka confirmed on February 25 that he intends to run in 2025 for what would be his eighth consecutive presidential term. However, questions remain over whether he may yet seek to switch to a different role. In 2022, Lukashenka staged a referendum to rubber-stamp constitutional changes establishing the unelected All-Belarusian People’s Assembly as the country’s supreme authority. This potentially creates an opportunity for him to vacate the presidency while maintaining control over Belarus. Whatever he decides to do next year, meaningful change in Belarus looks to be out of the question as long as Lukashenka remains in charge of the country.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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The post No opposition candidates allowed in Belarus dictator’s “sham” elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Examining the Freedom Index overall, which combines economic, political, and legal freedom subindexes, the differences between China and the rest of the region are striking: not only does China underperform compared to the regional average (in 1995, the beginning of the Index, China’s freedom score was just over 40 compared with just under 60 for the East Asia & the Pacific regional average) but it shows an overall decline in freedom over the Index time span. Overall freedom improved slightly between 2000 and 2009, but since President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, it has been slowly declining. 

Consideration of freedoms in China needs to be put in some context, since much of the movement on the Freedom Indexes reflects tensions between the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) efforts to promote economic growth and its need to manage social dissent. The first decade of this century saw an intense focus on economic growth in China, in which the government undertook significant and rapid economic reforms to liberalize the economy. For example, prior to these reforms practically all Chinese industries were state-owned. Chinese leaders realized the economic gains to be made from privatizing China’s industries and enabling foreign joint ventures. China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001 provided another huge economic boost. The country’s export-driven economic development flourished because of its preferred trading status with—and then integration into—most of the major world economies.  

The first period on the graph, from 1995 to roughly 2010, which shows gradual improvement on the Freedom Index, tracks closely with this period of economic growth. State control over citizens’ private lives decreased, while many citizens experienced dramatically improved standards of living. In stark contrast to an earlier era of state-controlled housing assignments and goods allocations, everything from housing to basic commodities to healthcare became available in commercial markets.  

Chinese civil society, which had not really existed before 2000, began to expand during this time as well. From the time of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1947, citizens and government operated under a system of social management known as “the iron rice bowl,” under which the CCP and the government provided for all of the needs of citizens from cradle to grave, and also controlled all aspects of people’s lives. As a result, throughout most of the 1990s, there were virtually no nongovernmental organizations operating in China. However, around 2001, China’s economic liberalization began to affect the country in multiple ways. Economic success and prosperity empowered Chinese citizens with more access to information. Citizens became more confident in themselves and less reliant on the government as they began to realize that the government either was not taking care of, or could not take care of, all their needs. Chinese civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged in part because the government’s promise of the “iron rice bowl” became impossible to fulfill; these CSOs became a channel for people to both voice their discontent and develop solutions to the challenges they faced.  

Between 2000 and 2008 was a dynamic period, especially in terms of civil society. People began to voice their needs, priorities, and grievances, pushing back against the party’s controls. During this time, though the CCP ostensibly controlled nearly every aspect of life, the system allowed for some experimentation. Local officials, tasked with achieving ambitious economic targets while maintaining social order, and beyond the scrutiny of the center, realized they had considerable room for flexibility. For nearly a decade, local officials experimented with a range of approaches, such as increasing women’s participation in politics, participatory budgeting and other types of local governance reform, and opening limited space for public advocacy on some issues. This was no golden age: restrictions persisted and controls were particularly oppressive for China’s ethnic minorities and people living in Tibet and Xinjiang. However, the period marked a gradual increase in overall freedom in China. It corresponded with a time when ordinary Chinese citizens had a greater say in decisions affecting their daily lives. Civil society activity combined with local governments’ eagerness to deliver economic targets created space in which people could associate, voice their concerns, and even actively seek redress from the government, such as compensation for losses in land disputes. 

Around 2008–09, a number of events were precursors to a significant shift in the CCP’s approach that had an impact on political freedoms: the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, and an impending change in the senior leadership of the party. While the party continued to prioritize economic growth, its actions indicated an intention to limit growth and openness to only that sector, and to reassert party control of the social and political space, particularly at the grassroots level. Post-Olympics, there was a noticeable decline in enthusiasm for direct external influence in China. Avenues for free expression and civil society began to systematically close, and new laws restricting civil society activities emerged.  

Overall, it is striking how, despite massive economic advancement, China achieved very little progress in overall freedom during this period. When these data are compared to the East Asia & the Pacific regional average, China’s performance is truly underwhelming. The CCP missed the opportunity to leverage China’s economic growth to bring substantial improvements in the lives of its people and across various indices.  

The Index shows a very modest aggregate increase in economic freedom from 1996 to 2022. Economic freedoms increased quite dramatically from about 2002 to 2008. The relatively higher score on economic freedoms in China, compared to political and legal freedoms, corresponds with the government’s focus on economic development during this period, as described above, and the challenge faced by the CCP in maintaining its previous systems of control. As noted earlier, the privatization of state-owned industries, combined with newly opened commercial markets, provided Chinese citizens with a range of choices not previously available to them. Other factors contributing to the positive trend during this period included the protection of property rights and an increase in women’s economic freedom. Two things are striking in the data: First, after a sharp decline in overall economic freedom around 2009–10 (corresponding with the global financial crisis), economic freedoms did not reemerge—even as the Chinese economy grew to be the second largest in the world after 2010; Second, three of the four economic freedom trend lines remained quite static for several years after about 2004. Despite astounding economic growth, there was no significant subsequent change in the trajectory of economic freedom. This lack of progress is indeed noteworthy. 

In terms of political freedom, China starts on a lower score than for economic freedom, then remains relatively static until a sharp and consistent decline after Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013. It is worth noting the trends among the four indicators of the political freedom score; until about 2005, they each remain static or show modest improvements. After 2005, only legislative constraints on the executive improves while the other scores decline, civil liberties and political rights dramatically so. These trends again reflect the CCP’s manipulation of citizens’ rights to serve the party’s broader need for social control. As economic growth accelerated from the mid-1990s, the central government faced challenges in fulfilling the promise of the “iron rice bowl,” and had to delegate authority to local officials who themselves lacked clear solutions. The need for solutions to growing social challenges provided an opening for the rise of an independent civil society in China. The slight increases in the scores for civil liberties and political rights until 2005 reflect the extent to which ordinary citizens took matters into their own hands, working within their communities and networks to address local issues. This approach served the CCP’s needs: People saw solutions being delivered, which reduced discontent. The party could showcase its fulfillment of promises to provide support from cradle to grave. And the whole process served as a release valve for societal pressures, such as increasing inequality.  

However, this level of agency by citizens became untenable to the CCP, because it posed a threat to the party’s legitimacy and thus its level of control in the broader society. The fate of local elections in China exemplifies how this situation was handled by the center. The CCP had tolerated limited elections at the village level as part of the era of experimentation, but ultimately became concerned that this channel for popular opinion posed a threat to party power. Couching its concerns in nationalism and relying on long-standing suspicion of outside influence, the CCP branded elections as a foreign concept imposed on China with the purpose of destabilizing the country. As it sought to address internal threats to its authority, the CCP closely watched external developments as well, reacting strongly to the “color revolutions” that were altering the political landscape in Eastern Europe. By the mid-2000s, the party determined that the color revolutions stemmed from domestic CSOs manipulated by foreign actors, and determined to block this threat in China. The CCP instructed local authorities to regain control of the activities of CSOs, sharply reducing the civic and political space. Once Xi assumed power in 2013, the antagonism of the CCP to civil society in general, and its anxiety about the influence of “Western liberal ideas,” was articulated to party officials in an instruction known as “Document No. 9”. The CCP began to redefine the idea of civil society: no longer was it to be independent and separate from government, but instead it became a sector that was required to meet specific government criteria. The introduction of laws around nongovernmental organizations in 2017 further tightened the space, specifically banning political and religious organizations that did not meet government approval, and creating limitations that left little space for independent civil society to function.  

While the practice of rule of law in China has generally improved over the period of review, legal freedom has always been harnessed to serve the political goals of the CCP. The Chinese government has been particularly successful in using the legal system to support its political objectives, and will revert to “rule by law” when necessary. There were glimpses of judicial independence and effectiveness in the 1990s, largely as part of broader experiments occurring during that time. In particular, the CCP was aware that trust in the legal system played a crucial role in economic development. China’s early legal experiments aimed to address important questions: How could China achieve economic growth? And how could it attract companies and reassure people that China was a favorable place for doing business and supporting economic development? Yet even within the awareness of the need to foster legal trust, the party’s interpretation of the law always took precedence.  

The tightening of control by the CCP over various aspects of civic and political life from the mid-2000s also affected overall legal freedoms. The modest improvement in the corruption score reflects ongoing efforts by the party to address this issue. Corruption was a significant concern at all levels in China, touching almost all aspects of peoples’ daily lives and well-being. The party recognized this as “low-hanging fruit” and made tackling corruption a priority. With ample space to work at the local level, they aimed to bring this under control, resulting in positive outcomes. However, even this social good serves the CCP’s political ends, as seen in the most recent anti-corruption campaign targeting entrepreneurs such as Jack Ma, whose wealth and independence posed a threat to the party’s authority. Regarding security, it is notable that, while China devotes significant resources to its domestic security, the overall score on this indicator has remained unchanged. Despite the extensive use of surveillance technology to control the potential for political violence and terrorism, Chinese society remains restive. Official metrics present the appearance of security and stability, but ignore the underlying discontent, evidenced by the thousands of protests that occur regularly in China. This unrest does not imply complete insecurity, but it underscores the complexity of maintaining social order in the country. 

From freedom to prosperity

The data show that overall prosperity in China gradually increased until about 2014, after which it has remained basically static. Unsurprisingly, the most dramatic and sustained improvement has come in economic prosperity, with the data on income reflecting the country’s rapid economic growth. This should be recognized as a remarkable achievement by the CCP and the Chinese people. However, the reality is more complex, since this impressive aggregate achievement obscures the stark inequalities within the country that the data manifest in different ways. China’s economic growth has been uneven as urban areas were given priority and preferential treatment over rural areas. This has caused great and growing inequality; while gross domestic product (GDP) per capita may average out to an appearance of growth due to the immense scale of the Chinese economy, beyond the major cities and coastal areas China is a nation where many people still face significant poverty. And it is not only on economic metrics that China’s population experiences inequalities. The data from other charts underscore how disparities persist across different segments of the population. For an individual who falls outside the party’s accepted norms—such as belonging to a religious or ethnic minority group—quality of life is significantly worse than for the average person. While lack of progress on various forms of freedoms might be explainable by the party’s instincts to restrict liberties to maintain social controls, the inability of the CCP to deliver more equitable prosperity to all its citizens seems a squandered opportunity. 

For minority rights, while the Indexes only use religious discrimination as a proxy, broader classifications of “minority” would likely reflect similar trends. Looking at the trends on religious freedom, the modest improvements seen until about 2008 diminish considerably to the present day. Since the founding of the PRC, the CCP has made concerted efforts to assimilate religious communities, which has had a significant impact on the rights and well-being of religious minority groups. While the Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, in practice the party implements a “Sinicization” of religion, requiring that religious groups adhere to the prescribed rules and guidelines set by the state. This approach means that the state exerts considerable control over religious practices, limiting the freedoms and rights of religious minorities. The CCP utilizes a range of interventions, primarily using state-controlled religious organizations to redefine how religious practices are conducted, including censorship of religious texts, and managing how religious leaders are chosen. Deviations from the prescribed framework are met with reprisals such as closure of places of worship, harassment, and detention. The systematic detention of one million Uyghurs in “reeducation centers” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region represents the most extreme example of the CCP’s efforts to control the cultural and religious identities of minority groups.  

The provision of healthcare in China is one of the few measures in which the PRC has outperformed its regional peers. The party included healthcare as part of the services that the state provided under the concept of the “iron rice bowl.” Starting from a low baseline, the PRC experimented with a variety of approaches to improve the quality of and access to health across the country, including the use of “barefoot doctors” at the rural level. Improving healthcare and access to medical services was a relatively straightforward way for the party to demonstrate its dedication to the well-being of its citizens; reforms introduced in the early 2000s expanded healthcare coverage to almost all Chinese people. However, the PRC’s healthcare system must still serve the party’s interests: the suppression of information and miscommunication about the early phase of the coronavirus outbreak in 2019 revealed ongoing systemic flaws in the country’s health services. Persons with disabilities and those living with mental health disorders remain underserved in most of the country. 

China’s environment score reflects another issue on which the country has seen only limited improvement, despite the leadership’s grand commitments in policy and its investment in green technologies. China signed the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate, and the government expressed its intent to address environmental issues, including through pledges to cut emissions. However, the negative effects on citizens of pollution and environmental degradation result in ongoing protests and petitions against the government at all levels. There has been a significant crackdown on environmental activists and against any efforts to highlight environmental problems. CCP officials also seek to “manage” environmental indicators to suit the party’s needs. One striking example of this occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when officials in Beijing were concerned that air quality measurements would not meet international standards. A decision was made to suspend the activity of coal plants around Beijing, reduce the number of cars on the roads and shutter factories around the capital. These measures not only showed the seriousness of the pollution but also an utter disregard for the human cost associated with these efforts.  

In terms of education, China started from a relatively low base and has made significant investments and progress. Since the founding of the PRC, the government has focused on promoting literacy and access to education, somewhat mirroring its emphasis on health. This focus was a critical factor in the country’s economic success, producing an educated workforce that could drive economic modernization. However, as in other aspects of China’s development, there are significant in­equalities in the education system. Disparities follow existing lines of inequality in the country, for example between rural and urban areas, and this affects recruitment of teachers, access to education, and therefore future opportunities. The highly structured and competitive process for educational achievement creates tremendous pressure for students and their families, and leaves little room for independent, creative development. This may pose a challenge for the country as it seeks to move its economy beyond manufacturing to more advanced industries. 

The future ahead

As has been noted, the conclusions drawn from the data, overall, are underwhelming: despite phenomenal growth in GDP, Chinese people have seen only modest gains (if any) across a range of freedom and prosperity indices. Meanwhile, other East Asian and Pacific countries have improved their freedoms considerably, even with slower income growth; overall, they seem to do more with fewer resources to enhance their societies and systems. When viewed through this lens, it is hard not to lament a significant missed opportunity by the CCP to create a more modern and dynamic society, one that reflects the “Chinese dream” Xi Jinping asserts is within grasp. 

Of course, the CCP can argue that prioritizing economic growth over other factors was and remains the right choice for China, and that China’s citizens must continue to follow the party’s lead to ensure continued success in the future. If we accept that position, the question we need to address is whether the choices being made are sustainable. The data clearly point to a broader implication of China’s economic and social development: it has become more socially, economically, and politically complex. As the scores above demonstrate, the party has failed to share the benefits of the country’s upward economic trajectory equally among its citizens. The task of doing so will only become more challenging as the wants and needs of its citizens continue to diversify.  

I have major reservations about the viability of the current model, and several factors contribute to my skepticism. The economic turmoil during the COVID-19 pandemic has raised doubts about the effectiveness of the model, even though we lack sufficient data to draw definitive conclusions. But the most striking aspect of the data is the CCP’s commitment to an inherently unequal form of governance, particularly when it comes to individual and subgroup rights. The CCP frequently touts its collectivist approach, where the well-being of the collective outweighs individual freedoms. However, the data suggest a more selective approach: in this model, certain groups are favored at the expense of others. 

This type of inequality is not a new phenomenon within the CCP system. Historically, there have always been winners and losers, with the party elite and affiliated businesses reaping the rewards of extraordinary economic growth while the general population experienced more modest improvements. Yet, in the past, the wealth gap in China was often characterized as urban versus rural. What the data reveal is a shift towards absolute, rather than relative, inequality. There are clear losers in this system, including individuals and groups who have experienced a significant loss of freedoms. These groups include ethnic and religious minorities, the LGBTQ+ community, and those who advocate for more liberal—seen by the CCP as dangerous and foreign—ideals. 

This discrimination is not solely identity based; it is also about values and alignment with the CCP’s objectives. As we look forward, the situation appears to be deteriorating. As the CCP sees growing threats to its authority and control, pressure will increase on individuals and groups to conform to a more limited definition of acceptability or face forced assimilation. This trend is exemplified by the genocidal “reeducation” of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and in calls by party leaders in October 2023 for Chinese women to focus on family and traditional values. This shift towards a more rigid societal framework could lead to individuals being excluded from the benefits of society or, in the worst case, losing their social freedoms. The rapid expansion of surveillance technology and its use in determining the status of a “good citizen” provide the state with powerful tools to enforce its will. While these tactics have succeeded in managing dissent, they are likely only temporary fixes. Without substantial, systemic reform, the diverse wants and needs of Chinese people will continue to drive demands for change. 

Johanna Kao is the senior director for Asia-Pacific at the International Republican Institute and is concurrently a senior nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Her work is informed by more than twenty-five years’ experience in international political development, living in some of Asia’s most challenging and dynamic countries. Johanna is a graduate of the University of Chicago and received her LLM from the University of Hong Kong.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post China must spread its wealth to reach equality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Democracy and freedom are in crisis. Freedom House reports that democracy around the world has been in constant retreat for seventeen consecutive years.¹ In 2021, sixty countries experienced declines in their democracy score, while only twenty-five showed improvement. Today, the world is less democratic than it has been at any time since 1997. Concurrently, there has been a steep decline in support for democracy. In international surveys, 60 percent of respondents reported a positive view of democracy in the mid-1990s; the number now stands at 50 percent.²

The erosion of democracy is intertwined with a crisis of freedom. The most common path toward democratic decline is via the election of authoritarian leaders who then clamp down on media, dissent, and opposition forces.³ Censorship is on the rise and freedom of expression is in decline around the world, led by China, where government surveillance has intensified, aided by controls over media, social media, the Internet, and all kinds of nongovernmental organizations, including businesses.⁴ Similar trends are visible not only in countries like Iran and Russia, similarly recognized for their repressive regimes, but also in the Middle East, Hungary, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Mexico, and several countries in Africa. There is growing demand for Chinese technologies for surveillance, exports of which are growing around the world.⁵

The chapters in this handbook summarize these worrying developments in rich detail. While many of them also point in hopeful directions, there are reasons to worry that even worse times may be ahead for freedom and democracy. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have already intensified controls over free expression.⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic provided an excuse for many governments to further tighten the screws, and in several cases these controls have remained in place even after the pandemic subsided.⁷ All of this could be made worse if, as forecasted, refugee and immigrant flows increase rapidly as a result of global climate change and domestic politics in destination countries shifts further in a nativist-populist direction.

Even more worrying are two major economic and technological developments which will likely continue to push toward more intense authoritarianism. The first is the growing sense that millions (or even billions) of people are being left behind while a global elite are benefiting from economic growth and technological progress.⁸ This grievance has been central to the rise of left-wing and right-wing populist regimes in both established and nascent democracies, and this worrisome trend shows no sign of subsiding.⁹ The second is the rapid pace of advances in artificial intelligence (AI), which has been used for data collection on a massive scale by many governments and multinational corporations, and which has also enabled large-scale surveillance, as in China, Russia, and Iran. Although AI technology could be developed in less repressive ways, its current trajectory is concerning for democracy and liberty.

A simple framework

There is still much we do not know about the consequences for prosperity, inequality, and the future of democracy and freedom. I argue in the rest of this foreword that a simple framework—building on my 2019 book The Narrow Corridor, jointly written with James Robinson—may be useful to shed light on the problems of democracy and freedom, and point to pathways for developing institutions, norms, and practices for democratic rejuvenation.¹⁰

The main thesis of this framework can be summarized by Figure 1 below, which I borrow from the book.

This figure exposits some of the key social and political forces shaping state-society dynamics and their implications for democracy and freedom. The centerpiece of this approach is the relationship between the powers of the state and society. By the “power of the society,” which is depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 1, we mean the ability of society to organize collective action, act according to its norms and values, and participate in politics, even against opposition and repression from state institutions and elites (by “elites,” we refer to groups that wield disproportionate economic or political power). The vertical axis depicts the power of the state, which represents the relative capacity of state institutions and the power of economic and political elites who control the state and command the key roles in politics and the economy. State power has a repressive element, as it enables state institutions and elites to overwhelm and silence opposition and society at large, but also some positive aspects—because a more powerful state may provide better public services, collect useful information, resolve disputes, and handle societal problems.

In our framework, state-society relations determine the nature of political power. This is summarized by the three regions depicted in the figure. The region on the left is the “basin of attraction” of the “Despotic Leviathan,” which signifies a state that is despotic in the sense that it can implement policies or impose its wishes without input from society. The implied dynamics, reminiscent of a simplified version of Chinese political history, are inexorably toward lower levels of societal power. This is the reason why the trajectory indicated there moves gradually toward the vertical axis, where society’s power against the state reaches a minimum. 

The polar opposite of the despotic path is one where the state and its institutions are weak and society’s traditions and organizational capacity are strong. At first, this might appear as a remedy against state repression. In reality, it is also inimical to freedom. It impedes the development of political hierarchy, a precondition for the emergence and evolution of state institutions, including a legal system and regulatory rules that are essential for protecting individuals against predation, expropriation, and intimidation. Even when states do appear within this context, they are weak and, in fact, often absent from large parts of the territory they are supposed to control. James Robinson and I thus labeled them as “Absent Leviathans.” These dynamics lead toward even greater state weakness.

More interesting is the region in the middle: “the narrow corridor.” This corridor is defined by a balance of power between state and society. The trajectories in this region look very different than those outside of it. This, we argue, is the hallmark of a different type of state and different nature of political power. We label it the “Shackled Leviathan” to capture the notion that the state is still strong, but it is monitored, challenged, and controlled by society—and, ultimately, by democratic institutions.

The heart of our theory is that true democratic participation and liberty, as well as economic incentives encouraging innovation and experimentation, can only flourish within the corridor. The corridor itself, though precarious at the best of times, can be bolstered by societal mobilization and participation. Institutions matter, but neither a cleverly designed constitution nor the correct set of institutional guardrails are sufficient by themselves to protect the corridor, nor are they a true bulwark against threats to democracy. Put simply: democracy is seldom given to the people, and it is often taken; thus, democracy is almost always in need of defense by the people.

There is another important aspect to the corridor, emphasized by the direction of trajectories within it, contrasted with those outside. Outside of the corridor, historical dynamics are likely to weaken one party as they strengthen the other. Inside of the corridor, however, the capacities of both state and society can rise in tandem. There are two synergistic reasons for the mutually beneficial dynamics within the corridor. First, state and society are locked in a fairly balanced competition. As state institutions become stronger—for example, because of new exigencies—society strives to increase its own capacity in order to control the emboldened state. Second, when balanced in terms of their capacities, state and society can cooperate. For example, when institutions and societal mobilization mean that an upstart politician cannot immediately hijack the public budget or misuse information that state agencies collect, people will be more willing to allow greater taxation and information collection. The centerpiece of this state-society cooperation is a degree of trust between state institutions and the population at large.

Both the positive-sum state-society competition and the trust in institutions are fragile, however. Competition can easily spin out of control, and trust is easier to destroy than to build.

This framework also highlights why societal norms are so important. These norms determine the boundaries of what elites and the agents of the state are expected to do, and how much trust they can command. These norms also shape how society mobilizes and resolves its own differences in the service of organizing against elites and impositions from the state.

Norms themselves are shaped by broader cultural trends, and while The Narrow Corridor did not study cultural dynamics in detail, our more recent work has proposed a complementary framework for doing so.¹¹ This framework starts from the observation that no human society possesses an unambiguous and unchanging cultural structure. Rather, different human communities have a reservoir of “attributes,” which gel together in distinct ways to create different underpinnings of political and social behaviors. The importance of this perspective is that we should not think of culture as a hard constraint on democracy or freedom, but rather as the language through which ideas related to democracy, liberty, and inequality can be articulated. Nevertheless, there is persistence in culture. Once freedoms start to be sidelined, it becomes more difficult to build the cultural tools to defend them. Once trust between state and society is destroyed, it also becomes harder to generate the ideas and coalitions needed to rebuild it.

In The Narrow Corridor, James Robinson and I trace the history of many historical polities via these trajectories and explain what sorts of events can place a society inside or outside the corridor and what shapes its boundaries. Most importantly, the historical account reveals how the process of entering and traveling within the corridor is a slow, conflict-ridden process, and how trust between state and society develops gradually and often painfully over time—but also how this trust can be easily destroyed, and how competition can quickly turn zero-sum. 

The eclipse of democracy and freedom

What does this framework imply for the current difficulties and future prospects of democracy and freedom? Two complementary processes can be identified. First, societies inside of the corridor have experienced weakening democracies and intensifying clampdowns on freedoms. Second, Despotic Leviathans outside of the corridor have become more adept at defending their nondemocratic regimes against the counterbalancing powers of society, thanks to China’s rise, the use of AI and related technologies, and also because democracies themselves have become weaker. I now focus on the first process, returning to the second process later in this foreword.

The fact that support for democracy among the people has declined—rather than authoritarian leaders merely clamping down on democratic rights and freedoms against the people’s wishes—provides an important clue about the problems of democracy and freedom. The causes of this deteriorating support for democracy are explored in my joint work with Nicolás Ajzenman, Cevat Aksoy, Martin Fiszbein, and Carlos Molina.¹² We find that people who have experience with democratic institutions tend to support them. Hence, a history of democracy should boost people’s willingness to defend the regime. But a more detailed look at the data reveals that the relationship between democratic experience and support for democracy is far from unconditional. It is only people who have experience with successful democracies—meaning democracies that deliver the kinds of economic performance, public services, and outcomes that they desire—that support democracy. In fact, we found that people who live under unsuccessful democracies do not increase their support for these institutions at all. 

So, what is it that people want from democracies? Our results suggest several important dimensions of success: economic growth (democracies that get mired in economic crises do not garner support); peace and political stability (wars or instability are of course not what people want); control of corruption; good public services; and low inequality. These last three are particularly important, because they underpin one of the important pillars of trust between state and society, as emphasized by the framework in Figure 1. The cooperative, positive-sum relationship between state and society collapses when trust in democratic institutions is eroded. This becomes much more likely when democratic institutions malfunction, and especially when they enable malfeasance by public officials, fail to deliver basic public services, and cannot (or choose not to) control inequality.

I believe it is these dimensions in which democracies, and more generally societies, in or near the corridor, have failed in recent decades. There are several reasons for this failure. Some of them are technological, some of them economic, and some of them political. New technologies have favored the very well-educated elite both in industrialized and developing nations, and governments have not taken steps to redress these inequities. Economically, the rapid drive toward globalization, transmogrified by the rapid accession of China into the global trading order, has contributed to the same trends.

But even worse for democracy’s reputation has been the policy response to these trends. Neither technology nor globalization are acts of nature. They are choices that societies make about how to use existing scientific know-how, what types of new technologies to develop, and what kind of globalization to implement. In the case of industrialized nations, led by the United States, these were choices made by political and economic elites. Trust among the people was markedly undermined—especially for people who were not among the winners from these processes—because these decisions were made by an insular technocratic elite who kept claiming (with very vocal support from the mainstream media) that everybody would benefit from unlimited technological growth and expansive globalization. In the United States, nothing of the sort happened. For example, low-education households have seen their real incomes collapse since 1980. In several other industrialized nations, the trends are less clear-cut, but people in the bottom half of the income distribution did not receive much of the promised benefits. At the same time, the technocratic elite became more and more integrated with the business elite, convincing many that corruption was on the rise (whether this was true or not).

This collapse of trust in public institutions and public servants is inimical to life in the corridor, and it has been a major driver of eroding support for democracy. It has also been an important force toward declining respect for democratic rights and broader freedoms.

As democracy’s reputation has become tarnished in the West, this has created an opening for authoritarian regimes, led by China and Russia, to solidify control over their populations, with disastrous effects for freedom around the world.

If this account is correct, it is the failure of democratic institutions that is threatening the balance within the corridor. The corresponding declines in trust and support for democracy make the implications for future political regimes and myriad freedoms and rights especially dire.

Will it get worse?

There are at least three reasons to worry that the trends we are seeing could get worse.

First, there is no obvious end to the slide of demo­cratic norms around the world. As demo­cracies continue to perform poorly on many dimensions that their citizens care about and as powerful auto­cracies, such as China and Russia, expand their global reach and propaganda, it would be quixotic to hope for an immediate turnaround. Historical evidence is consistent with the idea that, once waves of democracy start, they go on for a while.¹³ Likewise, once the decline of democracy is underway, we may see further slides for quite some time.

Second, the key forces that have led to the benefits of prosperity not being shared equally are still present. As Simon Johnson and I argue in Power and Progress,¹⁴ the main factor leading to growing inequality and lack of wage growth around the world has been the use of digital technologies to drive workplace automation and worker disempowerment. With recent advances in generative AI, these forces may have gone into overdrive. While there is nothing inherent in the nature of AI that should make it always eliminate labor and increase inequality, our current technological trajectory is toward automation and a reduced role of labor across diverse sectors of the economy.¹⁵ If this technological trend continues, it will exacerbate the failure of democracies to create shared prosperity. Although certain aspects of globalization may have slowed down, the role of multinational corporations and other dimensions of global integration are likely to increase, which could create another set of forces toward unshared prosperity.¹⁶

Third, AI also has direct impacts on democracy, which will likely exacerbate democratic tensions in the years to come. As mentioned above, this is both because AI is being used increasingly skillfully by autocratic regimes to quell discontent and demand for democratic rights,¹⁷ but even more fundamentally, it is because AI is distorting political communication and discourse in electoral democracies around the world.¹⁸ The role of Facebook and other social media platforms in fostering filter bubbles and polarization and fomenting partisanship and misinformation during the 2010s is now well understood. There are concerns that, with advances in generative AI, even worse practices will take root in the new social media ecosystem.¹⁹

While several political, economic, and technological trends may augur hard times for democracy and freedom, there is one small silver lining suggested by the framework in The Narrow Corridor: leaving the corridor is not permanent, and countries that have recently lost the balance between state and society will also be the ones where this balance is still partly present. As conditions change, and as pro-democracy forces and measures strengthen the demand for democratic and civil rights, it is possible to reenter the corridor. For example, after the murderous, totalitarian Nazi regime in Germany, the country was able to rebuild a balance between state and society and develop fairly healthy democratic institutions in the postwar era.²⁰ The same perspective provides some hope that, even as we are witnessing the slide of democratic norms and institutions, rebuilding them is a possibility.

What to do?

Almost all of the chapters in this book suggest ideas to rejuvenate freedom. Let me add to these valuable insights by summarizing some perspectives from the framework presented here.

To put it simply, the best way to counter the current pernicious trends is to create another wave of democracy, similar to the one witnessed after the collapse of military dictatorships in Southern Europe in the 1970s. But how?

There is no surefire way of achieving something so ambitious. But I would like to briefly present a couple of ideas.

• Rebuild support for democracy. Democracy is nothing without people’s support. The first step in improving the future of democracy and freedom is to rebuild support for democracy within democratically governed populations, then hope that these ideas will spread around the world. In my assessment, the only way this can be achieved is by democracy performing better, at least starting in a number of key places, such as the United States, Western Europe and Latin America. Democracies in these ideological battlegrounds need to show that they deliver in terms of economic growth, shared prosperity, control of corruption, and responsiveness to people’s needs and wishes. The role of shared prosperity here cannot be overemphasized. Democracy will continue to lose support if it is seen as the handmaiden of a two-tiered society in which a small group of elites benefits from economic growth and technological change while the rest become increasingly dependent.
• Trust in institutions. Concurrently, democratic institutions need to foster people’s trust. This again starts with performance. But procedures matter too. One of the reasons why democracies started losing people’s trust and support is because of an error of “technocracy.” Increasingly, many segments of the population are becoming disillusioned with democracies because they think that, under the veneer of democracy, a small group of technocrats, in cahoots with economic and political elites, runs the show. This state of affairs is not conducive to trust in institutions or support for democracy. To get out of this situation is certainly not easy, especially after democratic norms have become weakened. Sidelining experts and expertise from policy making, or enabling the emergence of a tyranny of the majority that could damage civil rights and minority rights, would certainly be disastrous for broad freedoms. The solution then must be sought in democratizing procedures subject to well-articulated constraints. The alternative to technocracy should thus not be viewed as “mob rule,” but as institutions that are truly responsive to people’s needs and concerns. These institutions should be built and should function within well-defined and communicated constraints, set by constitutions, and a firm commitment to minority and human rights.
• The right kind of empowerment for civil society. The framework in The Narrow Corridor puts special emphasis on the role of civil society. The weakening of democratic norms and freedoms around the world has coincided with civil society becoming either weaker, as in many autocratic regimes, or more polarized, as in the United States and Western Europe.²¹ We need the right kind of empowerment for civil society, which means civil society becoming a true bulwark in the defense of freedoms and democracy. This must start with civil society organizations (CSOs) themselves recognizing that they should not be an instrument to suppress rights and freedoms. The tragedy in much of Western Europe and the United States today is that several CSOs have become active participants in banning free speech or silencing alternative voices.²² The right kind of civil society empowerment must start with a strong commitment to freedom of speech. All other concerns, including the fact that some groups may feel uncomfortable when certain ideas are expressed, must be subservient to this principle. It is only then that CSOs can be a true force against state repression and elite dominance and can help rebuild freedom and democracy.

Daron Acemoglu is an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also a fellow of NAS, APS, BAS, AAAS; the winner of BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge Award, Nemmers Prize, Global Economy Prize, A.SK Prize, CME Prize, and John Bates Clark Medal; and the author of New York Times bestseller Why Nations Fail (with James Robinson); The Narrow Corridor (with James Robinson); and Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity (with Simon Johnson).

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Foreword: Creating another wave of democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

In his treatise The Road to Serfdom Friedrich Hayek argues that the abandonment of classical liberalism leads to a loss of freedom, the creation of an oppressive society, and in some cases the tyranny of a dictator. Several contemporary political leaders fit with Hayek’s foreboding picture, among them Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China. In times of crisis, as during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, societies naturally demand new protections from their governments. These protections enhance security at the expense of freedom. The history of previous crises—be they economic, social, or due to wars and natural disasters—teaches us that such limits to freedom tend to remain in place long after the original purpose of regulation or state intervention has abated, and that this sometimes leads to the path Hayek predicted.

The world has experienced a sequence of significant crises in the past dozen years—the Great Recession in 2009–12, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the COVID-19 pandemic, and most recently the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war—and governments have substantially increased their reach in economic and social life during these years. This expansion of the role of government challenges traditional liberal views on the foundations of freedom, and necessitates a new look at basic questions.

In designing policies to increase prosperity, one must also acknowledge challenges to standard economic theory, which predicts that, as societies become richer, more educated, and economically more developed, they should also experience a particular path of political institutional developments—that is, they become more democratic, increase respect for civil and human rights, and develop several other societal features we commonly associate with Western democracies. China is the most obvious challenge to this theory, but there are others, even in relatively prosperous European societies like Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, as well as Latin American countries like Venezuela.

There is another worrying issue, too. The effectiveness of public institutions depends on the trust that citizens and businesses bestow upon them. However, in the last two decades trust in government has continuously fallen around the world, including in the advanced economies (Figure 1). Civic engagement helps people extend their trust from their familiar circle to include public institutions as well. While there is a long history of civic engagement at the local level in many developing economies, disruptions due to decolonization and war have made it difficult to replicate Europe’s results in participatory democracy to these economies.

Figure 1. Trust levels, global results (2020)

The concern that comes out most often in country studies is over personal security. This concern comes through in countries at war like Ukraine or parts of Africa; in countries with high levels of gang violence, as in Brazil or several Central American nations; and in countries where political polarization brings about crimes and discrimination against minority groups, as in China or India. This dichotomy—between declining trust in government while requiring more government to ensure security—is the principal trade-off that has evolved in recent times. New technologies are increasingly used by governments to analyze individuals’ behavior, in the name of enhancing security. Such analyses disrupt the standard concept of personal privacy and can easily become tools in an oppressive society. Examples in China and the Middle East suggest that social protest or dissent, even as benign as views expressed on social media, is identified through the use of spying technologies, and is quickly stifled.

The importance of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center is in identifying policies that build trust in government institutions while protecting personal freedom. Such policies are couched in political, economic, and legal reform. The task for governments is to disseminate the reasons for these policies being implemented and their likely impact on prosperity. This analysis helps policymakers and influencers in developing countries, as well as other organizations and individuals who are trying to expand freedoms through incremental or fundamental change towards prosperity.

This volume brings together the insights of some of the world’s leading economists and diplomats into how countries and regions pursue steps towards prosperity. Often these steps to prosperity ignore the role of freedom, but there is always an implicit association or algorithm connecting policies to freedoms—or the abandonment of those freedoms—and prosperity. This is precisely the goal of the Atlantic Council’s project: to document this algorithm and derive the success stories associated with it. In doing so, we hope to identify the roads politicians travel to attain prosperity. 

This chapter is organized as follows: First, we summarize the views of eminent economic scholars and foreign policy experts on what the future may hold for some large countries and regions. We have chosen case studies where we see interesting dynamics that may affect global prosperity—be it because those countries and regions are large and home to significant portions of the world’s population, or because their policies affect neighboring countries and regions. Second, we describe four worrying trends related to raising prosperity. Finally, we suggest some directions for future work to convince politicians and influencers of the link between freedom and prosperity.

Likely issues in the next decade

In this section we summarize the views of contributors to this volume on the likely direction of change towards freedom and prosperity in the next decade. We list countries and regions alphabetically, though their respective dynamics may be quite diverse. These countries and regions are chosen for analysis as they represent a large share of the world’s population. Their policies often affect the global consensus on significant prosperity-related debates too.

Africa 

Economic liberalization across Africa has borne fruit in the past decade and further financial and trade integration with the rest of the world would have continued benefits, argues William Easterly. The big challenge is to strengthen the process of democratization and institution building. The necessary reforms in these areas are harder to accomplish. The recent wave of military coups in countries like Burkina Faso, Gabon, Niger, Mali, and Sudan is a worrying sign, and there is ongoing conflict associated with Islamic movements in some areas, for example, in Nigeria. The resolution of conflict and the maintenance of peace and security are crucial necessary conditions for further development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is unlikely that international institutions and foreign countries will provide as much support for African development as in the past. Things tend to go in cycles: there was a lot of support and attention for African development in the 1990s and 2000s, though foreign support was not all that successful in achieving economic growth; foreign aid did receive some of the credit for the progress on health and education, however. Since then, the focus has shifted to other parts of the world, like Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and the situation in Israel and Gaza is also drawing attention towards the Middle East.

In terms of Sub-Saharan African development, the Belt and Road Initiative, led by China, is having similarly disappointing results to the significant funding received from Western nations during the 1980–2010 period. The same problems of debt repayment and default are likely to be repeated with China’s investments. At the end of the day, for foreign investment and aid to successfully affect Africa’s economic development, it has to be directed to some productive uses. And this is not usually the case as this kind of financing is heavily politicized.

Finally, within-region trade is unusually low for neighboring countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. But increasing it is certainly not an easy task, as the several unsuccessful attempts to promote free trade areas or common currencies in the region in the last couple of decades attest. This failure may be due to Africa’s burden of having so many small states, creating divisiveness. This generates great difficulties in reaching agreements because there is a multitude of strong political interests that do not trust each other.

Argentina 

The economic situation has materially worsened in recent times. Weekly inflation at the end of November 2023 is running at 3.1 percent, which implies an annualized rate of 230 percent. That is, Argentina is experiencing in a week the level of inflation that normal countries see in a year. Related to this, Argentina’s poverty rate in 2023 was close to 42 percent of the population.

It is understandable that the Argentinian people are frustrated, and are looking for someone new, outside of the traditional parties, argues Guido Sandleris. It seems like a revival of the mantra “¡Que se vayan todos!” (They all must go!) of 2001. And the new man that Argentinians have chosen as president is Javier Milei, an outsider to the traditional political system of Argentina. His ascent makes the prospects for the next few years highly uncertain.

Like many other politicians, Milei has identified real problems in the country (inflation, high and inefficient public spending, political capture, corruption, and so on), and has proposed a series of easy-sounding solutions. And the Argentinian people have voted for this project. Nonetheless, it is obvious that solutions will be anything but easy, and Milei has already walked back on some of his positions. Dollarization is the obvious example, as there are just not enough dollars in the Argentinian Central Bank to dollarize the economy, at least in the short run. Furthermore, Milei’s position in the national congress is weak, so to enact legislation, he needs to build consensus with the traditional parties around more moderate proposals. Cutting public spending is always unpopular, so it is highly uncertain whether President Milei can get enough parliamentary support on that front to push forward proposals.

The touchstone of President Milei’s administration is going to be the macroeconomic situation, which is extremely delicate. Argentina is on the verge of hyperinflation, and a situation in which the economy basically stops. It is likely that some of Milei’s reforms to tackle inflation in the medium term, like the correction in utility prices and the exchange rate, will actually generate a rise in prices in the short run. He will only be successful if he can offer a fiscal anchor to the economy, and make credible the commitment of the Central Bank to stop printing money to finance the Treasury; this is not an easy task.

Brazil 

The private sector in Brazil faces a huge number of hurdles, according to José Scheinkman. Taxes are high and inefficient. Firms are more worried about paying less tax than producing in a more efficient way, because it does not pay. Regulations in Brazil are especially inefficient and there are important difficulties regarding long-term financing, related to the legal risks and fiscal deficits in the country. The labor market is rigid and President Lula announced plans to impose new labor regulations in 2024. If adopted, such regulation dims the overall economic prospects for Brazil.

Security is a fundamental challenge for Brazil. In particular, this concern refers to the opening of a new route for drug trafficking—from Latin American producers in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia into Europe—through Brazil. As a result of this illegal activity, some Brazilian gangs are becoming powerful and fight with each other for control of the routes, increasing crime. For the first time in decades, paramilitary groups are appearing. These groups are more organized than the gangs and they have started to harass legal businesses. Paramilitary groups also control part of the logistics and construction sectors.

Some policies ease the burden on legal businesses, like the tax reform that the government is preparing for 2024. It is hoped that this reform will simplify the tax code and eliminate various exceptions and loopholes that benefit businesses with links to politicians. Brazil has the cleanest energy mix of any large emerging economy, thanks to its abundant water and solar resources. The government is dealing effectively with the illegal deforestation going on in the Amazon. This can make Brazil the biggest exporter of goods that have a positive climate footprint. Finally, the largest corruption scandal in Brazil’s history—surrounding the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht, which admitted guilt in a cash-for-contracts corruption scandal in twelve countries—has resulted in more trust in prosecutorial authorities and cleaner public procurement.

Chile 

Chile has two big challenges in the coming decade, one economic and one political, writes Andrés Velasco. The big economic challenge is that Chile is not a fast-growing economy anymore. That is a big structural break. Productivity growth, which was very fast late in the twentieth and early twenty-first century, has gone down. Investment rates have not dropped, but nor have they increased. Chile was a country with a large diversification of exports, and that diversification process has come to a halt. When it comes to prosperity, the big question is: Why was the fast-growth period in Chile so short-lived?

Economic theory predicts that, as a country becomes richer, its growth slows due to a convergence process. But we would have expected fast growth in Chile until the country’s standards of living had reached the level of South Korea, for example. Instead, fast growth seems to have stopped with living standards only at the level of Greece. 

Regarding inequality, the country has slowly improved in the last few decades, despite the really poor initial level of this indicator. But there is high uncertainty regarding the potential medium-term effects of the events of recent years. In particular, the very lengthy school closures that Chile imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic seem to be exacerbating inequality of opportunity. Most Latin American countries closed their schools for longer than European countries, but even within the region, Chile’s restrictions lasted longer than most. And this decision worsened inequality. If you had a good internet connection and your school could teach online, then the loss of learning was minimal. But if all you had was one bad internet connection via somebody’s cell phone, and the school was not well equipped to teach online, then nearly two years of school closure is clearly detrimental for the development of human capital and for equality in the future.

The big political challenges have to do with the sociopolitical climate. Chile was a consensual country in the years between the return of democracy in 1990 and around 2010. Since then, politics has become polarized. Power has become a lot more fragmented. Chile went from having seven parties in Congress to twenty-two. If you look at indices of satisfaction with the performance of democracy, or indices of trust in government, political parties, the judiciary, the police, the media, business lobbies, unions, and so on. they have all deteriorated. It seems that Chileans do not trust anyone anymore. That is a worldwide trend, but in Chile it might be a little more pronounced. The big question is: How do you restore politics?

Chile’s answer has been to try to rewrite the social contract: the Constitution. Politicians have tried twice already and failed, and the third time is not looking good. President Bachelet drafted a new constitution in her second term, but she ran out of time to get it approved. A constitutional convention was chosen in 2021, which wrote a terrible text that was rejected by 62 percent of voters a little over a year ago, and a new convention was elected. And Andrés Velasco’s prediction was correct. In December 2023, Chileans rejected again the proposed changes to the Constitution.

China 

China is missing the chance to create a more dynamic society—the “Chinese dream.” Meanwhile, other East Asian countries have improved their freedoms considerably, despite slower income growth. They seem to do more with fewer resources to enhance their societies’ prosperity, argues Johanna Kao.

The primary question the Chinese government needs to address in the next decade is whether the policy choices being made are sustainable. The economic turmoil during the COVID-19 pandemic has reduced public trust in the effectiveness of the Chinese growth model. The most striking aspect of the evidence is the government’s commitment to an inherently unequal form of governance, particularly when it comes to individual and subgroup rights. While China is often described as having a collectivist approach, where the well-being of the collective outweighs individual freedoms, the data suggest a more selective approach to collectivism. In Xi Jinping’s model of government, certain groups are favored at the expense of others.

This type of inequality is not a new phenomenon in China. Historically, there have always been winners and losers, with the party elite and affiliated businesses reaping the rewards of extraordinary economic growth while the general population experienced more modest improvements. Yet, in the past, the wealth gap in China was often characterized as urban versus rural. In the past decade there has been a shift towards absolute, rather than relative, inequality. There are clear losers in this system: individuals and groups that have experienced a significant loss of freedoms. 

As we look into the next decade, equality seems likely to deteriorate, with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) representation of the collective shrinking. These dynamics put pressure on individuals to conform to a more limited definition of acceptability or face forced assimilation. The trend is exemplified in regions like Xinjiang, where the Uyghurs are subject to extreme reeducation efforts. The rapid expansion of surveillance technology in the name of security, and its use in determining whether people meet the imposed standard of a “good citizen,” are likely to make things worse.

East Asia and the Pacific 

The region unveils a narrative deeply intertwined with historical events and ongoing geopolitical shifts writes Amb. (ret.) Kelley E. Currie. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1988–89, a wave of democratization swept through East Asia and the Pacific. However, progress stagnated thereafter, with democratization efforts in countries like Indonesia not significantly altering the overall political landscape at a regional level. 

The period from 2012 onward witnessed visible improvements in political and economic freedom, primarily attributed to Myanmar’s quasi-democratic transition and increased political dynamism in Malaysia. However, China’s economic growth, accompanied by limited political liberalization, took a downturn after 2013 with Xi Jinping’s ascension to power, exerting downward pressure on freedom across the region. This pressure is exacerbated by China’s internal policy shifts and its external influence on neighboring countries’ democratic and economic development.

Notably, the region saw significant progress in women’s economic freedom, driven by efforts to enhance female workforce involvement and dismantle regulatory barriers. This progress, spearheaded by initiatives like the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative, has played a pivotal role in driving economic growth in the region.

Despite economic resilience, challenges persist in areas such as inequality, minority rights, weak political institutions, corruption, and regression in the rule of law. The region’s youth population increasingly demands responsive political systems and sustainable growth, highlighting the need for environmental preservation and pragmatic solutions.

In navigating the complex landscape of freedom and prosperity, regional cooperation and support from global allies are paramount. Strengthening institutions and building political and economic resilience remain imperative, ensuring stability and prosperity amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics and internal challenges.

Egypt 

Egypt will have to navigate difficult macroeconomic challenges in the next few years. The country is heavily indebted, and that may tilt the scales of an already worrisome sociopolitical situation, says Rabah Arezki. In the December 2023 elections, President al-Sisi will be reelected and there will be no appetite for political reforms. While his reelection should give him a mandate for reform, it is unlikely that al-Sisi will make any changes that affect crony or military interests. Instead, al-Sisi might have to resort to further devaluation of the currency, which would ignite further inflation and hurt vulnerable households. What is more, this would create a fatal currency mismatch when it comes to Egypt’s external debt denominated in foreign currency. 

Al-Sisi will have to find external sources of financing outside of capital markets, given the prohibitive spread on external borrowing. Financial aid from Gulf countries, which typically provided a lifeline, is no longer forthcoming. Gulf countries are looking to invest in strategic assets but also want to see reforms before doing more to support the country. Gulf partners are counting on the International Monetary Fund to push for more market-oriented reforms. 

While political reforms are unlikely given the current circumstances, deep economic reforms also seem improbable. Indeed, the militarization of politics and of the economy is so entrenched as to make reform of either one unlikely. This stalled situation will likely continue to limit Egypt’s potential. It is imperative that the country re-embarks on a balanced economic and political transition, to avoid the youth becoming frustrated and creating domestic instability. 

The geopolitical situation is also tense. The renewed escalation of violence between Israel and Gaza is spilling over into Egypt. That could destabilize the country and in turn spill over to the whole Middle East and North Africa region.

The European Union

The next decade of European Union (EU) freedom and prosperity dynamics will be marked by the war in Ukraine, writes Simeon Djankov. The EU has committed enormous financial resources to supporting Ukraine’s fight against the aggressor. It has also imposed sectoral and economy-wide sanctions on Russia. These sanctions have negative implications for some industries in Europe, which have traditionally relied on resources from Russia.

The main influence of Russia’s war in Ukraine is the rethinking of the Green Deal that the European Commission has championed for the past decade. Given Russia’s threats to Europe’s energy security, a decision was taken in 2022 to reduce the dependence on Russian energy products. With only two countries—Bulgaria and Hungary—receiving postponement of these measures to 2024, Europe has quickly weaned itself off Russian oil and gas. This change, however, has come at an environmental cost: a number of countries have increased the use of coal and other high-polluting sources of energy. 

The past decade has shown evidence that Europe cannot multitask—perhaps the hallmark of gradual consensus building among twenty-seven member states—appearing to focus on one item at a time. When it comes to increasing freedoms, the clear task at hand is helping Ukraine win the war.

Europe’s prosperity agenda is fourfold: First, there are wide disparities across regions within Europe. This disparity is seen within countries, for example southern versus northern Italy, and across countries, for example Scandinavia versus southeastern Europe. A significant portion of the EU budget is directed to reducing these disparities, through investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and regional economic development. Such financial aid needs to be coupled with policies that increase economic freedom at the regional level. For example, decentralization of some tax policies, combined with explicit subsidy schemes, will keep more resources in underdeveloped regions and thus attract businesses and individuals who would otherwise look for opportunities in more advanced parts of the EU.

Second, increased prosperity in the EU comes from completing the internal markets for energy and financial services. These topics were discussed even before the 2014 annexation of Crimea, which ushered in a series of crisis years for the EU. 2024 is a good moment to go back to the original design and create a single energy market in Europe, as well as a single financial market, with a single set of regulators. Much has been written and discussed about how to achieve these goals; now is the time to act.

Third, migration has been at the forefront of European politics for the past decade. It promises to remain an issue in the decade to come. On the one hand, Europe’s demographics are such that the labor market benefits from human capital coming into European countries and putting their labor and talents to productive use. On the other hand, social tensions have risen in the countries that have received large numbers of migrants. Even in countries with relatively few migrants, the specter of competition for social services and jobs has boosted the fortunes of nationalist parties that have promised to erect barriers to further migration. This issue inflames public opinion in Europe to a degree that no other issue does.

Finally, prosperity in Europe emanates from open markets. While the European market itself is large, many innovations and technologies come from either the American or Asian markets. The two other superpowers—the United States and China—have been on a collision course in asserting their economic dominance, leaving Europe to choose how to align in the global picture. So far this path has meandered, with calls for protecting Europe’s own market. Such an isolationist approach is counterproductive. Europe has to remain as open as possible, assimilating leading innovations and creating the space to implement these new ideas into better production processes and products.

India 

The evolution of political freedom in India is worrisome, posits Pratap Bhanu Mehta. There is a high probability that political freedoms might decline even more in the next decade. The way in which the Modi government has empowered hate speech against minorities and co-opted the judiciary is concerning.

It is the first time since 1975 that we must ask the question: Will there be a smooth transition of power? If it looks like this government is struggling and could lose the election, will it accept that transition of power as smoothly as India is used to? There is a catch-22: if this government wins, the majoritarian consolidation will be a continued threat to political freedom. But if it looks like it could lose, then the chances of it resorting to extra-legal means to either hold on to power or making sure that the successive government is not able to function have risen considerably. There is already evidence of this behavior in state elections which the ruling party has been losing. In many of them, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is deploying the central government’s power to break up the state governments that have been elected.

On the prosperity front, there are reasons to be optimistic. Large sectors of Indian capital and foreign investors have learned to live with limits to political freedom. If they can make money, they will continue operating in India. An open question is whether improving prosperity will be enough to overcome the structural problem of the middle 40 percent of the population in terms of income distribution. This conundrum makes the politicians’ jobs harder. The opposition is struggling to align deep economic discontent with voting in elections.

Kenya 

One of the critical issues that Kenya faces in the next decade is how to keep improving productivity, says Robert Mudida. An obvious area for improvement is manufacturing and its share in gross domestic product (GDP), which in 2023 was slightly below 10 percent. Kenya should double that share. There is a big opportunity in Africa with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It would create tremendous opportunities for countries like Kenya, which have some manufacturing bases. Bigger markets can generate productivity improvements.

An important challenge for Kenya relates to the large share of informal employment. Moving some of these workers and firms towards formalization will ensure that economic opportunity and development are more stable. Higher levels of formal employment and production generate larger and more stable sources of government revenue. This will buttress the already firm fiscal consolidation path that Kenya has followed in recent years.

The current account deficit has also been declining in the last decade, partly because of reduced imports, but also due to stronger and more competitive exports. This is a very promising path for Kenya, which needs to take advantage not only of regional value chains, but also global value chains in areas like tourism. It helps that Kenya is perceived as peaceful and secure in comparison with some of its neighbors.

Mexico 

Mexico continues to maintain key technical and autonomous institutions, which have made it resilient to affronts to political, legal, and economic freedoms, writes Vanessa Rubio-Márquez. These institutions have helped sustain a basic level of prosperity. However, the negative developments in some of the indicators serve as early warning signs for the country. Some point to the uneven path forward if the country wants to advance towards the next stage in democratic consolidation and progress in well-being standards. These can be summarized in three clear pillars: strong institutions, high sustained growth, and well-articulated redistribution policies.

Mexico remains a bastion of free trade in Latin America and is in a strategic position, being the United States’ largest trading partner. Amid US-China decoupling, gains from nearshoring could be significant. This has mostly materialized into expectations, however, and only very recently into actual investment commitments. Expectations cannot materialize into more significant commitments if the institutional framework continues to weaken. In many ways, Mexico has de jure maintained the institutions and legal framework to support political, economic, and legal freedoms—including an independent central bank, an autonomous Supreme Court of Justice, and an independent National Electoral Institute. But a de facto deterioration is clearly occurring in the form of political appointees to key autonomous institutions, budget and staff cuts, and a centralization of power under the president, all of which are impacting growth and prosperity.

In this sense, pendular politics remains a significant risk to institutions and continuity of sound evidence-based policy making. The country heads to the polls in June 2024 and the signs of polarization have not wavered. While disagreement and debate are essential components of a healthy democracy, the current discourse in the country is all but constructive, and radical shifts in policy put at risk the possibility of high sustained growth and well-being improvements more broadly.  

High sustained growth and strong institutions are therefore prerequisites before considering redistribution policies; if they are not in place, the country is likely to continue on a path of uneven progress. After unlocking high sustained growth, the country can turn to enhancing institutional capacity to deliver and redistribute gains—and the country has a good track record of institutional capacity for infrastructure and redistribution policies. The risk here then is that the country continues on a path of discontinuity, with every incoming administration embarking on pet infrastructure projects and unfocused social policy.

The Middle East and North Africa

Over the next decade, countries in the Middle East will have to grapple with economic and political transitions in a world in mutation. To achieve freedom and prosperity, countries in the region will have to face risks linked to geopolitics, climate change, and the transformation of energy markets, as well as social polarization, argues Rabah Arezki.

The region is at a tipping point when it comes to conflict escalation. Indeed, the alarming intensity and casualties resulting from the conflict between Israel and Hamas risk engulfing the whole region. This new phase of escalation of violence brings not only tragic loss of lives but also physical destruction, fear, and uncertainty. This renewed violence will have far-reaching economic and social consequences. What is more, the Palestinian issue is an important fault line between the Global North and the Global South, one that could have global repercussions and pull the region further apart.

The region is most exposed to the existential threat posed by climate change. Climate change is simply making this region unlivable at a faster rate than any other. Specifically, a water crisis is looming in the Middle East, heightening domestic tensions and interstate conflicts. Temperatures have reached record highs. And the crisis is made worse by the inadequate governance of the water and other utilities sectors, which has exacerbated the frustration of the citizenry over poor public services.

The region also needs to transition away from fossil fuels. Oil prices have been persistently high and provided some respite to the many oil-exporting countries in the region. Yet, as the world moves away from fossil fuels, the vast reserves of oil and natural gas with which the Middle East is endowed will become stranded—and so will the capital investment in the sector. Several Middle Eastern countries have embarked on ambitious diversification programs to move away from oil, though as yet there is little to show for these efforts. Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic and social transformation agenda, if successful, could be a game-changer for the region and offer a model for other countries to emulate.

A credible economic and social transformation agenda is long overdue to meet the aspirations of an educated youth and to absorb the millions of young women into the labor market. The abortive political transitions have, however, polarized societies in the region. Two sides stand in opposition, with the people on streets who continue to protest on one side, and the political elites and crony capitalists on the other.

Pakistan 

The defining question for Pakistan’s near-term future will be around political stability, comments Ali Cheema. Even though the country has been involved in a transition towards democracy since 2013, it has been full of political instability. The 2013 election results were not accepted by the opposition, leading to protests in the streets, and the same happened after the 2018 election. This political instability is concomitant with the deterioration of political freedom in the country, making Pakistan a much more repressive society. And political tensions generate policy instability, with politicians’ and bureaucrats’ incentives to reform and create state capacity being significantly diminished. The ensuing uncertainty around the regulatory framework represents a major constraint on Pakistan’s development. Today we observe a breakdown of the consensus over the electoral process, which sometimes means that transitions of power do not take place within the timeframe mandated in the Constitution.

Russia 

The prospects for Russia are determined by the evolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin’s regime entered a declining stage even before the beginning of the war, which is typical of authoritarian and personalistic regimes, argues Konstantin Sonin. It is the last stage, after a period of stagnation, where every effort of the regime is devoted to maintaining power. Even before 2020, political repression was very substantial. There were tens of thousands of people leaving the country every year because they feared arrest if they said something “wrong” on social media, for example.

For Russia, there is no easy way out of the war, nor from Putin’s authoritarian rule. Change in any personalistic regime is always dramatic and turbulent, and even if a lot of the same people still hold power, it always implies substantial changes. It was the same after the death of Stalin.

There is an upside to dramatic change, because when Putin is gone, the new leadership will be able to do some things that will represent an immediate improvement for Russia. For example, any new leadership can withdraw the Russian troops from the occupied territories. And talks about lifting economic sanctions and reopening trade will immediately follow. Some companies that left Russia will quickly return, but this return may not generate a huge economic boom, as the loss of growth potential due to the war is substantial. Nonetheless, it will represent an immediate improvement over the status quo. But in the near term, as long as the war continues, Russia will suffer further decreases in every dimension of prosperity.

Saudi Arabia 

The Kingdom’s transformation agenda is a form of state-led capitalism. The political structure remains unchanged while the leadership focuses on reforming the economy, writes Rabah Arezki. There is no tolerance for any dissent, including on social media, where users are monitored closely using surveillance technology. The notion that economic transformation can happen independently of political transformation is certainly taking a page out of China’s book. This approach may badly backfire.

Despite the absence of political freedom, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has managed to rally the population behind him. Unlike many other leaders in the Middle Eastern region, MBS is popular. In fact, he enjoys a level of popularity that was last experienced by leaders immediately following independence. Such cohesiveness could create momentum for the Kingdom to enact further bold reforms. Yet the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas risks derailing the transformation agenda, as a result of the heightened uncertainty. While MBS has thus far navigated the new geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether Saudi Arabia’s situation in the region will remain tenable. 

Most if not all investments pertaining to the transformation agenda are financed with public money. That public money will eventually run out, as the world economy moves decisively away from fossil fuels. A true test of the sustainability of the economic transformation agenda is whether reforms will attract (domestic and foreign) private investments instead of public investments. All in all, the Kingdom’s unbalanced transformation, focused on the economic (and social) dimensions, may prove short-lived as more and more educated youth will demand more political freedom.

South Africa  

In South Africa, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic brought about stringent health restrictions, arguably among the strictest worldwide, including severe lockdowns and limitations on movement. The measures, intended to curb the virus’s spread, led to a notable decline in civil liberties protection, compounded by proposed legislation aiming to curtail civil society’s activities, argues Greg Mills. This decline in legal freedom has been accentuated since 2008, marked by efforts to consolidate power within the criminal justice system, raising concerns about bureaucracy quality and corruption.

South Africa’s recent development trajectory has seen a decline in prosperity, particularly evident in the health sector. The initial post-apartheid years were marked by positive economic growth fueled by redistributive policies, but subsequent years witnessed stagnation, exacerbated by political changes and the global financial crisis. The health indicator’s dramatic dynamics reflect shifts in government approaches to healthcare, with notable impacts on life expectancy and COVID-19 response effectiveness.

South Africa grapples with significant inequality, driven by a dysfunctional labor market and expansionary policies that failed to address unemployment. While initiatives aimed to expand the middle class, they widened the gap between those with secure employment and those without. The country’s environmental progress remains sluggish, attributed to reliance on fossil fuels and slow transition to renewable energy sources. Despite strides in education enrollment, concerns persist regarding declining educational quality, evidenced by global benchmarking tests.

Looking ahead, South Africa’s political landscape will shape its future trajectory, with the 2024 election holding crucial significance. A shift towards a coalition system could foster greater accountability but also bring political instability. Addressing fiscal challenges and reevaluating global alignments, particularly with BRICS nations, will be imperative for South Africa’s journey towards sustained freedom and prosperity.

United States of America

The United States formal political and civil institutions remain relatively stable, offering a semblance of continuity amidst escalating public discord, write Edward Glaeser. However, the domain of public discourse has undergone a decline, veering sharply from the norms expected within a stable democracy. This is characterized by heightened polarization and a surge in confrontational rhetoric, exacerbated by erosions in civil liberties and legislative constraints, particularly notable since the year 2016.

On the economic front, the United States is holding up well overall, but it’s not without its flaws. Issues like inequality and a growing national debt pose potential challenges for future prosperity. Notably, there are noticeable shifts in how free trade and property rights are perceived, indicating changing attitudes and uncertainties around regulations. However, despite some minor adjustments at the state level, there hasn’t been a significant push for widespread reforms.

On the prosperity front, the United States remains relatively stable, thanks to its strong economic foundation. However, problems persist in areas such as healthcare and entrenched inequalities, exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. While there have been some improvements in environmental and educational sectors, significant hurdles remain, necessitating concerted efforts towards reform and fostering more constructive political discussions.

Looking forward, addressing the mounting national debt and navigating the challenges posed by political polarization are critical priorities. Reforms aimed at simplifying regulations for small businesses, improving procurement processes, and enhancing overall government efficiency are essential for sustaining economic growth. Yet, fostering civil discourse presents a formidable challenge, given the deep divides and identity politics shaping contemporary debates. This underscores the complexity of forging a cohesive national vision amidst evolving challenges.

Ukraine 

The future of Ukraine will be shaped by its accession to the EU and NATO, writes Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Joining the EU implies convergence in terms of the legal structures, economic conditions, and environmental and health standards. The experience of Poland and other former communist countries suggests that Ukraine will see radical improvements after accession—in labor productivity, market access, infrastructure, and other key metrics of economic progress. Joining NATO will be critical for addressing security concerns. NATO can guarantee peace and thus make Ukraine an investable country and bring refugees back to Ukraine.

There is a widespread perception that the Ukrainian judicial system does not adequately protect private property or the individual rights of citizens, and that it does not act as an effective check on executive power. This is a fundamental challenge that needs to be addressed in the next decade if the country is to become a success story.

The war will leave many scars on the country. These will be not only the destroyed factories and homes (although rebuilding these could allow the country to modernize its infrastructure and productive capacity), but also the huge swaths of lands that will need to be de-mined, the many millions of displaced Ukrainians who will return, and the many (likely over a million) war veterans who will need reintegration into civilian lives, including hundreds of thousands who will need medical rehabilitation.

Furthermore, there is a generation of children who will not have received a proper education, during COVID-19 and then the war. The losses of human capital are enormous and hard to reverse. Estimates of Harmonized Learning Outcomes due to this length of school closure show a fall from 481 to about 420 points, well below the lowest-performing countries in Europe: Moldova and Armenia. The long-term effect could be substantial, with future earning losses of more than 20 percent a year per student.

Four worrying trends for prosperity 

Privacy is the first worrying trend for prosperity. Some of the most prominent economists and foreign policy experts contributing to this book highlight the trade-off between strengthening security and increasing freedoms. The topic of security comes up in three-quarters of the country and regional studies: be it security from war and civil unrest or security of property and political freedoms. Enhanced technology tilts this trade-off heavily towards fewer individual freedoms, as more and more possibilities arise for individuals to be closely monitored in their daily routine. The rise of surveillance technology in curtailing freedom is seen in various locations, for example, China, Russia, and the Middle East.

Do technologies that reduce freedom nevertheless serve the common good? Big technology companies make precisely that claim: the more information they have, the better data analysis is possible to decipher consumer needs and increase prosperity. The same data can be used, and perhaps are used, to spy on individuals or groups deemed “of public interest.” The EU has taken recent steps to limit the use of facial recognition technology in public spaces. Various other countries are considering similar regulations.

The second worrying trend is the loss of human capital during the pandemic and the lasting effects that this loss has on productivity and equality of opportunity. In Ukraine, approximately two years of education was lost due to the pandemic, followed by Russia’s invasion. Estimates imply that these losses amount to about 20 percent of the future earnings of this generation of children. In Chile, one of the countries that imposed the strictest pandemic measures, the loss could be about 10 percent of long-term earnings. In several Middle Eastern countries, the losses are similar. More worrisome, the lack of access to online education among the poor meant that some children dropped out of school altogether, for example in Egypt.

The third worry is the changing goalposts on the transition to net zero. Prior to the war in Ukraine, the world had, with some effort, approved the Paris Agreement—a legally binding green deal. In this regard, the main impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine is the rethinking of the Green Deal in Europe. Given Russia’s threats to Europe’s energy security, a decision was taken in 2022 in Brussels to reduce the dependence on Russian energy products. This change, however, has come at an environmental cost: a number of countries have increased the use of coal and other high-polluting sources of energy. Other countries have also rolled back their commitments, for example, the United Kingdom.

The fourth worrying trend for prosperity is declining productivity growth. This comes in two flavors: demographic decline, implying fewer workers in China and Europe over the next decade; and rising social tensions, as we are already witnessing in Argentina, Chile, India, and the Middle East, for example, implying that young adults may not be joining the labor force as quickly as in previous decades. Stagnant productivity directly affects prosperity and is the focus of many government programs. Saudi Arabia’s 2050 program, for example, targets new high-value-added sectors as a response to the likely decline in natural resource sectors. So far, however, the investments in these new sectors are primarily public. To shift sufficient resources towards new industries, the private sector also has to believe that the returns will be there. 

Open questions 

Throughout the chapters in this volume there is a common underlying belief, supported by evidence, that a higher degree of freedom is consistent with a faster path to prosperity. There are some politicians who do not share this belief, and hence further work is needed to convince them.  

Not a perfect fit 

The first issue that arises in discussions of the link between freedom and prosperity is that the correlation is not perfect. The R2 statistic of the univariate regression implies that 63 percent of the variance in prosperity can be explained by differences in freedom across countries (Figure 2).

Figure 2. The correlation between freedom and prosperity in 2022 

If we conclude that there exists a close relationship between freedom and prosperity, this raises a methodological question: namely, that we are pooling together countries from all continents, and thus disregarding significant differences among regions. However, a strong positive association between freedom and prosperity scores is also present within regions. The correlation coefficient is above 0.6 for all regions, except South and Central Asia (0.41), which is probably due to the small number of countries (twelve) in that region. So across all regions, we observe that countries with higher freedom scores also have higher levels of prosperity.

Perhaps prosperity explains freedom 

In a nutshell, freedom and prosperity are closely associated, but is there a causal link? And in which direction does it run? Does freedom today lead to prosperity tomorrow, or is the demand for freedom a consequence of societies becoming more prosperous? To be sure, this is a question that has received extensive attention from economists and political scientists and is still a matter of heated debates. 

One can start by noting that freedom in 1995, the start of the sample period, is positively correlated with prosperity in 2022, the end of the sample period. This association is statistically significant at the one percent level. The time lapse between the explanatory variable (freedom) and the dependent variable (prosperity) is sufficiently long to ensure that no feedback loop—from higher prosperity to increased freedom—is responsible for the result (Figure 3). When running the reverse regression (freedom in 2022 on prosperity in 1995), the R² statistic is lower, at 0.553, which provides some support for the argument that the direction of causality runs from freedom to prosperity.

Figure 3. The causal relation of freedom level in 1995 and prosperity level in 2022  

We look for outliers in the data to see whether some countries defy this long-term pattern. Yemen is such a country. In recent years, it has become a failed state and regional powers vie for a dominant position at the expense of the prosperity of the population. These dynamics are consistent with Yemen’s relative standing: more freedom and less prosperity relative to the sample trend line in Figure 3. In essence, past freedoms were insufficient to lead to prosperity in 2022—as the civil war (engulfing the country since 2014) undermined the country’s progress.

The case of Yemen demonstrates a general pattern: countries in civil war or countries involved in other recent conflicts tend to be below the trend line. Examples include Burkina Faso (2015–16 conflict), Chad (2005–10), Mali (2012–present), and South Sudan (2013–17).

At the other end of the spectrum, the United Arab Emirates stands out as having a high level of prosperity in 2022 and fewer freedoms at the start of the sample period. This seeming discrepancy can be explained by the able management of natural resources.

Time lags mask the relation  

To be sure, changes in freedom do not immediately bring about changes in prosperity. The size and scale of the lag depend on various place-specific factors, and also factors related to the condition of the global economy. The relationship between changes in freedom and changes in prosperity can be disrupted by events such as civil conflict or war, a shift toward dictatorship, or closed economic policies. Over time, such shifts will become evident in prosperity measures. The remainder of the explanation lies in sudden shocks such as war and civil conflict, the rise of dictatorships, and the advent of global crises, be they economic, financial, or health related.

One can, for example, speculate that the increased levels of freedom in Taiwan have not yet resulted in a commensurate increase in prosperity due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely limited global trade and investment. Conversely, the limits to freedoms in Mali may yet reduce prosperity as the effects of the protracted civil war are only now manifesting themselves in reduced social and economic indicators.

Based on the data, one can also speculate that the imperfect relation between a change in freedom and change in prosperity is asymmetric. Losses in freedom result in swift losses in prosperity, as illustrated by Yemen, Venezuela, and Syria. In contrast, improvements in freedom take a longer time to result in improved prosperity. In other words, it takes a longer time to build than to destroy. 

The latter finding is particularly relevant for politicians, as their time in office is usually limited and they would like to see results fast enough that they are reelected, or at least so that the ultimate increase in prosperity is attributed to their work. Alas, such attribution is sometimes not possible. This delay likely results in some “good” reforms not taking place.

Reversals of fortune 

Should political freedom take too long to evolve, the gains from economic and legal reforms may be reversed. Russia in the 1990s and 2000s is a prime example of such a reversal. And China seems to have been following the same path in recent years: economic freedom and legal freedom have remained stable in our sample, but political freedom has declined by 26 percent since Xi Jinping took office in 2013. Prosperity had increased 17 percent from 1995 to 2013, but has since plateaued.

Reversals significantly affect the overall correlation between freedom and prosperity, as the pace of change in the two sets of indicators differ, and hence the relationship appears weakened or even lost. The use of longer-term time series would fix this disparity, another reason why the Atlantic Council is investing in the construction of these Indexes.

It’s something else 

The final counterpoint to advancing policies that improve freedoms and, from there, have a positive effect on prosperity is the argument that freedom indicators proxy for some other social dynamic that underlies changes in prosperity. In this narrative, an enlightened central planner, be it the government or political parties or global institutions, designs social change in a way that both increases freedoms and enhances prosperity. Freedom and prosperity are both the result of some other force. As the leading comparative legal scholars Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz note, “the style of a legal system may be marked by an ideology, that is, a religious or political conception of how economic or social life should be organized”.¹ In this conception, freedom and prosperity are central to understanding the varieties of capitalism.

Hayek traces the differences between common and civil law to distinct conceptions of freedom. He distinguishes two views of freedom directly traceable to the predominance of an essentially empiricist view of the world in England and a rationalist approach in France: “One finds the essence of freedom in spontaneity and the absence of coercion, the other believes it to be realized only in the pursuit and attainment of an absolute social purpose; one stands for organic, slow, self-conscious growth, the other for doctrinaire deliberateness; one for trial and error procedure, the other for the enforced solely valid pattern”.² To Hayek, the differences in legal systems reflect these profound differences in philosophies of freedom.

This hypothesis sounds plausible, until one runs down the list of possible candidates. An enlightened government can simultaneously affect political, economic, and legal freedoms, as well as impact directly the various components of prosperity like health, education, income, and equality between women and men. Such social revolutions are not present in the data, however. Progress tends to be gradual or cyclical with few discrete jumps. To the extent that such upward jumps are seen in the data, they are present in the former communist countries like Croatia and Georgia. Even there, it takes years for the effects on prosperity to become apparent. Improvements in both freedom and prosperity tend to follow a slow, methodical pattern; evolution rather than revolution. This evidence contradicts the idea of an all-out reformer. 

There are many arguments for global convergence, one of which offers a simple explanation: globalization leads to a much faster exchange of ideas, including ideas about laws and regulations, and therefore encourages the transfer of legal knowledge. Globalization also encourages competition among countries for foreign direct investment, for capital, and for business in general, which must also apply some pressure toward the adoption of good legal rules and regulations.

This explanation—of centrifugal global forces at play over large parts of the sample period—fits well the reversal in freedoms that we see towards the end of the sample period. Globalization has stalled and even reversed, and with it the trends in freedom and prosperity have changed too. But even globalization is a proxy for the collective political philosophies in the major world economies. Hayek, as is often the case, could see further than most of us.

Simeon Djankov is policy director of the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics. He was deputy prime minister and minister of finance of Bulgaria from 2009 to 2013. Prior to his cabinet appointment, Djankov was chief economist of the finance and private sector vice presidency of the World Bank. 

Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank. He advised governments on policy reforms that help boost entrepreneurship and shared prosperity, primarily in Francophone Africa and the Middle East. 

Dan Negrea is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He was the State Department’s Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs between 2019 and 2021. In that capacity, he pioneered and led the Deal Team Initiative, a coordination mechanism between US government agencies. The initiative promotes business relations between US and foreign companies around the world. 

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Regaining trust in government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is not the first conflict to feature unmanned aerial vehicles in significant numbers. Reconnaissance and strike UAVs were employed extensively in eastern Ukraine following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, and in a range of other combat zones over the past decade including Syria, Libya, and the Second Karabakh War in the southern Caucasus. Nevertheless, the unprecedented numbers of UAVs used by both sides over the past two years in Ukraine has led some to call Russia’s invasion the world’s first drone war.

The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine is leading to dramatic changes on the battlefield. Fleets of UAVs have revolutionized surveillance, making it extremely difficult for commanders to benefit from the element of surprise. This helps to explain why both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are finding it increasingly difficult to mount successful offensives against defensive positions. In addition to dramatically enhancing battlefield visibility, drones also serve as precision strike weapons capable of replicating many of the functions performed by artillery and missiles at only a fraction of the price.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Over the past two years, the Ukrainian military has managed to incorporate drones with considerable success. This has often been done on a somewhat improvised basis, with separate UAV teams independently established as part of different units. Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities have owed much to public fundraising efforts and contributions from diverse grassroots groups including volunteer networks. Meanwhile, a startup-style drone manufacturing and modification industry has emerged from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech industry.

The results have been impressive. During a single week in early 2024, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov reported that the country’s drone units had destroyed 73 Russian tanks along with air defense systems, fuel storage depots, and multiple other high-value targets. Longer range drones are now being used to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia including military production sites and energy industry infrastructure. At sea, marine drones have helped break the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and have forced the bulk of Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea.

Much of this has been possible thanks to expanding domestic production. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, by early 2024 there were approximately 200 companies producing drones in Ukraine, with domestic output around one hundred times higher in 2023 than during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As manufacturing potential continues to expand, Ukrainian officials have set a target of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.

Ukraine’s international partners are also focusing their efforts on helping the country stay one step ahead of Russia in the drone war. A coalition of around ten countries recently vowed to deliver one million drones to Ukraine by February 2025, while France is reportedly preparing to provide the Ukrainian military with the latest strike drone models in the coming weeks.

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Ukraine’s newly established Unmanned Systems Force must now manage this highly dynamic drone supply situation while making sure the country’s expanding UAV fleets are deployed effectively in what is a rapidly changing battlefield environment.

The creation of a separate branch of the armed forces dedicated to drones should allow Ukraine to assess developments in a systematic manner and gain an accurate overview of the most effective tactics, making it possible to create something approaching a drone warfare doctrine. This would represent a considerable improvement on today’s somewhat chaotic approach to sharing experience, which often relies on direct communication between individual drone pilots and unit commanders.

The Unmanned Systems Force could take the lead in developing a more coordinated approach to training. At present, many of Ukraine’s UAV training programs are private initiatives that typically offer valuable insights but lack any centrally established standards. Additionally, the new branch can contribute to more effective cooperation with the military industrial complex to make sure Ukrainian manufacturers are focused on producing the kinds of drones the military needs.

Zelenskyy’s decision to establish a specific drone branch of the army also creates a number of potential challenges. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution over the past two years has often been organic in nature. On many occasions, creative solutions have been implemented with a high degree of operational flexibility by people on the front lines of the conflict. Ukrainian commanders must now make sure efforts to coordinate the country’s drone operations do not blunt this creativity or slow down reaction times by introducing new layers of bureaucracy.

There is also a danger that efforts to fill leadership and training positions within the Unmanned Systems Force could lead to the withdrawal of experienced pilots from the combat zone. One solution might be to prioritize the recruitment of wounded drone operators who are not currently able to serve in front line conditions but have valuable knowledge to share.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has turned the country into a giant war lab and confirmed the status of drones as the weapons of the future. With Ukraine no longer assured of further military aid from the US and increasingly obliged to ration ammunition, drones are a cost-effective solution that plays to the country’s tech sector strengths. President Zelenskyy and his military leaders clearly recognize this, and will be hoping the new Unmanned Systems Force can help Ukraine maximize its drone potential without becoming a bureaucratic burden.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Further reading

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea exposes the emptiness of Russia’s red lines and provides a road map for victory over Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s weaponization of bad history has helped fuel the bloodiest European conflict since World War II, writes Taras Kuzio.

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To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

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By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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